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8 April 1966

WINNING IN THE PAST: THE IMPLICATIONS TODAY

By


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Winning in the Past: The Implications Today

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8 April 1966

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SUMMARY

In the world environment of today, the threat of general war appears to be receding, as the likelihood of confrontations and limited wars increases. The American people, then, who are more familiar with winning general wars, may have to learn to live with a new definition of what it means to win a war, both militarily and politically. It is the purpose of this paper to review the Revolutionary War, World War I, and World War II as a means of determining what it meant for Americans to win in the past and the implications of that type of win in today's environment.

A background of each war establishes the setting within which American attitudes and war aims were developed. Actions resulting from accomplishing these war aims are used as a substrate from which is distilled, "what it meant to win."

It is concluded that, in each of these wars, the victor won:

- (1) the right to control and shape elements of national power;
- (2) the right to determine sovereignty; (3) the right to approve the distribution of lands and peoples among sovereign entities; and,
- (4) the obligation to solve problems of national and international relations, peace, and order. It is also concluded that the American people have a basic, instinctive feeling toward isolationism and non-intervention, and are reluctant to engage in war. It is further concluded that the American people, after having been forced into war, seem to change their attitude to one of desiring the total defeat and punishment of their enemies.

If Americans cling to this concept of what it means to win, and insist upon defeating and punishing their enemies, the implications in today's environment of limited wars are: (1) the United States Government may be denied the use of war, or the threat of war, as a rational political instrument; or (2) the American people may become frustrated over never winning, and revert to isolationism and non-intervention, which would be disastrous for the free world.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In these days of widespread strife, violence, bloodshed, and social change it frequently is difficult to distinguish friend from foe, combatant from non-combatant, or soldier from civilian. In addition, it is generally recognized that the pattern of conflict has changed. The wars of today and the potential contests of tomorrow do not seem to fit the pattern to which Americans have become accustomed; no longer is it possible to sign, seal, and deliver wars in a neat package. These conflicts even resist attempts to categorize them. Thus, thinking people are now asking themselves this question: "How will we know when we have won a war?" Perhaps there is a single answer; or it may be that there are as many different answers as there are conflicts. In either event, it seems logical that if one is to contemplate what it means to win today, he must first try to understand what it meant to win in the past. This paper, then, is directed toward a better understanding of America's wins in the past, and what impact those wins may have upon American thinking of today and tomorrow.

War, as we usually understand it, means armed conflict among people. It is not a contest between machines, or supplies, or animals; it is a contest between groups of human beings. It is a conflict generated when the needs, interests, desires, aspirations, or concepts of people have come into opposition and require a

decision in trial-by-combat. Therefore, an American win can be best understood when examined in its own environment: the situation leading to war, the feeling of Americans toward conflict, and the war aims or objectives of the United States.

Obviously, military operations are important to winning a war. However, they have been treated at great length in a number of books, and need not be considered here as they would not add substance to the paper.

Many definitions could be contrived to explain a win in exact terms, but wars of the past have terminated under such a wide spectrum of conditions that it is doubtful that one definition would be adequate for all wars. In general, though, people have been able to distinguish the victors from the vanquished, the winners from the losers, and the conquerors from the conquered. More specifically, wars seem to have been concluded in one of four ways: (1) hostilities ceased by mutual consent of the combatants, but neither side gained its objectives in the war, (2) hostilities ceased by mutual consent of the combatants, and both sides accomplished some of their objectives, (3) hostilities ceased by mutual consent of the combatants, and one side accomplished some or all of its objectives, or (4) hostilities ceased when one side subjugated the other, thereby, accomplishing its objectives. In the first instance, people have generally considered the war to be a draw or stalemate without a win. The second instance seems to have created much confusion as to whether a win did occur; and, if there

was a win, to whom it should be accredited. In the latter two situations, people have usually ascribed a win to the side accomplishing its objectives. It is with this intuitive understanding of "win," then, that this paper begins, and attempts to go from the general to the specific.

To keep the study within manageable limits, it will be confined to three major American wars involving European or Asiatic nations: the Revolutionary War, World War I, and World War II. In each case, the environment prior to war will be reviewed to establish the setting of the war and feelings of the American people toward entering the war. United States' war aims or objectives, in the context of an intuitive win, will be used to derive the meaning of the win in each war. Finally, pertinent portions of each case will be brought together in a synthesis of what it meant to win in the past, and the implication of that type of win upon American thinking--today and tomorrow.

CHAPTER 2

REVOLUTIONARY WAR

The American Revolution began long before the "shot that was heard around the world." Here was a situation in which the mother country, England, lived by tradition, precedence, and a rigid, stereotyped system. England enjoyed her position in the world, and the elite enjoyed its position in England; the mother country was old and static, a status quo nation. The 13 colonies, often referred to as the colonies, America, and American colonies, on the other hand, were young, vital, and dynamic. Establishment of many groups of people in the American wilderness with ideas of individualism, representation, and Protestantism led to the creation of ideas and concepts which widely diverged from those evolving in England. The new needs, desires, wants, and points of view resulted in a demand by American colonists that they be allowed to live their own lives in their own way. Such divergence of interests between mother country and colonies could not be reconciled, and inevitably led to an ideological conflict which reached its climax in the Declaration of Independence.

The colonies had existed for two centuries in the new and remote land, while passively resisting England's rule almost from the beginning. Colonial Americans had become used to managing their own affairs, and had assumed the right to self-direction without interference. By the middle of the 18th century, this habit of self-direction was evident throughout the fabric of

colonial life. American institutions, practices, and ideals had grown away from those of England during the colonial economic, political, religious, and psychological evolution. Americans had built a new way of life and outlook, one based on "liberty," one which they regarded as their very own. Thus, the underlying, basic causes of the Revolution truly lay in the hearts of men.

BACKGROUND

Britain controlled colonial economic life for more than a century under the Navigation Laws and Acts of Trade. In the beginning, Americans grudgingly tolerated this control, because there were some encouragements and protections for the colonial economy, and because the Laws and Acts were not effectively enforced. However, by 1750, Americans saw that colonial economic development must eventually conflict with the mercantilistic colonial policy of Britain. With the end of the Seven Years War, Britain began to tax Americans for support of future colonial defense, and began to tighten enforcement of the Laws and Acts regulating colonial trade. Passage of the Revenue Act of 1764 showed that England intended to enforce her system of control, and the implications of stronger control over colonial commerce thoroughly alarmed the Americans.¹

The colonies were a long way from England in terms of time and distance, and Americans, through neglect on the part of England or

¹John M. Ludlow, The War of American Independence, pp. 64-69. Max Seville, "Road to Revolution," in Problems in American History, Richard W. Leopold and Arthur S. Link, ed., pp. 45-48. John C. Miller, Origins of the American Revolution, Chap. One.

desire on the part of colonials, or both, assumed a large measure of self-direction. Mid-eighteenth century colonial ideals and political institutions had grown to a point where they differed widely from the original English concepts from which they evolved. Concepts and practices relating to political representation, suffrage qualifications, and operation of the law had grown away from the ideas held in England. Thoughts differed as to the nature of the colonial and imperial constitutions, and the constitutional relationships among various functions of government. The overall political problem had become one of deciding the line of demarcation between the rights of a British government based on ancient experience and institutions, and the rights of Americans based on new experience in a new situation. The basic question, then, was whether the relationship between England and her colonies was based on real substance, or was merely the ties of a legal relationship.²

The notion that many early settlers had fled from England in order to evade religious persecution was a powerful, deep-rooted belief in the colonies. Most colonials were non-Anglicans, and were moving in the direction of complete separation of church from any official connection with the state. These "dissenters" were ever fearful that there might be an extension of the Anglican Church, which they distrusted and criticized, into the colonies.³

²Saville, op. cit., pp. 48-50. Miller, op. cit., Chap. Two.

³Richard B. Morris, The American Revolution: A Short History, pp. 43-44. George E. Howard, "Preliminaries of the Revolution," in The American Nation: A History, Albert Hart, ed., Chap. XII. Saville, op. cit., pp. 50-51.

During the 18th century, masses of immigrants arrived from Europe, resulting in a rapid increase of population among the colonies. This large body of Scotsmen, Irishmen, Frenchmen, Dutchmen, Germans, Swedes, and others had never known Britain, and felt no particular allegiance to her. As these non-Englishmen pushed on into the wilderness, they resented Britain's attempts to prevent them from occupying the West and openly protested against the restrictions placed upon them.

Despite differences and divisions among themselves, colonial Englishmen and non-Englishmen began to feel a devotion to their provinces. Gradually they became aware of a belief that they were different from the British people, and by the time of the Revolution there was a feeling of pride in being Americans and a loyalty to American tradition. Common ideals and common aspirations reached beyond provincial boundaries, along with a sense of destiny for America. An uniquely American ideal had been born.⁴

In the 1760's, it was generally recognized that Parliament was the supreme lawmaking body for the British Empire. Colonials, wishing to assure their representation, insisted that they had a right to sit in Parliament; meanwhile, conveniently ignoring the fact that not all parts of England itself were represented in Parliament. In addition to this representation, Americans believed that the colonies should continue to have their own representative assemblies to administer internal affairs.

⁴Howard, op. cit., p. 11. Miller, op. cit., p. 53. Savelle, op. cit., pp. 51-52.

It was soon realized, however, that representation in Parliament was not practical. The distances were too great for effective participation, and the colonies probably would always be outvoted, anyway. Besides, there was a possibility that representation in Parliament might lead to abolition of the colonial assemblies. Therefore, the demand for American representation in Parliament quietly died.⁵

Meanwhile, Parliament continued to reorganize the British Empire and passed the Sugar Act in 1764, which brought excited protests from the merchants over control of the colonies' commerce. Taxation, in the form of the Stamp Act of 1765, was felt by the general population, resulting in wide-spread denunciation and resistance. Almost immediately, colonial legislature after legislature asserted that its members alone had the right to levy taxes. There were no lawful means whereby the colonies could express their discontent in a united voice; therefore, the Stamp Act Congress, consisting of representatives from nine colonies, met and wrote a Declaration against Parliamentary taxation. It also petitioned King George III, the House of Lords, and House of Commons for repeal of the Stamp Act. American merchants, acting on their own, stopped importing English goods, and British merchants, who suffered the effects of the stoppage, soon petitioned Parliament for repeal of the Act.⁶

⁵Savelle, op. cit., pp. 54-56.

⁶Miller, op. cit., Chap. V-VII. Savelle, op. cit., pp. 56-59. Howard, op. cit., Chap. VI-IX.

Whatever the reason, Parliament repealed the Act in 1765, but asserted its right to legislate for the colonies in all cases whatever. Soon thereafter, in 1767, it passed the Townshend duties on American imports to raise revenue for support of Britain's protection of the colonies; the New York legislature was suspended by Parliament; and the system for enforcing Navigation Acts was tightened.⁷ These actions angered the colonials, and resistance broke out again. Many Americans were now claiming that any legislation affecting domestic affairs must involve taxation of some sort and that Parliament had no right to tax the colonies in any way; therefore, the colonies must renounce the power of Parliament to legislate upon any internal colonial affairs. Now, the dispute between England and the colonies was no longer one of taxation or representation, but one concerning Parliament's authority over the colonies and the degree of self-government due the colonies.⁸

During the decade prior to 1776, American Whigs almost unknowingly had evolved a concept that the colonies were autonomous governmental units within a British Empire, which was a federation of quasi-sovereign states bound together by allegiance to the British Crown. Admittedly, Parliament had the right to legislate on matters of inter-colonial and external relations, but colonials maintained it had no power over internal affairs of the colonies. The colonists believed that they had always been autonomous, that the original charters had granted them autonomy, and that as

⁷Howard, op. cit., Chap. X.

⁸Saville, op. cit., pp. 59-62.

Englishmen they had a right to be autonomous. Further, they believed a "tyrannical" Parliament had introduced revolutionary ideas and practices into the long established status quo by instituting its program of control and taxation in 1763; therefore, the mother country had initiated radical courses of action intended to make second-class citizens of the colonials. Thus, Americans were obliged to preserve what they believed to be their rights of self-government as Englishmen; they considered themselves to be conservatives because they were trying to preserve the only way of life they had ever known.⁹

Most Englishmen and American Tories, on the other hand, held firmly to the belief that the Empire was an integrated unit, a whole, an indivisible nation with Parliament as its supreme legislature. Inherent in this belief was the idea that each and every subject of the Crown, no matter where, was bound by the acts of Parliament. Even Englishmen such as William Pitt and Edmund Burke, while concerned over the authority of Parliament to tax the colonies, held to this basic belief. To most Englishmen it was unthinkable that British subjects anywhere could challenge the authority of Parliament to pass any law it deemed right and proper. Therefore, the American Whig view was a new, subversive, revolutionary doctrine which threatened to destroy the integrity of the Empire. Consequently, the English were obliged to defend the old institutions

⁹ Miller, op. cit., Chap. VIII. Savelle, op. cit., p. 86.

and ideals, and they considered themselves to be conservatives since they were trying to maintain the status quo.¹⁰

From the British point of view, the American colonists had rebelled, and the colonial proposal for partial autonomy was tantamount to dissolution of the Empire. In the summer of 1775, the King refused to receive the "Olive Branch petition" on the grounds that the Continental Congress was an illegal body.¹¹ After a spring and summer of overt armed conflict and obvious colonial revolt, King George III addressed Parliament and expressed his intentions toward the colonies. He indicated that the rebellion was being conducted for the purpose of establishing an independent empire; then, went on to say that he had increased his naval and land forces for the purpose of bringing a speedy end to the disorders. He continued by pointing out that he would be ready to receive the submission of any province or colony when the people came to their senses and pledged their allegiance to the Crown.¹² In a sense, this address was an ultimatum to the rebellious colonials which required unconditional surrender of their political ideals.

Each side had raised the standards for its crusade, and neither side could retreat without renouncing its ideology in this monumental misunderstanding. The stage was set for the final act: decision by armed conflict.

¹⁰Miller, op. cit., Chap. IX. Savelle, op. cit., pp. 86-87.

¹¹Samuel E. Morison and Henry S. Commager, The Growth of the American Republic, Vol. 1, pp. 186-187.

¹²King George III, as quoted by Savelle, op. cit., pp. 80-81.

WAR AIMS

American Whigs could not return to the conditions existing prior to the revolt without renouncing their political philosophies. Radical Whigs believed in the ideals expressed in the Declaration of Independence, believed in democracy, and wanted to secede immediately. Conservative Whigs believed the revolution could be used to assume power from the Tories, and establish an aristocratic Whig government; they had no intention of establishing democracy in the colonies. Conservatives had no real desire to secede, but were swept along with the radical elements of the party. Tories, on the other hand, remained loyal to the Crown, and refused to accept independence, even after it was declared. They feared the revolution could not be kept under the control of gentlemen, and that common people would take control of the government from the aristocracy.¹³

As a result of these differences, the Declaration of Independence was designed to serve a three-fold purpose. First, the United States of America announced to the world that they had established a new form of government; a government based upon an untried political philosophy, the unalienable rights of men.

Second, a large portion of the Declaration was devoted to what we now might call propaganda. Many colonials had become disenchanted with Parliament and were ready to discard it, but could not bring themselves to renounce their allegiance to the sovereign. By

¹³Miller, op. cit., pp. 55-60, 497-505.

avoiding statements against Parliament and heaping many evils upon the King, the Declaration attempted to give each colonist reasons he could accept for repudiating his allegiance to the Crown.¹⁴

And, third, the aims of the revolution were expressed in the last paragraph of the Declaration in these words:

We. . .solemnly publish and declare, That these United Colonies are, and of Right, ought to be Free and Independent States; that they are Absolved from all Allegiance to the British Crown, and that all political connection between them and the State of Great Britain, is and ought to be totally dissolved. . . ."¹⁵

There is little room to doubt that the objective of the revolution was unconditional independence and sovereignty over the colonies.

DISCUSSION

A new, vital, antithetical social and political philosophy had taken root in America, which left King George III with three alternatives: absorb the new philosophy and risk its spread to the remainder of the Empire, free the colonies, or crush the revolt. The first two alternatives were rejected by the King. In announcing to Parliament his decision to stop the revolt, King George, in effect, demanded unconditional surrender of the colonies to the Crown. The stakes in the game were high: loss of a large portion of the Empire or loss of colonial independence. Failure of the sides to reason together, compromise, or accommodate inevitably led to a protracted, bitterly fought war of brother against brother and

¹⁴Morison and Commager, op. cit., pp. 189-191.

¹⁵United States Code, 1964 ed., pp. XXVII-XXIX.

brother against Indian. The King's insistence on unconditional surrender to the Crown left both sides exhausted by war, both treasuries depleted, the Empire shattered, and a deep animosity between the two peoples which lasted over a century.

At the conclusion of the war, all Americans realized that a new nation had been born, and set about the business of establishing a government. What was not immediately recognized, however, was that radical Whigs also had won a victory over the Tories and conservative Whigs. The democratic movement, which Tories and conservative Whigs alike had dreaded so much, had been launched. A people had risen and declared they would govern themselves, and no longer would one man or one class of men govern by right of birth. No longer would these people make a compact with a ruler to protect "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness"; the people would protect these rights themselves. A new social force had been unleashed which would sweep over the Americas, Western Europe, and parts of Asia. It would be the basis for most of the important liberal reform movements of the 19th century, and would impinge upon the governments of France, England, Germany, Greece, Italy and almost all other European countries.¹⁶ Ironically, almost two centuries after its birth, democracy would be locked in a titanic world struggle with another social movement spawned by revolution.

But something went awry in translating democracy into practice. Among the colonists, opinions toward negroes ran the gamut from one

¹⁶Henry Cabot Lodge, The Story of the Revolution, Vol. 2, Chap. X.

extreme to the other: some colonists did not consider negroes as part of society at all, while others considered negroes as their equals. Jefferson's draft of the Declaration of Independence contained a burning paragraph against slavery, which was struck from the document at the insistence of Southern and New England delegates.¹⁷ Promulgation of the Declaration led to rising expectations among the slaves and free negroes, based upon the general tenor of the Declaration and its emotion packed wording. Eventually, the Congress and 11 states passed acts ranging from voluntary emancipation to abolition of slavery.¹⁸ However, the problem of slavery in America was not faced squarely and resolved; it became an emotional issue in a great civil war a century later, and was to produce social problems two centuries later.

Most first generation American leaders believed the Old World and New World were distinctly different, and should be kept apart politically. In their eyes, Europe was embroiled in frequent wars and gripped by ancient hatreds; it was a personification of corruption, degeneracy, and tyrannical monarchies.¹⁹ Thomas Paine argued that the colonies had to break away from England to avoid being caught in her wars. George Washington warned against permanent foreign alliances. Jefferson and Monroe added their weight on the side of "isolationism" in the great debate on American foreign

¹⁷Editors of American Heritage, The American Heritage Book of The Revolution, p. 147.

¹⁸Benjamin Quarles, The Negro in the American Revolution, Chap. III.

¹⁹Richard N. Current, "Foundations of Foreign Policy Beginning the Great Debate (1776-1826)," in Problems in American History, Richard W. Leopold and Arthur S. Link, ed., pp. 192-193.

policy. As a result of this early feeling toward the Old World, the United States became an "isolationist" nation until World War I, and did not ratify a treaty of alliance between 1778 and 1949.²⁰

What conclusions, then, may be made from this look at the Revolutionary War? First, it is abundantly clear that the colonists did not desire a war with England, and engaged in a trial-by-combat only after having been provoked to the point where there was no alternative. Second, this was a war of principles and emotions, and neither the King nor the colonists would or could compromise their positions. And, third, to win meant the victors had the right to control and shape the elements of national power within the area of the colonies, the right to determine sovereignty, the right to approve the distribution of land and people among the States, and the obligation to solve problems relating to federal and international relations, peace, and order.

Obviously, Revolutionary America was unlike World War I America in many respects. In the interim, generations came and went, the Industrial Revolution changed the lives of millions of people, a continent was spanned and tamed, and America became a mighty nation under a strong federal government. However, one idea which these two Americas held in common was the concept of what it meant to win a major war.

²⁰Morison and Commager, op. cit., p. 265.

CHAPTER 3

WORLD WAR I

Politically, Europe was at peace after the Franco-Prussian War. To be sure, there was a Russo-Japanese War, which established Japan as a major power, and the Russo-Turkish War; but, by and large, things were peaceful on the surface. Intensely nationalistic Europe was master of the world, with the exception of isolationist United States, and Europe considered itself as "the world." In this context, the world was composed of sovereign states, each of which had a right to exist. This concept was upheld by the Concert of Europe, whose purpose was to maintain international order. The idea of international law was in the air, but nothing was being done toward curbing the sovereignty of individual states. Sovereignty, as understood by all, denied the existence of any higher authority or law, and power remained the last resort among states; but there was general agreement on the desirability of an equilibrium of forces, a balance of power to prevent war.

BACKGROUND

Britain was an old nation, governed by a Parliament and well versed in democracy. She was an Imperial power controlling almost a quarter of the globe, and still bent upon an expansionist course, even though self-government was being promoted in the colonies under an overall policy of a close-linked Empire and free trade

within the Imperial domain. England's interests ran the length of Africa from Egypt to the southern tip, and around the rim of Asia from Constantinople to China. Highly industrialized, she depended upon imports and exports for her existence; hence, her navies were required to rule the world seas. The standing army was small and professionally competent, and Britain was generally conceded to be the dominant power in the world.

France had been unstable politically since the days of her revolution, and at various times had been a republic, an empire, and a monarchy. Even after Napoleon's defeat, France was acknowledged as the ranking power on the Continent, and she continued her long rivalry with England. But, France lost her power status to Germany as a result of being crushed in the Franco-Prussian War, and a new rivalry started. German annexation of Alsace-Lorraine created a point of irreconcilable difference between France and Germany, and all subsequent French governments were committed to correcting this wrong. France had long feared the rise of a major power in Central Europe, and became alarmed after her defeat in the Franco-Prussian War. In an attempt to neutralize this rising power, France entered into numerous treaties and alliances, and at various times was aligned with Sweden, Russia, and even Prussia itself. Outwardly, France was embarked on a policy of imperial expansionism, and her Empire, although somewhat smaller, was second only to Britain's. Within, France's industry was rapidly becoming obsolete, and she was the only European state with a static population.

Germany was a new nation that had been created by Prussian conquests, the Franco-Prussian War, and Bismark. She was a federation dominated by Prussia, whose King was also the German Kaiser. The country's leaders, Prussians, still believed that conquest was a profitable venture, but the economic leaders preferred commercial penetration of other countries without the cost and bother of governing them. Conflict between these two concepts existed up to World War I. Industrially, Germany was a young giant which had the country bursting at the seams; and raw materials, capital, and markets were urgently needed. After Bismark's reign, France's many alliances were viewed as an attempt to strangle Germany. The new, less talented German leaders began to look outward with an eye toward crushing France again, annexing French mining districts, annexing Belgium, and gaining a place in the sun by establishing colonies in the Middle East, Africa, Western Pacific, and on the rim of Asia. Germany, in 1914, was bent on the hegemony of Europe, and indirectly of the world.

Austria-Hungary, the Habsburg Empire, was an anachronism in a world of rising nationalism. Austrians and Magyars were dominant politically, but were ethnic minorities when compared to the Slavs. The Empire remained viable only through repression and inadequate concessions to the Slavs, who were denied political equality. Consequently, the Slavs were a restless people who looked with longing toward the free Slav state of Serbia, and created a dangerous situation between little Serbia and the Empire. Austria-Hungary was still a major power, however, and looked for new lands to conquer.

Blocked from expanding to the East, North, and West by major powers, the Empire focused its attention upon the Balkan countries, Serbia in particular.

Imperialistic Russia was annexing contiguous areas whenever possible, and had devoured most of Poland, displaced the Turks in the Black Sea area, and taken a large share of Asia which included some Central Asian and Chinese people. But her main thrust was for sea ports, which lead her toward the Baltic Sea, Mediterranean Sea, Persian Gulf, Indian Ocean, and Pacific Ocean. Starting with Peter the Great, most Tsars tried to modernize, Westernize, Russia, although some looked to the East, resulting in intermittent interest in the Balkan states. Serbia, previously subservient to Austria-Hungary, became an outpost of Russia in 1903. The Russian people were basically oriented toward Europe, but with Asiatic ties, and most of them were illiterate. Unrest among the people was put down by autocratic, repressive measures, resulting in much conspiratorial, revolutionary activity accompanied by violence and terrorist tactics.

Italy was a newly created state with strong nationalism, but lacking in social unity. Conflict continued between the King and Pope over who should exercise temporal powers. Italy was recognized as a great power, but her resources were scant, and a large gap existed between the progressive north and depressed south. Italy, too, wanted to expand, and kept her eye on the Balkan states and Africa.

The Ottoman Empire had once straddled Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, but now it was known as the "Sick Man of Europe," and

had lost its African lands. It survived and wielded influence because the major powers could not decide how to divide the Empire; thus, Ottoman policy was to cultivate differences among the major states.

As Balkan countries gained their freedom, they initiated rivalries among themselves. These little states were protected by the strong European states, and mirrored competing major national entities. Great powers used them as outposts, and Balkan countries exercised powers of the great nations; hence, the name "powder keg of Europe."

Belgium and Holland, although not powerful, were small, stable, well managed states. Belgium was well industrialized, with a foreign trade approximately equal to that of huge Russia. Holland was a well established commercial state. Both had their eyes on Africa and the Western Pacific for colonization.

Jealousies, rivalries, and secret intrigues existed throughout Europe, and expansionist drives met on collision courses. Austria-Hungary eyed the Balkans because other major powers prevented expansion in other directions, and because independent Serbia was a focus of attention for the South Slavs who created unrest in the Habsburg Empire. Russia was interested in the Balkans as a road to the Straits, which meant access to a warm-water port. Britain opposed Russia's acquisition of the Straits as being a blow which would disintegrate the Ottoman Empire; England and Russia also opposed each other in areas of China and India. France opposed Germany's attempts at expansion in Central Europe. Britain and

France were imperialistic rivals in oversea areas, as well as long standing rivals on the Continent. In this maelstrom, the major European rivalries were Anglo-Russian, Anglo-French, and Franco-German.¹

Archduke Ferdinand, heir to the Austrian-Hungarian throne, was assassinated on June 28, 1914, and the Empire immediately became intent upon war with Serbia, the country from which the assassins came. Russia affirmed her loyalty to her tiny protectorate, Serbia, and started mobilization. Germany stood with Austria-Hungary, and demanded that Russia demobilize. France upheld her alliance with Russia, while Britain decided to throw her lot in with France and Russia. Italy was allied with Germany and Austria-Hungary, the Central Powers. On the eve of war the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy faced the Triple Entente of Russia, France, and Britain, the Allies. Meanwhile, isolationist United States watched from afar.²

The Central Powers entered World War I with a master plan, the Schlieffen Plan, which called for a quick knockout blow against France. But French forts along the border were formidable obstacles to rapid conquest. Therefore, Germany, invoking the "law of

¹For additional information on background to this point see: Gustave LeBon, The World in Revolt: A Psychological Study of Our Times, pp. 78-80. William H. Hobbs, The World War and Its Consequences, Chap. 1. Chester V. Easum, Half-century of Conflict, Chap. 1. Francis W. Halsey, The Literary Digest History of the World War, Vol. 1, pp. 1-20. Rene Albrecht-Carrie, The Meaning of the First World War, pp. 1-36.

²Easum, op. cit., pp. 14-20. Hobbs, op. cit., pp. 21-36.

necessity" as a sovereign state, quickly overran neutral Belgium and enveloped the north flank of the French forts. War on this Western Front soon bogged down to trench warfare and attrition of the enemy. Italy declared her neutrality when war started. Russia invaded the Central Powers along the Eastern Front, and was pushed back to her borders, after suffering heavy losses in manpower. Japan joined the Allied cause, and ousted Germany from the Far East. The Ottoman Empire was invaded by the Allies, sealing the fate of Europe's "Sick Man," although the Empire fought until the end of the war. From the European point of view, the world was at war in 1914.³

Meanwhile, neutrality had been proclaimed by the United States. There were some outright interventionists, including Theodore Roosevelt, who called for action, but to most Americans the war was far away and unreal. The country was shocked, but not alarmed, when Germany invaded neutral Belgium. Generally, Americans were thankful for their peace and security.

The United States Government decided it was important to maintain the rights of neutrals, in order to localize the war and permit uninterrupted international exchanges. Inherent in this idea was the right to sell and deliver goods to belligerents unless an effective blockade was in force. Germany could not establish an effective blockade; but Britain could, and she forbade imports, including food, to Germany. The Allies continued to import whatever

³Halsey, op. cit., pp. 157-185. Hobbs, op. cit., pp. 39-43.

was needed and could be paid for.⁴

In 1915, the Central Powers had taken vast territories and inflicted enormous casualties on their enemies, but had not eliminated any major power from the conflict. Poison gas warfare began, and zeppelins bombed London. Of particular importance, however, was Germany's use of the submarine as a commerce destroyer in an attempt to blockade England. Hundreds of Allied and neutral ships, and some American lives, were lost without warning to submarines.⁵

In America, 1915 saw the Austrian Ambassador and German military and naval attaches declared persona non grata for inciting strikes and sabotage. Americans reacted to submarine warfare, and some severely criticized President Wilson for not taking the country into war. The United States continued to insist upon the rights of all neutrals in war, and Wilson warned Germany against further atrocities. Accordingly, Germany instructed her U-boat commanders that no ocean liner was to be sunk without warning or provisions made for the safety of the passengers and crew.⁶

War took on a new flavor in 1916, one of moral significance. The fighting at Verdun meant a hope of victory for the Germans and a hope of survival for the French. France made her supreme effort here, and her army was practically "bled White." In the second half of the year, Britain and Germany engaged in a war of attrition

⁴Halsey, op. cit., pp. 187-189. Richard W. Leopold, "The Great Crusade and the Separate Peace," in Problems in American History, Richard W. Leopold and Arthur S. Link, ed., pp. 744-749.

⁵Easum, op. cit., pp. 23-27. Albrecht-Carrie, op. cit., pp. 47-52.

⁶Hobbs, op. cit., p. 202. Easum, op. cit., pp. 39-41.

along the Somme River, in which Britain was severely weakened. Germany had been weakened in both battles, of course. Austria-Hungary attacked Italy, but failed to collapse the Italian Front. Russia attacked through Austria, but was eventually stopped by lack of supplies and German and Austro-Hungarian forces. Rumania entered the war on the Allied side, and was promptly defeated. The German fleet ventured out to meet the British fleet at Jutland, giving better than it took, but retired from the Atlantic for the remainder of the war.⁷

Debate in the United States over the sinking of the Lusitania was bitter, and caused Secretary of State Bryan to resign. Congressional bills were introduced in 1916, which would have prevented Americans from traveling on ships of belligerents, but neither house passed the bills. The steamer Sussex was sunk without warning in March, causing the United States Government to send Germany an ultimatum demanding cessation of submarine warfare against passenger and freight ships under penalty of severing diplomatic relations. Germany acquiesced and neutrals sailed the seas for the remainder of the year in relative safety; but, peace for America depended upon the Sussex pledge. Reelection of President Wilson indicated that most Americans still considered this a foreign war, and only a small minority wanted to intervene.⁸

Late in 1916, Germany was perilously short of raw materials and foodstuffs, thanks to the British blockade. Conversely, Britain

⁷Easum, op. cit., pp. 28-32.

⁸Ibid., pp. 41-44. Hobbs, op. cit., pp. 233-234.

remained in the war only because she had access to world commerce. The German High Command concluded that the blockade had to be broken and shipping to England stopped. A decision was made in January, 1917, to employ Germany's most potent naval weapon, the submarine, in unrestricted warfare about the British Isles, along the coast of France, and in the Mediterranean. In February, the deadly submarine went to work in earnest. In the first half of 1917, one in four ships headed for England was sent to the bottom; the average number of sinkings during this time was 10 per day. Five American vessels were lost in March, alone. England truly was in dire straits, and in danger of having to sue for peace.⁹

Germany's hand was further exposed in January, 1917, when the Zimmermann Note, to her ambassador in Mexico, was intercepted, decoded, and published in the United States. This note suggested a Mexican attack on the United States if America entered the war. In return for the attack, Mexico was to receive Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona.¹⁰

Wilson tried to get world leaders to reason and accommodate in January, 1917. But his idea of peace without victory between equals, and his ideas which would later become the "Fourteen Points" were brushed aside by world statesmen as they planned for victory.

Meanwhile, Russia's backward economy had been stressed to the breaking-point, her armies had sustained millions of casualties,

⁹Ibid., pp. 48-53.

¹⁰The Zimmermann Note, as quoted by Louis L. Snyder, Historic Documents of World War I, pp. 150-151.

and her populace had become disenchanted with fighting for the Tsar. Germany had invaded vast areas of Russian territory, thereby, isolating Russia from supplies that the Allies might have provided to her. In 1917, the March Revolution set in motion a chain of events which resulted in overthrow of the Tsarist regime, the creation of a new Bolshevik government, and Russia's defeat in the war.¹¹

The American people were giving serious consideration to that "European" war in early 1917. A bill to arm American merchant ships failed to pass Congress in March, however, indicating that not all of the people were prepared to accept conflict. People were wondering if Germany might not win the war, and what would happen if the stabilizing influence of the British fleet were lost to the world. A victorious England would not endanger the United States, but a triumphant Germany could be dangerous. Sentiment was becoming more anti-German than pro-Ally, and traditional friendship with France was turning to sympathy. The Allies were seen as the champions of democracy when compared to imperialistic Austria-Hungary and dictatorial Germany. Southwestern United States, which had been lukewarm to war, quickly changed its attitude when the Zimmermann Note was exposed. Russia's defeat, submarine warfare, and sinkings of American ships brought matters to a head.¹²

The President advised Congress, on April 2, that the status of belligerent had been thrust upon the United States.¹³ Congress,

¹¹Albrecht-Carrie, op. cit., pp. 71-78.

¹²Snyder, op. cit., p. 150. Easum, op. cit., pp. 45-52.

¹³Wilson, as quoted by Louis L. Snyder, op. cit., pp. 152-155.

on April 6, 1917, declared war on Germany.

WAR AIMS

The war aims of European belligerents underwent a number of superficial changes during the war. Stated aims were vague or concrete, expanded or contracted, depending upon the fortunes of war. Germany's initial military thrusts were highly successful, and gave support and high hopes to her war aims, which would lead to world hegemony. As the war ground on, however, these aims were gradually scaled down. But even at the end, Germany expected some territorial gains. The Allies were fighting for their existence early in the war, and it was only after the tide of war had changed that they expressed desires for territorial gains.¹⁴

United States objectives in World War I were clearly stated by President Wilson in his address to the joint session of Congress on January 8, 1918.¹⁵ That the President's famous "Fourteen Points," were the country's aims cannot be doubted in light of his address to Congress on February 11, 1918, in which he stated, ". . . On the 8th of January I had the honor of addressing you on the objects of the war as our people conceive them."¹⁶ Nor can there be doubt that the United States was fighting a war of the

¹⁴LeBon, op. cit., Chap. III.

¹⁵Woodrow Wilson, "Address of the President of the United States Delivered at a Joint Session of the Two Houses of Congress, January 8, 1918," US Dept of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: 1918, Supplement 1, The World War, Vol. 1, pp. 12-17 (referred to hereafter as "Foreign Relations").

¹⁶Wilson, Foreign Relations, p. 108.

highest ideals, a war of principles. The President's address of January 8 contained these statements:

No statesman who has the least conception of his responsibility ought for a moment to permit himself to continue this tragical and appalling outpouring of blood and treasure unless he is sure beyond a peradventure that the objects of the vital sacrifice are part and parcel of the very life of society and that the people for whom he speaks think them right and imperative as he does. . . . We entered this war because violations of right had occurred which touched us to the quick and made the life of our own people impossible unless they were corrected and the world secured once for all against their recurrence. What we demand in this war, therefore, is nothing peculiar to ourselves. It is that the world be made fit and safe to live in. . . . An evident principle runs through the whole programme I have outlined. It is the principle of justice to all peoples and nationalities, and their right to live on equal terms of liberty and safety with one another, whether they be strong or weak. Unless this principle be made its foundation no part of the structure of international justice can stand. The people of the United States could act upon no other principle; and to the vindication of this principle they are ready to devote their lives, their honor, and everything that they possess.¹⁷

President Wilson, through his high ideals and diplomacy, managed to prevent the Allies from imposing totally unrealistic peace demands upon the Central Powers. The war aims of the Allies gave way under the crusading spirit of Wilson, and a slightly modified "Fourteen Points" became the war aims of the Allies.

DISCUSSION

Obviously, the hegemonic concepts of the Central Powers were diametrically opposed to America's expressed war aims, and neither

¹⁷Ibid., pp. 108-112.

side could renounce its principles. There could be no bargaining at the table. What was there to bargain? America's principles? No. Therefore, the war was destined to continue until one side was exhausted and could no longer resist.

At war's end, there was no doubt who was victorious; Wilson's principle of self-determination had prevailed. The Central Powers were exhausted and could no longer resist the collective might of the Allied Powers. But what price victory? Russia had suffered millions of casualties, gone through a revolution, sued for a separate peace, and acquired a new form of government--communism. France had been "bled white" of manpower, lost a large share of her industry which had to be rebuilt, depleted her treasury, borrowed huge sums of money, and finished the war with a strong sense of insecurity and a morbid fear of Germany; but, she had increased her international prestige. Britain lost her status as the dominant world power, lost much of her merchant marine, lost many of her vital world markets, and lost heavily in manpower.¹⁸

Signing of the Armistice permitted the Allies to impose their collective will upon the vanquished in accordance with the "Fourteen Points." The military forces of the Central Powers were destroyed or reduced to impotence, and the victorious armies occupied the countries themselves. The Germans had changed their form of government to please the Allies; and the Austrian-Hungarian Empire ceased to exist. Countries, such as Belgium, which had lost their independence, were restored as sovereign states; other countries, such

¹⁸LeBon, op. cit., Chap. V.

as Yugoslavia, were created as sovereign states; and territories and their peoples, such as Alsace-Lorraine, were detached from one sovereign nation and given to another. The Allies reserved unto themselves the right to dictate, not negotiate, but to dictate the terms of peace; Germany was not invited to the Peace Conference. To win in World War I, then, was little different from the "unconditional surrender" of the future, because it meant the victors could completely impose their will upon the enemy in these respects, they could: (1) Reorient the elements of national power of enemy states; (2) determine national sovereignty, acceptable political ideals and concept, and forms of government; and (3) apportion territories and peoples.

Treaty makers were engulfed by the sheer numbers of the problems they faced, and people from many diverse backgrounds were eventually called upon to assist statesmen in preparing peace terms. The inevitable push-pull, conciliation, and compromise resulted in numerous modifications which really made no one happy. Generally speaking, the peace settlement might be considered a balance of discontent.¹⁹

Germany felt no guilt over having started the war, and was determined to reverse the results in the next war. But Wilson's fourth point was an obstacle to the revival of militarism: "Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety."²⁰ As

¹⁹Easum, op. cit., pp. 113-114.

²⁰Wilson, Foreign Relations, p. 15.

implemented in the Treaty of Versailles, Point IV severely restricted the size of the armed forces and the types of equipment that could be used. In addition, the Rhineland Zone was to be demilitarized. Unfortunately, the job of watchdog was given to weak, fearful France, who was not equal to the task of policing Germany. Almost immediately, Germans set about subverting treaty provisions, and France was powerless to stop them; the other Allies no longer cared. Twenty years later, the world would pay the price for not adequately solving this problem.²¹

Granting Alsace and Lorraine to France simultaneously satisfied one of France's major war aims and Wilson's Point VII:

All French territory should be freed and the invaded portions restored, and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, should be righted, in order that peace may once more be made secure in the interest of all.²²

However, this disposition of the disputed territory did not satisfy the Germans. They believed the acquisition of Alsace-Lorraine by Germany in 1871 simply corrected an older wrong when France took the area from the old Germanic empire.²³ Perhaps it was not possible to solve the problem under conditions prevailing at that time, but this festering sore continued to plague both countries until World War II.

Wilson's Point XIII dealt with the Polish problem:

An independent Polish State should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably

²¹Easum, op. cit., pp. 96-98.

²²Wilson, Foreign Relations, p. 15.

²³Easum, op. cit., p. 80.

Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant.²⁴

German and Polish claims to the Danzig area go back 500 years, while German claims to West Prussia and Upper Silesia are based upon conquests by Frederick II in the 18th century. The high ideals of Point XIII, then, faced the facts of tradition; die-hard German nationalists would not accept the new German-Polish border as being either just or permanent. Neither the Polish corridor through Germany, nor Polish rule over thousands of Germans was acceptable. The Polish problem, then, had not been solved to the satisfaction of all concerned, and waited impatiently for a new solution by a new conqueror, Adolph Hitler.²⁵

The League of Nations was created to implement the ideal of mutual security expressed by Wilson, and was to be "world policeman" and watchdog of the world's peace, political independence, and territorial integrity. Moral suasion was inadequate to prevent aggression, however, and dependence upon military assistance from member nations proved impractical as we shall see later. Without adequate military support, the League failed in its primary mission.

Clearly, the Allies recognized that, along with winning the right to impose their will upon the enemy, they had won the obligation to solve the problems of international relations, peace, and order. Of this there can be no doubt, because strenuous efforts

²⁴Wilson, Foreign Relations, p. 16.

²⁵Easum, op. cit., p. 80.

were made to find appropriate solutions for those problems which were identified. However, unidentified problems, inadequate solutions, and side effects of solutions would present themselves periodically in the future to plague the victors.

What essences, then, may be distilled from this review of the United States and World War I? First, it is quite evident that Americans did not want war, and did everything possible to avoid a trial-by-combat until they literally were forced into war. Second, for the United States this was a war of principles and emotions, and there could be no compromise; therefore, it was inevitable that the war would continue until the enemy was exhausted and surrendered. And, third, to win meant the victor acquired the right to control and reshape the elements of national power of the vanquished, the right to determine sovereignty, the right to distribute lands and peoples among sovereign nations, and the obligation to solve problems relating to international relations, peace, and order.

The span of time between World Wars I and II was only a generation in length, but many American concepts changed during this period. Female suffrage became a reality, listening to the radio and watching moving pictures became national pastimes, and Americans accepted urbanization as a way of life. Prohibition came and went, while the United States economy went through a boom-and-bust cycle which taught Americans frugality. But the concept of what it meant to win remained unchanged, and Americans would enter and fight World War II with the same basic attitudes toward war that they had held during the Revolutionary War and World War I.

CHAPTER 4

WORLD WAR II

World War I left two important power vacuums in the world: one in Central Europe, and one in the Far East. In Europe, Germany had been stripped of her colonies, deprived of her Navy and merchant marine, relieved of her working capital, and shorn of economically valuable lands along with millions of her people. Britain had withdrawn to her islands, while the United States retreated to North America. Russia was effectively screened from Central Europe by newly created nations who feared any Russian intrusion. To France, then, fell the task of acting the part of a major power and keeping peace on the Continent. But France, war-torn, "bled white," and afraid of Germany, was not equal to her task. The Russo-Japanese War and World War I had effectively eliminated Russia as a power in the Far East. China could not act as a cohesive unit to exert its potential power, and Japan had not yet exerted its power. Through default or inability, no major state exercised power in Central Europe or the Far East.

Three "dissatisfied" nations, however, were determined to fill the breach and enjoy a place in the sun: Germany, Italy, and Japan. Inflation struck Germany soon after the war and almost destroyed the middle-class of people. But after 1933, Hitler's managed defense economy replaced the sagging Weimar economy, Germany geared for war, and the forced economy made everything look brighter for the people.

Ultra-nationalistic dreams were built for the Germans, which included Utopia, "Lebensraum" (living space), and hegemony of Europe. The Dictator of National Socialism promised Germany its place in the sun.

Italy finished World War I as an unsatiated nation; her modest desires for land in the Balkans had not been met. Italians were impoverished, and felt they had been badly treated by the Allies and denied the fruits of victory. Mussolini encouraged ultra-nationalism, and promised Italy an empire which he would build with bayonets.

Japan was a populous, industrial, emerging nation which required raw materials, markets, and "Lebensraum." Her militarists, industrialists, and statesmen promised Utopia by carving out a large piece of Asia for Japan. Thus, the National Socialist Dictator of Germany, the Fascist Dictator of Italy, and the ultra-nationalistic Lords of Japan promised their people hegemony of the World.

Meanwhile, the victorious wartime Allies faced the future with uncertainty. Those who had failed in their responsibilities to solve world problems and preserve peace were now disunited and militarily unprepared. They were forced into half-hearted attempts at maintaining the international status quo through concessions and appeasement.

The sides for the coming war had been chosen, and the choice had been made on principles. Dictatorial ultra-nationalism, bent on world hegemony, would face democracy which espoused self-determination as the way of life. The war would be long and bitterly fought, and would not end until one side was exhausted, for neither side would voluntarily renounce its principles.

BACKGROUND

Germany was defeated on the battlefield in World War I and her economy collapsed, but her spirit of nationalism was not broken. Behind her lay a history of one-man rule; prosperity; leadership in Central Europe; and imperialism, which Germans felt had been taken from them through Allied duplicity. Germans rejected the idea that their armies had been defeated in combat. In a hope of pleasing the Allies and gaining an easier peace settlement at the war's end, a republican government was formed which evolved into the Weimar Republic. The new Republic fought a running battle with communism, crushing inflation, and seriously depressed public morale, until 1924 when Allied loans under the Dawes Plan, private American loans, and French evacuation of the Ruhr brought about financial equilibrium. Prosperity returned and the economy expanded; but with the 1929 depression, American loans ceased and Germany's economy collapsed, again. Meanwhile, many political parties fought for power under the unfamiliar democratic system, and the German President became a virtual dictator in order to keep the government functioning. The Nazi Party gradually grew in strength amid strikes, violence, terrorist tactics, and suppression, and Hitler took de facto control of the government in 1933. Hitler's Third Reich withdrew from the League of Nations and Disarmament Conference in 1933, and immediately established an economy designed to prepare the country for aggressive war. Mobilization began in 1934. Between 1936 and 1938, the Reich occupied the Rhineland and the Ruhr, and annexed Austria, the

Sudetenland, and most of Czechoslovakia. By 1939, the Reich was prepared to invade Poland. The German people were psychologically prepared to do the bidding of the State, the Armed Forces were ready, and the economy was booming. Germany had rearmed and the Allies had done nothing. When the Ruhr and Rhineland were occupied, the Western Democracies did nothing. Austria was annexed and Britain and France did nothing. At Munich, the democracies "gave in." Poland would be annexed and the democracies would do nothing, then it would be Russia, and one-by-one the other nations; or so Hitler thought.¹

Russia finished World War I as a shattered state. Her armies had been defeated in the field, she had undergone a revolution, and Germany had imposed the punitive Treaty of Brest-Litvosk. From these ashes rose a new social order, Bolshevik Communism, which would guide Russia from then on. Immediately after the war, the new regime was faced with intervention by Russia's wartime Allies, excision of Vladivostok by Japan, war with Poland, and counter-revolutions. Uneasy peace was established in 1920, but the world isolated Russia because of its Red regime. Between 1926 and 1935 Russia, anxious for peace, managed to protect her western borders by signing non-aggression pacts with the Baltic countries, Czechoslovakia, France, Germany, Poland, Romania, and Turkey. She joined

¹Floyd A. Cave, "Germany Between Two Wars," in The Origins and Consequences of World War II, Floyd A. Cave, ed., Chap. 11. Chester V. Easum, Half-century of Conflict, pp. 462-476. Dwight E. Lee, Ten Years: The World on the Way to War, 1930-1940, pp. 115-120. Oscar G. Darlington, "Germany's War for Hegemony of Europe and the World," in The Origins and Consequences of World War II, Floyd A. Cave, ed., Chap. 14.

the League of Nations in 1934 and insisted that Britain and France uphold the Locarno Pact when Germany invaded the Rhineland, and attempted to save Czechoslovakia when it was betrayed, but to no avail. On the eve of World War II, Russia stood alone. She anticipated invasion by Germany, and distrusted the appeasers of Munich. Germany, France, and Britain looked upon Russia as a weak, unknown quantity in view of her poor showing against Finland and her purges of military officers in the 1930's.²

World War I left a bitter taste with Italians. They felt the Allies had cheated them of their just rewards for great wartime sacrifices. Italian lands lay destroyed, the people were hungry, unemployment was everywhere, taxes were a heavy burden, and Parliament had been set aside in favor of Royal decree. Violent social unrest accompanied a struggle for power by the Socialist, Catholic People's, and Fascist Parties. For a while, Socialists held power and managed to sovietize a number of farms and factories. However, in 1922, Mussolini and his Fascist Party gained control of the government, establishing a dictatorship with the King as titular head of the government. Political stability brought the inevitable indoctrination of the people, but Fascist thinking was superficial and offered little to the populace, as it was more negative than positive. Along with

²Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War: The Gathering Storm, Chap. 20. D. F. Fleming, The Cold War and Its Origins, 1917-1960, Vol. 1, pp. 16-52. George Waskovich and Floyd A. Cave, "The Rise of the Soviet Union," in The Origins and Consequences of World War II, Floyd A. Cave, ed., Chap. 5. Lee, op. cit., pp. 120-124.

political stability came a measure of prosperity which lasted until 1927, when the world depression struck Italy; the economy did not recover from this blow. Italian armed forces fought in Ethiopia and Spain, but never achieved first-rate status. When Hitler invaded Poland, Mussolini was faced with a weak economy, armed forces of uncertain quality, and a people who had not wholeheartedly accepted Fascism. Italy remained neutral in World War II until it was certain that France would fall to Germany, then opportunistically joined the team.³

Japan emerged from World War I as one of the Five Great Powers. Her share of the victor's spoils was Germany's concessions and properties in Shantung, plus a mandate over the ex-German islands in the Pacific Ocean north of the equator. Her homeland had not been touched by war, and industrialization proceeded at an acceptable rate. Citizens still owed their lives and allegiance to the Emperor, although elite cliques governed the country. Japan's "New Order" emphasized "world brotherhood" and a drive to the west and south, in order to gain raw materials for industry, "Lebensraum," and protection from invasion by China or Russia. Accordingly, Manchuria was invaded in 1931, with the puppet state of Manchukuo being established in 1932. The Manchurian Incident caused political dissension in the Japanese government, resulting in a take-over by militarists who remained in power throughout World War II. Friction and conflict

³Floyd A. Cave, "The Fascist Counter-Revolution in Italy," in The Origins and Consequences of World War II, Floyd A. Cave, ed., Chap. 6. Easum, op. cit., pp. 476-485.

continued between Japan and China until 1937, when Japan invaded China in an undeclared war which merged into World War II. With the invasion of China, Japan changed the emphasis in her economy from light to heavy industry and, for all practical purposes, assumed a war oriented economy. In 1939, Japan occupied Hainan Island and the Spratly Islands, and in 1940, established a mission in Indo-China. In December, 1941, Japan could boast of a large, battle-tested Army, strong sea power, a wartime economy, and a people who gloried in war and would die for the Empire.⁴

Britain was a victor in World War I and assisted in reshaping the world, but she had difficulties in remaking herself. War had cost her dearly. Britain was no longer the world's dominant manufacturing and trading nation. Unemployment was high, taxes were heavy, trade balances were unfavorable, and her industry was outdated. Political leadership was hampered by labor unrest, party disunity, and conflict between conservatism and socialism. Russian communism was seen as the major menace; therefore, it was extremely important to maintain friendly relations with Germany and Italy in order to defend England. In addition, the Empire was in jeopardy. Canada and Australia suffered from the world depression, as did Britain herself. South Africa faced racial problems, and the Oriental areas were under pressure from Japan. Ireland declared her independence, and India sought her independence. Britain had been

⁴H. J. Timperley, Japan: A World Problem, Chap. III-VII. F. C. Jones, Japan's New Order in East Asia: Its Rise and Fall, 1937-45, Chap. VIII. Otto D. Tolischus, Through Japanese Eyes, Chap. 4.

unable to participate in enforcing League of Nations policies between the wars, and faced the coming war unprepared.⁵

France's economy survived the war, being reasonably well balanced between agriculture and industry. But the costs of rejuvenating her war devastated areas was a heavy financial burden, which German reparations did not meet, resulting in perennial national budget problems, inflation, and disruption of the French middle-class. Political fractionalization continued as it had throughout the life of the Third Republic, thereby, seriously weakening the government's ability to meet internal or world situations with any degree of consistency. The populace had been overwhelmed with the horrors of World War I; now, almost any solution was preferable to armed conflict. France was in no position to participate in enforcing League of Nations policies, or enforce provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, or defend herself in another World War.⁶

With the conclusion of World War I, the United States retreated to its side of the Atlantic. The war had changed America from a pre-war debtor nation into a post-war creditor nation, and the country was busily increasing its control over the world economy. Americans doubted the wisdom of having entered World War I, and were determined they would not get involved in another "European"

⁵Lee, op. cit., pp. 81-88. Easum, op. cit., Chap. 9. Glenn S. Dumke, "Democracy Off Guard," in The Origins and Consequences of World War II, Floyd A. Cave, ed., pp. 335-339.

⁶Lee, op. cit., Chap. IV. Dumke, op. cit., pp. 339-345. Easum, op. cit., Chap. 11.

war. Isolationism and non-interventionism settled over the United States, although the League of Nations was supported in principle. Japan flouted the American Open Door policy by invading Manchuria, while America watched. Italy invaded Ethiopia in 1935, and America passed the Neutrality Act in order to preserve her neutrality. China was invaded, Austria annexed, Czechoslovakia taken, and Americans frowned. It was 1938 before America began to increase the size of her Navy, and 1940 when the Selective Service Act was passed. It was late 1939 when public opinion finally changed enough to permit "cash and carry" sales, including war items, to the belligerents; Lend-Lease was passed in 1941. The United States remained unprepared and neutral until the eleventh hour.⁷

The Munich Conference signaled a change in the tide of American isolationism. Public opinion doubted the wisdom of the Munich settlement and distrusted Hitler's intentions. Germany became the object of American dislike, but the predominant feeling was still one of staying out of Europe's wars. With the invasion of Poland, Americans realized that what happened in Europe was important to them, and public sympathy swung to the western Allies, but many Americans still believed the U.S. could protect its security by measures short of war. The Neutrality Act of 1939, which replaced the 1937 Act, permitted sale of war items to belligerents on a cash-and-carry

⁷Cyril E. Black and Thomas P. Thornton, Communism and Revolution: The Strategic Uses of Political Violence, pp. 788-795. Robert A. Devine, The Reluctant Belligerent: American Entry into World War II, Chap. I-V. Easum, op. cit., Chap. 14. Dumke, op. cit., pp. 345-349.

basis; provided the title was transferred before the items left the United States, and provided that foreign ships carried the cargo.⁸

The fall of France caused another change in American attitudes. The public no longer expected the Allies to win; in fact, a majority felt that Germany was likely to win the war. Most Americans now favored giving England all-out aid, but insisted that the aid should not involve the United States in war. Britain was suffering severely from German air and submarine attacks on her shipping, and appeared to be finished. At this point, Americans finally realized the importance of the British fleet in maintaining the Atlantic as a secure barrier against invasion of the United States. Consequently, when Britain asked for American combat ships, the destroyers-for-bases agreement was signed, and America ended her strict "neutrality" by openly supporting England against Germany.⁹

Early in 1941, when Britain was about to exhaust her funds for purchase of cash-and-carry American goods under the 1939 Neutrality Act, she requested American assistance. With the support of the public, Congress enacted Lend-Lease, and appropriated funds to insure supplies for the Allies. American foreign policy had reached an important turning point and taken a major step toward war.¹⁰

During the first half of 1941, Germany perfected her submarine wolfpack techniques, and extended the war zone to include the waters

⁸Divine, op. cit., pp. 55-56, 65, 71.

⁹Ibid., pp. 88-92.

¹⁰Fleming, op. cit., pp. 140-143. Easum, op. cit., pp. 633-636.

near Greenland; thereby, threatening to strangle England. The Battle of the Atlantic went against Britain in spite of United States patrols in the Western Atlantic which reported on German movements.¹¹

With the attack of Germany upon Russia, the United States started sending aid to the Soviet Union. Americans hoped this would take some pressure off Britain, wear down the military might of both Germany and Russia, and keep America out of the conflict. Americans were not ready for war, nor did the President feel he could commit the United States to the Allied cause. However, Britain and the United States jointly announced their eight-point Atlantic Charter in August, 1941. The United States was on the brink of war in the summer of 1941.¹²

American troops occupied Iceland, with permission of that government in July, 1941. An incident between an American destroyer and German submarine, in September, led the President to begin American escorting of convoys traveling across the Atlantic. In October, American merchantmen were permitted to arm; in November, the Neutrality Act was amended, permitting the President to send American merchant ships into the war zone.¹³

Meanwhile, in 1939, public opinion had turned increasingly toward China and away from Japan. Public sentiment was against

¹¹Divine, op. cit., pp. 107-111, 128.

¹²US Dept of State, Toward the Peace, p. 1. Easum, op. cit., pp. 636-637, 645-647. Divine, op. cit., pp. 133-135.

¹³Easum, op. cit., pp. 646-647.

trade in oil and scrap iron with Japan, and in 1940, the United States permitted its 1911 Commercial Treaty with Japan to expire. The fall of France and Battle of Britain gave Japan an opportunity to seal-off China from French and British supplies entering through Southeast Asia. America, recognizing this threat, attempted to restrain Japan by shifting the base of the Pacific Fleet from California to Hawaii, and by placing an embargo on gasoline and scrap iron bound for Japan. However, these actions did not prevent Japan from moving into Indo-China, or from signing the Tripartite Pact which was expected to scare the United States and keep it neutral in the war.¹⁴

An American decision, that the United States would assume an essentially defensive stance in the Far East while giving priority to the war against Germany, presented diplomatic difficulties in restraining Japan. A military confrontation had to be avoided. Therefore, the embargo was extended to include additional materials, but not oil, because prohibiting shipment of this vital substance might lead Japan to declare war. Assistance to China was increased in order to divert Japan's attention and keep her occupied. Japan, recognizing the critical situation, approached the United States seeking a settlement, and negotiations were begun which lasted until war was declared. But, misunderstandings between the American Secretary of State and Japanese Ambassador plagued the negotiations

¹⁴W. Leon Godshall, "The Trend to War in the Orient," in The Origins and Consequences of World War II, Floyd A. Cave, ed., pp. 510-518. Divine, op. cit., pp. 92-98.

and prevented any meeting of the minds. The two countries could not come to an agreement on the moral issues involved in Japan's "New Order" for Asia.¹⁵

Japan invaded Indo-China in 1941; the United States retaliated by freezing Japanese assets and severing trade relations. Japan, then, was faced with the choice of foregoing its New Order, or seizing the Dutch East Indies to assure itself an adequate oil supply and other needed materials. In the negotiations, Japan contended that peace required the United States to end its economic sanctions, stop helping China, and permit Japan to conclude its war with China. The United States, on the other hand, maintained that peace depended upon Japan's withdrawal of her troops from China and Indo-China. Each country had threatened the other's vital national interests, and compromise was not possible; diplomacy came to a stand-still, and war became inevitable. American neutrality was a hollow shell, and it was a question of whether the Germans or Japanese would strike first.¹⁶

WAR AIMS

Immediately prior to World War II, Britain was the major sea-power in the world. The bulk of the land and air forces, however, were held by three nations: Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union. Together, these totalitarian states were more than a match for the

¹⁵Godshall, op. cit., pp. 519-520. Divine, op. cit., pp. 113-118.

¹⁶Godshall, op. cit., pp. 510-520. Divine, op. cit., pp. 113-122.

Western democracies in Eurasia. In case of war, the democracies could not be victorious without the aid of one of the totalitarian nations, all of whom were hostile to the democracies. Therefore, when war started, the Allies were forced to wage a defensive war for survival; meanwhile, wooing the Soviet Union. Even after Hitler invaded Russia and the Soviet Union joined the democracies, the Allies were fighting defensively with the primary objective of survival.¹⁷

United States' entry into the war made little change in the situation. But, as America's military and industrial might were channeled into combat, the trend of the war gradually changed; the turning-point being reached about the end of 1942.¹⁸ With this turning, the war aims of the Allies changed from defensive to offensive. President Franklin D. Roosevelt of the United States, at Casablanca on January 24, 1943, served notice on friend and foe alike that this change had occurred when he indicated that the ultimate Allied objective was to be "unconditional surrender" of Germany, Italy, and Japan. Marshal Joseph Stalin was absent from the meeting, but Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill of Great Britain was present and concurred in the President's statement.¹⁹

As the war progressed, additional meetings were held which amplified Allied war aims. The Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers,

¹⁷George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy, 1900-1950, p. 66.

¹⁸Easum, op. cit., p. 671.

¹⁹Louis L. Snyder, The War: A Concise History, 1939-1945, pp. 294-295. Easum, op. cit., pp. 673-675.

held from 10-30 October, 1943, and attended by the Foreign Secretaries of the Big Three Powers (Cordell Hull, Anthony Eden, and V. M. Molotov) indicated some intentions of the Allies: German war criminals were to be punished, and East Prussia was to be separated from Germany; Fascism would be destroyed in Italy; Austrian independence and its political security were to be assured; and consideration was given to establishing an international organization "based on the principle of sovereign equality of all peace-loving States."²⁰

President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek of China, in their Three Power Cairo Meeting held from 22-26 November, 1943, elaborated on the war aims. Basically, this conference called for Japan to be stripped of all her conquests; the Pacific islands she had acquired since 1914 were to be taken away; Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores were to be returned to China; and Korea was to gain its independence eventually. The stated purpose of these Allies was, "the unconditional surrender of Japan." The aims expressed in the Cairo Declaration were reaffirmed by the Potsdam Proclamation on July 26, 1945, and the Soviet Union, when it declared war against Japan on August 8, 1945, subscribed to that portion of the Potsdam Proclamation dealing with Japan's surrender.²¹

The Big Three (Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin) met at Yalta from 4-11 February, 1945, and further defined Allied war aims.

²⁰US Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, World War II International Agreements and Understandings Entered Into During Secret Conferences Concerning Other Peoples, pp. 3-8.

²¹Ibid., pp. 9-10.

Although the complete text of the proceedings of this Crimean Conference was not made public until March 24, 1947, the agreements were made in 1945. It was agreed that the policy toward Germany would be: "unconditional surrender," dismemberment, and occupation by the Allies; nazi-ism and militarism in Germany were to be destroyed, and war criminals punished. Faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter was reaffirmed, and April 25, 1945, was selected as the date for the United Nations Conference at San Francisco; the nations to be invited to the conference were determined, and voting within the Security Council was decided. In return for Russian participation in the war against Japan, it was agreed that Russia was to regain the Southern part of Sakhalin and the islands adjacent to it, and that the rights taken from Russia by Japan in 1904 would be restored. Additionally, it was decided that Poland's Eastern frontier would follow the Curzon Line, and that Poland would acquire some German territory.²²

DISCUSSION

The failure of World War I to prevent war, and the events leading up to 1939, profoundly influenced the leaders of the Allies in World War II. This time there would be no doubt that the aggressors were truly defeated. This time the political systems of the aggressors would be destroyed, then reconstructed in a manner that would not threaten world peace. This time the victors

²²Ibid., pp. 30-50.

would join together in an international organization which would guarantee world peace.²³

Unfortunately many unforeseen and uncontrollable factors enter political equations, and the results were less than hoped for. At the Potsdam and San Francisco Conferences, it was apparent that the Allies were drifting apart and pursuing their separate interests. Difficult problems, which had been set aside during the war, were becoming almost insoluble as the diplomatic climate changed. Conciliation became more difficult, and rapprochement a rarity. United States' policies and the Soviet Union's policies were on divergent paths.

Accomplishment of their ultimate war aims permitted the Allies to impose their collective will upon the vanquished in any manner they so desired. The military forces of Germany, Italy, and Japan were reduced to impotence, and victorious armies occupied the countries themselves. Fascist governments were dismantled and replaced by more democratic forms of government under the Western democracies, while Communist governments were created in countries under the watchful Red Army. Countries, such as Poland and Czechoslovakia, which had lost their independence, were restored as sovereign states; other territories and their peoples, such as East Prussia and the Kurile Islands, were detached from one sovereign nation and given to another. War crimes trials were held and the convicted punished, while economies were managed by the occupying powers.

²³Ibid.

And, the Allies reserved unto themselves the right to dictate, not negotiate, but to dictate the terms of peace.²⁴

A political vacuum was created in Central Europe with the defeat of Germany, for no major power existed between England and Russia. It was natural that this vacuum be filled, and that the spheres of influence of the Western Democracies and the Soviet Union should collide as they filled the vacuum. The Soviet concern over its own weakness, distrust of the West, and desire for a series of buffer states between itself and the West, prompted the Soviets to interpret the Allied conferences to their advantage; Communist governments were established in nations occupied by Soviet forces. On the other hand, the Western countries, who did not trust the Soviets, had a different understanding of the meaning of the conferences; therefore, Soviet Russia was blamed for failing to live up to the Yalta and Potsdam agreements. These opposing interpretations resulted in a series of disagreements and incidents, which gradually escalated into what was to become known as the "Cold War."²⁵

Another political vacuum was created by the defeat of Japan, and her confinement to the home islands. China was engaged in a great civil war, and could not fill the vacuum. Russia was in no position to make her presence felt in the Far East. The United States was not involved on the Asiatic mainland, except in assisting Nationalist China's war effort. Britain, France, and the Netherlands

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵Snyder, op. cit., pp. 247, 322, 402.

were not strong enough to assume their pre-war positions in Southeast Asia. Consequently, anti-colonial and nationalist movements gradually Balkanized Southeast Asia. Victory of the Chinese Communists over the Kuomintang in the Chinese Civil War established a second major power with interests inimicable to the West, and led to a clash of interests between East and West in the area of the vacuum.

Accomplishing the Allied war aims of "unconditional surrender" of Germany, Italy, and Japan, presented the Allies with political problems which they were obliged to solve. That these problems were recognized, at least in some degree, is attested by the rapidity with which the United States put the Marshall Plan into effect, and went about reconstructing Japan as a viable nation. Problems left over from World War II prevent a German peace treaty to this day, however. The fact is that the Allies failed to work together to solve the problems at the time they should have been solved, and the "spin-off" from these problems continues to complicate the international scene today.

The one remaining war aim to be considered is that of establishing the joint security organization. This organization was proposed at Moscow in 1943, negotiated at Dumbarton Oaks in 1944, and finally born at San Francisco in 1945 as the United Nations. The proposals issuing from Dumbarton Oaks indicated that the organization should have four main purposes: (1) To maintain peace and security, (2) To develop friendly relations among nations and

strengthen universal peace, (3) To achieve international cooperation in solving international humanitarian problems, and (4) To afford a center for harmonizing the actions of nations toward common ends.²⁶ At best, this organization can only be said to have partially accomplished its purposes, for its successes have been primarily in areas in which the vital interests of the Soviet Union and the United States were not threatened. The failure of the Allies to agree upon a suitable military force for the United Nations left an unsolved problem, which has degenerated into a balance of power situation between communism and the Free World, and which continues to prevent the United Nations from maintaining peace and security.

Throughout the period of time between World War I and World War II, the American people were intent upon isolationism and pacifism. This is evidenced by their withdrawal to the Western Hemisphere, their desire to remain aloof from "European" wars, and the Neutrality Acts. Nations friendly to the United States fell to the Fascists, but Americans were not moved to declare war. Britain fought a lonesome, desperate battle for survival, but America clung to its "non-interventionism" and refused war. The American people literally had to be pushed into war, as the Japanese did at Pearl Harbor.

However, once the United States was committed to combat, the people reversed their former attitudes. The war effort was supported

²⁶US Dept of State, Toward the Peace, pp. 19-25.

throughout the nation in such a manner that President F. D. Roosevelt felt he could commit the nation to a policy of "unconditional surrender" of the enemy, and pursue the conflict to its inevitable end.

What important points may be extracted from this brief view of World War II? First, it is crystal clear that America clung to its traditional position of isolation and non-intervention, and would not enter the war until forced to take up arms. Second, this was a war of principles and emotions, and there could be no compromise; therefore, it was certain to be a long, bitterly fought conflict which would end only when the enemy was exhausted and surrendered. And, third, to win meant the victors acquired the right to control and reshape the elements of national power of the defeated nations, the right to determine sovereignty, the right to distribute lands and peoples among sovereign nations, and the obligation to solve problems relating to international relations, peace, and order.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

These three American wars were dissimilar in many ways, as was the United States which fought them. For example, the America which fought the Revolution was politically weak and could hardly sustain an army in the field, but the America of World War I and World War II was politically strong and literally became the arsenal of democracy. The Revolution began as an insurgency and evolved into a revolution in which America became a true belligerent, but in later wars the United States entered the conflicts as a belligerent. During the Revolutionary War, France came to the assistance of America, but during the World Wars the United States went to the aid of the Allies. Revolutionary America was attempting to free itself from "tyranny" and create a new country, thereby, upsetting the international balance of power. By the time of the World Wars, America had become a satiated power which desired to maintain the international status quo. Many more instances of dissimilarity could be cited, but these suffice to indicate the magnitude of differences.

On the other hand, there are a number of similarities among the wars, and some of these are of primary concern here. One of the major similarities is that the United States achieved its important war aims, and is generally credited, in the intuitive sense, with having won each war.

A second similarity lies in the concept of what it meant to win these trials-by-combat. On the negative side, to win did not mean three things: attainment of a limited political goal, a return to the status quo ante bellum, or a fait accompli. If winning did not mean one of these, what did it mean? It meant acquiring the right, through military means, to impose the political will of the victor upon the vanquished.

Americans fought England in order to completely sever their existing relation with the British Empire and establish a new country governed under a new political philosophy. From the American standpoint, this was an unlimited political objective. To accomplish this objective, it was necessary to defeat the British Army in the field and force the enemy to sue for peace. Having accomplished their military task, the Colonists won the right to:

- (1) control the elements of national power among the States,
- (2) determine Federal and State sovereignty, and (3) determine the distribution of lands and people among the States.

The United States fought World War I to make the world "fit and safe to live in." This, too, was an unlimited political objective and required defeat of the enemy armed forces in the field. By defeating the enemy forces, the Allies won the right to: (1) control and reshape the elements of national power of the vanquished, (2) determine sovereignty, and (3) determine the distribution of lands and people among nations.

Americans fought World War II for essentially the same ultimate objective as that in World War I, and again it was necessary to defeat the enemy forces in the field. Again, the Allies won the same rights as those won in World War I.

However, along with winning these rights, the victors won something else: the obligation to solve problems relating to national and international relations, peace, and order. After defeating the enemy forces and assuming the rights they had won, the victors were the only political entities capable of exercising the authority necessary to solve these problems, since the authority is inherent in and dependent upon the powers assumed by the victors. It is immaterial whether the victors recognized their obligation or chose to exercise their assumed authority, the obligation was there.

To win in these three wars, then, meant the victor acquired:

1. The right to control and shape the elements of national power of the nations in question;
2. The right to determine sovereignty in or among the nations in question;
3. The right to determine the distribution of lands and people in or among the nations in question; and
4. The obligation to solve problems of national and international relations, peace, and order for the nations in question.

Another similarity relates to the feeling of the American people: their penchant for isolationism, non-intervention, and reluctance to

engage in war. During the period of time prior to the Declaration of Independence, the Colonists were extremely reluctant to openly defy George III and accept open conflict with British troops. All the Colonials wanted was to be left alone to pursue their own ends. At virtually the eleventh hour, the Americans submitted the "Olive Branch petition" in an attempt to avoid war, but to no avail. The Americans of the World War I period similarly attempted to avoid war; they enjoyed their peace and security. There was no constraint over providing money or supplies to the belligerents, but not even the severe reverses of the friendly Allies could generate a real desire for America to enter the war. The loss of American lives was not a sufficient motivating force to overcome non-intervention and isolationism. Literally, World War I had to be thrust upon the United States by Germany. World War II indicates the same pattern of American feeling. Europe's problems were of little concern to Americans, and the early phases of the war did not really stir them. Germany annexed Austria, Sudetenland, and most of Czechoslovakia, and occupied France, but Americans were not ready for war. Japan flouted the American Open Door policy in Asia, attacked China, and occupied Indo-China, but Americans persisted in isolationism and neutrality. The United States entered the conflict only after being forced to by the attack on Pearl Harbor. It is clear that America's two-century trend of isolation and non-intervention indicates a basic feeling of the people and is a part of America's heritage. This feeling is not a sometime thing,

subject to political maneuvering or negotiation; it seems to be a deep-felt, instinctive part of American life.

American idealism and emotion toward the wars were similar in each case. The Revolutionary War resulted from an ideological impasse between the Colonies and England. Americans were proud of their provinces, proud of being Americans, proud of being different from the British people, proud of being able to administer their own affairs, and emotions ran high when the people felt that Parliament or the King were violating their rights or being unjust. The Declaration of Independence, itself, expresses the feeling and principles for which the war was fought. World War I was a war of principles and emotion as evidenced by President Wilson's address to Congress on January 8, 1918, in which he said,

We entered this war because violations of right had occurred which touched us to the quick and made the life of our people impossible unless they were corrected and the world secured once for all against their recurrence. What we demand in this war, therefore, is nothing peculiar to ourselves. It is that the world be made fit and safe to live in. . . . An evident principle runs through the whole programme I have outlined. . . . The moral climax of this the culminating and final war for human liberty has come. . . .¹

The emotional tone and principles of World War II were indicated by President Roosevelt when he spoke to the American people on December 9, 1941, and said,

¹Woodrow Wilson, "Address of the President of the United States Delivered at a Joint Session of the Two Houses of Congress, January 8, 1918," US Dept of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of The United States: 1918, Supplement I, The World War, Vol. 1, pp. 14-17.

Powerful and resourceful gangsters have banded together to make war upon the whole human race And no honest person, today or a thousand years hence, will be able to suppress a sense of indignation and horror at the treachery committed by the military dictators of Japan. . . . In my message to the Congress yesterday I said that we 'will make very certain that this form of treachery shall never endanger us again'. . . . The true goal we seek is far above and beyond the ugly field of battle. When we resort to force, as now we must, we are determined that this force shall be directed toward ultimate good as well as against immediate evil. We Americans are not destroyers - we are builders.²

In each case America fought a war of principle and emotion, and the people rallied behind leaders who gave substance and life to those principles and emotions. In these wars, at least, it appears that American political leaders felt these two ingredients were necessary if America was to be led into an armed conflict and win.

A final similarity is found in the change that came over Americans when war was declared. Once it was clear that war could no longer be avoided, Americans set about winning their war and forcing the enemy to accept American peace terms. Each was a long, hard fought war, but nothing less than a total win by the United States was acceptable. It was as if the enemy had to be defeated and punished for having intruded upon United States' isolation.

²US Dept of State, The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. V, No. 129, 12 Dec. 1941, pp. 476-480.

CHAPTER 6

IMPLICATIONS

What, then, are the implications of these conclusions? The future is unknowable, of course, but one is permitted to anticipate, to go from the known to the unknown, to hypothesize.

Perhaps some relationship exists between America's deep-rooted desire to remain aloof from war, and her insistence upon fighting wars of principle and emotion which require a "win" of the type noted in these three wars. It is possible that, finally having been forced into combat, Americans swing to the opposite emotional extreme and demand punishment of the enemy.¹ Punishment which rains down on the enemy's head, and forces him to accept America's terms. If this hypothesis is correct, it has roots in 200 years of American history, and would be extremely difficult to change in the one or two generations of contemporary history.

World history since World War II has been turbulent and laced with crises. The Cold War, the North-South conflict, the East-West conflict, Korea, Cuba, Santo Domingo, Vietnam, and many other confrontations have all left their mark; and, judging from the recent past, it seems reasonable to expect additional confrontations of a similar nature in the future. Confrontations in which the United States will, of necessity, have to accept a leading role and expend its manpower and treasure. Confrontations which will have some unknown effect on the American public.

¹George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy: 1900-1950, pp. 73-74.

General war has been successfully avoided since World War II by the major powers of the world. This highly desirable situation appears to have come about through a realization of the impact of such a war, and a deliberate effort on the part of the major nations to avoid general war. There does not seem to be a similar effort to avoid wars of lesser intensity, however. On the contrary, some nations seem to deliberately foster conflicts ranging from subversion and coups to limited war. If this apparent trend continues, and general war is held in check, it seems likely that the United States may well find itself confronted by a series of small wars. Wars in which the United States is not the aggressor, has no interest in material gain, and cannot bring its full power to bear upon the enemy to subdue or punish him. Wars in which there is no win in the sense found in this paper, only a return to the status quo ante bellum or a negotiated settlement.

If the hypothesis of American reaction to war is true, and if the apparent trend in war continues, what is the implication? It is quite possible that the United States might have extreme difficulty in maintaining its status as a world leader in the international arena.

The United States is generally recognized as the most powerful nation in the world, leader of the free world, and guardian of the peace. In addition, it has numerous commitments to assist other nations in maintaining their freedom. Therefore, it seems almost inevitable that America will find itself periodically engaged in a war of low or medium intensity; that is, a war of less intensity than general or unlimited conflict. It is also generally recognized that

a win of the type required by the hypothesis is not necessarily appropriate to wars of low or medium intensity in this environment, because application of sufficient force to assure a triumph greatly increases the risk of widening and escalating a small war to one of general conflict. Therefore, if the American people insist upon defeating and punishing their enemies in wars of low or medium intensity, they could deny their government the use of military power for limited, rational, political purposes.

On the other hand, if the United States Government should find it necessary to deliberately engage in a protracted series of small, limited, rational wars, each of which ends in a negotiated peace instead of a win, how will the American people react? Can they throw off their heritage of winning and elect leaders who will see them through until a different concept of winning is firmly established? Or will they become frustrated over never winning, reject all international obligations, and elect leaders who will carry them back into their traditional position of isolation and non-intervention? The latter course could spell disaster for the free world.

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