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# WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO WIN IN THE COLD WAR -- THE MAXIMIZATION APPROACH

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# The Maximization Approach

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## SUMMARY

The lack of total victory in the Korean War focused attention on a dilemma associated with the cold war which still exists today. The quandary concerns the development of an answer to the question, "What does it mean to win in the Cold War?" Many approaches are possible in pursuit of an acceptable theory of "win." This thesis develops one of these--the "Maximization Approach."

Before proceeding to evolve the approach, it is necessary to establish the proper setting. The cold war not only is defined in its normal sense as a state of conflict involving political, economic, sociological, psychological, paramilitary, and military measures short of overt conflict, but also is expanded to include those limited wars which do not include overt military engagement between major powers of the Communist and Free Worlds. A boundary is placed around the cold war arena which limits the scope of the conflicts conducted within. This boundary is general war. Such a limitation imposes constraints on policies developed for the prosecution of cold war activities, the most important of which is the infeasibility of total victory.

Within such an arena of conflict the theory of maximization is developed. It visualizes achieving from each conflict situation the maximum possible gain that is consistent with the existing constraints. The long-range objectives derived from the national purpose are used as guideposts for steering the course, and the nation's vital interest is identified as the major measurement device for determining the value of gains or losses incurred.

It is found that the "Maximization Approach" is realistic in its recognition of cold war limitations; is flexible in adjusting to changing objectives and values; and, is selective in its application of the nation's elements of power. On the other hand, the approach presents many problems. The most significant of these include the difficulty in identifying national interests, the complexity of selecting appropriate objectives, the possibility of an adverse internal psychological reaction, and the difficulty involved in securing military acceptance of the philosophy.

The thesis concludes that the advantages of adopting a feasible, realistic, and flexible method of pursuing a course of action in the cold war which brings the nation closer to the realization of its long-range objectives outweigh the difficulties involved. It also concludes that the "Maximization Approach" incorporates a philosophy of "win" which is an appropriate substitute for the total victory concept of yesteryear.

# CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION

> But once war is forced upon us, there is no other alternative than to apply every available means to bring it to a swift end. War's very object is victory, not prolonged indecision.
>
> In war there can be no substitute for victory.[1]
>
> --General MacArthur

Certainly this statement made to the Joint Session of the United States Congress on 19 April 1951 was an aphorism. Did it not succinctly express the general will of the American people when confronted with domestic or external conflict? Why, then, did the pronouncement create such a furor in the midst of the Korean War? Why, in fact, was there any discussion of it at all? Could it be that contemporary adherence to such a maxim was anachronistic?

The dilemma appeared to focus not so directly on the broad concept itself, but rather on the interpretative meaning of two key words--war and victory. The complexity of this definition problem was highlighted in the Congressional hearings on the Far East situation after the relief of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur from his command in April 1951. In digesting the varied interpretations of the two words rendered by the major military

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[1]Douglas MacArthur, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur's Address to Congress, 19 April 1951, Washington, D. C., p. 30.

leaders of the day, it became readily apparent that there were a variety of restraints imposed on the employment of means in the Korean War, and that the military and political objectives sought were limited. Attention was directed to the fact that the United States was neither fighting a total war nor pursuing a total victory.[2]

## VICTORY IN WORLD WAR II

It was this lack of totality that seemingly provoked the turmoil over the Korean War policies. As Robert Osgood, a political scientist, said about the country's historical approach to war, ". . . America has been notoriously slow to anticipate war or prepare for it, but it has been shocked into single-minded determination to overwhelm the enemy once war has broken out."[3] The policy of "unconditional surrender" in World War II was an embodiment of this concept.[4] When a similar policy was not adopted during the Korean War, doubts were aroused.

However, pursuing "unconditional surrender" was not itself an impeccable course of action. Its fallacy became apparent in the post-World War II realization that the United States had "won the war but lost the peace." As one political analyst put it:

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[2]US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Military Situation in the Far East, Pt. 1, pp. 167-168, 644-646, 960-961, 1416-1418, 1420, 1595-1596 (referred to hereafter as "Congress, Military Situation in the Far East").

[3]Robert E. Osgood, Limited War, p. 29.

[4]Paul Kecskemeti, Strategic Surrender: The Politics of Victory and Defeat, pp. 25-26.

"Permanent peace rests on a weak foundation indeed if it depends on the undying memory of a just chastisement. This, however, was the foundation we prepared for it by adopting the unconditional-surrender policy."[5] But, long established aphorisms are difficult to shake. True, the object of "unconditional surrender" might have been ill-conceived particularly from a political point of view, but was not the maxim of Clausewitz that "war is . . . an act of force to compel our adversary to do our will"[6] still valid? Many thought so. Certainly General MacArthur did. Perhaps they were right. However, there were other factors that contributed to the difficulty in establishing objectives and defining victory in the Korean conflict. Two of these will be discussed next.

## POSTWAR CHANGES

The postwar era ushered in a metamorphosis of thought concerning great power conflict. As Under Secretary of State George Ball said: "The first great postwar change was the Iron Curtain drawn between East and West bringing with it the cold war--a contest on a world scale between two major centers of power with competing ideologies."[7] The United States found itself threatened by an aggressive, expansionist-minded Soviet Union that was bent on

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[5]Ibid., p. 240.
[6]Karl von Clausewitz, On War, p. 3.
[7]George Ball, "The Responsibilities of a Global Power," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 51, 5 Oct. 1964, p. 473.

achieving its aims by a variety of means of conflict including the threat of direct military aggression. These aims had to be thwarted, but the objective of "unconditional surrender" did not seem appropriate to the occasion. Thus, the first dilution of totality of purpose ensued.

A second change which further clouded the issue was the introduction of a new dimension in warfare. The bending of nuclear energy to the purposes of war was hailed by Americans as a marvelous achievement of "Yankee ingenuity"--that is, while the United States maintained a monopoly in the production of nuclear weapons. However, entrance of the USSR into the nuclear weapons family in 1949 gave rise to considerable speculation concerning the conduct and outcome of future conflicts. The totality of war and the concept of complete victory were not so easily accepted as they had once been. The threat of nuclear holocaust was a matter of national survival. The thought, "There are no national objectives which can be served by national suicide,"[8] took on significant meaning.

These two changes had a profound effect on United States policy. In the first instance, the cold war introduced a new scope of international conflict, and the Truman Doctrine, with its policy of containment, was designed to counter Soviet expansionist designs.[9]

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[8]Amos A. Jordan, National Power, 23 Aug. 1965, p. 7.

[9]Harry S. Truman, Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope, Vol. 2, pp. 93-109.

The United States shucked its idealistic and legalistic approach to power politics and made far-reaching peacetime commitments to counter aggression.

In the second instance, the possession of nuclear weapons by both antagonists in effect superimposed a dark canopy over the cold war arena. For the first time the threat of mass destruction within the continental limits of the United States was real. In Western Europe the threat of conquest loomed again. To counter this situation, United States policy was directed toward building the Free World's military, political, and economic strength. Additionally, President Truman directed the continuance of work on nuclear weapons to include the hydrogen bomb. The goal in pursuing these courses was simply to develop and maintain sufficient strength to deter aggression. Thus, we find the beginning of the deterrence policy. Although positive in nature, the policy also contained the seeds for future limitation of action.[10]

## LIMITED OBJECTIVES IN KOREA

The effectiveness of the two policies broke down in Korea for many reasons. However, in the case of the containment policy, the Far East held a low second priority position to Europe in regards to resources and efforts allocated to its implementation. As for

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[10] Ibid., pp. 296-315.

Korea itself, its defense was not unilaterally guaranteed by the United States.[11]

In relation to the deterrence policy, it was aimed specifically at direct Soviet aggression. Aggression by a lesser power was another matter. Theoretically, the Soviet Union was not involved.

Thus, in furtherance of the containment policy to halt expansion of communism, Truman committed forces to stem the tide of North Korean aggression, and, in light of the nuclear deterrence policy and the inherent responsibilities it carried for the United States, great care was exercised to prevent escalation of the war into general nuclear proportions.[12] As Truman said, "Every decision I made in connection with the Korean conflict had this one aim in mind: to prevent a third world war and the terrible destruction it would bring to the civilized world."[13]

It was within the scope of these situational changes, operational policies, and general constraints that the debates on the objectives of war and meanings of victory were conducted. The fact that the Korean War was a limited conflict--limited in means utilized, and in objectives sought--became clear from the Congressional hearings. Even MacArthur recognized the limitations and made his recommendations accordingly.[14] It was under

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[11]Jules Davids, America and the World of Our Times, United States Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century, pp. 401, 436-437.

[12]Ibid., pp. 440-441.

[13]Truman, op. cit., p. 345.

[14]Congress, Military Situation in the Far East, pp. 19, 115-118, 167-168, 259.

these limiting circumstances, in contrast to the World War II objective of "unconditional surrender," that the philosophy of victory in the Korean War became difficult to describe. The question can still be asked, "What did it mean to win in the Korean War?"

## APPROACHES TO THE THEORY OF "WIN"

Today, in 1966, we face a similar definition dilemma in the struggle against Communist expansion in Vietnam. While the conflict is different in several important ways, it does present the same problem of defining victory. What does it mean to win in Vietnam--or for that matter, in Berlin, or Cuba, or the Dominican Republic, or Colombia, or in any other conflict area associated with the cold war? From this difficulty stems the objective of this thesis which is to develop a "win" theory or philosophy which, in turn, may prove of assistance in arriving at a satisfactory answer to the question, "What does it mean to win?"

Obviously there are many approaches which can be taken in pursuit of a "win" theory. One of these might well be the so-called "Objectives Approach." In this case the concept would generally be developed that unless clear-cut, precise national objectives and goals are defined and articulated, the resulting policies and implementing programs and plans cannot hope to encompass the intended purpose, nor foster subordinate "win" objectives. However, with definitive national objectives, the

military, political, economic, social, and psychological subobjectives, which directly contribute to the achievement of the specific national objectives, can be developed. Such a pursuit would constitute a "win" philosophy, and the actual accomplishment of a national objective would constitute a victory, even though the objective itself might be limited.

Another approach might theorize that in every type of potential or actual cold war conflict situation certain military, political, economic, social, cultural, and psychological factors predominate. They vary in degree, but are always present in similar types of conflict situations. By prompt identification of these factors and effective application of remedial action, either a crisis can be averted or the conflict won. This might be termed the "Template Approach." It would, in its conception, visualize a series of objectives, policies, programs, and plans which would be developed for each of the possible situations that might be expected to result when one or more of the denominators predominated.

Next, the "Ideal Goal Approach" might be considered. Here the assumption would be made that victory is transitory, and therefore the objectives established in furtherance of its attainment must themselves be general in nature to permit necessary maneuvering and adjustment. Thus, broad, idealistic goals would be established to provide for maximum flexibility. Such ideals as "Peace," "Make Safe for Democracy," "Status Quo Ante," and "Self-Determination," as examples, would set forth goals which, if achieved to the degree

considered desirable or appropriate to the circumstance, would constitute a victory for United States policy.

Or perhaps an "Historical Approach" might be developed which considers that in the Twentieth Century there has not been and cannot be any such phenomenon as a total victory. It is postulated that even though military victory has been accomplished and may well be again in the future, it is invariably accompanied by political, economic, and social losses which far outweigh the gains achieved by such military victory. Thus, conflict results in a loss and not a victory. The question is relative, and decisions must reflect what loss is to be willingly accepted in order to achieve the desired gain.

Although there are certainly many other approaches that might be taken in the quest of a "win" theory, and several variations and combinations of those approaches outlined above, there is one further approach of significance which must be examined. That is the "Maximization Approach"--the subject of this thesis. The theory to be developed visualizes that in every conflict situation there is a maximum value that can be expected to be achieved from the rational pursuit of objectives and policies; and, it is by achieving the maximum gain, or in some instances sustaining the minimum loss, consistent with the constraints, risks, and degree of national interest involved, that a "win" is effected in that particular situation.

Thus, having examined briefly the contemporary difficulties involved in pursuing the World War II philosophy of victory, it is

the purpose of the remaining portion of this thesis to explore the current environment of cold war conflict, develop the theory of maximization as a win philosophy, evaluate this maximization approach, and develop conclusions concerning the application of the theory and approach in the political and military arenas.

It is emphasized that the conflict environment will be confined to the spectrum of cold war broadened to encompass certain limited wars, and thus will not include that of general war ". . . in which the total resources of the belligerents are employed, and the national survival of a major belligerent is in jeopardy."[15]

Additionally, emphasis will be focused only on the political and military elements of national power, and then only in their broadest aspect, recognizing that economic, social, psychological, and cultural elements are equally as important. The thesis length limitation permits only casual reference to the role of the latter in the development of a "win" philosophy.

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[15]US Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS Pub. 1: Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage, 1 Dec. 1964, p. 64.

# CHAPTER 2

## ENVIRONMENT OF CONFLICT

> Today no war has been declared--and however fierce the struggle may be, it may never be declared in the traditional fashion. Our way of life is under attack. Those who make themselves our enemy are advancing around the globe. The survival of our friends is in danger. And yet no war has been declared, no borders have been crossed by marching troops, no missiles have been fired.[1]
>
> --John F. Kennedy

Before the development of a "win" philosophy can be attempted, it is necessary to establish the perimeters within which the philosophy is expected to be applied. Merely to describe the area of conflict as the cold war is not sufficient, for the scope that term implies is not precisely fixed. Not only must the arena of conflict be determined, but also the participants identified, the operational constraints established, the concept of "win" delineated, and goals to be sought defined. Thus, it is the purpose of this chapter to outline the environmental setting of cold war conflict within which a "win" theory can be developed.

### COLD WAR ARENA

The examination of the cold war arena must necessarily begin with a definition of the cold war itself. The official United

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[1]John F. Kennedy, "The President and the Press, Restraints of National Security," Vital Speeches of the Day, Vol. 27, 15 May 1961, p. 451.

States Joint Chiefs of Staff definition describes the cold war as: "A state of international tension, wherein political, economic, technological, sociological, psychological, paramilitary, and military measures short of overt armed conflict involving regular military forces are employed to achieve national objectives."[2] It will be noted that overt armed conflict is excluded from the scope of cold war activities. One type of overt armed conflict, general war, has been previously defined. This is total war "between the major powers of the Communist and free worlds."[3] Additionally, between the two extremes of cold and general war, a third category of war exists--limited war--which also involves overt armed conflict. It is exclusive of incidents and encompasses only "the overt engagement of the military force of two or more nations."[4]

At first sight it would appear that these definitions were adequate and covered the entire spectrum of modern warfare. However, upon analysis, it is discovered that they do not always stand separately without further explanation. The three forms of war defined sufficiently delineate the scope of conflict in which two nations or groups of nations may directly engage; but, how would one describe the current Vietnam conflict? Virtually all elements of both the cold war and limited war definitions are applicable.

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[2]US Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS Pub. 1: Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage, 1 Dec. 1964, p. 30.

[3]Ibid., p. 64.

[4]Ibid., p. 83.

Leaving aside the nuances of nationhood, it would seem that in that one conflict the United States is engaged in a limited war with the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese, and in a cold war with the Russians and Chinese. To further complicate the situation, what would be the effect on this determination if it were found that Russian and/or Chinese armed forces personnel were actively engaged in the air defense of North Vietnam against United States air attacks?

It is not the purpose here to analyze the Vietnam situation, but to point out that conflict cannot always be neatly classified by one of the three categories of war--cold, limited, or general--that have been officially established. However, this presents no major problem if it is accepted that the three categories do not necessarily represent separate gradations in the level of warfare. As cold war symbolizes an atmosphere of "international tension" wherein many measures "are employed to achieve national objectives," it is possible to find the United States engaged in its prosecution while at the same time engaging in a limited war in a localized region such as Korea or Vietnam. Thus, it need not be an either-or situation. There need not be a requirement to determine whether the United States is engaged either in cold war or limited war. The country can be and is today engaged in both. This is possible even if the war is between the United States and a major Communist power.

Korea is an example of a limited war in which the United States and a major Communist power, Communist China, were involved. However, the Korean war itself was within an international environment of cold war with the other Communist power, the USSR, directly challenging the United States. Even the USSR military strategists now recognize the possibility of limited--in their terms "local"--war between themselves and the Western powers.[5]

However, in a limited war between major powers of the Communist and Free Worlds, it would be possible for such a war to absorb the cold war activities and, in effect, reduce the type of war being waged to one. It was this type of limited war to which Premier Khrushchev referred in 1961 when he warned that it in turn would most certainly escalate and unleash a nuclear war.[6]

In this regard, it is important to focus back on the current international scene and remember that "cold, lukewarm, or hot--we are in a state of war today,"[7] and that "the only real difference between violent and nonviolent conflict is one of technique; in all other respects they are exactly similar."[8] After all, the terms we are using all include the word "war." Even though Khrushchev concluded that the "concept of 'war' does not include peaceful, 'nonmilitary,' means of conflict," he defines "peaceful coexistence"

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[5]V. D. Sokolovskii, ed., Soviet Military Strategy, p. 291.
[6]Ibid., p. 293.
[7]Howard P. Jones, "America Faces Asia," Congressional Record, Vol. 3, 4 Oct. 1965, p. 25000.
[8]Charles O. Lerche, Principles of International Politics, p. 145.

as ". . . a continuation of the struggle between the two social systems. . . ." This is considered to be an ". . . economic, political and ideological struggle. . . ."[9] The Soviets also support the concept of "wars of national liberation."[10]

In order to make more meaningful the interconnection and relationship of the three types of war, the next step in proceeding towards a "win" philosophy is the construction of a world environmental setting which can be used to describe the arena of conflict within which the United States desires to achieve success or to "win." Although the world is being used as the environment, the conflict referred to will be the direct East-West conflict, with particular emphasis on United States involvement. Also included are specific conflicts which evolve from the broader one. To better visualize the explanation of the setting, reference should be made to the relationship diagram in Annex A and the expanse of cold war shown in Annex B.

First, the cold war is described as an arena within which various military, paramilitary, political, economic, technological, psychological, and sociological conflicts occur between the Free and Communist Worlds. It will be noted that military conflicts have been added to the JCS definition. These include wars of national liberation, revolutionary wars, and those limited wars

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[9]Sokolovskii, op. cit., p. 275.
[10]Ibid., p. 281.

in which there is not direct overt military engagement between major powers of the Free and Communist Worlds. Thus, the cold war arena includes the vast majority of conflicts of various types that face the United States today. In practice these may range from political and psychological conflicts in the United Nations with the Soviet Bloc to a war in which a large number of United States combat troops are employed in overt engagements, and from the political and military tensions of a Berlin crisis to the attempt to prevent the political swing of uncommitted nations of the world into the Sino-Soviet orbit. As one political scientist put it, "In a 'cold war' every issue becomes a matter of struggle. . . ."[11]

This expanse of cold war activity must have some boundary to it. There must be some finite world condition which encompasses the cold war arena and in effect limits its activity. For our purposes here it can be established that the major barrier, or wall, within which the cold war contests are confined are those of non-conflict conditions and general war. Since this thesis is concerned with conflict situations, only that portion of the spectrum of East-West relations will be considered.

Should the general war wall be penetrated and that form of conflict ensue, the cold war would no longer exist. The individual conflicts which were in progress would be vented through the breach and engulfed in general war. The national survival of world powers

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[11]Lerche, op. cit., p. 148.

would be at stake and all resources would be utilized to insure such survival.

And so there are the two categories of conflict that were mentioned before--cold and general war, with the latter limiting the former. The third category of limited war has already been dealt with in one manner by including it within the cold war category when the overt military engagement of the forces of both the major Free and Communist Worlds are not involved. However, when both are engaged, we find a grey area which lies between cold war and general war. Neither the explosiveness of such a situation nor the potential of its scope permit inclusion of such a limited war within the cold war arena. As total resources might never be used, or a power's national survival not be at stake, the conflict cannot be described as general war. Thus is found this special category of limited war which is between the cold and general war categories. However, it does not completely bound the cold war arena. It is possible for a cold war conflict to erupt violently into a general war. It is also possible for a cold war conflict to escalate through the major powers' limited war category and then into general war. Therefore, as shown in the diagram, it will be recognized that the cold war arena is bounded in some areas directly by the general war type of conflict and in other areas by the limited war between major powers of the Free and Communist Worlds.

Thus, the general environment of conflict has been established. Of primary interest in this thesis is a cold war arena which is

interpreted to include all nonviolent forms of conflict. Also included are those violent forms of conflict up to and including limited war, but excluding the form of limited war which directly involves overt military engagement between major powers of both the Free and Communist Worlds.

## POLICY CONSTRAINTS

So far, a picture has been drawn of the cold war battlefield which shows a wide array of individual battles being fought sometimes in isolation, sometimes in combination, but always with a threat of nuclear war overhead. The major participants in the contests are the powers of the Western and Communist blocs. All elements of national power are found employed to some degree as weapons in the struggle. Observing the overall struggle, and even at times becoming involved in an individual battle, are found the uncommitted, neutral, and newly emerging nations of the world. With this summary, it would seem that the picture is complete. The field has been laid out and enclosed; the elements of the game have been identified; and, the participants and spectators segregated. However, it is still too early to plunge into the development of a theoretical approach to "winning." Left still to be examined are some ground rules associated with the struggle, and the ultimate goals to be achieved. First, the ground rules will be established.

Among the initial ground rules, or more accurately constraints, is the obvious limitation imposed by the established boundaries of

the arena. Limiting the cold war arena by the spectre of general war or a combination of limited war and general war, as has been done, places a restraint on measures that can be undertaken in pursuit of goals. As indicated by the United States Office of Emergency Planning:

> In addition to normal competition, the last two decades have been characterized by international conflicts of varying intensities. Yet the measures employed have been carefully controlled by the major powers to avoid the risk of general war.
>
> Such conflicts are likely to continue. So, too, is the exercise of restraint.[12]

Of particular concern is the use of force. "The threat of a nuclear holocaust has made the use of force subject to great risks."[13] Thus, if general war is to be avoided, an initial constraint in pursuing objectives in the cold war is the necessity for temperate use of force. The major Communist powers appear to agree on this constraint. As one political scientist put it, ". . . there is now agreement between Moscow and Peking on the avoidability of world war. . . ."[14] Dean Rusk is more cautious. In an obvious reference to the famous article of the Chinese Defense Minister, Lin Piao, of 2 September 1965, Secretary Rusk said that, "Some in the Communist world appear to realize the

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[12]US Office of Emergency Planning, National Planning for Emergency Preparedness, Dec. 1964, p. 1.

[13]Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Inc., Special Studies Project, The Mid-Century Challenge to US Foreign Policy, p. 53.

[14]Frederic S. Burin, "The Communist Doctrine of the Inevitability of War," American Political Science Review, Vol. 57, Jun. 1963, p. 353.

prohibitive costs of nuclear war. Some may not." He goes on to indicate that the goal of ". . . strangling the Atlantic world--is common to all. Their differences . . . are how to get on with their world revolution."[15] However, regardless of the degree, the threat of nuclear war governs the actions of all cold war participants. Even the self-admitted "bellicose" Chinese recognize the threat and the restrictions it imposes.[16]

It is the consideration of the degree of restrictive influence the threat of general war has on nations participating in the cold war which gives rise to the next constraint. That is the effect of a threat to a nation's vital interests. The effect is two-sided and can influence a country's action in two opposite ways. In the first case, should the vital interests of the United States be threatened then the degree to which the country is willing to risk the breakout of general war is considerably greater than when the vital interests are not at stake. Elmer Plischke, a political scientist, has stated that the vital interests of the United States are deemed to be ". . . matters on which, in negotiations, we will not make concessions. These are the absolutes!"[17] The 1962 Cuban missile crisis is an example of the country's willingness to risk a nuclear war when an interest considered vital was at stake.

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[15]Dean Rusk, "The Anatomy of Foreign Policy Decisions," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 53, 27 Sep. 1965, p. 505.

[16]Lin Piao, "Long Live the Victory of the People's War," Daily Report Supplement, Far East, 3 Sep. 1965, pp. 21-22, 25-29.

[17]Elmer Plischke, National Objectives, 20 Aug. 1965, p. 10.

However, if the circumstance is turned around, it must be recognized that when the United States threatens the vital interest of a cold war antagonist, it can expect equally strong reaction with apparent disregard by the antagonist of the inherent risk of escalation to general war. The leaders of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China are as sensitive to what they consider their vital interests as are the leaders of the United States sensitive to what interests have been similarly determined to be vital.

Consequently, the vital interest constraint assumes significance in developing objectives and policies in protection of the national interests of the United States in that it limits the concession to an adversary's pressure. On the other hand, when the adversary's vital national interests are at stake, great care and moderation must be taken in the formulation of foreign policy objectives in order not to force him to take unwanted measures.

The most critical situation evolves when the vital national interests of both adversaries are at stake to a great and generally equal degree. In this case, restraints are still in force, but unless some face-saving solution to the confrontation can be found which permits a backing away without appreciable effect on the national security or well-being of either antagonist, the chance of general war is great.

This condition leads directly to the last of the major constraints to be discussed here, and that is the infeasibility of

total victory in the cold war. It has been said that, "Victory in a thermonuclear exchange is likely to be a worthless reward."[18] But a thermonuclear exchange would seem to be the only way in which a total victory could be imposed on a major adversary in the overall cold war arena. Should an antagonist begin to approach a total victory, it would mean per se that the vital interests of the opposing nation would be at stake. This would, as stated earlier, appreciably elevate the risk level of nuclear war. Should it appear that the very survival of that nation was then in jeopardy, nuclear war would seem most likely. It will not be argued whether a nuclear war can be decisively won by either side for that is beyond the scope of this paper. However, it will be concluded that should a cold war conflict escalate into a general war or even into a major limited war between powers of the East and West, regardless of the outcome, the cold war could not be won, but only lost. The purpose of the cold war is to achieve aims without resort to destructive general war. As such it can never be totally won, for to do so would involve the vital interests of the losing adversary to the extent that general war would almost certainly ensue. As Plischke sees it:

> Winning the cold war . . . would mean moving to hot war, so that in a sense, winning the cold war itself is a <u>non sequitur</u> because . . . the very reason for

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[18]David H. Popper, "NATO after Sixteen Years: An Anniversary Assessment," <u>Department of State Bulletin</u>, Vol. 52, 12 Apr. 1965, p. 521.

> having a cold war is to avoid resorting to hot war. I'm not here concerned with limited skirmishes, I am not focusing on individual battles, and I am not directing these remarks to geographically restricted hostilities. Rather, I am talking about major total war.[19]

Thus, three general constraints in the formulation of objectives and policies have been identified. There is a direct relation between the risk of general war, the escalating and restraining effect of vital national interests, and the infeasibility of achieving total victory in the cold war. Above all hangs the nuclear weapon which was singled out in Chapter 1 as being a major influence of change in the post-World War II period. This weapon symbolizes the most significant constraint in international relations, particularly as it affects East-West relations. It is not an absolute constraint, but certainly a most effective one to date. For when objectives and policies are constrained, the achievement of ultimate goals and aims is retarded. Here, to a degree, the constraint impinges on vital national interests.

## NATIONAL PURPOSE

The delicate balance that this implies was well expressed by President Lyndon B. Johnson in speaking of the conflict in Vietnam when he stated:

> We do not want an expanding struggle with consequences that no one can perceive, nor will we bluster or bully

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[19]Plischke, op. cit., p. 16.

> or flaunt our power, but we will not surrender and we will not retreat, for behind our American pledge lies the determination and resources, I believe, of all of the American nation.[20]

This statement adequately presents the position of the United States in regards to the policy limits that apply to one specific struggle. But, what are the ultimate goals in the cold war towards which the nation is striving? Some understanding of the aims or goals must be fixed before a determination can be made as to the progress toward their achievement, which after all is a measure of whether the main stream of effort is producing success or failure.

It is not the intent to develop a single, concrete national purpose for the United States which is designed to live in aeternum. Rather, the intent is to erect a general framework of several ideas which are compatible and which provide the necessary broad guidelines for implementation of a national strategy. By definition the national purpose is not specific. In broad terms, it represents "The enduring aspirations of a nation for its security, well-being, and development."[21]

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[20]Lyndon B. Johnson, "We Will Stand in Viet-Nam," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 53, 16 Aug. 1965, p. 264.

[21]US Army War College, The Curricular Theme, Reference Manual, Pt. 1, 1 Jul. 1965, p. 21.

Such aspirations can be expressed in many ways. President Johnson has said, "As a nation and as a people, world peace is our fixed star and our first goal."[22]

Perhaps the Preamble to the Constitution still eloquently establishes the aims of the United States when it explains the reasoning behind its adoption as being, ". . . to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common Defence, promote the general Welfare and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity." Dean Rusk referred to the Preamble when he said of American foreign policy that, "Its central objective is our national safety and well-being--to 'secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity'."[23] This supports the theory that "States generally seek self-preservation or security above all. They regard survival as their paramount interest."[24]

Many other pronouncements have been uttered setting forth the aims and aspirations of the American people. The last lines of Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, Wilson's First Inaugural Address in 1913, Truman's address to the Congress on 12 March 1947 announcing what came to be known as the Truman Doctrine, Kennedy's State of the Union Message in 1963, and many others all express the national

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[22]Lyndon B. Johnson, "Veterans Day, 1965, Proclamation 3676," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 1, 4 Oct. 1965, p. 332.

[23]Dean Rusk, "The Control of Force in International Relations," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 52, 10 May 1965, p. 695.

[24]Vernon Van Dyke, International Politics, p. 29.

purpose in a variety of ways. It could be argued that this nation has no specific national purpose as there is no one single document that officially sets forth such a purpose. However, the utterances of our Presidents provide the necessary rededication to the aspirations of our forefathers as given in the Preamble to the Constitution and serve as the contemporary purpose to which the United States is committed. President Johnson summarized these contemporary goals aptly when he said:

> We seek peace.
>
> We seek freedom.
>
> We seek to enrich the life of man.[25]

In this chapter, the foundation upon which to develop one possible approach to the understanding of the meaning of "win" has been laid. Examined were the cold war arena with its variety of international conflicts, the constraints imposed upon objectives and policies because of the nature of the cold war setting, the infeasibility of achieving complete and final victory in the cold war itself, and finally the overall national purpose to which Americans aspire and which serves as the ultimate guiding light for objectives and policies. It is with such a foundation and background that the development of a "win" philosophy can next be attempted.

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[25]Lyndon B. Johnson, State of the Union Message, 4 Jan. 1965, p. 4.

CHAPTER 3

# THE MAXIMIZATION APPROACH

> As war is no act of blind passion, but is dominated by the political object, therefore the value of that object determines the measures of the sacrifices by which it is to be purchased.[1]
>
> --Karl von Clausewitz

The infeasibility of obtaining total victory in the cold war should not convey the impression that no victory is feasible--far from it. The problem is to develop a theory of "win" which provides for an acceptable victory short of total and yet insures the maximum advancement toward the achievement of the goals inherent in the national purpose of the country.

## THEORY OF MAXIMIZATION

A second view of the national purpose may prove beneficial in the search for such a theory. As enduring aspirations, "peace," "freedom," "domestic tranquility," "security," and the like are not subjective in nature. They are broad goals for which the nation constantly strives, but which "can almost never be perfectly attained."[2] As poet Archibald MacLeish once reflected, ". . . freedom is never an accomplished fact. It is always a process."[3]

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[1]Karl von Clausewitz, On War, p. 21.

[2]David S. McLellan, and others, The Theory and Practice of International Politics, p. 2.

[3]Archibald MacLeish, "National Purpose," Life, Vol. 48, Pt. II, 30 May 1960, p. 93.

The very difficulty in interpreting the meaning and applicability of such aspirations in a specific situation much less in the whole context of international relations makes the concept of victory, based on the achievement of these goals, most elusive.

However, this elusiveness leads to an insight to the meaning of "win" in a lesser included facet of the international scene of cold war. For if, in the conduct of cold war activities, advancement is made toward the achievement of the nation's remote, ultimate goals, is not the nation following a "winning" course of action? In other words, should the results of aggregate cold war conflicts be interpreted to show a gain in the overall course of events, can it not be said that the nation is winning? Certainly, it would seem so. For with total victory infeasible of grasping and national goals fuzzy and remote, the best that can be hoped for is to chart a course toward the goals and accept progress toward their achievement as the measure of success. Progress is the key to this concept of "winning." The status quo is not good enough. As Dean Rusk said recently, "We have not only to put out fires, as they break out, but also to try to build a more fireproof structure--a more secure world."[4]

Of course, it would be desirable to achieve the maximum progress possible or, in Rusk's terms, construct as nearly as possible

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[4]Dean Rusk, "The Anatomy of Foreign Policy Decisions," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 53, 27 Sep. 1965, p. 504.

a completely "fireproof structure." Put another way, it would be advantageous to maximize the gains toward national goals. However, it must be recognized that certain restrictions and limitations are inherent in any maximization process. It is this maximization of the progression toward national goals to the extent feasible under the restraint of reality which will be developed and analyzed in this and succeeding chapters. It will represent an approach to answering the question "What does it mean to win in the Cold War?"

## GAIN-LOSS SPECTRUM

A key to the implementation of the theory is the determination of what is feasible. As has been pointed out, it would seem infeasible to achieve a total win in the cold war as such a win directly concerns the loser's vital interests and would likely threaten his survival. This in turn would in all probability project the conflict beyond the cold war environment. As an international lawyer, Roger Fisher, points out:

> A goal of winning the cold war suggests that the major task at hand is for the good guys to beat the bad guys. But that is not true. The fact that we are strongly opposed to having the Communist take over and run the free world does not mean that we want to take over and run the Communist world.
>
> . . . In this struggle our first and immediate objective is survival--survival for ourselves, for other free peoples, and for our political way of life. We cannot afford to lose. But the overall contest is one which we should not expect to 'win'; no permanent victory is in sight.[5]

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[5]Roger Fisher, "Do We Want to 'Win' the Cold War?," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 18, Jan. 1962, p. 33.

This is not to say that substantial gains cannot be achieved in the cold war. Gains can be achieved as a result of favorable resolution of individual cold war conflicts and an aggregate gain can be realized as an end result of many such conflicts. This aggregate gain is what propels a nation toward achievement of the ultimate goals. The process must be viewed as a spectrum.

To give some dimension to this spectrum, a base line will be established which will be designated the "Threshold of Win." If this threshold is crossed and risen above, a nation, by its actions, has successfully entered the "Gain Zone." If after an analysis of the results achieved, it is determined that the nation is below the "Threshold of Win," it is considered to be in the "Loss Zone." Should the unusual situation occur in which a conflict results in neither loss nor gain, then the nation is standing on the "Threshold of Win" and possibly could go either way at some later time. This could be termed the "Neutral Zone." However, it is a theoretical position only and will not be considered further in the practical application of the concept of "winning" under examination. Although it is theoretically feasible to terminate a conflict in the "Neutral Zone," for practical purposes it is not. Valuation placed on results are imprecise judgment values of national leaders not finite mathematical values. To end up with an exact balance of gains and losses which would place the result in the "Neutral Zone" would be highly unlikely. Additionally, in a situation that is so close that a minor judgment value could tip the scale, it would seem that the

mere fact that the "Threshold of Win" was reached could be considered as a gain. In any event, it will be so considered in the remainder of this paper.

In this visualization, many variations are possible. A nation at the start of a conflict could be in the "Gain Zone" and move through the "Threshold of Win" to the "Loss Zone." The accomplishments of the North Koreans in the Korean War would seem to fit this pattern. In the case of the South Koreans, the reverse was true. It probably now could be argued that after the war's end they both ended up on the "Threshold of Win." In other cases, nations can begin and end in one of the zones with relative positions therein improving, diminishing, or remaining unchanged. For example, the United States has consistently been successful in preventing admission of Red China to the United Nations, but the margin of victory has been decreasing. There are, of course, numerous other variations and examples. However, it quickly should become apparent that there is an important consideration involved in making such gain and loss determinations. That is the valuation placed on individual results of any given conflict for any given period of time. But, before getting to a discussion of measuring gains and losses, more need be said concerning the "Gain-Loss Spectrum."

The critical part of the spectrum, of course, is the base line--the "Threshold of Win." Its position generally will determine whether an achieved result is in the "Gain" or "Loss Zone." Although it can be defined in many ways, some of which could place

it inordinately high or disastrously low, it shall be moderately established for purposes of this thesis and defined as the minimum acceptable result to be achieved from any conflict or in the overall cold war itself. If this result is not achieved, a loss is incurred. If it is achieved, then the "Gain Zone" is entered. The minimum acceptable result does not represent an absolute win. If the result projects a nation well beyond the threshold, a greater gain and thereby more of a victory is achieved. It would seem to follow that a major thrust into the "Gain Zone" might achieve total victory. However, the infeasibility of such an occurrence in the cold war has already been established. Although the constraint of no total victory prevents the establishment of a finite ceiling to the spectrum of win, it does at the same time impose some limitations to the degree of victory sought and achieved.[6] These together with other constraints and limitations lead to a system of measuring gains and losses in given conflict situations which is the crux of the entire maximization process.

## VARIETY OF COMBINATIONS

Returning to the problem of weighing the gains and losses, there are many factors to consider when trying to arrive at a final firm valuation for any one conflict or series of conflicts. Some of these are attributed to the fact that there are numerous

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[6]Clausewitz, op. cit., p. 575.

combinations of results possible from cold war conflicts. Even when reducing the number of conflicting parties to two, and identifying losses and gains in only three categories--substantial, moderate, and negligible--the hypothetical possibilities total 36. These different combinations are depicted in the chart at Annex C. Without determining the feasibility or probability of any of these occurring, certain important conclusions may be drawn from an analysis of the combinations.

First, it is obvious that not all of the possibilities represent a direct gain and loss relationship between opponents. In other words, a large gain for one is not automatically a large loss for the other. Neither does a gain of any dimension for one represent a corresponding loss of any sort for another. In fact, there are situations in which both sides gain and those in which both sides lose. The syndicated columnist of the New York Times, James Reston, recently made this point when in discussing the problem of containing Communist Chinese power in Asia, he said, ". . . in this struggle, the Soviet Union may not always be the enemy but may in some cases, as in the Indian-Pakistani war, be an ally."[7] In determining the gain and loss balance between the United States and Russia in such a situation, both could achieve a gain or both a loss depending upon the outcome. This does not mean that the value of

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[7]James Reston, "Asian Conflicts Forcing New Look at US Policies," Congressional Record, Vol. III, 1 Oct. 1965, p. A5621.

the gain or loss is comparable for both, but merely that it is possible for both to be in the same zone of the "Gain-Loss Spectrum."

Thus, it cannot always be assumed that one or both of the opponents will try to minimize the gain of the other. Nor can it be assumed that one opponent will try always to do his worst to the other. This points up the fallacy of a constant "minimax" strategy which assumes such conditions and calls for minimizing the maximum loss an opponent can inflict or maximizing the gain the opponent is trying to minimize. Such a concept is applicable when the interests of the opponents are directly opposed and the gain of one is equal to the loss of the other or when the situation is vague and one or both opponents decide to "play it safe" and assume the worst.[8]

When surveying the various hypothetical possibilities in Annex C, it is apparent that the situations which may be termed the most critical are those wherein one opponent achieves a substantial gain at the expense of the other. Conversely, in periods of mutual loss and mutual gain, conditions appear ripe for detente. However, such broad generalizations, not to mention specific application of the maximization approach, are meaningless unless some measure is applied to the scale and some value is determined for the degrees of gain and loss. Thus, the factors which affect these determinations will be discussed next.

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[8]Charles J. Hitch, and Roland N. McKean, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age, Appendix by Alain C. Enthoven, pp. 403-404.

## VALUE DETERMINATION

One of the prime factors is the scope and extent of the conflict being analyzed. Each of the numerous types of conflicts being waged in the cold war arena represents an important piece in the entire scene; however, the degree of importance varies markedly. Some issues may actually be of a peripheral nature in which sharp gains or losses may well be blunted by their very insignificance in the whole realm of events. It could well be that a total loss is sustained; but, the loss is bearable if the objective was unimportant and the effort expended in pursuit of the objective was small. For, as Clausewitz points out, ". . . the less important our political object, the less will be the value we attach to it and the readier we shall be to abandon it. For this reason also our own efforts will be slighter."[9]

On the other hand, the issue might not be peripheral but of major proportions. If so, it can be expected that the ante will be raised and the stakes become higher. It is under such circumstances that major opponents roll up their sleeves, world tensions increase, and containment of the conflict within the cold war boundaries becomes threatened. For when a conflict develops over an issue of major significance, not only the gain or loss that feasibly could result from the conflict is at stake, but also the

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[9]Clausewitz, op. cit., p. 9.

entire balance of the cold war issue itself. It is important to note "that the United States and the Soviet Union weigh losses and gains according to their effect upon the bipolar balance."[10]

Thus, it is the overall balance of gains and losses from the cold war conflicts that is of utmost concern. Such realization permits a country to accept minimum gains and even losses in certain conflict situations which do not seriously affect the cold war balance. This is an important concession, for as one political scientist put it:

> It is unrealistic for any country to expect that it can impose solutions which reflect only gain for its own position. Indeed, the task of statesmanship is often to 'cut one's losses' and accept the least of several evils.[11]

As another author expressed it, "There are even situations where losing is the best strategy in the long run."[12]

This introduces the subjects of gain and loss longevity and the type of objective being sought. In assessing the result of any conflict situation, not only should the immediate balance of gain and loss be considered, but also the effect on the achievement of ultimate aims should be determined. Gains in the immediate time frame do not necessarily result in ultimate gains nor do immediate losses always represent ultimate losses. The long range objectives

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[10]Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Stability of a Bipolar World," Daedalus, Vol. 93, Summer 1964, p. 903.

[11]McLellan, and others, op. cit., p. 3.

[12]Alfred R. Maxwell, "This World Strategy," Air University Quarterly Review, Vol. 7, Spring 1954, p. 74.

inherent in the national purpose are the important goals toward which the country points its effort. The fact that these are necessarily broad and imprecise admittedly makes the task more difficult,[13] but it does not detract from their preeminence. Neither does such impreciseness make the substitution of short range, clear-cut, definitive objectives any more desirable. These have a definite place in the immediate time frame and in the pursuit of limited goals. However, they may support but should not replace the nebulous objectives deduced from the enduring aspirations of the people.

Another factor which affects the determination of gain-loss values is the relation of the power elements being measured. As has been pointed out, the cold war involves the utilization of many elements of national power--military, political, economic, psycho-social, and the like. In any given situation, of course, the total end product of gain or loss is the significant feature. The difficulty lies in weighting the relative importance of each of the elements for the particular situation within a certain time frame.

Drawing out only the military and political elements as examples, the famous maxim of Clausewitz that ". . . war is . . . a real political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, a carrying out of the same by other means,"[14] would seem to provide

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[13]Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet, pp. 80-83.
[14]Clausewitz, op. cit., p. 16.

a guage for relative measurement. However, this guide is not always recognized or followed. At the end of World War II, General Omar Bradley recalled the British propensity for injecting this political primacy philosophy, but in assessing the United States military position he said, "As soldiers we looked naively on this British inclination to complicate the war with political foresight and nonmilitary objectives."[15] On the other hand, Robert Osgood theorizes that:

> To subordinate military operations to political considerations might mean sacrificing the military success indispensable for the attainment of any worthwhile national purpose at all. Therefore, in practice, military necessities and the fortunes of war may determine the nature of the feasible political choices, and the subordination of certain political considerations to military requirements may be the necessary condition for avoiding defeat.[16]

Thus, the weighting process is not a fixed one, but must be determined for each conflict situation in the cold war arena. There is no numerical value that can be assigned. The judgment is a subjective one in each case. But the point here is that specific consideration must be given to the weighting process.

When all of these previous judgments are being appraised, other factors present themselves in the form of questions. What response will the enemy make? To what degree is he willing to escalate the scale of conflict? What risks is he willing to accept?

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[15]Omar N. Bradley, A Soldier's Story, p. 536.
[16]Robert E. Osgood, Limited War, p. 23.

What risks are we willing to accept? How about costs? These and many similar questions bring into focus two major factors which lurk in the background of every decision to follow a "winning" philosophy which is expected to move the results of a conflict into the "Gain Zone." These factors are risks and costs.

In the instance of risks, it need be determined what risks are involved in any conflict situation and what risks are willingly accepted. Risks may involve escalation to an unacceptable level of conflict within the cold war arena, escalation of the cold war to a major limited war or general war, and inability to achieve stated objectives. In analyzing the acceptability of such risks, a calculation is made concerning what Glenn Snyder, a political scientist, calls the "balance of intentions."[17] Just how prepared are the opponents to perforate the boundaries of the cold war arena and risk the advent of nuclear destruction? This, of course, involves a measurement of the willingness and resolve of the nations to pursue given objectives. However, willingness and resolve are not measured in a vacuum. Simultaneous consideration must be given to the costs involved.

The costs of achieving gains in a specific conflict situation may be considered in several different ways. They may include: reduced abilities to fully realize domestic objectives, loss of

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[17]Glenn H. Snyder, "Deterrence and Power," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 4, Jun. 1961, p. 165.

opportunities in other cold war situations, failure to achieve full potential of all elements of national power, loss of prestige, loss of honor, and the like. There are more objective costs such as those measured in terms of men, money, and material.

Additionally, costs must be analyzed in more than one way. Not only should an assessment be made concerning the costs involved in following a particular course of action with its inherent risks, but also the costs involved if the course of action is not followed. Dean Rusk emphasized this in a recent telecast when asked by a news analyst a question concerning the evaluating and weighing of the costs of honor in the Vietnam conflict, he replied:

> Well, let me say that you also weigh the costs of dishonor, that is the failure of an American commitment. . . .
>
> No, there are costs involved in meeting your commitments of honor. There always have been, there always will be. But I would suggest, if we look at the history of the last 30 to 40 years, that the costs of not meeting your obligations are far greater than those of meeting your obligations.[18]

Such costs together with the risks are weighed and considered. In theory, the risks are compared to the stakes involved. In the end, if the costs do not exceed the advantages of victory, the risk is taken.[19]

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[18]Dean Rusk, and Robert S. McNamara, "Political and Military Aspects of US Policy in Viet-Nam," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 53, 30 Aug. 1965, p. 344.

[19]Walter J. Dabros, "The Credibility of the Deterrent and Its Implications for NATO," United States Naval Proceedings, Vol. 91, Jul. 1965, p. 28.

So far, various factors which directly affect the determination of the values of gains and losses in the cold war environment have been discussed, but still no real dimension has been established. What is required is some measure of the importance of the values involved in the conflict itself--some guide which will assist in deciding the value of the gain or loss, the worth of the costs, the significance of the risks, and the impact on the whole scene. The last factor to be discussed is considered the key element in fulfilling this requirement. It is the involvement of the vital national interest.

Whenever in a conflict situation the vital interest of one nation is involved in the ultimate decision, it can be assumed that the stakes are high and the risks involved to that nation are worth the taking. In other words, the value of success far outweighs the costs incurred. Thus, the risks will be taken and the costs borne in pursuit of objectives in which vital interests are at stake. In such cases it can be assumed that not just the one or more conflict situations in which such interests are at stake are involved, but the whole arena of cold war conflict and the whole balance of world power. Thus, successful pursuit of the aims expressed in the national purpose is likewise involved.

There are no quantitative measurement terms that can be applied to the degree of vital interest that is involved. There are no such terms that are applicable to the resultant gains or losses in vital interest situations. Judgment is completely subjective. A gain

which would seem relatively small in another situation could prove to be substantial in a vital interest situation. A relatively small loss could prove to be unacceptable. The measurement of gains and losses is most critical when the vital interests of both conflicting parties are threatened. In such cases, neither is willing to sustain a loss, but neither can logically expect a significant comparative gain. However, in measurement process, a slight gain may in fact be viewed as one of substantial importance when considered in light of what can be accomplished and what costs and risks are involved.

The important thing in the conflicts involving vital interests is not to lose. The objectives established for achievement in these conflicts are generally more demanding than in nonvital interest "battles." The "Threshold of Win" base line is shifted upward in the "Gain-Loss Spectrum" which means that the minimum acceptable result is more than would normally be expected in situations not involving the vital national interest. By such shifting, the significance of the outcome is automatically increased, the degree of any gain is high, and the cost of losing is great.

Thus, in measuring results of a conflict, a determination must first be made as to whether the vital interest of either opponent is involved. If so, the stakes are high, as are the risks. The costs of "winning" may be great, but not as great as the cost of "losing." The scope of the individual conflict broadens to encompass the entire cold war arena and immediate and long-range

objectives merge. All elements of national power are measured with the political element not always retaining its usual position of primacy.[20] Gains and losses are measured relatively with slight shifts in either direction taking on great importance.

If the determination is made that vital interests are not involved, the stakes generally are not as high. Risks may or may not be high, but they normally are unacceptable if they are high. Costs of gains may be substantial, but the costs of losing are less. The scope of the conflict can generally be confined to the conflict area itself and immediate objectives can be distinguished from the objectives deduced from a country's enduring aspirations. All elements of national power are measured, but in this case the political element retains its normal position of primacy.[21] Large gains and losses relatively can be sustained without disruption of balance.

## APPLICATION OF THE APPROACH

As a form of summary for this chapter, the "Maximization Approach" will be applied to the contemporary cold war arena with emphasis on its impact on the philosophy of "winning."

In the current East-West cold war conflict the United States cannot hope to "win" in the sense that it together with its allies

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[20] Osgood, op. cit., pp. 24-25.
[21] Ibid.

will achieve a total victory over Soviet Russia, the People's Republic of China, and Communist Bloc countries. An approach to such a victory would jeopardize the survival of these nations, and for that matter the Communist ideology, to such an extent that general war would be expected to ensue. Consequently, without a total victory objective, the United States must adopt another approach to the cold war conflicts which accepts results to an extent less than total and recognizes that the achievement of gains toward the long-range national purpose objectives represents a philosophy of "winning." It should also be recognized that this is a dynamic philosophy, not one calling for the status quo.

Within this philosophy the maximization occurs when the United States attempts to achieve the greatest gain that is realistic, feasible, and desirable. However, it is this determination of what is realistic, feasible, and desirable that presents the real problem. Each conflict must be viewed with reference to the relation it plays in the overall stream of events. Some weighting of the degree of importance must be accomplished and then objectives established, policies and plans developed, and resources allocated comparable to the effort called for by the conflict's weighted importance. The weighting is a judgment decision by the nation's leaders, but has as its basis the relative impact that gains and losses resulting from each conflict might have on moving towards the achievement of long-range national aims. The key element in such determination is the involvement of the vital interest of the

country. When it is determined that a nation's vital interest is at stake, then the significance of the results of a conflict is substantial. As President Johnson said of the conflict in Vietnam, "If we are driven from the field in Viet-Nam, then no nation can ever again have the same confidence in American promise or in American protection."[22] Thus, the stakes in that conflict are high. Vital interests are involved. Gains and losses can be substantial. The risks are also great. These risks can limit the scope of the gains or losses achieved, but not their significance. Secretary Rusk recognized the inherent risks in discussing the limited objectives sought in Vietnam when he remarked: ". . . it is not a part of our desire to turn these difficult and mean and frustrating issues into general war. That is the easiest thing to think of and the easiest thing to do."[23]

And so the weighing process is accomplished. What is the minimum objective in Vietnam that, if achieved, will be considered acceptable? An answer to this question would establish the "Threshold of Win." Then the question should be asked, "How much can be achieved within the limits of acceptable costs and risks?" An answer to this question establishes an objective which may be considered realistic, feasible, and desirable. The development and implementation of policies and programs aimed at the achievement of

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[22]Lyndon B. Johnson, "We Will Stand in Viet-Nam," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 53, 16 Aug. 1965, p. 263.

[23]Rusk, and McNamara, op. cit., p. 350.

such an objective would constitute a maximization approach and a "winning" philosophy. As Presidential candidate Barry Goldwater said in regards to achieving political victory in the cold war, "In the final analysis the choice is not: yield, or fight a nuclear war. It is: win, or fight a nuclear war."[24]

There is still that problem of defining "win" however, when analyzing such a statement. In the "Maximization Approach," it would mean achieving the maximum gain possible within the established limits of risks and costs. With this philosophy, each cold war conflict would be approached. In some cases, such as reversal of the United States position on United Nations member payments for peacekeeping operations, losses would be sustained and accepted. In others, losses may be grudgingly sustained. In those cases, such as the Cuban missile crises, where a vital national interest is involved and a loss of any degree might prove disastrous, the "Threshold of Win" is high, the risk of escalation to nuclear war is worth the taking, the cost of achieving the established objective is less than the cost of failure, and a final gain is essential. As these conflicts and crises come and go, their influence on the cold war balance is registered. In the long run if the balance indicates a trend of progress toward the achievement of the national aims, then the country is "winning" the cold war. As Walt

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[24]Barry Goldwater, "Goldwater: 'How to Win the Cold War'," New York Times Magazine, 17 Sep. 1961, p. 102.

Rostow, Chairman of the Department of State Policy Planning Council, has said, "The victory we desire is a victory for the fundamental principles of national independence and human freedom. . . ."[25] This is a long-range aim.

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[25]Walt W. Rostow, "US Policy in a Changing World," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 51, 2 Nov. 1964, p. 640.

# CHAPTER 4

## EVALUATION OF THE APPROACH

> It is unrealistic to assume that history is static and that we are doomed to repeat failures of the past. But the hard-won lesson of a generation's hazardous experience is that our powder should be kept dry. An awareness of the truly revolutionary character of the ultimate issues--and an awareness also of the undiminished, even gathering strength and vitality of the West and its values--should give us the poise to be patient.[1]
>
> --Walt W. Rostow

Having developed the theory and philosophy of the "Maximization Approach" to the subject of "winning," and discussing its utilization in the contemporary environment of the cold war, it is well that the approach be evaluated and the major advantages and disadvantages be highlighted before drawing any final conclusions on its workability. It is, therefore, the purpose of this chapter to develop those specific merits of the approach which favor its adoption and those major problem areas which are significant enough to detract materially from its effectiveness unless measures are taken to overcome them. From the examination of the factors favoring adoption and the existing limitations, the conclusions in Chapter 5 will be drawn.

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[1]Walt W. Rostow, "The Third Round," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 42, Oct. 1963, p. 10.

## MERITS

One of the first contributions of the "Maximization Approach" which supports its usefulness is the insight it provides to the limitations of cold war conflicts. It recognizes that the immediate objectives sought are somewhat less than are traditionally ascribed for total victory while at the same time acknowledging the broad scope of the war itself. It establishes general war, and in certain instances a form of limited war, as the boundary of the cold war arena which opposing nations recognize. It is this self-restriction which limits the degree of victory that can be achieved within the confines of the cold war and requires a reappraisal of the traditional concept of a "winning" philosophy. One authority analyzes the situation as follows:

> The cold war is neither war nor peace in the orthodox sense, but a continuing struggle for power, waged by political, psychological, and economic means as well as by a variety of military and semimilitary means. There is no way of fighting the cold war to a clear-cut decision without precipitating a total war; but the American people know that total war with nuclear weapons would be an incredible disaster and that the enemy may never offer the provocation for such a war. In the meantime, the United States is forced to consider the means to protect and promote its farflung interests against unrelenting Communist pressure and the ever-present possibility of limited war. Therefore, in some measure the United States has had to alter its traditional approach to war. . . .[2]

In its recognition of these conditions, the "Maximization Approach" is realistic.

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[2]Robert E. Osgood, Limited War, p. 44.

It is also flexible. Rigid objectives which are not subject to adjustment are not required in the implementation of the approach. The adjustment of objectives to the changing values of costs and risks associated with every cold war conflict is inherent in its application. The establishment of a "Gain Zone" in lieu of a single concrete objective permits such flexibility without altering the nation's pursuit of a "winning" philosophy. In considering objectives, one author points out:

> . . . a limited objective that is spelled out in concrete terms is capable of achievement; an imprecise and absolute objective tends instead to involve the state seeking it in continuous inconclusive struggle. The promotion of national ideology, the enhancement of national prestige, the augmentation of national power: these are absolutist objectives that attract controversy because of their very lack of rational content and clearly defined limits.[3]

The point in question is the type of objective being considered. The "Maximization Approach" visualizes the utilization of the "absolutist" objectives as long-range goals derived from the nation's national purpose which form the basis for action in the cold war environment. With these as guideposts, more specific and, if appropriate, concrete limited objectives can be formulated for achievement in individual cold war conflicts. These latter objectives, though, should be readily adjusted as the need arises without incurring a psychological fear that such adjustment will be construed as a retreat from victory. By maximizing efforts to

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[3]Charles O. Lerche, Principles of International Politics, p. 138.

achieve that which is feasibly attainable within self-prescribed constraints, a nation can provide itself with such flexibility.

In a similar vein, another advantage of the approach is the scope of its outlook. It not only views the cold war as a many-faceted conflict ranging from political debates in the United Nations to limited war in Vietnam, but it also places it in long-range perspective. Each conflict is not seen as another crises to be dealt with in absence of relation to those that preceded or may follow or with no view to the future impact of the results. On the contrary, the system of measuring all gains and losses to insure a favorable long-range trend insures the proper balance of effort for each conflict in the overall arena.

Such consideration provides a satisfactory way of countering Communist strategy which is explained by William Kintner, a military strategist, as follows:

> The Communist assault on the West operates almost entirely on a time axis, since it requires time for the impact of a series of events to change the attitudes of people toward this or that conflict issue. The Communists are willing to temporize and to play for small advantages, each of which is calculated to erode the will to resist. Communist strategy is multi-dimensional. Pursuits which Western peoples look upon as those of peace are regularly employed by the Communists as tools of war. Under cover of the umbrella of Soviet military power, the Communists probe into troubled areas of the non-Communist world, seeking to exploit situations which are difficult to check militarily.[4]

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[4]William R. Kintner, "The Politicalization of Strategy," Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 49, Apr. 1965, p. 24.

Additionally, such consideration assists in the proper application of the various elements of national power. In conjunction with the realization that something less than total victory is an acceptable objective, this permits utilization of the power elements to the degree deemed appropriate without regard or concern for totality of application unless such is desirable. Thus, the "Maximization Approach" is selective in its implementation.

Selectivity is likewise gained by adoption of the included philosophy that even within the less than total victory objective established, it is not a feasible course to expect to win always and win everything. There are times when losing is necessary and even desirable. The approach acknowledges this and attempts to minimize the loss incurred to the extent practicable. In a similar light is the realization that at times gains and losses may be jointly shared by opponents. Such situations can be capitalized upon by the adoption of flexible objectives as already discussed.

A further beneficial aspect of the "Maximization Approach" concerns its ability to deal with uncertainties. In pursuing cold war objectives and measuring results, uncertainties and incommensurables are diverse. To cope with this situation there are those who recommend the adoption of an "optimal strategy, which is that plan of action which secures . . . the best possible outcome no matter what the opponent does."[5] As Henry Kissinger,

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[5]Oskar Morgenstern, The Question of National Defense, p. 76.

another military strategist, reflects: "Now as before, in our impatience to realize grand designs we are often reluctant to admit that a statesman must concern himself with the worst--and not only the best--foreseeable contingency."[6] However, this poses a dilemma in planning; for, always considering the worst may result in a "do-nothing" strategy. Alain Enthoven, an Assistant Secretary of Defense, indicates that in the Department of Defense officials "make a conscious effort to evaluate alternative postures under a wide range of different hypothetical future circumstances and policies."[7] This is done to overcome the fashionable tendency, in cases of doubt, to "overestimate one's opponent and underestimate one's own capabilities" which in fact is just as dangerous as underestimating "the enemy's capabilities relative to our own."[8] Mr. Enthoven offers the solution used in the Department of Defense in the evaluation of systems and strategies when he continues:

> Next, we have found that in case of uncertainty, it is often useful to carry three sets of factors through the calculations: an 'Optimistic' and a 'Pessimistic' estimate that bracket the range of uncertainty, and a 'Best Estimate' that has the highest likelihood.[9]

The utilization of the zone approach to maximizing a "win" accommodates this method of dealing with uncertainties. The

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[6]Henry A. Kissinger, "The Illusionist: Why We Misread de Gaulle," Harper's, Vol. 230, Mar. 1965, p. 73.

[7]Alain C. Enthoven, Economic Analysis in the Department of Defense, pp. 15-16.

[8]Ibid., p. 14.

[9]Ibid.

"Threshold of Win" could be made to correspond to Enthoven's "Pessimistic" estimate. The determination of the greatest gain that feasibly could be achieved would relate to the "Optimistic" estimate. Then, between these extremes, the "Best" estimate can be made, objectives established, and plans implemented with confidence that the successful achievement of the stated objectives would fall within the "Gain Zone" and thus be contributing to an overall cold war philosophy of "win."

An inherent uncertainty in this process, as well as in every other policy, is the degree of enemy reaction to the implemented policy. This is specially difficult to assess when considering the deterrent effect of programs or strategies. As one author summarizes the problem:

> In a very abstract nutshell, the potential aggressor presumably is deterred from a military move not simply when his expected cost exceeds his expected gain but when the net gain is less or the net cost more than he expects when he refrains from the move.[10]

The "Maximization Approach" not only provides a method for developing one's own "winning" strategy but also can be utilized for the analysis of enemy alternatives and intentions. This would include taking into account the possibility that the enemy might act irrationally which might ". . . take the form either of failing to act in accordance with /his/ best estimate of costs, gains,

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[10]Glenn H. Snyder, "Deterrence and Power," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 4, Jun. 1960, p. 166.

and probabilities, or of faulty calculation of these factors in the light of evidence available."[11]

In confronting another problem, the "Maximization Approach" is useful in establishing "winning" objectives and policies with regard to nonenemy nations of the world. The difficulty of maintaining a more rigid philosophy of assessing gains in cold war activities in which these nations are in some manner involved is deduced from a recent statement of Dean Rusk in which he pointed out:

> In an average year there are 30 or 40 changes of government in the world--and not all of them through orderly processes--and many of these will you may be sure, run contrary to our own expectations or perhaps even hopes.[12]

By virtue of its adaptability, the "Maximization Approach" can account for such changes, assess the results, and place each one in its proper perspective.

A final advantage is derived from the method employed of utilizing vital national interests as an essential tool among others for developing perspective. It serves as the measurement guide, however imprecise, for balancing gains and losses with risks and costs in the short term. It assists in the determination of the relative worth of each conflict in the cold war arena. Without such a measurement guide, assessment of the impact of each conflict

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[11] Ibid., p. 174.

[12] Dean Rusk, "Guidelines of US Foreign Policy," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 52, 28 Jun. 1965, p. 1031.

on the maintenance of a "winning" trend toward achievement of long-range goals would be indeed difficult.

In short, the maximization process provides a positive and dynamic philosophy in considering the problem of "winning" the cold war and defining the scope of that task.

## PROBLEMS

One of the first problems that presents itself in the implementation of the "Maximization Approach" to a "win" philosophy is the difficulty encountered in identifying the nation's vital interests. All conflict situations do not directly involve these interests. In the international arena of cold war virtually all conflicts can be construed to have some relation to the national interests of the United States, but not all affect the vital interests. The key, of course, is the word vital. What does it mean?

There can be no uncompromising definition of vital interests. Such interests can vary as do short range objectives and can be as nebulous as the long-range ones. What might be construed as a vital interest today may well prove to be of insignificant value in the future. Any definition devised would present a problem of interpretation when applied to a given cold war situation. For example, if it were determined that the United States vital interest was defined to include any situation in which the security or survival of the United States was endangered or in which progress

toward the achievement of national objectives was prevented, most conflicts in the cold war environment could be included. If an attempt was made to further qualify the statement by saying that vital interest situations included those in which security or survival was greatly endangered or in which progress was materially prevented, then a definition problem would exist in regards to the words "greatly" and "materially." The problem of degree would have been introduced.

Actually, there is no satisfactory, pat definition of vital interest that can escape the difficulty of interpretation. This, of course, presents a problem in using vital interests as a major measurement tool in the process of maximizing gains. Reliance must be placed on the professional and skilled judgment of those in positions of authority in the United States Government to accomplish the proper determination of vital interests in relation to the circumstances involved, if in fact, vital interests are involved. This is no different than is normally expected in any high level decision-making process. The point is, however, that once a vital interest has been determined to be associated with a given situation, then the "Maximization Approach" visualizes that it will become the primary tool in establishing objectives, determining the "Threshold of Win," and in measuring resulting gains or losses. Elmer Plischke alludes to the implementation of such a usage of the vital interest when he says, ". . . I deem it essential to forget about winning the cold war and concentrating

on identifying the 'battles' that are vital to this country and doing all that is necessary to win them."[13]

The fact that the identification of the nation's vital interests is not an exact science leads to other problems of a similar nature. One of these is the difficulty associated with the establishment of minimum acceptable and maximum possible objectives. Here again the process is highly subjective. A key element is the estimation of the enemy's capability in relation to one's own. As mentioned earlier, Alain Enthoven points out, ". . . there seems to be a widespread belief that the safe thing to do, in cases of doubt, is to overestimate one's opponent and underestimate one's own capabilities." He goes on to say that:

> . . . it is just as dangerous to overestimate the enemy's capabilities relative to our own as it is to underestimate them. Over estimates do not necessarily lead to insurance and safety. They are just as likely to lead to despair, to pricing important policy objectives out of the market, and to strategies of desperation.[14]

It will be recalled that Enthoven's solution in cases of uncertainty is to use the "Optimistic," "Pessimistic," and "Best" estimate approach. But even in this identification there is uncertainty, and a high degree of subjective judgment is required.

The difficulty is amplified by the necessity to consider the possibility of the enemy nation acting irrationally by attempting "to increase its own welfare or security . . . without regard to

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[13]Elmer Plischke, National Objectives, 20 Aug. 1965, pp. 16-17.
[14]Enthoven, op. cit., p. 14.

the security or welfare of others."[15] Or, an enemy might make an irrational response to an action by the United States if his vital interests are at stake. In addition, it can be assumed that the enemy will have the same difficulty in assessing our capabilities and intentions and might thereby miscalculate the true goals that we desire to achieve. It is often difficult to relate the correct interpretation of United States objectives to the enemy. Such possibilities must be taken into account when developing a spectrum of objectives.

The problems relating to the selection of objectives are manifold. As the long-range goals derived from the national purpose are not clear-cut and definitive, there is difficulty in converting these into useful tools for short-range use. Reversing the view, it is difficult to reconcile immediate and short-range objectives designed to cope with current conflict situations in the cold war with the long-range goals. This leads to the criticism that "basic national security policies are so broad and general in character that they provide inadequate guidelines for the development of forces and resources, and almost no direction for the employment of these means. . . ."[16] This critical reference relates primarily to the military, but is equally applicable to the other power elements. It is not within the scope of this thesis to

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[15]Morton Deutsch, "Some Considerations Relevant to National Policy," Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 17, p. 58.

[16]Kintner, op. cit., p. 25.

determine whether the designation of more definitive and less nebulous long-range goals is feasible. However, it would seem that the farther away a goal might be, the less definite its scope can be visualized. As was said earlier, some goals may never be reached. They merely indicate a direction in which to proceed. In any regard, there is a problem with which the decision-maker must contend. The "Maximization Approach" envisages the establishment of a spectrum of objectives for each situation which is designed to contribute to the ultimate goals. The difficulty in achieving the connection is recognized, but the effort is worthwhile. The alternative of operating in a vacuum is much less desirable.

The objectives problem is magnified by the frequent necessity to change immediate objectives. The frustration of not looking ahead to a specific, clear-cut, never-changing objective can be intense. However, circumstances change and so must objectives. A vital interest situation today may be inconsequential tomorrow. The weighing of gains and losses is thus a never-ending process with the basis for measurement constantly changing. The weighting of the results of a conflict situation is itself an inexact science, but, when the value of a given result frequently fluctuates, the overall problem of value determination and assessing degrees of gains and losses is that much more complicated.

There are still other problems generated by the acceptance of the "Maximization Approach" that are generally related to its

psychological impact at home and abroad. In the first place, the very flexibility and adaptability inherent within the approach might be construed as a sign of weakness and a lack of resolve not only by our friends but also by our enemies. The problem is magnified by the impreciseness of long-range goals as well as actual disagreement on the broadly defined goals that are established. Perhaps the lack of a single official ideology contributes to the situation. John Stoessinger, a political scientist, addresses this when he asserts:

> Ideology as a source of power is largely a monopoly of totalitarianism. A democracy may have goals or ideals but not an ideology. Since the very essence of a democracy is the principle of the right of disagreement on substantive goals, such a nation lacks the fanaticism and uniformity which lend an ideology its coherence and drive.[17]

This seeming lack of unity of purpose and existence of ambiguity of purpose might prove of comfort to the enemy.

A second problem in the psychological realm concerns itself with rationalization. An opportunity exists in the implementation of the "Maximization Approach" to rationalize one's failure to achieve the maximum gain possible by the manipulation of the factors involved in weighing risks and costs as well as gains and losses. The subjective judgments involved provide the occasion to seek lesser objectives that might still be considered within the "Gain Zone" in order to play a safer and less dynamic game

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[17]John G. Stoessinger, The Might of Nations, p. 29.

of cold war or to accommodate political expediency. Such utilization, of course, is not the purpose of the approach and would detract from its effectiveness and validity. In addition, an adverse psychological impact within the country and throughout the world might well result from such practices.

Adverse psychological impact in another form becomes a third problem area. The American public might be willing to accept the fact that total victory is no longer a feasible objective, particularly in the cold war environment. Some may argue that such acceptance has already been achieved. Robert Osgood in a BBC broadcast in 1962 indicated that:

> . . . we as Americans, did tend to look upon warfare in rather simple terms, as a crusade, and something to be fought all out, or not at all. However, I think that American public opinion has vastly changed since the time of the Korean war, and in fact we are in a mood to accept this much more subtle kind of military threat that is likely to exist in the next decade.[18]

However, the achievement of a gain less than the maximum possible within established constraints might prove less acceptable. The result might feasibly take the form of public reaction against such policies that lead to less than that which is achievable or might occasion public apathy and an eventual erosion of the country's will to win. Neither would be desirable from an Administration's point of view.

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[18]Anthony Moncrieff, ed., The Strategy of Survival, pp. 14-15.

A significant problem of public reaction is concerned with prestige. Charles Lerche presents the dimensions of the problem quite well in the following statement:

> At times of crisis, when popular attitudes are the most inflammed, states find it increasingly difficult to adopt acceptable compromise solutions to particular disputes because of the fear that anything less than complete victory might result in a loss of 'face.' Exactly what real loss to national interest would arise from a diminished prestige is seldom made clear even if it were certain that a lessened prestige would actually result from the settlement of a dispute upon a basis of give-and-take. The insistence upon considerations of prestige is such that statesmen often find themselves unable and unwilling to take the risk.[19]

Such reaction makes the implementation of the theory of maximization more difficult.

Another problem associated with the application of the "Maximization Approach" in the political and military fields is that the approach initially appears to be more adaptable to political than military usage. Broad long-range goals, adjustable short-range and immediate objectives, fluctuating degrees of national interest, uncertainties of risks and costs, and varying measurements of resultant values are familiar circumstances to the statesman dealing with international conflicts. But to the military leader, they are familiar only in so far as he is associated with the statesman. The soldier prefers and most often deals with

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[19]Lerche, op. cit., p. 54.

specifics within his own profession. Internally, the military is used to executing missions with clear-cut objectives. Achievement of these objectives spells victory. Something less than full achievement is something less than full victory. Objectives adjusted to unforeseen developments in the uncertainties of enemy and friendly reaction, risks and costs, and gains and losses are acceptable as interim goals, but eventual achievement of complete victory has been inbred in the military as the ultimate objective. The several setbacks of World War II were disconcerting, but did not result in a wavering from the ultimate "unconditional surrender" objective. Whether that objective was politically right or wrong is immaterial to the issue. The military subscribes to the Clausewitz thesis that war is merely an extension of "political intercourse," but in war's prosecution, whether cold or hot, it desires clear-cut objectives that can be relentlessly pursued.

General Maxwell Taylor alludes to this when he said, "Efficient administration in any field calls for sound advice, clear and timely decisions, and follow-up of the implementation of these decisions."[20]

A Rockefeller Brothers Special Studies Panel expressed the thought in the following manner:

> The task of statesmanship in the next decade must be to define with fresh clarity the purposes which

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[20]Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet, p. 83.

> the United States wishes to achieve. To this end it must reinterpret existing policies as well as devise new ones.[21]

However, applying this to the cold war is difficult. Dean Rusk referred to an objective of freedom when he said:

> There are those who believe that we ourselves should erect a solid wall between ourselves and the peoples of the Communist world--a wall of implacable hostility and rigidity, a wall through which the winds of freedom cannot blow. I would suggest that if we are seriously concerned about a victory for freedom and if we understand that this victory should come through peaceful process if possible, then no single phrase can describe an imaginative and productive policy toward those countries which call themselves Communist.[22]

As intimated, such an objective is difficult to express in concrete terms for relentless pursuit.

In view of the fact that the "Maximization Approach" accepts imprecise long-range objectives and frequently changing short-range and immediate objectives together with a varying scale of values for the measurement of achievement, and recognizes victory as something less than total, it might be expected that the military would be reluctant to support the approach. This, of course, would detract from its effectiveness.

In summary, certain primary advantages of the "Maximization Approach" have been highlighted and these, in turn, have been countered by a significant number of problem areas in which

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[21]Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Inc., Special Studies Project, The Mid-Century Challenge to US Foreign Policy, p. 72.

[22]Dean Rusk, "Toward Victory for Freedom," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 51, 5 Oct. 1964, p. 464.

certain disadvantages were developed. What then is the feasibility and applicability of the approach?

# CHAPTER 5

## CONCLUSIONS

> We did not choose to be the guardians at the gate, but there is no one else.[1]
>
> --Lyndon B. Johnson

As the ". . . guardians at the gate . . ." we find a need in the current cold war environment for a "winning" philosophy in order to accomplish the task implied in President Johnson's statement. With complete victory beyond our grasp, an acceptable substitute is necessary. It is concluded that the "Maximization Approach" fulfills this requirement.

The approach is not offered as a panacea, but rather as a realistic manner of assessing the results of cold war conflicts and determining their impact on the attainment of ultimate goals. The use of a zone concept for recognizing gains in these conflicts provides an acceptable alternative to the designation of a single objective for total victory. The concept of striving for the greatest possible gain consistent with the imposed constraints assures a proper philosophical approach.

However, it must be concluded also that in broadening the spectrum of a "win" philosophy, the results are apt to be less satisfying. Acceptance of something less than what some might

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[1]Lyndon B. Johnson, "We Will Stand in Viet-Nam," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 53, 16 Aug. 1965, p. 263.

consider as total victory may never prove popular. Nevertheless, it is realistic.

One military author defines this less than total approach to "win" when he says:

> To win may be to simply benefit from an improvement in one's own position--measured in subjective values--not necessarily at an adversary's expense. This may be accomplished by avoiding actions which could be mutually destructive, by minimizing the risk of actual war to obtain carefully circumscribed objectives while affording opponents a face-saving way out of a nuclear labyrinth.[2]

The "Maximization Approach" encompasses this concept. It recognizes that the national objectives are not always totalistic or unalterable.

In the national arena it is likely to be the military which is the least satisfied with this approach. When political objectives are "carefully circumscribed," they are apt to be limited and the military is inclined to feel it is under wraps. But, when political objectives are not "carefully circumscribed," they are apt to be broad and imprecise. In this event, the military task of deducing objectives and assessing results is made more difficult. However, these conditions are likely to persist. They, therefore, must be accommodated. The "Maximization Approach" makes the necessary accommodation by the utilization of both "absolutist" objectives for long-range goals and concrete limited objectives for specific cold war conflicts.

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[2]Thomas J. McDonald, JCS Politico-Military Desk Games, p. 6.

No attempt is contemplated to impose the approach within the military system with a view to replacing the traditional method of designating clear-cut objectives and judging accomplished missions as specific gains. Actually, the approach is designed for use at the highest levels of government. It is applicable to all governmental agencies involved in cold war activities. Top military leaders involved with political leaders in the national decision-making process would thereby be included.

The implementation of the "Maximization Approach" is not a simple process. However, the difficulties involved in identifying vital interests and measuring risks, costs, gains, and losses are outweighed by the advantages derived from adopting a feasible, realistic, and flexible method of pursuing a course in the cold war which brings the nation closer to the realization of the goals inherent in its national purpose.

Finally, it is concluded that the "Maximization Approach" incorporates a philosophy of "win" and can be utilized by political and military leaders alike in specific conflict situations to develop an answer to the question, "What does it mean to win?" in those situations.

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23. Huntington, Samuel P. The Common Defense. New York: Columbia University Press, 1961. (UA23 H94)

(An examination of the military policy of the US and how it is formulated in conjunction with other governmental policies under the US system of government. A useful work for background purposes.)

24. Inozemstev, N. N. "The Alternative to War: Peaceful Coexistence An Objective Necessity." Vital Speeches of the Day, Vol. 31, 1 May 1965, pp. 421-424.

(The author, a Deputy Chief Editor of Pravda, in a speech delivered at the Pacem in Terris Convocation, New York City, 18 February 1965, expouses the USSR policy of peaceful coexistence and the concept that wars are no longer inevitable but are now avoidable.)

25. Johnson, Lyndon B. State of the Union Message. Washington: US GPO, 4 Jan. 1965. (J80 A2)

(The 1965 presidential State of the Union Message which includes goals and objectives for the future.)

26. Johnson, Lyndon B. "Veterans Day, 1965, Proclamation 3676." Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 1, 4 Oct. 1965, pp. 332-333.

(In a proclamation by the President of the United States in commemoration of Veterans Day, 1965, President Johnson proclaims the cause of freedom and peace for which the US is striving throughout the world.)

27. Johnson, Lyndon B. "We Will Stand in Viet-Nam." Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 53, 16 Aug. 1965, pp. 262-265.

(A statement by the President read at the opening of a news conference at the White House on 28 July 1965 which announced the decision to increase the US troop strength in Vietnam to 128,000 but holds the door open for unconditional discussions with the Communists on the Vietnamese war.)

28. Jones, Howard P. "America Faces Asia." Congressional Record, Vol. 3, 4 Oct. 1965, pp. 24999-25000.

(An excellent article on US policies, attitudes, and future in Asia by the former US Ambassador to Indonesia. The author emphasizes the need to accept the reality of Asian nationalism and to bend its force to US advantage in the fight against Communist expansion.)

29. Jones, Joseph M. The Fifteen Weeks. New York: Viking Press, 1955. (E816 J6)

(An excellent detailed account of the happenings incident to the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan from the date the British announced the decision to withdraw from Greece and Turkey until Marshall's speech at Harvard University which launched the Marshall Plan. The author presents a comprehensive background to the key decisions which led to the cold war policy of containing Communist expansion.)

30. Jordan, Amos A. National Power. Lecture. Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College, 23 Aug. 1965. (AWC L65/56)

(An excellent lecture on national power which included discussion of problems in application, problems of concept difficulties, and military power applications. The contents are of only limited value to the development of a "win" philosophy.)

31. Kecskemeti, Paul. Strategic Surrender: The Politics of Victory and Defeat. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1958. (RAND R-308)

(An excellent, comprehensive survey of the theory of surrender. The author concludes that the World War II concept of unconditional surrender was improper then and inconceivable now. He stresses that rationally we must limit the expectation of gain in the nuclear age or jeopardize our national survival.)

32. Kennan, George F. "A Fresh Look at Our China Policy." New York Times Magazine, 22 Nov. 1964, pp. 27, 140-147.

(An excellent analysis of US China policy. The author postulates that the US objective in relations to Communist China is not to overthrow and destroy its political regime but to contain Communist expansion and let the forces of the Almighty and time prevail to bring more peaceful methods of international intercourse into use.)

33. Kennan, George F. American Diplomacy 1900-1950. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951.

(An excellent analysis of US foreign policy and the reasoning behind diplomatic decisions during the first half of the Twentieth Century.)

34. Kennedy, John F. "The President and the Press, Restraints of National Security." Vital Speeches of the Day, Vol. 27, 15 May 1961, pp. 450-452.

(In a speech delivered to the Bureau of Advertising of the American Newspaper Publishers Association, New York City, 27 April 1961, President Kennedy discusses two requirements of direct concern to the President and the press. These are: greater public information and need for greater official secrecy. In explaining these requirements a discussion of the cold war challenges and the corresponding Communist threat to our way of life is included.)

35. Kintner, William R. "The Politicalization of Strategy." Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 49, Apr. 1965, pp. 20-26; Vol. 49, May 1965, pp. 51-55.

(An excellent article on the interplay of military and political elements of power in the development of national strategy. The author contends that the importance of the political element in both the development of strategy and the conduct of operations has overshadowed the military. To bring affairs back in balance, he recommends adequate military representation on a national general staff and the return to the military of operational responsibility.)

36. Kissinger, Henry A. "The Illusionist: Why We Misread de Gaulle." Harper's, Vol. 230, Mar. 1965, pp. 69-77.

(The author explains the emptiness of victory in the two world wars, how the historical weakening and eventual release of France has deeply influenced de Gaulle's insistence on independence of action within the Atlantic Community. He concludes that by unrelenting pursuit of objectives beyond her reach, France may tear down European unity and weaken its position in the world arena.)

37. Koenig, Louis W. The Truman Administration: Its Principles and Practice. New York: New York University Press, 1956. (E813 T68)

(An edited account of the official acts and statements of the Truman Administration dealing with the post-World War II background to the Truman Doctrine and the doctrine itself.)

38. Lerche, Charles O. Principles of International Politics. New York: Oxford University Press, 1956. (JX1395 L45)

(A comprehensive view of the international arena in the cold war and a development of principles and concepts which apply to the international situation. The author believes that the cold war can be ended without total war or unrealistic change.)

39. Lin Piao. "Long Live the Victory of the People's War." Daily Report Supplement, Far East, 3 Sep. 1965, entire issue.

(The famous article by the Defense Minister of the People's Republic of China, Lin Piao commemorating V-J Day Anniversary in which the strategy of encircling the US by successful people's wars in Asia, Africa, and Latin America is expounded.)

40. Lowe, George E. "Damage Limitation: A New Strategic Panacea?" United States Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 91, Jun. 1965, pp. 39-47.

(A strong argument against the strategic concepts of counterforce, damage limitation, and extended deterrence. The author calls for the strategy of balanced spectrum deterrence.)

41. MacArthur, Douglas. General of the Army Douglas MacArthur's Address to Congress, 19 April 1951, Washington, D. C. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1951. (DS918 M3)

(MacArthur's famous address to the assembled Congress on 19 April 1951 after his relief from command in the Far East. Included also are highlights of his career.)

42. MacArthur, Douglas. Revitalizing a Nation. Correlation and Captions, by John M. Pratt. Chicago: Heritage Foundation, 1952. (E745 M3 A5)

(Statements of beliefs, opinions, and aspirations as drawn from the public pronouncements of MacArthur.)

43. McDonald, Thomas J. JCS Politico-Military Desk Games. Washington: Soviet War Games Agency, 1964. (QA272 M25)

(An excellent presentation to the Washington Operations Research Council by a member of the Cold War Division, Joint War Games Agency, OJCS which points up the key aspects of politico-military desk games in the cold war environment.)

44. MacLeish, Archibald. "National Purpose." Life, Vol. 48, Pt. II, 30 May 1960, pp. 86-88, 93.

(The author declares that the US has a national purpose. In short it is to liberate from domination; to set men free. This the author calls the American Dream as embodied in the Declaration of Independence, Constitution, etc. He indicates today we need not to discover our national purpose but to exercise it.)

45. McLellan, David S., and others. The Theory and Practice of International Relations. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1960. (JX1391 M23)

46. McNamara, Robert S. "Managing the Department of Defense." Civil Service Journal, Vol. 4, Apr.-Jun. 1964, pp. 269-273.

(The Secretary of Defense discusses the problems of choosing from among alternative strategies and the development of a defense program. The value of this article lies in the

insight gained into the DOD management philosophy and concept. It is of only marginal value in this thesis.)

47. Mahan, Alfred T. Mahan on Naval Warfare, ed. by Allan Wescott. Boston: Little, Brown, 1948. (V17 M3)

(The Bible on naval supremacy and control of the sea. It is of little value to this particular thesis.)

48. Marshall, Charles. The Limits of Foreign Policy. New York: Holt, 1954. (E744 M368)

(A basic guide to the formulation of foreign policy in which the author postulates that conceived ends are limitless but means to achieve them are limited. It is easy to establish goals. The real test is to sort out what can be achieved by the means available. Historical and contemporary development of US foreign policy leads to this thesis.)

49. Maxwell, Alfred R. "This World Strategy." Air University Quarterly Review, Vol. 7, Spring 1954, pp. 66-74.

(An attempt to analyze the many definitions of strategy and to formulate a more modern conception of the term. He concludes that the key to future strategy is the inclusion of technology and scientific principles along with the standard tools of sound plans and objectives, timely use of appropriate principles of war, and adequate resources.)

50. Moncrieff, Anthony, ed. The Strategy of Survival. London: British Broadcasting Corporation, 1962.

(A series of BBC broadcasts, the most significant of which for our purposes here is entitled "Rethinking in the West." It is a discussion between Arthur Lee Burin and Robert E. Osgood on 21 March 1962 in which the Kennedy Administration build up of conventional forces, the role of the nuclear weapon in Europe, and the "first strike," and "deterrence" concepts are analyzed. Osgood supports the build up of forces for use in conventional, peripheral conflicts.)

51. Morgenstern, Oskar. The Question of National Defense. New York: Random House, 1959. (UA23 M61)

(An analysis of the probabilities of a thermonuclear war and its effects on the US. The value of an invulnerable retaliatory force of submarines, the survivability of our population with adequate civil defense measures, and the folly of surrender are stressed.)

52. Morgenthau, Hans J. "The Revolution in US Foreign Policy." Commentary, Vol. 23, Feb. 1957, pp. 101-105.

(An analysis of the cold war through 1956 with emphasis on the policy of containment and US relations with Britain and France in light of the Hungarian revolt and the Suez crisis in the fall of 1956.)

53. Osgood, Robert E. Limited War. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957. (UA23 08)

(The author develops the thesis that certain kinds of aggression do not warrant the assumption of large risks of total war and thus the capability for engaging in limited war has in 1957 become a necessity. This book provides an excellent insight into the possibility of limiting war and the military and political requirements necessary for waging limited war effectively.)

54. Padelford, Norman J., and Lincoln, George A. The Dynamics of International Politics. New York: Macmillan, 1962. (JX1308 P281)

(A view of the international arena with emphasis on troublesome questions facing US decision-makers. The authors suggest guidelines for US policy in the future. They expose the world as being in a state of continuous flux and thus present a systematic method of analyzing the international scene at any particular time.)

55. Page, Thorton. "National Policy and the Army." Army, Vol. 6, Jun. 1956, pp. 30-33, 57-59.

(A discussion of the alternatives to total war at a time when the policy of "massive retaliation" was in effect. It is concluded in the article that thermonuclear war is doubtful except in desperation; that the USSR will continue to practice a "balance of terror" policy; and, that the US needs a practical instrument of national policy for use in altercations less than total war.)

56. Patchen, Martin. "Decision Theory in the Study of National Action: Problems and a Proposal." Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 9, Jun. 1965, pp. 165-176.

(A technical discussion of the problems in the use of decision theory as a tool in predicting and explaining the behavior of national decision-makers. It is of only limited value in relation to weighing the balance of gains and losses in a cold war area of conflict.)

57. Plischke, Elmer. National Objectives. Lecture. Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College, 20 Aug. 1965. (AWC L65/66)

(An excellent comprehensive discussion of the characteristics of national objectives, stratification of goals and policies, vital national interests, and ramifications of the cold war arena. A very useful lecture in developing conclusions in this thesis.)

58. Popper, David H. "NATO after Sixteen Years: An Anniversary Assessment." Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 52, 12 Apr. 1965, pp. 518-527.

(The author reviews the foundations of NATO, its current strengths and problem areas, and its prospects for the future. Three alternatives are outlined--fragmentation of NATO, emergence of a European organization, or an expanded world-viewing NATO of Europe and America. The latter, of course, is the hoped-for solution.)

59. Rabinowitch, Eugene. "New Year's Thoughts, 1965." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 21, Jan. 1965, pp. 2-5.

(A preview of the year 1965 which cautions on the dangers of polycentrism and the grim aspects of international anarchy. The article recommends pursuing the detente with the USSR, recognition of the PRC, and an arms race freeze to achieve an international status quo. An appeal is made for more imaginative US leadership.)

60. RAND Corporation. Games of Strategy, Theory and Applications, by Melvin Drexler. Santa Monica, Calif.: May 1961. (RAND R-360)

(A mathematical exposition of the theory of games designed to assist in the solving of military problems. This approach to the theory of games requires a close familiarity with calculus. It is of little value in the development of this thesis.)

61. Read, Thorton. Military Policy in a Changing Political Context. Policy Memorandum No. 31. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University, Center of International Studies, 11 Dec. 1964. (U162.6 R4)

(A treatise on meshing military strategy with political reality to cope with the uncertainties of the future. The memorandum includes a discussion of relating short-range decision-making and long-range planning which is most helpful.)

62. Reston, James. "Asian Conflicts Forcing New Look at US Policies." Congressional Record, Vol. III, 1 Oct. 1965, p. A5621.

(An article in the Pittsburgh Post Gazette, 4 October 1965 reprinted in the Congressional Record which proposes that our real objective in Asia now is the containment of Chinese power and that the US must anchor its efforts on the unity of India and security of Japan. The author also indicates that our policies may more frequently coincide with those of the USSR.)

63. Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Inc. Special Studies Project. The Mid-Century Challenge to US Foreign Policy. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1959. (JX1416 R58)

(A panel report on US foreign policy which concludes that the US foreign policy must be active and dynamic to achieve its goal of world order in which nations and peoples can fulfill their needs, under a system of international law. The impacts of international and regional organizations, the Communist threat, the emerging nations, arms control, decline of bipolarity, and the democratic process are considered.)

64. Ross, Hugh. The Cold War: Containment and Its Critics. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963. (JX1428 R9 R63)

(A summary analysis of the "Containment" policy developed in 1947 with discussion of the policies of "Liberation," "Massive Retaliation," and "Disengagement." Both the pros and cons of each policy are pointed up with conclusions left to the reader.)

65. Rostow, Walt W. "Can We Beat the Russians at Their Own Game?" Air Force Magazine, Vol. 39, Nov. 1956, pp. 60-68.

(The author during the period of the "Massive Retaliation" policy discusses the Communist tactics that circumvent this strategy. He proposes that the US continue to outstep the USSR in the nuclear arms race; develop capabilities for general and limited war; and generate a foreign policy designed to defeat communism on the political, ideological, and economic battleground. He also recommends a balance of policy and force in pursuing our objectives.)

66. Rostow, Walt W. "The Third Round." Foreign Affairs, Vol. 42, Oct. 1963, pp. 1-10.

(The author establishes the Cuban missile crisis as a turning point in US-USSR relations and indicates that this might well mark a third time since World War II that Russia tried to establish whether or not it is possible to live with the West. Arms control and the German settlement still are listed as the two fundamental issues as they were in 1945. At best, only very slow progress in detente with the USSR can be expected.)

67. Rostow, Walt W. The United States in the World Arena. New York: Harper, 1960. (E741 R6)

(A historical view of the roots of US foreign and military policy and their influence on the post-World War II policies of the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations. This book is a good source of background historical data.)

68. Rostow, Walt W. "US Policy in a Changing World." Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 51, 2 Nov. 1964, pp. 637-642.

(Address made before the Institute of North American Studies, Barcelona, Spain, on 6 October 1964, which identifies the fundamental forces in the contemporary world; outlines US strategy designed to cope with the forces; and discusses the relations between the advanced nations of the Free World and the developing nations in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America.)

69. Rusk, Dean. "Guidelines of US Foreign Policy." Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 52, 28 Jun. 1965, pp. 1030-1034.

(An address by the Secretary of State made at commencement exercises at George Washington University, Washington, D. C., on 6 June 1965, in which he set forth some caveats and fundamental principles regarding the conduct of foreign policy. He concludes that the most powerful political force in the world today is the concept that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed.)

70. Rusk, Dean. "Our Atlantic Policy." Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 52, 22 Mar. 1965, pp. 427-431.

(The Secretary of State in an address made before the Cleveland Council on World Affairs at Cleveland, Ohio, on 6 March 1965, views the continued necessity of the Atlantic Alliance and concludes that these are new needs for the Alliance and new challenges on a worldwide front to be met. He states that NATO's responsibility does not lie within Europe alone.)

71. Rusk, Dean. "The Anatomy of Foreign Policy Decisions." Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 53, 27 Sep. 1965, pp. 502-509.

(An address by the Secretary of State made before the American Political Science Association at Washington, D. C., on 7 September 1965, in which he presents a foreign policy check list for use in decision-making or decision-recommending. The range of factors to be considered include US objectives and responsibilities, interests of other nations, international law, public opinions, Congressional support, and opinions of other governmental agencies.)

72. Rusk, Dean. "The Control of Force in International Relations." Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 52, 10 May 1965, pp. 694-701.

(Address made before the American Secretary of International Law at Washington, D. C., on 23 April 1965, which stresses the role of law in international affairs and legally justifies US assistance in the Vietnam struggle.)

73. Rusk, Dean. "Toward Victory for Freedom." Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 51, 5 Oct. 1964, pp. 463-468.

(Address made before the Economic Club of Detroit at Detroit, Michigan, on 14 September 1964, which propounds the major elements of US policy toward the Communist world and emphasizes our concern for the people within the Communist Bloc.)

74. Rusk, Dean, and McNamara, Robert S. "Political and Military Aspects of US Policy in Viet-Nam." Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 53, 30 Aug. 1965, pp. 342-356.

(A transcript of an interview with the Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara on a Columbia Broadcasting System television program on 9 August 1965, which covers a wide spectrum of political and military decisions involved in United States policies in Vietnam.)

75. Schelling, Thomas C. "An Essay on Bargaining." American Economic Review, Vol. 46, Jun. 1956, pp. 281-306.

(An analysis of the art of bargaining which is applicable to the international arena and which concerns itself with "distributional" aspects of bargaining--conflicts in which the gains of one side mean the loss of the other side. The article is comprehensive and quite technical. However, it

has application to the subject of optimizing a conflict situation in face of risks.)

76. Singer, J. David. "Inter-Nation Influence: A Formal Model." American Political Science Review, Vol. 57, Jun. 1963, pp. 420-430.

(This article analyzes, by means of a formal model, the characteristics of bilateral internation influence, discusses the threat and promise techniques of influencing other nations, and concludes that a need exists for an empirically based theory of internation influence to assist the policy-maker in selecting intelligently from among a wide range of alternative courses of action.)

77. Snyder, Glenn H. "Deterrence and Power." Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 4, Jun. 1960, pp. 163-178.

(A very comprehensive discussion of the power of deterrence in the maintenance of peace and the conduct of war with emphasis on the logic of its adoption and uncertainties in its use.)

78. Sokolovskii, V. D., ed. Soviet Military Strategy. A Rand Corporation Research Study. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963. (U162 S6 1963a)

(An authoritative book on Soviet military doctrine and concepts in the wide spectrum of international conflict as seen by the Soviets themselves. The Rand analysis of key points is most helpful in understanding the significance of certain concepts in the overall Soviet strategy and also the shifts of strategy which have taken place since 1960. The Soviet stress on general nuclear war and wars of national liberation is marked. However, for the first time the possibility of limited war is openly presented.)

79. Stoessinger, John G. The Might of Nations. New York: Random House, 1961. (D1051 S8)

(An excellent analysis of the broad field of international relations. Of particular interest is Part II which highlights the many aspects of the East-West struggle for power. The author feels that there will be an evolutionary change in the cold war conflict between East and West but he feels that a hot war still remains a distinct possibility. However, he feels that there is a reasonable chance for such wars to be of the conventional, limited type.)

80. Strausz-Hupé, Robert, and Kintner, William R. "Military Defense: Free World Strategy in the 60's." General Electric Forum, Vol. 5, Jan.-Mar. 1962, pp. 21-26.

(The authors analyze the US national defense requirements, outline five war strategies, and list the major unresolved problems for the 1960's. They conclude that all tasks to be accomplished are within our national resources and can be fulfilled if the US maintains and expands its representative government and free enterprise system.)

81. Taylor, Maxwell D. The Uncertain Trumpet. New York: Harper, 1959. (UA23 T319)

(An inside view of the decision-making process at the JCS-DOD-State Department-White House level with emphasis on the military view toward the development of national security strategy.)

82. "The Worldwide Status of Democracy." Time, Vol. 85, 23 Apr. 1965, pp. 30-31.

(A survey of democracy throughout the world, the article classifies countries as democracies, dictatorships, and doubtful democracies. In assessing the future of democracy in the world, the obstacles of lack of understanding, tension between individual freedom and need for control, lack of respect for order and continued hatred of colonialism are listed as a few. The hopes of ideological contagion and economic infiltration are held out for the ultimate triumph of democracy.)

83. Truman, Harry S. Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Vol. 2, 1956. (E814 T75 v.2)

(Volume II of Memoirs by Harry S. Truman which deals with the period of 1945-1951. For purposes here, there are excellent insights into the cold war environment of the time, development and implementation of the Truman Doctrine, expansion of the nuclear weapons program, and the initial stages of the Korean War with particular emphasis on decisions made.)

84. US Army War College. The Curricular Theme. Reference Manual. Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College, Pt. 1, 1 Jul. 1965.

(The USAWC Reference Manual which defines and explains the Curricular Theme of the War College. The theme is "A US National Strategy and Its Supporting Military Program.")

85. US Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Winning the Cold War: The US Ideological Offensive. Washington: US GPO, 1963. (E744.5 U4881 1963a)

(A Congressional effort to evaluate the nonmilitary and non-economic programs which are intended to support US foreign policy in the cold war. Primarily, the efforts of USIA to conduct the ideological offensive are examined.)

86. US Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Military Situation in the Far East. Hearings. 82d Congress, 2d Session. Washington: US GPO, Pt. 1 and Pt. 2, 1951. (DS918 U55 pt. 1-2)

(Senate hearings on the military situation in the Far East designed to permit the Congress to discharge its proper function in regard to the problems of peace and war in that area as well as throughout the world. General Douglas MacArthur was the first witness. The attempts to define the meaning and effect of victory, unconditional surrender, and negotiations are of significance to this thesis.)

87. US Joint Chiefs of Staff. JCS Pub. 1: Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage. Washington: US GPO, 1 Dec. 1964.

(The Joint Dictionary in use throughout the Department of Defense which standardizes the definition of military terms.)

88. US Office of Emergency Planning. National Planning for Emergency Preparedness. Washington: Dec. 1964. (UA927 A6362 1964)

(The plan prepared by the US Office of Emergency Planning, which "sets forth the basic principles, policies, responsibilities, preparations, and responses of civil government to meet any kind of national defense emergency.")

89. Van Dyke, Vernon. International Politics. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1957. (JX1395 V3)

(An excellent book on the factors that motivate the behavior of nation-states in their relation to each other. Chapter 9, "Common Objectives of States," is of particular interest. The motivating forces of security, sovereignty, aggrandizement, peace, justice, power, ideology and the like are analyzed.)

90. Von Clausewitz, Karl. On War. Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1950. (U102 C65 1950)

(An invaluable reference concerning the theory and art of war for use in any military writing.)

91. Von Hassel, Kai-Uwe. "Organizing Western Defense." Foreign Affairs, Vol. 43, Jan. 1965, pp. 209-216.

(The German view of the defense of Western Europe recommending acceptance of the concepts of second strike capability, forward defense, flexible response, multilateral force and integration of NATO forces together with an appeal to be moderate in placing reliance on a meaningful detente with the USSR.)

92. Waltz, Kenneth N. "The Stability of a Bipolar World." Daedalus, Vol. 93, Summer 1964, pp. 881-909.

(An excellent discussion of the bipolar relationship of the US and USSR which reaches the conclusion that a stability does exist in the relationship but not a rigidity. The tactical moves of China and France are possible under the bipolar umbrella as are the moves of many of the nonaligned countries some of which, in fact, may be out from under the umbrella.)

93. Waskow, Arthur I. "New Roads to a World Without War." Yale Review, Vol. 54, Autumn 1964, pp. 85-111.

(A good synopsis of various investigative approaches to the nature of conflict and of five paths of action which might lead to peace.)

94. Williams, J. D. The Compleat Strategyst. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1954. (RAND R-Z-1)

(An excellent explanation in layman's terms of the "theory of games" and its application to the formulation of strategy. It is of use in this thesis in identifying the inherent limitations and necessary preconditions associated with a mathematical approach to complex nonmathematical problems.)

ANNEX A

# CONFLICT RELATIONSHIPS




*LIMITED WAR BETWEEN COMMUNIST AND FREE WORLD POWERS.

ANNEX B

# COLD WAR ENVIRONMENT




* LIMITED WAR II - BETWEEN COMMUNIST AND FREE WORLD POWERS

LIMITED WAR I - ALL OTHERS

ANNEX C

GAIN-LOSS COMBINATIONS

| Combination Number | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Friendly Gain | ≠ | ≠ | ≠ | ≠ | ≠ | ≠ | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Enemy Gain | | | | ≠ | 0 | - | | | | ≠ | 0 | - | | | | ≠ | 0 | - |
| Enemy Loss | ≠ | 0 | - | | | | ≠ | 0 | - | | | | ≠ | 0 | - | | | |

| Combination Number | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 31 | 32 | 33 | 34 | 35 | 36 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Friendly Loss | ≠ | ≠ | ≠ | ≠ | ≠ | ≠ | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Enemy Gain | | | | ≠ | 0 | - | | | | ≠ | 0 | - | | | | ≠ | 0 | - |
| Enemy Loss | ≠ | 0 | - | | | | ≠ | 0 | - | | | | ≠ | 0 | - | | | |

Key: ≠ Substantial
0 Moderate
- Negligible