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STUDENT THESIS

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8 April 1966

WHAT NEXT AFTER HO CHI MINH?

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SUMMARY

The United States involvement in the war in Vietnam is increasing daily. The American public is more aware of the seriousness of this crisis as US casualties continue to mount and as more men and material are appropriated through our Congress. It has been said that America's prestige and the future of the Free World are held in the balance of the outcome of the war between South and North Vietnam. As stated by our last three Presidents, the United States is deeply committed to the defense of South Vietnam and to guarantee her independence and right of self-government.

North Vietnam has, since the signing of the Geneve Agreements in 1954, maintained a closed door policy to the free world. Other than Ho Chi Minh, President and party chieftan, little is known of the Hanoi leadership that is directing the war effort against the Saigon regime. Ho, the internationally known Communist, is now 75 years old and cannot expect to provide effective leadership in the future. There are known pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese factions in the North Vietnam Politburo which have influenced North Vietnam's foreign policy over the years.

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the top leadership in North Vietnam under Ho to determine what prospects the United States will be confronted with in future relations with this Communist state, especially when Ho turns over the reins of power to a successor(s) or at his demise. In any event, during the succession crisis there will be a violent power struggle with the concomitant opportunities for the United States to exploit this crisis to the best advantage. In so doing, the United States could enhance its position in bringing the "war" to a faster yet satisfactory conclusion. In arriving at the conclusions, the thesis traces the development of the Communist state to its present form, identifies the leading contenders for power and their position in relation to the Sino-Soviet rift, speculates on how succession might occur based on prior Soviet successions, and finally, the man considered most likely to succeed is identified.

The termination date for research on this thesis was 15 December 1965.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

> Of all the Asian Communists, it is the North Vietnamese who for reasons of geography, history and culture are the most sensitive to the aims and policies of Peking. Indeed, under a leader less able and subtle than Ho Chi Minh, North Vietnam by now might well have been a fully-fledged Chinese Satellite.[1]

Today, Vietnam is a subject of intense interest to the US military and the American public at large. The news media is constantly filled with articles pertaining to US involvement and our Government's policy toward Vietnam. Not even at the height of the Korean conflict were Americans so divided and so confused about a war as they are about Vietnam today.

On one hand, thousands of students stage parades proclaiming our cause wrong, or hopeless, or both. On the other hand, a still larger number of belligerent citizens accuse the demonstrators of treason and call for air attacks on the capital of Hanoi. Slogans such as "Get out of Vietnam; . . . Unnecessary War; . . . Stop the Bombing; . . . Escalation for What?; . . . Why?" and on the other hand "Bomb Hanoi; . . . No Communist Sanctuary; . . . Don't Let Our Boys Down; . . . No alternative to Victory"[2] are commonplace in today's press and President Johnson's Administration is constantly under conflicting pressures over its course of action in Vietnam.

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[1]Roderick Mac Farquhar, "Editorial," The China Quarterly, No. 9, Jan.-Mar. 1962, p. 1.

[2]"Vietnam Issues," New York Times, 28 Nov. 1965, p. E1.

Senators, cabinet members, and retired military leaders have expressed widely divergent views on policy which has spawned a second debate over whether the controversy itself might make the Communists believe the country is divided and is weakening in its resolve to pursue the Vietnam struggle. In a recent letter to Linus Pauling, an American physicist and pacifist, North Vietnamese President Ho Chi Minh said, "The Vietnamese people highly value"[3] the demonstrations. Be that what it may, the United States is deeply committed to the defense of South Vietnam against Communist aggression. This aggression is directed from Hanoi and the ultimate objective of the Hanoi leadership is to enslave the people of South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand.[4]

Ho Chi Minh,[5] the internationally known Communist and leader of North Vietnam, is now 75 years old. This age can be considered old by any standards and his period of effective leadership is forecast by this author to be limited. Mostly because of its closed door policy to the West, little is known of the subordinate leaders

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[3]Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report - Far East, 22 Nov. 1965, p. jjj2.

[4]"Why Vietnam," Pamphlet, US Government Printing Office, 20 Aug. 1965, pp. 1-27.

[5]All Vietnamese names are made up of Chinese characters, although they are not necessarily of Chinese origin. Names usually consist of three parts: The family name, a copulative word, and the given name, in that order. In Vietnamese practice, one is referred to by the given name, rather than the family name. Ho is the one exception to this because he is considered to have attained a stature so far above the rest of his countrymen that there can be no possible mistake as to his identity.

who are likely to succeed as the leader or leaders in the totalitarian state of North Vietnam.[6]

Before analyzing the leadership in the DRV it is considered necessary to have a reasonable understanding of the government, the party, and the theory of how succession might occur. In addition, before some meaningful conclusions can be made, consideration must also be given to the political factions existing in the higher echelon of government, especially as they relate to the Sino-Soviet ideological dispute.

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[6]Since Communist North Vietnam calls itself the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, it is commonly referred to by the initials DRV; for the sake of brevity that usage is employed hereafter in the text. See Annex A for other commonly used abbreviations.

CHAPTER 2

GOVERNMENT AND PARTY

GOVERNMENT

> . . . North Vietnam, like East Germany, is not a 'single party' state. There exist tiny Socialist and Democratic parties without the slightest shred of power but with carefully selected candidates who stand for re-election and voted their seats in the rubber-stamp parliament at comfortable majorities of 83-93 per cent of the votes (Communist Party candidates, of course, are elected with 99.8 per cent of the votes).[1]

In order to analyze the present leaders in the DRV and the power they exert both domestically and in the foreign arena, it is necessary to examine the present government, how it evolved, and the influence the party has vis-a-vis the government.

When the French were pushed aside by the Japanese on March 9, 1945 a coalition of Vietnamese revolutionary parties with Ho at its head emerged as the principal political and military force in Vietnam. This coalition, commonly called the Vietminh,[2] composed of

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[1]Bernard B. Fall, The Two Vietnams, p. 101.

[2]Foreign correspondents and writers customarily refer to the Vietnamese Communists as the Vietminh, sometimes rather crudely shortened to Viet. It should be noted that Viet is a generic name for the whole people in Southeast China and in Vietnam, and that Vietminh initially was a national movement for independence in which a number of non-Communists participated. In May 1941, the leading members of the ICP met at Chinghsi, China with representatives of several less important groups: The New Vietnam Party; the Vietnam Revolutionary Youth League; elements of the old Vietnam Nationalist Party (VNQDD); and various National Salvation organizations. During the course of this meeting all these groups banded together to create the League for the Independence of Vietnam, better known as the Vietminh.

Communists, nationalists and revolutionary groups exploited the total vacuum created in the civil administration of the country and gained control over a considerable area of northern Vietnam. The Provisional Government of the DRV was formed in Hanoi on August 29, 1945 with Ho as president and foreign minister. Key cabinet posts of interior (police), national defense, finance, propaganda, education and youth were given to either party or Vietminh stalwarts.

The government under Ho was farsighted enough not to let pass the opportunity of sanctifying the regime by reinforcing its nationalist aspect. Ho appointed Bao Dai, the once French-protected Emperor of Vietnam, as Supreme Advisor to the government. After completing an impressive list of bloodless political successes the DRV was officially proclaimed by Ho on September 2, 1945. This declaration of independence was carefully designed to appeal sentimentally to the anti-colonialist leanings of the United States. Nowhere in the declaration is there any reference to the achievements of the Communists; on the contrary, the declaration[3] refers to the United States, French Revolution and the Teheran and San Francisco Declarations. During this period, the slow disintegration of the opposition parties began almost unnoticed.

On September 8, 1945 Ho proclaimed general suffrage in Vietnam. On December 22, 1945 an agreement was signed between the DMH, the

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[3]Bernard B. Fall, The Viet-Minh Regime, pp. 1-6.

VNQDD, and the Vietminh as all other splinter parties had more or less fallen by the wayside. This agreement stipulated that the nationalist parties would not sabotage the elections; that as of January 1, 1946 two ministerial posts would be handed over to the two parties; that a new Vice-Presidential post would be given to Nguyen Hai Than, leader of the DMH; and lastly, the VNQDD would receive 50 and the DMH 20 seats in the future National Assembly without participating in the elections. Obviously this procedure falls somewhat short of democratic procedures. Under the aegis of the DRV, the first general election in the history of Indochina was held on January 6, 1946 to create a National Assembly which later in the year adopted a constitution providing for a bill of rights, a president, and a cabinet responsible to a unicameral legislature to be elected by universal suffrage.[4]

In the words of Bernard B. Fall:

> The elections themselves took place in an atmosphere of excitement and festivity skillfully developed by the propaganda services of the Provisional Government. The results were hardly unexpected. An American account speaks of the 'wide popular response' and 'enthusiastic support' which Ho's candidates 'who stood, often unchallenged,' received. Viet-Minh sources speak of an overall election participation of 'above 90 per cent,' with 100 per cent results for Ho Chi Minh in Ho's own constituency and an overall pro-Government vote of 97 per cent in the Hanoi area.[5]

Mr. Rupert Emerson states:

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[4] Ibid., pp. 8-13.
[5] Ibid., p. 9.

> This election, conducted under the most difficult conditions, has been both proclaimed as a striking demonstration of the democratic character of the Vietminh and denounced as a largely fraudulent piece of Communist political manipulation.[6]

When the National Assembly convened for its second session on October 28, 1946 to finalize the forthcoming constitution, 291 of 444 original members were present. According to neutral press correspondents, only 37 out of the original 70 were of the opposition. Purges and arrests of the opposition continued while the Assembly was in session. By the time the constitution was voted upon on November 8, 1946 only two opposition members were left, while the number of pro-government delegates had diminished to 240. It was under such conditions that the Constitution of the DRV was proclaimed on November 9, 1946. This constitution remained in force in theory at least, until a new constitution was promulgated on January 1, 1960. The 1946 constitution gave a democratic impression to the reader and was designed to provide "reader appeal" in the Anglo-Saxon countries, and particularly in the United States. None of the guarantees and freedoms contained in the 1946 constitution was ever put into effect, and even the basic structural features were not respected.[7]

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[6]Rupert Emerson, Representative Government in Southeast Asia, pp. 172-173.

[7]Bernard B. Fall, The Two Vietnams, pp. 130-133.

When the Indochina War officially erupted on December 19, 1946, the DRV Government was well on its way to one-party rule. The only cabinet posts which the Vietminh did not control were those of Public Works, Health and Social Security.[8]

The return of peace and the divided Vietnam which resulted from the Geneva Agreements brought many problems. The government lacked the skills for the proper control and management of over 62,000 square miles of territory and its vast industrial establishments. The simple structure that had held the movement together during the war was not capable of administering cities such as Hanoi and Haiphong.[9]

The most important institutional changes affected the central government. From November 1946 until May 1960, the DRV had operated with the same National Assembly, but the membership had shrunk from 444 to 202 owing to purges of the non-Communist members, the desertion or capture of others during the war, and normal attrition. The low standing of the Assembly was evidenced by the passage of a resolution in January 1957, after the 1956 peasant uprisings, requesting that the Assembly's parliamentary immunities be respected and that bills proposed by the executive be presented for legislative approval within 10 days.

Complaints in the Assembly led the regime to scrap plans for a perfunctory revision of the original 1946 constitution and to

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[8]Bernard B. Fall, The Viet-Minh Regime, pp. 16-17.
[9]Bernard B. Fall, The Two Vietnams, pp. 138-139.

charge the committee appointed for this purpose with framing an altogether new constitution. After a year of preparatory work, in which Ho took a personal hand, the draft constitution was presented for public discussion in April 1959 and, after many amendments, was adopted by the legislative on January 1, 1960.[10] It provided for important structural changes and its preamble is a spiteful indictment of the West. The preamble is little more than a propaganda leaflet with reference to the able leadership of Ho throughout.

Perhaps the most significant change in the new constitution is the Communist structure of the economy which is significantly placed ahead of the section dealing with the rights of the citizenry. The powers of the National Assembly are modeled on those of the USSR with the real powers going to the permanent Committee on Current Affairs, a close copy of the Soviet Presidium. Presidential powers are extremely liberal allowing the President to preside over all the meetings of the Council of Ministers. The constitution also provides for the Vice President to assume the Presidency should that post become vacant.[11]

A new Special Political Council composed of the President, Vice-President, Premier, the President of the Committee on Current Affairs of the National Assembly and other important members was also established. It examines the great problems of the state which

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[10]See Annex B for the organizational structure of the 1960 DRV Constitution.

[11]Bernard B. Fall, The Two Vietnams, pp. 142-143.

are then transmitted to the legislative and the executive branches. This reduces the power of the Council of Ministers and of the Premier. The Council of Ministers' mission is technical rather than political since the heads of State Commissions such as Planning, Scientific Research, Nationalistic, State Control and National Reunification are ex-officio members along with the Director General of the National Bank. The Premier is now surrounded by five Vice Premiers, whose additional cabinet posts cover such areas as defense, interior, heavy industry and planning.[12]

Another important organ is the National Defense Council whose functions resemble those of the National Security Council in the United States. The newly created cabinet posts further emphasize the control of the state over ever-widening sectors of the DRV economy.[13]

PARTY

> After a hopeful beginning of constitutional democratic government, a single party gained control of the state apparatus, the armed forces, and the bulk of the local administrative machinery. This party - direct successor of the Indochinese Communist Party - has successfully consolidated its grip upon the State so that today the acts and policies of the Democratic Republic closely resemble those of any other state of the Soviet orbit. This does not mean that the Democratic Republic has abandoned its national objectives, particularly as regards its regional aim of supremacy over the other member states of the former Indochinese Federation.[14]

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[12] Ibid., pp. 143-144.
[13] Ibid., p. 145.
[14] Emerson, op. cit., p. 174.

The reins of power in the DRV are held firmly by the Dang Lao Dong, or Workers' Party.[15] The party alone makes all the major decisions and most of the minor ones as well. As has been noted earlier, this is not immediately apparent from the terms of the constitution, and the governmental apparatus is, to some extent, designed to suggest popular participation in ruling the DRV. The Communist Party itself has gone through several transformations. In a bid to obtain more nationalist support for the Vietminh, the party was dissolved by Ho on November 11, 1945; but not by coincidence, the Association for Marxist Studies appeared on the same day.[16] While the party was officially dissolved and the leadership of the resistance movement rested within the Lien Viet Front, the future of communism in Vietnam could not be assured.

Even though Communists occupied all the key positions in the front and supplied direction to the movement, they did so by virtue of their membership in the Lien Viet Front. If some unforeseen circumstance should arise which permitted another group to seize the leadership of this Front, communism could conceivably be left without any official representation. This was the true reason which impelled the Communists to make their party an official one as soon as they felt themselves strong enough to do so, and to make it the

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[15]The DRV Communist Party is commonly referred to as the Lao Dong Party and will be used in that context hereafter.

[16]Patrick J. Honey, "North Vietnam's Workers' Party and South Vietnam's Peoples Revolutionary Party," Pacific Affairs, Vol. XXXV, No. 4, Winter 1962-63, pp. 375-379.

ruling body in the resistance movement. With the support of the PRC in their war effort, the Communists felt sufficiently strong to publicly reestablish the Communist Party. Hopefully to disguise its real nature and to appeal to the Vietnamese people who were almost entirely non-Communist, it reappeared as the Lao Dong Party in March 1951 with Ho as its President.[17]

It should be emphasized that the Government of the DRV actually took from 1945 to 1951 to transform the regime openly into the satellite state it is today. In the words of Bernard B. Fall:

> The process of absorption of the Viet-Minh which contained the remains of other Vietnamese splinter parties, such as the VNQDD and DMH Socialist Parties was very slow and gradual and was only completed during the 'Congress of Unification of the Lien-Viet and Viet-Minh Fronts' held early in March, 1951 in North Vietnam. Once this process was completed and the various subsidiary organizations of the Viet-Minh solidly integrated, the leaders of the Democratic Republic proceeded to re-create a hard inner core of politically trained and reliable citizens. The Viet-Nam Dan Lao Dong (Vietnam Workers' Party, or DLD) was born.[18]

A cursory examination of the party statutes show that they hardly differ from those of the CPSU and CCP. The statutes cannot be considered an accurate picture of the actual work done by the party. One may safely affirm that the statutes overstate the political importance of the party while they seriously understate its administrative importance as a vital arm of the DRV Government in the furtherance of its policies.

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[17] Ibid., pp. 380-383.
[18] Bernard B. Fall, The Viet-Minh Regime, pp. 34-36.

There are in fact only two major changes in the organizational structure of the Lao Dong Party as compared with that of the old ICP: it has a separate Politburo and a Party Inspectorate. The Politburo contains 11 members and two alternates. It is the most influential organ within the party. The Central Committee contains 19 members and 10 alternates. Most of the members of the Politburo and Central Committee hold extra-committee positions of importance within the party.[19] Furthermore, the Politburo and Central Committee not only control the affairs of the party but also are able to control the administration of the country. Key members of the government are also members of the Lao Dong Politburo and Central Committee. At practically every level in the organization the party cell constitutes the local administration in the community. Every factory, village, school, city borough, and army company has its party cell or even cell group.[20]

The party operation was observed to be:

> In its own curious way, the Democratic Republic seems to practise the Marxist principle of 'withering-away of the state' by replacing or capping state organs by a party machinery that frequently is far more complex and comprehensive than the administrative or executive organ which it parallels

and thus,

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[19]See Annex C for the organizational structure of the Lao Dong Party.

[20]Bernard B. Fall, The Viet-Minh Regime, pp. 34-37.

> . . . the DRVN is a state - but a totalitarian state, for by no stretch of the imagination can the regime that at present rules the Republican zone be called 'democratic' in the sense generally attributed to the term, unless autocritiques, 'brain-washing', show trials, supremacy of a political party over the governmental machinery, are accepted as part of the system.[21]

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[21]Emerson, op. cit., p. 174.

CHAPTER 3

SUCCESSION

SUCCESSION THEORY

> The mode of succession has long been recognized as one of the principal factors in determining the stability of a given political system and a key datum in the analysis of power relations within such a system.[1]

How the succession in Communist North Vietnam might evolve is subject to much speculation and conjecture. There is little precedent to go on as Ho has retained the Presidency and Chairmanship of the party since its inception. Communist China affords little comparison as Mao Tse Tung has firmly held the reins of power since the Communist take over in 1949. It appears that the USSR provides the best precedent for the development of a succession theory in a Communist state. Needless to say, limitations of concrete evidence introduce considerable speculation, even in the Soviet system.

The 1960 DRV Constitution provides for "free" elections every five years and further stipulates that the Vice President shall succeed to the Presidency during periods of illness or death of the President. In 1960, the leaders of the Politburo must have awaited the appointment to the Vice Presidency with great anticipation. It was immediately apparent that Ho had lost none of his effective

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[1]Bohdan R. Bociurkiw, "The Problem of Succession in the Soviet Political System: The Case of Khrushchev," The Canadian Journal of Economic and Political Science, Vol. 26, Nov. 1960, p. 575.

control over the government machinery and that he was not ready to transfer the mantle of leadership to the shoulders of an eager young successor. Ho appointed his old friend, Ton Duc Thang, who is now 83 years old and showing signs of senility. Ho, obviously was unwilling to single out a potential successor and thereby weaken his own position.[2]

It has been pointed out previously that the DRV Constitution and its democratic sounding principles are only a facade in this Communist state. It would be naive to expect anything but token observance to the legal succession procedures. If legal formalities are observed, they will not offer any clue as to how the real decision was made. This decision will likely be arrived at secretly as the result of party infighting and clever manipulation of power levers which will be discussed presently.

No one can forecast what the next succession in the USSR will be like. While it will most certainly not duplicate in detail previous crises, a knowledge of these is vital to any reasonable speculation on the subject. The USSR is a highly politicized society in which a small elite group has attempted to reshape society according to its own vision. The nature and role of the CPSU, the personality and style of a particular leader, and the political differences among the elite are all vital, though not the

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[2]Patrick J. Honey, Communism in North Vietnam, p. 24.

only necessary factors, for knowledge of the Soviet political system. In the words of Robert Conquest:

> Soviet politics proper takes place within a very limited circle. The struggle within this circle comprises both a conflict on policy and a contest for personal power. Its progress determines who will rule in Russia and what lines of action will be followed: it is therefore of crucial importance to the entire world.[3]

When a Soviet dictator leaves the political scene a succession crisis is inevitable since there is no established, recognized center of decisionmaking and no orderly method of determining succession. Stalin and Khrushchev employed various devices that will be discussed later to mitigate the severity of a succession crisis. These devices have serious drawbacks and do not assure an orderly transfer of power. If the struggle over succession is brief it may be easily resolved; if it is long and intense, however, so that important social groups become engaged in the higher politics of the USSR, the party's hegemony may be endangered. This is the critical question in a Soviet succession crisis because functionaries of the party machine are the main source of totalitarianism in the regime.[4]

Soviet politics tend to be unstable and evolve around a succession cycle in which the following cycles are evident: (1) a phase of personal rule marked by little or no overt expression of popular discontent; (2) a breakdown of personal rule during a succession with the attendant opportunities for interested groups

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[3]Robert Conquest, The Soviet Succession Problem, p. 1.

[4]Myron Rush, "The Khrushchev Succession Problem" World Politics, Vol. XIV, Jan. 1962, pp. 259-261.

within the regime to influence politics; (3) and a resolution of the crisis in a new stable regime. The Soviet dictator not only tolerates factionalism but uses it to meet his own ends.

Policymaking in the USSR is a struggle among rival groups and the primary function of the ruler is to resolve these factional disputes through exercise of his personal authority. Once the ruler has announced his decision, the struggle must subside on the policy issue in question unless the losing group is prepared to challenge the ruler himself. There is no one else in the system who can perform this function of conflict resolution. During a succession crisis there is no one to resolve differences and to limit the factional activity, which becomes greatly intensified.[5]

Another source makes a keen observation on Soviet policymaking by classifying the policymaker as one who can or cannot exact unquestioning obedience from his subordinates. If he can, he is a dictator like Stalin and his rule is likely to be characterized by stability; if he cannot, he is a dictator subject to pressures exercised by an oligarchy, like Khrushchev, and his rule is likely to be unstable. Coups are a regular feature of Soviet politics and serve to illustrate this point. A fait accompli engineered by Malenkov and Beria in March 1953, an attempted coup by Beria in June of the same year, an open threat by Marshal Zhukov, and an armed

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[5]Ibid., pp. 259-263.

maneuver on the part of the anti-party group are examples used to substantiate this thesis.[6]

Lenin and his successors never publicly announced that ultimate responsibility should be delegated to a single individual. They maintained that decisions should be, and were, made collectively by the leadership. However, there was the absence of any strong belief of the right or need of opposition views and of any institutionalized process where dissenting opinions could be voiced. These factors led to the monopolization of power by the Communist Party and resulted in the consolidation of power in the hands of a single man.

Concurrent with the consolidation of the position of the Communist Party over Soviet society, power was increasingly concentrated within the party. Lenin's dominant position in the party rested largely on his personal authority as "father of the revolution." He was willing to consult with his colleagues and reply heavily on his powers of persuasion to achieve his ends. Nevertheless, he could, on occasion, act in a highly authoritarian manner. Although during his reign force was not unleashed against party members, he did employ it against other elements of the society.[7]

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[6]Robert Conquest, Russia After Khrushchev, pp. 125-128.

[7]Howard R. Swearer, The Politics of Succession in the U.S.R.R., pp. 8-9.

Writing about Lenin's formula for Communist Party control, Trotsky wrote in 1904 that "democratic centralism" meant "the organization of the party substitutes itself for the party, the Central Committee substitutes itself for the organization, and finally the dicator substitutes himself for the Central Committee."[8]

Stalin's heirs admitted collective leadership did not exist during most of his reign but stipulated the whole problem of succession would be solved with collective leadership. Lenin never ventured beyond the formula of collective leadership as the answer to the problem of succession and in his famous "testament" of the winter of 1922-23, he noted that Stalin had attained enormous power and recommended that he be removed from the office of General Secretary. Knowing the conflict between Trotsky and Stalin existed, Lenin advised doubling the membership in the Central Committee in order to spread the differences between them and avoid a possible schism in the party. Not only did Stalin retain his office, he had amassed enough power to suppress the publication of the "testament".

Stalin took Lenin's advice and increased the membership of the Central Committee--supplementing that body with his own supporters in order to destroy any semblance of oligarchy leadership and gain

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[8]Bohdan R. Bociurkis, "The Problem of Succession in the Soviet Political System: The Case of Khrushchev," The Canadian Journal of Economic and Political Science, Vol. 26, Nov. 1960, p. 575.

absolute power over the party and the state. Lenin also provided Stalin with additional leverage against oligarchy rule. In order to maintain a monolithic facade and discourage factionalism, a resolution was passed in 1921 outlawing all factional activities. This same resolution was used successfully by Khrushchev in 1957 when he "cleaned house" in the Presidium and Central Committee.[9]

A number of developments after Stalin's death were remarkably similar to those after Lenin's with the critical role of the party machine being perhaps the most outstanding. After Stalin's death the party machine, headed by Khrushchev, was opposed by the administrative bureaucracy of the government, headed by Malenkov. While the government bureaucracy displayed considerable political strength, it was defeated after four years of contention, and many of its leading figures were removed from the centers of power. Thus the cleavage between these two institutions, already considerable at Stalin's death, was broadened and deepened by their subsequent conflict.

The Soviet regime succeeded in preserving its totalitarian character after the deaths of Lenin and Stalin because, although non-party institutions and broad social groups were drawn into higher Soviet politics by the resulting succession crisis, they were neither sufficiently powerful nor sufficiently antagonistic to overthrow the party's hegemony. Only if factional conflict

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[9] Ibid., pp. 575-577.

and controversy over policy are transformed into a fundamentally institutional conflict will an effective alliance against the party apparatus be likely to form and persist long enough to break its power.[10]

Robert Conquest writing about Khrushchev before his overthrow indicated that his leading status was not in doubt but his control was not absolute, as Stalin's was, and concluded that he had sometimes been under successful pressure from other elements in the leadership to abandon or amend certain of his policies. While his leadership contained men who owe their careers to his patronage, there were other leaders who had come up independently and with whom he was compelled to share power. Conquest further indicated that it would be quite possible for Khrushchev to fall during his lifetime and predicted that if he did, the new leadership will offer even less stability. He further stipulated the new leadership would be drawn from the present Presidium and raised the serious question whether the new leader would be strong enough to take both Khrushchev's leading posts--the First Secretaryship and Premiership. The successor must also possess political prestige and the necessary skill and experience in the required in-fighting and manipulation of the party.[11]

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[10]Myron Rush, "The Khrushchev Succession Problem," World Politics, Vol. XIV, Jan. 1962, pp. 267-271.

[11]Robert Conquest, The Soviet Succession Problem, pp. 1-4.

Oligarchy rule in the Kremlin is rejected and when appearing is transitory, i.e. Stalin and Khrushchev appeared to be responsible to oligarchy leadership in the Presidium from 1922 to 1930 and 1953 to 1957 respectively. However, the transitory arrangement was overthrown each time when these men consolidated their power in their own behalf.[12]

Three succession crises have demonstrated that a dictator, once he is ousted from the seat of political power, has absolutely no influence over the choice of his successor. Yet, it is in the nature of a dictator's egoism to feel obliged to designate someone to succeed him. Lenin did not have time to make concrete arrangements for his own succession; however, Stalin was the last person Lenin wanted to step into his position. There is a remarkable similarity between Stalin's and Khrushchev's arrangements for their succession. During the last years of their rule, each appointed an heir apparent--Malenkov and Brezhnev, respectively--as the number two man in the institutional hierarchy. Stalin also elevated Khrushchev to the number three spot as a counterheir to keep Malenkov from usurping supreme power prematurely. Khrushchev gave this same function to Podgorny.[13]

Stalin, additionally to his succession arrangement, took care to increase the power in his own hands over the political

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[12]Myron Rush, "The Khrushchev Succession Problem," World Politics, Vol. XIV, Jan. 1962, p. 263.

[13]Myron Rush, Political Succession in the U.S.S.R., pp. 114-139.

institutions. He did this by enlarging the Politburo from 10 to 25 members and the Secretariat of the Central Committee from 4 to 10, thus diffusing the power of the individual members and increasing his own control over them. Last but not least, Stalin began another great purge, a reign of terror which, in retrospect, may not have been an act of madness.[14]

Khrushchev, in an effort to arrange for an orderly succession to himself, tried to limit likely factional struggles by balancing personnel and organs of rule in a manner that promised to preserve his own power while paving the way for the heir apparent. A fundamental source of instability in Soviet succession crises has been the chronic conflict between the party machine and the state bureaucracy. Khrushchev's subsequent insistence that the state was already in the process of withering away would seem to have been designed, in part, to impair the state bureaucracy's capacity to contest the party's hegemony hereafter.[15]

In an intra-party conflict the military leaders will almost inevitably be involved, as they were in the USSR after the death of Stalin. Should they seek to stand aloof, they would be involved by the warring factions who would seek their armed support. In the political struggle the most powerful faction of them would be more apt to be kingmakers than kings. Theoretically, there is a possibility that if internal or foreign threats really endangered

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[14] Ibid., p. 50.
[15] Ibid., pp. 122-123.

the regime, a junta of top party soldiers might seize power. There is considerable recent precedent in the underdeveloped areas for the establishment of military governments, but there is none in the history of the Communist movements.[16] The army and the police certainly play an important part but their interests are limited as compared with the state and party.

The causes for Khrushchev's premature political demise are not hard to find. By designating an heir apparent, he had created the opportunity for his own overthrow. Khrushchev could not, like Stalin did before him, institute a reign of terror because the power once exercised by Stalin was irrevocably diffused among his successors. Presently there is no one in the Kremlin who combines in himself sufficient personal prestige and political acumen to demand unquestioned obedience. The situation created by this combination of factors makes for instability at the top. Therefore, "the Soviet Union must now be regarded as being in a most unstable condition and subject to extreme change over perhaps quite a short period."[17]

Because Brezhnev and Kosygin lack sufficient prestige and personal authority, their overthrow by a conspiracy must be rated as a most likely eventuality. Their allies in the conspiracy

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[16]Ralph L. Powell, "Political-Military Relationships in Communist China," Policy Research Study, US Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Oct. 1963, pp. 15-16.

[17]Robert Conquest, Russia After Khrushchev, p. 10.

against Khrushchev, after all, were united only in their opposition to their former ruler, not on basic policies.[18]

There are some analogies to be drawn from Stalin's and Khrushchev's rise to power in Russia. First, both became First Secretary of the party machinery where they used that office as a springboard to their political success. Here they were able to pack the local and territorial secretariats and bureaus with their own supporters, resulting in the control of the party's electoral machinery and eventual control in Congress and the Central Committee. The end result deprived their opponents in the Presidium of the necessary support in the superior party organs. Second, both took advantage of party prerogatives and placed their supporters in charge of governmental and police organs, the army, and the media of communication and indoctrination thus depriving their oppenents of institutional support outside the party hierarchy. Third, both played off their rivals against each other by manipulating issues tended to increase friction among them and shrewdly alternated concessions and persuasion with threats and political blackmail. According to Bociurkiw:

> Indeed the talents the two men shared - talents for intrigue and manipulation, for dissimulation and conspicuous unpretentiousness - were of decisive importance in the initial stages of their drive for power, when they were still overshadowed and outnumbered by more prominent aspirants to Soviet leadership.[19]

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[18] Ibid., pp. 160-170.

[19] Bohdan R. Bociurkiw, "The Problem of Succession in the Soviet Political System: The Case of Khrushchev," The Canadian Journal of Economic and Political Science, Vol. 26, Nov. 1960, pp. 587-588.

In chapter 2 it was noted the statutes of the Lao Dong Party are similar to those of the CPSU; therefore, from this analysis of succession in the USSR, the man who becomes the First Secretary will be favorably placed in the struggle for succession. His every move will probably be closely observed by all the aspiring contenders but mere occupancy of that post will not provide him the automatic authority to become dictator. The position does afford the occupant the opportunity to aggrandize himself through the successful exercise of that office. He may win power but not his colleagues' acknowledgement that they must obey him because he occupies that office. Should Ho Chi Minh die before stepping aside for a man of his choice, we can expect a crisis. Collective leadership will evolve, a power struggle will ensue, and in the end through the familiar process of elimination, a new dictator will take over. The winner in this struggle may not be the most obvious candidate, but possibly a "dark horse" candidate, and the master of political in-fighting and of the party's machine. The history of Soviet succession has so aptly shown the secretarial machine of the party is the central avenue of political succession.

During succession, the period of fear and insecurity at the top might provide the opportunity for the United States to exploit this unstable condition to its advantage. A direct or indirect approach to the government with implicit promises or favors of support to a selected faction at the critical moment might be beneficial in bringing the Vietnam War to a quicker conclusion.

This period of opportunity would likely extend until the new leadership emerges and assumes complete control of the country.

THE CONTENDERS

An authority on Vietnam has noted that Ho presides over a party structure that has not suffered a major purge since its inception in 1930.[20] On May 19th of this year Ho was 75 years old. The question of who is to succeed him must be foremost in the minds of the DRV leaders, and some of these must be considering how best they can press their claims to become the new leader of the DRV upon Ho's demise or retirement. Succession, of course, involves both the state and the party. Who, then, are the leaders with a reasonable hope of being able to attain Ho's position? The number of Vietnamese occupying very senior posts in the most important institutions of the state is large, so that the list of candidates might seem likely to be long. A sizable number of these persons may be eliminated directly, for they exert very little influence upon the running of the DRV now and are unlikely to do so in the future.

As indicated earlier, the Politburo of the Lao Dong Party is the most powerful body in the DRV, so that it is more than probable that one of its members will eventually succeed Ho Chi Minh. The DRV Politburo comprises 11 full members and two alternate members who are responsible for state security and owe their membership to

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[20]Fall, op. cit., p. 102.

the posts they occupy. Thus, if the names of Ho Chi Minh and the two ex-officio members, Van Tien Dung and Tran Quoc Hoan are set aside, there remain only ten candidates in the running for the succession. This number can further be reduced to eight. One member, Nguyen Chi Thanh, is a protege of one of the other members, Truong Chinh. There is reason for supposing that another, Pham Hung, was elected to membership at the insistence of Pham Van Dong in order to offset the influence of Truong Chinh in the Politburo.[21] The eight Politburo members remaining and their positions in the North Vietnam hierarchy are:[22]

LeDuan - Member, Presidium, National Assembly: First Secretary, Lao Dong Party

Truong Chinh - Chairman, Standing Committee, National Assembly; Member, Presidium, National Assembly

Pham Van Dong - Premier; Vice Chairman, National Defense Council; Member, Presidium, National Assembly

Vo Nguyen Giap - Vice Premier; Commander in Chief, Peoples Army of Vietnam; Minister of Defense; Vice Chairman, National Defense Council; Member, Presidium, National Assembly

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[21] Honey, op. cit., pp. 21-22.

[22] "Party and Government Leadership in North Vietnam," Background Information North Vietnam, 9 Jun. 1965, pp. 1-5.

Nguyen Duy Trinh - Vice Premier; Chairman State Planning Commission; Chairman, National Scientific Research Commission; Member, National Defense Council; Member, Presidium, National Assembly

Le Thanh Nghi - Vice Premier; Chairman, Industrial Board attached to Premier's Office

Le Duc Tho - Central Committee Secretary; Head of the Lao Dong Organization Board and Director of the Lao Dong Training School

Hoang Van Hoan - Vice Chairman, Standing Committee, National Assembly; Member, Presidium, National Assembly; Chairman of the Commission on Drafting Laws

It seems highly probable that one of these men will succeed Ho Chi Minh when he lays down his responsibilities.

CHAPTER 4

THE LINE-UP

THE LESSER THREE - HOANG VAN HOAN, LE DUC THO, LE THANH NGHI

While these three men are categorized into a grouping of less importance in the leadership of the DRV hierarchy, they nonetheless occupy important positions within the government and are permanent members of the Lao Dong Politburo. Their probability of succession must be considered. Their grouping in this minor echelon was, to some extent, influenced by the absence of research material. The VNA translations and other sources of news originating from the DRV revealed little of their activities.

HOANG VAN HOAN is the party's foremost expert on external affairs and international negotiations. He served as the DRV Ambassador to Peking during the 1950's and was a prominent member of the Vietnamese delegation to Geneva in 1954.[1] Following the proclamation of the 1960 DRV Constitution Hoan was given the Vice Presidency of the Committee on Current Affairs, presumably from pressure from the Chinese, with whom he had worked so closely as the DRV Ambassador.[2] In a recent speech in Peking, he described Communist China as his country's most effective supporter against the United States and praised Peking for "holding high the banner

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[1]Patrick J. Honey, Communism in North Vietnam, pp. 37-38; 43.
[2]Bernard B. Fall, The Two Vietnams, p. 147.

of antirevisionism"[3] with the implied criticism of Moscow's ideological stand.

LE DUC THO is considered pro-Chinese and predominantly a party figure. Tho's main strength lies in his early association with the Vietnamese Communist movement from the days when the ICP was founded.[4]

In 1951 Tho was sent to southern Vietnam as an inspector and official delegate of the DRV. The violent disagreement with Le Duan over the conduct of the war in the south became so embittered that it virtually split the southern resistance movement. The animosity that developed between the two still exists today. Le Duan was finally summoned to Hanoi and Tho remained to direct the resistance movement. Through subsequent events, however, Le Duan rose to the position of First Secretary and as such is likely to keep Tho from rising much more in the DRV hierarchy.[5]

His frequent appearances and public speeches make him appear as one of the most influential members of the Lao Dong Party. On January 30, 1965 Tho was designated by Ho to deliver the primary speech with all the top party leaders present in celebration of the 35th Anniversary of the Lao Dong Party.[6]

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[3]Seymour Topping, "Hanoi Official Calls Peking Key Guide," New York Times, 15 Jul. 1965, p. 2.

[4]"Succession in North Vietnam," Background Information North Vietnam, 19 May 1965, pp. 4-5.

[5]Honey, op. cit., pp. 35, 37.

[6]"Brief History of the North Vietnam Workers Party," Trends and Highlights, 16 Mar. 1965, pp. A8-A11. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

LE THANH NGHI is one of the five Vice Premiers, under Pham Van Dong. In addition, he is Chairman of the Industrial Board attached to the Premier's Office and as such is the industrial specialist within the party and concerns himself exclusively with that phase in the development of the DRV.[7]

THE BIG FIVE - NGUYEN DUY TRINH, PHAM VAN DONG, TRUONG CHINH, VO NGUYEN GIAP, LE DUAN

Among the 11 members of the Politburo (Ho Chi Minh himself is the chairman of that body), there are five whose background, personal characteristics and present positions make them the most logical candidates for succession. These men share among themselves the most important decision making positions in the state and the party. Their common characteristics are their age (all in their mid-fifties), their revolutionary experience, and their early association with Ho Chi Minh. The "Big Five" are discussed in detail below.

NGUYEN DUY TRINH, 55, has been a revolutionary for nearly 40 years and has spent more than 14 years in prison for his Communist activities. In the Indochina War he organized uprisings in central Vietnam and played a key role there. A British official who has followed Trinh's career closely says "His planning is cast in the Communist mold, reflecting what the Party thinks is right rather

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[7]Honey, op. cit., pp. 37-38.

than what is practical."[8] Since moving to the top echelon in the DRV hierarchy, he has been the leading planner and the principle force behind Hanoi's industrialization drive. He has always advocated closer economic cooperation with the Communist bloc. An indication to what the West can expect from Trinh is seen in his close cooperation in recent years with Truong Chinh, chief ideologist of the DRV Lao Dong Party and reportedly the leader of the pro-Chinese faction in the DRV.[9]

Another source classified Trinh as:

> . . . one of the most experienced guerrilla leaders of the pre-independence period. He organized uprisings and led the anti-French guerrilla war in Central Vietnam between 1945 and 1954. A member of Ho Chi Minh's Indochinese CP since 1930, he has been on the Vietnamese Workers' Party Central Committee since 1951[10]

The VNA on 7 April 1965 announced the sudden appointment of Trinh as Minister of Foreign Affairs replacing Xuan Thui, a non-Politburo member. Another significant political function goes to a member of the pro-Chinese faction within the party. It is significant to note that a Foreign Minister in a Communist country is not a decision maker as all foreign policy is made by the party; however, with the new Foreign Minister now a member of the Politburo he can more authoritatively represent the party and the government in his dealings with foreign governments. Trinh is less radical than

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[9] Ibid.

[10] "Government Reshuffle in North Vietnam," Background Information North Vietnam, 8 Apr. 1965, p. 2.

Troung Chinh and other pro-Chinese members of the Politburo such as Nguyen Chi Thanh and Le Duc Tho.[11]

As the former Chairman of the DRV's State Planning Commission since 1958, he is expected to seek more aid, while serving in his new position, for economic programs he has begun. US officials will find him hard to deal with in future negotiations.[12]

PHAM VAN DONG, 58, has been a faithful companion of Ho's for forty years. He has held the premiership since 1955. His father was Chef de Cabinet to the former Emperor Duy Tam and he obtained his schooling at the University of Hanoi. It was from there he was forced to flee to China in 1925 for his nationalistic associations and for initiating strikes against the government. It was there he met Ho and was introduced to communism. In 1926 he was one of the first Vietnamese revolutionaries to be assigned by Ho to organize a Communist revolutionary base on native soil. He was arrested by the French and given six years of hard labor; however, he was back in the movement by the mid-1930's. Dong was associated with the birth of the Vietminh and went to Paris in 1945 with Ho to negotiate, albeit unsuccessfully, for his country's independence.[13]

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[11] Ibid., pp. 1-3.

[12] "Hanoi Shift Hints at Harder Policy," New York Times, 8 Apr. 1965, p. 17.

[13] James Cameron, a longtime British correspondent, has just returned from a month in North Vietnam (Nov. 1965). He met and talked with, among others, Ho Chi Minh and Pham Van Dong. James Cameron, "From Hanoi: Premier Says, 'Let U.S. Go, and the War is Over'," New York Times, 10 Dec. 1965, p. 16.

A former schoolteacher and journalist Dong worked hard to promote the ICP, often at the risk of his life, and played a prominent part in directing party affairs until the end of World War II.[14]

Since 1945 his energies were directed primarily in governmental matters and administration, allowing party interests and activities to decline. Dong has avoided factional strife and personal feuds within the Politburo and has on occasion joined with Ho in resolving disputes while maintaining outwardly friendly relations with all the other leaders.[15]

At Geneva in 1954 Dong was by far the most influential representative of the Vietminh delegation.[16] Despite his long association with communism, Dong is no political extremist but rather a cautious moderate. His performance during the 1954 Geneva negotiations is said to have impressed the Soviets and he is inclined to favor current Soviet policies. In fact, he thinks that Asia's problems can be solved only through cooperation with the white races.[17]

James Cameron argues that Dong is one of the potential stars in SEA and speculates that Ho is starting a gradual process of grooming him for the presidency. "Now he runs the country, and the destiny of the whole macabre Vietnam war is to a great degree in

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[14]Fall, op. cit., pp. 38, 85, 87, 96, 133.
[15]Honey, op. cit., pp. 26-27.
[16]James Cameron, "Fron Hanoi: Premier Says, 'Let U.S. Go, and the War is Over'," New York Times, 10 Dec. 1965, p. 16.
[17]Honey, op. cit., pp. 26-28.

his hands. It would seem that he is perceptibly taking more and more weight from President Ho Chi Minh - who, after all, is 76."[18]

TRUONG CHINH, 58, has long been associated with the Communist movement in SEA. As the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the DRV National Assembly he exercises considerable influence. In 1927 he became a member of the Vietnamese Revolutionary Youth League and in 1928 he became a founding member of the ICP. He was arrested and imprisoned in 1930 by the French and later released in 1936 when the Popular Front in France attained power. During the years 1936-39 he toiled for the creation of a Democratic Front in Vietnam and devoted his efforts to the propaganda organization of the ICP. Following the outbreak of World War II in 1939 he worked underground for the party. During the period of 1941-56 he served as First Secretary of the ICP. In addition he has served as Vice Premier of the DRV and as Chairman of the National Science Committee.[19]

Truong Chinh has a number of influential leaders with the La Dong Party as his staunch supporters--men such as Hoang Quoc Viet (President, Supreme People's Procuratorate), Nguyen Duy Trinh, and Nguyen Chi Thanh. They are closely allied with him and support the pro-Chinese faction in the party. Ho was so impressed by

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[18]James Cameron, "From Hanoi: Premier Says, 'Let U.S. Go, and the War is Over'," New York Times, 10 Dec. 1965, p. 16.

[19]U. S. Joint Publications Research Service, Biographical Information on National Assembly Candidates - North Vietnam, p. 7.

Chinh's performance and ability that he was appointed to the number two position in the party as indicated above. During the French-Indochina War, Chinese Communists that came to Vietnam to assist the resistance movement impressed Chinh with the way things were done in China.[20]

Chinh publicly associated himself with the DRV agrarian reform which in all respects was patterned after the Chinese. He literally forced the land reform on the farmers using every available propaganda device. These reforms were carried out with brutality and complete disregard for justice. An educated guess indicated that close to 50,000 North Vietnamese were executed in connection with the land reform and that twice as many were arrested and sent to forced labor camps. The peasantry reacted so violently that Ho found it necessary to intervene personally by abolishing the land reform tribunals and remove the unpopular Chinh from post of First Secretary of the Party.[21]

Ho officially assumed this post himself. However, it was Le Duan who carried out these duties for Ho until he was officially appointed to the post in 1961. The agrarian debacle was a moment of real test of Chinh's importance, for he was the most hated man in the DRV and the party could, by expelling him, have diverted some of the popular anger from itself. Chinh, because of the support he enjoyed from the PRC, was permitted to retain his

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[20]Honey, op. cit., p. 32.
[21]Fall, op. cit., pp. 156-157.

membership in the Politburo, and his principal enemy, Vo Nguyen Giap, did not appear to derive any benefit from the incident. This suggests that Chinh was considered too valuable a party leader to be dismissed for popular discontent and that the importance of Giap was not great enough to permit him to exploit his enemy's disgrace to his own advantage.[22]

GENERAL VO NGUYEN GIAP, 53, is the top military authority of the DRV who achieved world fame as the victor of Dien Bien Phu. He was born in Vuangbinh Province in central Vietnam, formerly called Annam. His father was a modest scholar who also worked a rice field to provide for his family. Little is known of Giap's early life until he enrolled in the French school at Hue, where he quickly attracted much attention by his quick intelligence and strong nationalism. The latter was strongly influenced by a thorough study of Vietnamese history. The fact that his country had been under Chinese domination for fifteen hundred of the past two thousand years and under French colonial rule for the past hundred and fifty turned him against those countries.[23] The school, Lycée Quoc-Hoc, was then Vietnam's best high school and provided the young Vietnamese elite with Western knowledge, untainted by French views. In the words of one author:

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[22] Ibid.

[23] Max Clos, "The Strategy Behind the Vietcong," New York Times Magazine, 16 Aug. 1964, p. 7.

> The name of the school, which means 'national' but with the connotation of 'nationalist,' gives in itself a key to its importance; and a list of the students who graduated from it or were dismissed from it over the past forty years reads like a 'Who's Who in Vietnamese Revolution' on both sides of the 17th parallel; to name a few: Ho Chi Minh, Vo Nguyen Giap, Pham Van Dong - and Ngo Dinh Diem.[24]

The French security police watched him closely as a potential hot headed agitator. In 1930 when a peasant rebellion disturbance broke out in the Hue district he was arrested along with other party stalwarts such as Pham Van Dong and Truong Chinh. Upon his release from jail he immediately joined the Communist Party; however, it is believed that this decision was based more on realism than on ideology. There were at that time in Vietnam many secret organizations all devoted to winning independence from France, but they were ineffective and did little but argue and talk. The Communists, well organized and disciplined attracted Giap, an idealistic youth who desired results for his nationalistic dreams. The Communist Party seemed the only way of passing from words to deeds. As pointed out in chapter 2, many non-Communist Vietnamese nationalists later rallied to the Vietminh for the same reason.[25]

Giap left Hue to study law at the University of Hanoi. He subsisted by teaching history and geography in a private school and continued an active part in Communist Party work. In 1938 he

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[24]Fall, op. cit., p. 85.

[25]Max Clos, "The Strategy Behind the Vietcong," New York Times Magazine, 16 Aug. 1964, pp. 52-53.

received his doctorate of law and by then had married the daughter of one of his professors.[26] The Communist Party was outlawed during this period; however, Giap and Pham Van Dong published a Communist newspaper, Tin-Tuc (The News), under the facade of Indochinese Democratic Front.[27]

When World War II broke out in 1939, France forced Giap and some other Communist Party leaders to withdraw to China. Unfortunately for all concerned, he left his wife in Hanoi where she was promptly jailed by the French Security Police because of her association with him. She died in prison in 1943, reportedly from torture. In addition, the French guillotined Giap's sister-in-law. These two deaths turned Giap's dislike of the French into a fanatical hatred. It was undoubtedly this hatred which sustained and motivated him throughout the eight long years of the war against the French forces.[28]

When the Vietminh Front was formed, Giap, then 29 years old, was considered to be the most brilliant of the young Indochinese Communists and was given the task of organizing the first rebel underground forces. This he did with astonishing success.[29] In December 1944 Giap led his Vietminh rebels across the Chinese border into Vietnam where he effectively supported native uprisings.[30]

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[26] Ibid., p. 52.
[27] Fall, op. cit., p. 38.
[28] Max Clos, "The Strategy Behind the Vietcong," New York Times Magazine, 16 Aug. 1964, p. 52.
[29] Ibid., pp. 52-53.
[30] David Schoenbrun, As France Goes, p. 224.

After the Japanese surrender on August 16, 1945, Giap led the first Vietminh troops into Hanoi and seized power. The next day Ho emerged to declare himself President of the "free Vietnam".[31] Giap was appointed Minister of Interior (Security Police) in the new government. In 1946 when Ho went to Fountainbleu in Paris for a conference with the French, Giap was left as absolute governor of northern Vietnam. His conduct during that period has been characterized by Vietnamese nationalists and foreigners alike as ruthless. Serving in this capacity he purged and neutralized the armed nationalist groups one by one, forcing such leaders as Vu Hong Khanh, who fought against the French in the abortive 1930 rebellion, to flee once more to China, never to return. Giap purged the last nationalist leaders still free in Hanoi on July 11, 1946 and closed down Vietnam, their only remaining newspaper.[32]

In the words of Bernard B. Fall:

> . . . while Ho was negotiating with French Government officials in Fountainbleu, his ablest deputies - Vo Nguyan Giap, Tran Van Giau, Nguyen Binh, and Pham Van Bach - were liquidating the 'internal enemies of the regime': leaders of religious sects, mandarins (such as Ngo Dinh Khoi, brother of South Viet-Nam's President Ngo Dinh Diem), intellectuals (such as Pham-Quynh), Trotskyites, and anti-communist nationalists.[33]

In December of that year Vietnamese/French relations erupted for the final time and Giap was immediately appointed Commander-in-Chief

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[31] Ibid.
[32] Fall, op. cit., p. 130.
[33] Ibid., p. 101.

of the young Vietnamese Army. His accomplishments in this position and ultimate success in defeating the French at Dien Bien Phu are well known.[34]

LE DUAN, 58, was born in Quang Tri, approximately 20 miles from Hue. In 1928 and 1929 he participated in and worked actively for the Vietnamese Revolutionery Youth League, the precursor of the ICP. In 1930 he became a member of the ICP and for his work on the propaganda committee was arrested and sentenced to an incommunicado term of twenty years in 1931. Le Duan was given his freedom in 1936 when the Popular Front assumed power in France.

In 1937 he served as Secretary General of the central Vietnam region party committee. He became a permanent member of the Party Central Committee in 1939 but was again arrested and imprisoned in 1940 by the French Colonialists. When the August 1945 Communist revolution was successful he was greeted by the party and assumed the role of Central Committee Party member and Secretary General of the southern Vietnam party committee. On the administrative plane he was the Political Commissar attached to the southern Vietnam Military High Command. Le Duan was appointed to the party Central Executive Committee by the Second Party Congress in 1951. Later he was assigned to the party's Politburo.[35]

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[34]Honey, op. cit., p. 29.

[35]U. S. Joint Publications Research Service, Biographical Information on National Assembly Candidates - North Vietnam, p. 6.

Little is known of Le Duan's activities from 1951 through 1960 since he concerned himself primarily with clandestine Communist activity and internal party organizational work.[36]

Le Duan, had not been, up until this period, openly involved in the Sino-Soviet tug of war. It is interesting to note that Le Duan was not given an official government position following the 1960 "election" although he had run for "election" and had won his constituency with an honorable 97 percent of the vote. Apparently, this was but another of Ho's maneuvers to avoid trouble with the older party members. In September 1961 at the Fourth Party Congress, Ho divested himself of the First Secretaryship of the party and handed this key post to Le Duan. Le Duan was now openly acknowledged number two man of the DRV, ahead of Ho's long time associate Pham Van Dong and even Vo Nguyen Giap. This may or may not be an important indicator of a likely successor to Ho.[37]

In recent years he has played a key role in interparty relations, and particularly the party's relations with the CPSU and the CCP. Earlier he had accompanied Ho on trips to Peking and Moscow; however, the last two Vietnamese party and state delegations to those capitals were led by Le Duan himself.[38]

While General Giap now enjoys personal prestige second only to Ho, the likelihood of Giap obtaining one or both of the top

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[36]Honey, op. cit., p. 35.
[37]Fall, op. cit., p. 147
[38]"Succession in North Vietnam," Background Information North Vietnam, 19 May 1965, p. 3.

positions of leadership is discounted based on the hypothesis that the South Vietnam regime with U.S. support will "win" the present conflict. Giap's popularity will diminish considerably as the war takes a turn for the worse in the DRV.

During a power struggle for the DRV leadership, Dong might be the only leader to whom none of the rival factions would take exception; moreover, he has acquired more expertise than the rest in the everyday tasks of running the government and administering the country. On the other hand, he has limited influence with the army and little support within the party. He would probably survive the power struggle and serve the new government in a senior administrative capacity.

It seems inconceivable to me that any ambitious man, such as Le Duan, serving as the party's First Secretary would not be strongly tempted to consolidate his own position by removing persons loyal to his predecessor (Troung Chinh) and by placing his own supporters in important offices and positions of influence. If Le Duan is in fact engaged in doing this, it would offer an explanation for Troung Chinh's gradual dropping of party offices in favor of governmental ones.

CHAPTER 5

THE SINO-SOVIET RIFT

"The evidence suggests that, to date, the Sino-Soviet rift has been aggravated rather than reduced as a result of Washington's direct, though measured, retaliation against North Vietnam."[1]

HO'S POSITION

Ever since the Sino-Soviet ideological rift erupted in 1960, Ho has tried desperately to use his influence to forestall the split in the international Communist movement. The split, Ho felt, would mean the taking of sides and this was exactly what Ho hoped to avoid as it would either antagonize the PRC with whom the Vietnamese share a long common border or the Russians on whom the country relies for both machinery and technical know-how imperative to the DRV's industrialization program.[2]

Ho, a consummate politician, has held the party together and it has prospered under his leadership. It has floundered whenever he was absent. It is doubtful whether any other Vietnamese communist could have overcome the difficulties which have beset the Lao Dong Party since the beginning of the Sino-Soviet dispute, but Ho has done better than this. Not only has he held together

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[1]Tai Sung An, "The Sino-Soviet Dispute and Vietnam," Orbis, Vol. IV, Summer 1965, p. 426.

[2]Vietnamese Party Delegation in Moscow," Background Information North Vietnam, 31 Jan. 1964, p. 2.

the pro-Soviet and the pro-Chinese factions, he has exploited the individual sympathies of his divided subordinates to the advantage of Vietnam.[3]

Ho has successfully succeeded in leading his country through the two Cuban crises and the Chinese attack on India in 1962 without a derogation of relations with either Moscow or Peking; however, the partial test ban treaty proved too much for even his powers. When the Soviets demanded the DRV endorse the test ban the Chinese were no less insistent that she refuse. After much deep thought, Ho refused to sign and thus aligned the country into the Peking camp.[4]

In the past, Ho has been known for his efforts not only to forestall such a split but also to bring the two parties together and has attained prestige in the international Communist movement. At home he maintained a stand which, through ideologically closer to the Chinese, was in practice nearer the middle. He managed this by meticulously maintaining what other Communists would regard as heresy: factionalism within the top echelon of the part.[5]

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[3]"Ho Chi Minh at 75," Background Information North Vietnam, 18 May 1965, pp. 3-4.

[4]"North Vietnam Still on the Fence," Background Information North Vietnam, 27 Jan. 1964, p. 4.

[5]"Ho Chi Minh at 75," Background Information North Vietnam, 18 May 1965, pp. 3-4.

POLITBURO FACTIONS

Most of the senior DRV Communists had been attracted by the political creed of Russia, and all of them were aware of communism's debt to the Soviets. On the other hand, it was in China that the majority of them had received their political training and their first experience of communism. The Vietminh itself had come into being on Chinese soil, and the victory over the French was due, in very large measure, to Chinese military aid. Thus, the loyalties of the Vietnamese Communists were divided. There were sharp differences between factions and strong pressures to side either with Moscow or with Peking in the dispute.[6]

It is possible to discern the following major shifts within the DRV leadership since 1954. The pro-Chinese faction was in the ascendancy until the fall of 1956, when the agrarian reforms, copied from the Chinese, failed and brought about a rebellion of the peasantry. The failure of the Hundred Flowers--another Chinese import--caused the swing of the pendulum toward Moscow. Late in 1959, pro-Chinese elements began to come to the fore again, and there were some indications that late in 1960 the VPA hero, General Giap (considered a leader of the pro Soviet faction), was temporarily out of favor. Strong animosity developed between Giap and Thanh when the latter was promoted to full generalship in 1959 (he is the only senior party officer besides Giap to hold that rank) and attempted to wrestle away the top military leadership.

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[6]Bernard B. Fall, The Two Vietnams, pp. 197-200.

Subsequent changes in the VPA General Staff, however, showed that Giap had weathered the storm. In March 1961 General Song Hao replaced General Thanh, leader of the Lao Dong's youth movement and then Chief of the VPA's Political Department. General Thanh, a staunch protaganist of the pro-Chinese line, was suddenly transferred to head the Ministry of Agriculture. Three other senior generals, known for their personal loyalty to Giap, were transferred to key jobs on the VPA General Staff. After Ho's trip to Moscow in October 1961, the pro-Soviet faction again seemed to have gained the upper hand.

The Chinese ambassadorial post in Hanoi was vacant for more than three months in the summer of 1962, and some sub-Cabinet changes in Hanoi in 1962 and 1963 tended to substantiate this. An excellent example of this careful navigating between two lines was the joint statement issued by Ho and Liu Shao-ch'i in May 1963. Liu emphasized faithfulness to Marxism-Leninism, while Ho just as steadfastly cautioned Peking against "dogmatism."[7]

The motives which impel leading Vietnamese Communists to support one or the other factions are varied. Personal rivalries have existed between some of the leaders for a very long time, and the adherence of one such person to a particular faction was sometimes sufficient to drive his rival into the opposite one. The

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[7] Ibid., pp. 198-199.

most celebrated of these quarrels between individuals is that which divided Giap and Chinh for many years. It is hardly surprising to find that when Giap, who has never concealed his distrust of China since his student days, became a leading protagonist of the Russian cause, Chinh gave his allegiance to that of China.[8] Other leaders lend their support to one or other faction for reasons of self-interest and hope of preferment. Many of the second rank leaders are bound to first rank leaders since they owe their present positions to the patronage of the latter. It is natural then to follow their patron into the faction of his choosing.[9] Almost as well known as the Giap-Chinh and the Giap-Thanh feud is the quarrel between Le Duan and Le Duc Tho, which was discussed in chapter 4.

As indicated above, some of this friction within the Politburo goes back for years; however, Ho has been considered to be above factions. Of the other members of the Politburo four are usually considered pro-Chinese and four pro-Soviet, while the remaining two are considered to be neutral, devoting their energies to their particular field--foreign policy and economics. The pro-Chinese faction includes: Truong Chinh, former First Secretary of the party and director of the Central Committee's Propagands Department; Nguyen Chi Thanh, protege of Truong Chinh; Nguyen Duy Trinh; and Le Duc Tho. The pro-Soviet faction consists of Pham Van Dong, General Giap, Le Duan, and Pham Hung, a protege of Pham Van Dong.

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[8]Patrick J. Honey, Communism in North Vietnam, pp. 29-31.
[9]Ibid., pp. 52-58.

Le Thanh Nghi, specialist in industrialization policy, and Hoang Van Hoan, the party's affairs specialist are considered neutral.[10]

Ernst Kux, another authority on Vietnam, classified the factions on a graduated scale ranging from pro-Chinese to pro-Soviet as indicated:[11]

"Pro-Chinese"	"National Communist"	"Pro-Soviet"
	Ho Chi Minh	
Le Duan		
Truong Chinh		
		Pham Van Dong
	Pham Hung	
	General Giap	
Le Duc Tho		
Nguyen Chi Thanh		
Nguyen Duy Trinh		
	Le Thanh Nghi	
	Hoang Van Hoan	

In early 1964 tensions within the Politburo again reached a high level of intensity attributable to the pressures of the Sino-Soviet dispute. The pro-Chinese faction, dominated by Chinh and Thanh, has continually attacked the "Modern Revisionists", in effect the CPSU and the pro-Soviet faction headed by Premier Dong and

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[10]"Where Do the Vietnamese Communists Stand?", Background Information North Vietnam, 24 Mar. 1964, p. 6.

[11]"Succession in North Vietnam," Background Information North Vietnam, 19 May 1965, p. 2.

General Giap. Tensions again increased following the United States retalitatory measures in August 1964 when issues of national defense, military strategy, and party-military relationships were involved. By early 1965, this source concluded that the pro-Chinese faction continues to hold a majority within the party and was again demanding absolute party leadership over the army in addition to stressing the need to strengthen ideological and political education of the military rank and file. This was another affront to General Giap. The party's concern with the increasing internal conflict during the time of military crisis in February 1965 was quite evident in a lengthy article by Le Duc Tho in the Lao Dong's theoretical journal, Hoc Tap, where he openly admitted that "internal contradictions always exist in the party and cannot be overcome overnight."[12]

Analyzing radio and press releases indicates there is a Politburo faction in favor of negotiating. They are still in the minority since the "militarists" still control the radio and press. Recent denunciations for wanting to live a luxurious life rather than carry through with the revolution to final victory, for wanting to save their own lives, and for being anxious to surrender for the sake of material benefits has been interpreted by one authority to mean that Ho, in his old age, is becoming senile and has been

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[12]"Internal Contradictions in the Vietnam Workers Party," Trends and Highlights, 16 Aug. 1965, pp. A4-A6. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

removed from effective leadership. US bombings may have to go on for some time before either faction cracks.[13]

Another source supports the thesis that the Chinese faction has the upper hand in the power struggle and that Ho has been pushed out of the top leadership role. This is based on the hypothesis that Ho, in view of the devastation to his homeland, would have taken some initiative before now to negotiate a settlement of the Vietnam War. The factions are jealously watching each other which makes it difficult for the DRV to undertake peace negotiations. The first step in that direction by any group is bound to make it a target for charges of appeasement and defeatism by the other faction.[14]

MOSCOW'S POSITION

"Moscow favors 'peaceful coexistence' - a more cautious and devious drive toward world communism - as the proper strategy for the world communist movement in the present era of thermonuclear terror."[15]

The rift is reflected in practically every political and economic move undertaken by the feuding powers. Already the differences have affected the USSR's standing and influence in SEA.

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[13]"Here's How North Vietnam is Doing in the War," U.S. News and World Report, 19 Apr. 1965, p. 41.

[14]"Hard Times in North Vietnam; Hunger, Failures, Dissension," U.S. News and World Report, 31 May 1965, pp. 56-57.

[15]Tai Sung An, "The Sino-Soviet Dispute and Vietnam," Orbis, Vol. IV, No. 2, Summer 1965, p. 427.

The USSR finds itself in a difficult and complex position. On the one hand, the nuclear facts of life require a policy of "peaceful coexistence" with the United States despite the intense suspicion which this policy arouses in Peking. On the other hand, the Soviets cannot afford to be too accomodating with the West for fear of losing their predominant position in the world Communist movement.[16]

The CCP, in its efforts to exacerbate the Sino-Soviet dispute, have succeeded in making the USSR highly vulnerable to criticism for failure to help another socialist country which has fallen under intensified US aerial bombardment. In the face of accusations from Peking, Moscow finds its position within the Communist bloc in danger of further erosion but is powerless to provide an effective answer to Communist China's attacks. Moscow is apparently aware that a deeper involvement in the Vietnam War could only lead to the taking of risks without the tangible reward of success. The Soviets, caught in the cross fire of blistering Peking denunciations and the US determination to continue aerial bombardments, were forced to undertake face-saving measures. While providing defensive missiles to Hanoi, Moscow has stepped up its propaganda attacks against US policies in Vietnam and has threatened to send Soviet volunteer troops there. At present, the Soviets continue to refuse a deeper commitment in Vietnam.

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[16]"Soviet and Chinese Communist Maneuverings," Trends and Highlights, 1 Jul. 1965, pp. B1-B4. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

While the possibility of increased Soviet involvement in the war in the future cannot be precluded, three major reasons indicate their involvement will be limited to materiel and technical assistance. First, direct participation would negate the validity of the Soviets' "peaceful coexistence" line which, at present, remains the cornerstone of Soviet capitulation to the PRC on the focal issue in the ideological struggle. Increased participation would not only prove Peking's militant line to be correct but would also lead to destruction of the detente with the United States. Second, direct intervention in Vietnam would lead to a confrontation between Soviet and US military power in an area which, although not vital to Soviet security interests, carries the risk of possible escalation into a nuclear war. Third, despite the great risks involved in intervention, Moscow has practically nothing to gain in the power relationship in the area.

The geographic propinquity of the PRC to Vietnam enables it to cast a larger shadow over the area than the Soviets, and Peking thus has more chances of increasing its influence over the DRV than the Soviets ever hope to attain.[17] To extricate themselves from such a painful dilemma, there seems to be only one solution: to advocate a negotiated settlement of the Vietnam War.

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[17]"Soviet Union's Predicament in Vietnam Within the Context of the Sino-Soviet Dispute," Trends and Highlights, 1 Oct. 1965, pp. A12-A15. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

PEKING'S POSITION

> What makes Chinese military power in South and Southeast Asia so formidable is not so much its military power-in-being as its apparent political and psychological willingness to use war and the threat of war as a constant element of its foreign policy.[18]

In its bid for leadership the PRC has devoted much effort to the underdeveloped world, and has especially great hopes in Africa and Latin America. As a signatory of the Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962, Peking has assumed definite obligations in the area of Indochina. Apart from this, it has a direct ideological and political relations with the DRV, which forms part of Communist influence in Asia, and in its political connections with the NFLSV. Peking is exploiting the Soviet's failure to react with adequate military countermeasures in Vietnam. The PRC is endeavoring to project itself as the leading power in the anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist world, parallel with her direct efforts to isolate and discredit the USSR.[19]

Peking is aware that only the Soviets can provide the military support necessary to create a brighter prospect for the Vietcong in SVN. By successfully urging the Soviets to make extensive use of its military power in Vietnam, however, the PRC not only hopes to enhance its ideological position vis-a-vis the USSR within the Communist

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[18]Bernard B. Fall, "Red China's Aims in South Asia," Current History, Sep. 1962, p. 136.

[19]"Soviet and Chinese Communist Maneuverings," Trends and Highlights, 1 Jul. 1965, pp. B1-B4. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

bloc but also to destroy the US-Soviet detente. Peking wants to embroil Moscow in the Vietnam War to prove the accuracy of its thesis that the United States is a "paper tiger" which can be defeated and therefore provide justification for the PRC's militant line against the West. A successful Soviet assisted DRV victory in SVN, moreover, would provide the example to inspire "wars of national liberation" in other areas of the underdeveloped world.

On the other hand, the continuing Soviet reluctance to get seriously involved in Vietnam has also provided Peking with a powerful lever for attacking Moscow by pointing out that the Soviets, being the most powerful country within the Communist bloc and which purports to assume the role of leader, is simply powerless to help a socialist country in distress. By successfully drawing Moscow into the war, Peking will have succeeded in pitting Soviet military power against the United States. This would not only demonstrate the inadvisability of "peaceful coexistence" with the United States but would also bring about a continuing crisis atmosphere between the United States and the Soviets which would make it virtually impossible for Washington and Moscow to have any meaningful cooperation.[20]

Peking may even want to see the DRV considerably weakened and thus inhibited in its political aspirations. This may be one of

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[20]"Soviet Union's Predicament in Vietnam within the Context of the Sino-Soviet Dispute," Trends and Highlights, 1 Oct. 1965, pp. A12-A15. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

the reasons the Chinese Communists are advising Hanoi to endure the US bombing while pressing on with the Vietcong insurrection until the anti-Communist regime in SVN collapses and the United States is forced to withdraw. This protraction of the Vietnam conflict would leave two exhausted Vietnams much more susceptible to the PRC's influence, discredit Soviet policy of "peaceful coexistence", trim the influence of the pro-Soviet faction in Hanoi, and strengthen Peking's belligerent revolutionary line.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS

A positive overall conclusion from an evaluation of the succession issue is that the leading candidates will invariably come from the present membership of the party's Politburo. In this totalitarian state with its one party Communist government at the helm it is impossible to draw any hard and fast conclusions as to who will positively succeed Ho. However, when Ho eventually quits the political scene, a violent power struggle between rival factions would appear inevitable. Since Ho enjoys immeasurably more popular esteem inside Vietnam than any of the other leaders and has afforded copious proof of his superior political abilities in the past, upon his exodus the presidency and chairmanship of the party will probably be divided.

Only Le Duan, the present First Secretary, seems to possess enough influence to retain both jobs in one person. If Le Duan is not able to consolidate his position in both offices during the succession crises, the chairmanship of the party is forecast to go to Le Duan and the presidency to Pham Van Dong. Such a division of the posts could maintain a certain initial balance between the pro-Chinese and pro-Soviet elements in the party which might, however, eventually lead to a serious power struggle between the two factions. The outcome of that struggle cannot of course be

foreseen, but it is certain to end the Ho Chi Minh-style personality cult that has been so characteristic of Communist DRV since 1945.

As indicated previously, the Vietnamese for centuries have a deep resentment and fear of the Chinese. The DRV leaders would not welcome massive PRC troop movements into their territory lest this should lead to Chinese domination. It is this ingrained fear of China that will continue to prompt the DRV leaders to resist Peking's heavy pressure for a complete break with Moscow. They are well aware that the Soviets can supply far more military and economic aid than can the PRC. Moreover, the DRV leadership is anxious to keep the door open to Moscow in the event that someday they might have to seek a counterweight to Peking.

Another important reason for wanting to avoid direct PRC military intervention in the DRV is for their own political ambitions in Indochina. The ultimate aim of the DRV leadership is to bring the whole of Vietnam, Laos, Thailand and Cambodia under Hanoi's hegemony.

The DRV leadership has since early 1963 taken public stands favoring the PRC in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Hanoi has allied itself primarily with Peking because the Chinese Communists were willing to support Hanoi's effort to unify all of Vietnam under its hegemony. At the present time, Hanoi and Peking have overlapping interests, the most important of which is to evict US power from SEA.

Since Ho himself was not able to mend the ideological differences between Peking and Moscow in the past, it is concluded the new leadership in the future will not be able to influence the outcome of the Sino-Soviet polemic. As long as the Vietnam crisis continues it is not likely to be the occasion for a restoration of unity between the USSR and the PRC. The Sino-Soviet split appears irreparable, though neither side seeks a complete and final break. Unity could be restored only in the extremely unlikely event that the United States became involved in a general war with the Chinese Communists.

The Sino-Soviet rift has made it impossible for the two giants of the Communist bloc to coordinate their policies and power in a joint offensive against the West. By skillfully using its military superiority in and around Vietnam, the United States can contain Communist aggression and force the Chinese and North Vietnamese Communists to abandon their designs on SEA. Such a victory might go far to blunt the PRC strategy of "wars of national liberation" and "protracted guerrilla conflict" and strengthen other Free World nations in SEA.

Since factionalism within the DRV will continue to have most important political implications in the future, it would be in the US interests to exploit by propaganda, diplomatic maneuverings, and even hired killings in order to secure the pro-Soviet faction in a position of dominance within the DRV Politburo. As has been pointed out the swing of the pendulum has, from time to time, favored one

faction or the other, in recent years favoring Peking. As of this writing there are indications that the pendulum is starting to swing back toward the neutral position and hopefully toward the pro-Soviet side.

In spite of repeated statements to the contrary, the DRV leadership might be at a point when a political (rather than a military) solution of the conflict may become conceivable if not desirable. Evidence indicated that since February of this year the new Soviet leadership, under Brezhnev and Kosygin, is attempting to lure the DRV regime into their sphere of influence. Additionally, the pro-Soviet faction, headed by Premier Pham Van Dong and General Giap have been pressing for a rapprochement with Moscow that would yield more military and economic aid. Virtually the same clique of men has controlled the DRV since its inception in 1945 and as long as they remain in power, the DRV position is not likely to change significantly. But circumstances, such as those just indicated, might force their hand--or even result in an overall change in government. In either case, attitudes in Hanoi might shift--beginning with a pro-Soviet outlook, and concluding, with Soviet insistence, at the bargaining table.

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(An insight to succession in communistic states.)

ANNEX A

ABBREVIATIONS

CCP	CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY
CPSU	COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION
DLD	DANG LAO DONG (VIETNAM WORKERS' PARTY/COMMUNIST PARTY)
DMH	VIETNAM REVOLUTIONARY LEAGUE
DRK	DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF KOREA
DRV	DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (COMMUNIST NORTH VIETNAM)
GDR	DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
ICC	INTERNATIONAL CONTROL COMMISSION
ICP	INDOCHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY
MPR	MONGOLIA PEOPLES' REPUBLIC
NCNA	NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY
NFLSV	NATIONAL FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM
PRC	CHINA PEOPLES' REPUBLIC
SEA	SOUTHEAST ASIA
SVN	SOUTH VIETNAM
US	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
USSR	UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
VNA	VIETNAM NEWS AGENCY (NORTH VIETNAM)
VNQDD	VIETNAM NATIONALIST PARTY
VPA	VIETNAM PEOPLES' ARMY (NORTH VIETNAM)

ANNEX B
NORTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION



* MEMBERS OF THE LAO DONG PARTY POLITBURO

ANNEX C

NORTH VIETNAMESE LAO DONG PARTY