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8 April 1966

WHAT IT MEANS TO WIN - A POST WORLD WAR II SURVEY

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SUMMARY

PURPOSE

To develop the meaning of "win" by enumerating the United States philosophy of "win" and by surveying several post World War II situations for the purpose of assessing whether the United States won or lost in each event.

DISCUSSION

This thesis takes up the dialogue of "win" by initially discussing some of the background aspects of winning which are considered germane: the literal meaning of the word; the American concept of the meaning of the word; and the impact that the environment, in which the word is used, has on its meaning.

"Win" by the Webster definition is "to succeed or prevail in a contest or effort; to triumph." Inherent in the definition is the suggestion that there are criteria by which a "win" may be determined. Usually rules for contests are specific and easily understood. When dealing with things national though, such as competition with other nations, the determination of the criteria for a "win" becomes more involved. Nevertheless, notwithstanding the complexity of the "game," attainment must be associated with the goals or objectives or else the use of the word "win" loses its meaning.

"Win" is an absolute term and should be used to describe achievement in conjunction with competition of all sorts that are finite. Difficulties arise as to meaning when the term is used in relation to conditions or a state of being, such as cold war.

War has always been considered to be morally wrong by Americans. Conflict between nations has been justified in the past only on the basis that it is waged to eliminate war. The logic of fighting a war as a moral crusade in order to eliminate the evil that war represents, led to the concept of the totality of war in the United States.

The impact of the nuclear age upon the American concept of total war has been sobering. For the first time in the history of mankind, a nation has the ability to destroy another nation completely and unequivocally. The question arises whether there is such a goal as "total victory" outside of genocide. If the reply is in the negative, then the use of the phrase "total victory" as an objective of war is suspect as to its validity.

Next, four situations are discussed: Congo, 1960-1962; Laos, 1962; Cuba, 1961-1962; and Korea, 1950-1953. Each is described with a view toward assessing whether the United States "won" or "lost." It is recognized that the four situations are only samples of the times since World War II. They are considered unique in themselves

and also are considered to be inter-related due to the thread of a policy of containment; a policy which evolved over the years in response to events and circumstances. The survey may be considered to be somewhat limited to the extent that the major antagonists in each situation turns out to be the United States and Russia. Therefore, China's influence on United States objectives is not made a part of the considerations in the thesis.

The United Nations forces filled the vacuum created by the lack of internal law and order in the Congo, after that country received its independence. The United States policies toward the Congo were aligned with those of the United Nations, namely, a desire for an independent and united Congo. We achieved our objectives in the Congo. When the United Nations forces departed the Congo in 1964, some measure of stability existed and the Congolese Government was neutral but friendly to the United States.

At the time of the negotiations for a settlement in Laos, that country was threatened by a Communist take-over. The United States desired a neutral and independent state in Laos. On paper the signing of the Geneva Agreement indicated that we achieved our objective and therefore "won."

The United States objective in the Cuban missile crisis was a modest one. We did not want Cuba turned into a Soviet offensive military base and it wasn't.

We did not win a "total victory" in Korea, though we did achieve our initial objective. The North Korean aggression was resisted and turned back, so was the Chinese aggression. We never did unite Korea by military force because, in the minds of our decision-makers, the price of overcoming China was too high for the commensurate gain.

As a result of the post World War II survey the meaning of "win" becomes abundantly clear. To "win" is to achieve one's objectives. The United States attained its objectives, in most part, in the four situations discussed. From an overview of the situations, one can readily perceive a pattern of containment, which was fashioned over the years to counter the encroachment of the Soviet Union. Hence to win is to attain our stated goals and that goal in the past twenty years has been to contain the Soviet Union.

CONCLUSIONS

The paper concludes that the meaning of "win" is to achieve the stated objectives. In main, our terms of reference in regard to winning have changed from "total victory" to "victory." The thesis also concludes that the policy of containment, which came about over a period of years, has been successful in deterring Soviet encroachment on the free world. Finally it is concluded that in any future discussion of "win" there is a need to discard tired, old, and meaningless cliches and substitute in lieu thereof meaningful thinking.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

To start at the beginning of a discussion on the term "to win" is to understand something about the word. The intent of such a beginning is to establish a framework in which further discussion becomes more meaningful.

"Win" by the Webster definition is "to succeed or prevail in a contest or effort; to triumph."¹ The definition suggests that there is a means of determining whether the participants in a "contest" or "effort" achieve success or prevail; that is, there exists a set of criteria which describe the conditions by which a "win" or "loss" is ascertained. The rules of the contest are usually specific, easily understood, more times than not, concise. When dealing with things national, such as policy, objectives, and competition among other nations, then the determination becomes more involved. Notwithstanding the complexity of the "game," attainment must be associated with goals or objectives or else the use of the word "win" loses its meaning.

"Win" is an absolute term. Therefore it should be used to describe achievement in conjunction with events, contests, or competition of all sorts, that are finite, that have, at least, a discernible beginning and definitely an apparent end. Difficulties

¹Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary, 1952, p. 1970.

arise when the term is used in relation to conditions or a state of being, such as cold war.

The environment or contest in which the term "win" is employed has a definite impact on its meaning. United States history shows that this great nation has never lost a war in which it has participated. Americans are proud of this fact, but they do not boast of it as war is repugnant to them. War is considered to be morally wrong. It tends to degrade and debase man. Robert E. Osgood, noted American political scientist and author, stated that our aversion to war:

springs, ultimately, from the great liberal and humane ideals of Christianity and the Enlightenment, which look toward man's progressive ability to resolve human conflicts by peaceful settlement--by impartial reference to reason, law, and morality.²

Despite the American deep-rooted antipathy toward war, the United States has participated in many wars, small and large.

Americans sailed across the Atlantic Ocean into World War I under the banner that "the world must be made safe for democracy."³ World War II was fought to root out Nazism and Fascism and the cancerous evil they represented. Paul Kecskemeti is a Senior Fellow of the Research Institute on Communist Affairs of Columbia University. While serving as a member of the Social Science staff of the Rand Corporation, Mr. Kecskemeti authored a study for the United States Air Force. In this study he observed that:

²Robert E. Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy, p. 32.

³John Bartlett, Familiar Quotations, p. 20. President Woodrow Wilson made this statement in his address to Congress on 2 April 1917.

wars waged in the spirit of the traditional American approach . . . are essentially crusades . . . the concept of war as a crusade is particularly adaptable to the mentality of the public in modern Western democracies . . . war can be justified only if it is waged to eliminate war.⁴

The logic of fighting a war as a moral crusade, in order to eliminate the evil that war represents, led to the concept of totality of war. Nothing must be allowed to deter from achieving the objective of eradicating the sinful source of war. Specialists for the situation, the military, were called upon to effectively deal with the prosecution of the war. (As American liberalism never accepted the Clausewitzian thesis that war is another aspect of politics, sharp distinctions were made between the use of power and politics. Power was employed when politics failed.) Therefore, in war, the military dominated. They knew no other objective than that which conformed to the concept of total war and total victory; the criterion used was the destruction of the enemy's forces in the field.

The nuclear age and the cold war have had a serious impact upon American concepts of war and the interplay between power and politics. The advent of nuclear weapons added a new dimension to the spectrum of war. For the first time in the history of mankind, a nation had the ability to destroy another nation completely and unequivocally. In the late-fifties, terms used in discussing the nuclear dilemma included such phrases as: "hardened sites"; "pre-emptive strike";

⁴Paul Kecskemeti, Strategic Surrender, The Politics of Victory and Defeat, p. 26.

"counter-force," and "nuclear parity." All of these expressions gave credibility to a sobering thought. Neither of the major antagonists, the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, could initiate a nuclear attack on the other without risking a nuclear response of prohibitive destruction. If an all-out nuclear exchange were to occur, one could conclude without hesitation that the "contestants" would be losers and there would be no winners. Therefore, it appears inappropriate to use the term "win" in conjunction with any realistic discussion concerning the outcome of a general nuclear war.

In the aftermath of World War II two great powers emerged, the United States and the Soviet Union. The lines of conflict between these two nations were quickly drawn when the aggressive objectives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic were perceived. The "Iron Curtain" descended in Europe and the process of its establishment was heard around the world. The Cold War ensued.

Osgood writes that:

It is primarily the cold war that is transforming America's traditional approach to the relation between power and policy; for the cold war confronted the nation, as World War II never did, with the practical necessity of balancing military means with political ends within the framework of national strategy.⁵

It is in this new environment, the cold war, that four international situations are depicted in the following pages. Described also are the United States objectives associated with each situation. This

⁵Osgood, op. cit., p. 44.

is done with two things in mind--first, to determine whether the United States achieved its stated objectives in each case and second, whether these objectives, as enunciated by three different presidents, portray any pattern whose discernment may lead to a better understanding by the military of future United States foreign policy.

I take this opportunity to recognize the fine assistance given to me by Colonel Paul N. Horton and Lieutenant Colonel D. M. Smith on Laos and the Congo respectively. I am grateful to my research director, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas H. Reese, who guided this paper to its end with finesse and, at times, with much needed encouragement. Lastly, I am indebted to my wife, Mary Lou Rachmeler, for her astute observations and forbearance.

CHAPTER 2

THE REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

The Republic of the Congo, formerly the Belgian Congo (1908-1960), and before that the private estate of King Leopold II of Belgium (1885-1908), is the scene today of a country desperately trying to maintain its identity. Since its independence on 30 June 1960, the Congo has witnessed on separate occasions; mob rule, law and order, foreign intervention, some requested and beneficial, some requested and counter-productive, internal insurrection and secession, peace, parliamentary government and one man rule.

INDEPENDENCE AND CHAOS

Independence was thrust upon a country that was totally unprepared for it, and totally incapable of making it work. An unstable government which was patched together a week before independence, primarily because no one individual could muster enough support to form a government, called for United Nations assistance some twelve days after formal receipt of independence. In the background of this request was the mutiny of the Congolese Army-Force Publique--which took to mob violence in Leopoldville on 8 July 1960 and to mutiny in Katanga and Luluabourg on 9 July 1960. As a result of these unwarranted and unpredicted eruptions of lust and passion, Belgian paratroopers were introduced into the Congo to protect thousands of Belgian nationals who were still residing there. The re-appearance of the Belgian Army acted as a signal for the rebellion to flare everywhere. South African author Colin Legum wrote:

The mutiny changed everything; it destroyed what was hopeful in the situation; it killed cooperation between the Belgians and the Congolese; it splintered the brittle alliances of the Coalition Government; it opened the way for foreign intervention; and it wrecked internal security. Those trained /Force Publique/ to uphold law and order were themselves the leaders of lawlessness and disorder.¹

Chaos reigned.

On 9 July 1960, Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, Republic of the Congo, requested military assistance from the United States in order to maintain internal order. This request was turned aside by a United States suggestion that the United Nations be asked for such assistance. The United States Government sympathized with the Congolese in their immediate situation and was prepared to provide economic and diplomatic assistance, but not inclined to provide military forces on a unilateral basis. United States President Dwight D. Eisenhower felt that the situation in the Congo was fraught with the dangerous possibility of a East-West confrontation; something he seriously wanted to avoid.²

UNITED NATIONS

The United Nations responded to Congo President Joseph Kasavubu's and Prime Minister Lumumba's request for military aid to "protect the natural territory of the Congo against the present external aggression /Belgian/," by initially sending troops. The Secretary-General of the

¹Colin Legum, Congo Disaster, p. 110.

²Dean Rusk, "US Policy in the Congo," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 66, 5 Feb. 1962, p. 216.

United Nations, Dag Hammarskjold, was given a mandate from the Security Council in the form of a unanimous resolution on the evening of 13-14 July 1960. Among other things, the Security Council called upon the Government of Belgium to withdraw its troops from the territory of the Congo.

On 21 July 1960, the Security Council unanimously, inter alia, requested all states:

to refrain from any action which might tend to impede the restoration of law and order and the exercise by the Government of the Congo of its authority and also to refrain from any action which might undermine the territorial integrity and the political independence of the Republic of the Congo.³

In supporting these resolutions the United States manifested its desire to keep the Congo from being an active Cold War arena. The United States State Department considered it best that the vacuum created by the rapid disintegration of the Congolese internal structure be filled by the United Nations and not by a big-power intervention.

One other major event occurred during this period of time which not only contributed to the confusion and the chaotic conditions following independence but, at a later date, threatened to cause the collapse of the United Nations effort in the Congo and the direct military intervention of the United States. This incident concerned Katanga Province which: holds 1/6 the Congo's population, occupies approximately 1/5 of the geography,⁴ but contains a disproportionate

³"Security Council Resolution on the Congo," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 63, 8 Aug. 1960, p. 223.

⁴Phillipa Schuyler, Who Killed the Congo?, P. 299.

amount of the Congo's wealth,⁵ approximately 47%. Moïse Tshombe, the duly elected leader of the province and one of the four political leaders who emerged in the aftermath of Congolese independence, declared the secession of the Katangan province from the Republic of the Congo on 11 July 1960. With the aid of Katangan resources, Tshombe organized a mercenary-led army, and with the aid of the Belgians, attempted to create favorable world opinion in the United Nations and Washington for an independent Katanga. Negotiation between Tshombe and Lumumba for a reconciliation ended in failure.

Lumumba attempted to create a strong central government and sought support from the United Nations. This was denied to him primarily due to the Secretary-General's interpretation of the Security Council resolutions of 14 and 21 July 1960. The United Nations forces would not take part in any actions which concerned Congolese internal affairs.⁶ Lumumba turned from the United Nations and publicly requested the active backing of the African states against the United Nations (the African states elected not to give this support). He then cashed in on a private Russian offer to provide aid by accepting trucks, Ilyushin transport planes, and Russian "technicians."

Prime Minister Lumumba, during the month of August, declared martial law, expelled the Belgian ambassador, and used Russian planes to air lift his troops into the Kasai province to put down the

⁵Alan P. Merriam, Congo Background of Conflict, p. 316.

⁶Legum, op. cit., p. 131.

dissident government set up by Albert Kalonji.⁷ These actions led to an open break between Kasavubu and Lumumba.

On the evening of 5 September President Kasavubu ousted Lumumba for causing fratricidal warfare. One hour later Lumumba announced the dismissal of Kasavubu. The Chamber of Deputies invalidated both ousters on 7 September.⁸ The situation appeared to be somewhat ludicrous and could be considered an immature comedy, but for its tragic consequences in the toll of human lives.

The following week, Colonel (now General) Mobutu, Chief of Staff of the Congolese Army, assumed control of the government by a bloodless coup. Mobutu initially did not indicate leanings toward any of the political leaders. Later he sided with Kasavubu. As a consequence, Lumumba's influence declined until his death in January 1961. The Communists also suffered at the hands of Mobutu. He ordered the Russian and Czech embassies closed and the personnel therein out of the country.

THE UNITED STATES

In sum this was the situation in the Congo that President Kennedy inherited: a central government without a parliament; a dissident government in Stanleyville, claiming prime legitimacy to represent the Congo, under the tutelage of Antoine Gizenga, Lumumba's Vice

⁷Kasai province was one of two provinces that seceded from the Republic of the Congo in July. Approximately 1,000 Baluba tribesmen were killed by the Lulus, another tribe and pro-Lumumbaists. Schuyler, op. cit., p. 225.

⁸Merriam, op. cit., pp. 252-253.

Prime Minister and more of a Marxist than his boss; a Congo seething with tribal riots; and a United States policy supporting the United Nations actions in the Congo.

Theodore C. Sorensen, aide to President J. F. Kennedy wrote:

The Kennedy policy was largely an extension of the Eisenhower policy. Its aim was the restoration of stability and order to a reunited, independent and viable Congo, free from communist domination and free from both civil war and cold war conflicts. The chief channel of this policy was our support-- diplomatic, economic and, to the extent of providing air transport, military--of the United Nations in its efforts to pacify the country and reconcile its factions.

Kennedy did not want the Congo to become another Laos, drawing American energies and goodwill in a jungle war against Communist supported local troops. Nor did he want it to become another Cuba, providing Communists with a strategically located military base, vast natural resources and a fertile breeding ground of subversives and guerrillas.⁹

SECESSION OF KATANGA

The problem of the secession of Katanga Province presented the United Nations with a difficult obstacle to overcome. It was suggested that the people of Katanga were simply determining their future when their wily leader, Moïse Tshombe, declared for independence. Others, such as American author Phillipa Schuyler, argued that the movement for independence "was a black movement, inspired by the desire to assert and renew the ancient Katanga cultural, tribal and political heritage."¹⁰

⁹Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy, pp. 635-636.

¹⁰Schuyler, op. cit., p. 266.

The United States took the position that an integrated, independent Congo must be preserved. A splintered Congo only would tend to make permanent the chaos in the area. Furthermore, there was no legal basis for the secession. The Congo achieved its independence as an entity. Specifically, it was determined that the Congo state would be "made up of six provinces whose geographical boundaries are those of the provinces now in existence¹¹/prior to independence/." Furthermore, the armed secession of Katanga, which was supported to some extent by external "sources," played directly into the hands of the Communists since; it created an environment for civil war; made the United Nation's task of preserving law and order infinitely more difficult; and, if successful, would establish a precedent for tribal leaders in other areas to follow.

PROGRESS

The processes of parliamentary government were reestablished in July 1961 when officials from all the provinces, except Katanga, convened in Leopoldville and duly elected Cyrilla Adoula to head up a moderate government. Antoine Gizenga was named Deputy Prime

¹¹Merriam, op. cit., p. 337.
(Author's note: The Round Table Conference took place in Brussels, from 20 January - 20 February 1960, where Belgian and Congolese leaders met. They approved some 16 resolutions. These provided the framework in which the Congo would politically function prior to and after independence. The resolution contained the organization of the Congo State, the Constitution of the First Central Government of the Congo and the organization of the Congolese Parliament, among other things.)

Minister. Mr. Tshombe, President of Katanga, refused to attend the sessions because he insisted that Katanga was an independent state and not part of the Congo.

One of President Kennedy's main concerns during this period of time was the knowledge that, while the Security Council authorized the use of force, in the last resort, to prevent civil war in the Congo, the United Nations forces there might not have the wherewithal to accomplish their mission. He wanted to avoid, if he possibly could, sending United States military forces to support the United Nations. The picture of American planes bombing African cities, even under the auspices of the United Nations, did not appeal to him one iota. Nevertheless, he supported the principal of an integrated Congo and the maintenance of the United Nations in its role as a nation builder.

The Russians, however, took another view of the whole operation. Frustrated in their attempt to "take over" when their protege Lumumba fell, the Soviet Union turned its wrath on the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Mr. Hammarskjold was not only portrayed as being partial to the "colonists" and "imperialists," but was charged by the Russians with the responsibility for Patrice Lumumba's death.

A series of armed clashes occurred between the United Nations and Katangan forces; intermingled with ceasefire agreements. Overtures for peaceful negotiations came to naught. It appeared that the United Nations was being stymied at every turn to accomplish its mission peaceably. The Indian forces, constituting the bulk of the forces in the United Nations Command, were to be returned to India

for financial and political reasons. The Congolese Central Government wanted the United Nations to mount an offensive and integrate Katanga by force and were willing to look elsewhere for arms and men if the United Nations couldn't accomplish the job. United Nations Secretary-General U Thant appealed to the United States for planes, tanks, and vehicles. Before President Kennedy's military fact-finding mission could return home from the Congo with its report as to the extent of the aid required, the United Nations forces swept Katangan forces away in two weeks of fighting and the Katangan independence collapsed.

The United Nations, by its resolute and determined actions, brought about the integration of the Congo and helped to bring some measure of stability to an area torn by strife; in so doing, the United Nations helped prevent a direct East-West confrontation. In President Kennedy's words, "The UN could not bring the great powers together in the Congo, but at least it could keep them apart."¹²

Unlike the Congo, the situation in Laos did not erupt suddenly but evolved over a period of time. Like the Congo though, the United States and the Soviet Union found themselves in a tug-of-war in Southeast Asia with the survival of Laos at stake. Let us see how the United States made out.

¹²Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., A Thousand Days, p. 575.

CHAPTER 3

LAOS

Laos, under French control since 1893, came within the administrative framework of the Indo-Chinese Union. French control lapsed toward the end of World War II when the Japanese decided to administer the area that had been occupied by their military forces since 1941. The French Government reestablished its authority in 1945 when they accepted the nationalistic principal of a territorially united Laos, under a king. A series of concessions were enacted with the Laotians during the following seven years. These concessions culminated in the French-Laotian Treaty of Friendship, signed 22 October 1953. The French Republic pursuant to this treaty, recognized the Kingdom of Laos as a sovereign state and transferred to it military, diplomatic, and judicial rights previously exercised by the French.¹

Laos was the least developed of the states in Southeast Asia. It travelled the road to statehood and nationhood rather rapidly; in retrospect, too rapidly. In 1945 Laos was simply a conglomeration of provinces. The internal problems that beset the new nation were tremendous. The standard of living needed to be raised; natural resources had to be developed; communication routes had to be laced through the jungles and over the mountains to unite physically that which had been united politically. Everything that had to be done had to begin from the beginning.

¹United Kingdom, Central Office of Information, Laos, pp. 6-7.

Unfortunately the political leaders were not united in their efforts and there were no trained personnel to implement any programs that might be initiated. The Laotians looked to the French for aid.

The French couldn't do much for the Laotians as their influence was being swept from the Indo-China peninsula by a wave of anti-colonialism. This tide was given direction and leadership by the men who were also disciples of Mao Tse-tung, the successful Chinese Communist revolutionary. French influence and physical presence were virtually eliminated from Southeast Asia as a result of agreements reached at the conferences held at Geneva, Switzerland, April-July 1954.

GENEVA

Representatives of the Soviet Union, France, Communist China, the United Kingdom, and the United States met at Geneva, Switzerland, from 26 April to 21 July 1954 to discuss the reunification of Korea and the war in Indo-China. Representatives of Cambodia, Laos, the State of Vietnam (non-communist Vietnam) and the Viet Minh (Democratic Republic of Vietnam), were included in the discussions on Indo-China which commenced on 8 May 1954. An agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Laos² was signed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Forces of the French Union, who represented Laos, and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam Vice Minister of National Defense, who represented

²Sisouk Na Champassak, Storm Over Laos, A Contemporary History, pp. 173-184.

the Viet Minh and the "fighting forces of the Pathet Lao." The Agreement provided for a ceasefire and prohibited the introduction of any troops into Laos from the outside; the French were authorized to maintain certain instructors and garrisons, other foreign forces were to withdraw; the Pathet Lao "forces" were to move from provincial assembly areas to the provinces of Phong Saly (borders on China and North Vietnam) and Sam Neua (borders on North Vietnam); and an International Control Commission was created, consisting of representatives from Canada, India, and Poland. This commission was charged with the responsibility for the control and the supervision of the provisions of the Agreement.

Two unilateral declarations were issued by the Royal Laotian Government immediately after the Geneva Agreement on 21 July 1954. The first declared that the Laotian government would:

never join in any agreement with other states if this agreement includes the obligation for the Royal Government of Laos to participate in a military alliance not in conformity with the principals of the Charter of the United Nations or with the principle of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities or, unless its security is threatened, the obligation to establish bases on Laotian territory for military forces of foreign Powers. . . . During the period between the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam and the final settlement of that country's political problems, the Royal Government of Laos will not request foreign aid, whether in war material, in personnel or in instructors, except for the purpose of its effective territorial defense and to the extent defined by the agreement on the cessation of hostilities.³

³US Dept of State, The Situation in Laos, p. 5.

The second declaration indicated in essence the resolve and willingness of the Royal Government of Laos to do everything possible to incorporate the dissident Laotian factions into the national community without prejudice. In a final declaration, the conferees took notice, among other things, of the two unilateral declarations made by the Laotian Government. The conferees stated in Article 12 that

. . . each member of the Geneva Conference undertakes to respect the sovereignty, the independence, the unity, and the territorial integrity of the above-mentioned States [Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam], and to refrain from any interference in their internal affairs.⁴

AFTER GENEVA

The Geneva Agreement of 1954 gave recognition to the Pathet Lao Combat Units as a military organization, but not as a political body. This gave some satisfaction to the Pathet Lao leader, Prince Souphannouvong, who sought legal status or recognition for his "Pathet Lao Resistance Movement."⁵

Prince Souphannouvong had previously been associated with the Lao Issara (Free Lao) Movement which had been promulgated just after the termination of World War II. He was one of a group of partisan Laotian leaders who sincerely desired complete independence for Laos.

⁴Champassak, op. cit., p. 186.

⁵The "Pathet Lao Resistance Movement" was founded in August 1950 by Prince Souphannouvong. The movement gained notice and notoriety as being Communist led and directed but was without real substance as a Laotian popular movement. Champassak, op. cit., p. 28.

The group was forced into exile when the French reestablished their authority over the small country in 1946. Prince Souphannouvong openly advocated war against the French. The other leaders and their followers did not. As his forces were meager, Prince Souphannouvong sought and found the Viet Minh who in turn fostered the Prince and primed him as the leader of the "local Laotian forces" which could contribute handsomely to a Communist take-over of Laos.

Hanoi continued to proclaim the "Pathet Lao Resistance Movement" as the only legitimate government in Laos. On the other hand, the Royal Laotian Government recognized Prince Souphannouvong as a bandit leading a small group of renegades against a government, which by 1953, was recognized by some 46 countries. The Movement found little basis among the Laotians except in the Phong Saly and Sam Neua provinces where Viet Minh forces, under the guise of "volunteers," aided and abetted the Pathet Lao. Nevertheless the Prince needed legal recognition or faced the prospect of having his Movement stymied. The Geneva Conference provided the vehicle.

The Royal Laotian Government was determined to hold national elections in 1955 in order to discharge one of the obligations imposed by the Geneva Accords. Discussions between the Pathet Lao and the Royal Laotian Government proved to be fruitless and the "national election" took place in December 1955 without the participation of the Pathet Lao.

Pathet Lao Combat Units in the two provinces of Phong Saly and Sam Neua were active during this period, consolidating, building, and strengthening their positions with the aggressive support, in the

form of equipment and arms, of the Viet Minh. The situation in the provinces deteriorated to the point where the International Control Commission was asked to investigate.

In a majority resolution, the International Control Commission recommended that the Royal Administration be reestablished in the Sam Neua and Phong Saly provinces without delay and the two parties reconvene political talks. The Royal Laotian Government agreed. The Pathet Lao did not. By mid-year (1956), the Communists changed their tone toward the Royal Laotian Government and discussions ensued based upon the International Control Commission resolution. In December 1956, a Joint Declaration provided that: a coalition government be formed prior to the holding of general supplementary elections in which the Pathet Lao would run as a political party under a different name, Nel Leo Hak Sat; after the investiture of the coalition government the two Pathet Lao provinces would be officially turned back to the Royal Laotian Government; and the electoral law⁶ should guarantee free and secret ballot.⁷

Eighteen months later, May 1958, the supplementary elections were held. Twenty one seats were contested. The Nel Leo Hak Sat won nine, the Peace Party, an ally of the Nel Leo Hak Sat, won three. The remaining nine were scattered, the majority going to unaffiliated candidates. The results of the election did not go unheeded.

⁶The electoral law was revised in February 1957, to provide for an increased number of deputies, from 39 to 59. US Dept of State, op. cit., p. 10.

⁷UK Central Office of Information, op. cit., p. 10.

The disconcerted nationalists regrouped and reorganized to form the Laotian People's Rally under the leadership of Prince Souvanna Phouma. Another group, the "Young Ones," who were in complete sympathy with the Laotian People's Rally but who did not want to be associated with the "Old Ones,"⁸ formed a committee for the Defense of National Interests.⁹ This group played an active role in Laotian politics in 1959 and 1960.

The election of 4 May 1958 was validated by the National Assembly two months later. In accordance with the Lao constitution, Prime Minister Souvanna resigned in order to form a new government based upon the results of the election. He was unsuccessful. M. Phoui Sananikone, also of the Laotian People's Rally, succeeded.

The new government indicated its policy in the investiture speech by Prime Minister Phoui Sananikone.

Our objective is to preserve our newly won independence and unification. We must guard against the most threatening danger, which will undermine our independence and unification. This danger is Communism. . . .¹⁰

EXTERNAL PRESSURE

It was apparent to the North Vietnamese and their Chinese hosts that the Laotian government was going to do everything possible to

⁸Champassak, op. cit., p. 63.

⁹Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. indicated in his book A Thousand Days that "In 1958 Washington decided to install a reliably pro-western regime. CIA spooks put in their appearance, set up a committee for the Defence of the National Interests. . . ." p. 325.

¹⁰US Dept of State, op. cit., p. 63.

combat subversion. The Communists stepped up their pressure on the Royal Laotian Government with the intent to intimidate--to no avail. Toward the latter part of 1958, Prime Minister Sananikone's government had succeeded in isolating the Nel Leo Hak Sat; many of its followers defected. Further, the Sananikone government adopted a definition of neutralism which leaned more toward the West. Democratic Republic of Vietnam attacks on the Laotian border increased.

The Laotian government declined to enter into bilateral negotiations with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam concerning these incidents. Instead, Prime Minister Sananikone asked for and received the power to rule by decree. On 11 February 1959, Phoui Sananikone called a press conference to announce that his government had fulfilled the obligations of the Geneva Agreements and that Laos was a sovereign and independent state which would pursue its own course and tolerate no interference in its internal affairs.¹¹ Thus, Communist interests were challenged in three distinct areas. Their leverage to effect the political orientation of the Laotian government was weakened by the stifling of the Nel Leo Hak Sat. The spread of Western influence was becoming a matter of fact in Laos. The "stability" in the political environment of Laos after the Geneva Agreements was being upset to the detriment of the Communist position, expressed by Chen Yi, Minister of Foreign Affairs, People's Republic of China, that the International Control Commission should "continue to perform its duties."¹²

¹¹Champassak, op. cit., pp. 69-70.

¹²PRC Foreign Language Press, Concerning the Situation In Laos, p. 2.

The Hanoi regime carried on a propaganda campaign in conjunction with Peking. They charged Laos with serious violations of the Geneva Agreements and of the Laos-Pathet Lao Agreements of 1957; they repeatedly denounced the Laotians for border incursions and insisted that the Royal Laotian Government was provoking civil war. The Minister of Foreign Affairs for the People's Republic of China made a statement on 18 May 1959, which called attention to a "civil war":

The present measures¹³ taken by the Government of the Kingdom of Laos against the former Pathet Lao fighting units are tantamount to the open launching of a civil war in Laos and proceeding further to sabotage peace in Indo-China. . . .¹⁴

Despite the fact that the Communists were outmaneuvered on the domestic front, they forged ahead in their campaign to dominate the country. The Pathet Lao battalion established itself in the north once more and consolidated a base from which to operate. Military incursions across the Laotian borders increased. The tempo of contacts between the National Army and Pathet Lao units also increased. The Lao government declared a state of national emergency in September 1959. They also appealed to the United Nations for assistance and the dispatch of an emergency force. The situation was momentarily stabilized by the arrival of a fact-finding sub-committee of the Security Council. Peking and Hanoi were opposed to any United Nations activity in Laos. They wanted the International Control Commission to return. Moscow echoed this sentiment in the Security Council.

¹³Two battalions of the Pathet Lao were to be integrated into the Royal Laotian Army by mutual agreement. In the act of integration, one of the two battalions mutinied and escaped to the North Vietnam border.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 35.

Much rivalry and bickering was evident in the Sananikone government during 1959. Prime Minister Saninkone resigned after his charter to rule by decree for a year terminated. General Phoumi Nosavan, leading a group of army officers, took over the government until such a time as a new government could be formed.

During the spring of 1960 elections were held. Mr. Schlesinger wrote of the elections as follows:

During early 1960 Phoumi dominated non-communist Laos. Recognizing that Defence and CIA were committed to him, he felt free to ignore their advice, rigging the spring elections so blatantly, for example, that the results lacked any color of legitimacy.¹⁵

As a result of the elections, the pro-Communist opposition was completely eliminated in parliament. Prince Somsanith formed a new government. Phoumi was Minister of Defense. Prince Souvanna was elected President of the Assembly.

A relatively unknown came on to the political scene to shatter the "stability" of the four month old government. Captain Kong Le, Commander of the 2nd Parachute Battalion, took advantage of the quiet in Vientiane on August 9, 1960, and took over the government; most of the government officials were out of town. He wanted to bring peace to his people and he desired nothing for himself. The

¹⁵Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 326. Another view of the authenticity of the general elections was voiced by Mr. Sisouk Na Champassak, one of the founders of the Committee for the Defence of the National Interests. "To reproach the government and the Army for departing from its methods in organizing these elections would be to accuse them of not having handed the Communists the weapon for their own assassination." Champassak, op. cit., p. 142.

old government fell and a new government was formed with Prince Souvanna Phouma as the Prime Minister and rightist Phoumi as Vice Premier and Minister of Interior. (The latter was incorporated into the government as part of Souvanna's hope for national reconciliation.)

Souvanna strove for neutrality in foreign policy. The United States government tried to influence him to lean to the right; it was unsuccessful. The Prime Minister turned to the Russians when the United States refused to grant economic aid. Moscow rushed in with planeloads of rice and oil initially, later guns and equipment arrived for the Pathet Lao. This led to a generally unstable situation.

General Phoumi besieged the capital of Vientiane causing Souvanna to leave for Cambodia. Civil war erupted and lasted for several days. Captain Kong Le and his forces evacuated the city and joined the Pathet Lao in the Plaine des Jarres, north of Vientiane, where war material was supplied by Russian air-drops. The prospects for peace in the area became mistier and more nebulous.

COALITION

In 1961, new events changed the course of a worsening situation in Laos--A new President took office in Washington. The United Kingdom and Russia engaged in exchanging notes and opinions on how to bring about peace in Laos. Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia suggested a fourteen nation conference. The King of Laos appealed to all countries to respect his nation's independence and neutrality and

requested his three neighbors, Burma, Cambodia, and Thailand, to serve as guarantors. Burma and Cambodia refused.

President Kennedy convinced the Russians to desist in providing further military assistance by making a public statement on 23 March 1961:

The position of this administration has been carefully considered, and we have sought to make it just as clear as we know how to the governments concerned. First: We strongly and unreservedly support the goal of a neutral and independent Laos, tied to no outside power or group of powers, threatening no one, and free from any domination . . . Secondly, if there is to be a peaceful solution, there must be a cessation of the present armed attacks by externally supported Communists . . . Third, we are earnestly in favor of constructive negotiations--among the nations concerned and among the leaders of Laos--which can help Laos back to the pathway of independence and genuine neutrality . . . I want to make it clear to the American people, and to all the world, that all we want in Laos is peace, not war--a truly neutral government, not a cold-war pawn--a settlement concluded at the conference table, not on the battlefield.¹⁶

He sent five hundred United States Marines into Thailand to show American determination.

On 24 April, the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference on Indo-China, the United Kingdom and Russia, issued a message which requested the recall of the International Control Commission. They also invited fourteen nations to participate in an international conference. The conference convened on 16 May 1961, ended on 23 July 1962, and resulted in a Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos being ratified by the conferees.

¹⁶John F. Kennedy, "The Situation in Laos," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 64, 17 Apr. 1961, pp. 543-544.

This then was the solution: a coalition government was formed with Souvanna as Prime Minister and Prince Souphannouvong and Phoumi as Vice Premiers; an independent neutral Laos with guarantees of its sovereignty by the signatory nations; and an International Control Commission to control and supervise the terms of the Declaration.

Presidential aide Theodore C. Sorensen astutely observed:

The Geneva Agreement was imperfect and untidy, but it was better than no agreement at all, better than a major military confrontation and better than a communist conquest. It was more consistent, in short, with this nation's capabilities and interests than the untenable position in which Kennedy found himself wedged in January 1961. . . . "We have never suggested that there was a final easy answer in Laos," said the President.¹⁷

United States and Soviet Union rivalries brought these two great powers into direct confrontation in Cuba. The world waited silently and apprehensively as the events unfolded in October and November, 1962; events which could conceivably cause World War III. They didn't, much to the joy of all, but like Laos, there was no final easy answer in Cuba for the United States.

¹⁷Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy, p. 648.

CHAPTER 4

CUBA

The fiasco in the Zapata Swamp at the Cuban Bay of Pigs ended on 19 April 1961, with disastrous results. For the new President, John F. Kennedy, this incident was a bitter pill to swallow and terminated his initial hundred days in office on a dismal note. The abortive attempt to overthrow Castro was the result of a decision, made by the previous Administration, to sponsor an invasion of Cuba by a group of anti-Castro exiles, this group to be directed and trained by the United States Central Intelligence Agency. In retrospect, historians and the public-at-large have not been too kind to those in the United States who participated in the operation. Apparently, we as a people haven't learned to do anything surreptitiously and do it well. This may be as our strength lies and will continue to lie in an open society.

Relations between the United States and Cuba grew steadily worse from the time that Fidel Castro and his "revolutionaries" emerged from the Sierra Maestra mountains to take over the reins of the Cuban government. This might be accounted for in general: by the gradual revelation that Castro's regime was unalterably and wittingly headed to the left; by the continued strident and vitrollic attacks made by Castro against the US, casting the American in the role of an economic colonizer and a political interventionist; by the unwillingness of the United States to raise its arms embargo against Castro after the departure of Batista; (Castro sought arms

elsewhere--eventually receiving what he desired from the Communist nations); and by the unwillingness of the Castro government to make "prompt, adequate, and effective"¹ compensation for land and other United States capital investments expropriated by the Castro regime. The two countries broke diplomatic relations in January 1961.

AFTER THE BAY OF PIGS

The debacle in and around Cochinos Bay ended as a completely unmitigated failure. American historian Arthur M. Schlesinger, in his estimate, believed though that "no one can doubt that the failure in Cuba in 1961 contributed to success in Cuba in 1962."² Our troubles did not end with the demise of the 2506th Brigada Asalto of the Cuban Revolutionary Council. The real crisis for the United States had just begun.³

United States prestige in Latin America took a serious blow as a result of the Bay of Pigs. While our friends to the South (Latin America) never hesitated to pluck a few of the eagle's feathers now and then, many of the constituted governments did not like Castro and wanted to see him go. They privately wished to see the invasion succeed. The manner in which it failed showed Latin America a lack of United States determination and resolve.⁴ One is also assured that Premier N. K. Khrushchev believed the United States too "liberal"

¹David D. Burks, Cuba Under Castro, p. 55.

²Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., A Thousand Days, p. 297.

³Thomas Freeman, The Crisis In Cuba, p. 22.

⁴Burks, op. cit., p. 56.

to fight. Some of the events in the months that followed manifest this rather conclusively. To name a few of the events: the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam announced on 1 May that their progress was at a rate to enable the complete take-over of South Vietnam by the end of the year; Khrushchev indicated to President Kennedy on 4 June that Russia would sign a peace treaty with East Germany by the end of the year, thereby terminating Western access rights in West Berlin; the erection of the wall, sealing East Berlin from West Berlin, was started on 13 August 1961; two weeks later, Moscow broke the three-year moratorium on nuclear testing in the atmosphere by detonating multi-megaton devices over northern Russia.⁵

Castro took the opportunity of our "loss" in the Bay of Pigs to expose the character of his revolution as being a "socialist revolution." Events in Cuba prior to and subsequent to the Bay of Pigs bore this out. In a speech on 1 December 1961, Castro:

was torn . . . between his desire to repudiate his past in order to get closer to the Communists, and the desire to salvage his past in order to preserve his revolutionary leadership.⁶

It was in the same speech that Castro cried out, "I am a Marxist-Leninist, and I will be one until the last day of my life."⁷

The Castro-led revolution in Cuba was captured by the Communists. How much the Russians dominated the most beautiful of the islands in

⁵Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy, p. 293.

⁶Theodore Draper, Castro's Revolution, Myths and Realities, p. 146.

⁷Ibid., p. 147.

the Caribbean Sea was to be shown in the latter part of 1962, much to the chagrin of the United States government and much to the amazement of the world as to the method of demonstration. A decision was made by the Russians and the Cuban regime sometime in the spring of 1962. The Soviets would bail Castro out of his economic difficulties. In return, Castro would authorize missile sites to be constructed on Cuban soil.

By the summer of 1962 the number of ships arriving in Cuban ports, carrying arms and "technicians," grew at an alarming rate. Much discussion of these actions took place in Congress. Many of the Congressmen wanted the government to do something. United States Senator Thomas J. Dodd of Connecticut said in a speech before the Senate on 10 September 1962:

To overthrow the Castro regime today--I have no illusion on the score--will require a far greater effort than it would have required 1 year ago. But the cost of overthrowing it today would be infinitely smaller than the price we will have to pay 2 or 3 years hence. . . .⁸

A belligerent Moscow note arrived in Washington on 11 September. It said in effect that the armaments being shipped to Cuba were defensive, and that:

There is no need for the Soviet Union to shift its weapons for the repulsion of aggression . . . to any other country, for instance Cuba. Our nuclear weapons are so powerful . . . and the Soviet Union has so powerful rockets to

⁸Thomas J. Dodd, "The Problem of the Soviet Quisling Regime In Cuba and the Future of Latin America," Congressional Record, Vol. 108, 10 Sep. 1962, p. 6.

carry these nuclear warheads, that there is no need to search for sites for them beyond the boundaries of the Soviet Union.⁹

The Senate shortly thereafter passed a resolution, broadly worded, which gave their support to the President by authorizing him:

to prevent by whatever means necessary, including the use of arms, the Castro regime from exporting its aggressive purposes to any part of the hemisphere. . . .¹⁰

Nevertheless, the President was not about to be pressured into premature actions. He authorized increased surveillance of the island that lies at the mouth of the Gulf of Mexico pointed at the underbelly of the United States. On 14 October "hard evidence" arrived. Photos, taken as a result of a U-2 flight, indicated a launching pad, a missile on the ground and a series of buildings for ballistic missiles; the rudimentary beginnings of a medium range missile site in San Cristobal. The Russians in one stroke, by placing medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM) in Cuba, could obviate our entire strategic early warning system that was oriented toward the Polar Cap. If Khrushchev could have the Medium Range Ballistic Missiles operational, he could upset, to a degree, the balance of power between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic. President Kennedy decided that the offensive missiles must go.

During a week of deliberate and intensive consultations, the President and his advisers (called the Executive Committee) scrutinized, discussed, haggled over, debated, and appraised from every

⁹Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 799.

¹⁰US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations and Committee on Armed Services, Situation in Cuba, p. 8.

angle, all the alternatives for a proper response to the Soviet calculated rashness. President Kennedy decided on 20 October to place a quarantine on all offensive military equipment under shipment to Cuba. He stated, among other things, in his speech to the nation on 21 October, that:

should these offensive military preparations in Cuba continue, thus increasing the threat to the hemisphere, further action will be justified. . . . Our goal is not victory of might but the vindication of right--not peace at the expense of freedom, here in this hemisphere and, we hope, around the world.¹¹

CRISIS

The crisis had begun. It was the Russians this time whose hands were caught in the proverbial cookie jar. The next day, 22 October, the Organization of American States adopted unanimously a resolution authorizing the use of force, individually or collectively, to carry out the quarantine. All eyes were focused on the 18 Russian cargo ships that were steaming toward Cuba. By Thursday of that week, 25 October, the Soviet ships either stopped or altered course. Work, though, still continued at a feverish pace on the missile sites. On 27 October, Kennedy gave the Soviet Premier twenty-four hours to reply to the former's query as to what the Soviets intended to do about dismantling the missile sites. If no reply was forthcoming, the United States would invade Cuba on Tuesday, 30 October. Sunday,

¹¹John F. Kennedy, "The U.S. Response To Soviet Military Buildup In Cuba," Department of State Publication 7449, Oct. 1962, p. 12.

28 October, Mr. Khrushchev wired that the offensive weapons would be shipped back to the Soviet Union, and on-site inspection of the island bases would be authorized, provided Kennedy gave a non-invasion pledge.

Castro was furious with Russia for not consulting him about the bases. He refused to allow any inspection of his soil. Regardless, the sites were dismantled and the missiles and equipment were shipped home. We counted the crates by means of sea and air surveillance. Castro insisted that IL-28 bombers belonged to Cuba and Khrushchev agreed. Kennedy insisted that they be returned to the Soviet Union. Khrushchev finally agreed.

After 18 months, since an ignominious low in April 1961, the prestige of the eagle was again flying high. Notwithstanding, Cuba was still there and Castro was firmly esconced therein. The Cuban crisis made it abundantly clear that the lider maximo (maximum leader) was indeed a Soviet puppet. Cuba's very existence depended upon the Soviet's massive support. Therefore, as long as the present Cuban regime remained, the Russian bear would be present in the Western Hemisphere.

In Korea, the next situation to be discussed, force was met directly by force and Communist aggression was stopped. But in so doing, the United States had to learn the hard way what it meant to fight a limited war with limited objectives.

CHAPTER 5

KOREA

Korea, an appendix of the China mainland, juts out into the Pacific Ocean as a peninsula. It separates the Yellow Sea from the Sea of Japan. For centuries this piece of real estate, disfigured by multitudinous mountains and valleys, had been the scene of foreign incursions and invasions. Russia, China, and Japan each vied for domination of the peninsula and the people thereon. However, as a result of her military victories in the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, Japan emerged as the dominant power in northeast Asia. Japan proceeded to formally annex Korea in 1910 and ruled there until evicted by the Allied Powers in 1945.¹

KOREA: OUTSIDE THE PERIPHERY

Earlier in 1943 at the Cairo Conference, held in Cairo, Egypt, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Republic of China agreed that "in due course Korea shall become free and independent."² These same powers confirmed their pronouncements at Cairo in the Potsdam Proclamation of 26 July 1945. The Soviet Union subscribed to the Potsdam Proclamation in its declaration of war against Japan on 7 August 1945.³ It thus followed that the Soviet Union agreed in principle to the idea that Korea should become free and independent.

¹Carl Berger, The Korea Knot, p. 25.

²US Dept of State, "Record of Korean Unification 1943-1960," Department of State Publication 7084, p. 42.

³Ibid., p. 4.

There was never any thought of a politically divided Korea. There was no formal agreement at any other wartime conference to divide Korea into zones of occupation. Unfortunately, as it turned out later, due to military considerations, the United States proposed, and the Soviet Union agreed to the arrangement, that General Douglas MacArthur accept the surrender of the Japanese forces south of the 38th parallel and the Soviet commander accept the surrender of the Japanese forces north of the 38th parallel. The 38th parallel was used only as an administrative expediency; it turned out to be more durable than originally contemplated. On 9 September, United States forces accepted the surrender of the Japanese forces south of the 38th parallel.

In the ensuing weeks, which turned into months, which turned into years, negotiations concerning the establishment of a free and independent Korea failed initially at the region commander level, failed later at the level of the United States-Soviet Joint Commission and finally failed at the Foreign Ministerial level. Determined to see a unified Korea, the United States placed the issue of Korean independence before the General Assembly of the United Nations in September 1947.

The General Assembly passed a resolution in November 1947, which provided a program for Korean independence. The resolution called for: general elections in Korea, to be held no later than 31 March 1948; the establishment of a nine-nation United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea with responsibility to oversee the

elections; and the establishment of a national Korean government, based upon the results of the general elections.

The United Nations program for Korean unification was not recognized by Moscow as being valid; the Soviets doggedly repeated that the United Nations had no prerogatives on the question of the unification of Korea. The Russians carried this thought one step further by never implementing the United Nations program in North Korea. Therefore, while a national government was formed, its jurisdiction was established in South Korea only. (This government was recognized by a General Assembly resolution, adopted 12 December 1948.)⁴ Thus, in reality, the 38th parallel became a border with all its implications.

The proposition to withdraw foreign troops from Korean soil, initially proposed by the Soviets, was concurred in by the United States and the United Nations. The United States was motivated by several cogent reasons for this position of withdrawal; first, the assets in the United States military "cupboard" were bare. The mighty war machine generated in World War II was decimated by United States post-World War II policies. Congress was not thinking in terms of world-wide collective security responsibilities. President Harry S. Truman's budget submission of some 37.5 billion dollars was slashed approximately one sixth by the 80th Congress;

⁴US Dept of State, "United States Policy In The Korean Conflict, July 1950 - February 1951," Department of State Publication 4263, p. 42. (From Official Records of the Third Session of the General Assembly, Part I, 21 Sep. - 12 Dec. 1948, Resolutions.)

secondly, the Armed Forces were forced to consider the best use for the assets they did have to employ. The best use fell in the category of total war. Korea had very little significance in the framework of total war as an all-out struggle with our enemy, the Soviet Union, could not possibly take place in Korea; and thirdly, the United States was desirous of being able to withdraw its forces from Korea under favorable circumstances.

Internal progress toward a free and independent Korea was slow. Civil disorders, while common, were at a low level. If they were to take a turn for the worse, the occupation forces would find themselves in an awkward and untenable position. A precipitous withdrawal of troops under these conditions would be serious in terms of world opinion. We could ill-afford to have our prestige sink at a time when our military capabilities were indeed so low.

Mr. Dean Acheson, Secretary of State, also took note that our interests in the Pacific did not include Korea. He stated this in a speech to the National Press Club on 12 January 1950 when he defined the defense perimeter in the Pacific. Korea was outside the focus of our interests. (Although in the same speech, he did make the qualifying remark that the United States would meet its obligations under the provisions of the United Nations charter.)⁵

The last contingent of the United States forces departed from Korea the 29th day of June 1949, under the observance of the United Nations Commission on Korea.

⁵John W. Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War, pp. 17-21.

AGGRESSION AND REACTION

On 25 June 1950, the American Ambassador to Korea, the Honorable John J. Muccio, forwarded a message to Washington which the State Department received at 2126 hours, 24 June 1950, eastern daylight time. It read in part:

According to Korean Army reports which are partly confirmed by Korean Military Advisory Group field adviser reports, North Korean forces invaded Republic of Korea territory at several points this morning. . . .

It would appear from the nature of the attack and the manner in which it was launched that it constitutes an all-out offensive against the Republic of Korea.⁶

The United States lost no time in calling a meeting of the Security Council. It convened at 1400 hours, 25 June. A resolution was adopted; calling for the cessation of hostilities in Korea and the withdrawal of North Korean armed forces to the 38th parallel; and requesting member nations assist the United Nations in the execution of the resolution.⁷ (The Soviet Union delegate was not present at the Security Council meeting and therefore did not veto the resolution.)

General Douglas MacArthur, the United States Far East Commander, received orders from the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 25 June to use air and naval forces to assist in the evacuation of United States personnel from Korea. On 27 June the Security Council adopted a resolution recommending that:

⁶US Dept of State, "Korean Crisis," Department of State Publication 3922, p. 11.
⁷Ibid., p. 16.

the Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area.⁸

On the same day the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized General MacArthur to use air and naval forces to provide support and cover to the Korean Government troops. In the early hours of 30 June, President Truman received General MacArthur's report of the situation in Korea. The General had gone to Korea to assess the situation first-hand. The press release by the White House on 30 June 1950, announced to the world that United States forces were committed in Korea.

. . . the President announced that he had authorized the United States Air Force to conduct missions on specific military targets in Northern Korea. . . and had ordered a Naval blockade of the entire Korean coast.

General MacArthur had been authorized to use certain supporting ground units.⁹

The basic decisions were made and put into effect for the complete reversal of our Korean and Far East policy.

The North Korean aggression presented to the United States a problem, limited in scope, but fraught with unlimited dangers. Our prior considerations toward Korea, in the context of our world relationships, were couched in terms of total war, Russian encroachment in Europe, and our own efforts to nurture the infant NATO alliance along as a means of containing the avaricious Communist expansion in that part of the world.

⁸"Korean Crisis," op. cit., p. 24.

⁹Ibid., pp. 24-25.

In one stroke the Soviets made us alter our strategic evaluation of Korea. We could not afford a Communist dominated Korea, pointed like a dagger at Japan. We could not afford United States inaction to overt aggression, albeit limited, lest our European allies and our potential ally Japan receive the impression that the United States gave more credence to words than deeds.¹⁰ We could not afford to be blind to the prospects that our commitment in Korea might result in further expansion of the fighting into a general war.

In piecemeal fashion, (we had no other recourse), our ground units were fed into the Korean maelstrom to forge a perimeter around Pusan and to help stop the on-rushing North Korean Armies. By September 1950, the military situation changed little. The Communist could not dent the United Nations perimeter in and around Pusan and the United Nations forces did not have the strength to break out.¹¹

CHANGE IN OBJECTIVES

The surprise landing by United States forces at the port of Inchon, which serves Seoul, the capital of Korea, changed the stalemate. In one fell swoop, the Communist armies which stood and fought tenaciously along the Pusan Perimeter, disengaged themselves, turned

¹⁰The U.S. and Japan were in the throes of completing the groundwork for a peace treaty which would tie Japan's external security to the United States.

¹¹Samuel L.A. Marshall, The Military History of The Korean War, pp. 22-25.

and fled to the north as a disorganized rabble. Thousands were taken prisoner, many thousands more sifted through the thin lines of the United Nations forces in their retreat past the 38 parallel. The North Korean Armies were defeated. On 30 September, the allied troops occupied all of South Korea.

On 7 October the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution which: recalled that "the essential objective" of the previously adopted resolutions concerning Korea "was the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Government of Korea," and recommended that "all appropriate steps be taken to ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea."¹² John Spanier, American author, wrote: "The advance into North Korea reflected a political decision by the United States government to achieve a militarily unified Korea."¹³ General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified to the same effect before the Senate hearings held in May 1951.¹⁴

Our goal to "round up" the remnants of the North Korean army was pursued with vigor throughout the months of October and November 1950. Victory, impressive and complete, was in sight. This proved

¹²US Dept of State, "The Record On Korean Unification 1943-1960," Department of State Publication 7084, p. 106.

¹³Spanier, Op. cit., p. 91.

¹⁴US Congress, Senate, Committee of Armed Services and Committee on Foreign Relations, Military Situation in the Far East and the Facts Surrounding the Relief of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur From His Assignments. Hearings, 82d Congress, 1st Session, (referred to hereafter as Senate Hearings).

to be an illusion. A well coordinated, massive Chinese counter-attack in the latter part of November turned around the United Nations forces and sent them reeling back toward the 38th parallel. The Chinese had changed the rules of the game. This was an entirely new situation.

By mid-January the Chinese had run out of momentum and supplies and the United Nations forces had sufficiently regrouped to provide a stabilization of lines, approximately thirty to thirty-five miles south of Seoul and running east toward Samchok on the coast. The United Nations forces in Korea were under the command of Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgeway.

General Ridgeway breathed life into a tired Eighth Army. He was everywhere up front inspiring confidence by his personal magnetism. Skirmishes by patrols led into fights by company or battalion size units. The Eighth Army did not move forward coherently, it lurched forward a unit at a time. The Chinese suffered at the hands of a rejuvenated Eighth Army.

Seoul was retaken on 14 March 1951, never to be given up again.

Despite another change of command, General Ridgeway replaced General MacArthur and Lieutenant General James A. Van Fleet replaced Ridgeway, a Chinese offensive in April 1951 was halted with the Chinese sustaining huge losses. The United Nations forces then steadily pushed the Chinese back across the 38th parallel. That is where, more or less, the United Nations forces were facing the Communist forces when the Russian delegate to the United Nations, Jacob Malek, proposed, on 23 June 1951, a ceasefire and an armistice

as initial steps to the peaceful settlement of the Korean situation.¹⁵

Negotiations ensued and lasted some twenty-five months. It was at the conference table that the Free World learned how bitter, intransigent, and devious our Communist adversaries could be. The armistice was signed on 27 July 1953 after a Communist offensive on 13-14 July 1953, failed.¹⁶

¹⁵Record on Korean Unification, op. cit., p. 133.

¹⁶Ibid., pp. 21-22.

CHAPTER 6

WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO WIN?

CONGO

The environment surrounding the birth and infancy of the Republic of the Congo was fertile for Communist intervention. The country was given its independence too rapidly. Tribal animosities were aroused; there was no one individual who could pull the strings of government together; there was no indigenous middle class, economically or politically, to provide the needed stability while the government went through its infancy; the Congo was plagued by "foreign interests."

The United States policies toward the Congo were aligned with those of the United Nations. We desired an independent and a united Congo. We did not desire to have a major confrontation in the Congo with other major powers. We also desired to prevent the establishment in the Congo of a major Communist port-of-entry into Africa.

The United Nations provided an objective force which kept the major powers separated in the Congo and provided the forces which ultimately squashed the major two internal factions of Tshombe and Gizenga; both of these factions had a disruptive effect on the internal order within the Congo.

When the United Nations forces departed the Congo in 1964, internal peace was secure, at least for the time being. The situation was stabilized. The government was neutral, but friendly to the United States. On balance, we "won" in the Congo.

LAOS

It is difficult to address the situation in Laos without speaking to the situation in its bordering countries especially, North and South Vietnam, Thailand, and Cambodia. The situation in Laos was at the time of the Geneva Agreement of 1962 of "secondary" importance to the more important events that were taking place in South Vietnam.

The prime concern of President Ho Chi Minh's regime was the avidly anti-Communist government in South Vietnam. Laos provided an avenue for infiltration into South Vietnam. A Communist take-over of the Laotian government and thereby the country: would have made access to South Vietnam easier and thereby made the United States position in South Vietnam that much more difficult; would have given North Vietnamese presence in Laos a legal stamp of approval; and further would have represented another advance for communism in that part of the world.

The Communist attempt to subvert the Laotian government politically reached its apex in 1958 and failed. The situation changed when the Communist resorted to increased militant action in the countryside. The Laotian government was not able to cope with the Pathet Lao in 1960-1961 despite our military and economic assistance. President Kennedy's aim in Laos was to stabilize the situation in order to prevent complete Communist takeover; this was done without the use of United States military forces. He was convinced that the solution to Laos did not lay in the realm of the military. Mr.

W. W. Rostow, Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council, Department of State summed it up in a speech before the 1962 Democratic Women's Conference at Washington, D.C., on 21 May 1962:

In Laos we have set out to create a neutral and independent state which would permit the people of this small country to work out their destiny in their own way. . . . We are sure our objective is the best among difficult alternatives; Namely, to get the foreign forces out of Laos and to create a situation where the existence of a neutral, independent state could avoid a direct confrontation in that unstable area between Communist and free world military power.¹

The signing of the Geneva Agreement in 1962 indicated on paper that we had achieved our objective. In fact, though, the coalition government has not been able to function since the pro-Communist faction disassociated itself with the government in Vientiane. The neutralist Prince Souvanna Phouma became disenchanted with the intransigence of the Communists and has leaned toward the West. Each faction, the neutralists, the pro-Western and the pro-Communist, still maintain control over its respective areas. The armed forces of each faction were never integrated. (There was no provision for the integration of the armed forces. This was recognized by the United States as a short fall in the Geneva Agreement.)² In sum, Laos, outwardly, has its independence. Yet it remains as the scene of a tug-of-war between the free and Communist forces. A stalemate still exists.

¹W. W. Rostow, "Where We Stand," Department of State Bulletin, 18 Jun. 1962, p. 968.

²Richard P. Stebbins, The United States In World Affairs, pp. 191-195.

On balance, we extricated a rapidly deteriorating situation in Laos and raised it to one of a standoff. This in main was the limited objective of the Kennedy Administration. Therefore we should consider this a "win."

CUBA

The Soviet Union nearly changed the balance of power vis-a-vis the United States by the missile "episode" in Cuba. The Russian decision to place ballistic missiles in Cuba miscalculated the United States determination to "fight." The swiftness and directness of our response to Soviet brashness and deceit completely outmaneuvered the Russian Bear. The status quo ante was more or less restored when the offensive missiles and IL-28 bombers were returned to the Soviet Union.

The United States objective was a modest one. We did not want Cuba turned into a Soviet offensive military base. It wasn't. Thus our objective was achieved. But the problem of the elimination of the Castro regime still remained and there was no assurance that at some later date the Soviets might not try again to create a similar situation. On the other hand, we gave no assurance to Premier Khrushchev that we would not invade Cuba since the United Nations was unable to verify, on the spot, the return shipment of Soviet offensive weapons; an item to which both Kennedy and Khrushchev agreed, to which Castro vehemently was opposed.

As for the missile crisis, the United States attained its objectives and therefore "won." In so doing, United States prestige soared and Soviet prestige dropped.

Furthermore, the United States still holds to its main objective; the Castro regime must go. We are determined to strengthen Latin American countries so "that they may, through individual and collective means, resist communist subversion." Under Secretary of State, George W. Ball went further on to say, in his speech before the Omicron Delta Kappa Society at Roanoke, Virginia on 23 April 1964, that:

We must employ all available instruments of power less than acts of war to limit or reduce the ability of the Cuban government to advance the Communist cause in Latin America through propaganda, subversion, and sabotage.³

KOREA

The limited Soviet "adventure" in Korea presented the United States with a most difficult problem, for it did not fit our strategic doctrine. Korea certainly wasn't important enough for the United States to risk total war with Russia. Korea was outside the periphery of our national interests. Fighting in Korea did not lend itself to the employment of strategic air power, the instrument upon which our concept of containing Soviet aggression was based.

³George W. Ball, "U.S. Policy Toward Cuba," Department of State Publication 7690, p. 7.

The United States had very little flexibility in making a decision whether to react to the North Korean invasion of South Korea. Ethiopia, the Rhineland, Munich, and Greece were too recent in history for President Truman to forget. Yet the United States response had to be limited in order to maintain the posture of our strategic air arm and hence our strategic doctrine of massive retaliation. (This policy, though given official recognition in the Eisenhower Administration, was in the process of being fabricated in the Truman Administration.)⁴

Initially our objective was the restoration of Korea to the status quo. We achieved this objective by 30 September 1950.

The United Nations forces crossed the 38th parallel in force on 8 October. This time the objective was the restoration of a united Korea. The official pronouncement of the objective was contained in the United Nations resolution of 7 October. A free, independent, and unified Korea had been a United States objective since consideration was given to the Korean question in 1943.

Communist China intervened in Korean in November 1950. Our forces, which were approaching the Manchurian border, were thrown back. The United Nations objective of obtaining a united Korea by military force was stymied and was never achieved. This one we "lost."

⁴Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Chief of Staff, Air Force testified: "In my opinion, the United States Air Force is the single potential that has kept the balance of power in our favor. It is the one thing that has, up to date, kept the Russians from deciding to go to war." Senate hearings, op. cit., p. 1379.

General MacArthur felt that the Communist Chinese could be defeated on the battlefield. He requested: the use of Nationalist Chinese troops; the permission to bomb Manchuria and other military targets on the China mainland; and the blockade of the Chinese coast; all were denied. President Truman and his advisers were adamant in their view to limit the war. They did not wish to provide the Politburo an excuse to come into the war and thus start World War III. The war was limited; by excluding all targets outside of Korea proper by limiting the number of United States ground troops to be employed in Korea, and by limiting the weaponry to be conventional. The very nature of this policy, of limiting the war and our objectives in Korea, formed the basis for the dismissal of General MacArthur by President Truman. The Far East Commander could not reconcile himself to anything but "total victory."

In May 1951, the United Nations forces sat astraddle the 38th parallel. General James A. Van Fleet, the United Nations Commander, was ordered to inflict the maximum casualties on the Chinese with a minimum loss to his forces. This indeed indicated a revision of United Nations objectives to unite Korea by military force and adherence to the United States objective of "repelling North Korean and Chinese Communist aggression against the South Korean Republic. . . ."⁵ President Truman stated in a speech in Washington, D.C., on 4 July 1951:

Our aims in Korea are just as simple as the things
for which we fought in the American Revolution. . . .

⁵Senate hearings, op. cit., pp. 1191-1193.

We are not fighting there /Korea/ to conquer China or to destroy the Soviet Empire. We are fighting for a simple aim . . . the aim of securing the right of nations to be free and to live in peace. . . .

Our constant aim in Korea has been peace, under the principles of the United Nations.⁶

By signing the armistice in 1953, we achieved the objective of a status quo in Korea. We ended the war and thus ended the drain on American lives and treasure.

The stillness of the guns on the battlefield in Korea did not still the debate that ensued in the United States. The "hawks" urged that we had "lost" as Korea remained divided.⁷ Many others argued that we had deterred Communist aggression. We had demonstrated to the Soviets and to the world that the United States would fight to uphold a principle without territorial gains. Most important of all, we achieved peace.

On balance, we "won" in Korea, even though we changed one of our objectives amid-stream.

PATTERNS

Containment as a policy was given its name and its guidelines, on an academic basis, by George F. Kennan, former United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union, when he discussed the subject of "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" in the July 1947 edition of Foreign

⁶Harry S. Truman, "The Defense of Freedom," Department of State Bulletin, p. 84.

⁷Robert J. Donovan, Eisenhower, The Inside Story, p. 126.

Affairs magazine. He maintained that the United States could initiate:

a policy of containment designed to confront the Russians with unalterable counterforce at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world.⁸

One can discern a pattern of containment when viewing collectively the United States objectives that are discussed in this thesis. Our reactions may be considered as representing the "counterforce" that Mr. Kennan referred to in his paper. Noticeably in the Congo, Laos, and Cuban situations our military forces were involved only indirectly. The United Nations was the main vehicle in the Congo while United States diplomacy and economic measures were the principal vehicles used in the Laotian affair.

It is recognized that the four situations are only samples of the times since World War II. They are unique in themselves and yet are inter-related one with another, by the thread of our policy of containment; a policy which evolved over the years as a result of events and circumstances.

If we assume our sampling to be representative, then we can assume that our policy of containment has been successful, more or less. Secretary of State Rusk stated in 1962:

The struggle between coercion and freedom is taking place in a world of revolutionary change. The times are dangerous. . . . But on balance the free world is gaining strength relative to the Communist world. . . .⁹

⁸George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy, 1900-1950, p. 126.

⁹US Dept of State, "Five Goals of US Policy," Department of State Publication 7432, p. 4.

This doesn't imply by any manner or means that the United States should blindly pursue a policy of containment in the future. An objective analysis of other broad national strategies, to include roll-back and peaceful co-existence, would have to be made before an indorsement of any future policy could be stated. Such an undertaking is beyond the purview of this thesis.

We did not win a "total victory" in Korea, though we did achieve our initial objective. The North Korean aggression was resisted and turned back, so was the Chinese aggression. We never did unite Korea by military force because, in the minds of our decision makers, the price of overcoming China was too high for the commensurate gain.

The question arises whether there is such a goal as "total victory" in war outside of genocide. If the reply is in the negative, then the use of the phrase "total victory" as an objective of war is suspect as to its validity.

What about "victory," have we excluded the concept of victory or winning from our philosophy and our national policy? If the sampling of the four situations that have been viewed are indicative, then one must readily agree that we have the desire and willingness to win, and we have not discarded the concept of winning from our national objectives.

The American people have traveled a long way down the road of dialogue concerning victory. In 1951 it was horrendous to think of winning in nothing but terms of total victory. Today the great debate concerning Vietnam echoes in the halls of Congress, flows

in the streets of the United States and vibrates among the American people at large. The decision-makers are being asked daily by Americans for assurances that the war remain a limited one and not be allowed to escalate into World War III, and that we achieve our limited objectives in that war-torn country. No, we haven't discarded the thoughts of winning, but our term of reference has changed from "total victory" to "victory."

CHAPTER 7


CONCLUSIONS

In all four situations U.S. objectives were achieved. In so doing, the United States not only held the "line" against Soviet-inspired aggression but helped increase its own influence throughout the world. When the United States objectives are viewed collectively, a pattern of containment is perceived. This policy did not just materialize, but evolved over a period of time in response to events and circumstances. Based upon the results obtained in the specific situations, it is concluded that this policy of containment has been moderately successful.

From the actions in the Congo, Cuba, and Korea, we glean the notion that Communist aggression must be met headon, swiftly, with determination, and discretion. Furthermore each situation was different in its own right. Therefore the United States response was "tuned" to the circumstances. Force was applied against force in Korea. In Cuba we molded the situation where force could be applied, but was not. The United States emphasized, in main, the use of diplomacy and economic "persuasion" in dealing with the Congo. Diplomatic pressure was effectively brought to bear in Laos. All of this leads one to conclude that over the years since 1945 the United States leadership is learning how to use military power in terms of political objectives and not for the sake of military power per se.

Since Korea there has been a perceptible evolutionary change of thought on the subject of winning. The concept of "total victory" prevalent in World War II is recognized in the nuclear age as one which may very well lead to a "no-win." "Victory," on the other hand, was actively pursued. The objectives were limited; the goals were achieved.

Finally it is concluded that to discuss "win" is to address the subject of objectives. Our goals should be clearly and concisely stated to promote understanding as to meaning and intent. The employment of stereotyped words, terms, and/or statements, which by themselves are meaningless without further definition and clarification, in any consideration of national affairs tends to confuse rather than to enlighten. National problems and the stakes associated with their solutions are too high to allow the luxury of misunderstanding caused by the use of tired cliches as a substitute for lucid thinking.



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