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8 April 1966

WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO WIN: THE WORLD TODAY

By

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The World Today

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SUMMARY

What does it mean to win? In the complex world of international affairs of today, a simple answer to this relatively straightforward question seems to elude both the amateur and professional observer. A definition of the contest, a listing of the participants, the rules being followed, and an identification of the objective are required in order to determine what "win" really means. Before setting our course on a strategy which hopefully will lead to a win, we must determine what "win" means, or risk the chance of not recognizing our victory when and if we do achieve it. This research study is a part of a larger study group effort addressing this subject. This portion of the study endeavors, through an examination of the general political, economic, military, and social conditions of the world today, to establish a backdrop, or an environment, in which the meaning of "win" can be determined.

At the heart of the international conflict in which the United States is engaged in all parts of the world lies the basic enmity which has existed, in fact, since the end of World War I, the clash of the Communist ideology and the liberal democracy ideology of the Free World. The basic conflict, however, is made increasingly more complex in nature by the inner struggle raging between the leading Communist powers, Russia and China, coupled with the tensions which strain the mutual assistance, mutual defense alliances of the Free World. Adding to the turmoil within and between the two major power blocs is the major force of nationalism which feeds the fires of strife in the politically uncommitted, developing nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. This nationalism is also at the root of much of the intra-camp disputes of the Communist and Free World blocs and adds to the overall international turbulence.

This study looks in some detail at each of the areas of conflict and reviews the United States strategy, tactics, and foreign policy objectives. It concludes with suggestions that in order to determine the meaning of "win," we must establish firm long range objectives and goals, and maintain a consistent effort to attain these goals. In our short range considerations, we must identify milestone objectives which, as they are attained, contribute to measuring our "win." If we can show continued containment or roll back of communism--we win. If we are successful in maintaining mutually beneficial relations with our allies--we win. If we solidify unity within the Western Hemisphere, if we bridge the walls that stand between the free and Communist worlds--we win. If we provide hope and opportunity to emerging nations, assist in stabilizing new states in which man may guide his destiny and pursue his goal, unhampered by outside inhibiting influences--we win.

We cannot view military victories as finite wins, but must look to winning the peace which follows the cease-fire. Each step of the way which realizes a saving of man's resources, a retention or establishment of stability and viability of people and nations, an opportunity for progress through self-direction, can be used as a guidepost to identify the degree and meaning of winning. We are apparently beyond the era of clear decision reflected by the unconditional surrender of the past. The "win" of an undeclared war, a contest limited by constraints foreign to the rules of engagement and the principles of war, can be assessed only by the quantification of the impact of the military, social, economic, and political actions on the betterment of the overall status of mankind.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This study is prepared as a part of a group study effort directed at an exploration of the question "What does it mean to win?" While others examine the meaning of winning in its traditional sense, based on standard definitions and historical background, this portion of the study is focused on conditions existing in the world today. The scope includes an examination of the general political, economic, military, and social conditions of the world today with a hope of providing a backdrop, or of establishing an environment, against which the meaning of "win" can be determined.

The complex nature of international affairs today has so complicated the meaning of winning and losing, that only by an analysis of factual conditions and by interpolation of related effects, can the question "Did I win or lose?" be accurately answered. Hence, in this study, the conflicting ideologies which govern the courses of nations are examined. The participants in international conflict are identified, and the forces and problems which motivate and influence the actions of these participants are analyzed. The exposition of the world situation today, and a determination of the major areas of conflict, provide factors which may be used in the determination of the definition of "win."

CHAPTER 2

THE AREAS OF CONFLICT

At the heart of international conflict in all parts of the world today lies the same basic enmity which has existed since the end of World War I, that of Communist ideology versus the liberal democracy ideology of the "Free World." This basic conflict, however, is more complex in nature than it has been in the past, for communism itself has inner conflict raging between the Soviet ideology and methods of projecting communism worldwide through peaceful coexistence, and the violent, hard line, aggressive communism of Red China as promulgated by Mao Tse-tung. Similarly, the ideology of the "Free World" or the "West" has become complex and difficult to identify and isolate. The differences between the Free World nations abound as France, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States and other nations allied by Free World treaties dispute on matters which undermine the alliances. The dispute of India and Pakistan over the Kashmir territory finds the United States and Russia aligned in seeking a cease-fire. We find Communist Russia and Fascist Spain joined with NATO's France opposing the efforts of the United States to bring discussion of the Vietnam war before the United Nations. The United Kingdom, long the staunchest ally of the United States, continues to trade with Red China and North Vietnam. Conversely we find Russia complaining that China is hindering the delivery of USSR war materiel

to North Vietnam--a government which is theoretically a Chinese puppet.

To add to the complexity of the Communist-Free World struggle, a third major force of conflict exists worldwide in the rising tide of "nationalism" which feeds the fires of strife in not only the politically uncommitted developing nations, but in the camps of each of the major blocs of power. With the decline of colonialism and the loss of European influence in the Middle East, Asia and Africa, the nationalistic trend has shaped the policies of the major powers as both the Communist and Western forces attempt to influence the destiny, the political, social, and economic development and the power affiliation of the new nations. Similarly, the Communist attempts to extend ideological influence in Latin America, a rich developing stronghold of power, bring direct opposition of the United States into play, while also running athwart the national interests of the individual Latin American countries which are hostile to any outside influence.

This same spirit of nationalism has caused rifts to occur among the NATO allies as France, under the parochially slanted leadership of General Charles de Gaulle, has threatened to topple the alliance. Similarly within the Russian bloc of influence we find the Yugoslavian model of nationalistic communism becoming stronger and more individualistic, while a like spirit develops in Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the other Eastern European Soviet satellites. The impact of this spirit on the policies of the USSR is not negligible.

Although no threat of dissolution of the Eastern Europe Communist bloc is extant, the Russian attitude in recognizing and permitting the growth has resulted in the development and application of new Soviet policies which are a far departure from the hard line Communist doctrine under which the Soviet satellite states of Eastern Europe originally were held under Communist domination. These policies, to a degree, have widened the schism with Communist China through an apparent softening of the Soviet line with the West, in accommodation of the less stringent control of the satellites.

Nor has the Chinese Communist doctrine been unhampered by nationalism. In Asia, we find a Democratic Republic of Vietnam conducting a people's war theoretically under the direction of Peking with a nationalistic pride that includes a dislike and distrust of the Chinese, coupled with a determination of resisting subjugation to the Red Chinese regime. In Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand we find large overseas Chinese populations sympathetic to the government of the homeland, but not sympathetic to domination of their interests by the homeland. In Thailand particularly, where the Chinese are the prosperous merchant class, continuation of the status quo and freedom from Chinese domination is in that class' interest rather than the establishment of a people's socialist state.

Other Asian nationalism fans discord in the natural enmity which exists between the people of Japan and South Korea. Each a staunch ally of the United States, both are pursuing policies towards each other which are inimical to United States interests.

And at home in the United States we find nationalistic tendencies which have led to bitter criticism of the Administration's foreign policy on all fronts. The divided home front opinion on the war in Vietnam, the caustic denunciation of our overall foreign assistance legislation, the disagreements over our policy in our relations with France, Great Britain, West Germany, and our Latin American neighbors, all have their roots in our nationalistic concepts of Fortress America isolationism.

Let us look at each of these areas of conflict in more detail: communism, the Free World, the developing areas, and the United States itself, to ascertain if out of the maze of twisting policies we can find a thread which might lead us to a determination of "win."

CHAPTER 3

THE COMMUNIST WORLD

A deep rift today separates the two primary exponents of communism, Soviet Russia and Red China. The schism between the two giants has been developing for many years, but only as recently as 1962 did it surface to a position where it became open for world analysis. With the Russian backdown to the United States in the Cuban missile crisis, the tempo of the tension and the publicity of the disagreement increased to major proportions. Initially, the split was looked upon by some Western observers as temporary. Others regarded the public denunciations of the two camps as a hoax. The consensus of opinion today, however, leans towards viewing the breach between the two countries as an irreparable division which has reached a point of no return. The power struggle which has developed is a struggle for the leadership of communism, for the control and direction of the world socialist revolution. It must be kept in mind by all who study or reflect upon the two directions which communism now seems to have before it, that the aim of their foreign policy remains as fixed as it was when proposed by Lenin, world socialist revolution. The argument resolves itself to the method of attaining the goal, by peaceful coexistence or by military action.

The Soviet fostered theme of peaceful coexistence, enunciated by Khrushchev in 1956 during the Twentieth Communist Party Congress,

was introduced as a major foreign policy strategy during the "de-Stalinization" period. Peaceful coexistence with other nations of the capitalist or noncommitted world does not mean to the Soviets an end to the struggle for the extension of socialism, or communism, throughout the world. Hand in hand with this strategy walks conflict with opposing governments, conflict which at times would be impossible to pursue except for the mantle of peaceful coexistence. The doctrine is not new, but was understood and used by Lenin himself to justify trade with the West in the early days of his regime for the purpose of building Russia's internal stability.

The peaceful coexistence theme has proved profitable to the Soviet Union. Under this policy Yugoslavia was welcomed back into the Soviet camp. Economic and cultural ties with the West have been strengthened, to the benefit of the Soviet Union, and strides have been made in Russia's dream to equal and surpass the United States in the production of goods and in the buildup of industry, as they have in the great space race. The dualism of Russian Communist policy has succeeded in keeping coexistence alive despite the brutality shown in crushing revolts in Poland and Hungary in 1956, and despite bringing the United States to the brink of overt military action in the Western Hemisphere during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. The appeal of the strategy to the uncommitted nations cannot be minimized. The Russians strive to maintain their image as a peace loving people, avoiding the confrontation of Russian troops with troops of other nations, and condemning the

imperialistic aggression of the United States in Southeast Asia and the Dominican Republic. Peace, and peaceful world conditions, is a strong support for world socialism in the mind of the Russian Communist, as peace and time work for communism and against capitalism. Time gives opportunity to the people of the emerging nations to assert themselves through the conduct of wars of national liberation. Again the dualism of Communist thinking is evident as the Soviet Union can furnish support to those insurgencies, avoid confrontation with the West, and peacefully coexist with both sides of the contest.

The success of this strategy has not been without cost to the Soviet Union, however. It is at the base of the dispute with China, as stated above, and also has figured in the changes in the nature of Soviet control of the Eastern European satellites.

The character of the relationship between Russia and the European satellites began to change following the denunciation of Stalin by Khrushchev and the party in the first years following Stalin's death. With the acceptance back of Tito and Yugoslavia in 1956, and the announcement of a doctrine of different roads to socialism, Khrushchev precipitated the erosion of the 'till then authoritarian control which Russia had wielded ruthlessly over the satellites. The drastic measures which Russia employed in crushing the Hungarian revolt in 1956 constituted a firm warning as to the limits beyond which independent Communist nationalism can not go. But the USSR can no longer prevent deviations from central control within these limits.

Contributing to the breakdown of centralized control of the satellites has been the failure of the Communist economic system to produce effectively. Centralized planning, emphasis on heavy industry, forced collectivization of agriculture, and the neglect of consumer wants, proved inefficient in the long run. The failure of the system to satisfy individual nationalistic needs, and the malutilization of national resources aggravated the inefficiency. The tremendous growth rates realized in the early industrialization of the Communist bloc levelled off as the industrialized states attained a point beyond which the cumbersome system of centralization could not produce effectively. Concurrent failures in the Soviet agricultural programs added to the general apathy of the people and a loss of incentive which in turn contributed to further degradation of results.

Contributing to the dissatisfaction of the people with the Soviet economic policies was the comparison of the Socialist states' condition in relation to the economy of the Western European states. The spectacular growth and soundness of the economy of Western Europe belies the Marxist theory that capitalism should be dying. The failure of the Communist system to provide a competitive economy led to serious doubt in the nationalistic minds of the satellite populations. The inferior quality of Soviet bloc goods, due to the sacrifice of quality to meet quantity quotas, further adversely affected the economy of the bloc. Adverse working conditions, poor compensation, lack of consumer goods and dissatisfaction

in management led the satellites to demand economic reforms. The demands have been listened to in Moscow.

Disenchantment with Communist economic practices is widespread within the Soviet Union itself due to the failure of Russian industry and agriculture to adequately produce. In recognition of the stagnation of the economy, the lack of incentive and the apathy of the workers, the realization of the inability of the centralized system of planning and management to generate the sophisticated technology and imagination required in a modern economy, reform measures for Czechoslovakia's economic structure won approval of the Communist Party's Central Committee.¹ These reforms are being implemented now and include provisions for large factories and trusts to make their own operational decisions. There are also provisions for these interests to negotiate many of their own prices, to set wages, and to benefit or suffer from profit or loss due to competition of domestic and foreign producers. Fixed production quotas are replaced by profit incentive. The role of central planning is reduced to predicting market and production opportunity and choosing areas for possible development.

The victory of the Czechs in industrial operations is no small break from the stereotyped hard Communist line. The entire bloc economy may eventually follow this pilot model economy. Of most importance to the United States point of view is that the approach

¹"Winds of Change in Eastern Europe," For Commanders-This Changing World, Vol. 4, 1 Feb. 1965.

to a profit-loss market economy in the Russian sphere drives home to the Communists the explosion of another part of the myth of the Marxism-Leninism superiority as a way of life.

Throughout the bloc satellite nations, more freedom of enterprise and less blind obedience to the authority of Russia is found. A demand for sovereignty, national independence and noninterference in internal affairs pervades the Eastern European satellites. Expansion of trade with the West has come as Russia has proved unable to provide for food shortages in the satellites. Use of Western machinery has grown and also the use of other manufactured goods. In trade matters it appears that each of the satellites in Eastern Europe is looking out for its own national interest, an attitude which further cracks the image of Communist unity.

The breakdown of Communist unity is more clearly apparent in the relationship existing between Russia and Communist China. Whereas the strategy of peaceful coexistence with the West has been favored by the Eastern European states and used to advantage by them, it has become the center of the wedge of discord from the Chinese point of view. The Chinese attitude toward this strategy is summed up by the Chinese Minister of Defense and Vice Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Lin Piao, in his now famous manifesto of September 1965. He states that,

The Khrushchev revisionists claim that if their general line of peaceful coexistence, peaceful transition, and peaceful competition is followed, the oppressed will be liberated and a world without weapons, without armed forces, and without wars will come into being. But the

inexorable fact is that imperialism and reaction headed by the United States, are zealously priming their war machine and are daily engaged in the sanguinary suppression of the revolutionary people and in the threat and use of armed force against independent countries. The kind of rubbish peddled by the Khrushchev revisionists has already taken a great toll of lives in a number of countries.²

Herein lies a major disagreement at the heart of the Sino-Soviet split. The Chinese militant way to world communism, the hard line road of people's wars, the refusal to compromise or "coexist" with the imperialists, is the Chinese inevitable course. Russia, in the Chinese mind, is in collusion with the United States and no longer a true proponent of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine. The Russians are no longer revolutionaries, but revisionists who have betrayed the masses and who are working hand in glove with the reactionaries, the United States and its lackeys.

Today's leadership in Russia has followed the policies instituted by Khrushchev and regard the Chinese approach to the world socialist revolution as adventurism and dangerously bellicose. The significance of the split between the two nations lies in the competition for leadership of the movement which has risen as the natural by-product of the infighting. The struggle for leadership takes place in all parts of the world as the two contestants vie for the position from which the direction of the entire movement can be centralized.

²Lin Piao, "Long Live the Victory of the Peoples War," Daily Report, Far East, 3 Sep. 1965, p. 28.

The impact of the Sino-Soviet split on Western policies and actions has been varied. In some quarters, judging from public statements reported in the press, we find the Russians being looked on as the "good guys." This is an attitude that Americans must guard against. As stated above, though communism may no longer appear to have the single direction of the past, it remains a highly organized, aggressively international, and intensely competitive system which has as its ultimate goal the world socialist revolution.

The United States today, as a result of the Sino-Soviet split, has an increased threat to counter. Two Communist camps must be contended with rather than one. As the two compete in Africa, Latin America, and Asia for influence in the developing areas, the United States is faced with this double problem. Communist subversion goes on apace throughout the world, despite the split. In fact, it is intensified because of the split. The target of subversion in some instances has changed, but the results of the subversion may well be detrimental to United States interests even though instituted by one Communist camp against the other.

The influence of the Chinese Communists is naturally the strongest Communist influence in Asia. At home, Mao Tse-tung is firmly entrenched as head of his country and of the movement. Chinese thought and thinking processes are guided by the prolific books and slogans published by the party and written by or attributed to Mao. The party in China is evident in all walks of life

and maintains a rigid centralized control of all segments of the exploding population. Despite failure of the "Great Leap Forward," despite the inadequacy of agriculture and industrial programs, the party remains in firm control. Party policies and dogma are determined by Mao and his small group of party leaders.³ These policies are fed to the Chinese people by constant propaganda. Coupled with this is sufficient advancement in education, economics and technology to satisfy the populace and retain the loyalty of the people.

Throughout Asia, communism is at work attempting to exploit social disorder and economic insufficiencies. China's assistance helped solidify the regime of Ho Chi Minh in North Vietnam. It has provided doctrinal and materiel assistance to the Vietnamese war of national liberation since the open conflict with the French began in Indochina. In Laos, the Communist Pathet Lao influence is the strongest single entity in that "neutral" country. The materiel support which is given to the Viet Cong in South Vietnam from China and from North Vietnam is possible only because of Pathet Lao assistance in protecting the supply and communication networks leading to the south through Laos.

In Cambodia and Burma the Communist influence is such that those nations passively resist efforts of the non-Communist world to establish rapport and enlist anti-Communist support.

³Harry Schwartz, China, p. 67.

The Chinese Communist doctrine of wars of national liberation and insurgency poses a real threat to the United States interests throughout the world, but particularly in Southeast Asia. As indicated above, serious inroads of communism have been made in Vietnam, Burma, Laos and Cambodia. Peking has announced publicly that Thailand is the next target for insurgency and has established and is supporting a Thai patriotic front as an initial step in this direction.⁴

Thailand is of great importance to the United States in our efforts to contain Chinese communism, not only because of its geographic location as a physical barrier to the Chinese, but because of its strategic value to the United States as a base of operations for our logistic and tactical support of our military effort throughout the Southeast Asia area. Similarly, the importance of Thailand lies in the psychological field. The nation has a long history and heritage of independence. It has never been colonized by Europeans, although it was subjected to control by the Japanese during World War II. The country's constitutional monarchy form of government, the peoples love of freedom, the relative independence in government and social inclination, links it with the ideology of the West. Its name means "Free Land." The Buddhist religion of the Thai people incorporates a disinclination of the taking of human or

⁴Thomas J. Dodd, "The New Isolationism," The Vietnam Reader, p. 164.

animal life and has fostered a trait of nonviolence in the character of the people. The religious leaning of the nation as a whole is real and has proved a block to the spread of Marxist-Leninist atheism. As the largest rice exporting nation in the world, control of Thailand and of its rich, fertile agricultural lands is a specific target for the Chinese nation which has been unable to successfully feed its ever rapidly expanding population.

Chinese fostered insurgency in Thailand well could take its pattern in the form of subversion and insurgency in the northeast portion of the country. News reports of an increase of assassinations of local leaders and acts of banditry point to a conclusion that an active insurgency has already commenced. In that area of the nation lives a relatively large population of Vietnamese sympathetic to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. A smaller but active group of Communist sympathizers inhabits the southernmost tip of the Thailand panhandle, bordering on Malaysia. The long border separating Thailand from Laos is a natural route of infiltration for subversive elements, relatively unhampered by border patrols due to the terrain and to the scarcity of police forces.

The greatest hope for resistance to a people's war in Thailand lies in the strong government of the land and the prosperity of the economy. Although a large group of overseas Chinese are resident in the nation, they are not at this time a threat as their trade as merchants is healthy and their selfish aims oppose communism. Despite the relative strength of the nation, however, and its

maintenance of relatively large armed forces, there is a lack of communication between the government and the rural and hill populace. The situation appears ripe for the Mao technique of the countryside engulfing the cities. United States assistance to Thailand appears to recognize the threat and is moving in the direction of solidifying our status in relation to the country through proper application of military, economic, and political-social aid.

In summary, our look at the Communist world reveals an ideology of world socialist revolution, split in interpretation, polycentric in direction, and rent by a real, deep, and serious schism between the two main proponents. As Marxism proves less and less relevant and responsive to the economic and social problems of the modern European world, state socialism has become intermeshed with nationalism, free enterprise, and profit making in the area of major Soviet influence. Hard line Leninism continues to guide the Chinese, however, on its despotic road from feudalism to socialism.

The two directions of communism clash in Asia, in Africa, in Europe, and in Latin America. Even in North Vietnam, so close to China and so allied ideologically with Mao as that nation is, Russian influence is considered paramount. The military assistance stake the Russians have invested in North Vietnam, and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam's requirement for reliance on Russian air defense weapons, ammunition, communications, and petroleum with which to conduct the war to the south, keeps Chinese influence at a subordinate level. Yet, the overall problem which faces the United

States in Southeast Asia is the threat of a Chinese take-over of the entire area.

Our meaning of "win" may well be influenced by the success of our containment of the Chinese socialist revolution to the borders of that country, and by our capitalizing on the evolution of the Soviet Union to a position of respectability in the diplomatic-political world. To pit one Communist against the other, and to reap the benefits of the feud to the interest of the West, is part of winning. But we must always be cognizant of the basic Communist tenet--world socialist revolution--or we may lose abruptly and not realize we have done so until too late.

CHAPTER 4

THE WEST

The Atlantic community--the West--the nations which consider themselves threatened by communism and which are determined to resist the insidious encroachment, is made up of nations extending on the periphery of the Communist world and actively engaged in containing it. This world is led in principle and policy by the United States and includes nations allied under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), Australia, New Zealand and the United States, as members of the ANZUS pact, and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). These nations, through their mutual defense-mutual security-mutual assistance alliances, have served as a bulwark restraining the spectre of communism since the end of World War II. But what is the homogeneity of the Free World today? Is it still a line of resistance to communism? What conflicting interests weaken the alliances and threaten to prove the Lenin theory that conflict between and among capitalist, or nonsocialist, states is inevitable?

As previously noted, we find paradoxical situations existing in the relations of our allies and ourselves, in their relations with each other, and in their relations with the Communist world. To better understand the meaning of "win" in this environment, an examination of the critical factors affecting these relationships is required.

Since World War II the strongest defense against the spread of Soviet communism has been the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a mutual security alliance formed in 1949 to combat the pressures of Russian communism in Western Europe. This collective defense pact provided for the security of nations stretching from the Middle East to Scandinavia through mutual cooperation and supported by the nuclear military power of the United States. The alliance has never been without problems, but the need for united effort against communism has served to keep it in being and to survive major crises. The militarization of West Germany and the acceptance of that state as a member nation in the alliance was a difficult circumstance for France, England, and the Benelux countries which had all suffered the ravages of German military might in two world wars. The interrelation and interdependence of the member states was contrary to past characteristic European policy which basically was one of every nation for itself. But necessity made strange bedfellows and the organization grew, became strong, and has accomplished its primary goal for the past sixteen years, the containment of communism in Western Europe. It forms today an Atlantic neighborhood of relative stability in a turbulent world.¹

The future of the NATO alliance, and that of the Atlantic community of nations is, of course, of primary importance to the

¹David H. Pepper, "NATO After Sixteen Years: An Anniversary Assessment," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 52, 12 Apr. 1965, p. 518.

national security of the United States. Although in the past discord has, to a degree, caused friction within the community, the fact that this strong group of nations has presented a united, stable front against the Soviet bloc has been a stabilizing factor in our security posture. Economic problems of member nations have hampered the raising and maintenance of the force goals called for in the alliance. Dissatisfaction with basic NATO strategy and disagreement on what the strategy should be have created additional problems. The growth and strength of a revived Germany, the development of a nuclear capability by Great Britain and France, and disagreement on policies of nuclear control and nuclear sharing have adversely affected the harmonious relations of the member nations.

The creation and growth of the Common Market have spectacularly contributed to the economic growth of Western Europe. The formation of this economic grouping of states, however, has been a source of agitation between the "Inner Six," those nations who are members, and the "Outer Seven," those nations who are not accepted for membership. It has also added complications to the foreign trade policies of the United States and has led to constant negotiations and discussions in an effort to establish reasonable and equitable tariff relationships which will not only be in the best interests of the Atlantic community as a whole, but will prove palatable to the business interests of the United States.

At the root of some of the most disruptive elements in the Atlantic community, however, is the conflict of the national

interests of the individual member nations of the NATO alliance. The NATO disapproval of Great Britain and France's actions in the Suez incident of 1956, Britain and France's colonial interests which conflicted or complicated NATO unity, Greece and Turkey's confrontation over the Cyprus situation, America's position of nonsupport of France in retention of the French colonial empire; all these and similar situations have tended to undermine the alliance. Most particularly disruptive has been the attitude of France, which under Charles de Gaulle, aspires to the leadership of the European community in political, military and economic influence.

De Gaulle has long resented the influence and position of leadership that the United States has played in European affairs. He is not alone in this resentment as many Europeans appear to regard America as an upstart nation and Americans as crass, conceited, and crude, unskilled and inexperienced in the world of diplomacy and statesmanship. The French do not desire non-Europeans, such as Americans or Britains, negotiating with the Russians on the future of Europe. The development of a nuclear capability by France, accomplished primarily to bring prestige and diplomatic recognition, has resulted in France attaining a larger voice in world affairs. De Gaulle partially justified this expensive French step by declaring that Europe can no longer depend on the United States for all-out nuclear defense of the continent in the event the Soviets begin an advance by conventional means.

Although the results of the recent French elections reduced de Gaulle's personal image, as he was forced to win in a runoff election, the position of France is strong throughout Europe in the political and economic fields. The French veto of Great Britain's entry into the Common Market has had a deleterious effect on that country's economy and de Gaulle has shown no inclination to change his position.

Great Britain, despite her economic ills, the loss of her colonial empire, her requirement for, but lack of resources to maintain a military force east of Suez, has remained a relatively staunch ally of the United States and a supporter of our foreign policy in both Europe and in Southeast Asia. Yet left wing criticism, announced in news articles, of the current Labor Government's support of our Vietnam policy shows that troublesome elements are adding fuel to the fire which may separate our two governments' paths. Criticism within the United States of Britain's policy towards Red China also has a disruptive effect in our relations with England.

The neutrals of Free World Europe, Switzerland and Austria, outside of NATO, yet free of Soviet ties, show no inclination to change their status to that of an active participant supporting United States policy. They remain linked with other members of the "Outer Seven" economically, however, in the European Free Trade Association.

The importance of Spain geographically in the defense of the Free World is evident. Our policy of use of military air and naval

facilities in that country has linked us closely to her. Yet to other NATO members Spain, with Fascist dictatorship ruling the country, represents an ugly reminder of the days of Hitler and Mussolini, and this feeling bars close cooperation and acceptance of Spain into the defense pacts of Western Europe.

The constant friction between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus proves an unsettling influence to the Free World nations. Great Britain's rule of Cyprus ended in 1959, but the presence of British troops was required to keep an uneasy peace between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Following violent outbreak of hostilities between Greek and Turkish Cypriots over the intervening years, we find the island a place of unrest today and we find Turkish and Greek governments slowly cooling to the United States because of our failure to strongly support their respective positions relating to each other and to the island.

From this brief review of our major Free World allies, the nations of the Atlantic community, we find that we have a strong defense pact which since its inception has provided a real deterrent to the Soviet advance to Western Europe. On close examination, however, we find areas of political, economic, ideological, and national interests which may well in time destroy this valuable alliance. These factors indicate that to "win" anywhere we must preserve the integrity of NATO; we must combat the destructive effect of pure nationalism of the French variety; we must foster economic interdependence to keep the individual member nations

viable politically and economically; and we must strive to secure NATO support for our foreign policy worldwide, particularly in relation to Southeast Asia. As Secretary of State Dean Rusk stated in an address before the Cleveland Council of World Affairs in March 1965:

Europe and the North Atlantic Community cannot preserve their security merely by holding a line across Europe. Their common security is involved also in what happens in Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, South Asia and the Western Pacific. They have a vital common interest in the defeat of active aggression in South East Asia. They have a common interest with the free peoples of the developing world in putting an end to aggression by the infiltration of arms and trained fighting men across national frontiers. . . . The United States must be prepared to see Europe, reviving in strength and confidence, play a larger role in joint decision in these ventures.²

In addition to our attempt to have NATO recognize that its security rests on the interdependence of security throughout the world, we must further our cause on European oriented problems. The sharing and control of nuclear weapons; NATO's acceptance, at least partially, of a strategy of flexible response; development of measures for furthering a reunification of Germany; establishment and broadening of trade and cultural ties with the Communist nations of Eastern Europe to better loosen the Soviet rein on their affairs; joint cooperation and assistance to the developing nations; united efforts and goals in Asia; and a common approach to the definition

²Dean Rusk, "Our Atlantic Policy," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 52, 22 Mar. 1965, p. 427.

of the threat of Communist China. These are matters which, if they can be realized, can contribute meaningfully to the definition of "win."

CHAPTER 5

THE DEVELOPING AREAS

The simple phrase "the developing areas" is hardly descriptive enough or comprehensive enough to adequately reflect the vast continents of South America, Africa, and Asia. Yet these masses of land, in fact, all of the land masses of the world except North America, Scandinavia, Europe, and Russia can be so described. Within these developing lands major conflict exists. Some of the developing nations have close ties with the United States, while other nations are sympathetic to Communist influence. In almost every one of the nation-states concerned in these areas, a strong spirit of nationalism exists and precludes firm, exclusive ties with either camp. Some states have been in existence less than one year as sovereign powers. Others have been "developing" or "emerging" for over 2000 years.

It is not enough to say that "win" in these areas necessarily means stopping the spread of communism, although universally this basic consideration can be seen in every political, economic, or military action we take. But it is too cut and dried a yardstick to tell us whether to back Israel or the Arabs, India or Pakistan, the old or the new regime in Nigeria, or the British and French or Egypt in the 1956 Suez crisis. It would appear that United States foreign policy relating to many of the developing, or uncommitted nations, is handled on an ad hoc basis and may be aimed primarily

at seeking the stability, security, welfare, and prosperity of the nation concerned in the hope that the better functioning nation will be a better functioning member of the international community and thus add some measure of peace and security to the world.

In some of these developing areas contiguous to Communist borders, however, the United States has a real committed interest, primarily gauged to halt the encroachment of communism. In these areas, vital to US security and prestige, we should concentrate our efforts to "win." We provide military and economic aid to eleven forward defense countries in Europe and the Middle East which stretch along the Communist borders from the eastern flank of NATO to the Western Pacific. Greece, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, India, Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, the Philippines, the Republic of China on Taiwan, and South Korea all are vital to our national security. But our containment shield here is not solid. As discussed in a previous chapter, our relations with both Greece and Turkey are strained over the matter of Cyprus. Pakistan today is closer to Red China than ever before, following the action taken by the United States in relation to the Kashmir dispute.¹ The neutralist government in Laos has proved incapable of preventing the Pathet Lao from furnishing assistance to North Vietnam in that country's aggression against South Vietnam.

¹Mohammed Ayub Khan, "The Pakistan-American Alliance," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 42, Jan. 1964, pp. 207-208.

In Libya and Ethiopia we hold tenuous base rights. In northern Africa we have many ties relating to the oil interests there, but generally our influence in the Arab world is limited by our acceptance and fostering of Israel. Despite our inability, however, to entrench ourselves politically with North Africa, we have not lost too much ground to the Communists as the Arab states have adopted a neutralist attitude, despite Soviet arms and financial aid received during the past ten years.

In the new independent nations of Africa, I feel that the primary threat is posed by Communist China. The Red Chinese maintain diplomatic relations with about half of the African states. Through trade and assistance programs the Chinese have been able to introduce trained Communists into the country. Despite changing attitudes of the new governments towards Communist domination, the entry the Chinese have in the countryside undoubtedly enables them to work from the bottom up and to provide fuel for the unrest and ferment of the populace which accompanys the growth of new political states. This gives the Chinese Communist movement its strength in Africa.

The Soviet Union is also active in Africa having expended some \$650 million in the ten years preceding June 1964.² Today Russia has an added incentive in granting assistance to developing nations, particularly in Africa, in that they are now in active competition

²US Congress, Joint Economic Commission, Annual Indicators for the USSR, p. 115.

with the Red Chinese as well as with the United States in the struggle for the capture of mens' minds. The Sino-Soviet split has resulted in increased effort on the part of each to establish themselves as the true leader of the Communist movement in the eyes of these potential allies.

United States objectives in Africa appear to be twofold. First, we desire to discredit the Communist way of life and government in the minds of the newly established ruling political factions in the new independent states. Further, we desire to assist the African nations to improve their stability and security, in order that they may effectively utilize their own resources and make optimum use of the foreign economic aid that is furnished them. This will lead to the individual countries moving rapidly toward their own chosen political and economic goals. We have not been able, despite our efforts, to promote stability throughout the new nations to the degree desired by us. The recent coup in Nigeria saw the upset of what was looked on by us as a triumph of stability engineered by the British, aided by the United States, and predominantly Western oriented. Our rescue operations of white hostages in the Congo, conducted with the Belgians, were regarded by the United States and many of its allies as a success, but was regarded by many African states and some of the Western camp, as well as the Communists, as interference with local affairs and aggression.

If we are to "win" in Africa, we must take a hard look at our problems, accept the costs of a massive effort, and actively pursue

a course to combat the Communist inroads in areas of social, economic, military, and political fields. A factor in our favor may well be the reluctance of the new states to come under the influence of any outsider--Communist or Western. This has been shown in the attitude of Nassar of Egypt and the recent overthrow of Ben Bella in Algeria. Our support of the governments in being, while watching warily for insurgency from the popular fronts, may well be a means to achieve our African objectives, the desire for stability and growth of the new nations according to their will, unhampered by outside influence.

The Communist influence in Asia was discussed in Chapter 3 and will not be repeated here. Suffice to say that the Chinese Communist ties are strong with the developing countries of North Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Burma. India and China are at odds over their border disputes which recently led to open conflict. Chinese-Pakistan relations are closer than at any time in the past five years. Pakistan is also on better terms with Russia following the meetings in Russia of Ayub Khan, the President of Pakistan, and the late Premier Shastri of India, which resulted in a cease-fire in Kashmir and opened the way for further negotiations of that critical problem.

Thailand is a strong ally of the United States and of South Vietnam. The Communist threat which was discussed above in that country must be closely followed if we are to prevent Thailand from falling prey to Communist subversion and insurgency. Similarly,

the Philippines are currently strongly in the camp of the United States.

The failure of the Communist-backed coup in Indonesia of last October, and the current anti-Communist campaign being conducted despite the protests of Sukarno, is one bright spot from the United States point of view in the Southeast Asia area. While to date we have not published a policy statement relating to the new governmental influences in Indonesia, the possibility of an additional ally in that area of the world lends itself towards planning for the resumption of our assistance programs with that nation. The United States will continue to oppose Indonesian pressure on neighboring states, but should be alert for opportunities to better relations with that nation if it adopts a policy not adverse to those of the US.

Australia and New Zealand have both played an important role in the plans for collective security of the Southeast Asia area. With the United States these two countries are signators of the ANZUS pact and are also members of SEATO. Both countries have troops engaged in the struggle in South Vietnam and support our policies there. Both are active in seeking Southeast Asian economic development.

In Latin America the Communist threat sits 90 miles from our shores in Cuba. What does it mean to win here? In my mind, the only "win" in relation to Cuba will be the breaking of the Communist regime. As long as the symbol of what has always seemed a remote

ideology to a large segment of the American people remains across the entrance to the Gulf of Mexico, the United States is in danger of repeated crises. From Castro's island flows cadres of trainers and subversives to foment insurgency throughout Central and South America. Both Chinese and Russian influence are felt in Havana. News reports indicate that Chinese influence is diminishing because of a dispute between Castro and Peking over economic aid. The New York Times of 7 February 1966, in page 1 coverage, cites an unofficial translation of a Castro statement published in Havana on 6 February. In this statement Castro violently attacked Communist China for having curtailed its trade with Cuba. He accused the Peking government of having betrayed the good faith of the Cuban people and of wanting to strangle his government economically. The open controversy between the two nations apparently stems from China's rejection earlier this year to deliver an amount of rice to Cuba requested by Castro.³ Exchanges of invectives between the two governments have occurred since early January. Castro specifically mentioned his irritation with the amount of Chinese propaganda distributed to members of Cuba's armed forces. The impact of the disaffection between China and Cuba enhances the position of the Soviet Union in Cuba. The USSR has been materially financially supporting Cuba since the beginning of the Castro regime and apparently

³Fidel Castro, "Castro Charges Peking Tries to Subvert Cubans," New York Times, 7 Feb. 1966, p. 1.

has maintained its position of prominence and influence in Cuban affairs.

Latin America as a whole is a fertile area for Communist infiltration. Unstable governments, masses of poor peasants, ownership of land by small select groups, have long been prevalent in producing turmoil in the continent. Bandits have terrorized the countryside in numerous countries. Graft in government and poor police discipline are notorious. Capitalizing on these conditions, and assisted by the presence of Cuba as a base of operations, Communist activities have increased over the past few years. The means by which the United States seeks to stop the spread of communism in Latin America is through the promotion of economic and social development. In order for this development to take shape, an environment free of internal disorder and discord is required. Therefore, in addition to economic aid, it is the policy of the United States to assist the police and internal security forces of the Latin American nations.

The Cuban missile crisis, and President Kennedy's firm stand at that time, proved a factor in drawing together the nations comprising the Organization of American States (OAS), and has resulted in a more firm stand by individual states against Communist factions. Since that time, the pro-Communist leaders in Venezuela, Brazil, Chile, and British Guiana were deposed by election or coup and a more conservative element placed in power in each country. Progressive governments throughout the continent are seeking acceptable

means to accomplish land reforms, increase educational and medical facilities, provide better low cost housing, and in general raise the standard of living of their individual states, thus eliminating causes of dissension on which insurgency can feed. The American sponsored Alliance for Progress is contributing to these efforts and proving beneficial.

The Communist threat to Latin America, however, remains real and active. Men, money, propaganda, and arms are constantly being smuggled into states of Latin America, and being used in an active insurgency campaign. Radio propaganda is beamed to Latin America from Russia, China, Eastern Europe, and Cuba. The full scale Communist sponsored struggle for the Latin American mind is an all-out effort in subversion which must be countered by the United States to provide an element of "win" in the Western Hemisphere. If we don't win in this hemisphere, our victories in other parts of the world, remote from our shores, will be meaningless and empty.

CHAPTER 6

THE UNITED STATES

In order to determine the meaning of "win" for the United States we must review our strategy, tactics, and foreign policy objectives of the past few years and relate these to our present day situation. Our most critical immediate problem, of course, is the conflict in Vietnam. But as our resources are applied in increasing quantity in the Vietnamese theater, our ability is degraded to react to crises in other areas of conflict where we have strong commitments. The overall determination of a United States "win" becomes more elusive and indefinable as our overall potential to carry out our foreign policies diminishes.

Over the years the United States foreign policy has evolved from one of noninvolvement in foreign affairs to the worldwide commitments and ties with foreign governments which are now in being. During the nineteenth century we were concerned primarily with our own internal defense and relied on the British Navy to screen us effectively from infringement of our national security by European countries. As we developed our strong navy, before and during World War I, we took up the task of our own external defense. We sought to maintain a balance of power in Europe and to bar further entry by Europeans into the countries of the American continent. In the Pacific our objective was to contain an awakening Japan and to keep our Western borders free from threat. Following

World War II, attempts were made to resume our isolationist trends, but reality overtook America. Our commitments in a divided Germany, the realization of the true threat of communism to Europe and the Middle East, our activities in the rehabilitation of Japan, and our support of Chiang Kai-shek against Mao Tse-tung, soon did away with the Fortress America strategic concept. The containment of communism became our strategic objective.

With the perfection of our long range nuclear delivery capability came the Dulles doctrine of massive retaliation as the strategy by which the peace of the world was guaranteed. This effective deterrent of general war gave us an umbrella under which to assist in attaining a degree of stability in Greece and Turkey; in rebuilding Europe through military and economic assistance; and to rejuvenate Japan. Russia's growing nuclear capability resulted in the development of a condition of the mutual deterrence of general war. But our great nuclear strength did not prevent China from falling to Mao. It did not prevent the opening of hostilities in Korea. Nor did it deter a series of crises in Germany over access to Berlin. What our reliance on massive retaliation did do was to effect the degradation of our conventional military power to a point of extreme danger. For while a balance was struck which prevented general war, it became apparent that our grand strategy was invalid as a deterrent to conflicts of lower intensity. Its application in furthering United States influence in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, in the face of insurgency, proved to be nil.

The critical nature of the situation which had developed was brought out in force with the adoption of the "wars of national liberation" by the Communists as the standard policy for expansion. Concurrently came an increase in the tempo of insurgency throughout the "underdeveloped" world.

In answer to the now identified threat, the Kennedy administration took positive countermeasures. While our overall strategic objective has remained the containment of communism, our tactics changed from massive retaliation, that is, strict reliance on nuclear weapons, to one of a flexible, measured response to aggression. In other words, maintain a capability and military posture to respond with conventional or nuclear force as required to quell a conflict, using no more force than necessary. Balanced forces with a balanced capability are required to counter aggression at all levels.

This is where the United States stands strategy-wise today. But our problems in conducting these strategies are manifold. Despite United States urging for a multiple option strategy for NATO defense, the members of the alliance resist. In the minds of the Europeans, a conventional war in Europe is apparently impossible to conjecture. Hence, an all-out nuclear response to any advance by Russia remains the NATO strategy. With the bleeding of our military resources by the Vietnam war, an effective US response in Europe other than nuclear strikes appears less feasible than at any time in the past. This condition will continue until our

strategic reserve forces in the Continental United States are rebuilt to a point where we can suitably reinforce our European based troop units. Our ability to respond to crises at any point in the world is hampered by our necessity to maintain large forces in Southeast Asia, and it will be further degraded as our commitment in Vietnam expands.

In today's world, the determination of the meaning of "win" for the United States is primarily affected by the success or failure of our activities in South Vietnam. The achievement of our stated objectives in Vietnam would be classed as winning. Partial success may well be still viewed as winning since "win" in today's complicated world is a relative thing. A win in Vietnam would add weight to our ability to win through the accomplishment of our objectives in other parts of the world. Let's determine what our objectives are in Vietnam--what are we trying to win.

Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara summarized United States objectives in South Vietnam succinctly in an address before the James Forestal Memorial Awards Dinner at Washington, D.C., in March 1964.¹ Mr. McNamara stated that the "ultimate goal of the United States in South East Asia . . . is to help maintain free and independent nations which can develop politically, economically, and socially, and which can be responsible members of the world community." He pointed

¹Robert S. McNamara, "Response to Aggression: US Objectives," The Vietnam Reader, p. 194.

out the strategic significance of the area in the forward defense of the United States. The repulsing of the Communist threat to the security of the United States and to the family of Free World nations to which we belong was stated as a second objective. Our third major objective, cited by McNamara, is to "prove in the Vietnamese test case that the free world can cope with Communist 'wars of liberation' as we have coped successfully with Communist aggression at other levels."

These objectives were reiterated by President Johnson in his 1966 State of the Union message to the Congress in January 1966.

Mr. Johnson stated:

We seek neither territory nor bases, economic domination or military alliance in Vietnam. We fight for the principle of self determination - that the people of South Vietnam should be able to choose their own course, in free elections, without violence, terror, and fear. We believe the people of all Vietnam should make a free decision on the great question of reunification.²

As the military action continues to escalate in Vietnam, the United States continues to conduct its "peace offensive" throughout the world. President Johnson also stated in his State of the Union message that "there are no arbitrary limits to our search for peace."

He further stated as policy that:

We stand by the Geneva agreements of 1954 and 1962. We will meet at any conference table, discuss any proposals . . . and consider the views of any group. We will work for a cease fire now or once discussions have begun. We

²Lyndon B. Johnson, "State of the Union Message to Congress," Washington Post, 13 Jan. 1966, p. A6.

will respond if others reduce their use of force and we will withdraw our soldiers once South Vietnam is securely guaranteed the right to shape its own future.³

Following the meeting of President Johnson with the South Vietnamese Chief of State, Lieutenant General Nguyen Van Thieu and Premier Nguyen Cao Ky in Honolulu in early February 1966, the objectives of the United States were again presented in the "Declaration of Honolulu" and a "Joint Communique" issued at the close of the conference.⁴ These joint US-South Vietnam documents include a statement of the United States will to support the government of South Vietnam in its struggle to defeat Communist aggression, the eradication of social injustice within its borders, and the establishment of a stable, viable, constitutional democracy. Following a repetition of the statements included in the President's State of the Union message cited above, the Declaration expands the joint policies to include support of free elections and an open arms and amnesty policy for those who leave the Viet Cong movement. The United States pledges itself to assist in an attack on hunger, ignorance, and disease, and to measures directed at stabilizing the economy. The "purpose of peace" is repeated and the two governments pledge themselves to continue an unending quest for peace and to leave no path unexplored. An area of disagreement appears to exist, however, in the light of Premier Ky's later statements, reported by

³Ibid.

⁴"Declaration of Honolulu," New York Times, 9 Feb. 1966, p. 14.

the American Press,⁵ that his government refuses to consider the Viet Cong as a rightful bargaining power at any negotiations of the future.

The objectives of the United States in South Vietnam are plainly stated. As indicated above, the full or partial attainment of these goals will constitute a "win." A cease-fire, negotiations, promotion of a stable nation through a lessening of terror permitting agricultural and industrial advances--all these are part of winning. Not clear-cut, however, is the value of the possible win in the face of a free election which places Viet Cong or Ho Chi Minh sympathizers at the head of the government. In such an instance we may lose from the strategic security standpoint, but this may have to be balanced by the value of a viable state, not torn by warfare, and not causing a tremendous drain on the United States security resources.

⁵New York Times, 9 Feb. 1966, p. 1.

CHAPTER 7


CONCLUSION

We have traced the forces at work in international relations through a complicated maze, highlighting the factors which seem to be of primary importance to the foreign policy of the United States, in order to provide a setting against which we can determine "What does it mean to win?" The United States is engaged in a contest to win in all parts of the world. Of prime importance currently is our role in Vietnam, and whether we win or lose worldwide is deeply involved in that complicated situation. This war, however, is but one of the many facets of our problem.

If we contain or roll back communism--we win. If we are successful in maintaining mutually beneficial relations with our current allies--we win. If we solidify unity within the Western Hemisphere and if we bridge the walls which stand between the Free World and the Communist world--we win. If we provide hope and opportunity to emerging nations, assist in stabilizing new states where man has the opportunity to guide his destiny and pursue his goals unhampered by outside inhibiting influences--we win.

All of the above are long range wins and are fairly easy to interpret. But in the short range view, the problem remains complex. Entering negotiations over Vietnam and succeeding in ending the cruel war that tears that country may appear to be a win. But our task continues, for we also must win the negotiations. Each of

the problem areas cited in the foregoing study includes a series of contests in which we must participate. It may be that a definition of winning must remain undefined since it can no longer be reduced to a finite status. As we pursue our quest for victory, each step of the way which realizes a saving of man's resources, a retention or establishment of stability and viability of people and nations, a capitalizing on opportunity for progress through national self-direction, each of these can be used as guideposts to identify the degree of winning. We are apparently beyond the era of clear decision reflected by the unconditional surrender of the past. The "win" of an undeclared war, a contest limited by constraints foreign to the rules of engagement and the principles of war, can only be assessed by the quantification of the impact of the military, social, economic, and political actions on the betterment of the overall status of mankind.


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