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
8 April 1966

US MILITARY PERSONNEL - - INSTRUMENTALITIES IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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US Military Personnel--
Instrumentalities in Foreign Affairs

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Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania
8 April 1966

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SUMMARY

The purpose of this thesis is to consider the missions performed by US military personnel which place them in a position to influence foreign relations and to make recommendations which should enhance their use in this role. The study traces the involvement of military personnel in foreign affairs from their traditional position of isolation before the Spanish-American War to World War II when they were thrust headlong into the international arena. Today the military man may find himself in the role of an advisor to a Turkish commander, a Thai village chief, or a Vietnamese counterinsurgency leader; he may be an instructor to a Venezuelan military school, a South Korean police unit, or an Ethiopian construction crew; he could be an assistant to an Italian general in a NATO headquarters, a member of the Central Military Planning Staff of CENTO, or an instructor in a US military school teaching a man who may later become president of his country.

The thesis emphasizes the need of melding political and military means and objectives. Past failures to interrelate diplomatic and military goals are indicated along with examples where such coordination was handsomely rewarded. In this world of Communist aggression and enormous advances in science and technology, all agencies involved in national security must constantly improve their mutual understanding and their coordinative mechanisms.

The thesis does not advocate an expanded effort by the armed services in foreign affairs, but does assert that many military personnel are in positions to influence foreign relations, which opens to the US Government many opportunities not now fully appreciated.

Eight conclusions and accompanying recommendations have been derived from the study. In general, it is recommended that military personnel be capitalized on by the Departments of State and Defense in the conduct of foreign affairs, that military personnel be formally assigned roles in these areas, that selected training in international relations be afforded military personnel, and that adequate foreign policy guidance be given.

In the years ahead the military establishment must be prepared to manage nonmilitary problems in the areas of diplomacy, politics, economics, social psychology, and anthropology--arts and sciences that contribute mightily to building nations and stabilizing the world--by judiciously blending these with the traditional military arts and sciences to meet adequately the dynamic challenges of the future.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

PURPOSE AND SCOPE

The purpose of this thesis is to consider the missions performed by US military personnel which place them in a position to influence foreign relations and to make recommendations which should enhance their use in this role, and thereby contribute to the advancement of national security. The intent is not to focus on those military officers who have served in special diplomatic positions, but to study the duties military personnel are performing today which could impinge upon or penetrate into the broad area called international relations. The study will concentrate on overseas efforts and programs because there the involvement of military personnel is both extensive and novel.

The armed forces are an instrument of foreign policy; however, there is little understanding of the many avenues open to military personnel for aiding in the conduct of foreign affairs. It may be appreciated in a few quasi-diplomatic positions such as military attachés and commanders-in-chief of international forces, but these are exceptions. Because of this lack of understanding of soldiers' capabilities to assist in foreign affairs, little

effort is made to orient men going overseas regarding the foreign relations between the country they will serve in and the United States.¹ In some ways military personnel could enhance these foreign relations if afforded an insight into the possibilities.

The armed forces have prided themselves on not interfering with national or international politics. The Government has determined the course the nation would follow, and the soldier has done his duty to support the course steered by the President and Congress. However, times have changed, and the roles and missions of the military forces must change also to adapt and exploit their competence more fully to the requirements of United States security programs. The premise of this thesis is that many US military personnel are in positions to influence foreign affairs and that the Government should capitalize on their presence and abilities to carry out purposeful US goals.

DEFINITIONS

The term diplomacy is used in two senses: one, as the formation and execution of foreign policy on all levels; and

¹The author spent a year at the Italian Scuola di Guerra where there were many opportunities to influence international affairs. Before leaving the United States no mission was assigned to the author, though an effort was made to get one. In the final report to the Department of the Army, the author made a strong recommendation to assign a priority of missions to students attending foreign schools. A foreign affairs mission was high on the list suggested.

two, as the process of negotiation by an ambassador representing his state in a foreign land.² The term is used in both contexts in this thesis; however, the first definition is the one most generally applied.

The terms international relations, international affairs, international politics, foreign affairs, foreign relations, and foreign politics are used interchangeably throughout the thesis. These terms are used to mean the actions taken by citizens of the United States in the official name of the state with some foreign person or organization for the purpose of advancing or protecting the interests of the United States.

In the constitutional sense the President of the United States is specifically charged with conducting foreign affairs. He delegates much of this function to the Secretary of State, who is assisted by the members of the State Department. Few military officers conduct foreign affairs per se. The armed services implement the decisions, objectives, and programs of the President and the State Department in the field of international relations. The "conduct of foreign affairs" referred to in this paper is a low-level, informal type performed by the military man in the execution of, or ancillary to, his assigned military

²US Army War College, The World Environment and Sources of Conflict, p. 61.

duties, or by virtue of the fact he is in a foreign environment and able to contribute somehow to the relationship between the United States and the foreign state. There is absolutely no intent in this paper to suggest an alteration in any of the basic functions of the US Military Establishment.

What does the author mean by military personnel influencing foreign affairs? This can signify many things, depending on the specific circumstances: namely, the foreign state involved, the relationships and foreign policies between that state and the United States, the type of government, the religion of the people, the degree of literacy, the historical background, the per capita income, and others. In general, to influence means to impart to the foreigner the meaning of America's national purpose; its ethical and moral creeds; its system of government; and its foreign, political, social, economic, and military objectives and policies. In essence, it is to make others understand the American way of life and America's past, present, and future objectives. It is not an attempt to foist upon another society American methods and ideals, but to present these in such a way that their true merit and rationale will shine through.

The United States ostensibly bases its actions on its Judeo-Christian heritage of peace, charity, truth, virtue, brotherly love, and personal dignity; and on its democratic ethics of individual

freedom, inalienable rights, rule by majority, and civic responsibility. These ideals are difficult to emulate in practice, but a carefully designed set of policies and programs can go a long way toward manifesting them. If American servicemen and their families overseas live in closed enclaves, maintain both official and private isolation from the local populace; display their opulence in the face of local poverty, exhibit superiority or superciliousness toward any stratum of the society, or show any disdain for customs, laws, and circumstances, these belie what the United States says it stands for, and indicate that US foreign policy must not be based on fidelity, magnanimity, and genuine concern for world betterment. In other words, the relationship between US military personnel and local citizenry personifies the relationship between the United States and the foreign state.

If in a certain area, for example, US foreign policy is to promote respect for the local government, to aid in educating the children, and to create friendship, the military commander can assist greatly. Among things he can do is appear in public with local governmental officials and invite them to the military post for official and private functions. He can stage military parades in honor of local holidays and functions. He can encourage local officials to use the US radio and television network for

worthwhile civic purposes. Military units can establish youth athletic, church, wildlife, and industrial arts groups to train and teach the children not only in the mechanics of doing things, but by example and influence can impart American ideals and democratic practices. Military families can entertain and associate with local families both on the military post and in the milieu of local life, and can perform a multitude of friendly acts.

These are only a sample of the things that might be done. Such programs will take time, some money, and considerable effort (such as learning to converse in the foreign tongue); however, if world peace and stability are the aim of the United States, more of the above things will have to be done.

EVOLUTION OF MILITARY PARTICIPATION IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS

The participation of military personnel in foreign affairs evolved slowly. As with "all modern political institutions, diplomacy on the one hand and the armed forces on the other underwent the process of division of labor and specialization. . . ." ³ Prior to World War II military personnel led somewhat cloistered lives within a small sub-culture of America. Most of the work they did and the positions they held were in the tradition of the

³ Alfred Vagts, Defense and Diplomacy, p. 13.

profession of arms. Such international functions as mutual security alliances, military and foreign aid, and the administration of overseas territories were beyond their terms of reference. Yet, there were precedents in history when military personnel were in a position to influence foreign affairs.

At the close of the Spanish-American War and later in support of the policies of Presidents Theodore Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson, instances arose when the military became involved overseas. There were military units and personnel in Cuba from 1898 until the turn of the century, in the Philippines from 1899 until the present, in Panama from 1903 until now, in China from the Boxer Rebellion until World War II, in the Dominican Republic off and on from 1907 until 1924. In 1912, 2,500 Marines landed in Nicaragua and a small group remained until 1925, while Marines went into Haiti in 1915 and stayed until 1933.⁴ Large numbers of US military personnel occupied Germany for a number of years following World War I. These are the principal examples where the direct presence of the US military man was felt in foreign lands during these eras. Occasions of this type were rare, however, in the life of a soldier.

The war clouds brewing up World War II set the stage for the military actor in the international arena. Step by step there emerged the pattern of joint and combined strategic planning that

⁴Thomas A. Bailey. A Diplomatic History of the American People, pp. 465-544.

was to continue throughout the war. Thus, by the time the Japanese Imperial Navy struck Pearl Harbor such aspects of national security policy as joint and combined strategy, international politics, economic mobilization, foreign aid, and scientific research and development were coming into the military's orbit of activities. This trend was accelerated as the nation bent its efforts toward winning the war. Nor did the advent of peace allow the military establishment to draw away from civilian-type, non-traditional duties, many of which were in the area of foreign affairs.

The first important task overseas following the surrender of the Axis Powers was the administration of countries and territories, such as Germany, Japan, Austria, Korea, Trieste, and many Pacific islands. This was a gigantic undertaking that immersed the military in the sea of foreign affairs. Military observers traveled with United Nations commissions to many countries. The Air Force operated bases on several continents, collaborated with Canada and other countries in devising early-warning air defense systems, commanded joint forces in Alaska, and participated in NATO air forces. The Navy supervised the repatriation of four million Japanese and one million Chinese, Koreans, and other Asians to their homelands. Naval officers administered more than 20 overseas bases and governed several islands such as Saipan and Tinian.⁵ These

⁵ John W. Masland and Laurence I. Radway. Soldiers and Scholars, p. 19.

foreign responsibilities were further increased with the development of military and economic aid programs and mutual defense alliances.

The avowed goal of the Communists to conquer the globe, coupled with the advent of thermonuclear weapons, created a whole host of world-shaking problems. In recognition of the need for complete integration of military and political policies and means to cope with these grave problems, the United States passed the National Security Act of 1947. Section 2 of the Act states, inter alia, that in enacting this legislation, it was the intent of Congress to provide

a comprehensive program for the future security of the United States; to provide for the establishment of integrated policies and procedures for the departments, agencies and functions of the Government relating to the national security. . . .⁶

The Act established the National Security Council over which the President presides. The function of the Council is to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security so as "to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving national security."⁷

The Act provided for a Department of Defense, including the three military Departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force,

⁶US Army War College, Organization of the US Government for National Security, Part II, p. 129.

⁷Ibid., pp. 129-130.

under the authority and control of the Secretary of Defense. The Act also established the Central Intelligence Agency for the purpose of coordinating national security intelligence efforts and policies.⁸ The first annual report of the Secretary of Defense said this Act was the first time in history that our nation had the governmental mechanism to unite international politics and military objectives.⁹

In summary, the coalescing of foreign and military missions and policies was forged by several factors arising out of the ashes of World War II including: one, mutual security alliances; two, need for military strength in being; three, military and economic aid programs; four, world-wide Communist aggression; and five, weapons of mass destruction.

The soldier of old was called forth to fight his nation's battles when diplomatic means failed to gain sought after goals. When the war ended, the soldier returned from foreign lands to his garrison and, in general, prepared for the next war. Today's soldier still fights his country's battles, but when the fighting has ended, he remains overseas, and performs a whole host of jobs aimed at stabilizing the world and preventing future conflicts.

⁸Ibid., pp. 129-130, 132.

⁹US Department of Defense, First Report of the Secretary of Defense, p. 13.

CHAPTER 2

MILITARY DUTIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL CHARACTER

STATISTICAL OVERVIEW

United States military forces stationed overseas perform missions of an international character on a day-to-day basis, yet the magnitude of this participation is not fully appreciated. The United States maintains approximately one million military personnel outside the continental United States.¹ About 41 per cent of the Army, for example, is stationed overseas.² The military supervises the spending of a good portion of the \$3.2 billion approved for foreign aid³ and administers the Military Assistance Program involving between \$1.0 and \$1.8 billion annually.⁴ For fiscal year 1966 the President requested Congress to approve \$1.17 billion for military assistance.⁵ In 1963 this program was functioning in 66 countries,⁶ while in 1965 the number was 53.⁷ The 13 countries deleted, however, currently have training

¹US Dept of Defense, Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1963, p. 52.

²US Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1966, pt. 3, p. 546.

³US Congress, House, Public Law 89-171, 6 Sep. 1965.

⁴US Dept of Defense, 1963, op. cit., pp. 53-54.

⁵US President, President's Foreign Aid Message to the Congress of the US, p. 2.

⁶US Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Operations Appropriations for 1965, p. 284.

⁷Ibid., p. 434.

programs sponsored by the United States.⁸ The United States maintains about 2,200 military installations overseas,⁹ which initially cost \$3.7 billion¹⁰ and comprise 2.2 million acres.¹¹ During the fiscal year 1963 the military trained 17,527 foreign personnel in military schools in the United States and another 8,252 in American military schools overseas.¹²

These statistics, which do not include the current Vietnam buildup, only provide an overview of the magnitude of the overseas military effort. The remainder of the Chapter examines many of the overseas projects which have thrust the military into international affairs.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

The Military Assistance Program provides military equipment and training to those states whose defense is in our national interest. For the countries whose stability is crucial to the United States, this

⁸US Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1965, pp. 9-10.

⁹US Congress, House, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1962, p. 146.

¹⁰US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Review of Foreign Policy, p. 11 (referred to hereafter as "Congress, Review of Foreign Policy").

¹¹US Dept of Defense, Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1961, p. 394.

¹²US Congress, House, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Operations Appropriations for 1963, p. 414 (referred to hereafter as "Congress, Foreign Operations Appropriations for 1963").

assistance has broadened to give them a general combat readiness. The Military Assistance Program is completely administered by the military establishment, which is in consonance with recommendations made by a Presidential Committee in 1959.¹³

Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAG's) are the representatives of the Secretary of Defense who have conducted military aid functions in some 85 countries. They are under the direction and supervision of the area Unified Commander; however, as representatives of the United States in another state, they are subject to the authority of the Chief of the United States Diplomatic Mission.¹⁴ The 9,300 officers and men serving in MAAG's are often supported by some of the one million United States military personnel abroad.¹⁵ Military missions, which pre-date and are similar to MAAG's, are found in Greece, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, Turkey, and a dozen in Latin America.¹⁶ Full diplomatic status is accorded the MAAG or Mission Chief and the senior officer of each service represented. A second category of personnel enjoys the same privileges and immunities except inclusion on the diplomatic lists. Noncommissioned personnel have the same status as clerical

¹³The President's Committee, Composite Report of the President's Committee to Study the United States Military Assistance Program, Vol. I, p. 23.

¹⁴US Dept of the Air Force, Information and Guidance on Military Assistance, p. 22.

¹⁵US Dept of Defense, 1963, op. cit., p. 331.

¹⁶Vincent M. Barnett, Jr., ed., The Representation of the United States Abroad, p. 155.

personnel of a diplomatic mission.¹⁷ While speaking at the US Army War College recently, Ambassador McClintock stated in regard to the conduct of diplomacy by US military aid advisors that they are of "tremendous help to the ambassador."¹⁸

Military assistance was instituted to furnish states with military equipment and training to strengthen their security. However, another purpose is being served which may be ten-fold more important. A vast reservoir of good-will and understanding is being created, and the personal contact in this training should prove advantageous in the long struggle against communism. The author has had personal experience in these matters with the Greeks, Italians, and Turks while serving with NATO.

US Military Missions have considerable influence on foreign affairs. The mission to Greece headed by General James A. Van Fleet helped strengthen the Greek Army in its fight against the Communist movement. Similarly, the mission to Turkey contributed immeasurably to the military strength and economic stability of the anchor of NATO's southern flank. Considerable military equipment has been furnished Yugoslavia, and members of the military mission have inspected and observed the Yugoslav military forces. This may have continued to weaken the Communist's monolithic

¹⁷US Dept of the Air Force, op. cit., pp. 21-22.

¹⁸Robert W. McClintock, Diplomacy, Lecture, USAWC, 25 Aug. 1965. Cited with permission of Ambassador McClintock.

structure in Eastern Europe. Missions in the Middle East have helped stabilize the economy and politics of these countries and have engendered good-will. However, military assistance sometimes can be used as a weapon in diplomatic relations. In July 1962, when a military junta seized the government in Peru, the United States suspended military aid to that country.¹⁹

Likewise, in the recent Indian-Pakistan undeclared war, the United States suspended military aid to both states which undoubtedly contributed to the opposing armies grinding to a halt. At this juncture in history, no more important mission can be conceived than the training of the Republic of Korea Armed Forces. Needless to say, the work of US forces in Vietnam and the rest of Southeast Asia speaks for itself everyday in the news media. The future of Asia rests in large measure on the shoulders of the US military men in Vietnam and Thailand.

The MAAG Chief has tremendous influence in the host country. The large amount of money involved, the visible assistance to the country's security, and the evidence of United States' friendship, all increase his stature and responsibility. His importance has been recognized by a Senate study:

The Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group must primarily be a soldier. Yet he must be able to deal diplomatically with his

¹⁹ Jack Raymond, Power At The Pentagon, p. 113.

counterparts in the host country, civilian officials of the host country, the ambassador and his own superiors in the major services of our military system. In addition to his official duties, he attends many social functions. He is a man who is known and watched by many citizens, politicians, and molders of public opinion of the host country.²⁰

The Country Team is a mechanism for coordinating the MAAG Program with other activities. This Team is a committee in each country which includes the Chief of the Operations Mission of the Agency of International Development, the local United States Information Service Public Affairs Officer, the Chief of the MAAG, and the Chief of the United States Diplomatic Mission. Its purpose is to insure consistency between foreign policies and military assistance at the field level.²¹ Ambassador McClintock said the Country Team is "an essential concept and mechanism for the way we conduct foreign policy in the field." All agencies should "be conducted like a symphony orchestra by the ambassador!"²² President Kennedy had the same idea when he charged all American ambassadors abroad with being responsible for the entire United States Diplomatic Mission and all its operations.²³

²⁰US Congress, Senate, Special Committee to Study the Foreign Aid Program, Foreign Aid Program--Compilation of Studies and Surveys, pp. 134-135.

²¹Ibid.

²²McClintock, op. cit. Cited with the Ambassador's permission.

²³US Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Administration of National Security, 1962, p. 9.

MILITARY SCHOOLING FOR FOREIGNERS

American military schools propagate United States influence throughout the world. In the decade after 1950 more than 110,000 foreigners from 66 countries took American military training. Some came to the United States for a few weeks, others for a considerable period of time; for example, the average aircraft pilot remained here 18 months. Every year six to ten foreigners graduate from US service academies. For example, as of 30 June 1965, there were 78 living foreign graduates of the US Military Academy at West Point. Most of these were living in Latin America and the Philippine Islands.²⁴ Many foreigners have attended higher US military service schools. Over 9,000 of these students have been senior officers and civilians, many representing nations where the military has important political and economic roles.²⁵ In the summer of 1963 the US military forces established a six-month leadership training program for selected African soldiers. This type of military assistance can have an impact on our foreign relations, since many of these students are destined to be leaders in their countries.²⁶

An additional 25,000 foreigners have been trained at US military and allied facilities overseas at a cost of some \$14

²⁴West Point Alumni Foundation, Inc., Register of Graduates and Former Cadets of the US Military Academy, p. 760.

²⁵The President's Committee, Vol. II, op. cit., p. 111.

²⁶Raymond, op. cit., p. 112.

million. Often US military personnel have been used as traveling teachers to provide low-cost on-the-job training.²⁷ The US Army operates a school for Latin Americans at Fort Gulick in the Panama Canal Zone. Between February 1949 and July 1958, 6,932 Latin American military students received training. These soldiers varied in rank from private to general. The US Air Force operates a similar school for air force personnel at Albrook Air Force Base in the Canal Zone.²⁸ Between 1949 and 1963 the Air Force trained 4,081 foreign pilots in the United States and 7,672 other flying specialists here and abroad. Technical training was given to more than 67,700 foreign nationals.²⁹

US military personnel have a broad and deep influence on the foreign student which carries well beyond the military realm into political, economic, sociological, and psychological facets. There is much evidence that cooperation, understanding, and friendship with the United States spring from this schooling experience. Secretary of Defense McNamara is clearly on record as praising this type of schooling:

Probably the greatest return on our military assistance investment comes from the training

²⁷The President's Committee, Vol. II, op. cit., p. 110.

²⁸Ibid., p. 112.

²⁹US Dept of Defense, 1963, op. cit., p. 299.

of selected officers and key specialists at our military schools and training centers in the United States and overseas. . . . They are the coming leaders of their countries. . . . I need not dwell upon the value of having in positions of leadership men who have firsthand knowledge of how Americans do things and how they think. It is beyond price to us to make friends of such men.³⁰

There are many concrete examples where US personnel have been in a position to profit by or observe the fruits of US military schooling for foreigners. The President of Brazil, General Castello Branco, is a graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth. Brigadier General Walters, US Defense Attache to Brazil, recently noted that many military officers in the Brazilian Government have graduated from the College at Fort Leavenworth and that these officers are a great help to him in his work because of the rapport and mutual confidence that exists. He said well over 95 per cent of the Brazilian officers who have graduated from US military schools are definitely pro-United States. During World War II General Walters had served as the US Liaison Officer to the Brazilian Division in Italy. Many of the Brazilians he met during this service are now in high governmental positions, among those the President. General Walters stated: "If I hadn't known some Army officers when I returned to Brazil as Attache, I would have been totally isolated as was our US Ambassador in Poland." He

³⁰ US Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Foreign Assistance Act of 1962, p. 69.

asserted strongly that it is a great investment for the United States to invite foreign military officers to this country for an orientation or a school and that the program should be increased.³¹

The Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State, Honorable Samuel D. Berger, Ambassador to Korea during the period 1961-64, offered another example. A great number of the military officers in the present South Korean Government have received training at Fort Leavenworth or Fort Benning. On more than one occasion the Ambassador was told by one of these officers: "You taught us how to organize at your military schools." Most of these officers are great friends of the United States, and this friendship redounds favorably upon US policies in the Far East.³²

Another example of the value of foreign graduates of US military schools had its setting in Vietnam. The Vietnamese Commander of the 21st Infantry Division was a classmate at Fort Leavenworth in 1958-59 of the US Advisor to his Division in Vietnam during the period 1963-64. Several other Vietnamese high ranking officers were also in that class. Among these were the Commander of the III Corps, the Commander of the Capital Military Division, and the J-3 of the Vietnamese Armed Forces. The friendship between the

³¹ Brig Gen Vernon A. Walters, Personal interview, 13 Dec. 1965.

³² Samuel D. Berger, Personal interview, 14 Dec. 1965.

US Advisor and the Vietnamese generals which began at Fort Leavenworth matured in Vietnam. Mutual trust, confidence, and cooperation, essential ingredients in combat, were present among these Leavenworth classmates.³³

In a speech at West Point General Taylor recalled an episode in the spring of 1963 which gives an indication of the value of this schooling:

I stood on a hilltop in Iran and with the military representatives of the CENTO Alliance watched with the Shah a military demonstration presented by the Iranian Army and Air Force. The explanation to the assembled international audience was made in English by Iranian officers in uniforms similar to the United States field uniform and the briefing bore the unmistakable mark of Fort Benning or Fort Sill. One sensed the influence of the American soldier in his role as teacher of the Armies of freedom.³⁴

INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCES

The United States has spun an intricate web of alliances to bolster up the free world in its fight against communism. In 1958, a congressional committee asserted that the US Military Establishment is "more than national Our Military Establishment is charged with a trust for the benefit of many other nations."³⁵

The United States has large formations of Army, Navy, and Air Force

³³Lt Col Robert M. Montague, Jr., Personal interview, 10 Dec. 1965.

³⁴Maxwell D. Taylor, The American Soldier, p. 3.

³⁵Congress, Review of Foreign Policy, p. 789.

units stationed in Europe as part of the NATO commitment. There are about ten international headquarters in Europe staffed with some American officers. These officers influence their foreign contemporaries by their American cultural backgrounds, their specific American politico-military perspectives, and their military competence.³⁶ Anyone who has served on an international staff knows the important contribution of the United States military contingent. The author, who has recently served on a NATO staff, has heard soldiers of more than one nation make such statements as, "without the Americans nothing would get done and NATO would fold up." While this sentiment is exaggerated, the fact remains that military men of other countries do lean on the competence of US military personnel and appreciate their dedication.

Two of the three senior NATO commands are headed by an American admiral and general, respectively.³⁷ The senior American officer who commands an international headquarters has a tremendous influence on international relations. The tasks facing these NATO commanders in exhorting adequate contributions of national forces and in urging adequate military draft legislation are as much diplomatic as military. An example was Admiral James S. Russell, Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe from January 1962 until March 1965. This military statesman directed the defense of nearly 2,000 miles of Italian, Greek, and Turkish borders, most of which were contiguous

³⁶Barnett, op. cit., p. 144.

³⁷NATO Information Service, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Appendix 7, p. 83.

with Communist countries. He almost never made a purely military decision, but was continuously emersed in international politics. A testament to this was made in an Associated Press news release shortly before Admiral Russell retired from the Navy:

A U.S. Admiral-Diplomat, successful commander of both Greek and Turkish forces while they have edged dangerously close to war over Cyprus, virtually ended the ticklish job today with a call on Greece's young King Constantine. . . .

It was also practically his final act in a 43-year career as sailor, aviator and latter-day diplomat without portfolio. . . .

In a farewell toast at Larissa, General George Goulgouzis, commander for the First Greek Army, told Russell that he had "performed high service for Greece. . . ."

Astonishingly, Russell heard almost the same words translated from the Turkish only a few days before in Ankara.³⁸

OVERSEAS FORCES AND BASES

Since the outbreak of the Korean Conflict and the adoption of an integrated military structure by the North Atlantic Alliance, the United States has stationed about one-half of its active military forces overseas. These troops have been located at about 150 air and naval bases in addition to hundreds of large and small army installations.³⁹ The Army alone employs 150,000 foreign nationals.⁴⁰

³⁸Allan Jacks, "Russell," Associated Press News Release, Athens, Greece, 11 Mar. 1965.

³⁹George Stambuk, American Military Forces Abroad, pp. 3-5.

⁴⁰US Dept of Defense, 1961, op. cit., p. 104.

Most of the \$3 billion spent overseas each year is spent through the military bases, which patently represents a major contribution to the prosperity of the local communities. A post commander controls the operations and services common to any large civilian community, plus many which are peculiar to a military post in a foreign land such as regulating off-post housing and rents. His powers, capabilities, and authorities could give him a great amount of leverage in accomplishing specific foreign policy programs, which, of course, would be coordinated with the Department of State.

An additional impact of overseas bases is the political significance of the facility. They are a shining symbol of United States determination to block Soviet expansionism. A mass withdrawal of these bases could lead to the demise of the system of international alliances and seriously weaken the free world. The presence of an American base can also be a source of friction, particularly one where nuclear weapons can be launched.⁴¹ This friction can be ameliorated if the base commander sets up programs to convince the civilians that its presence is indeed in the host country's interest. This is diplomacy in action. The presence of an American base can have a stabilizing influence on a state. Any contemplated coup or uprising must take into account the presence of the American troops which ostensibly support the existing government.

⁴¹ Maxwell D. Taylor, "Security Will Not Wait," Foreign Affairs, Jan. 1961, p. 180.

American military men and forces are continually moving in and out of foreign countries, while foreign military personnel make visits to the United States. These units and individuals have an effect on foreign affairs, since there are inevitable intercultural exchanges. Some of the effects are minor, others can be significant. A few examples should suffice to give an indication of these events which normally escape the attention of the average citizen. In April 1964, 35 senior military officers from nine NATO countries attended a short course in atomic warfare at the Nuclear Weapons Training Center, Norfolk, Virginia.⁴² Also in 1964 a NATO program, which began in 1957, involved the exchange of 50 squadrons of aircraft and their personnel among countries.⁴³ In April 1965 over 500 US Marines participated in three weeks of intensive winter training at Voss, Norway, together with Norwegian and British troops.⁴⁴ Military bands from Italy, Turkey, the United Kingdom, Netherlands, and the United States took part in a festival of military music at Arnhem, Holland, from June 26 to July 3, 1965. The festival, which has been held yearly since 1958, attracts tens of thousands of visitors each year.⁴⁵

⁴²"Focus on NATO," NATO Letter, Apr. 1964, p. 24.

⁴³Ibid.

⁴⁴"Focus on NATO," NATO Letter, Apr. 1965, p. 23.

⁴⁵"Focus on NATO," NATO Letter, pp. 26-27.

There are many good-will efforts by the US military. One program is called SOLANT Amity. The force consists of several ships and a platoon of marines, who emphasize ceremonial displays, fielding of athletic teams, and a general public information program. The purpose of SOLANT Amity is to extend the friendly hand of the free world to the newly arising nations of Africa.⁴⁶

The presence of American troops overseas involves a number of miscellaneous duties. These include negotiations pertaining to the legal status of American forces on foreign soil, the many claims and criminal actions that must be settled in accordance with the Status of Forces Agreements negotiated with the countries, property occupancy and damage problems, arrangements governing American construction on foreign land, and purchasing arrangements for the local supplying of US forces.⁴⁷ The effective performance of such duties requires knowledge of local laws and customs as well as an appreciation of foreign viewpoints in matters of law, commerce, and industry.

QUASI-DIPLOMATIC ROLES

The attaché system has long been a part of our foreign missions. These military attachés are very important in maintaining contact with other countries' higher military staffs and gaining military

⁴⁶US Dept of Defense, 1961, op. cit., p. 205.

⁴⁷Barnett, op. cit., p. 168.

intelligence through travels, inspections, briefings, and social affairs. There are 540 officers serving as military attachés in 97 different countries.⁴⁸ In addition there are many enlisted men serving in administrative capacities.

The Defense Attaché System has been established recently as an organizational function of the Defense Intelligence Agency. This replaces the separate attaché systems previously administered by the military departments. The new system provides a single military attaché advisor to each Chief of US Diplomatic Mission. He will be the senior of the attachés on duty at the embassy.⁴⁹ This should enhance the politico-military significance of the attaché by upgrading a military position on the staff of the US Diplomatic Mission. The qualifications of the attachés are extremely rigid, and those chosen are well prepared to assume these important diplomatic-military positions.

There are cases where the attachés are not used to their fullest capabilities. This is a key point in the thesis: namely, the military are not adequately exploited in the international relations arena. One case in point was personally attested to by a former US Army Attaché. There were four Army field grade officers in a particular

⁴⁸US Dept of State, Foreign Service List, 1965.

⁴⁹US Defense Intelligence Agency, "Defense Attaché System," Instruction No. 60-5, 7 Jul. 1965, pp. 2-4.

attache' office. All four had Master of Arts degrees in political science. One officer also had a Master of Science degree in engineering and was a Rhodes Scholar. Another of the four had almost completed the requirements for a Doctor of Philosophy degree in international affairs. Each of the four was fluent in the country's language. In the opinion of the Military Attache', these men were well qualified to conduct international affairs in the host country by virtue of their education, experience, and positions. Yet, none was used by the Ambassador or his staff to the fullest measure of his capabilities in conducting meaningful foreign relations.⁵⁰ Certainly the Ambassador had foreign service officers available to perform required duties. However, there are seldom enough personnel to do all the work. These military attaches could have assisted in many of the normal diplomatic contacts throughout the nation, since they were traveling constantly on military matters. The author knows that in this particular country the military officer is held in high esteem.

There are several spheres where the military has a role in foreign affairs under the direct supervision of the State Department. A military staff represented by a general or flag officer from each service is attached to the United States Mission to the United Nations, and another military staff is with the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.⁵¹ Another example is the program between the

⁵⁰Col William D. Neale, Personal interview, 15 Aug. 1965.

⁵¹US Government Organization Manual, 1965-66, pp. 77, 506.

Departments of State and Defense whereby key personnel are exchanged for two-year periods for training and to promote a better understanding of foreign affairs and military problems and their interrelationships.⁵²

For a number of years the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs has had on his staff about 45 officers drawn from all three military services. This office helps formulate views on United Nations affairs, National Security Council actions, North Atlantic Treaty affairs, defense aid, intergovernmental conferences, and similar politico-military matters. It arranges for Department of Defense representation on governmental and intergovernmental organizations, including those concerned with regulation of armaments, hemispheric defense, and military aid.⁵³

Needless to say, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are heavily involved in international security affairs. Much of the preliminary work that supports their recommendations to the President and the National Security Council is done by the 400 military members of the Joint Staff.

CIVIC ACTION

Civic Action is one of the newest forms of military activity. It consists of military-economic projects, such as constructing

⁵²US Dept of State, "Defense and State Departments Begin Exchange Program for Key Personnel," Department of State Bulletin, 30 Jan. 1961, pp.169-170.

⁵³US Army War College, Organization of the US Government for National Security, Part II, pp. 31-32.

roads, communications and sanitation facilities, and fostering public health and vocational education programs, which are designed to strengthen backward countries in their fight against communism. Instead of aiding combat operations, the US soldier works with the indigenous government forces on projects useful to the local populace. This provides worthwhile civic programs under the sponsorship of local military forces, and raises their prestige among their own people.

Civic action programs were established in South Korea shortly after the shooting stopped. In the decade following, 4,537 projects were completed. Among these were 2,000 new schools, 250 churches, 350 public health facilities, 350 orphanages, 416 civic buildings, as well as bridges, public utilities, public reclamation work, and a vast rehabilitation project for devastated Pusan. In Guatemala a US Army mobile training team helped the Guatemalan Army with irrigation, dispensary services, and improving roads and water supplies. US military personnel built school facilities in Turkey for literacy training. In Ethiopia military advisors helped build schools and roads, and drill wells. In Thailand the US-supported Border Patrol Police established 150 schools in a five-year period.⁵⁴

In South Vietnam the American civic action program is almost as dramatic as the combat operations in vivifying the population against the Viet Cong. By 1964 the US Army was carrying out civic action

⁵⁴Raymond, op. cit., pp. 115-117.

projects in 25 countries in the Far East, Middle East, and Latin America.⁵⁵

Dr. Hilsman, Professor of Government at Columbia University and former Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, stated that Civic Action Teams keep the US Government in touch with what is going on in the viscera of a country. He praised the work of US Army Civic Action Teams in Indonesia and said the United States should have kept the teams there. Their efforts may have had favorable effects upon the politics and economy of Indonesia as well as have fostered good relations with the United States.⁵⁶

There is a new awareness among the armies of the world that they not only defend their countries, but they also help build them. The tremendous impact our civic action teams are having in the implementation of international relations cannot be measured now, but their results should prove significant for years to come. General Harold K. Johnson, US Army Chief of Staff, has signaled their importance in a recent article.⁵⁷

CIVIL AFFAIRS

The armed forces have been involved in civil affairs for years. A few examples should suffice. As was mentioned previously, civil

⁵⁵Ibid., p.118.

⁵⁶Roger Hilsman, The North-South Conflict and the Developing Nations, Lecture, USAWC, 16 Aug. 1965. Cited with Dr. Hilsman's permission.

⁵⁷General Harold K. Johnson, "The Army's Role in Nation Building and Preserving Stability," Army Information Digest, Nov. 1965, pp. 6-13.

affairs and military government was a big business for the US military following World War II when they administered great areas of the world. The Governor of the Panama Canal Zone has been traditionally a US Army officer, who also holds the position of Director and President of the Panama Canal Company. Since World War II the Army has administered the former Japanese archipelago, the Ryukyu Islands, which contains Okinawa, the most important US base in the western Pacific. The High Commissioner of the Islands is a US Army officer.⁵⁸ Obviously, such work and positions enmesh military personnel deeply in foreign relations.

EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE

Closely allied with civic action and civil affairs is the emergency assistance rendered by the US Armed Forces to peoples abroad. Troops stationed overseas are always ready to help villages, cities, and peoples in time of natural disaster. A few examples will bring to mind many more.

In September 1962 thousands of Iranians were made homeless by the worst earthquake in the country's history. In January 1963 many Moroccans were driven from their villages by raging floods, and the inhabitants of Santa Maria Island in the Azores were cut

⁵⁸US Dept of Defense, 1963, op. cit., pp. 172-173.

off from food shipments for six weeks by high seas.⁵⁹ One horrible night in 1964 the Vaiont Dam broke and obliterated Longarone and other villages nestled in the Italian Carnic Alps.⁶⁰ More recently an earthquake destroyed Skoplje, Yugoslavia.⁶¹ In all these disasters the US Armed Forces rushed in to give aid and comfort to the injured, hungry, and homeless, and to help put these stricken communities back into operation. This type of international relations is more remunerative in creating good-will and confidence than the traditional diplomatic speeches, handshakes, and cocktail parties.

COUNTERINSURGENCY

Effective counterinsurgency requires the blending of military, political, and economic efforts. Because of the complexion of the cold war, which has created a number of hot war areas, US Armed Forces have geared themselves for counterinsurgencies. In this type of warfare, the soldier has to win the support of the population, and to do this he must engage in practical politics.⁶² In severing ties between villagers and

⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 55.

⁶⁰ The author was present in Italy at this time and has firsthand knowledge of the favorable impression the assistance rendered by US personnel made upon the Italian nation.

⁶¹ Barnett, op. cit., p. 143.

⁶² David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, p. 161.

the Viet Cong, our advisors have had "to acquire skills of tact and diplomacy and to deal with the essentially political problems of alleviating concrete grievances. . . ." ⁶³ It has become clear that this type of warfare is not simply a combat task, but is also underlaid with problems of internal politics. To meet this requirement, many US forces are being trained in psychological operations, social administration, and civic action.

OFFSHORE PROCUREMENT PROGRAM

Offshore procurement is another aspect of military assistance which has considerable impact on foreign affairs. This program is under the direct control of the military and permits the United States to purchase equipment overseas. Purchases are made when an item can be bought cheaper overseas, where production abroad closes the dollar gap, or where it is desirable to shorten supply lines. In 1963, \$240 million was earmarked for truck procurement in Japan. It was pertinent that Japan had a large balance of payments deficit with the United States. ⁶⁴ An appreciation of the impact this program can have in foreign relations was exemplified in 1955 when the US Ambassador to Italy succeeded in getting some proposed purchases cancelled from factories whose unions were Communist-controlled. This action caused many workers to change their union membership. ⁶⁵

⁶³Barnett, op. cit., p. 161.

⁶⁴Congress, Foreign Operations Appropriations for 1963, p. 16.

⁶⁵Barnett, op. cit., p. 150.

SIXTH AND SEVENTH FLEETS

The Sixth Fleet is maintained in the Mediterranean as both a deterrent to our enemies and as a sustainer of the strength and morale of the countries that form the southern flank of NATO. It is a nuclear-capable force of about 50 ships, 20,000 men, more than 150 aircraft, and an amphibious striking force of 2,000 marines.⁶⁶ The Seventh Fleet patrols the waters of the Far East in support of national foreign policy. Its composition is constantly changing because of Vietnam. Aside from the demonstration of force, these Fleets are comprised of thousands of men and officers who constitute a sizeable American representation abroad. The people they contact, the money they spend, and the impressions they create do much to influence the opinions held by the peoples of the Mediterranean and Far East.

SUMMARY

The officers and men performing the tasks cataloged in this Chapter are in continual contact with foreigners from many levels of society, who have a wide variety of private, civic, and military responsibilities. Often the American influences his foreign contacts as a direct result of his assigned job, such as a NATO staff officer, a civic action operator, or a counterinsurgency advisor. But, the

⁶⁶ John F. R. Sietz, "AFSOUTH in NATO," Army Information Digest, Oct. 1962, pp. 45-46.

American serviceman also has an indirect effect on foreigners by his presence in many contexts within their country. He may be integrated within a foreign community, as, for example, are US military officers attending foreign military schools or assigned to international staffs. In this environment the American can become enmeshed in all sorts of relationships with foreigners ranging from athletic contests, church affairs, and speaking engagements, to entertaining foreigners, patronizing local businesses, and engaging in private discussions on US foreign policy. He may be the classic "roving ambassador" from a US fleet that spends many hours a month dealing with merchants, talking to children, dining at private homes, or participating in a variety of official and non-official recreational activities.

From the evidence contained herein there should be little question that US soldiers and officers are indeed performing missions which can have a monumental impact upon the relationships between the United States and some one hundred nations.

CHAPTER 3

RATIONALE FOR THE USE OF MILITARY PERSONNEL IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS

SHOULD MILITARY PERSONNEL HAVE A ROLE IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS?

Some people believe the military professional is becoming submerged in national politics and international relations. They have the strong conviction that the officer should concentrate his talents, energies, and education on military problems which deal with the traditional roles of national security. Edward L. Katzenbach, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Education, recently wrote an article which indicted the war colleges for spending too much time on subjects of a "civilian" character, such as international affairs, broad national and technological trends, and intra-governmental affairs. He asserted that pure military professionalism is being vitiated and that the officers should concentrate on being expert in military matters.¹

Mr. Katzenbach and his supporters have a point, but they must not lose sight of the rapidly changing conditions in the world. Military personnel are scattered throughout the globe, performing a great variety of jobs and missions, dealing with scores of cultures, and doing things of which the military man of the past never dreamed. If the military man is to perform well the many jobs in which he is

¹Edward L. Katzenbach, Jr., "The Demotion of Professionalism at the War Colleges," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, Mar. 1965, pp. 34-41.

engaged, then he must have better guidance and a wider education. If the military man should not fulfill his many assignments in the area of international relations, then that is another question. But, the fact remains he is performing these tasks, and the way the tide is flowing, he will continue to conduct such missions for many years to come.

Dr. Stambuk, who has written considerably on the subject of American representation abroad, asks:

to what degree are certain traditionally civilian functions, such as that of advice and consultation through diplomatic channels, devolving upon the military in areas where American officers not only dispense military aid but sometimes direct domestic police operations and, hence, dispose with leverage and status possibly far beyond that of diplomatic missions?²

According to a congressional committee the role of the armed forces is as important in peacetime as in wartime, and in peace their "primary function is diplomacy."³

In his remarks to the graduating class of the US Air Force Academy on 5 June 1963, President Kennedy underscored the widening fields of interest, particularly in the area of international relations, where the military man must be competent and where the Chief Executive, at least, is relying on the military professional:

²George Stambuk, "Foreign Policy and the Stationing of American Forces Abroad," The Journal of Politics, Aug. 63, p. 488.

³US Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Conduct of National Security Policy, 1965, p. 42.

We needed in October [Cuban missile crisis]--and we had them and we shall need them in the future, and we shall have them--military commanders who are conscious of the enormous stakes in the nuclear age of every decision that they take, who are aware of the fact that there are no purely political decisions or purely military decisions; that every problem is a mixture of both, men who know the difference between vital interests and peripheral interests. . . and who can foresee the effects of military action on political policy. We need men, in short, who can cope with the challenge of a new political struggle, an armed doctrine which uses every weapon in the struggle around the globe.⁴

The US serviceman overseas does not always ingratiate himself with the foreign populace. There was much common evidence of this which issued from World War II and Korea. Today in Vietnam, there are indications that the "Ugly American" image is forming there. One case in point was attested to by recent returnees from Vietnam. Many Vietnamese dwellings are being requisitioned by military units, which naturally creates hard feelings. But, to compound the situation, some US servicemen are displacing local Vietnamese by paying exorbitant rents, by Vietnamese standards, and using these houses for unofficial purposes.⁵ Some antagonism is bound to emanate from close intercultural associations. These instances are on the debit side of the ledger, but they seem to be outweighed by the evidence of good relationships stemming from the duties performed by US soldiers which are specified in this study. It is up to the

⁴US President, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 1963, p. 442.

⁵Lt Cols Hoyt R. Livingston and Francis M. Watson, Jr., Vietnam Panel, US Army War College, 10 Dec. 1965. Cited with these officers' permission.

military services to make certain that all servicemen receive proper guidance and orientation before going overseas, plus the normal command emphasis in the area of operations.

The military services are the focal point for considerable research in the area of foreign cultures and cross-cultural communication. The author has some first-hand knowledge of the Army's social science research program.⁶ While the effort is considerable and the research of good quality, the author believes the distribution and use of these research products need to be drastically improved. For example, much of the results of this research could be used as inputs for training and orientation for personnel embarking on overseas missions, so they can better understand the interpersonal and intercultural relationships that exist in the area of operations.

In conclusion, the author believes there are three excellent reasons why military personnel should implement foreign relations at this juncture in time. One, they have the manpower, talent, and materiel resources. Two, there is no other agency which at this time can execute the many foreign affairs tasks that military forces are performing. And, three, military personnel are available "on the ground." These points will be explored later in the Chapter.

⁶The Human Resources Research Office of The George Washington University, a non-profit organization that works exclusively under contract to the Department of the Army, has done a large amount of research in these areas. For example, a recent publication is: Examples of Cross-Cultural Problems Encountered by Americans Working Overseas: An Instructor's Handbook, by Robert J. Foster.

MELDING MILITARY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS

To attain national security objectives without war requires a strategy in which military prowess is integrated with political bargaining, propaganda, and other measures that can foster friendly relations among countries. The President relies on the national security departments and agencies for initiating and carrying out national policy. A congressional committee emphasized that the "Departments of State and Defense, the military services, and related agencies. . . are for the most part staffed with experienced, capable, and dedicated people. They are a vast storehouse of information, historical perspective, skills, and resources."⁷ And, there is little question that members of the armed forces are "among the most active participants in international affairs."⁸

Some factors which bring diplomatic and military affairs close together are not evident. The tendency of the State Department to delegate the implementation of foreign policy to the military is one factor, such as the administration of the occupied countries following World War II. Another factor is the close work of the Departments of State and Defense in foreign aid. The tendency of Congress to turn to the military for advice is another factor. The

⁷US Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Administration of National Security, 1963, p. 1.

⁸Norman J. Padelford and George A. Lincoln, The Dynamics of International Politics, p. 348.

opinions of military men are sought on a wide variety of political questions, such as "the ultimate implication of our present involvement in Vietnam," or "do you favor the importation of this grain?" (to Red China), or "How do you feel about the Diem Government?"⁹ During one committee hearing a congressman told a Unified Commander, "Admiral, I have made this statement several times that I wished you had charge of the whole Far East for 2 years, the diplomatic and military end of it."¹⁰ The result of these factors has added to the military man's sensitivity to foreign affairs, and has contributed to the melding of military and diplomatic relations.

Diplomatic methods whether practiced by a foreign service or military officer should be similar since both must deal with the vital boundaries where diplomatic and military questions meet and interpenetrate. Sometimes international affairs are conducted with gentility and finesse, sometimes with firmness, and sometimes with military force. Neither force nor diplomacy can stand alone in the international arena. Jomini taught Mahan a great truth along this line: to reject the traditional distinctions often asserted between military and diplomatic considerations.¹¹ This is precisely what Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Chief of Staff of the Army George C. Marshall had reference to when both agreed that none of

⁹US Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Foreign Assistance Act of 1962, pp. 190-197 (referred to hereafter as "Congress, Foreign Assistance Act of 1962").

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹A. T. Mahan, Naval Strategy, p. 107.

their subordinates should use the phrases, "purely political" or "purely military."¹² After his relief from command in Korea, which was underlaid with politico-military factors, General MacArthur remarked before a Senate committee that it was impossible to draw a line between what is political and what is military.¹³ President Kennedy summed up this point in his remarks at the Air Force Academy on 5 June 1963 when he said:

We live in a world. . . where the principal problems that we face are not susceptible to military solutions alone. The role of our military power, in essence, is, therefore, to free ourselves and our allies to pursue the goals of freedom without the danger of enemy attack, but we do not have a separate military policy, and a separate diplomatic policy, and a separate disarmament policy, and a separate foreign aid policy, all unrelated to each other. They are all bound up together in the policy of the United States.¹⁴

ADVANTAGES OF USING MILITARY PERSONNEL

Military officers have been used as diplomats by the United States on many occasions because of their particular qualifications. Examples are Admiral Leahy as Ambassador to Vichy during World War II and General W. Bedell Smith as Ambassador to Russia from 1946 to

¹²Walter Millis and others, Arms and the State, pp. 358-359.

¹³US Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, An Enquiry into the Military Situation in the Far East and the Facts Surrounding the Relief of General of the Army MacArthur, p. 45.

¹⁴US President, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 1963, p. 442.

1949.¹⁵ General George C. Marshall headed a diplomatic mission to China following World War II, while more recently General Maxwell D. Taylor, General James M. Gavin, and Admiral George W. Anderson have filled ambassadorial posts. These military men were called on to occupy formal diplomatic posts because of their reputations. But, there are many other less formal foreign affairs missions which are quite suitable for military officers.

The administration of the military assistance program is manifestly a phase of foreign affairs particularly within the purview of the armed services. Technical military knowledge is necessary to determine initial requirements and to insure the equipment received is compatible with the requirements of the receiving country.

When negotiations are conducted with foreign military personnel or with governments influenced by the military elite, the use of United States military personnel would under some conditions be advantageous. Advantages include a common military language, the "brothers-in-arms" affinity and the close day-to-day contact that exists. This is especially true in negotiations involving NATO, military aid, or overseas United States military bases. There can be an informality and mutual exchange of ideas among military men that is difficult to achieve at the normal diplomatic levels. While most of the contacts of the American military man overseas are with

¹⁵ Alfred Vagts, Defense and Diplomacy, pp. 49-52.

military counterparts, these counterparts are frequently the "coming leaders of their countries."¹⁶ In many newly created countries, the armed forces represent the greater part of the educated people and the only organization with cohesion and strength.¹⁷

In states with militarily controlled or influenced governments, intercourse through military channels is bound to be effective. For example, in Latin America a military voice in governments is the rule rather than the exception. According to past experience, of the 20 republics in Latin America, six are always under military influence, 12 are occasionally under military influence, and in only two are the military never deeply involved in politics.¹⁸ Algeria, Burma, China, Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, Pakistan, Portugal, South Korea, Spain, Turkey, and Vietnam are some of the other countries where military men play a very important role in government.

Another area where rapport between US and foreign leaders occurs is in the area of military schooling. Many of the thousands of foreign students who attend US military schools are high ranking officers that move into positions of influence in their countries.

¹⁶Congress, Foreign Assistance Act of 1962, p. 69.

¹⁷Congress, House, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Operations Appropriations for 1963, p. 651.

¹⁸Theodore Wyckoff, "The Role of the Military in Contemporary Latin American Politics," Western Political Quarterly, Sep. 1960, p. 745.

The other side of the coin is that many US officers attend foreign military schools each year. The US officer meets and makes life-long friendships with the "cream of the crop" of the foreign officer corps, those who are destined for positions of high leadership.¹⁹ Here again American officers learn the foreign tongue which may immediately qualify them for a broader scope of duties in the international field.

Another advantage which accrues to a military man is the experience he gains in overseas service. For example, if he has been on an international staff, or if he were on a MAAG team, or with an attache' office, these are duties where he not only makes friends among military and civilian administrators and diplomats, but he learns much about foreign politics.

Less obvious are some intangible advantages which a military man has in the conduct of foreign affairs. Today's international politics are greatly influenced by the ability to exert force. Where force is available and appreciated, the use of military men could clarify and facilitate the conduct of negotiations. Military officers did much during the Lebanon crisis in 1958 to avert war there, and they are currently helping to maintain peace in the Dominican Republic.

MATERIEL RESOURCES OF THE MILITARY

The military man often has materiel resources not readily able to the diplomat. A post commander can contribute immeasurably to the

¹⁹The author had personal experience along this line at the Italian Scuola di Guerra.

conduct of foreign affairs. He can use post facilities to further people-to-people programs. He can permit selected local nationals to attend the military-supported schools. He can provide medical service to assist in emergency situations. He can launch helicopters to search for missing fisherman. He can provide transportation for local clubs. He can spray areas with DDT to check malaria epidemics. He can provide United States-monitored news and entertainment over radio and television. He can provide military honors and bands at local functions. He can field athletic teams to play with local teams before local audiences. Aside from these materiel resources, a post commander has at his disposal hundreds or thousands of people to assist in the implementation of selected foreign affairs at the "grass roots" level. The post commander can also talk to highly placed military and civilian dignitaries of the host country and develop informal relationships without the implication of engaging in "diplomacy." From the above, it is evident that the commander of a major military post possesses resources, access, flexibilities, and authorities not readily at the disposal of a conventional diplomat.²⁰

MILITARY MAN'S PERSONAL RESOURCES

Many military officers possess the attributes and training needed to conduct formal international affairs. As an example, a general serving as Chief of a MAAG would have between 25 and 30

²⁰Herbert S. Ainsworth, The Role of the Military in the Conduct of Foreign Affairs, pp. 50-52.

years of administrative and operational experience at all levels. The military man develops sound judgment in the execution of his duties; this judgment affects the survival of his troops, ship, or aircraft. He can take and give orders and has a habit of making decisions, but he has learned to negotiate because of his experience on combined and joint staffs. He is trained to be a planner, to think analytically and conceive contingencies. He has studied history to draw upon the wisdom and mistakes of the past, but he is capable of improvisation to cope with constantly changing situations. The military man is experienced in public relations. He is accustomed to the demands and responsibilities of foreign stations and is aware of the attitudes and emotions of foreign nationals. The military man understands intelligence and appreciates the use of force. Since he is familiar with war, he neither exaggerates nor underestimates the horrors and undesirability of armed conflict. Finally, his especially providential qualification is that he is there on the ground in the foreign country.

21

MILITARY SCHOOLING

The armed forces have been doing a creditable job of providing military personnel with the skills needed to perform the wide range of duties demanded in the fields of coalition planning, military assistance, attaché duty, counterinsurgency, and civic action. It

²¹Ibid., pp. 56-59.

is an exception when a soldier, sailor, or airman enters upon a special assignment without some form of schooling. Practically all American personnel taking up key MAAG assignments attend the Military Assistance Institute, which is supervised by the Department of Defense. It graduates about 1,100 students each year and deals with the specialized aspects of military assistance within a broadly political and strategic framework. It provides orientation not only in the operations of the MAAG system, but in the political structure of countries of assignment and the United States' broad security responsibilities.²²

The Special Warfare School and Civil Affairs School are two among a variety of specialized service schools which offer courses both for American and foreign military personnel. The courses in these two schools are replete with subjects which have a direct bearing on the implementation of international affairs to prepare its graduates for their duties in a foreign land.²³

The Inter-American and NATO Defense Colleges are similar in that both support collective security organizations, the OAS and NATO, respectively. However, the Inter-American Defense College is operated by the United States, while the NATO Defense College is a multi-national school. The NATO school focuses its courses on collective security coalition planning, while the Inter-American school

²²Vincent M. Barnett, Jr., The Representation of the United States Abroad, p. 171.

²³US Dept of the Army, Pamphlet No. 350-10, pp. 4-2E-8 and 9; 4-5D-1.

concentrates more on civic action and the tasks of political modernization.²⁴ Each school has military students from the United States in its classes.

Attendance at the Defense Intelligence School in Washington is mandatory for all prospective military attachés and many military personnel assigned to missions. The curriculum ranges widely over the field of national security as well as intelligence and the representative duties of a military man in a foreign country.

The Defense Language Institute is an important cog in the wheel of military education; it prepares thousands of military personnel with tools to be more effective diplomats throughout the world. During fiscal year 1966 the Institute will train about two-thirds of the 7,000 full-time military students. The remainder will receive instruction at the Department of State's Foreign Service Institute and various civilian universities and commercial schools. The military services now train their personnel in 50 languages.²⁵

Specific training for service on combined or joint staffs is given at the Armed Forces Staff College. The role of the five war colleges is critical in preparing military officers with the tools and capabilities to cope with the demands of important positions in international affairs. These colleges are graduate level institutions whose curricula are geared to prepare officers for positions

²⁴Barnett, op. cit., p. 171.

²⁵US Defense Language Institute, Defense Language Institute General Information, pp. 1-2.

with international responsibilities. One writer notes that these colleges are placing

an increased emphasis on the problems of international politics, the dilemmas of war and peace brought on by nuclear weapons, the impact of defence on the national economy and the complexities of life in a world of allies, international organizations and un-committed nations.²⁶

A good percentage of military officers obtain graduate training in civilian universities. During the past ten years over 4,600 Army officers alone have gotten advanced degrees through government tuition assistance.²⁷ Many others have obtained degrees on their own. A sample survey made for the Department of Defense in 1962 showed 7.4 per cent of Army officers held the Master of Arts or Science degree and 3 per cent the LLB or doctorate degree in many fields of the arts and sciences.²⁸ These percentages are much greater now. An example of the trend (admittedly a biased one in reference to the number of degrees) is the following chart which shows the percentages of students in the last three classes at the US Army War College who have advanced degrees from civilian universities. These classes averaged a total of 204 students.²⁹

²⁶Gene M. Lyons, "The New Civil-Military Relations," The American Political Science Review, 1 Mar. 1961, p. 62.

²⁷US Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1966, pt. 3, p. 505.

²⁸Barnett, op. cit., p. 175.

²⁹US Army War College, Statistical Comparisons, Letter, 30 Aug. 1965, pp. 2, 4.

| (year) | <u>1963-64</u> | <u>1964-65</u> | <u>1965-66</u> |
|---------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| PhD | 1.5 | 3.4 | 5.9 |
| Masters | 27.2 | 35.6 | 42.9 |

The services give an officer a variety of jobs during his career which help him become a well-rounded leader, operator, and administrator. In addition to the more normal command, technical, and staff assignments, officers are enjoined to seek duties in the fields of counterinsurgency, take duty on a joint or combined staff,³⁰ learn at least one foreign language, and learn to write and speak on a variety of subjects. The armed forces are constantly broadening military education to "keep abreast of new opportunities for the exercise of politically meaningful military representation abroad."³¹

SUMMARY

Certainly the military man will be judged upon his individual ability rather than by some military norm, but it is obvious from the evidence that a good many military men possess the personal resources necessary to influence, and in some cases to implement, international affairs on a rather formal basis. Reinforce these personal capabilities with the many, almost unique, materiel resources the military man possesses and one can begin to see quite clearly the tremendous capacity the military establishment has for influencing foreign affairs on many levels.

³⁰US Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Administration of National Security, 1961, p. 115. It is a policy of the Secretary of Defense that all officers serve a normal tour of duty with a joint, combined, allied, or Office of the Secretary of Defense staff before being considered qualified for promotion to general or flag officer rank.

³¹Barnett, op. cit., p. 183.

CHAPTER 4

COORDINATION OF MILITARY AND FOREIGN POLICIES

This Chapter will offer a brief discussion of the critical importance of complete coordination and cooperation between the civilian diplomat and the military operator in the planning and execution of foreign policies and programs. Hans Morgenthau echoed Clausewitz when he wrote, "The Armed Forces are the instrument of foreign policy."¹ Recent history has demonstrated clearly that foreign and military plans and policies go hand in hand. The most dynamic factor generating mutuality of military and diplomatic concepts is the current recognition by the United States that the manipulation of military strength is a vital and respectable part of international politics. This appreciation of force is overdue, since military power has been the keystone of European politics for centuries. The rejection of force by the United States has long been decried by some political scientists.²

Science and technology have created a situation nowadays which is unique in the history of mankind, where the first day of war can decide conclusively whether or not a country will continue to exist. As one writer said upon considering this frightening possibility: "We cannot go on blithely letting one group of specialists decide

¹Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p. 566.

²John W. Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World War II, p. 12.

how to wage war and another decide when and to what purpose, with only the most casual and spasmodic communication between them."³ And, this author did not refer to coordination only on high-level policy but also on every level of planning.⁴

FAILURE TO COORDINATE

When the interrelation of diplomatic and military affairs has been neglected the results have been disastrous. History is replete with situations where a diplomat has not sought military advice, or where the military man has failed to consider the political aspects of a course of action. No more vivid example can be offered than the knotty Berlin situation. Despite diplomatic pressures from Britain to establish a land corridor to Berlin, the War Department believed the question was a military rather than a political matter.⁵ Philip Mosely, who was directly involved in the negotiations of the European Advisory Commission, stated that access was not included in the agreements because it was a matter to be negotiated by the military commanders.⁶ However, General Clay said of this remark that "despite my responsibilities as General Eisenhower's deputy in

³Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, p. 7.

⁴Ibid., p. 9.

⁵Hanson W. Baldwin, Great Mistakes of the War, p. 48.

⁶Philip E. Mosely, "The Occupation of Germany: New Light on How the Zones Were Drawn," Foreign Affairs, Jul. 1950, pp. 587-588.

charge of our entry into Berlin, I had not been informed of this intention.⁷ Hanson Baldwin claimed the diplomats resisted military attempts to define precisely United States control of the corridor to Berlin.⁸ Regardless of the ultimate responsibility, the world is living today with this problem because of the lack of military and political coordination.

The military planners and the diplomats did not fully coordinate their policies regarding Korea, and disaster struck. First, the diplomats failed to recognize the portent of omitting Korea from the American defense perimeter in the Far East.⁹ Moreover, the lack of interest in Korea was shown in a Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum to President Truman in September 1947 which stated that the Korean Peninsula would be bypassed if the United States undertook offensive action aimed at Asia.¹⁰ Further, the proposals for the withdrawal of US Forces from Korea in 1947 came at a time when United States' efforts to unify Korea by diplomatic means through negotiations with the Soviet Union were failing.¹¹ Failure of the Defense and State Departments to coordinate and arrive at a sound plan for the defense of Korea was not lost to the Communist opportunists. Even after the North Koreans crossed the 38th Parallel and drove south, many US military planners saw the conflict as a localized action and

⁷Lucius D. Clay, "Berlin," Foreign Affairs, Oct. 1962, p. 49.

⁸Baldwin, op. cit., p. 47.

⁹Walter Millis and others, Arms and the State, p. 260.

¹⁰Jules Davids, America and the World of Our Times, p. 433.

¹¹Ibid.

did not appreciate the global aspects. Each aspect should have been carefully weighed in terms of its effect on Europe, the United Nations, the Soviet Union, and Red China.¹² Former Ambassador to Korea, the Honorable Samuel D. Berger, corroborated this serious lack of a coordinated effort between the diplomatic and military planners for the protection of South Korea.¹³

During World War II, General Stilwell fought masterly campaigns in Burma and China, but his over-all accomplishments were marred by his diplomatic imbroglios.¹⁴ General MacArthur would not listen to the State Department and refused to fight the Korean Conflict for limited military and political objectives. He lost his argument with those who did appreciate these restrictions.

A prime deficiency in the conduct of World War II was the insufficient representation of the military viewpoint in the formation of national strategic objectives. If the leavening of military advice had been used, some serious political mistakes could have been averted.¹⁵ The other side of the coin is that long term political and economic objectives must not be doomed to satisfy short term military objectives. Ambassador McClintock, while discussing military advisors in the field, said they must take care not to call for measures which would have a deliterious effect on the foreign state.

¹²Ibid., p. 443.

¹³Samuel D. Berger, Personal interview, 14 Dec. 1965.

¹⁴Millis, op. cit., p. 177.

¹⁵Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, p. 344.

Obviously referring to Vietnam, he said an advisor should not call for the destruction of a village for military reasons when this action would have lasting adverse political and economic effects on the ally.¹⁶

A recent situation is illustrative of the need for close cooperation between military and civilian agencies. It is a general consensus that to build a strong, viable, free state in South Vietnam the problems which must be tackled are not only military in nature. Equally or more important are the political, economic, and psychological issues. A team of US Army officers was sent to Vietnam during the period August to October 1965 to study civil-military affairs. Their report reflects that the present cooperation and coordination between such agencies as the US Operations Mission (a field unit of the Agency for International Development), the US Military Assistance Command, the US Information Agency, and the US Embassy leave much to be desired. Progress toward nation building in Vietnam could be moving faster if there were better understanding and cooperation between these military and civilian agencies.¹⁷

EXAMPLES OF COORDINATION

The missile crisis in Cuba offers a good example where the interplay of diplomacy and military force paid good dividends.

¹⁶Robert M. McClintock, Diplomacy, Lecture, USAWC, 25 Aug. 1965. Cited with the Ambassador's permission.

¹⁷Hoyt R. Livingston and Francis M. Watson, Jr., Vietnam Panel, USAWC, 10 Dec. 1965. Cited with these officers' permission.

Appeals to the United Nations, coordination of efforts within regional alliances, direct negotiations with the Soviet leaders, plus a show of military force were all used to compel the Soviet Union into taking the desired course.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization represents an example of the interdependence of military and diplomatic efforts. As one guest speaker at the US Army War College said, "NATO is a miracle." But, this miracle is an important factor in maintaining a relatively stable world, one in which there is every hope of keeping the fire kindled so low between diametric philosophies that the world itself will not become ignited.

The status of forces negotiations within NATO demonstrate the diplomatic-military nature of the alliance. Because of the vagueness of NATO provisions, the determination of the status of forces becomes a matter of day-to-day accommodation, often carried out at the local level between officials who not long ago would have established contact with each other through their respective foreign ministers if at all.¹⁸

The United States will not often make a serious blunder on an international politico-military question when both the militarists and diplomatists work out the particulars in union. Clausewitz's advice against "purely military judgments on a great military event

¹⁸George Stambuk, "Foreign Policy and the Stationing of American Forces Abroad," The Journal of Politics, Aug. 1963, p. 480.

or plan"¹⁹ must now include a caution against purely diplomatic judgments on questions of international politics.

¹⁹Karl von Clausewitz, On War, p. 599.

CHAPTER 5

RECAPITULATION

The greatly increased participation of the United States military forces in foreign affairs represents one of the more important governmental developments of the last quarter of a century. It can be explained by the recently assumed position of world leadership by the United States. The catalyst which has placed the United States at the helm of leadership is the menace of international communism. This threat is sharpened by revolutionary advances in the technology of war. This condition has brought about a much larger standing military force with expanded responsibilities in the formation of foreign policy. But the expansion of the military establishment's contribution to foreign policymaking is only the part of the iceberg showing above the surface. That part not in the public's view is the actual implementation of America's foreign policies. The military man is influencing international relations at all levels, ranging from the highest headquarters of international alliances to the individual tribal chief, policeman, or soldier at the "grass roots" level. The role of military forces in promoting social, economic, and political progress may well be as important as their contribution to the deterrence of direct military aggression.¹

¹The President's Committee, Composite Report of the President's Committee to Study the United States Military Assistance Program, Vol. II, p. 151.

The United States is a member of the United Nations and 52 other international organizations. She has become involved in five alliances, signed mutual defense treaties with 42 nations, and attempted to shore up the free world by putting \$150 billions into foreign economic and military aid. At the same time weapons of mass destruction, space satellites, and phenomenal improvements in communications have pushed the professional soldier into the international relations arena, and have made greater demands upon his service and potentialities.² The constabulary duties of an overseas assignment, the pseudo-diplomatic function of military assistance advisory groups and attachés, the planning involved in a Pentagon or NATO position, the implementing of a civic action program, the training of counterinsurgency forces in a small jungle retreat in Southeast Asia, the training of foreign military personnel in Central America, the rendering of aid to the injured, sick, and destitute in an area wrecked by an earthquake in Iran--these are the international tasks the military man is doing and must be prepared to do in the future. Coupled with this is the ominous threat of war by any and all means, ranging from psychological and harassing actions to thermonuclear holocaust. These new responsibilities for military leaders "have not so much altered their fundamental make-up as they

²James G. Holland, Jr., The Development of a National Strategy and a Supporting Military Program, Lecture, USAWC, 11 Aug. 65. Cited with Colonel Holland's permission.

have added new dimensions to their character and made them more complex human beings."³

The new complexity of the military officer is being reflected in a number of changes in the profession. Three of these are of particular importance: one, the broadening base for officer recruitment; two, the development of higher military education; and three, new policies for the selection and promotion to higher rank and responsible positions.⁴ The Services are constantly searching for the best candidates for commissions available in the American society and are recruiting specialists in a wide variety of crafts and professions. Likewise, the requirements for promotion to higher ranks and the prerequisites for many positions are becoming most exacting. Higher military education is rapidly responding to the broadening character of military responsibility. Curriculum changes in the service academies, in ROTC programs, and in the service schools, primarily at the war college level, are adapting themselves to the pressing need for officers prepared to fill positions in the area of international affairs. Our military schools are in consonance with Mahan's advice to his brother officers to "keep abreast of international relations" and "aim to be yourselves statesmen as well as seamen."⁵

³US Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Administration of National Security, 1962, p. 114 (hereafter referred to as "Congress, Administration of National Security, 1962").

⁴Ibid.

⁵Mahan, Naval Strategy, p. 21.

Some people may become alarmed that military officers are taking over jobs held traditionally by civilians, or that military men are becoming too "civilianized." These people need not be concerned, for the soldier will continue to be a professional man of arms and be influenced by his traditional basic philosophies and tools of trade. A congressional committee opined that "without this distinction what is the meaning of the military profession as a separate group in society?"⁶ The answer is, "nothing!" The military has no intention of usurping the role of the professional diplomat.⁷

In his remarks to the graduation class of the Military Academy on 6 June 1962, President Kennedy summed up the international scope and role of the military officer in today's fast-moving world:

The nonmilitary problems which you will face will also be most demanding, diplomatic, political, and economic. In the years ahead, some of you will serve as advisors to foreign aid missions or even to foreign governments. Some will negotiate terms of a cease-fire with broad political as well as military ramifications. Some of you will go to the far corners of the earth, and to the far reaches of space. Some of you will sit in the highest councils of the Pentagon. Others will hold delicate command posts which are international in character. Still others will advise on plans to abolish arms. . . . Whatever your position, the scope of your decisions will not be confined to the traditional tenets of military competence and training. . . .

⁶Congress, Administration of National Security, 1962, p. 116.

⁷Dean Rusk, "The Underlying Crisis: Coercion vs. Choice," The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XLV, 31 Jul. 1961, p. 179.

In many countries, your posture and performance will provide the local population with the only evidence of what our country is really like. In other countries, your military mission, its advice and action, will play a key role in determining whether those people will remain free. You will need to understand the importance of military power and also the limits of military power, to decide what arms should be used to fight and when they should be used to prevent a fight, to determine what represents our vital interests and what interests are only marginal. . . .

Our forces, therefore, must fulfill a broader role as a complement to our diplomacy, as an arm of our diplomacy, as a deterrent to our adversaries, and as a symbol to our allies of our determination to support them.⁸

In these excerpts are explicit or implicit in capsulated form the demands and requirements being placed on military personnel to carry out national strategic policies by not only performing traditional military duties, but also by implementing international affairs. This is a new and inescapable role for military personnel, one which should be assigned in a more meaningful context to exploit their great potential.

It has been demonstrated in this thesis that military personnel are de facto influencing foreign affairs on a great number of levels here and overseas. Not only are the military capable, but they are willing and, importantly, they are where the work must be done. Like all his many tasks the soldier takes pride in a job well done, and

⁸Congress, Administration of National Security, 1962, pp. 18-19.

as Plato wrote: "Now nothing can be more important than that the work of a soldier should be well done."⁹

⁹ Plato's The Republic, p. 67.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusion 1. Military personnel are influencing international affairs throughout the world as an integral part of their jobs. Yet the role of the military man in foreign affairs has not been clearly defined.

Recommendation 1. That military personnel be formally assigned roles and missions in the implementation of international affairs where this is determined to be advantageous to exploit the demonstrated potential of the armed forces in this area. This assignment of roles would be an integrated effort of the Departments of State and Defense.

Conclusion 2. The role of the military in promoting social, economic, and political progress in nation building throughout the developing areas of the world has taken on remarkable importance.

Recommendation 2. That the present roles and missions of military personnel in the areas of civil affairs, civic action, emergency relief, counterinsurgency, international alliances, and schooling for foreigners be continually emphasized, fully supported, and expanded where necessary to assist emerging nations in their progress toward stability and freedom.

Conclusion 3. The armed forces have vast personnel and materiel resources that can be exploited in the execution of foreign relations.

Recommendation 3. That the Departments of State and Defense jointly study these personnel and materiel resources available throughout the world and establish a more definitive program for using them to implement foreign affairs objectives and programs where appropriate. That continual reappraisals be instituted to fully exploit these vast resources as foreign affairs objectives and programs change.

Conclusion 4. Military personnel who are directly involved in the more important and traditionally recognized jobs and positions in the field of foreign affairs must be trained in the arts and sciences of international relations. And, all professional military officers should have a good appreciation of these arts and sciences.

Recommendation 4. That military personnel assigned directly to duties involving foreign relations receive specific training. Important subjects which should be included in varying degrees, depending on the particular job and country, are language training, political science, social psychology, anthropology, coalition military planning, and the procedures and objectives of foreign aid. The military school system must include international relations at all levels, certainly beginning at staff level schools, in order to acquaint all professional military officers with this field of knowledge. Advantage must be taken of all available quotas in such schools as the Inter-American and NATO Defense Colleges. As many

students as possible should be sent to such schools as the Defense Intelligence School, Defense Language Institute, Special Warfare School, and Civil Affairs School. Efforts must be made to increase the enrollment of military students in such schools as the Foreign Service Institute; and, as a corollary, civil service personnel must be encouraged to attend military schools. The exchange program between the Departments of State and Defense should be expanded to provide for maximum cross-training of personnel. All opportunities must be taken to send military officers to foreign schools. As a corollary, the Department of Defense should encourage the enrollment of foreign students in all levels of US military schooling where this is deemed practical and remunerative.

Conclusion 5. Military personnel going overseas must receive a thorough briefing concerning the country of destination.

Recommendation 5. That military personnel destined for overseas receive a briefing on the destination country to include its history, politics, economics, religion, culture, and military forces. Also included in such orientations should be an explanation of United States foreign policies, objectives, and programs with respect to the country, and guidance should be given as to how the military, individually and collectively, might assist in implementing these policies, objectives, and programs.¹ More detailed briefings

¹Orientation booklets for military men going overseas are inadequate and mainly concerned with such subjects as deportment, customs, blackmarket, attitudes, and the admonition to "be good." One such booklet, DOD Gen-15: Serving Your Country Overseas, made only one mention of the importance of foreign relations.

can be given to officers and selected noncommissioned officers.

Conclusion 6. The military services have personnel who have considerable foreign affairs expertise.

Recommendation 6. That adequate numbers of properly qualified and trained military personnel be provided to combined staffs, MAAG's, missions, and certain sensitive posts to perform important duties involving foreign relations. Those selected should be of high caliber, duty tours should be extended where appropriate, and career opportunities assured to provide the expertise demanded. Military personnel scheduled for early retirement should be investigated as a possible source of administrators for foreign aid programs and similar positions.

Conclusion 7. Only in combining military power and means with political objectives and means can a nation conduct an effective over-all foreign policy.

Recommendation 7. That the Department of State and Defense study the possibility of assigning civilian political advisors on a broader basis to the staffs of those military commanders who are involved continually in foreign politics. These political advisors can furnish guidance and provide liaison with the Department of State. This would further assure the melding of military and foreign objectives and programs.

Conclusion 8. Many foreign governments are controlled or influenced by the military elite. This is especially true of many of the newly emerging states.

Recommendation 8. That consideration be given to including on any group which is involved in foreign relations with these military-controlled or -influenced countries a United States military representation. This "brothers-in-arms" affinity might prove to be the key to good relations and speedy negotiations.

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