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# **FUTURE WAR PAPER**

***TITLE: Unrestricted Warfare: A Chinese doctrine for  
future warfare?***

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## Executive Summary

**Title:** *Unrestricted Warfare*: A Chinese doctrine for future warfare?

**Author:** Major John A. Van Messel, USMC

**Thesis:** *Unrestricted Warfare* is neither a revolution in military thought nor an executable doctrine for future warfare but a collection of tactics, techniques, and procedures that have been used throughout history and will continue to be used by future adversaries.

**Discussion:** In February 1999, two Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) senior Air Force colonels, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, published *Unrestricted Warfare*. This paper critically analyzes the concept of "Unrestricted Warfare" as it relates to future warfare doctrine. It accomplishes this by discussing why "Unrestricted Warfare" is not an original concept; provides three examples of why the concept would be difficult to adopt; explains what direction the Chinese Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) has taken since the book was published; and concludes with an analysis of the impact of the publication on future warfare.

**Conclusion(s) or Recommendation(s):** *Unrestricted Warfare* fails to recognize that future war will still have its limitations. In order to adhere to the concepts of the book, a nation would have to conduct warfare with all elements of national power, resembling something closer to the Clausewitzian model of "total" war. There are major constraints to the implementation of this model, from directing a legitimate government to wage indiscriminate acts of warfare to the effects of warfare waged in an era of increased globalization. Additionally, the book fails to explain how a nation organizes, trains, and equips all elements of national power to execute the different forms and methods of "Unrestricted Warfare." *Unrestricted Warfare*, as it is currently written, is less of an executable doctrine than a collection of tactics, techniques, and procedures for future war adversaries.

## Table of Contents

<b>Disclaimer</b>	<b>ii</b>
<b>Executive Summary</b>	<b>iii</b>
<b>Table of Contents</b>	<b>iv</b>
<b>Introduction</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Unrestricted Warfare - not an Original Concept</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>Applying the Concept of Unrestricted Warfare</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>The PLA Today</b>	<b>12</b>
<b>Conclusions</b>	<b>14</b>
<b>Annex A - Forms of Unrestricted Warfare</b>	<b>17</b>
<b>Annex B - Methods of Combination</b>	<b>18</b>
<b>Annex C – Principles of War</b>	<b>19</b>
<b>Bibliography</b>	<b>20</b>

## Introduction

“Whether it be the instructions of hackers, a major explosion at the World Trade Center, or a bombing attack by bin Laden, all of these greatly exceed the frequency bandwidths understood by the American military...This is because they have never taken into consideration and have even refused to consider means that are contrary to tradition and to select measures of operation other than military means.”<sup>1</sup>

In February 1999, two Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) senior Air Force colonels, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, published *Unrestricted Warfare*. The book was written in reaction to the stunning 1991 U.S. led coalition victory in the Gulf War against Iraq. By the time it was translated and placed in wide distribution, the events of September 11, 2001 were occurring in the United States. The above quotation foreshadowed events to come and highlighted concern that the Chinese were adopting a new style of warfare for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. Now five years since the publication of *Unrestricted Warfare*, what impact has the book had on the discussion of future war?

This paper will critically analyze the concept of “Unrestricted Warfare” as it relates to future warfare doctrine. It attempts to accomplish this by discussing why “Unrestricted Warfare” is not an original concept; providing three examples of why the concept would be difficult to adopt; explaining what direction the Chinese Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) has taken since the book was published; and concluding with an analysis of the impact of the publication on future warfare. Ultimately, this paper determines that *Unrestricted Warfare* is neither a revolution in military thought nor an executable doctrine for future warfare but a collection of tactics, techniques, and procedures that have been used throughout history and will continue to be used by future adversaries.

## **Unrestricted Warfare - not an original concept**

The thesis of *Unrestricted Warfare* is that recent advances in technology, the rise of globalism, the diffusion of power beyond the nation-state, coupled with increased capabilities of modern weapons, have all combined to create a new context for conflict.<sup>2</sup> The authors believe that their publication contains a new concept to adopt in order to succeed in this new context. Neither the factors expressed in the thesis nor the concept that they can be combined in future conflict is an original idea. Close examination of the footnotes shows that most of the inspiration in *Unrestricted Warfare* comes from western futurists, U.S. military theorists and U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) documents. A closer look at each chapter is necessary to gauge the originality of the work.

The first chapter, on the relationship of weapons and warfare, begins with the concept that a weapons revolution precedes a revolution in military affairs (RMA). In the past, the invention of a few weapons could alter the form of war. Today, numerous weapons integrated into a weapons system have the same effect. This idea comes from the 1996 article, “Preparing for the Next War: Some Views on the Revolution of Military Affairs”, written by theorist Steven Blank. The chapter continues with a discussion of the ideas of “fight the fight that fits one’s weapons” and “build the weapons to fit the fight.” The first concept describes the natural evolution of weapons and tactics in warfare. The second concept describes an American approach to future warfare. This discussion draws largely from T.N. Dupuy’s *The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare*.

The authors then discuss “old concept” and “new concept” weapons. Precision-guided bombs, for example, are considered “old concept” weapons because they are an extension of an existing weapon used in the same manner. “New concept” weapons use technology in a new way, such as the use of silver iodide power to help detect soldiers walking along the Ho Chi Minh Trail during the Vietnam War. This discussion is then extended to the notion of “weapons of new concept,” which encompasses weapons that transcend the military realm, but can still be used in combat operations, such as a man-made stock market crash, a computer virus, or an earthquake. Numerous books and articles on “concept” weapons were written prior to the publication of *Unrestricted Warfare*, including the referenced 1997 book *New Military Perspectives for the Next Century* by the Military Science Publishing House.

The second chapter focuses on future war. The authors believe that non-professional warriors and non-state actors are posing a greater threat to sovereign nations, making these warriors and actors more serious adversaries for every professional army.<sup>3</sup> The authors cite numerous examples including a 16 year-old hacker who broke into the Pentagon’s secure internet system and a global investor who caused economic instability in the Malaysian market. The chapter concludes with a critique of the American definition of military operations other than war (MOOTW). The authors feel that the definition of missions and operations undertaken by armed forces when there is no state of war is too narrow. They believe that “non-military war operations” better captures the true essence that human beings will use every conceivable means to achieve their goals.<sup>4</sup>

This chapter references multiple articles from military journals and draws on a big influence from U.S. futurists Alvin and Heidi Toffler. In their book *War and Anti War*, the authors reference the quote “If the tools of warfare are no longer tanks and artillery, but rather computer viruses and micro-robots, then we can no longer say that nations are the only armed groups or that soldiers are the only ones in possession of the tools of war.”<sup>5</sup> Clearly this quote is striking similar to the thesis of chapter two. Additionally, the examples of “non-military” means (Annex A) are commonly known methods of warfare.

The third chapter analyses the 1991 Gulf War from various perspectives in order to prove that this war was a model for future wars. The chapter begins with an explanation of why the Gulf War should be considered a classic war in the age of technically integrated globalization. The chapter shifts to a discussion of military reorganization and the vital role the Goldwater-Nichols Act played in making the U.S. services fight as a joint force. The authors believe that any country that hopes to win a war in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century must inevitably face the option of either reorganizing or being defeated.<sup>6</sup> The authors note that battles of the Gulf War were mainly decided by an integrated air campaign and showed the possibility of “omni-directional” combat.<sup>7</sup> The chapter concludes with an exploration of the role of the tank, the emerging role of the attack helicopter, and the media’s role and its importance to future wars.

This chapter is almost entirely derived from DoD documents, military books and journals. Analysis of the Gulf War footnotes the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report *Military Experiences and Lessons of the Gulf War* and quotes heavily from numerous Gulf War books including *The Gulf War* and *Desert Warrior*. Later in the chapter, the

authors' note that the term "omni-directional" combat is taken directly from U.S. Army literature. The concluding discussions of tanks, attack helicopters, and the role of the media have been addressed by numerous western sources prior to the publication of *Unrestricted Warfare*.

The fourth chapter looks at what lessons the American Armed Forces learned from the Gulf War and what current trends the U.S. military is pursuing. Each of the services learned different lessons from the Gulf War: the Army learned that it needed to be more digital, flexible, and smaller; the Air Force that it needed to deploy faster and be able to exploit space; and the Navy that it needed to transition from seapower to a role of supplying the other services. Currently, the authors believe that the fundamental objective of the U.S. military is to use technology and weapons to achieve victory, while keeping casualties to a minimum. The authors also see military leaders striving to keep combat and non-combat military operations separate, which does not accurately reflect future warfare. Finally, the authors point out how each of the services has not learned the real lessons of "omni-directional" warfare from the Gulf War and missed the opportunity of progressing toward an RMA.

Gulf War lessons and current trends is another chapter almost exclusively derived from western sources. DoD documents and military journals are referenced at length, to include joint documents such as "Joint Doctrine for 2010." The only originality of the chapter is the debatable conclusion that the services have not learned the real lessons of "omni-directional" warfare, the power of jointness, and the connection between combat and non-combat operations.

The fifth chapter begins with a discussion of the perceived American attitude that military means will always be decisive in future conflict. The authors believe this is a shortsighted view because war does not involve only conventional weapons and that technologies are now in the hands of new kinds of enemies. The authors go on to point out how America is poorly organized for non-military threats, especially terrorism. The chapter then turns to a proposed method for fighting future war. The “cocktail style” of combining different forms of warfare (See Annex A) will be the key to conducting war in the future. The authors’ note that regardless of whether the war was 3,000 years ago or at the opening of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, it seemed that all victories display one common phenomenon - the winner is the one who combined well.<sup>8</sup>

In developing a common operating method for future warfare, the authors reference military journals, fellow Chinese and U.S. theorists. Of note “Strategy and the Revolution in Military Affairs – From Theory to Policy” (June 1995) by Steven Metz and James Kievit of the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute is referenced in relation to combining new technology. While the extent to which the authors develop the “cocktail style” method may be original, the idea of combining forms of warfare is not.

The sixth chapter is a philosophical chapter on identifying “Rules of Victory.” The authors are certain that there have always been “Rules of Victory” throughout the history of warfare. The chapter discusses the rule of the “Golden Section” and the “Side-Principle” rule.<sup>9</sup> In relation to warfare, both of these rules are based on using an indirect approach to achieve victory. The authors use historical examples to show that these rules can be used in various

forms (means, tactics, weapons, point of attack, opportunities of fighting, uneven deployment of forces, or strategy) to achieve an advantage. The chapter concludes that victory always belongs to the side that understands and correctly uses the rules.

This chapter primarily references Chinese authors and various military historians. While the “Golden Section” and the “Side-Principle” rules are not original, the concept of applying them to modern warfare is. The authors use historical examples, including Desert Storm, to validate the existence of these rules. While the authors are vague in defining tangible “Rules of Victory”, they are successful in adapting an indirect approach philosophy to their body of work.

The seventh chapter suggests how the means of unrestricted warfare should be combined as one. This chapter discusses how to be victorious in a war that is fought beyond the traditional battlefield. The authors believe the key to victory is to understand and effectively use four combinations of means: Supra-National Combinations (combining national, international, and non-state organizations to a country’s benefit), Supra-Domain Combinations (combining battlefields and choosing the main domain), Supra-Means Combinations (combining all available means, military and non-military, to carry out operations), and Supra-Tier Combinations (combining all levels of conflict into each campaign). (See Annex B) Once we accept the authors’ proposed concept of combined warfare, then the means used in peacetime can be used in war. Moreover, tactical level means can be used effectively at the strategic level.

The chapter references the writings of theorists Zbigniew Brzezinski and Alvin Toffler. The PLA colonels quote approvingly of Brzezinski’s books *Out of Control: Global Turmoil on*

*the Eve of the Twenty-First Century* and *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives* and Toffler's book *Powershift: Knowledge, Wealth, and Violence at the Edge of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*. Although the four combinations of means are originally labeled, the ideas are largely borrowed from these theorists.

The final chapter identifies the principles of future war. The chapter begins with a historical study of known principles of war. The authors note that principles are important to understanding war within a certain time and a specific national environment. In an attempt to update the historical principles, the authors identify eight essential principles of "Unrestricted Warfare": Omnidirectionality, Synchrony, Limited Objectives, Unlimited Measures, Asymmetry, Minimal Consumption, Multidimensional Coordination, and Adjustment and Control of the Entire Process. (See Annex C) While not guaranteeing success in every case, the authors do feel that a commander will definitely fail if he does not follow their principles.

This chapter references historical works by Sun Tzu and J.F.C. Fuller in describing principles of war. Although the terms and general concepts of the eight new principles of *Unrestricted Warfare* are not new, the authors are original in making an attempt to prioritize what is most important in future war. The authors use a common sense approach and try to take those principles that are most applicable to a multi-dimensional battlefield that focuses on combining actions at the right place and at the right time.

A final analysis of *Unrestricted Warfare* leads to the conclusion that the book, to a large degree, lacks original thought. A majority of the references come from U.S. military theorists,

futurists, DoD documents, and military journals. What may end up being the principle innovation of the authors is that they have provided a broad perspective on the implications of combining tactics and technologies in the new era of globalism.

### **Applying the Concept of Unrestricted Warfare**

In order to test the concepts of “Unrestricted Warfare,” three models, a large “nation-state”, a small “nation-state”, and a “non-state” actor are chosen to be applied to the forms of “Unrestricted Warfare” (See Annex A), the methods of combinations (See Annex B), the principles of war (See Annex C), and a scenario example from the book. The purpose of this analysis is to determine what difficulties the models would have in adopting the concepts of “Unrestricted Warfare.” The test will use China as a large “nation-state”, Taiwan as a small “nation-state”, and the Abu Sayyaf Group as a “non-state” actor to facilitate a clearer understanding of the three models.

In chapter five, the authors give an example of the “Cocktail Style” method of combining different forms of warfare. The example paints the following scenario: An attacking nation secretly musters large amounts of capital without the enemy nation being aware and launches a sneak attack against its financial markets. After causing a financial crisis, the nation buries a computer virus and hacker detachment in the opponent’s computer system while at the same time carrying out a network attack against the enemy so that the civilian electricity, traffic dispatching, financial transaction, telephone communications, and mass media networks are completely paralyzed. This action causes the enemy nation to fall into social panic, street riots,

and a political crisis. Finally, military means are utilized in gradual stages until the enemy is forced to sign a dishonorable peace treaty.<sup>10</sup>

In the large “nation-state” model, China is capable of conducting trade, financial, cultural, ecological, media, technological, resource, psychological, network, international law, environmental and economic aid forms of warfare. The forms of new terror, smuggling, and drug warfare most likely would not be conducted by China due to adhering to rules of law. China is a member of numerous organizations, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the United Nations, that are bounded by rules of law. Although the majority of the forms of warfare can be executed, China would also have to be concerned with the unintended consequences of globalization. For example, if the Chinese were to initiate a financial war, their economy may be adversely affected due to the interdependence of the world economy.

China should have the capability of using all four methods of combination and should be the most capable of applying the principles of war. The only principle that may be difficult to adopt is the principle of unlimited measures. In this instance, China again would be restricted in using unlimited measures by rules of law. Applying this model to the scenario, China should be capable of combining all actions of the example.

In the small “nation-state” model, Taiwan may be capable of conducting trade, financial, cultural, ecological, media, technological, resource, psychological, network, international law, environmental and economic aid forms of warfare to a limited degree. The level of success in

these forms would depend on the power and resources that Taiwan has at its disposal. Like China, the forms of new terror, smuggling, and drug warfare would be restricted to Taiwan by rules of law. Additionally, any unintended consequences would have an even greater impact on a small “nation-state” like Taiwan.

Taiwan should have the capability of employing the Supra-domain, Supra-means, and Supra-tier methods of combination. The Supra-national method, combining national, international, and non-state organizations, would be difficult for Taiwan to achieve due to its limited power and influence. Taiwan should be able to apply the omnidirectionality, synchrony, limited objectives, asymmetry, and adjustment and control principles of war. The principles of minimal consumption and multidimensional coordination may be beyond the capabilities of Taiwan and the principle of unlimited measures is again restricted by rules of law. Applying this model to the scenario, Taiwan would be challenged to achieve all components of the example, especially against an equal or larger sized nation.

In the “non-state” actor model, the Abu Sayyaf may be capable of conducting all forms of warfare but would be limited in conducting trade, international law, and economic aid warfare. These three types of warfare are more dependent on interaction at the national level. Although a majority of the forms of warfare can be executed, the Abu Sayyaf also may be limited in its ability to execute multiple forms simultaneously or to a sufficient level of magnitude due to its size and resources. The Abu Sayyaf however does have a big advantage over China and Taiwan in not abiding by rules of law.

The Abu Sayyaf should have a similar capability that Taiwan has in employing methods of combination. The Abu Sayyaf's limitations would be in its level of power and influence. The Abu Sayyaf should be able to apply omnidirectionality, synchrony, limited objectives, unlimited measures, asymmetry, and adjustment and control principles of war. The principles of minimal consumption and multidimensional coordination may be beyond the capabilities of the Abu Sayyaf due to its size and resources. Applying this model to the scenario, the Abu Sayyaf may be able to achieve a majority of the components of the example, but most likely would be unable to use effective military means in the end to force a treaty.

Based on the analysis above, it can be concluded that China has the best chance of successfully applying the tenets of "Unrestricted Warfare", but is impacted by adhering to rules of law and the effects of globalization. Taiwan has the least chance of successfully applying the tenets of "Unrestricted Warfare" because it has the same limitations as China and has limitations in size, power, and resources. The Abu Sayyaf has the distinct advantage of not being encumbered by rules of law, but has some of the same limitations as Taiwan and may be restricted in sufficient military means. In applying the tenets of "Unrestricted Warfare", it can be concluded that the concept would be difficult for any of the actors to fully adopt.

### **The PLA Today**

After reviewing FBIS translated messages since 2001 and the 2004 PRC translated white paper on national defense, it does not appear that the PLA has adopted the concept of *Unrestricted Warfare* as a future warfare doctrine. The Chinese have reoriented their military

doctrine from fighting a people's war under modern conditions to fighting and winning a high-technology war against a modern opponent. The PLA recognizes its weapons and equipment gap with western militaries and is focused on correcting this deficiency. According to the Defense Intelligence Agency, by 2010, even the best 10 percent of the Chinese military will have equipment that is more than 20 years behind the capabilities of the U.S. military.<sup>11</sup> Even taking intelligence estimates with a grain of salt, the Chinese state that the main task of their national defense is to step up modernization of its armed forces.<sup>12</sup>

Concurrent with modernization of the PLA, the Chinese are also attempting to incorporate new information technology. The body of reporting on Chinese military initiatives points to an emphasis on a simultaneous approach of informationalization and mechanization.<sup>13</sup> Informationalization is a word used by the Chinese to describe the integration of information-linked systems with armed forces in order to enhance warfighting capabilities. To a lesser extent, the Chinese are also focused on transforming the military from a manpower-intensive one to a technology-intensive one, stepping up development of new and high-tech weaponry and equipment, raising military training to a higher level, building joint operational capabilities, improving their system of leadership and command, and realigning the organizational structure of military educational institutions. These initiatives sound strikingly similar to some of our own DoD transformation initiatives.

As the authors of *Unrestricted Warfare* have pointed out, the Chinese believe that there is a worldwide RMA gaining momentum. The forms of war are undergoing changes from mechanization to informationalization. Confrontation between systems will become the

principle feature of future confrontation on the battlefield. While the Chinese do show a special interest in information technology, they do not emphasize the majority of the methods and forms of “Unrestricted Warfare.” Not surprisingly, the concepts discussed in the book may be appealing to China’s political leaders because it offers the lure of a defense policy on the cheap. The PLA, on the other hand, is less to embrace these forms of warfare because they will tend to see it translating into smaller defense budgets, lower manpower, less bureaucratic clout, and declining prestige.<sup>14</sup> So far, the PLA has dictated China’s military transformation efforts.

## **Conclusions**

This paper has examined the concept of “Unrestricted Warfare” as it relates to future warfare doctrine. It accomplished the task by concluding that the book lacks original thought; that applying the tenets of “Unrestricted Warfare” would be difficult for a large “nation-state”, a small “nation-state”, or a “non-state” actor to adopt; and that the PLA has not currently adopted the concept. Lastly, this paper will answer the question of whether “Unrestricted Warfare” is a viable doctrine for future warfare or whether it is a collection of tactics, techniques, and procedures for future war adversaries.

In understanding the future warfare environment, the conclusions of *Unrestricted Warfare* are invaluable. The authors correctly identify that we are entering an era of global and technological integration. The modern concept of “nation states” may no longer be the sole representative occupying the top position in social, political, economic and cultural organizations. They believe that the transition of “nation states” to globalization has supplanted

military means with diplomatic, informational, and economic means. Faced with warfare in the broad sense that will unfold on a borderless battlefield, it is no longer possible to rely on military forces and weapons alone to achieve national security in the larger strategic sense. *Unrestricted Warfare* also provides insight into understanding different forms and methods of conducting warfare.

Where *Unrestricted Warfare* falls short is in providing a proper context for war and in translating theory into executable doctrine. In regards to context, *Unrestricted Warfare* fails to recognize that future war will still have its limitations. In order to adhere to the concepts of the book, a nation would have to conduct warfare with all elements of national power, resembling something closer to the Clausewitzian model of “total” war. There are major constraints to the implementation of this model, from directing a legitimate government to wage indiscriminate acts of warfare to the effects of warfare waged in an era of increased globalization. Additionally, the book fails to explain how a nation organizes, trains, and equips all elements of national power to execute the different forms and methods of “Unrestricted Warfare.”

*Unrestricted Warfare*, as it is currently written, is less of an executable doctrine than a collection of tactics, techniques, and procedures for future war adversaries. Although *Unrestricted Warfare* will remain a concept, it will continue to stimulate professional thought and discussion. *Unrestricted Warfare* reminds us that potential enemies are always thinking, the field of military theory is always changing, and ensuring our national security is always an on-going process.

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<sup>1</sup> Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui *Unrestricted Warfare: China's Master Plan to Destroy America*. Panama City, Panama: Pan American Pub., 2002, 122.

<sup>2</sup> Dean Cheng "Unrestricted Warfare: Review Essay II" *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, Spring 2000, 123.

<sup>3</sup> *Unrestricted Warfare*, 36.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, 38

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 45.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 53.

<sup>7</sup> "Omni-directional" combat is a theory that combat will extend over a broad and all-inclusive range that covers the ground, sea, air, space, and cyber realms.

<sup>8</sup> *Unrestricted Warfare*, 117.

<sup>9</sup> The "Golden Section" is an ancient Greek architectural formula that was believed to be perfect. The "Side-Principle" rule is a metaphor for the combination of body and soul based upon the relationship of nouns and modifiers in the Chinese language.

<sup>10</sup> *Unrestricted Warfare*, 122-3.

<sup>11</sup> Gill Bates and Michael O'Hanlon, "China's Hollow Military." *National Interest*, Summer 1999, 4.

<sup>12</sup> State Council Information Office, People's Republic of China, *China's Nation Defense in 2004*, 27 December 2004, 5.

<sup>13</sup> Unclassified Message, R191258Z Jun 03, from FBIS, Subj: TKP: High-level CPC study section on RMA focuses on Lessons from Iraq War, 3.

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## ANNEX A

### Forms of Unrestricted Warfare<sup>1</sup>

**“Trade Warfare”** means using trade measures for waging non-military warfare.

**“Financial Warfare”** means entering and subverting banking and stock markets and manipulating the value of a targeted currency.

**“New Terror Warfare”** means terrorist operations using the latest technology to attack humanity as a whole.

**“Ecological Warfare”** means employing modern technology to adversely influence the natural state of rivers, oceans, the crust of the earth, the polar ice sheets, the air circulating in the atmosphere, and the ozone layer.

**“Smuggling warfare”** means sabotaging a rival country’s economy by flooding its markets with illegal goods, and jeopardizing a local economy by flooding the market with pirated products.

**“Cultural warfare”** means influencing the cultural biases of a targeted country by imposing your own cultural viewpoints.

**“Drug warfare”** means flooding illicit drugs across national borders and breaking down the fabric of a society through their use.

**“Media warfare”** means manipulating foreign media, either by compromising or intimidating journalists or getting access to another country’s airwaves and imposing your own national perspectives.

**“Technological warfare”** means gaining control or having an edge in particular vital technologies that can be used in both peace and wartime.

**“Resource warfare”** means gaining control of scarce natural resources and being able to control or manipulate their access and market value.

**“Psychological warfare”** means imposing one’s national interest by dominating a rival nation’s perception of its own strengths and weaknesses.

**“Network warfare”** means dominating or subverting transnational information systems.

**“International law warfare”** means joining international or multinational organizations in order to subvert their policies and the interpretation of legal rulings.

**“Environmental warfare”** means weakening or subjugating a rival nation by despoiling or altering its natural environment.

**“Economic aid warfare”** means controlling a targeted country through aid dependency.

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<sup>1</sup> Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui *Unrestricted Warfare: China’s Master Plan to Destroy America*. Panama City, Panama: Pan American Pub., 2002, xii, 38-43.

## ANNEX B

### Methods of Combination<sup>1</sup>

**Supra-national:** Combining national, international, and non-state organizations to a countries benefit.

Example: The U.S. and the international community during and after the Gulf War. Americans garnered the support of practically all of the countries in the United Nations, which led to a multi-national force of over 30 countries joining in the war on Iraq and after the war, supporting an economic embargo, arms inspections, and continued political and military pressure.

**Supra-domain:** Combining battlefields. The means of Supra-domain combinations is considered as the link between the Supra-national combinations and the Supra-means combinations, and is concerned with choosing which domain will be the main battlefield and will provide the greatest likelihood of achieving victory. Information warfare, financial warfare, and trade warfare are just a few of the examples of domains.

**Supra-means:** Combining all available means (military and non-military) to carry out operations. In essence, Supra-means combinations combine military means with diplomatic, economic, financial, technological, cultural, and other legal and illegal means. The Supra-means combinations are considered in relation to the objective.

Example: A good example of Supra-means combinations is the 1978 U.S. Embassy hostage crisis in Iran. After the military rescue failed, the crisis was solved by a combination of freezing Iran's foreign assets, imposing an arms embargo, supporting Iraq against Iran and conducting diplomatic negotiations.

**Supra-tier:** Combining all levels of conflict into each campaign. The PLA colonels propose four different levels of war and the appropriate focus at each level: Grand War – War Policy; War – Strategy; Campaign – Operational Art; and Battles – Tactics. They consider the level of Grand War, in terms of scale, to include military and non-military actions of warfare. The goal of Supra-tier combinations is to use combinations of all four levels.

Example: Some examples of Supra-tier combinations are using a strategic method, which is some sort of non-military action, to go along with the accomplishment of a tactical mission or using a tactical method to accomplish an object on the war policy level. A good example is Bin Laden using a tactical level method of two truckloads of explosives on the World Trade Center that threatened U.S. national interests at the strategic level.

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<sup>1</sup> Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui *Unrestricted Warfare: China's Master Plan to Destroy America*. Panama City, Panama: Pan American Pub., 2002, 155-171.

## ANNEX C

### **Eight Principles of Unrestricted Warfare**<sup>1</sup>

**1. Omnidirectionality** – 360 degree observation and design which combines use of all related factors. Omnidirectionality gives all-around consideration of all factors related to war and when observing the battlefield, designing plans, employing measures, and combining the use of all war resources to have a field of vision with no blind spots. Warfare can be military, quasi-military, or non-military. (The battlefield is said to exist everywhere and no distinctions are made between combatants and non-combatants)

**2. Synchrony** – Conducting actions in different spaces within the same period of time. Synchrony accomplishes objectives quickly under conditions of simultaneous occurrence, simultaneous action, and simultaneous completion. (Synchrony replaces the older idea of phasing of forces sequentially in an operation)

**3. Limited Objectives** – Set a compass to guide action within an acceptable range for measures. Limited objectives means limited in relation to measures used. Objectives must always be smaller than measures. (Means that measures, effort and resources, must be greater than the requirements of the objective to be sought or the action will fail)

**4. Unlimited Measures** – The trend is toward unrestricted employment of measures, but restricted to the accomplishment of limited objectives. (Is the notion that whatever means are necessary should be used to obtain a limited objective. No restrictions exist on what these measures can be – hence the idea of unrestricted warfare)

**5. Asymmetry** – Seek nodes of action in the opposite direction from the contours of the balance of symmetry. Understanding and employing the principle of asymmetry correctly allows us always to find and exploit an enemy's soft spots. (Means that the enemy's soft spots can be better exploited by directing asymmetric forces and techniques at these points rather than engaging in a mirror response with conventional force)

**6. Minimal Consumption** – Use the least amount of combat resources sufficient to accomplish the objective. (Analogous to the U.S. principle of economy of force. All types of resources must be considered)

**7. Multidimensional Coordination** – Coordinating and allocating all forces which can be mobilized in the military and non-military spheres covering an objective. (Encompasses multiple spheres and multiple fronts. This is not a new concept except that non-military factors, such as cultural warfare, are now brought into the equation)

**8. Adjustment and Control of the Entire Process** – During the entire course of a war, from its start, through its progress, to its conclusion, continually acquire information, adjust action, and control the situation. (This is a systems approach to warfare that allows for adjustment of the system via a feedback loop of some sort. A premium is placed on intuition (art) rather than mathematical deduction (science))

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<sup>1</sup> Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui *Unrestricted Warfare: China's Master Plan to Destroy America*. Panama City, Panama: Pan American Pub., 2002, 177-186. and Robert J. Bunker "Unrestricted Warfare: Review Essay I" *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, Spring 2000, 119-20.