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## **FUTURE WAR PAPER**

### **The Unpredictable Future: The Necessity of Full Spectrum Warfighting Capabilities**

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## The Certainty of an Uncertain Future

*So long as there are men there will be wars.* Albert Einstein

*Only the dead have seen the end of war.* Plato

Fourth Generation warfare, the Three-block War, 21<sup>st</sup> Century warfare, revolution in military affairs (RMA) – are all names that have been used to describe the future of warfare. Since the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War politicians, academics, military leaders, and defense contractors have been trying to ascertain the future of warfare and build America's armed forces to face the challenge. Unfortunately, as this paper shall attempt to highlight, America's armed forces have been generally ill prepared to face the actual conflict it finds itself embroiled in, and ready for a war that never comes. *Instead of attempting to gaze in a crystal ball and predict the nature of future conflicts, our political and military leaders should concentrate their energies, and America's resources, in constructing a force structure that is capable of meeting the Nation's security needs across the warfighting spectrum.*

Now this statement is obviously easier said than done. National security and the shape of America's armed forces are very contentious issues in Washington. There are many policy makers, officials, and constituencies that have roles to play in the development of military power, especially in light of the Global War on Terrorism. "Currently, the struggle is centered in Iraq and Afghanistan, but we will need to be prepared and arranged to successfully defend our Nation and its interests **around the globe for years to come.**"<sup>1</sup> (emphasis added) Instead of wasting time and resources trying to ascertain of how warfare will look like in 2025, our leaders should concentrate on developing a balanced, well-equipped, well-led force. Only a force

capable of defeating adversaries along the entire spectrum of warfare can ensure that America is never again caught unprepared.

Our civil-military leadership must create a strategic vision of the future, tempered by an understanding of our flawed history, that addresses security threats and possible contingencies across the entire spectrum of warfare. Today's headlines about our counter-insurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan must not be allowed to narrow our vision and produce a myopic view of the world around us. Terrorism, guerrilla warfare, and insurgency are the 'in vogue' threats now, but there is no dearth of conventional threats from nation states in the world, e.g. Iran, China, and North Korea.

Bereft of politics, parochialism, and partisanship the continuing debate on the future force structure of America's armed forces will impact the defense security of this nation well into the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. If the nightmare of 9/11 has proved anything to us, it is that we cannot fail our fellow citizens again.

### **A History of Miscalculations**

The present armchair grasp of reliance on sea power and air power to the obvious belittlement of land power, falls into this pattern. Such a concept may provide some short-range security for the United States. And it would seem to provide an escape from the grim realities of fighting a war from foxholes. Its greatest fallacy is that it abandons our friends to being overrun on the ground.<sup>2</sup>

General of the Army Bradley's statement reflects a dangerous, and unfortunately frequent, tendency of the United States armed forces to be ill prepared for war. Our history shows a repeated inability to properly equip and man an effective fighting force during peacetime. Additionally, our chosen grand strategies have incorrectly anticipated future security threats, leaving the nation vulnerable to emerging threats and forcing an unprepared military to bear the brunt of poor strategic planning. World War I, World War II, Korea, Vietnam, and an

innumerable number of smaller contingencies caught the United States unprepared. It can be argued that the first Gulf War occurred fortuitously after the end of the Cold War and before the 'peace dividend' of the 1990's was realized. Had Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1995 vice 1990, the outcome of the conflict would have been significantly different.

After America's and her allies' triumph over the Axis forces in World War II, the Truman Administration quickly demobilized the armed forces due to budgetary constraints and public opinion. But the draw down occurred without any formal strategy to meet future threats to America's security. When our political and military leaders realized the emerging Soviet menace, the military was quickly recapitalized, but in-line with the wrong strategy. The atomic bomb, and later the hydrogen bomb, delivered by a heavy Air Force bomber was enshrined as the key to America's security and subsequently received the majority of new defense dollars. The unexpected North Korean invasion of South Korea found the American military completely unprepared. When President Truman authorized General MacArthur to intervene against the Communist aggression, his forces on Japan proved woefully inadequate to stem the Communists. Years of under-funding the military had left America's armed forces unbalanced and a shadow of their former greatness. Unfortunately, thousands of poorly trained, equipped, and led Army draftees became casualties because of the shortsightedness of their leaders.

The Truman Administration's decision to contain the Soviet Union Empire and the Communist ideology put America squarely on the road to confrontation with the Soviets. Nuclear weapons were identified as the most economical and effective means of meeting the Soviet challenge to the detriment of the other Services. The famous "Revolt of the Admirals" was a consequence of the internal battles within the newly formed Department of Defense on the future force structure. Although the Navy's leadership 'revolted' primarily because of the

cancellation of the USS United States<sup>\*</sup>, the larger argument centered around the Air Force's increasingly disproportionate percentage of the defense budget. Amidst all the very public infighting, the Army continued to be drawn down to a skeletal force in search of relevance. This was the state of the military when the Korean War erupted.

General Bradley's remarks reflect the frustration he felt against the civilian leadership and within the uniformed services regarding the importance of land power. Despite the entry of the Chinese into the war, many still believed the Korean War to be a sideshow from the real confrontation, a nuclear standoff with the Soviet Union. Consequently, the Army was never given enough resources to truly combat the massive Chinese land forces in hopes that that the conflict could be settled by air power and sea power. The situation for the Army only grew worse after the end of the conflict in 1953 with the signing of the truce. In order to slash the defense budget, the newly elected Eisenhower Administration severely cut the Army and the Marine Corps, again, and adopted the policy of 'massive retaliation,' with heavy manned bombers, equipped with nuclear weapons as the cornerstone of America's defense. The Army resorted to creating the 'Pentomic Division,' capable of fighting on the nuclear battlefield with artillery-fired tactical nuclear weapons in an attempt to stay relevant. This ridiculous idea was seen as the future of warfare in the age of the nuclear equipped Soviet menace.

The reality of the debacle during the Korean War did not persuade the senior military and civilian leadership to rebalance the force. Even more surprising was the fact that President Eisenhower, a former five star Army general, would so enthusiastically support the growth of the

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<sup>\*</sup> The USS United States was to be the Navy's first post-World War II 'super carrier.' A big sister to the USS Midway class carrier, she was envisioned to be capable of carrying jet bombers with nuclear delivery capability as the Navy's contribution to strategic deterrence. When the ship was cancelled in favor of the Air Force's B-36, the Navy leadership saw this as a direct threat to their future existence. The Navy was not going to allow itself become subordinate to the new upstart service, the United States Air Force. Subsequently, the admirals took their fight to Congress and went public with their demands.

‘nuclear’ Air Force, i.e. Strategic Air Command (SAC) to the detriment of the rest of the armed forces. President Eisenhower considered the Air Force as the spearhead of deterrence against the Soviet threat. The allure of high technology, smaller defense budgets, and less risk to ground troops pulled President Eisenhower to favor the Air Force in the defense budget battles of the 1950s. Thus when America entered the 1960s, our military was geared to defeat the Soviet Union in a large nuclear total war, not the small wars of liberation that dominated warfare for the next 25 years.

America fought the Communists in Vietnam with a large conventional military that was ill equipped and trained for jungle warfare and counter-insurgency. The initial commander of American forces in Vietnam, General Westmoreland never grasped the nature of the war and tried to use conventional tactics to defeat a cunning and adaptable enemy. Despite the fact that the United States military was never defeated on the battlefield, the war was lost and thousands of American conscripts were once again became casualties. Again, the United States was ill prepared for war because the wrong strategy was picked and the wrong force structure was built. This lesson was not heeded either, because the military, especially the Army and the Air Force, quickly reverted back to readying themselves for the real battle; war against the Soviets.

After the Vietnam War, the military once again experienced a period of reduction and change. The rise of terrorism, especially in the Middle East, went largely unnoticed and did little to change the force structure of the United States. All the Special Operations Forces (SOF) and their tremendous capabilities, especially counter terrorism/counter insurgency expertise, were essentially lost. The main threat was still the Soviet Union and little else mattered. The lack of a properly balanced force structure once again affected the military when President Carter ordered a rescue attempt in the Iranian hostage crisis. The dismal failure of OPERATION IRON CLAW

revealed a glaring hole in the force structure; the lack of a joint, unified SOF command.\* Once again, the United States military was unprepared for the fight. This time there was not a second chance or the time to recover and press on. The nation and especially the military were humiliated before the world.

Within the military, the Persian Gulf War was seen by many as a vindication of the American way of fighting and the technological prowess of our modern technology. In reality, we were lucky. The Iraqi invasion caught the entire world by surprise. No one expected the United States to fight a war in the deserts of the Middle East after the fall of the Soviet Union.<sup>#</sup> In fact, the buzz around Washington concentrated on how the ‘peace dividend’ was going to affect the force structure. All the services were concentrating on saving their share of the upcoming defense budget, not who our next adversaries were going to be since the fall of the Soviet Empire. Saddam Hussein’s poor strategic vision guaranteed an American victory. The fall of the Soviet Empire allowed America to pull its troops from Europe. The desert provided the ideal battle ground for the Army’s large, armored formations and the Air Force’s high tech aircraft. Additionally, Saddam Hussein gave the coalition six long, unimpeded months to deploy and prepare for combat operations. Moreover, the conflict occurred in a ‘sweet spot’ in history, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, but before the inevitable drastic post Cold War draw down. Despite America’s surprise to the initial invasion of Kuwait, the above-mentioned circumstances ensured an American victory from the start and aided in the eventual overwhelming victory.

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\* OPERATION IRON CLAW or better known as Desert One, in regards to the staging base located within Iran, certainly failed for numerous reasons. The operation required the formation of an ad hoc unit from all four services. The unit had very little time to plan and no time to rehearse for the mission. None of the gear was standardized or fully suitable for the mission. It should not have come to the surprise to anyone that the mission failed, despite the valiant efforts of some truly dedicated warriors.

<sup>#</sup> By sheer coincidence, General Schwarzkopf had just conducted a Command Post Exercise (CPEX) at his forward headquarters in Saudi Arabia a few weeks before the Iraqi invasion. Named, Internal Look, the scenario for the exercise was the defense of Saudi Arabia against Iraqi aggression.<sup>3</sup>

An early lead, or having triumphed in the last conflict, by no means guarantees success in coping with the sort of fundamental changes in future wars that now appear to lie just over the temporal horizon, just out of clear view.<sup>4</sup>

Unfortunately, America's leaders failed to heed the advice of the above quote because ten years after the victory against Iraq, true to our history, we were caught unprepared once again. The events of September 11, 2001, caught America's armed forces in the midst of 'transformation.'<sup>5</sup> Exactly what the services were/are going to look like upon their completion of 'transformation' still remains a mystery today. Yet again, America was surprised. Despite the rising concerns of terrorism, the events of that day had been unimaginable by most Americans. The once forgotten land of Afghanistan suddenly became center stage. Within a few weeks, Americans were on the deck in Afghanistan and the opening rounds of America's new Global War on Terrorism commenced; a conflict that was unfathomable just a few weeks prior.

Currently, the services, especially the Army and the Marine Corps, are engaged in two simultaneous major nation building and counter-insurgency operations (OPERATIONS IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM), thousands of miles away from each other and half a world away from the United States. The emphasis has shifted from large conventional force on force operations to counter-insurgency (COIN), counter-terrorism, civil affairs, and psychological operations.<sup>6</sup> This type of warfare is ground intensive and less dependent on technology. Therefore, despite significant contributions by the Navy and the Air Force, this is not their type of war. The lean military budgets of the 1990s, especially for the Army, are just now finally being rectified. In fact, the Army is undergoing the largest reorganization of its forces, including the National Guard and Reserves, since the transition to the All Volunteer Force (AVF) in the 1970s, while simultaneously engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan.<sup>7</sup>

## **Force Structure Issues**

The US government has now embarked on its third major reassessment of current and future requirements since the end of the Cold War. Given the lead-time involved in making any significant change in the nation's defense posture, the results of this review are likely to influence American military capabilities well into the next century. That's all the more reason to insist that any such reexamination of America's military requirements should reflect a clear understanding of the likely character of future war.<sup>8</sup>

The guidance contained within the Bush Administration's National Security Strategy (NSS) and the Chairman's National Military Strategy (NMS) has been distilled into the often mentioned 1:4:2:1 force capability.<sup>9</sup> This standard was used for the just completed Quadrennial Defense Review. Today, academics and pundits are writing about the latest RMA, brought about by information technology and the effects on present and future warfare. Globalization, Fourth Generation Warfare, Network Centric Warfare<sup>10</sup>, cultural knowledge, and the 'Gap'<sup>11</sup> are some of the buzzwords floating around the Pentagon in a hopeless attempt to define warfare of the future. Unfortunately, the Pentagon has had a very poor record of accomplishment in trying to predict the look of war in the future and establishing a proper force structure for the Nation's security needs.

The looming military budget and force structure battle will once again settle on what type of military we will need for an uncertain future. Do we need the F/A-22 or the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)? Do we need Virginia class submarines or amphibious ships? Do we need the V-22 or new aerial refueling tankers? The answer to all of these questions is YES! Precisely because we do not know what the future holds for our nation, we need to be ready for a contingency across the spectrum of war. We must have the capability to deter and if required, repel China's aggression in the Pacific. This more conventional type of military action will require F/A-22 Raptors, JSFs, and Navy ships. But we also need the capability of conducting

humanitarian operations in conjunction with a nation building effort. Only a balanced force can possess the ability to meet these challenges.

The usual counterargument to a balanced force is a lack of resources, i.e. money.<sup>12</sup> This argument is moot. A balanced force does not automatically mean extremely large. Budgetary constraints will definitely constrain the size of our force, but if planned wisely, money need not limit our capabilities. Instead of the Air Force's original request for 250, maybe only 100 Raptors are procured. The objective is to get the capability the plane provides. This may require a reevaluation of operational use of the aircraft due to its limited numbers, but some capability has always been better than no capability. The goal of a balanced force is to have the capability for any military operation along the entire spectrum of warfare. To use a sport metaphor, the bench may not be deep, but the ability to cover all bases is available. Paraphrasing Secretary Rumsfeld, you fight with the military you have, not the one you wish you had. The speed in which crisis occurs and operations are conducted, demand that we have forces ready and capable for any contingency.

To increase the effectiveness of the balanced force, adaptability and flexibility must become inherent within every unit. There is a saying in the operating forces that a capability is not real until a unit has trained to the proper standards. For example, an infantry company cannot be used for riot/crowd control because they have not been trained for it. The likelihood of a mishap is high because an infantry company normally does not train to restrain the usage of force, but given the proper equipment and some additional training time in their training cycle the capability could be quickly attained. That is why flexible and adaptable units act as force multipliers, because they can quickly be trained for a particular skill set in anticipation of an operation or contingency.

An expeditionary culture and rapid deployability are also critical to the effectiveness of a balanced force. The capability to rapidly move into a crisis region and meet the requirements of the Joint Force Commander are crucial to overcome the force's limited numbers and quickly defuse any situation without massive reinforcements. Strategic and intratheater lift coupled with a units expeditionary nature will allow for the rapid movement of forces around the globe, mitigating the lack of a 'deep bench.'

## Recommendations

*Who would desire peace, prepare for war.* Flavius Vegetius Renatus (Roman author, c. 375 A.D.)

*To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of preserving peace.* George Washington

So, what will the future balanced force look like? Well in a recent article in Defense News, Lawrence Korb, a former Reagan Administration assistant secretary of defense espoused the views of many in Washington today: 'Weapons like the F-22 fighter jet and Virginia-class submarine were designed to counter threats from a bygone era. Yet, these Cold War arms are being built anyway...' <sup>13</sup> Views such as these completely disregard the threat posed by nations such as China.

In its annual report to Congress, the Office of the Secretary of Defense came to this conclusion: "PLA preparations, including an expanding force of ballistic missiles (long-range and short-range), cruise missiles, submarines, advanced aircraft, and other modern systems, come against the background of a policy toward Taiwan that espouses "peaceful reunification." China has not renounced the use of force, **however** (emphasis added)." <sup>14</sup> The ability to counter China's increasing **conventional** military strength will come from our own strong conventional

forces. Although the US military is currently heavily involved in counter-insurgency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, we cannot afford to disregard our conventional forces simply because we are not fighting a conventional war, **today**.

To prepare for future threats, all the services need to rethink their force structure and reconfigure accordingly. The Army and the Marine Corps are rapidly reshaping their forces to meet the challenges of tomorrow, adding capabilities and flexibility to their units while remaining actively engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan. Unfortunately, the Navy and Air Force are resisting the necessary balancing of their forces and in some cases actively preventing the transition of their forces.

As the largest of the services, the Army is undergoing some tremendous changes in the active duty force, reserves, and National Guard. Most importantly, the Army is restructuring into Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) as their basic fighting organization and increasing the number of brigades from 33 to over 50.<sup>15</sup> These organizations will become modular with the capability of attaching aviation, signal, infantry, armor, etc to the unit depending upon the mission. The Army is increasing the number of these maneuver brigades by disestablishing division and corps level headquarters and transitioning the billets into trigger pullers. The Army is quickly adapting an expeditionary mindset founded upon adapting skill sets to whatever the mission is at hand. Not only is the number of deploying units increasing, but so is the deployability and lethality of each brigade.<sup>16</sup> In addition, the Army is not losing any capability. Along with new lighter, faster Stryker vehicles, traditional heavy, armored vehicles are being retained in order to maintain lethality and survivability. The Army is not allowing the pendulum to swing to far in the other direction following their experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan. Despite the increasingly 'lightness' of their new equipment and force structure, the Army is still retaining their air assault,

airborne, and armored formations. The Army is getting leaner by losing fat, not muscle. Upon completion of its reorganization sometime in 2008, the Army will be more effective and still be the Nation's 'war winner.'

Another significant part of the Army's reorganization are the Reserve forces. Usually regarded as the Army's poor stepchild, the Reserves have quickly become indispensable to mission accomplishment. The Reserves should mirror the active duty Army in force structure, equipment, training and readiness. The only significant difference between the two should be deployability. In order to reinforce the active duty force quickly, a certain percentage of the Reserve should be on an immediate deployable readiness.<sup>17</sup> This could be established on a rotating basis. For example, each reserve brigade should be expected to 'stand' a six-month deployable duty (in CONUS) out of every five years. This would allow each reserve unit sufficient time to train up to standards while providing the active duty force with an immediate reinforcement capability. Simultaneously, the Army could concentrate its Reserve Force budget on the Reserve units that are training to deployable status. During the 'ramp-up' period, new equipment and training could be incorporated into the Reserves on a rotating basis. Additionally, the Army needs to rebalance the force for low density/demand jobs such as Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations. The goal is to smoothly and seamlessly integrate the Reserve force in to the active-duty force.<sup>18</sup> An over reliance on the Reserves, such as what occurred in the 1990s, was an abuse of the force and revealed a poorly managed and utilized Reserve force structure.

The Army National Guard faced many of the same problems as the Army Reserve. High operational tempo and numerous deployments severely affect readiness, retention, and casts doubts on whether the Guard is being properly utilized. Ideally, the Guard should be structured and manned to primarily support the Homeland Defense mission via Northern Command and

support overseas contingencies as a last resort (usually only in case of a Major Theater War).<sup>19</sup>

The Guard should shed all of its heavy forces such as artillery and armor, and transition into mostly light infantry, aviation (assault support type helicopters, not attack helicopters), and combat service support elements. These general purpose forces could easily fulfill the traditional roles of the National Guard: riot control, disaster relief, and protection of key infrastructure. A new key capability, and one that should be expanded, is the creation of the Nuclear Biological Chemical Radiological Enhanced explosive (NBCRE) response teams.<sup>20</sup> These special teams provide the states a powerful force to aid first responders in case of an attack or mishap involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Uniformly trained and equipped, these forces could reinforce each other, if the need arose.

The core mission of the National Guard and the Air National Guard should be Homeland Defense, in all its flavors. National Missile Defense, border defense, airspace patrol, and support to local police and fire departments should all be under the control of the National Guard and Air National Guard. These missions do not require the forces to deploy and are regionally focused. Guard forces should only be deployed in case of extreme national emergency. The use of the Guard in overseas deployments severely weakens enlistment rates, retention, and increases costs.

For years, the Air Force has created units within the Air National Guard without thought. For example, there are large numbers of tankers and A-10s within the Air Guard. These units routinely deploy overseas due to the lack of resources in the active duty force. Air interceptors, a small tanker force, and intratheater lift are the only aircraft that should be in the Air Guard. Additionally, the Air Force should create a modernization plan in order to increase the capabilities of the Air Guard. We no longer can afford to short change Homeland Defense.

The recent adoption of the Aerospace Expeditionary Wing structure has dramatically increased the expeditionary capability of the Air Force. This modular organization is a near perfect balance of fighters, bombers, intratheater airlift, and tankers. Unfortunately, the Air Force tends to concentrate on the procurement of tactical fighter aircraft to the detriment of the rest of fleet. The decrease in the size of the overall force, driven by the costs of procuring a balanced force, increases the importance of ‘common user’ items such as tankers and strategic airlift. A modern, modest-sized fleet of tankers and strategic airlift aircraft are critical to the rapid deployment of forces. Air Force tankers are utilized by all the services and are tremendous force multipliers; their current readiness state is a direct reflection of the Air Force’s neglect and mismanagement. Despite congressional pressure to increase the procurement of these common user items, the Air Force continues to prioritize fighter aircraft procurement over other aircraft types.<sup>21</sup>

The tremendous capabilities of the JSF and Raptor are required for continued American superiority in the air. But these aircraft cannot be procured at the expense of the tanker and strategic airlift fleet. Here is an example where the services must work together to prioritize procurement dollars. Instead of the current zero sum game in which one service ‘wins’ more dollars to the detriment of a sister service; we must work together to increase spending in a critical capability in order to attain a certain level within a reasonable time. Once the capability is attained, funds can be transferred to another service in order to procure the next priority capability. For example, the JSF and Raptor are competing for dollars not only within the Air Force, but also amongst the other services.<sup>22</sup> Funding priority could be given to the Navy and Marine Corps to replace their rapidly aging aircraft until a certain percentage of new aircraft have been procured.<sup>23</sup> Once the goal is attained, the Air Force is given the bulk of the funds

until they reach a certain procurement percentage. This scenario requires a level of trust and cooperation amongst the services that has never been attempted. In order to acquire and maintain a balanced capability-based force the services must prioritize procurement goals and adhere to multiyear plans.

The Navy and Marine Corps could definitely benefit from a structured multiyear joint procurement plan. Today's rapidly shrinking surface fleet is plagued by cost overruns and lack of strategic guidance. Carrier based aviation has continually proven its worth and will remain a vital capability for years to come. Low surface ship and submarine ship building rates coupled with ever-increasingly complicated platforms have conspired to drive costs out of control. The Navy must simplify its ship designs and boost production in order to decrease the average cost per ship. Even the new LPD-17 amphibious ships are estimated to cost over one billion dollars apiece. The Navy of tomorrow needs to be a balanced fleet of surface combatants, submarines, carriers, amphibs, and fast strategic sealift ships. The Navy and Marine Corps Team will continue to be the Nation's quick reaction capable of extending power ashore. The Navy also needs the capability to transport the Army's heavy forces quickly across the ocean in case a protracted conflict develops; and control of the sea will always be priority one for the Navy.

As long as America remains the world's only superpower and we continue to follow a strategy of engagement throughout the globe, a balanced military force is the only way to guarantee we are prepared for the future. Despite our best efforts, we have only met with marginal success in preparing for future conflicts. Instead of trying to identify the next threat, we need broad capabilities that will allow us to effectively respond to any future security threat. As weapons become more compact and lethal, it becomes even more imperative that we always remain ready to respond throughout the spectrum of warfare. As leaders, we owe it to our men

that we will be ready. The next 9/11 may be so devastating that we do not have a chance to respond.

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## ENDNOTES

- <sup>1</sup> U.S. Secretary of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, (Washington, DC: 03 February 2006), V.
- <sup>2</sup> Armed Forces Journal, (March 2005): 57. Quoted from a speech given by General Omar N. Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 17 March 1951, at the Philadelphia Bulletin Forum.
- <sup>3</sup> Gordon, Michael R. and General Bernard E. Trainor, The Generals' War, (Boston: 1995), 45.
- <sup>4</sup> Williamson Murray and Allan Millet, eds., Military Innovation in the Interwar Period (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 414.
- <sup>5</sup> Department of Defense, Elements of Defense Transformation, (Washington, DC: 2004), 2. A much misunderstood concept, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld identifies transformation as: A process that shapes the changing nature of military competition and cooperation through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people, and organizations that exploit our nation's advantages and protect against our asymmetric vulnerabilities to sustain our strategic position, which helps underpin peace and stability in the world.
- <sup>6</sup> Robert Scales, "The Lost Art of Land War," The American Legion Magazine, (October 2005): 25.
- <sup>7</sup> Robert Scales, "The Shape of Brigades to Come," Armed Forces Journal, (October 2005): 30.
- <sup>8</sup> Paul Van Riper and Robert H. Scales, JR., "Preparing for War in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century," Parameters, (Autumn 1997): 4.
- <sup>9</sup> U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy of the United States, (Washington, DC: 2004): 7. The NMS defines the role of the military as a) defend the homeland (1), b) deter aggression in (4) critical regions, c) swiftly defeat enemies in (2) of the four critical regions, and d) win (1) of the two conflicts decisively.
- <sup>10</sup> Robert Scales, "The Shape of Brigades to Come," Armed Forces Journal, (October 2005): 28. Defined by General Scales as, "The hope then was that the power of the network would allow the American military to see, sense, track, and kill the enemy with great precision and certainty. A ubiquitous eye over the battlefield would lift the fog of war sufficiently to allow the unfettered application of firepower, principally aerial firepower, against a hapless enemy."
- <sup>11</sup> Thomas P.M. Barnett, "The Pentagon's New Map," Esquire, (March 2003): 147. Prof Barnett defines the Gap thusly, "But show me where globalization is thinning or just plain absent, and I will show you regions plagued by politically repressive regimes, widespread poverty and disease, routine mass murder, and – most important – the chronic conflicts that incubate the next generation of global terrorists. These parts of the world I call the Non-integrating Gap, or Gap."
- <sup>12</sup> Laura M. Colarusso, "Tough Choices," Armed Forces Journal, (September 2005): 19.
- <sup>13</sup> Lawrence Korb, "Strength in Savings," Defense News, 27 March 2006. <<http://ebird.afis.mil/ebfiles/e20060327425516.html>> [27 March 2006].
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<sup>19</sup> Ibid, 20.

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