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8 April 1966

THE USSR AND THE NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT

By

SEP 27 1966
U. S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

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The National Liberation Movement

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SUMMARY

The National Liberation Movement is a major Communist strategy which aims to separate the colonies and semi-colonies of the West from the control and influence of the Western Powers, and to bring the colonies and semi-colonies fully into the Communist camp.

The National Liberation Movement had its genesis in the works of Marx and Engels, who--along with the other Socialists of the 19th Century, were seeking a better social order. These men were reacting to the problems created by the Industrial Revolution. A new system of production was developing in which productivity was being increased tremendously by the use of machinery. Marx and Engels considered the capitalist system as exploitation of the working masses at home and of the peoples in the colonies and semi-colonies. They proposed to eliminate this exploitation by radical changes in the economic-political structure instead of by evolutionary social changes as recommended by most of the other Socialists. Since radical changes would be resisted strongly by the bourgeoisie, Marx insisted that revolution was necessary--and in all probability, a violent revolution.

Marx and Engels had created the theoretical base for the National Liberation Movement by (1) providing an ideology which blamed capitalism for the evils of society, (2) condemning Western colonialism, and (3) calling for revolution to bring about the necessary social change.

But it was Lenin who expanded upon these theories and developed a workable doctrine for the liberation of the colonies and semi-colonies. Lenin elaborated upon Marx's anti-capitalist ideology by adding his doctrine on imperialism. Realizing that nationalism had become a strong force in Europe and that it might be utilized to gain Communist ends, Lenin developed his policy of "self-determination of nations". He also established the Third International to coordinate the world Communist revolution, including the revolutions in the colonies. Lastly Lenin contributed to the liberation movement by winning his own revolution in Russia and thereby providing the Communist movement with a base of operations.

Lenin expected that his revolutionary victory in Russia would be quickly followed by proletarian revolutions in Western Europe. By 1920, when it became evident that these revolutions were not imminent, Lenin decided to turn his attention to building Russia and to focusing increased attention on fostering revolutions in colonies. However, he still considered the colonial struggles to be second in priority to the proletarian revolutions in Europe.

After Lenin died, Stalin followed Lenin's same general line. In 1927, Stalin tried to exploit the nationalist revolution in China, but suffered a sharp reversal when Chiang turned on the Chinese Communists and decimated them. After World War II, the National Liberation Movement enjoyed a windfall when the Communists won control in virtually all of Eastern Europe, and when the Chinese won their revolution in 1949. By Stalin's death in 1954, the old European Empires had begun to crumble as a result of combined pressures from both the United States and the USSR, and from the rise of Afro-Asian nationalism.

Khrushchev decided early to give impetus to the liberation movement. He embraced the nationalist leaders in Asia and the Middle East, and he offered them aid in an effort to win them over. Soviet influence was expanded, but none of these national leaders were completely won over to communism. By 1960, with Castro in mind, Khrushchev tried a new approach--that of "national democracy"--with the leaders of the underdeveloped countries, but this too failed. Khrushchev then decided to recognize certain nationalist leaders such as Nasser as "revolutionary democrats" and to rely on them to put the nation on the "path to socialism". Local Communists, who were insignificant anyway, had virtually no role to play in this scheme.

Brezhnev and Kosygin have generally followed Khrushchev's policy toward the National Liberation Movement. There is some evidence that the Soviet leadership is frustrated for the moment over the monumental difficulties involved in trying to bring about scientific socialism in the underdeveloped areas where there is virtually no proletariat, and where the economies are extremely backward and the political structures are in flux. Indications are that the Russian leaders will focus for the next few years on internal domestic problems in the USSR while hoping that the national leaders of the underdeveloped nations, with the assistance and guidance of Moscow and the local Communists, will voluntarily decide to adopt scientific socialism. In the meantime, the Soviets hope that local Communist Parties can enlarge their base by identifying their aims with those of the masses.

FOREWARD

The Communist worldwide revolution against the socio-political system which Marxists refer to as "Capitalism" has become a serious threat to all nations which do not wish to exchange their system for communism. Prior to World War I there were no socialist (Marxist) countries. By 1959 there were fourteen with a total population of over a billion people. With each new country won over to communism, by revolution or otherwise, the balance of power shifts to the detriment of the West.

The Communist revolutionary movement is a threat to the United States because its avowed purpose is to bring about the overthrow of the American socio-political system--and because modern Communist leaders have demonstrated an unrelenting intent to use all of their skill in pursuance of this purpose.

One of the most important strategies which the Communists have employed to attain their goal is the National Liberation Movement. It is the objective of this paper to explain the National Liberation Movement as a Soviet strategy,--its development as a concept, its goals, its application, and its threat to the United States.

The National Liberation Movement is now a major element of the foreign policy of Communist China as well as the Soviet Union. However, since the Soviet Union poses by far the greater military threat to the American homeland, it was considered preferable to examine the Soviet approach in depth. Therefore, this paper

deals almost exclusively with the Soviet theory and doctrine of the National Liberation Movement. The Chinese viewpoint is mentioned only briefly.

For convenience, the following abbreviations have been used throughout: CPSU - Communist Party of the Soviet Union; CDSP - Current Digest of the Soviet Press; JPRS - Joint Publications Research Service; and USSR - Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The writer wishes to express his gratitude to Miss Joyce L. Eakin of the Army War College Library, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, for her assistance in flagging pertinent references.

CHAPTER 1

MARX AND ENGELS

IMPOVERISHMENT AND LIBERATION

The first half of the nineteenth century was a period of dynamic change. It was a period of revolution, romanticism, nationalism, science, liberalism, and social and political change. The Industrial Revolution was gaining momentum, and was bringing with it both progress and problems. Industrialization brought about fundamental changes in the commercial, political, and social life of Western Europe, and it introduced the rise of the bourgeoisie and the industrial working class. By mid-century, the bourgeoisie and the bourgeois economic philosophies were becoming dominant in the West.

Although superior in many respects to feudalism, capitalism did not bring prosperity to the industrial working class. In fact, the plight of the worker was so bad that many intellectuals and philosophers began a search for a better socio-economic system. Many of these thinkers turned to one form or another of socialism.¹

The most prominent of the social theorists of the nineteenth century was Karl Marx.² By 1848 Marx and his friend and collaborator Frederick Engels had synthesized the various socialist ideas into a coherent doctrine. Marx saw the capitalist system

¹Harry W. Laidler, Social-Economic Movements, pp. 44-120.

²Ibid., p. 121.

as one which brought material and spiritual impoverishment to the workers through the irresponsible exercise of power by the bourgeoisie whom he defined as those who owned the means of production and the controlling share of stocks. In Marx's day, the physical misery of the workers was extreme--especially in England where he was living. Work hours were long, working conditions were unsafe and unhealthy, housing miserable, and disease rampant and, from Marx's viewpoint, this misery would get worse under capitalism. The worker was also spiritually impoverished and he therefore suffered alienation from nature, from his tools, from his fellow men, and even from himself. In his quest for profits, the capitalist paid the worker barely enough to keep him alive. Enjoyment was denied to him, for it was all that he could do to provide himself and his family with minimum essentials. Marx concluded that the system was atrociously evil. The capitalists had nearly all the power and wealth - yet did little work - and were getting wealthier. The workers had almost nothing--did almost all the work--and were getting poorer. Marx therefore proposed to liberate the worker from the wretched conditions in which he was condemned by capitalism.³

³This paragraph is based largely on the lectures of Dr. Mary Matossian presented to her students of the University of Maryland in the Fall of 1964 on the subject of Europe in the nineteenth century.

Colonialism

Marx was also highly critical of the colonial system which capitalism was fostering. He theorized that the competitive character of capitalism was such that the capitalist would have to resort to extremes to keep costs down to realize profits. In the early stages of capitalism, the competition would be between individual businesses in a local area. Later, businesses would combine to keep costs down and to enable them to compete with firms in other countries. As the number of highly industrialized countries increased, and output greatly expanded through the use of modern machinery, a rivalry would develop in the quest for foreign markets and sources of raw materials. The quest for colonies would follow and Marx foresaw that this would lead to bitter struggles which in turn would lead inexorably to imperialist wars.⁴

Marx saw colonialism as exploitation--pure and simple. He brushed aside the Western arguments of "extending civilization", etc., as rationalizations to hide the real truth; namely, that the purpose of a colony is to increase the wealth and power of the mother country. Marx felt that the peoples of the colonies were being shamefully exploited and their wealth stolen from them. He wrote extensively on the subject of colonialism--particularly in India, China, and Ireland.⁵

⁴G. D. H. Cole, The Meaning of Marxism, p. 91.

⁵Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, On Colonialism.

In 1867, Marx advised the English workers to support self government and independence for Ireland. Engels considered the "subjugation" of Ireland to have been a disaster for England; and Marx said that the "English working class would never accomplish anything before it got rid of Ireland . . . English reaction in England had its roots . . . in the subjugation of Ireland."⁶ Lenin later pointed out that Marx had initially thought that it was not Ireland's national movement, but the proletarian movement in England that would emancipate Ireland. Thus, the national movement is not given emphasis by Marx, since he expected the victory of the working class in the advanced capitalist countries to bring emancipation for all nations. Marx later modified this position when it became evident that the British workers were not working for the independence of Ireland, but instead, it was the Irish bourgeoisie who were generating a revolution against England. Marx felt that the reactionary forces in England had been buttressed and fed by the enslavement of Ireland and that the working classes in England had come under the influence of these forces. This observation later developed into the concept that revolutions would therefore have to start in the "oppressed" nation; and that this nation could not necessarily depend on the proletariat of the oppressing nation for assistance in its struggle. If capitalism had fallen in England as quickly as Marx at first expected, there would have been no need for a "bourgeois-democratic

⁶V. I. Lenin, Selected Works, Vol. IV, p. 278.

and general national movement" in Ireland. When this movement did arise, Marx advised the British workers to support it in the interest of their own liberty.⁷

Lenin later noted that the policies which Marx and Engels developed concerning the Irish question furnished important guidance to the workers of the "dominating" nations on the matter of national movements.

HISTORY AND REVOLUTION

After concluding that capitalism and colonialism were evil and that they should be abolished, Marx examined history for confirmation. In his view, history indicated that man's existence had been a series of class struggles for power--struggles caused by the development of the methods of production. In each era, society organized itself in accord with these powers of production. As these powers develop, contradictions arise between them and the socio-political structure adopted at the outset of that stage; and these contradictions lead finally to a revolution which destroys the obsolete structure and introduces one which is more in tune with the latest powers of production. This process--or dialectic--had been experienced by the ruling classes throughout history. Each had given way, in turn, to a more progressive ruling group. In recent times the feudal monarchs had given way to the bourgeoisie--and it was Marx's contention that bourgeois

⁷Lenin, op. cit., pp. 278-279.

capitalism would give way to socialism. He predicted that the dialectical process would stop with socialism because for the first time in history the powers of production would be controlled by a majority class which would not use its power to exploit other classes but would use it for the benefit of all men.⁸

Revolution was one of Marx's distinctive legacies. The other socialists of his day felt that their systems would be recognized as superior and peacefully adopted. Marx did not share this evolutionary concept. It is true that in his early years he was more concerned with providing an organizational structure for the workers movement; but by 1848 he was convinced that a revolution would be necessary to overthrow the bourgeoisie. The revolutions of 1848 and the experience of the Paris Commune of 1871 indicated that seizing power was one thing, but retaining it was quite another. Hence, he developed a doctrine which called for a revolution to overthrow the bourgeoisie, to be followed by a period of tight control by the workers (the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat) to prevent the bourgeoisie from regaining control. Later in life Marx suggested that violent revolution might not be necessary in certain situations; nevertheless, the main thrust of his teachings, and the essential difference between Marxism and other forms of socialism today is the idea that the change from capitalism to socialism will in all probability

⁸Cole, op. cit., pp. 51-82.

require a violent revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat.

In his Communist Manifesto, Marx warned the bourgeoisie that the contradictions in capitalist society were such that revolutions were imminent; and that it would be led by the proletariat (the industrial working class). The Manifesto ended with a clear call for revolution:

In short, Communist everywhere support every revolutionary movement against the existing social and political order of things. . . . (Communist) ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions. Let the ruling classes tremble at a Communist revolution. The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. . . .

Working men of all countries, unite!⁹

THE (FIRST) INTERNATIONAL

Marx--and later Lenin and Stalin--tried to utilize an organization representing the proletariat of the whole world as a means of promoting socialist aims. The idea that the workers should band together and overthrow the bourgeoisie predated Marx. The early socialists established the League of the Just as far back as 1836. This organization was replaced by the League of Communists, and it was this group that authorized Marx and Engels to write the Communist Manifesto in 1848.¹⁰

By 1864, the European socialists decided to form an international association. In that year the (First) International was born and

⁹Karl Marx, The Communist Manifesto, pp. 81-82.

¹⁰G. D. H. Cole, "Socialism," Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol. 20, p. 880.

its opening meeting was held in London under the leadership of Marx and Engels. The constitution reflected Marx's view of capitalism as the cause of all social misery, moral degradation and political subordination. It called for emancipation from the economic slavery of capitalism and for the banding together of the workers for a united assault against this evil system.¹¹ The (First) International was the forerunner of several similar worker's organizations which were to become major instruments of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) for the dissemination of doctrine and for the coordination of the worldwide proletarian revolutionary movement. Later, the Third International was to perform the added function of coordinating the National Liberation Movement.

Marx and Engels gave their primary attention to the advanced industrialized countries of Europe, for it was there that they expected the proletarian revolutions to take place. They expected the colonies to acquire independence, but not until the proletarian revolutions had succeeded in Europe.¹² Although they criticized colonialism at length, and called for revolutions in the colonies, Marx and Engels did not spell out how these revolutions should be waged. They provided only the ideological rationale for colonial independence and they suggested a cure for colonial ills--but they

¹¹William Henry Chamberlin, Communist International, p. 33.

¹²W. Z. Laqueur, "Towards National Democracy - Soviet Doctrine and the New Countries," Survey, No. 37, Jul.-Sep. 1961, p. 3.

were too enmeshed in European problems to find time for developing the doctrinal structure of the modern National Liberation Movement.

SUMMARY

In summary, Marx and Engels saw capitalism as an appallingly evil system in which a few men, in their greedy search for profits and aggrandizement, controlled and exploited the great majority of the people. This exploitation was not confined to the advanced industrial countries, but also encompassed the peoples in the colonies overseas. Liberation from this miserable existence would come by overthrowing the ruling class by revolution. Meager reforms were not enough, for these did not materially improve the plight of the worker, nor change the basic relationship between the ruling group and the working class.

In order to understand the present liberation movement concept, one must realize the intense hostility which Marx felt toward capitalism and the bourgeoisie. To him, capitalism meant deprivation, oppression and enslavement. It was a form of tyranny, and as such, it would suffer the same fate as all tyrannies of history--overthrow by revolution. To Marx, the people and the colonies were fully justified in trying to liberate themselves by revolution.

The ideas of Marx and Engels provided the essential theoretical building blocks which now undergrid the modern national liberation movement of the Soviet Union. The essential blocks were; first, an anti-capitalist ideology; second, a call for liberation; third, a demand for revolution; and fourth, a condemnation of colonialism.

Although their contribution toward the liberation movement was important, Marx and Engels did not formulate even the broad conceptual outline of the movement as we know it today. This remained the task of their successors--especially Lenin.

CHAPTER II

LENIN

Marx died in 1883 and Engels died twelve years later, but Marxism grew in strength after their deaths and by the end of the century was the most powerful influence in the socialist movement. In 1889 Marxism came to the attention of Vladimir Ilich Ulyanov Lenin, a young Russian intellectual who soon became Marx's leading disciple. In that same year the socialists decided to establish the Second International in view of the worldwide interest in their movement. This organization ran into difficulty almost immediately because of serious doctrinal differences which developed within the socialist movement.

COLONIAL POLICY

One of the most difficult issues to face the International was the matter of developing an appropriate policy toward the "colonies and dependent countries". As early as 1896 the issue was hotly debated in connection with the question of "liberating" Poland. A resolution was adopted which provided, first, for the "unambiguous recognition of the full right of all nations to self-determination," and secondly, for an "equally unambiguous appeal to the workers for international unity in their class struggle." Lenin later supported this resolution--explaining that as long as Poland was still feudal, as it was in Marx's day, the democratic liberation

movement was all important. However, now that Poland had become a capitalist state and had initiated its proletarian movement, the independence issue was no more important than the need to indoctrinate the Polish workers concerning international proletarian unity and the class struggle.¹

In his article "Inflammable Material in World Politics", written in 1908, Lenin provides a good insight into his feelings of antagonism toward colonialism. He saw the English bourgeoisie becoming irritated by the growth of the English labor movement and frightened by the revolutions in India. He considered the English reaction to these revolutions to have been "brutal", and indicative of how violent the bourgeoisie would get to suppress any challenge to their colonial system. Lenin saw the system as one of slavery, plunder and violence--one in which the Indians were virtual slaves of the English bourgeoisie. In the Far East, Japan was being forced to develop a military establishment to protect its independence against the threat of European colonialism. Revolutions were just beginning in China but the French, by their actions in Indo-China, were already showing their anxiety.²

In this same article Lenin stated that the world was splitting into two hostile camps, and he predicted that the bourgeoisie of the world would unite against the proletarian movement. He leaves little doubt that he expected the bourgeoisie to take the same

¹V. I. Lenin, Selected Works, Vol. IV, p. 271.

²Ibid., p. 300.

unified action that the nobles took in Vienna in the 1820's against the threat of the bourgeoisie. Regardless of the bourgeois response, Lenin expected proletarian revolutions to break out everywhere--although he warned that the movement would not proceed evenly or in the same form in all countries. He saw the movement gaining strength at that time and approaching the crucial stage of the struggle.³

Anticipating that the bourgeois revolution--when it came to Russia--would generate inflammatory conditions which could be taken advantage of by the proletariat, Lenin warned that the Russian proletariat should not expect any assistance from the Russian bourgeoisie.

In 1907, the Second International held one of its most important Congresses. Lenin, representing the Russian Marxist Party, clashed with the right wing over the question of whether or not colonialism was acceptable if conducted by a socialist country, since the socialist country might exercise a civilizing influence.⁴ Lenin called the idea "monstrous" and no different than bourgeois colonialism which had bred wars and atrocities. He considered the idea of socialist colonialism to be a violation of his principle that colonialism meant conquest, subjugation, violence and plunder. Lenin was, of course, adhering closely to Marx, and he won his point after a hot debate.⁵

³Ibid., p. 303.

⁴Ibid., p. 316.

⁵Ibid., p. 317.

POLEMICS OVER SELF-DETERMINATION

Beginning in 1908, Lenin waged a long struggle against the socialists of the left and right on the subject of self-determination of nations. His concepts on this subject were to become a vital element of his overall doctrine concerning national liberation movements. In 1913 his Party passed a resolution declaring it the "bounden duty" of the party to champion the right of the oppressed nations to self-determination, including the right to secede and form independent states.⁶ In 1914 he reviewed the entire polemic in a long article "On the Right of Nations to Self-Determination". Lenin reminded his readers that the subject of self-determination of nations was mentioned as far back as 1896 in a resolution of the International:

. . . it upholds the full right of self-determination of all nations and expresses its sympathy for the workers of every country now suffering under the yoke of military, national or other despotism; the Congress calls on the workers of all these countries . . . to fight together with them for the defeat of international capitalism. . . .⁷

The final victory of capitalism over feudalism would be linked with national movements which would enable the bourgeoisie to promote those conditions--such as political unity and a common language--which are most favorable to the development of modern capitalism.⁸

⁶Ibid., p. 421.

⁷Ibid., p. 269.

⁸Ibid., p. 250.

Lenin stated: "The formation of national states, under which these requirements of modern capitalism are best satisfied, is therefore the tendency of every national movement."⁹

He also asserted that during the capitalist period the national state is the "typical, normal state". Self-determination meant to Lenin the political separation of one nation from another national body. He saw Europe as a system of independent bourgeois states while Asia consisted of either colonies or states which were extremely "dependent and oppressed". In Asia, conditions for the full development of commodity production had been created only in Japan--an independent bourgeois state--which had itself begun to oppress other nations and enslave colonies. But capitalism, having awakened Asia, had fostered everywhere on the continent national movements whose tendencies were to create national states. The same is true for the Balkans where the creation of national states established the best conditions for the development of capitalism. During the capitalist era, economic factors stimulated nations to create national states; however, attainment of political independence did not mean that a nation could avoid exploitation by other states of the bourgeois system, but it did satisfy Lenin's definition of "self-determination".¹⁰

As a Marxist, Lenin was obliged to explain the question of self-determination in historical terms. Lenin saw two epochs of

⁹Ibid., p. 251.

¹⁰Ibid., pp.254-254.

capitalism as regards national movements. The first was the epoch of the downfall of feudalism and absolutism when the national movement for the first time became a mass movement. All classes are drawn into politics by the press; representative institutions develop and the struggle is for "political liberty in general and for national rights in particular."¹¹ In the second epoch, the capitalist states have crystallized and strong antagonisms have developed between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. There is an absence in this epoch of mass bourgeois-democratic movements. Nations passed through these epochs in accordance with their stages of development. Western Europe had had its bourgeois-democratic revolutions during a fairly definite period--1789 to 1871. During this period Europe had created its national states and the bourgeois system. Since the West European nations had already experienced their revolutions and had gained their independence, Lenin asserted that the issue of self-determination did not apply to them.¹²

The question of self-determination had to be explained also in terms of the class struggle. Lenin saw the bourgeoisie as the leaders in the beginning of every national movement. The proletariat supports the efforts of the bourgeoisie only in matters involving national peace, equal rights, and for the sake of creating better conditions for the class struggle. He believed that the bourgeoisie wanted "either privileges for its own nation, or exceptional

¹¹Ibid., p. 255

¹²Ibid., p. 260.

advantages for it; . . . The proletariat is opposed to all privileges, to all exceptions." The proletariat, in matters involving the separation of nations, must give priority to the class struggle and the "development of the class."¹³ The bourgeoisie will try to counter this development by placing the tasks of the nation ahead of the objectives of the proletariat. Thus the proletariat should confine itself to: ". . . the negative demand of recognizing the right to self-determination, without guaranteeing anything to any nation, without undertaking to give anything at the expense of another nation."¹⁴

The bourgeoisie of oppressed nations will operate differently from those in the oppressing nations. The former will ask the proletariat to support its aspirations unconditionally, thereby distinguishing between one nation's right to separation against another. Proletarians should favor the right of separation for all nations, and should "value most the alliance of the proletarians of all nations." When the bourgeoisie of an oppressed nation struggles against the bourgeoisie of an oppressing nation, the proletarians will resolutely support this effort as the "staunchest and the most consistent enemies of oppression." Lenin considered it a mistake to ignore "the tasks of national liberation in a situation of national oppression." But when the bourgeoisie of an

¹³Ibid., p. 263-264.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 264.

oppressed nation argues for bourgeoisie nationalism and special privilege, they are to be opposed.¹⁵

It was recognized that bourgeois nationalism of every oppressed nation has a "general democratic content which is directed against oppression", and that this should be supported.¹⁶ What was important to Lenin in the case of Russia was that the proletariat not become overly involved in the matter of creating an independent state. He said: "We fight on the basis of the given state, unite the workers of all nations in the given state, we cannot vouch for this or that path of national development, we advance to our class goal by all possible paths."¹⁷

He repeatedly argued against isolating "self-determination" from the class struggle. While he wanted full, unambiguous rights of all nations to self-determination, he also demanded that this effort be coordinated with the struggle by the workers for international unity. In the context of the world struggle, Lenin considered self-determination to offer the maximum of democracy and a minimum of nationalism. For example, the unity and solidarity of the proletarians of Sweden and Norway had, in his view, actually improved after Norway seceded and formed an independent state.¹⁸

Lenin observed that Marx had placed the national question in a subordinate position as compared with the labor question;

¹⁵Ibid., pp. 264-265.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 267.

¹⁷Ibid., pp. 267-268.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 273.

nevertheless, Marx had not ignored the national question. And Marx had not believed that the working class should make a fetish of the national question, since capitalism would not necessarily motivate all nations toward independence. But mass national movements should not be ignored once started, and the progressive aspects of these movements should be supported.

Lenin warned that the Marxists of the oppressed nations would often be hampered by the fact that the masses of the people are blinded by the idea of "their" national liberation. Lenin makes it clear that he is not in favor of nationalism as such, and he is especially against the greedy aspects of bourgeois nationalism. An opponent of nationalism as a matter of principle, he refrains from glorifying the "national" aspect of the national liberation movement.¹⁹

Repeatedly he argues in favor of liberation movements which would free the oppressed nations from their oppressors, but he always hastens to add that the real goal is not a bourgeois form of independence but an independence which would promote the proletarian movement.

Lenin felt that capitalist countries could not survive without their colonies and dependencies; therefore, he pressed for political separation of the colonies--being careful to caution his followers that the national movement should not be permitted to result in national segregation or chauvinism. He never advocated independence

¹⁹ Ibid., pp. 290-293.

for its own sake, and he was strongly against "self-determination" in the sense that the term was being used by the bourgeoisie. As a socialist, Lenin opposed the competitive and the imperialistic aspects of bourgeois "independence." However, he realized the importance of these national movements and very cleverly developed a scheme for integrating them into his overall plan of world revolution.

In writing on the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, Lenin observed that certain bourgeois newspapers had spoken of national liberation of the Balkans while not giving attention to the economic plight of the people of the area. In his view, the most pressing problems of the area were the economic emancipation of the peasants from the landlords and the elimination of Turkish feudalism in Macedonia.²⁰

THE COLONIAL STRUGGLE

Lenin considered the period 1908-1912 as a time of colonial struggle for national liberation. During the bourgeois revolutions in the capitalist countries, the struggle had been against feudalism. National wars had been waged and national states had been created. As time went on, capitalism had given way to imperialism, and the bourgeoisie in the capitalistic countries had become reactionary. The proletariat was becoming stronger, and fear had driven the bourgeoisie to support all that is "backward, moribund, and medieval." The bourgeoisie was doing all it could to preserve

²⁰Ibid., p. 424.

its system of wage slavery. The resulting decline of the bourgeoisie does not mean the end to national movements; imperialism causes the bourgeoisie to intensify its oppression in dependent countries and in the colonies. Lenin concluded that national movements would therefore continue to grow, but they would shift from "imperialistic Europe to the oppressed countries of the East." The movements in the colonial countries are against both feudalism and imperialism. Lenin felt that imperialism was facing two enemies: the proletariat of the imperialist countries and the "democratic forces" of the colonies.²¹ This point is important, for it is here that Lenin develops the thesis that the proletariat of one country should ally itself with the revolutionary forces in the colonies who are struggling against native feudalism or against oppression by the European imperialists.

ANTICIPATING THE WAR'S AFTERMATH

In a short article, "The United States of Europe Slogan," written in 1915, Lenin charged that the world had been divided among the few great capitalist powers who now had under their oppressive control millions of peoples in the colonies. He cited the semi-colonies China, Turkey, and Persia "which are now being torn to pieces by the plunderers who are waging a 'war of liberation', . . ."²² This appears to be Lenin's first use of

²¹Ibid., pp. 429-430.

²²Lenin, Selected Works, Vol. V, p. 139.

the term of liberation. It is amusing to note that Lenin's first mention of this term--which later was to become a key Communist slogan--was to ridicule its use by the bourgeoisie.

Later the same year he stated that humanity would be liberated from the horrors, misery and savagery of the capitalists only by the proletarian revolution. If the proletarians were to win power during the World War they should then seek peace with "all belligerents on the basis of the liberation of the colonies and of all the dependent, oppressed and disenfranchised peoples."²³ Since Germany and France would probably reject such a proposal, Lenin envisaged that:

. . . we would have to prepare for and wage a revolutionary war, . . . systematically rouse to insurrection all the peoples now oppressed by the Great Russians, all the colonies and dependent countries in Asia (India, China, Persia, etc.), and also, and primarily, we would rouse to insurrection the socialist proletariat of Europe against its governments. . . . There is no doubt that a victory of the proletariat in Russia would create unusually favorable conditions for the development of the revolution both in Asia and in Europe.²⁴

This statement is important for several reasons. First, it prescribes clearly that the Russian proletariat, if successful in its revolution, should incite insurrections among the proletarians of the whole world--with priority on Europe. Secondly, the statement not only predicts that success in Russia would provide a bonus effect around the world, but it enjoins the Bolsheviks to be alert for "favorable conditions" once the revolution is won. Lenin's successors have never ceased looking for these "favorable conditions."

²³Ibid., p. 148.

²⁴Ibid., p. 157.

Lenin also anticipated that if the proletariat won out in one country, they would attract the "oppressed peoples" to their banner and ignite revolts around the world. He even went so far in one instance to suggest that the victorious proletariat of that country should, in the event of necessity, come "out even with armed force against the exploiting classes and their states."²⁵

In a statement in 1916, Lenin outlined in one short clear paragraph the doctrine which was to become the foundation of the modern national liberation movement:

Socialism must not only demand the unconditional and immediate liberation of the colonies without compensation - and this demand in its political expression signifies nothing else but the recognition of the right to self-determination - but they must render determined support to the more revolutionary elements in the bourgeois-democratic movements for national liberation in these countries and assist their uprisings - and if such be the case, their revolutionary war - against the imperialist powers that oppress them.²⁶

This statement is clearly the forerunner of Khrushchev's policy toward national liberation movements; in fact, Khrushchev's policy would be identical if one substituted the words "war of liberation" in the above quotation in place of Lenin's "revolutionary war."

²⁵Ibid., p. 141.

²⁶V. I. Lenin, The National Liberation Movement in the East, p. 109.

IMPERIALISM - THE HIGHEST STAGE OF CAPITALISM

One of Lenin's most significant contributions to Marxist doctrine, and to the liberation movement, is the theory of imperialism which he enunciated in the pamphlet Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, written in 1916. Lenin himself considered it an important work, explaining that in it he had explained the economic essence of imperialism and that unless one studied this aspect of imperialism, one could not understand and appraise modern war and modern politics.²⁷ The pamphlet defines imperialism as the "monopoly stage of capitalism", a stage reached in the early twentieth century when finance capital had replaced industrial capital. The concentration of capital had created monopolies--gigantic trusts and cartels--which compete with each other for world markets. A fierce rivalry ensues and the monopolies seek to acquire more colonies so as to stay ahead of their competitors. By 1900 the "unowned" areas which might be colonized had been exhausted; the capitalists had seized the whole planet. They then began to struggle over each others colonies and the intense rivalry which was generated brought on World War I. No other explanation for the causes of the war seems to have entered Lenin's mind. There was--to Lenin--only one cause: imperialism. It was a war for the division of the world; that is, for the partition of colonies and for spheres

²⁷ Lenin, Selected Works, Vol. V, p. 6.

of influence of finance capital. The real fight was between the British and the German capitalists--both of whom, to Lenin, were annexationists, predatory, and plunderous.²⁸

Lenin had accepted the thesis that the best way for capitalism to postpone its doom was to expand into noncapitalist space. This would provide a new lease on life for the imperialists and would be the cause of further imperialism.²⁹

The nations which are annexed by the imperialists are denied, among other things, the right of self-determination. However, as capitalist influence spreads in the colonies, capitalist relations change the old social order and gradually acquires for the people the means of their emancipation. Eventually they seek the same goal which the Europeans hold so dear: national independence. When this happens, European capitalism is threatened in its most profitable area and must suppress the rebelling colonies with ever increasing violence in order to retain its position of advantage. But while this suppression is taking place, the bourgeoisie must convince the people at home that this is a just war which should be supported. In soliciting indigenous support, the bourgeoisie deceives the masses into believing that these wars are waged for the fatherland, freedom and civilization. Thus the proletariat is distracted from its real task of supporting the "only real

²⁸Ibid., p. 7-114.

²⁹Carl Landauer, European Socialism, p. 1237.

war of liberation."--the civil war against the world bourgeoisie.³⁰

The proper course for the proletariat is to withdraw its support of the war. When he gained power in 1917, he promptly took Russia out of the war.

Lenin considered bourgeois appeals for peace to be a means of deceiving the people. He warned against calling for peace in 1915 because he feared it would be a bourgeois peace--and thus no peace at all. He argued that the only way that real peace could be achieved would be through a revolutionary overthrow of capitalism. By this time Lenin had begun to develop his plan of changing the World War into a proletarian revolution.

In a commentary on the World War in March 1915, Lenin wrote a passage which provided the general framework for Khrushchev's rationale on "liberation wars". Lenin said:

One of the forms of deception of the working class is pacifism and the abstract preaching of peace. Under capitalism, particularly in its imperialist stage, wars are inevitable. On the other hand, Social-Democrats cannot deny the positive significance of revolutionary wars, i.e., not imperialist wars, but such as were conducted, for instance, between 1789 and 1871, for the purpose of abolishing national oppression and creating national capitalist states out of the gains of the victorious proletariat in the struggle against the bourgeoisie.³¹

³⁰Lenin, Selected Works, Vol. V, p. 124.

³¹Ibid., p. 135.

WAR AND REVOLUTION

Another significant contribution which Lenin made to the national liberation movement was his explanation of wars and revolutions and their relation to each other. One of his best works in this regard is the anti-Kautsky pamphlet Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky, written in 1917.³² In it he takes the ambivalent position of being for peace, but preaching revolution. Socialism, he explains, is fundamentally for peace and opposed to violence against men and nations; yet there will never be real peace as long as there is capitalism--and therefore, socialist are not opposed to revolutionary violence. He chided those who thought that evil could be overcome through Christian conduct and self-perfection--and without resort to violence.³³

Every war involves violence against nations, but that does not mean that all wars are bad. In order to determine whether or not a certain war is justified, socialists should examine the class character of war. Wars wrought by reactionary forces, or by the imperialists, are bad. The World War was an imperialist war, and socialists should not have considered it their duty to support such a war. Socialists who supported the war were petty-bourgeois nationalists who had been duped by patriotic slogans into believing that it was being fought for "their" country and

³²Lenin, Selected Works, Vol. VII, p. 175.

³³Ibid., p. 457.

and for their interests; when actually it was fought--purely and simply--for the vested interests of the bourgeoisie.³⁴

In a war, the true socialist--according to Lenin--is not concerned over who is the aggressor or whose territory the so called enemy occupies. What is important is the "class that is waging the war", and the "politics of which this war is a continuation". If it is being waged by the bourgeois class, it should be opposed by the proletariat.³⁵

Lenin differentiated between the relative character of the various systems. Capitalism is considered progressive compared with feudalism, and imperialism is progressive compared with pre-monopoly capitalism. Hence, reactionary forces should not be supported against imperialism.³⁶

The struggle of those nations of Europe which are oppressed will advance revolutionary possibilities in Europe infinitely more than a revolution in some remote colony--even though the latter's revolution is further developed. The 1916 rebellion in Ireland was in Lenin's view a hundred times more significant politically than a similar rebellion in Asia or Africa. But he also cautioned:

We would be very poor revolutionaries if, in the great proletarian war for emancipation and socialism, we did not know how to utilize every popular movement against each separate disaster caused by imperialism in order to sharpen and extend the crisis.³⁷

³⁴Ibid., p. 176.

³⁵Ibid., p. 177.

³⁶Lenin, Selected Works, Vol. V, p. 299.

³⁷Ibid., p. 305.

Lenin felt that the 1916 Irish revolution failed because it rose prematurely. However, he was not too concerned over this failure because he felt that the Irish mistakes would provide excellent lessons which would profit the entire proletarian movement.³⁸

It is evident from the foregoing that Lenin placed first priority on the revolutions in the advanced capitalist nations--for they possessed the main strength of capitalism; but he also considered it important to utilize every revolutionary opportunity for weakening capitalism.

NATIONAL vs SOCIALIST REVOLUTION

Lenin clashed with the Polish left in 1916 over the subject of self-determination of nations. He adhered to his earlier position and elaborated upon it. The proletarian demands, he argued, should be pushed in a revolutionary way and not through the framework of bourgeois legality. Socialists should demand immediate liberation of the colonies and should "render determined support" to bourgeois-democratic movements for national liberation. The socialist revolution would not happen simultaneously around the world because all countries had not reached the same level of capitalist development. Only the advanced nations of Europe and North America were ripe for socialism and their proletariat should unite to bring it

³⁸Ibid., p. 306.

about. These countries had already had their national revolution-- it was time now for their class revolution.³⁹

In the underdeveloped countries the conditions are different; these nations still have national tasks such as throwing off foreign oppression. Backward nations should take advantage of the great crisis which will take place when the proletarians of the advanced countries begin their civil war. Lenin said:

The social revolution cannot come about except in the form of an epoch of proletarian civil war against the bourgeoisie in the advanced countries combined with a whole series of democratic and revolutionary movements, including movements for national liberation, in the undeveloped, backward and oppressed nations.

Why? Because capitalism develops unevenly. . . .

If national uprisings are possible under imperialism, so are national wars. Politically, there is no important difference between them. . . rebellions (are) in the same category as wars.

What is a 'national uprising'? It is an uprising that has for its aim the political independence of the oppressed nation, i.e., the establishment of a separate national state.⁴⁰

Lenin felt that he had sized up the situation accurately in Europe and that the international tactics that he had developed "did the utmost possible in one country for the development, support and stirring up of the revolution in all countries. . . ."⁴¹

Lenin shared Marx's view that, in the modern epoch, capitalism would continue to breed wars; and the only way to end these wars

³⁹Ibid., pp. 267, 276.

⁴⁰Ibid., pp. 296, 298-299.

⁴¹Lenin, Selected Works, Vol. VII, p. 183.

was to overthrow capitalism by revolution. Lenin scoffed at any suggestion that peace could be achieved in any other way. He would certainly have rejected the idea that real peace could be achieved by trying to maintain a balance of power or by the use of international organizations.

REVOLUTION AND AFTERMATH

A month before his revolution succeeded in Russia, Lenin predicted that the worldwide revolution was rapidly approaching. Revolutionary conditions did in fact exist in Russia, and in November Lenin and his Bolsheviks seized power in a quick and almost bloodless coup. He set about the tasks of taking Russia out of the "bourgeois" World War and of consolidating his position. As a Marxist he knew that the period following the seizure of power would be crucial, so he gingerly took measures to strengthen his position.

He realized that he had to be careful not to goad the stronger capitalist nations into war. He felt that if he could stall them off for a short time that other proletarian revolutions would break out in the other countries of Western Europe. It was during this period--May 1918--that Lenin stated:

If war is waged by the exploiting class with the object of strengthening its class rule, such a war is a criminal war, . . . If war is waged by the proletariat after it has conquered the bourgeoisie in its own country, and is waged with the object of strengthening and extending socialism, such a war is legitimate and 'holy'.⁴²

⁴²Ibid., p. 357.

And on the first anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, Lenin said: "We know that the wild beasts of imperialism are still stronger than we are, . . . But they cannot defeat the world revolution . . . Socialism will triumph in spite of it all."⁴³

In March 1919, during a discussion of the Party Program, Lenin argued that all nations were in the process of moving from feudalism to bourgeois democracy, or from bourgeois democracy to proletarian democracy--and that it was "absolutely inevitable" that this process take place. Account had to be taken of the stage that a nation had reached. He opposed the idea that the slogan "self-determination of nations" should be replaced by "self-determination of toilers" since he felt that such an approach failed to recognize the realities of the world situation, and the fact that various nations would proceed to the ultimate condition--the dictatorship of the proletariat--by different paths.⁴⁴ Regardless of the path they took, each nation is entitled to the right to self-determination. Once this had been achieved then self-determination of the toilers would be easier. The problem had to do with separating the proletariat from the bourgeoisie--a process which was occurring at a different rate in the various countries. Nor should the revolutionary process be decreed from Moscow--each nation would go its own way.

In this article Lenin also stated that Communism cannot be imposed by force. He displayed a sensitivity toward charges that

⁴³Lenin, Selected Works, Vol. VI, p. 499.

⁴⁴Lenin, Selected Works, Vol. VII, p. 343.

the Bolsheviks wanted to conquer Germany militarily and to implant their system on that country. Lenin described this suggestion as ridiculous and nonsensical, and he felt that the support of "self-determination of the toilers" and the denial of "self-determination of nations", would play into the hands of the bourgeoisie who were trying to convince the masses of the hostile intentions of the Bolsheviks.

In commenting on the proposed Party Program, Lenin outlined the following international tasks for the Soviet Union:

Support of the revolutionary movement of the socialist proletariat in the advanced countries in the first place.

Support of the democratic and revolutionary movement in countries in general, and particularly in the colonies and dependent countries.

Emancipation of the colonies. Federation, as a transition to voluntary amalgamation.⁴⁵

The Soviets have an affinity for listing items in their correct priority order; thus notice should be taken of the order in which the international tasks were listed in the Program. Of primary importance to Lenin at the time was the anticipated revolution in the advanced countries--and he gave that "first place" on his list. The colonial movements, however, were also to receive attention.

During the post-war period, matters continued to worsen between the young Soviet Republic and the West and during these trying times Lenin stated: "As long as capitalism and socialism exist, we cannot

⁴⁵ Lenin, Selected Works, Vol. VII, p. 334.

live in peace; in the end, one or the other will triumph--a funeral dirge will be sung over the Soviet Republic or over world capitalism."⁴⁶

From 1918 to 1920, the Soviets stepped up their propaganda regarding national liberation and self-determination. In 1919, Communist Parties were given a free hand to agitate for national independence and to woo the nationalists. This was followed by a statement by Lenin to the effect that both the proletarian revolution and the national liberation movement were rallying around the Soviet Union.⁴⁷

THE SECOND CONGRESS OF THE COMINTERN

The Second International collapsed at the outset of World War I but Lenin immediately initiated steps to build another International under his leadership. The Third International, or Comintern, was formally established in March 1919 in Moscow and its creed was Marxism. At this time Lenin still expected that his Bolshevik revolution would be followed by a series of proletarian revolutions in the West. He had serious doubts that his regime could survive unless his movement spread, so he considered it a primary task of the Comintern to "create a fertile field for armed revolt outside of Russia." Communist Parties would be built in each country and they would act as the spearheads of the revolts under the direction of the Comintern.⁴⁸

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 297.

⁴⁷Frederick C. Barghoorn, Soviet Foreign Propaganda, pp. 131-132.

⁴⁸Laidler, op. cit., p. 459.

Lenin's main focus at this time was on the industrialized countries of the West. We have seen that Lenin had also addressed himself, on occasion, to the colonial problem since about 1896. However, he gave only a small proportion of his overall effort to the colonial and related questions; and prior to 1920, Lenin did not develop a comprehensive concept for revolutionary movements in the backward areas. The great preponderance of his activities were concerned with Europe, and in 1917 to 1919 he was almost completely occupied with the Bolshevik revolution and Civil War.

By 1920, the Bolsheviks began to see tell-tale signs that the European proletariat were not going to revolt in the immediate future. After the Russian victory, there had been only brief successes in Hungary, Finland and Bavaria. Consequently, the Comintern was forced to reexamine its approach to world revolution. Such a reexamination was in progress when the Comintern met in 1920.

The Second Congress of the Comintern which met in 1920 was probably the most significant gathering of the Third International. Soviet victory in their own revolution had impressed the European socialists and over two hundred attended the Congress. It was at this assembly that Lenin laid down his famous twenty-one conditions for membership in the International.⁴⁹ Condition number eight

⁴⁹George F. Kennan, Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin, pp. 170-171.

provided that members must agree to denounce colonies and to give practical support to the colonial liberation movement.⁵⁰

It was at the Second Congress that Lenin first placed decisive importance on the colonial liberation movement.⁵¹ As the discussions progressed, it became evident that the members considered this movement--and its relationship with the proletarian movement in the West--to be one of the most important questions to be resolved. The defunct Second International was criticized for not giving sufficient attention to the backward areas where two revolutionary movements were already evident: the bourgeois-democratic-nationalist movement under the bourgeoisie, and the peasant and workers movement.

Lenin, more than any of his Marxist contemporaries, had sensed the potential of the liberation movements in the colonies; and he realized that, somehow, these movements should be utilized to serve Communists ends. He therefore proposed to the Congress that the Communists in the colonies form an alliance with the local bourgeoisie and the peasants. Lenin reasoned that:

There is not the slightest doubt that every national movement can only be a bourgeois-democratic movement, for the bulk of the population in the backward countries are peasants, who represent bourgeois-capitalist relations. It would be utopian to think that proletarian parties, if indeed they can arise in such countries,

⁵⁰Jane Degras, The Communist International, 1919-1943, p. 170.

⁵¹W. Z. Laqueur, "Towards National Democracy," Survey, No. 37, Jul.-Sep., p. 4.

could pursue Communist tactics . . . without having definite relations with the peasant movement and without effectively supporting it.⁵²

The proposed alliance with the peasants was quickly accepted by the Congress but Lenin ran into stiff opposition on the subject of collaboration with the bourgeoisie--a subject which was to plague Communist leaders and become one of the most vexing problems of the national liberation movement. The problem is an extremely delicate one since it poses the question: "When do the interests of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat conflict."⁵³ According to Marxism, the bourgeoisie could not be considered a permanent ally. Nevertheless, in order for a colony or semi-colony to gain full economic independence from the imperialist powers and from the local ruling class which compromises with these powers, the bourgeoisie will find it in their interest to act with the workers and the peasants. In other words, it was to the interest of all classes in the colonies that they unite in a joint revolutionary struggle against the foreign imperialists and their local collaborators. Sooner or later, however, the proletarians and peasants must turn on their temporary "ally", because the bourgeoisie will strive to establish a bourgeois order.

Leading the opposition to Lenin was the Indian M. N. Roy who argued heatedly against support of the bourgeoisie. He proposed, instead, that Communist support the peasants and the workers, and that leadership of the movement be in the hands of the Communists

⁵²Lenin, Selected Works, Vol. X, pp. 240-241.

⁵³Allen S. Whiting, Soviet Policies in China, 1917-1924, p. 50.

from the beginning.⁵⁴ It should be noted that Lenin had not recommended carte blanche support of the bourgeoisie. He insisted on including the proviso that support would be rendered only on the condition that future proletarians in the colonies be left free to develop revolutionary spirit in the masses so that the masses might later oppose the bourgeoisie. He also stipulated that the alliance between the Comintern and the bourgeois-democratic movement be temporary, and that the two must not be merged.⁵⁵ One wonders how a bourgeois-nationalist leader could be expected to accept such conditions.

After much debate⁵⁶ Lenin compromised with Roy. It was agreed that the final position of the Congress would reflect Lenin's basic approach, but that the actual wording of the document would substitute "revolutionary movements" in place of "bourgeois-democratic movements." The final version also included the statement that the Comintern must: "unconditionally maintain the independence of the proletarian movement, even if it is only in the embryonic stage."⁵⁷

Roy also disagreed with Lenin at the Congress on another substantive issue. Roy insisted that the revolutionary movement in Europe be considered completely dependent on the triumph of the

⁵⁴Laqueur, op. cit., p. 4.

⁵⁵Whiting, op. cit., pp. 49-50.

⁵⁶At that time Lenin's cult was not such that he could stampede his opposition. He had to rely on his considerable powers of persuasion to overcome Roy's arguments.

⁵⁷Degras, op. cit., p. 144.

revolutions in Asia. Leaning heavily on Lenin's own Imperialism, Roy pointed out that the main resources of world capitalism came from Asia's exploited markets and raw materials, and that if these super-profits were not cut off, the European bourgeoisie would be too strong to overcome. Lenin considered this as going too far. While he was ready to recognize that the Asian revolutions were important, he felt that the best way to beat capitalism was by hitting at its stronghold in Western Europe.⁵⁸ After considerable debate, Lenin again prevailed. This question again became a controversial issue between the Soviets and the Chinese in 1963.

The Second Comintern Congress had been of great significance to the development of the National Liberation Movement. It had taken a radical line toward the movement.⁵⁹ The Congress had agitated for revolt in the backward countries and had outlined the way to organize the struggle. It was not expected that these revolts would lead immediately to a socialist system, though this possibility was not ruled out. Both Lenin and Karl Radek insisted that the capitalist stage might be skipped in some countries.⁶⁰ The line taken by the Second Congress provided the blueprint for Soviet actions toward the backward nations for the next thirty-five years.

During the few remaining years of his life, Lenin saw Communist efforts at revolution frustrated at every turn. In 1920,

⁵⁸Whiting, op. cit., p. 54.

⁵⁹Barghoorn, op. cit., p. 133.

⁶⁰Whiting, op. cit., p. 46.

a revolutionary opportunity occurred in Germany in connection with the Kapp Putsch, but the German Communists failed to exploit the situation. A year later, a revolutionary attempt was made in Germany through the device of a general strike--but the workers did not give it their support and it also failed. By 1921, Lenin had definitely revised his estimate regarding the possibility of successful revolutions in Europe, and he turned his attention toward building a strong economic and political base in Russia.⁶¹ The radical course toward the colonial liberation movement was gradually abandoned when it became evident that the colonial peoples were not flocking to the Communist banner.

Shortly before the stroke which incapacitated him, Lenin observed signs of discontent in the colonies. He was therefore moved to make the statement which Communists frequently quote today:

And it should be perfectly clear that in the coming decisive battles of the world population, this movement of the majority of the world's population, originally aimed at national liberation, will turn against capitalism and imperialism and will, perhaps play a much more revolutionary role than we have been led to expect.⁶³

⁶¹Laidler, op. cit., p. 460.

⁶²Barghoorn, op. cit., p. 134.

⁶³Lenin, op. cit., p. 290.

SUMMARY

The national liberation movement, as we know it today, is to a very great extent the creation of Lenin. Marx's abstract theories had been translated by Lenin into workable doctrine and concrete guides for action. In directing the Communist movement, Lenin kept all of the related factors in harmony despite the disruptive influence of other Marxists.

With regard to the liberation movement, Lenin reinforced Marx's anti-capitalist ideology by adding his doctrine on imperialism. He steered a straight course on the matter of "self-determination of nations"; he described the proper phasing of colonial revolutions, he explained the related roles of wars and revolutions. Lenin also established the Third International as a means of coordinating all revolutionary efforts including those in the colonies and in 1920 he caused the Comintern to give increased priority to the liberation of the colonies. Perhaps his most significant contribution to the modern liberation movement--and one easily overlooked--was the winning of the socialist revolution in Russia; for it was this victory that not only furnished a tangible example to Communists of how to win a revolution, but it also provided the Communists with a country where they could put their ideas into effect and, hopefully, could provide a "showcase" to the world.

CHAPTER 3

STALIN

PASSIVITY AND MIS-ADVENTURE

Lenin died in 1924 and his successor, Joseph Stalin, continued the general course which Lenin had been following since 1921. Stalin too realized that the conditions were not ripe for revolution in the advanced countries of Europe, and that Soviet efforts could be better utilized in strengthening the USSR than in fruitless efforts to foment revolution. Stalin also continued Lenin's policy of watching for revolutionary opportunities in the colonies. His writings indicate that he was completely in accord with Lenin's views on the national liberation movement, and there is little doubt that he intended to exploit any good opportunity that might arise in the colonies.

In the meantime, Stalin decided to focus the main effort of the CPSU on building economic strength in the Soviet Union. His plan for building "socialism in one country" was opposed by Trotsky, but Stalin finally prevailed and launched a series of five year plans.

Stalin thought that he saw an opportunity for revolution in China in the mid-1920's. For years the Western Powers had taken advantage of China's weakness to gain special economic advantages. Many Chinese found this situation humiliating. Dissension mounted and a revolution brought Sun Yat-sen to power. Sun Yat-sen

signed an agreement with the Soviet Union in 1923 in which the Kremlin promised him support. He died in 1925 and the leadership passed to General Chiang Kai-shek who had spent some time in Moscow as a young man. Stalin decided to support Chiang and he directed the Chinese Communist Party to merge with Chiang's forces and try to penetrate the Kuomintang, acquire key positions, and ultimately gain control.¹ This was a departure from Lenin's basic policy that local Communist parties should support liberation movements but should retain their separate identities in the process. Stalin's departure from this policy brought disastrous results.

Chiang initially collaborated with the Communists but he soon realized that the Kremlin hoped to use his revolution as part of their anti-imperialist drive against Britain. He felt that it was not to this interest to break with the West. In 1926, as Chiang's armies approached Shanghai, the Communists in the city rose up against the Kuomintang's enemies. Chiang waited outside the city until the fighting was over, and the anti-Kuomintang forces had been beaten by the Communists. He then entered the city and slaughtered the Communists. Still another disaster befell the Communists in the Wuhan ports where the liberal wing of the Kuomintang also turned upon them. The Chinese Communist Party was decimated. Mao Tse-tung gathered the remnants of the Party and escaped to the hills.² Communism in China had suffered a

¹Carl Landauer, European Socialism, p. 1238.

²George F. Kennan, Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin, pp. 271-272.

severe blow from which it took years to recover. Stalin came under attack in the CPSU for this fiasco but he was able to point out that Lenin himself at one time had advised the British Communists to merge with the labor party in an effort to weaken and destroy it.³

The Sixth Comintern Congress of 1928 recognized that the Comintern's efforts toward "colonial work" had been weak, and the Congress therefore reverted to Lenin's more radical line taken at the Second Congress of 1920.⁴ Leadership of the revolutionary movements was to be in the hands of the Communists. Temporary cooperation with certain elements were permissible, but only under certain definite circumstances. There was to be absolutely no "fusion of the Communist movement with the petty-bourgeois revolutionary movement." Generally, the colonial policy adopted by the Sixth Congress is similar in many respects to that used by the CPSU in the 1960's--including the suggestion of the possibility of a "non-capitalist path of development".⁵

Although the Sixth Congress took a strong line on the liberation movement, the Communists were not able to translate this into effective action during the next few years.⁶ Before long, Hitler loomed as a grave threat to the Soviet homeland and the Russians were obliged to keep their primary attention on the threat

³Ibid., p. 269.

⁴Frederick C. Barghoorn, Soviet Foreign Propaganda, p. 134.

⁵Jane Degras, The Communist International, 1919-1943, pp. 526-548.

⁶Barghoorn, op. cit., p. 134.

in the West. The "popular front" originated in 1934 and was elaborated upon at the Seventh Congress of the Comintern in 1935 (the last Comintern Congress). This policy encouraged Communists to collaborate with socialists, trade unions, and progressive (leftist) groups.⁷ World War broke out in 1939 and Russia was drawn into the struggle. Stalin joined forces with the capitalist nations which endangered him least, and in deference to those nations, he disestablished the Third International in 1943.

A WINDFALL

From Lenin's death until 1940, Stalin had failed to bring about a single successful Communist revolution in either the advanced countries or in the colonies; although during the jockeying for position at the outset of the War, Stalin had taken over the Baltic States and parts of Finland.

After World War II, the Soviet Union emerged as the strongest power on the Eurasian continent. Lenin had predicted that the next world war would provide additional opportunities for revolution and Stalin was alert to these possibilities. The war had ended with Soviet troops in control of Eastern Europe. By a series of aggressive legal and illegal actions, aided and abetted by the Soviet Union, Communist Parties took political control in Poland, Bulgaria, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary by 1949.

⁷Harry W. Laidler, Social-Economic Movements, p. 467.

Therefore, within four short years after the war's end, Communist "revolutions" had "liberated" almost all of Eastern Europe. East Germany and Yugoslavia soon went Communist, and a revolution in Greece was defeated only after large American aid and the closing of the Yugoslav border. And perhaps the greatest Communist achievement of all, and one for which Stalin deserves little credit, was the successful revolution by the Chinese Communists which brought over 700 million souls into the Communist fold.

The post World War II period was indeed a highly lucrative era in the history of the National Liberation Movement. These successful revolutions, along with the decolonialization in South Asia and Africa which was to follow shortly, represented significant strides forward for the Communists.

Communist belligerence had alerted the United States in 1945. Western Europe had been weakened and exhausted by the war and might have become vulnerable to Communist take-overs had it not been for remarkable therapy provided by the Marshall Plan. Within a few years, these countries were so well off economically that the chance of a successful Communist revolution had become relatively remote. The establishment of NATO further discouraged the Communists.

By the end of 1949, the possibility of further Communist success in Europe had been considerably reduced, and Stalin turned his attention to the Far East. Korea had been divided along Communist and capitalist lines as an aftermath of the War. In June 1950 the North Koreans launched an armed attack on South

Korea in an overt attempt to "liberate" the South and to reunify the country under communism. The Soviet role in possibly instigating the war is still not entirely clear, but she undoubtedly condoned the attack--and possibly ordered it with promises of support.⁸

Although Lenin had not provided specific guidance on the action to be taken where a country is divided among Communists and capitalists--there is little doubt as to what he would have done. He had argued many times in favor of civil war against the reactionaries and against the capitalists--and the situation in Korea was essentially a civil war. But here again the United States intervened and the Communist efforts to "liberate" the South were thwarted.

During the last two years of his life Stalin became more and more aware of the danger he faced from American nuclear power. He became more cautious than he had been immediately following the war. Six months before his death, the 19th Party Congress of the CPSU had published a report that Soviet policy was based on the premise that "peaceful coexistence of capitalism and communism and cooperation was quite possible. . . ." Also pertinent was the statement attributed to Stalin that: "The export of revolution is nonsense. Each country will make its own revolution if it wants to do so, and if it does not want to do so there will be no revolution."⁹

⁸Jan Librach, The Rise of the Soviet Empire, p. 205.

⁹Leo Gruliov, ed., Current Soviet Policies II, pp. 105-106.

Other than in Korea, Stalin had paid little attention to the liberation movement in the East. This was probably because of the weakness of indigenous Communist Parties and his unwillingness to place his trust in the local bourgeois leaders after what had happened to him in China.

SUMMARY

From the standpoint of the National Liberation Movement, Stalin's rule consisted of two rather distinct phases.

The first phase - which included the first two decades of his rule--was one in which Soviet attention was focused primarily on building Russia. Although Stalin gave lip service to the liberation struggle in the backward areas, he took little real interest in the liberation movement and almost nothing was accomplished during the period. His one adventure, in China, was a dismal failure, and this caused Stalin to become even more distrustful of the bourgeoisie during the rest of his life. His 'popular front' line of the 1930's won limited support.

The second phase was quite another story. World War II had placed Communist forces in Eastern Europe; and within a few years of the War's end, virtually all of the area had undergone "national-democratic revolutions" which placed Communists in control of the governments. The post-war years were indeed productive ones for the National Liberation Movement. Stalin pressed his advantage as far as he dared, but Communist efforts to "liberate" South Korea were checked by the United States and Stalin was forced to

reevaluate his policies in the face of the superior military power of capitalism's new champion, the United States.

CHAPTER 4

KHRUSHCHEV

NEW EMPHASIS ON THE LIBERATION MOVEMENT

Stalin died in March 1953 and the new leaders in the Kremlin lost little time in changing the course of Soviet foreign policy. Realizing that Stalin's efforts to make further gains in Europe had been effectively blocked by the United States and that something new was needed to get communism moving again, the new leaders looked "East" just as Lenin had done when he found himself in a similar predicament in the early 1920's. What the Soviet leaders saw was the whole undeveloped world in ferment. The old colonial empires were disintegrating. Many of the nations had already been granted independence, some were scheduled for independence, and a few were being forcibly held in colonial status.

How could the Soviet Union best exploit this situation? The one problem which could not be postponed was the newly independent countries. The West, especially the United States and Great Britain, were moving quickly to reestablish old economic ties with the new regimes and thereby keep them in the "capitalist" system. If Western efforts were successful and the local bourgeoisie became firmly entrenched, it would be extremely difficult to overthrow them once the emotional fervor of the nationalist revolution had dissipated. The USSR would have to do something about this situation promptly, or possibly lose its opportunity

for a long time to come. To be sure, the colonies which were still under the "yoke of the imperialists" were also a matter of concern to the Kremlin--but the nations still in colonial status were rapidly being reduced to an insignificant few.

Once the decision was made to focus on the newly independent countries, the next problem was to determine the best way to accomplish the task of bringing about communism in those nations. Lenin's preferred solution was to rely primarily on the local Communists, in collaboration with the peasants if necessary, to overthrow the government by revolution. However, the Communist parties of the newly independent countries were still too weak to carry out such an assignment. Moreover, most of these countries had virtually no proletariat, and there was an absence of a disgruntled, unemployed intelligentsia.

By 1955 it was evident that the Soviet Union had decided to try to win these countries over to communism by wooing their leaders--although many of these leaders were more bourgeois than Communist. Khrushchev and Bulganin toured the Far East and appealed to several key national leaders with a combination of friendliness, persuasion, offers to aid, exploitation of anti-Western feeling, and reminders of Russia's rapid industrialization. Before the end of 1955, the USSR had initiated an economic offensive which included trade loans, and technical assistance to many of the undeveloped nations of Asia, the Middle East, and South America.¹

¹Wladyslaw W. Kulski, Peaceful Co-existence, p. 283.

By 1956 Khrushchev was firmly in control in the Kremlin and he chose the occasion of the Twentieth Party Congress of the CPSU of that year to denounce Stalin and to make a pitch for peace. The Twentieth Party Congress took note that the colonial system was disintegrating and that almost half of the world's population had been freed in the past ten years. Some nations were still under the colonial yoke; however, the Party Congress avoided taking a specific stand regarding these colonies.²

In his keynote speech to the Congress, Khrushchev observed that the liberation movement had "developed with particular force" after the "October socialist revolution," that it had been stimulated by the defeat of Germany and Japan, and that it had dealt a staggering blow in the victory of the Chinese revolution. His view was that all of the colonial and semi-colonial nations, including South America, were rising up against imperialism as Lenin had predicted. He cautioned that the winning of political freedom is but a first step--albeit an important one--toward full independence. The socialist countries were ready to help the exploited nations achieve economic independence. To Khrushchev, imperialism was still much in evidence in the world since the United States was trying to wrest markets, raw materials, and colonies from the other "capitalist" countries. The United States had become the big exploiter who was extracting the enormous profits; and it is the Americans who have introduced a new form of colonial

²Leo Gruliov, ed., Current Soviet Policies, p. 33.

enslavement under the guise of providing aid. Khrushchev also reemphasized the peaceful aspirations of the USSR and pictured the US as the real obstacle to peace.³

The Congress did present the appealing thesis that the transition to Socialism need not necessarily be violent, but could take a variety of paths. In some states, the parliamentary path might be used. Apparently this was meant to calm the fears of leaders who had recently won independence.⁴ Soviet propaganda during this period pictured the USSR as the champions of equal rights and self-determination and as the protector of new nations whose independence was being threatened by the imperialism of the Western Powers.⁵

Before the year was out, Khrushchev's peace offensive received a sharp set-back when Soviet troops were used to crush the revolution in Hungary.

By 1957, Soviet efforts in the underdeveloped areas began to pay off. The Asian-African Solidarity Conference, which met in December and included delegates from forty-two countries, adopted resolutions which indicated strong sympathy with the recent line of the Soviets to include slogans such as imperialism, peaceful coexistence, anti-colonialism, denunciation of foreign troops in Asia and Africa, seating of Communist China in the United Nations, etc.⁶

³Ibid.

⁴Frederick C. Barghoorn, Current Soviet Policies, p. 33.

⁵Ibid., p. 143.

⁶Kulski, op. cit., pp. 297-298.

It is difficult to plot Khrushchev's policy of the late 1950's. Despite set-backs in many of the newly independent countries he continued his efforts to win over their leaders. In the meantime he tried to keep the US off balance by alternately being friendly and hostile. At one moment he was professing a desire for peace and peaceful coexistence, and the next moment he was issuing ultimatums over Berlin. Castro's victory was, of course, very important to the Communists, and it probably contributed significantly to the development of the concept of the "national-democratic front" by which the bourgeois democracies might be transformed into "people's democracies". The latter term describes a country in which Communists have gained power.

THE NATIONAL-DEMOCRATIC STATE AND WARS OF LIBERATION

The National Liberation Movement received further impetus at the meeting of Communist leaders of 81 countries in Moscow in November 1960. The declaration issued at the end of the conference indicated that the National Liberation Movement was one of the seven main topics discussed.⁷

The conference put forth the slogan of "the national-democratic state" for the new independent nations. Such a state--even though non-Communist--was to be supported if it took certain measures such as adopting radical social and economic reforms, rejecting

⁷Charles Burton Marshall, Two Communist Manifestos, pp. 66-79.

Western political and economic influence, pursuing military neutralism, and permitting Communist parties to exist. The "national-democratic state" was to incorporate the efforts of all "patriotic" forces in a united front and be based primarily on an alliance of the working class and the peasants. The national bourgeoisie could participate, temporarily, in the united front; but it was expected that the people would eventually reject the bourgeoisie--who would compromise with imperialism--and the nation would adopt a "non-capitalist" course of development.⁸ The "national-democratic state" was evidently intended as a vehicle for getting the liberation movement off dead center after the Soviets had realized that their flirtation with the national bourgeoisie was no longer paying off. However, the new concept failed to identify the group that would lead the movement and it failed to resolve the old problem of how to promote Soviet interests in an undeveloped state while still supporting the local Communists.

Recognizing that many of the new nations would not quickly be won over to socialism, the Conference leaders had provided an alternative in which there would be an intermediate stage of "non-capitalist" development.

This approach was supported by propaganda designed to appeal to the residual anti-colonial feelings of the people and to their nationalistic tendencies toward patriotism, democracy, and reform.⁹

⁸Uri Ra'anan, "Moscow and the 'Third World'," Problems of Communism, p. 23.

⁹Barghoorn, op. cit., pp. 139-140.

In an obvious attempt to identify the USSR with the independence movement in Asia and Africa, Khrushchev introduced a resolution in 1960 in the UN General Assembly demanding immediate independence of the few remaining colonies. The resolution finally adopted in December 1960 was not the one that Khrushchev had introduced but a milder Afro-Asian resolution.¹⁰ In subsequent Soviet documents, the Russians have frequently made it appear that the resolution adopted had been theirs. Actually, they abstained from voting on the resolution which passed. Nevertheless, the effects of Soviet propaganda toward portraying themselves as the champion of independence for the backward nations should not be underestimated. Barghoorn points out that: "As Indians with whom the writer has discussed problems of their country have emphasized, the peoples of formerly colonial countries tend to feel that colonial rule would not have ended without Soviet pressure."¹¹

Khrushchev's Speech of January 6, 1961

In January 1961, Khrushchev made a speech to the Soviet Party officials in which he reported to them on the Moscow meeting. His explanations regarding the National Liberation Movement followed closely the wording of the Moscow Conference report. However, he elaborated on the matter of war and peace and enunciated his now famous thesis that wars fall into three categories: World Wars,

¹⁰Ibid., p. 141.

¹¹Ibid., p. 137.

limited wars, and liberation wars. He condemned World Wars explicitly, and he also rejected limited wars since they might lead to World War. He makes it clear that neither of these types of wars are favorable to Communist interests. On the other hand, "national-liberation wars" do favor Communist interests. These are "just" wars which should be supported wholeheartedly. On the subject of wars, Khrushchev said:

In modern conditions, the following categories of wars should be distinguished: World wars, local wars, liberation wars, and popular uprisings.

. . . the most probable wars are wars among the capitalist and imperialist countries, and this too should not be ruled out.

Wars are chiefly prepared by imperialists against socialist countries. . . . The task is to create impassable obstacles against the unleashing of wars by imperialists. . . .

. . . we are unable to completely exclude the possibility of wars, for the imperialist states exist. . . .¹²

On the subject of local, or limited wars, Khrushchev said:

A lot is being said nowadays in the imperialist camp about local wars . . . fearing that world war might end in complete collapse of capitalism, (the imperialists) are putting their money on unleashing local wars.

. . . A small imperialist war, . . . may grow into a world thermonuclear rocket war. We must therefore combat both world wars and local wars.

¹²US Congress, Senate, Committee on Judiciary, Analysis of the Khrushchev Speech of January 6, 1961, p. 63.

. . . an example of a local war . . . the Anglo-French-Israeli aggression against Egypt. . . . The Soviet government's stark warning . . . stopped the war.¹³

Khrushchev then had a "word" about "national-liberation wars":

The armed struggle by the Vietnamese people or the war of the Algerian people, . . . serve as the latest examples of such wars. These wars began as an uprising by the colonial peoples against their oppressors and changed into guerrilla warfare. Liberation wars will continue to exist as long as imperialism exists, as long as colonialism exists. These are revolutionary wars. Such wars are not only admissible but inevitable, since the colonialists do not grant independence voluntarily. Therefore, the peoples can attain their freedom and independence only by struggle, including armed struggle.

. . . It (the Algerian war) is the uprising of the Arab people in Algeria against French colonizers. It is being conducted in the form of a partisan war. . . . the United States and Britain render assistance to their French allies with arms. . . . But it is a liberation war of a people for its independence, it is a sacred war. We recognize such wars, we help and will help the peoples striving for their independence.

. . . take Cuba's example. A war . . . started as an uprising against the internal tyrannical regime supported by U.S. Imperialism. . . .

Can such wars flare up in the future? They can. . . . these wars which are national uprisings. . . . must not be identified with wars among states, with local wars, since in these uprisings the people are fighting for implementation of their right for self-determination, for independent social and national development. These are uprisings against rotten reactionary regimes, against the colonizers. The Communists fully support such just wars and march in the front rank with the peoples waging liberation struggles.

. . . The victory of socialism throughout the world, which is inevitable because of the laws of historic development is now near. For this victory, wars among states are not necessary. The entire foreign policy of the Soviet Union is directed toward the

¹³Ibid., p. 64.

strengthening of peace. . . . Peaceful coexistence is the high road of international relations between socialist and capitalist countries. . . . It facilitates the struggle the people wage against aggressive military blocs, . . . It helps the national liberation movement to gain successes.¹⁴

Khrushchev's speech also made it clear that Soviet foreign policy would be directed as a priority matter toward fostering the complete "liquidation" of the Western colonial system and of promoting the liberation movement:

The national liberation movement deals more and more blows against imperialism, . . . Asia, Africa, and Latin America are now the most important centers of revolutionary struggles against imperialism.

. . . the crumbling of the system of colonial slavery under the pressure of the national liberation movement is the second phenomenon of historic importance after the formation of the world system of socialism.

. . . there is no doubt that . . . the Union of South Africa will collapse, that Rhodesia, Uganda, and other parts of Africa will become free.

The successes of the national liberation movement . . . strengthen the international positions of socialism in the struggle against imperialism.

Bourgeois . . . politicians allege that . . . it is the colonizers who grant freedom to the peoples of the former colonial countries. Such inventions are launched to isolate the young independent states from the socialist camp, . . .

. . . the United States (is) exerting every effort to attach to (its) own system the countries which have freed themselves from . . . colonialism, and thus strengthen the position of world capitalism.

¹⁴Ibid., pp. 64-66.

. . . Communists generally support democratic measures taken by national governments. At the same time, Communists explain to the masses that these measures are not socialist ones.¹⁵

With colonialism rapidly disappearing, Khrushchev's comments on the next phase of the liberation movement takes on added significance. Khrushchev envisaged that once independence is achieved, the transition to socialism (i.e., scientific socialism) might be peaceful or nonpeaceful. Peaceful transition is possible if the "ruling classes" bow to the "will of the people." In other words, if the bourgeois government capitulates peacefully to the Communists then there would be no violence; if they do not it would mean civil war. Parliamentary institutions are permissible during the transition in countries where parliamentary traditions are highly developed; however, this would not be a Parliament in the Western sense, since it would be used only after a virtual dictatorship of the proletariat had been established. Khrushchev also suggested that local Communists be especially active with the masses during the transition period. Although he recognized that the Communist Parties would have a difficult time during this period, he was confident that they would succeed in view of the growing strength of the world socialist system.¹⁶

In summary, Khrushchev saw the main forces in world politics as: first, the collapse of Western imperialism and the weakening

¹⁵Ibid., pp. 69-71.

¹⁶Ibid., pp. 72-74.

of Western influence; second, the growth of the world socialist system; third, the emancipation of the colonies; and fourth, the shift of power toward the Communist bloc. He deemphasized wars between states, but encouraged revolutions (liberation wars). And lastly, he took a relatively mild line toward the use of violence during the transition to socialism.

A few months later, Khrushchev met with President Kennedy at Vienna. President Kennedy's report on the meeting indicates that Khrushchev had adhered strongly to the line which he had expounded in his January speech. Kennedy stated:

Generally Mr. Khrushchev did not talk in terms of war. . . . He stressed his intention to outdo us in industrial production, to prove to the world the superiority of his system over ours. Most of all he predicted the triumph of communism in the new and less developed countries. He was certain that the tide there was moving his way, that the revolution of rising peoples would eventually be a Communist revolution, and that the so-called "wars of liberation", supported by the Kremlin would replace the old methods of direct aggression and invasion.

. . . Their missiles, they believe, will hold off our missiles, and their troops can match our troops should we intervene in these so-called 'wars of liberation'. . . . A small group of disciplined Communists could exploit discontent and misery . . . seize control . . . of an entire country without Communist troops ever crossing any international frontier. This is the Communist theory.

. . . it is clear that this struggle in this area of the new and poorer nations will be a continuing crisis in this decade.¹⁷

¹⁷US Dept of State, American Foreign Policy; Current Documents, p. 577.

The 22d Party Congress and the New Party Program

The 22d Party Congress of the CPSU met in Moscow in the fall of 1961 and approved a new Party Program--only the third such program in Bolshevik history. Both the Program and Khrushchev's report to the Congress followed the line which had been set down in the November statement of 1960 and in the Khrushchev speech of January 1961. It is interesting to note that the 1961 Party Congress emphasized the National Liberation Movement by listing it as one of the foreign policy tasks of the USSR. This was the first time that the National Liberation Movement had been so listed in a Party Congress report.¹⁸

By mid-1963, the ideological differences between the Russians and the Chinese which had been brewing for some years, finally reached serious proportions.

The Chinese openly challenged the general line of Soviet policy in their letter of 13 June 1963. The differences over the National Liberation Movement seem to be more a matter of emphasis than of substance; but the differences are real nevertheless. In their letter, the Chinese indicated that the "whole cause of the international proletarian revolution" hinged on the outcome of the liberation movement in the underdeveloped areas. The Chinese considered it "impossible" for the proletariat of the advanced

¹⁸"The Central Committee Report by Khrushchev-II," Current Digest of the Soviet Press (hereafter referred to as CDSP), Vol. XIII, No. 41, 8 Nov. 1961, p. 7.

countries to liberate themselves unless the backward nations are liberated. In these countries, the Communists must lead the revolution, must have a program of their own, and must work independently. The Chinese also were not willing to go as far as the Soviets regarding the possibilities of a peaceful transition to socialism, pointing out that there is no historical precedent for such a transition, and that the Communists must prepare for the worse by building independent revolutionary strength.¹⁹

The Soviets responded in July. Moscow refused to give the National Liberation Movement priority over the "world system of socialism" and the "struggle of the international working class." The Soviets acknowledged that the National Liberation Movement had become more important in recent years, but they insist that the proletarian revolution still has the leading role in the world revolution. With respect to the peaceful transition to socialism the Soviets evidently prefer to emphasize the possibility of the peaceful transition and criticize the Chinese for overemphasizing the need for revolutionary violence.²⁰

Later in July, Kommunist took exception to the Chinese demand that the proletariat lead the liberation movement. The magazine observed that in some of the new countries the proletariat is either very small or non-existent.²¹

¹⁹The Letter from the Chinese Communist Party," CDSP, Vol. XV, No. 28, 7 Aug. 1963, pp. 3-15.

²⁰"The Soviet Reply to the Chinese Letter," CDSP, Vol. XV, No. 28, 7 Aug. 1963, pp. 16-30.

²¹"Kommunist Magazine Sums Up Case Against China," CDSP, Vol. XV, No. 35, 25 Sep. 1963, p. 19.

The prolonged debate in the public press between the Chinese and the Soviets has helped to clarify the Soviet position on the liberation movement. Apparently, the Soviets have divided the world into industrialized areas and non-industrialized areas. The former are the main targets. When conditions are not right for revolution in the industrialized countries, attention may be diverted temporarily to the non-industrialized countries. Dinerstein suggests that Algeria provided an example of how this works from the Soviet viewpoint. When the Algerian insurrection enhanced revolutionary prospects in both Algeria and France, Moscow directed its main attention--at least during the early phases--toward France. With the hope of fomenting strife in France, the Soviets permitted the war to drag on by limiting its support to the Algerians.²²

There is no doubt that the Soviets consider the liberation movement to be important, but its importance derives from the contribution that the movement makes to the weakening of the strongholds of capitalism. Besides, every subtraction from the capitalist camp is a plus for the Communists, and a resultant improvement in their power balance with the West.

In 1963 the Soviet Union published the second edition of the important Russian text Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism in which considerable attention is paid to the National Liberation Movement.

²²Rand Corporation, Sino-Soviet Conflict in the Underdeveloped Countries, by Herbert S. Dinerstein, Jan. 1964, p. 12.

The book follows the general line which had been in effect since 1960. It places the newly independent countries in two categories; first, countries which pursue an independent foreign policy, are free of capitalist enslavement, but remain in the capitalist camp (India, Indonesia, Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Ceylon, Iraq, UAR, Algeria, Syria, Sudan, Tunisia, Morocco, Libya, Guinea, Mali, and Ghana--the last three being singled out as the most progressive); and secondly, those states whose independence is fettered by economic agreements and by military alliances (Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines).²³ Latin American nations are considered to be under the indirect rule of the imperialist powers through local intermediaries; that is, rich landowners, big bourgeoisie, and military reactionaries. The book repeats the call made in the 1960 Moscow Declaration for "national democracies" ruled initially by coalitions of all "national democratic forces" including the progressive bourgeoisie.

THE REVOLUTIONARY-DEMOCRATIC STATE

By the end of 1963 Khrushchev took another decisive step toward embracing those regimes which appeared to be making progress toward adopting scientific socialism. Khrushchev now introduced a new term "revolutionary democrats" to describe the leaders of these regimes. The "revolutionary-democratic state" which they

²³Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism, 2d ed., p. 404.

headed is apparently one in which the Communist Parties are weak but their function is performed by leaders such as Ben Bella, Nkrumah, and Nasser. This new doctrine admits that non-Communists can put their nations on the path to socialism, a concept which is gross revisionism, and there is considerable evidence that the point was sharply debated by Soviet theoreticians.²⁴ Then, in early 1964, Khrushchev visited the UAR and Ben Bella visited Moscow. In conjunction with these visits, both Algeria and the UAR were referred to as non-Communist countries who had "embarked on the road to socialism". Although the Communist Parties "had not yet matured" in these countries, the socialist world system would perform their role. Khrushchev also awarded to Nasser and Ben Bella the award of the "Hero of the Soviet Union," an act which seems to have been frowned upon by many in the Kremlin. Despite the differences of opinion in the Kremlin, it appears that the Soviet commitment to the "revolutionary-democrats" has survived Khrushchev's departure. Since that time, Soviet documents have stated that nations which enjoy full support from, and are integrated with the local Communist Party might be recognized as "building socialism". Other nations are placed in lower categories which are described as nations undergoing "progressive transformation" or "non-capitalist development". In December, Pravda

²⁴Thomas Perry Thornton, The Shifting Soviet Attitudes Toward the Underdeveloped Countries, p. 6.

indicated that Algeria was on the "socialist path" but the UAR was only on the "non-capitalist path".²⁵

In December 1964, the Soviet theoretical journal Kommunist described the liberation movement as entering a new stage of "uprooting the economic roots of imperialist influence." The journal maintained that in 1919, 69.9% of the world's people were in colonies, while today there are less than one percent. Therefore, the main task of the liberation movement now is to liberate the peoples of former colonies from the pro-imperialist regimes which have gained political control, and to achieve true, not just formal, independence. The article repeats the idea that although some revolutions had been won with Communist at the helm, that this "cannot" be considered the only possible way to make the transition to socialism. The potential of the "revolutionary democrats" is stressed, and local Communist Parties are advised to follow a "policy of unity" with them. Kommunist also makes this interesting observation:

. . . the national-liberation revolutions is of tremendous significance both for the fates of the former colonies . . . (and) for the world liberation process as a whole. This is a difficult struggle. It may be even more difficult than the one waged during the preceding stage of the revolution.²⁶

The journal attributes the difficulties to the resistance of the imperialists, and to the fact that non-proletarians have led

²⁵Ibid., p. 31.

²⁶K. Brutents, "The Current Stage of the National-Liberation Movement," Translations from Kommunist, pp. 30-47.

many of the revolutions and have saddled the movement with their "prejudices and errors".

SUMMARY

Khrushchev was a pragmatist who, realizing that Stalin's policies had become moribund in the underdeveloped countries, decided early to make common cause with the national bourgeoisie the way Lenin had done. He embraced the nationalist leaders in Asia and the Middle East. He applauded their socialist tendencies and their neutralism, and he offered them aid. Initial results were striking, and the USSR came out of isolation and extended its influence throughout the world. However, these successes slowed to a halt when the national bourgeois leaders took steps to prevent their countries from being taken over by the Communists. By 1960, it was clear that this approach had failed. When the 81 Parties met in Moscow in 1960, they found themselves in a position similar to that of the 1920's. In the early twenties the European proletariat had failed; in the late fifties the national bourgeoisie had not worked out. Therefore, the Moscow Conference, with Castro in mind, developed the idea of a "national-democratic state". Such a state would cooperate with the USSR, bring Communists into the government, and make certain reforms. The new state concept had certain weaknesses, including the absence of a definite group to provide the motivating force. Within three years, the "national-democratic state" idea had made no headway and Khrushchev looked around for something more productive. In

1963 he announced a new Soviet doctrine of "revolutionary-democratic states" in which the leading role in the revolutionary movement was placed firmly in the hands of "revolutionary-democrats" such as Nasser and Ben Bella. The latest concept provided for a striking revision in that it recognized that non-Communists could lead their nations along the path to Socialism; and thereby compromised the position of the Communist Parties in the new nations.

CHAPTER 5

BREZHNEV AND KOSYGIN

A CONTINUATION OF KHRUSHCHEV'S POLICIES

Within a few months after assuming the leadership of the CPSU, Brezhnev and Kosygin made major speeches in which they came out in favor of the line which Khrushchev had been following on the National Liberation Movement. Throughout 1965, the liberation movement was given considerable coverage in the Soviet Press and in Party journals.

Pravda, in June, insisted that the liberation movement was linked with the system of socialism and with the struggle of the proletariat in the capitalist countries--and that these three links should not be treated separately. The newly independent nations are described as "beginning to move actively in the direction of socialism" (wording which would indicate that not much real progress has been made). The writer suggests that "every form of struggle" be employed, including both peaceful means and armed conflict.¹

F. Burlatsky, one of the Kremlin's foremost theoreticians, discussed the socialist movement in ideological terms in Pravda in September. He reminded his readers that Lenin had foreseen

¹"Pravda on USSR and National-Liberation Movement," CDSP, Vol. XVII, No. 26, 21 Jul. 1965, p. 5.

that it would be easier to start a socialist revolution in the backward nations than to complete it; since complete victory would require a modern industrial and scientific base. Burlatsky sees the national bourgeoisie as possessing mixed attributes:

The progressive forces of the national bourgeoisie welcome ideas of strengthening the state sector of the economy and planning. They justly see this the most effective way of overcoming economic backwardness. However, these forces often reject the ideas of social equality and the inevitability of the class struggle.²

Burlatsky takes a Leninist position toward the Communist Parties:

Thus the Communists welcome any social forces that sincerely aspire to socialism, but do not dissolve into them, rather occupying their own place, . . . In every revolutionary, democratic socialist movement they uphold not only the interests of the present day but also the interests of the future.³

Another Soviet writer had some interesting comments in Kommunist on the series of articles on "wars of liberation" which had appeared in the editorial section of the New York Times. The Russian denies that these wars involve "export of revolution" on the part of the Soviets, maintaining that the internal conditions of a country have to be right for a revolution to succeed. He insists that the USSR did not force its system on nations even when its troops were in the country. Examples cited were Austria and Norway where Soviet troops withdrew and the countries remained bourgeois. He denies that "wars of liberation" are aggression

²F. Burlatsky, "The Communist Position in the World Socialist Movement," CDSP, Vol. XVII, No. 33, 8 Sep. 1965, pp. 3-5.

³Ibid., p. 5.

any more than the American revolution was aggression against Britain or "Lincoln's war" to liberate the slaves was aggression. The writer insists that such wars are just, for wars are always justified when fought to overthrow the "yoke of oppression". The aims of these wars, he feels, had been validated by the United Nations Declaration which declared that an end should be put to colonialism "in all its forms and manifestations". Such struggles, in his view, are also in accord with the Charter of the United Nations. The United States is depicted as desiring "nonviolent revolutions" in which just enough meager reforms are made to divert the masses from revolting. Such reforms may temporarily prolong United States domination but will not stop the liberation movement aimed against this very domination. The article repeats the Marxist-Leninist view that certain nations are being exploited by others and that their revolutions against such exploitation is morally right and internationally sanctioned. The United States is seen as trying to stop these revolutions so that she may retain her favorable economic relationships with the poorer countries.⁴

Another article appeared in Kommunist indicating that the liberation movement is important, but that it is of somewhat less importance than the revolutions in the advanced industrial

⁴G. Starushenko, "Kommunist on a U.S. View of Wars of Liberation," CDSP, Vol. VII, No. 34, 15 Sep. 1965, pp. 5-6.

countries. The article exaggerates the "deepening contradictions" in the West over American alleged attempts to gain economic domination. President Johnson's action in the Dominican Republic and in Vietnam is seen as a direct challenge by "world imperialism" to the National Liberation Movement.⁵

In October, Pravda emphasizes the role that the people themselves had to play in the liberation movement of their own countries. The article argues that the socialist countries could not take the place of the peoples of the young nations since this would be "forcible imposition of their will on other peoples, which is alien to . . . Marxism-Leninism." Pravda recognized that such an attempt by the socialist countries "could lead to the unleashing of a world thermonuclear war. . . ." ⁶

For some time the Soviets had been encouraging the groupings of underdeveloped nations, apparently believing that coalitions would give these nations greater independence from the United States and the West Europeans. Therefore, the USSR was no doubt delighted when a "solidarity conference" of Asians, Africans, and Latin Americans was scheduled to meet in Havana in January 1966. The Kremlin decided to send a representative, and it chose for the task an alternate member of the Presidium, S. R. Rashidon. The Soviet representative called for freedom, peace,

⁵"Soviet Foreign Policy and Social Progress," Translations from Kommunist, No. 12, Aug. 1965, p. 6, 9.

⁶"Pravda on the Internationalist Duty of the USSR," COSP, Vol. XVII, No. 43, 17 Nov. 1965, p. 6.

independence, and social progress; and for opposition to oppression, enslavement, and injustice. These non-controversial aims are clearly meant to have mass appeal, and to identify the Soviet Union with the aspirations of the former colonial peoples.⁷

In January 1966, Kommunist published a comprehensive statement of Soviet policy concerning the National Liberation Movement. Essentially, the approach is quite similar to that which Khrushchev was following when he was deposed. Since the majority of the "previously oppressed nations" had already won their independence, they now have the following new tasks to perform: (1) Achieve economic independence and social liberty, (2) institute radical reforms to improve the conditions of the masses, (3) eliminate poverty, and (4) permit the participation by the people in the administration of the country. The article reminds the reader that the people of the new countries have a choice between two social systems. The Communist system is against imperialism, and against capitalism. The new nations are made up mostly of backward peasants who initially followed the leadership of the bourgeoisie to gain independence, but who now are gradually joining in the struggle against capitalism. Many nations are taking the "non-capitalist" path, and others are expected to follow suit. This path links them with the socialist system.

⁷"On the Eve of Meeting in Havana," CDSP, Vol. XVII, No. 51, 12 Jan. 1966, p. 18.

While the revolutionary-democratic leaders are still viewed as having a role to play, the article seems to direct its message to the "popular masses". The Communist Parties are told that they must decide their own course; but it is suggested that they inform the people that the transition to socialism will be difficult, and that it will be slow. Alliances are suggested with all those who are leaning toward socialism, though the Parties are warned not to cater to the "petty-bourgeoisie of the national-revolutionary democrats." Burma is seen as having "progressive" leaders (military), but a non-progressive bureaucracy. The article includes an ideological sermon and makes the flat statement that some leaders in the young nations have been slow to accept Marxism-Leninism, but that they cannot make "a single anti-capitalist change (successfully and to the end) without turning to Marx, Engels or Lenin." The article also tries to come to terms with the problem of religion by recognizing that many of the national leaders and many of the people in the new nations are inclined to be religious. The Communists are admonished to find "a common language" with these people. The rationale provided is that the Russian Orthodox Church was linked to the monarchy and therefore was reactionary; however, Buddhism and Islam are religions of the oppressed peoples of Asia and Africa. The article holds out the hope that Buddhist and Moslem peasants can be convinced that the clergy is acting only in the interest of the landlords and the capitalists.

The article is fourteen pages long. At the very end, in a short paragraph, the Soviet writer makes what is probably the most direct Russian challenge to the thesis announced by the Chinese Defense Minister, Lin Piao, in September 1965. The Kommunist article states:

History has entrusted the Communists with the task of developing the most perfect and efficient political line concerning the national democrats who have assumed, or are assuming, power in the liberated countries. The successful practical solution of this problem will lead to the fact that the 'world countryside' will firmly adopt the socialist system, following the world city. (Italics mine.)⁸

Although the Russians have in recent years softened their approach toward the more militant aspects of Marxism-Leninism, they have shown a definite reluctance to modify certain aspects of their ideology. Perhaps the best illustration of their intransigence on the subject of the National Liberation Movement is the interview in December 1965 of Premier Kosygin by James Reston of the New York Times. Reston asked Kosygin how he could reconcile "peaceful coexistence" with "wars of national liberation". Kosygin replied that "wars of national liberation" were just wars, and that "they will continue as long as there is national oppression by imperialist powers". He singled out Southern Rhodesia as a country which would have a "liberation war", and South Vietnam which is having one now because the "people do not want to be

⁸R. Ul'yanovskiy, "Some Aspects of the non-Capitalist Development of the Liberated Countries," Translations from Kommunist, No. 1, Jan. 1966, pp. 100-114.

governed by United States puppets". "In countries which have not yet freed themselves from the colonial yoke" he said, "there is colonial slavery, worse perhaps than the Roman Empire."⁹

Reston retorted that the US was trying to rule out all wars--including wars of liberation--and to establish instead machinery for peaceful change.

Looking at the world situation, Kosygin observed:

Everywhere the United States is lending its support to the colonialists, to the side of the oppressed, take Portugal. Everywhere the United States seeks to assist the colonialist nations. You want the people not to rise up for their freedom.

There is a growing feeling of hatred for United States policies because of your support for the colonialists and oppressors.¹⁰

Reston retorted that this was a "monstrous distortion of American Policy".

Kosygin seemed almost incredulous over Reston's inability to see the world situation "objectively" since to Kosygin the US was not combating colonialism, but was killing innocent people in Vietnam, and was arming West Germany. He asked: "How can you fail to see this? If you don't see this how can you have any objective judgment? . . . Even a blind man can see what is happening . . . I wonder if you really believe what you were saying."¹¹

⁹Kosygin, interview by James Reston, New York Times, 8 Dec. 1965, p. 20.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Ibid.

These comments had been made without emotionalism; and the indications are that he was genuinely sincere and that he really saw the US as the supporter of colonialism and imperialistic oppression. He saw the US--to use a recent phrase of Senator Russell Long of Louisiana--as the "international bad guy" because of her alleged imperialistic policies.

SUMMARY

Brezhnev and Kosygin have adhered rather closely to the general line concerning the liberation movement which Khrushchev was using at the time he was deposed. There is evidence, however, in the many articles written on the subject in 1965, that the CPSU is not satisfied with the results of the program and is searching for something better. At the moment, it appears that the leadership of the Party considers the problem of winning over the underdeveloped nations to be an extremely difficult one. At the moment the Russians seem to be taking the position that the struggle in the backward countries will be a long and arduous one, and that in the meantime the local Communists should try to build a broader base by patiently educating the people to the advantages of the Communist system and by guiding the national leaders toward Marxism. Simultaneously, the Soviet Union is trying to convince the peoples and leaders of the new countries that their future lies with the Soviet Union and with Marxism-Leninism, that the aims of these countries are basically the same as those of the USSR, and that these countries are being

threatened by the imperialistic and neo-colonial policies of the United States. The Soviets seem for the time being to be convinced that it may take a long time to get the new countries on the "path to socialism".

CHAPTER 6

ANALYSIS

THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY

One cannot begin to understand the Soviet "national liberation movement" without first comprehending the importance of ideology to the men who have led the Marxist-Leninist movement.

These men have fervently believed that capitalism, like the other systems which preceded it, is a tyrannical, oppressive, and unjust social system. In this system, a relatively few people--the bourgeoisie--control the political and economic power of the nation--a power used to oppress the weak. The favored few live in luxury, but do little work. They declare the wars fought in their economic interest; while the masses do the fighting and the dying.

The bourgeoisie makes the laws, sets the conditions of labor, and imposes its philosophy on the masses. The masses have little recourse but to endure their physical and spiritual impoverishment, and to accept bourgeois propaganda which tries to instill the idea that the capitalist system is the best one available.

To the Communists, capitalist emphasis on free competition and individualism fosters bitter antagonisms and struggles for personal aggrandizement which results in a dog-eat-dog attitude between people. The system dooms great numbers of workers to

lives of poverty and want; and it frustrates the age old dream of brotherhood, freedom, and justice.

The Communists recognize that the bourgeois values of democracy, freedom, and humanitarianism are improvements over feudal values; but they insist that these meritorious ideals often do not find their way down to the masses--thus many workers enjoy little if any real democracy or freedom.

Marxists see the plight of the colonies and "dependent countries" as classic examples of the oppressive nature of capitalism.

Americans contend that the "capitalist" system described by the Communists is a monstrous distortion of today's social system in the United States. The dire circumstances described by the Communists may have a resemblance to England of the 1840's, but the condition of today's industrial worker bears no relationship whatsoever to those existing a hundred years ago.

Today's Communists recognize that changes have been made in capitalism since Marx's day, but they feel that the reforms were insufficient and were adopted only to head off serious threats to the position of the bourgeoisie. They point to the conditions in the advanced capitalist countries--to the continuing poverty of millions of workers, the deprivations of the slums, the large crime rates, the recurring economic crises, and the continuing bourgeoisie proclivity to resort to wars to gain economic advantage. They point to the efforts being made by the

bourgeoisie to "keep the underdeveloped nations in economic dependence" and to "exploit their natural wealth". They contend that the United States has had over one hundred years to improve the conditions of Latin America--yet poverty is still rampant.

Thus, the modern Communist does not share the American's rosy view of the advantages of capitalism. One of the clearest demonstrations of this disparity of views is seen in the Kosygin--Reston interview of 6 December 1965 in which it is clearly evident that Kosygin still sees capitalism as an evil, obsolescent system which is dying and should be replaced.

These Communist views on capitalism provide the ideological rationale for the theories and doctrines which the Communists have developed concerning the national liberation movement. These convictions, especially since Lenin's time, have provided the justification for Soviet action in the international arena.

It is a mistake to underestimate the role of Marxist ideology as a causative factor in Soviet actions. Yet, this is often done by many Americans who are so sure of the efficacy of their system and are so repelled by communism that they suspect that the Communist leaders probably do not really believe their own statements--and that any day now the Soviets will see the true light and adopt American methods. There is little hard evidence to support such wishful thinking. While the Soviets have occasionally utilized capitalist techniques as temporary expedients, they have shown little inclination to compromise with their basic ideals. During his visit to the United States, Khrushchev

demonstrated a firm conviction that it was the Americans who would eventually see the light.

Many "Kremlinologists" have suggested that ideology in the Soviet Union was eroded during the Khrushchev era. However, the erosion of which they speak concerns the revision of tactics and methods in reaching communism. But they show no real evidence that there is erosion of Soviet belief that the ills of the world are attributable to capitalism. Neither is there weakening of Russian desire to eliminate the capitalist system. The Soviets are still firmly of the belief that international problems all stem from Imperialism. In other words, modern Soviet leaders still perceive the world's ills much the same as did Marx and Lenin, and they still share the same aim: the achievement of world communism. Only the method of achieving this aim has been revised.

LIBERATION

Marxism-Leninism applies the term "liberation" to a variety of circumstances. Individuals, those whose labor is exploited by others, are to be liberated from the bourgeoisie and the landlords; the oppressed classes are to be liberated from the oppressing class; and nations are to be liberated from the control and oppression of other nations.

Underlying the idea of liberation is the Marxist conviction that the systems of feudalism and capitalism are forms of tyranny

which keep individuals and whole countries in economic, political and social bondage. The process of freeing the masses from the capitalists and the feudal lords is what is generally meant by Marxists when they speak of "liberation".

On the international plane, the Marxist use of the term liberation usually has reference to the freeing of colonies and "dependent" countries from the control and influence of the advanced capitalist countries. The colonies are seen as enriching the capitalists by providing them with raw materials, markets, an outlet for capital, a source of large profits, etc. In order to maximize their profits the capitalists not only drain off the wealth of the country, but leave the people impoverished and in virtual enslavement to the monopolies. The nation is prevented from modernizing or from taking any real measures to improve the plight of the people. These are the conditions from which the nation and its people should be liberated, and it is in this sense that the term liberation is used in doctrine of the National Liberation Movement.

STAGES IN THE NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT

Soviet theoreticians are great believers in attaining Communist goals by a succession of stages.

The goal of the National Liberation Movement with regard to a colony or to a "dependent" country is to bring about a condition in which Communists are in control in the country and the nation

is firmly "on the path to scientific socialism". The Soviets have contemplated several possibilities in reaching this goal. A colony invariably proceeds toward the objective by way of an intermediate goal; that is, by achieving political independence. Marxists expect the attainment of this objective to be accomplished by a revolution which in almost every case will be accompanied by violence. The process of winning political independence--or what Lenin called "self-determination"--is the first stage in the liberation movement.

From time to time, this first stage has been referred to in a variety of ways. It has been called the national-democratic revolution, the national liberation revolution, the bourgeois-democratic revolution, the bourgeois revolution, the national revolution, and the democratic revolution. Whatever the name given to it at a given time by the CPSU the goal is the same; political independence. A more accurate title for this stage of the movement would be Revolution for Political Independence. When the Communists add "bourgeois" to the title they are indicating the class which they expect will lead the revolution. When they mention "democratic" they are including an objective of the revolution, i.e., a greater degree of democracy.

It is expected that the first stage will involve a violent revolution. Victory brings political independence and a greater degree of freedom and democracy for the people. This first stage is highly important to Marxists-Leninists because it breaks the political link--at least to a degree--between the colony and the

metropole. By weakening the imperialist control, the colony also becomes much more vulnerable to the Communists.

The second stage of the National Liberation Movement involves a final assault on the objective; i.e., scientific socialism. During this stage the young nation makes the transition from capitalism or feudalism (or somewhere in between) to the system of scientific socialism. The term scientific socialism is being used here instead of communism because, technically, communism has not yet been achieved in any country and may still be generations away even for the most advanced socialist countries. While the distant goal is communism, the objective of the National Liberation Movement is to place a country securely in the hands of leaders who have opted for scientific socialism.

During the second stage, several tasks must be accomplished. The first and foremost is to sever the economic link with the former "mother" country, with other imperialist nations, and with the monopolies and cartels of the capitalists. Until this is done, the Soviets believe that the country cannot exercise real political independence and freedom of action.

Another task to be accomplished in the second stage, and one which proceeds simultaneously with the struggle for economic independence, is the seizure of power by the local Communists. From the Soviet point of view it is preferable that this task be accomplished peacefully and without civil war--but they do not rule out the use of violence if that is the only way the

objective can be reached. In recent years, the Soviets have played down the use of violence in the second stage; and the Chinese have differed with them on this point.

The problem of how to gain power and to put a country on the path to socialism has plagued Communist leaders from the beginning. There have been two main viewpoints as to how this can best be done.

On the one hand is the Leftist approach in which the local Communists demand extreme social and national reforms. They do not cooperate with the government and act independently from it. They keep pressure on the national leaders by stirring up workers and alienating them from the government. This is the "united front" from below and involves a one-stage revolution.

On the other hand is the Rightist approach in which the local Communists stress national aims and integrate their actions with the national leaders through a popular front. Other political leaders are accepted temporarily and although their reforms are supported, the Communists steadily try to divide the other leaders, weaken them, and work themselves into key positions in the country. This is the "united front" from above and is usually conducted as a two stage revolution.¹

After Stalin had failed when he employed the Rightist approach in China in 1927, he veered to the left. In 1935 he

¹Donald S. Zagoria, "Communist Policy and the Struggle for Developing Countries," Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, pp. 70-72.

turned to the right with the United Front approach, and he later turned back to the left. After Stalin's death, the pendulum was swung back to the right. Since about 1954 the USSR has been using the classical Rightist strategy; varying their tactics and slogans from time to time.² Initially, Khrushchev embraced certain bourgeois-national regimes which he called "states of national democracy", and he gave them military and economic aid. In return, he expected them to oppose Western political and economic influence, maintain military neutrality, display friendship for the USSR, implement radical reforms, and permit Communist Parties to operate. The Party Program of 1961 authorized aid to the bourgeois-national regimes but withheld ideological indorsement by denouncing "socialism of the national type". Khrushchev later modified his ideological reservations by indorsing certain leaders whom he called "revolutionary-democratic statesmen". His only proviso was that they be friendly to the USSR, release imprisoned Communists, and advocate "non-capitalist methods" of solving national problems. He had recognized that the ruling group in some of the new countries were not bourgeois at all--but the intelligentsia or the military. He seems to have been carried away with the progress of Algeria and the UAR and he announced (albeit prematurely) that they had "embarked on the path of socialist construction". However, there is evidence that his exuberance was not shared by all in the CPSU. Since Khrushchev left office, the Kremlin has recognized regimes as "building

²Ibid., p. 72.

socialism" if they integrate with the local Communist Party. Other regimes are described as making "progressive transformations" or "non-capitalist development".³ The new leaders in the Kremlin apparently find the problems of getting the young countries on the "path to socialism" to be a very difficult one, and for the moment, they are continuing to support the revolutionary-democrats while trying to develop a broad mass following.

It appears that the Russians believe that they can still ride the nationalist wave to victory as they did in Cuba and Vietnam, because of promising signs in Algeria, Guinea, Ghana, Mali, and Burma.

Mao, on the other hand, has been using what Zagoria considers to be a modified Right approach in which a two stage revolution is conducted. The Communist gain power in the second stage after developing the proper conditions in the first. Communist goals are identified with mass goals, and they promise more than the nationalists. The Leftist technique of insisting on Communist leadership of the front is used along with the establishment of a separate power base which can exert pressure from below. This is closer to the strategy of the united front from below in which nationalism is exploited without leaving the Communists vulnerable to the nationalists.⁴

³Uri Ra'an, "Moscow and the 'Third World,'" Problems of Communism, pp. 23-24.

⁴Zagoria, op. cit., p. 71.

The Soviets and the Chinese have two other significant differences over the National Liberation Movement:

The first concerns the relative importance of the liberation movement vis-a-vis the socialist movement in the advanced countries. The Chinese consider the National Liberation Movement to be of such importance that it should receive primary importance in the context of the world socialist revolution. The Soviets recognize that the liberation movement is important, but they feel that it is important only in so far as it contributes to the demise of Western capitalism. To the Soviets, the socialist revolution in the advanced countries should receive primary emphasis. The current debate, incidentally, is quite similar to the Lenin-Roy debate of 1920--although the arguments are more subtle--with the Russians taking the Lenin view and the Chinese closer to Roy.

The second difference concerns the possibility of a "peaceful transition to socialism". The Russians would favor such a transition while the Chinese believe that experience indicates that violence will in all probability be necessary and therefore Communists should prepare for it rather than preoccupying themselves with a peaceful approach.

In recent years, the Soviet leaders have maintained that both the first and second stages of the liberation movement might be affected simultaneously. This might occur as it did in North Vietnam where the two revolutions ran concurrently. When the two stages are conducted separately, the problem of initiating a successful second stage has proved to be an extremely difficult one for the Communists.

MARXISM AND REVOLUTION

Modern Soviet communism is Marxism applied with little change to today's Russia. One of the principal differences between Marxism and the other brands of socialism is the matter of revolution. The other socialist forms assume that socialism can be achieved by evolutionary and gradual means and without a violent revolution. Marxism-Leninism contends that in order to liberate the masses there must be a revolution, which in nearly all countries, with few exceptions, is certain to be accompanied by violence because of the hostile opposition which the bourgeoisie is certain to mount against it.

Contrary to the views held by many in the West, Soviet Marxist doctrine does not prescribe the bringing about of communism throughout the world by military conquest. Marxist ideology does not preclude the USSR initiating a war in the interest of its own security (as it did against Finland), but offensive war is not the prescribed method of achieving socialist ends. It is true that Lenin in 1915 had spoken of the possible necessity of coming out-- "even with armed force against the exploiting classes and their states",¹ and later he spoke of the inevitability of war between capitalism and communism--and of the use of Soviet arms in this struggle; but these isolated statements did not alter the main thrust of his policy toward capitalism; that is, to bring it down with revolution.

¹Lenin, Selected Works, Vol. V, p. 141.

What the Soviets have repeatedly stated--and have adhered to rather closely--is a policy of trying to bring about communism by revolution. They are convinced that capitalism will be weakened by its own contradictions and will fall--country by country--as a result of revolutions led, preferably, by local Communist Parties. The Soviets do not hide the fact that they encourage such revolutions or that they will support them once they have begun. But the revolution must be, fundamentally and foremost, a local uprising, and it must be carried out primarily by the local people. They do not consider the type of assistance they give the local Communist revolutionaries to be the "export of revolution" any more than the French assistance to the Americans was "export of revolution" during the American Revolutionary War. The revolution must be a local movement which is attuned to local conditions. Care must be taken not to begin the revolution too soon or too late; but only when the "objective conditions" are right.

It would appear at first glance that the North Korean Communists flagrantly violated the doctrine of revolution when they openly attacked South Korea. However, the desire to unify the country was probably just as strong to the North Koreans as the wish to extend communism. At any rate, efforts to unify a nation are certainly not contrary to Lenin's teachings. Lenin envisaged complete national entities which, ultimately, would be associated with the other nations in a world Communist commonwealth. He was not only in favor of complete national groupings, but he also tended to favor larger voluntary mergers of nations.

The Communist have in the past and will continue to take advantage of the emotional desire for unification in those countries where nationalities are split. They will associate themselves with the unification movement--just as they do with the independence movement--with the hope that they can capitalize on the revolutionary ferment and work themselves into positions of control. Ideally, Communists would prevail during the unification upheaval and the newly unified nation would become a Communist state.

The revolutionary theme of Marxism-Leninism was directed not only at the proletariat but also at the colonies and the "dependent" countries. The National Liberation Movement is revolutionary in character. Marxism does not suggest that the Communist countries "liberate" the colonies by armed attack. The doctrine says that the colonies themselves should revolt and that the colonies themselves should shoulder the main burden in this regard. They would of course be assisted by the Communist states.

WARS OF NATIONAL LIBERATION

The idea of freeing the colonies by revolution and civil war dates back to Marx. Lenin saw the revolutionary potential of the liberation movement so he expanded on Marx's thesis and developed it into a formal doctrine. Lenin made an even clearer appeal for revolution and he widened the appeal to include all oppressed peoples instead of just the proletariat. In two instances Lenin

actually used the term "war of liberation", and in two other instances he used "national-liberation war".⁶

Although all the Soviet leaders have concurred in the idea that the colonies should be liberated by revolutionary wars, it remained for Khrushchev, in January 1961, to bestow on these struggles a title which was to capture the imagination of Communists and non-Communists: "wars of national liberation". By listing these struggles as one of the three forms of war, Khrushchev gave them an aura of legitimacy--especially since he branded the other two forms of war to be infeasible instruments of state policy in the nuclear age. He proposed to rule out world wars and limited wars as too great a danger to the survival of mankind, and he implied that nations who contemplated such wars were war-mongers. Since the Soviet Union is against such wars, then the implication is that it is a peace-loving nation.

Khrushchev argued that the support of "wars of national liberation" was not a war-like act and the wars themselves were not bad. On the contrary, they were "just" and "sacred".⁷ In other words, wars between states were bad; revolutions against feudalism or capitalism were good. While it is perfectly proper for socialist countries to support these revolutions--even with materiel of war--it is indeed improper and wrong for the capitalist

⁶Lenin, Selected Works, Vol. V, pp. 139, 124; Lenin, The National Liberation Movement, pp. 96, 101.

⁷US Congress, Senate, Committee on Judiciary, Analysis of the Khrushchev Speech of 6 January 1961, p. 63.

states to support a non-Communist government which is being rebelled against. If this thesis were accepted, Communist revolutions could be fomented and waged and supported with impunity, and the West would be obliged to stand by and do nothing about it.

The West, of course, disagrees with the entire thesis including the basic assumption that the "capitalist" system is more evil than the Communist system, or that any nation which is not Communist and is not moving toward communism should have its government overthrown by revolution. The West is opposed to wars and violent revolution as a means of bringing about social change, and it hopes that such violence can be prevented by diplomacy and through the means of international organizations.

In speaking of wars of liberation, Kosygin put most of his emphasis during his December 1965 interview by James Reston on the necessity of eliminating colonial oppression; but he did not limit these wars to colonies since he also mentioned South Vietnam. Of interest is the fact that he referred to the situation in the Dominican Republic as a "war". It is evident that imperialism is still the culprit to the Russians, and they are prepared to support liberation wars which are fought--by either colonies or other oppressed nations--to overthrow the imperialistic oppressors.

Recently President Johnson referred to the situation in South Vietnam and asked, "If this 'war of liberation' triumphs, who will be 'liberated' next?"⁸ The answer is that these wars may

⁸Washington Post, 17 Feb. 1966, p. 1.

appear in any of the underdeveloped countries where Communists are able to build up sufficient strength either alone or in a coalition to challenge a non-Communist government, and where attempts to suppress the ensuing insurrection leads to violence. There has been absolutely no indication that the Soviet leaders intend to modify the Marxist goal of "liberating" the underdeveloped nations from Western Imperialism and from bourgeois "oppression". It is true, however, that they have softened their proposed method of achieving this goal. The Soviets now stress "peaceful transition to socialism"; meaning that violence should be deemphasized during the second stage of the revolution. Since this is the stage that most countries are now in, the "peaceful transition" policy suggests that the likelihood of war developing during this phase will be somewhat less. This policy, however, does not rule out violence; and recent events indicate that when the pro-Communist forces have resorted to violence, the Kremlin has rendered them moral and material aid. It should be noted, however, that the Soviets have been careful not to deploy troops, except in Cuba, where they might have a confrontation with American troops.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSIONS

The National Liberation Movement is a Communist strategy which concerns the separation of the colonies and semi-colonies from the control and influence of the Western Powers; and the bringing of the colonies and semi-colonies into the Communist Camp.

This movement is one of two basic Marxist-Leninist strategies for overthrowing the bourgeoisie, and for replacing the capitalist system with the Communist system. The other strategy is proletarian revolution in the advanced capitalist countries. The Soviets have traditionally placed more importance on the latter strategy. The Chinese prefer to place primary emphasis on the liberation movement; and this difference of viewpoint has contributed to the Sino-Soviet schism.

The movement has as its ultimate objective the adoption of scientific socialism by all of the countries of the underdeveloped world.

The ultimate objective would be achieved in two stages--which may or may not run concurrently. The goal of the first stage is to win political independence for the colonies; while the goal of the second stage is to place Communists in control of the nation.

The National Liberation Movement had its genesis in Marx and Engels who considered capitalism--and its colonial manifestation--to be a form of slavery and oppression. As oppressed nations, the colonies and semi-colonies should be liberated.

Marx's and Engel's role in the development of the liberation movement was limited to a critique of capitalism and colonialism. It remained for Lenin and his successors to spell out the doctrine of how to actually achieve liberation.

Little real progress was made in the movement until the end of World War II. The War and a combination of other factors hastened the decolonialization process and by 1966 most of the colonies had won political independence. Therefore, the Soviet Communists are now concerned with implementing the second stage of the movement.

In order to achieve their objectives in both stages, the Soviets have associated themselves with the national aspirations of the peoples of the underdeveloped areas; hoping that to do so would permit them to capture the national revolutions which had arisen everywhere after the war.

A principal obstruction to Soviet aims is the continued presence and influence of the Western Powers in the underdeveloped areas. To eliminate this influence the Soviets have tried to convince the new nations that continued Western interests--especially those of the United States--are purely imperialistic. The Soviets themselves are still convinced of this; that is, that United States interests in these areas are based primarily on a desire to profit economically from the association.


The Soviets would prefer that the second stage of the liberation movement be accomplished peacefully because violence might invite United States intervention--which may in turn lead to war between

the US and the USSR. Nevertheless, if a local armed insurrection starts with the object of winning power for the Communists, the Soviets will consider this a "war of liberation" and will support it. This support will be designed to provide the local insurgents with the capability of winning their own revolution without Soviet military intervention. The USSR has not sent troops to assist such a "war of liberation" except in Cuba.

The Soviets have been pragmatic in trying to find a successful formula for achieving their goals; however, their efforts have not been productive in recent years in terms of actually winning over any countries to communism. Recent indications are that the new Soviet leaders foresee a long hard struggle in the underdeveloped areas. They are hoping that the Nassers and the Sukarnos will take the final plunge for communism the way Castro did, and that other national leaders will follow suit. In the meantime, the local Communist Parties have been advised by the Kremlin to develop mass support for communism in their respective countries.

The latest Soviet attitudes toward the underdeveloped world, and the National Liberation Movement, are less hostile than those of the Chinese Communists. The Soviets are not calling for violent revolution in these countries. They apparently would prefer to achieve their aims without precipitating local violence which might lead to a military confrontation with the United States. The Soviet approach--if it convinces native leaders to voluntarily adopt

scientific socialism--will in the long run be more dangerous to
US interests than the more militant approach of the Chinese.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Charles P. Biggio, Jr.", with a large, stylized flourish at the end.

CHARLES P. BIGGIO, JR.
Col, Artillery

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