

DETENTE AND SOUTH ASIA

by

ARCHER K. BLOOD

Over the years, the record of the United States in South Asia has been a mixed one at best. Our experience brought home to us the limitations on our ability, particularly regarding military assistance, to influence the actions of the major regional states, India and Pakistan. The Indo-Pakistani wars of 1965 and 1971 pushed us toward a posture of gradual disengagement.

Is this posture still valid today? Do the actions of the other two major external powers interested in South Asia, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, support or threaten a policy of disengagement? Will the current detente relationships between the United States and the Soviet Union and between the United States and China contribute to a moderation of great power rivalries in the Asian subcontinent? Or will regional crises pull the external powers back again into the vortex of South Asia?

A current assessment of the strategic importance of South Asia reveals a continued absence of US vital interests, but a delicate balance between the regional powers and the three external powers. Both our checkered experience in South Asia and our changed perception of the strategic importance of the area argue for a continued policy of disengagement which, by its very lack of commitment, favors greater flexibility and could encourage continued restraint on the part of the Soviet Union and China.

DISENGAGEMENT AND REASSESSMENT

Viewed through 10 years of hindsight, 1965 looms as the continental divide of US involvement in South Asia. As a prophetic signpost, 1965 seems even more significant than 1971 with its more dramatic but also more aberrant events.

From 1950 to 1965 US involvement in the subcontinent was sustained at a relatively high level of resources and diplomatic energy, relatively high, that is, for an area of the world always considered less important than Western Europe, the Far East, or Latin America. The United States offered extensive development assistance to India and Pakistan and, to a lesser but still considerable degree, to Afghanistan. The incorporation of Pakistan in 1954 into the Dullesian fortress line was aimed at containing Sino-Soviet expansionism, and it gave rise to extensive military assistance to Pakistan and to the establishment of a communications base outside Peshawar. This linkage with Pakistan was marked by the signing of a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, and subsequently a bilateral Agreement of Cooperation, as well as by Pakistan's adherence to SEATO and the Baghdad Pact, later CENTO.

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Report Documentation Page				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.					
1. REPORT DATE 1975		2. REPORT TYPE		3. DATES COVERED 00-00-1975 to 00-00-1975	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Detente and South Asia				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S)				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) US Army War College ,ATTN: Parameters ,122 Forbes Avenue,Carlisle,PA,17013-5238				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT Same as Report (SAR)	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 9	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified			

US diplomatic initiatives sought a resolution of the perennial quarrel between Afghanistan and Pakistan over the Afghan-raised Pushtunistan issue. Brief but intensive military assistance to India followed the Chinese-Indian border conflict of 1962. There were occasional attempts to play a mediatory role in the Kashmir dispute, and our energetic, successful efforts supported the Indus Water settlement under World Bank auspices.

The close US ties with Pakistan did serve to thwart the attempts of the Soviet Union to expand its influence with the Pakistan Government, but our military supply policy failed signally in its purpose of achieving a military balance on the subcontinent which would militate against the renewal of Pak-Indian hostilities. Instead, we, particularly the Congress, were appalled to see US weapons, furnished to Pakistan for defense against the Soviet Union and China, used offensively against India in 1965 in an attempt to force a decision on Kashmir. We were also dismayed to see US arms furnished to India for protection against the Chinese being used to broaden the conflict with Pakistan beyond the borders of Kashmir. The Pak-Indian conflict of 1965, brief though it was, forced home on us the realization that our ability to influence the actions of those major regional states was ineffective when set against the political dynamism of the subcontinent and the two nations' perceptions of their own national interests. Besides, by 1965, two other important external powers, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, were interested and significant participants in the South Asian game.

Our reaction was to forbid the supply of military equipment to both India and Pakistan. This austere policy was moderated in 1966 to permit both countries to buy "non-lethal end items," in 1967 to permit the sale of spare parts for military equipment already provided, and in 1970 on a one-time exception to allow Pakistan to buy some armored personnel carriers. The value of all types of military assistance to the nations of South Asia, however, declined from a yearly

average in the period 1950-65 of \$99 million to a yearly average in the period 1966-75 of less than \$16 million. A more important comparison is the share of worldwide military assistance commanded by the South Asian countries in FY 1965, which was over 5.5 percent, and their projected share for FY 1975 which is only .06 percent.¹

To those of us who were serving in the subcontinent at that time, 1965 did not appear a particularly high signpost. We were acutely aware of the strong congressional disillusionment with military assistance to the subcontinent in the wake of the 1965 war, and we were more pessimistic than was necessary about the opportunities for Soviet diplomacy flowing from the Soviet Union's peacemaking role at the Tashkent Conference. I doubt, however, that many of us realized the extent to which US preoccupation with Vietnam would move South Asia, and indeed other areas, to the back burner of priority in the ensuing years. Nor was it apparent then that the failure of Ayub's 1965 Kashmir putsch had fatally destroyed his infallibility and originated the set of circumstances which would strengthen another revisionist force, that of the Bengalis, and result in the division of Pakistan into two states.

Not only did US military assistance to the subcontinent dwindle to a trickle after 1965, but also US diplomatic activity in the area was muted. In January 1970 the US base near Peshawar was closed, thus removing what was both a tangible, but declining, US interest in the area and a Pakistani lever over US freedom of action vis-a-vis the subcontinent.

Although the levels of US development assistance did not decrease markedly after 1965, some of our regional elan and optimism about development prospects in South Asia began to disappear. We began to look less and less on the third world as a profitable arena of competition between the Communist and Free World economic systems. Progress was too slow. Rapidly increasing populations ate up the marginal increases in food production. Increased reliance on the institutions of state socialism by India and, to a lesser extent, by

Pakistan provided a less productive funnel for our aid. Also, we were comforted to see our rivals, the Soviet Union and China, experiencing the same headaches and frustrations as did we in the arena of development assistance.

Old enthusiasms matured as we came to realize that both Indian and Pakistani leaders could be difficult, as well as obstinately determined to follow their course as they saw it. The US-Indian relationship, which had been one of alternating fulfillment and disillusion on both sides, gravitated toward a plane of steady, albeit tolerable, mutual frustration. The US-Pakistani relationship, while always an easier one, became more realistic and hard-headed on both sides as the Pakistanis accepted military assistance from the Soviets and the Chinese and lowered their profile in SEATO and CENTO.

More important, we downgraded our estimate of the threat of Sino-Soviet aggression in the subcontinent. After its successful incursion into the frontier regions of India in 1962, China again became a paper tiger. The Soviet Union, as we shall note, muffed its post-Tashkent opportunities and, besides, was following a policy not essentially very different from our own.



It is tempting but unrealistic to look upon Russian/Soviet policy toward South Asia as one of consistent, patient pressure for control and influence, dating back to the early 19th century and culminating successfully in Soviet sponsorship of the winning side in the 1971 war between India and Pakistan. In the 19th century, Russian aspirations south of the Hindu Kush figured more prominently in the imagination of British writers like Kipling and British administrators like Lord Auckland than in the councils of Czarist ministers. Molotov's so-called expression of historic interest in South Asia and the Indian Ocean in 1940 now seems to be more of a German move to deflect Soviet interests from the Balkans and the Middle East than a true reading of Soviet goals.

Not until 1955, in the wake of the

establishment of the US tie with Pakistan, did Khrushchev and Bulganin visit the subcontinent and initiate Soviet developmental assistance to India. Soviet military assistance to India was another five years away.

Since the mid-1950s, the underlying thrust of Soviet policy seems to have been the creation of a stable subcontinent through improved relations between India and Pakistan, while at the same time limiting US and Chinese influence in the area. In particular, the Soviet Union has sought to ensure that China's flanks are contained by states either well-disposed toward the Soviet Union or, at a minimum, neutral with respect to China and the Soviet Union. To the extent that the Soviet Union and the United States have both favored stability through Indo-Pakistani cooperation, Soviet policy was complementary to US objectives.

During the 1962 Chinese incursion into India the Soviet Union, having no desire to see India further humiliated and being concerned about the gains achieved by the United States and the British, worked to bring about a halt to the fighting. In 1965 the Soviet Union, like the United States, was disturbed by the outbreak of war between India and Pakistan. Like the United States, the Soviet Union followed a policy of neutrality although, unlike the United States, it did not discontinue military aid.


In the Security Council, Moscow cooperated with the United States to bring about a ceasefire resolution acceptable to both sides and supported the Secretary General's peace mission to the subcontinent. In company with the United States, the Soviet Union warned the Chinese against taking any steps to escalate the conflict and, like the United States, was concerned that the conflict gave China the opportunity to expand its influence in Pakistan.

Soviet neutrality in the 1965 war enabled India and Pakistan to accept a Soviet mediatory role at the Tashkent Conference the following year. Although Soviet prestige and influence in South Asia seemed at a new high, the aftermath of Tashkent was not a success story for Soviet diplomacy. After

some initial progress in the withdrawal of troops, the exchange of prisoners, and the restoration of air, postal, and telegraphic links, Indo-Pakistani antagonisms reasserted themselves. The leaders of the two countries did not hold any follow-on meetings and trade connections remained severed. In Pakistan the Tashkent agreement was attacked as a pledge not to use force to settle the Kashmir dispute.

Soviet mediation at Tashkent and the subsequent Soviet attempt to play the role of the honest broker in the subcontinent did not succeed in achieving a reconciliation between India and Pakistan. Nor did the more involved Soviet role serve to weaken Pakistan's ties with Peking or Washington, despite the provision of Soviet military equipment to Pakistan beginning in 1968. When, in June 1969, Brezhnev launched his proposal for regional economic cooperation followed by a collective security arrangement, India was cool and President Yahya effectively scuttled the scheme for regional economic cooperation by declining to participate in a Soviet-sponsored conference in Kabul.

The Soviet Union, like the United States, thus experienced the futility and frustration of trying to hustle the East into a stability which neither major regional power was willing to purchase at the expense of its vital interests. Again, like the United States, the Soviets discovered that the other two external powers could exert an effective brake against the growth of the third power's influence through their ties and influence with one or other of the regional powers.

 Chinese involvement in the affairs of the subcontinent has differed in kind and extent from US and Soviet involvement because of two factors in the Sino-South Asian relationship not shared with the other two external powers. First, its geographic proximity is more marked, giving rise to actual border disputes with the largest of the South Asian states. Although the Soviet Union shares a common border with Afghanistan, there has been no border issue or conflict of interests

between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan since the latter part of the 19th century. China, on the other hand, looked at India over the buffer states of Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, and Tibet until the last two lost their buffer status through the incorporation of the one into India and the other into China. In addition, Chinese territory, including Tibet, is contiguous to both the Pakistani and Indian areas of Kashmir, the Indian states of Uttar Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh, and the North East Frontier Agency.

Secondly, because it had a direct clash of interest with a regional state, a state whose power differential was not considered to be significant, China could not play the detached, mediatory role which the United States and the Soviet Union occasionally assumed.

Yet once the border dispute with India was solved militarily to Chinese satisfaction, China's involvement in South Asia diminished. China continued its support of Pakistan through military and economic assistance and diplomatic means, probably aimed more toward countering US and Soviet influence with Pakistan than it was directed against India. China also harassed India through support to the Naxalites in West Bengal and the Mizo and Naga insurgents in Eastern India.

During the 1965 war, China supported Pakistan by making some threatening moves along the Sino-Indian border but desisted from any strong action in the face of US and Soviet warnings. Of the three external powers, only China was not neutral in 1965. Consequently, she was able to strengthen her position with Pakistan by taking over first place as arms purveyor to that country. Immersed in the problems of the cultural revolution, the Chinese seemed to take a less active interest in the subcontinent after 1966, while maintaining their intimate connection with Pakistan.

China's relatively restrained policy toward South Asia suggests a restrained Chinese interest in the region, focused primarily on the maintenance of stability and the security of the Chinese marchlands along the Himalayas. Apparently China has not thus far

looked upon South Asia as an area of great opportunity, and has not striven very energetically to exploit the potential for exercising leadership over indigenous revolutionary forces, in part because of its ties to the nonrevolutionary state of Pakistan.

The lessened US involvement in South Asia, which dates from 1965, preceded the Nixon or Guam Doctrine of 1969 and the beginning of the current detente relationship with the Soviet Union. Our disengagement from South Asia is sometimes referred to as a case study in the Nixon Doctrine, but it really occurred before application of that doctrine. The US-Soviet detente, while hospitable to restrained US-Soviet rivalry in South Asia, was not an important contributor to the standoff in the relationship of all three external powers to the subcontinent. Rather, each of the powers had learned of its limited ability to exert significant influence over a sustained period, either because of checks imposed by the other external powers or, more pointedly, because of rubbing up against the assertive nationalism of the regional states. "Once burned, twice shy" is perhaps too strong an adage to be applicable here. Still, of the three external powers, the United States and the Soviet Union carry some scar tissue, and all three have seen enough of subcontinental fires to be leery about plunging too deeply into South Asian affairs.

ENGAGEMENT AND REASSESSMENT

The dramatic US opening to China occurred during the incubation of the 1971 crisis which was to explode before the end of that year in hostilities between India and Pakistan and to give birth to Bangladesh. The coincidence of the crisis and the establishment of a different Sino-American relationship intensified the impact of the new three-cornered detente on the two principal South Asian states and the third external power. To complicate matters further, the focus of the crisis, Pakistan, had played a helpful role in bringing about the new relationship. Consequently, the US opening to China exacerbated, rather than checked,

tensions on the subcontinent and impeded, rather than facilitated, external power efforts to bring the crisis under control.

At the inception of the crisis in March 1971, it is unlikely that any one of the players wanted to see the breakup of Pakistan: not the United States, not China, not the Soviet Union, and not even India which stood to gain from an all-Pakistan government under the control of the Awami League that pledged better relations with India. All three external powers seemed relatively content with the status quo in early 1971, and apprehensive over drastic changes in the political map of the subcontinent.

At first, the Soviet Union followed a fairly neutral course. While censuring Pakistan's repressive actions in East Pakistan, the Soviet Union urged a peaceful solution of the dispute within the framework of a united Pakistan. Chinese public comment on the crisis was sparse and generally noncommittal. India, although making no secret of its sympathy for the Bengali insurgents, refrained from legal recognition of Bangladesh and overt military assistance to the insurgents.

It is moot whether the US opening to China was more of a reason or a pretext for the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation between the Soviet Union and India that was signed in New Delhi on 9 August 1971. To India, the new US-Chinese relationship meant that the United States would probably not join hands with the Soviet Union, as it did in 1965, to warn China against any show of force in support of Pakistan if the East Pakistan crisis deepened into war. Consequently, India could look only to the Soviet Union for support. The Soviet Union, for its part, might have conceived of the pact to some extent as a counter to a suddenly improved Sino-American relationship. But certain scholars have argued that Moscow hoped primarily that the pact would stabilize the situation by discouraging any precipitate action by Pakistan, which now knew that India would have Soviet support,² or by providing some leverage in restraining India if that became necessary.³ To Pakistan, after the fact, it appeared that the Indo-Soviet pact had been intended as a deliberate Indian

move to prepare for its invasion of East Pakistan.

When hostilities broke out, the two-sided triangle of the evolving US-Soviet and US-Chinese relationship did not prove to be as effective a platform for crisis management as had the pre-detente US-Soviet cooperation in 1965, when neither had any reason to be beholden to Chinese sensitivities. The balance of power in the subcontinent, suddenly made more intricate by the US opening to China and the Soviet pact with India at a time of regional crisis, made it easier for the regional states to play off one external power against another, and made a genuinely neutral role more difficult for the United States and the Soviet Union.

Nor did the leverage of the major powers over the actions of the regional states turn out to be decisive. US efforts with President Yahya to bring about a change in the suicidal policies of the Pakistani military ran out of time. The Chinese were unable to deter India from moving on Pakistan, and the Soviets watched from the sidelines as the crisis drifted into war.

In the immediate aftermath of the December 1971 war, most observers of the South Asian scene were prone to belabor the enhanced Soviet influence resulting from support of the victorious Indians and the correspondingly lessened influence of the United States and China. Now, over three years later, the starkness of these earlier impressions has been moderated by the processes of adjustment and accommodation under way on the subcontinent.

Pakistan seems to have reconciled itself amazingly fast and well to the loss of its eastern wing, and probably is better off politically and financially for it. Bangladesh, in desperate need of external assistance, has no reason to be hostile to any external power. India, its pact with the Soviet Union notwithstanding, has displayed a desire to warm relations with the United States, and even the tentative stirrings of an interest in looking toward an eventual improvement of its relations with China. The Soviet Union has not sought to capitalize on its 1971 gains in

any manner alarming to the United States; the United States has acknowledged the enhanced power of India; and China has continued its restrained role. Over all these developments the new and broadened detente relationship has cast a beneficial shadow, as the three external powers presumably attach more importance to the new relationship than to stirring up new rivalries in South Asia. Thus, the 1971 crisis, while it drew the three external powers willy-nilly into immediate involvement in South Asian affairs, may turn out to be only a temporary and reversible sidetracking of the longer-term trend of disengagement dating from the mid-1960s.

RESTRAINT AND REASSESSMENT

A well-conceived foreign policy toward a region should always adjust to the realities of the situation in that area. The problem in giving substance to this truism lies in determining what forces drive a government's perception of these realities or, as they are more often termed, national interests. In the case of South Asia, does the gradually evolved US posture of taking a reduced part in the affairs of the subcontinent represent:

- greater wisdom accumulated through almost thirty years of experience, comprehending a conscious judgment that South Asia now represents less of a threat and less of an opportunity;
- distraction to higher priority involvement in neighboring areas, first Indochina and then the Middle East; or,
- an attempt to rationalize past frustrations and to console ourselves into believing that our interests are not particularly large and important because we no longer have the resources or the will to support these interests?

The answer appears to contain all three elements, but the first is clearly the most important determinant.

The bogeyman of Soviet or Chinese military aggression in South Asia, never very substantial, seems even less so today in the light of the Sino-Soviet hostility and improved US relations with both the Soviet Union and China. Geographically, South Asia

is protected by tremendous mountain ranges, making major aggression extremely difficult. Moreover, the principal centers of Soviet and Chinese power are remote from South Asia.⁴ Nor need we be apprehensive over the prospects of internal subversion through indigenous Communist parties, at least in the near run or foreseeable future. In India, the Communists are plagued by factionalism. In Bangladesh, they have not yet succeeded in making substantial inroads into the political control of the dominant Awami League, nurtured on the still powerful spring of Bengali nationalism. In Pakistan, the Communists have remained weak and unable to exert any effective influence over the course of political developments.

South Asia possesses no natural resources which are needed urgently by the United States. Only one percent of US overseas foreign investment is in South Asia and US trade with the countries of the subcontinent has not been significant, appearing to hold little potential for substantial expansion.

Many writers have seen a derivative strategic importance for South Asia because of potential US-Soviet naval rivalry in the Indian Ocean. Such importance is likely to remain more hypothetical than actual until such time as a regional state, such as Iran or India, has the ability to project military power into the Indian Ocean to a meaningful degree, and as long as no regional state provides base facilities to either the Soviet Union or the United States.

Similarly, the transformation of East Pakistan into Bangladesh does not seem to have altered substantially that land's lack of strategic importance. A perceptive AID colleague in Dacca was fond of saying that "The strategic unimportance of East Pakistan (in great power eyes) cannot be underestimated." Now that the Bengalis have achieved independence, it can be argued perhaps that India no longer has to worry about a potentially hostile rear area in the event of renewed hostilities with China in the North East Frontier Agency. India's problems with insurgents in the areas bordering Bangladesh, however, have probably not diminished because of the chaotic law and

order situation and the quantity of loose arms in Bangladesh.

Our purely bilateral relations with the countries of South Asia present few significant problems. That most quotable of our ambassadors to South Asia, former Ambassador to India Daniel P. Moynihan, said, "The relationship between the United States and India is one in which there is no significant conflict of interest. . . . Neither covets the territory, trade or prestige of the other, nor do we compete for the attention or favors of third countries."⁵ The same statement could be made with respect to the other nations in the subcontinent, or indeed, to most of the countries in the Third World with whom our problems, if they exist, nearly always involve the relations of one or the other of us with third countries.

Indeed, the danger of these third country problems should be enough to keep us from being lulled into believing that the current, tolerably stable situation on the subcontinent is necessarily deep-rooted or permanent. There is always the danger that some one of the regional states will seek the support of one or more of the external powers in order to strengthen its position in a dispute with another state on the subcontinent, or to help redress the regional power balance more in its favor. Both India and Pakistan have sought and obtained external support in the past. Yet, balanced against a regional state's temptation to solicit outside support and an external power's temptation to provide that support is the underlying suspicion of the South Asian nations regarding great power activities, and the corresponding desire of the regional states to assert an independent course of action as much as possible.

In this connection, the July 1972 Simla Agreement between India and Pakistan is encouraging since it signified the intention of the two most important regional states to reconcile their differences on a bilateral basis. The three external powers, by welcoming the agreement, have chosen to follow a policy of noninvolvement in disputes between India and Pakistan. Further, the Simla process offers some hope even with regard to the

perennial problem of Kashmir. Although it is difficult to foresee a Kashmir settlement acceptable to both India and Pakistan, progress toward an eventual settlement seems greater in a bilateral context than if pursued in a wider arena such as the United Nations.

The internal power balance in South Asia, changed perceptibly in India's favor as the result of the 1971 war, is still an unsteady one. India is now perched higher than Pakistan on the seesaw, but not so much higher as to cause the plank to move all the way in one direction. The new situation on the subcontinent seems to call for Indian preeminence without domination, inequality of power without hegemony. Such a balance will necessarily be a delicate one, easily upset by one of the external powers and conceivably calling for the occasional insertion of some remedial external pressure.

Phillips Talbot has written of the post-1971 grouping of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh as a "ménage à trois" on the subcontinent.⁶ For the bulk of the post-World War II period, South Asia has also been an uneasy ménage à trois for the United States, the Soviet Union, and China. In the longer run, the South Asian scene could be altered significantly if the present triad of external powers capable of influencing developments in the area should expand to include Iran, which is already beginning to play an expanded role, and Japan. Again in the longer run, should its power increase markedly, then India, a nation which already has the world's fourth largest armed force and is an incipient nuclear power, might well chafe at even a restrained effort of the external powers to manipulate a security balance in South Asia. Indian writers are now beginning to express the hope that the possession of nuclear weapons by India could permit Indian policymakers to treat the subcontinent as India's security zone and to forestall foreign interference.⁷ In other words, the present distinction between the regional states and the major external powers, which is largely one of power, might come to be less meaningful.

The latest *ex cathedra* pronouncement on overall US policy toward South Asia is found

in President Nixon's report to the Congress on 3 May 1973 entitled "US Foreign Policy for the 1970s." In this report President Nixon said:

The relations between the countries of South Asia and countries outside the region must be consistent with the peace and independence of the subcontinent and the peace of the world. If any outside power acquires an exclusive position in an area of this mass and potential, others will be forced to respond. The major powers all have important relationships there. No South Asian interest is served if those relationships are embroiled in local tensions. . . . We see no reason why we cannot have bilateral ties with each country in South Asia consistent with its own aspirations and ours, and not directed against any other nation. We shall gear our relations with other major powers outside the region to encourage policies of restraint and noninterference.⁸



Such a policy is a prescription for continued mutual restraint by all three external powers, resting to a considerable extent on our belief that neither the Soviet Union nor China will want to risk its detente relationship with the United States by taking steps in the subcontinent that might provoke a countervailing response from us. Detente is thus explicitly credited with an important role in the preservation of stability in South Asia. Interestingly, the President spoke not of the vital interests but of the "important relationships" of the major powers. The term "relationship" suggests a historically-derived configuration of concerns with a particular country rather than a cold, hard assessment of that country's strategic importance to us. The most obvious of these relationships are the Soviet Union's relationships with India and Bangladesh, China's relationship with Pakistan, and the United States' relationships with India and Bangladesh, as well as with Pakistan.

Our undertaking to practice restraint and

noninterference, provided the other major powers follow suit, should favor greater objectivity in our diplomacy toward South Asia. Some specific corollaries of a policy of restraint would be:

- a scrupulously restrained military supply policy small enough as to be easily terminated if continued military supply seemed more of a liability than an asset;

- a meticulous effort to keep tabs on arms sales to Iran and the Arab nations to preclude these sales from being transformed, against our intention, into indirect military deliveries to Pakistan or into a war reserve for Pakistan;

- the firm eschewal of any bases in the subcontinent; and

- a cooling of our rhetoric which in the past has often connoted a degree of commitment greater than a policy of restrained noninvolvement would appropriately support.

For example, is it accurate or necessary to continue to refer to Pakistan as an ally, when we have no enemy in common and when our common objective boils down to the continued independence and integrity of Pakistan, the type of goal that we could say we shared with most of the countries of the world? Support and friendship can be offered in ways more meaningful and less misleading than through outmoded rhetoric.

IF the restraint of our words matches the restraint of our involvement, which in turn

matches and encourages the restraint of the Soviet Union or China, our policy toward South Asia should afford us the flexibility to adapt more readily to changing situations in this volatile part of the world where crises have a way of catching fire despite our most conscientious efforts and despite the beneficial damper of detente.

NOTES

1. Data Systems & Reports Division, Comptroller, Defense Security Assistance Agency, *Foreign Military Sales and Military Assistance Facts*, April 1974.

2. Vijay Sen Budhraj, *Soviet Russia and the Hindustan Subcontinent* (Bombay: Somaiya Publications, 1973), p. 218.

3. William J. Barnds, *India, Pakistan, and the Great Powers* (New York: Praeger, 1972), p. 243.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 324.

5. Daniel P. Moynihan, Address to the Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi, 28 December 1973. Printed in *India Quarterly*, Vol. XXX, No. 1 (January-March 1974), 6.

6. Phillips Talbot, "The Subcontinent: Ménage à Trois," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 50, No. 4 (July 1972), 698.

7. J. A. Naik, *India, Russia, China and Bangladesh* (New Delhi: S. Chand & Co., 1972), p. 94.

8. Richard M. Nixon, *US Foreign Policy for the 1970s; A Report to the Congress*, 3 May 1973 (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1973), p. 151.

