

October 2009

WARFIGHTER SUPPORT

Actions Needed to Improve Visibility and Coordination of DOD's Counter- Improvised Explosive Device Efforts



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Report Documentation Page

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Why GAO Did This Study

Prior to the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization's (JIEDDO) establishment in 2006, no single entity was responsible for coordinating the Department of Defense's (DOD) counter improvised explosive device (IED) efforts. JIEDDO was established to coordinate and focus all counter-IED efforts, including ongoing research and development, throughout DOD. This report, which is one in a series of congressionally mandated GAO reports related to JIEDDO's management and operations, assesses the extent to which 1) capability gaps were initially identified in DOD's effort to defeat IEDs and how these gaps and other factors led to the development of JIEDDO, 2) JIEDDO has maintained visibility over all counter-IED efforts, 3) JIEDDO has coordinated the transition of JIEDDO-funded initiatives to the military services, and 4) JIEDDO has developed criteria for the counter-IED training initiatives it will fund. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed and analyzed relevant documents and met with DOD and service officials.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that JIEDDO (1) improve its visibility of all counter-IED efforts, (2) work with the services to develop a complete transition plan for initiatives, and (3) define criteria for funding training initiatives. DOD generally concurred with our recommendations and noted actions to be taken.

[View GAO-10-95 or key components.](#)
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WARFIGHTER SUPPORT

Actions Needed to Improve Visibility and Coordination of DOD's Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Efforts

What GAO Found

With the escalation of the IED threat in Iraq, DOD identified several counter-IED capability gaps that included shortcomings in the areas of counter-IED technologies, qualified personnel with expertise in counter-IED tactics, training, dedicated funding, and expedited acquisition processes. For example, prior to JIEDDO's establishment, many different DOD entities focused on counter-IED issues, but coordination among these various efforts was informal and ad hoc. DOD's efforts to focus on addressing these gaps culminated in the creation of JIEDDO, but its creation was done in the absence of DOD having formal guidance for establishing joint organizations. Further, DOD did not systematically evaluate all preexisting counter-IED resources to determine whether other entities were engaged in similar efforts.

JIEDDO and the services lack full visibility over counter-IED initiatives throughout DOD. First, JIEDDO and the services lack a comprehensive database of all existing counter-IED initiatives, limiting their visibility over counter-IED efforts across DOD. Although JIEDDO is currently developing a management system that will track initiatives as they move through JIEDDO's acquisition process, the system will only track JIEDDO-funded initiatives—not those being independently developed and procured by the services and other DOD components. Second, the services lack full visibility over those JIEDDO-funded initiatives that bypass JIEDDO's acquisition process. With limited visibility, both JIEDDO and the services are at risk of duplicating efforts.

JIEDDO faces difficulties with transitioning Joint IED defeat initiatives to the military services, in part because JIEDDO and the services have difficulty resolving the gap between JIEDDO's transition timeline and DOD's base budget cycle. As a result, the services are mainly funding initiatives with funding for overseas contingency operations rather than their base budgets. Continuing to fund transferred initiatives with overseas contingency operations appropriations does not ensure funding availability for those initiatives in future years since these appropriations are not necessarily renewed from one year to the next. This transition is also hindered when service requirements are not fully considered during the development of joint-funded counter-IED initiatives, as evidenced by two counter-IED jamming systems. As a result, JIEDDO may be investing in counter-IED solutions that do not fully meet existing service requirements.

JIEDDO's lack of clear criteria for the counter-IED training initiatives it will fund has affected its counter-IED training investment decisions. As a result, JIEDDO has funded training initiatives that may have primary uses other than defeating IEDs. In March 2009, JIEDDO attempted to update its criteria for joint training initiatives by listing new requirements; however, these guidelines also could be broadly interpreted. Without specific criteria for counter-IED training initiatives, DOD may find that it lacks funding for future initiatives more directly related to the counter-IED mission.

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Abbreviations

CENTCOM	U.S. Central Command
CREW	Counter Remote Control Improvised Explosive Device Electronic Warfare
CVRJ	Counter Remote Control Improvised Explosive Device Electronic Warfare Vehicle Receiver/Jammer
DOD	Department of Defense
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
JCAAMP	Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Capability Approval and Acquisition Management Process
JIEDDO	Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense

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October 29, 2009

Congressional Committees

Improvised explosive devices (IED) continue to be the number one threat to U.S. troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. During 2008, IEDs accounted for almost 40 percent of the attacks on coalition forces in Iraq. In 2009, insurgents' use of IEDs against U.S. forces in Iraq began to decline for the second straight year since 2003, while in Afghanistan the number of monthly IED incidents increased to more than 800 in July 2009. Through fiscal year 2009, Congress has appropriated over \$16 billion to the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) to address the IED threat. In addition, other Department of Defense (DOD) components, including the military services, have devoted at least \$1.49 billion to the counter-IED effort. Along with the escalation in Afghanistan, the IED threat is expanding throughout the globe with over 300 IED events per month worldwide outside of Iraq and Afghanistan, according to JIEDDO. There is widespread consensus that this threat will not go away and that IEDs will continue to be a weapon of strategic influence in future conflicts.

Prior to JIEDDO's establishment in 2006, no single entity was responsible for coordinating DOD's counter-IED efforts. DOD established JIEDDO and directed it to focus (lead, advocate, and coordinate) all DOD actions in support of the combatant commanders' and their respective joint task forces' efforts to defeat IEDs as weapons of strategic influence.¹ DOD's directive mandates that JIEDDO's director serve as the DOD point of coordination for initiatives across the full range of efforts necessary to defeat the IED threat, integrate all counter-IED solutions throughout DOD, and coordinate with other DOD components for ongoing midterm research and development initiatives and long-term science and technology efforts.

In a series of reviews in response to direction in Senate Report 109-292, we first reported in March 2007 on several issues related to JIEDDO's management and operations, including JIEDDO's lack of a strategic plan and the resulting effects on the development of its financial and human

¹ *Department of Defense Directive 2000.19E*, Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) para. 4 (Feb. 14, 2006). (Hereinafter cited as DODD 2000.19E, (Feb. 14, 2006)). DODD 2000.19E superseded DODD 2000.19 (June 27, 2005) and transformed the IED Defeat entity from a joint task force, established under DODD 2000.19, into a joint organization.

capital management programs. We made several recommendations to the Secretary of Defense to improve the management of JIEDDO operations, stressing the development of JIEDDO's detailed strategic plan. Subsequently, we also reported on JIEDDO's financial management processes and internal controls and JIEDDO's coordination of intelligence support efforts. Due to concerns over JIEDDO's performance and its ability to effectively coordinate DOD's response to IEDs, Congress, in the Conference Report accompanying the Fiscal Year 2008 National Defense Authorization Act,² mandated that we review JIEDDO's efforts in this regard. In response, this review assesses the coordination of DOD's counter-IED efforts, specifically focusing on the extent to which (1) capability gaps were initially identified in DOD's effort to defeat IEDs and how these gaps and other factors led to the development of JIEDDO, (2) JIEDDO has maintained visibility over all counter-IED efforts, (3) JIEDDO has coordinated the transition of JIEDDO-funded initiatives to the military services, and (4) JIEDDO has developed criteria for the counter-IED training initiatives it will fund. In another ongoing engagement, we also are examining what progress JIEDDO has made to improve its management of internal processes.

To assess the extent to which capability gaps were initially identified in DOD's effort to defeat IEDs and how these gaps and other factors led to the development of JIEDDO, we met with officials from JIEDDO, the Army Asymmetric Warfare Office, the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and other current and former DOD officials involved in the establishment of JIEDDO. We also examined documentation including DOD Directive 2000.19E, which established JIEDDO, and documentation and briefings relating to JIEDDO's evolution. To assess the extent to which JIEDDO has maintained visibility over all counter-IED efforts, coordinated the transition³ of JIEDDO-funded initiatives to the military services, and defined what constitutes a counter-IED training initiative, we met with officials from organizations including the Army Asymmetric Warfare Office, Army Training and Doctrine Command, Army National Training Center, Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, Marine Corps Training and Education Command, Training Counter-IED Operations Integration Center, Joint Forces Command, JIEDDO Joint Center of Excellence, U.S. Central Command, Technical

² H. Rep. No. 110-477 (2008)

³ A service assumes sustainment costs for an initiative by placing it into a program of record as an enduring capability in a transition.

Support Working Group, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and JIEDDO. We also examined documentation including DOD Directive 2000.19E⁴ and JIEDDO Instruction 5000.01,⁵ which established JIEDDO's rapid acquisition process, as well as other documents and briefings from JIEDDO, the services, and other DOD entities.

We conducted this performance audit from June 2008 through August 2009 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix I provides additional details on our scope and methodology.

Results in Brief

With the escalation of the IED threat in Iraq, DOD identified several counter-IED capability gaps and began focusing on addressing counter-IED issues. These counter-IED gaps included shortcomings in the areas of counter-IED technologies, qualified personnel with expertise in counter-IED tactics, training, dedicated funding, and expedited acquisition processes. DOD's efforts to address these gaps culminated in the creation of JIEDDO in 2006. Prior to JIEDDO's establishment, many different DOD entities at the service and joint levels began focusing on counter-IED issues, but communication and cooperation among these various efforts was informal and ad hoc. In an attempt to coordinate and focus counter-IED efforts, the Army established an IED Task Force in 2003, but the Task Force lacked both the funding and authority to undertake a large-scale, departmentwide effort. DOD responded by elevating the Army IED Task Force to the joint level in 2004, placing it directly under the Deputy Secretary of Defense in 2005, and increasing the organization's budget from \$20 million in 2004 to over \$1.3 billion in 2005. In 2006, the Joint Task Force was turned into a permanent joint entity and jointly manned activity of DOD—JIEDDO—with an initial budget of over \$3.7 billion and with the

⁴ DOD Directive 2000.19E, *Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO)* (Feb. 14, 2006).

⁵ *Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization Instruction 5000.01, Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat (JIEDD) Capability Approval and Acquisition Management Process (JCAAMP)* (Nov. 9, 2007). (Hereinafter cited as JIEDDOI 5000.01, (Nov. 9, 2007)).

intention to provide the institutional stability necessary to attract and retain qualified personnel. These various actions that led to the development of JIEDDO were done in the absence of DOD having formal guidance for establishing joint organizations, and JIEDDO was developed largely through informal communication among key individuals in various services and agencies. Furthermore, DOD did not systematically evaluate all preexisting counter-IED resources in order to determine whether other DOD entities were engaged in similar efforts. In recognition of the increasing number of joint activities and the lack of official guidance for planning them, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review called for the development of a formal process for establishing joint organizations.⁶ In response, the Office of the Secretary of Defense is currently developing a Joint Task Assignment Process to provide formal guidance for planning joint activities, which it expects to implement in late 2009. Despite the creation of JIEDDO, many of the organizations engaged in the IED defeat effort prior to JIEDDO continued to develop, maintain, and expand their own IED defeat capabilities.

JIEDDO and the services have limited visibility over counter-IED initiatives throughout DOD. Although JIEDDO and various service organizations compile some information on the wide range of IED defeat initiatives existing throughout DOD, JIEDDO and the services lack a comprehensive database of all existing counter-IED initiatives, limiting their visibility over counter-IED efforts across DOD. JIEDDO is required to lead, advocate, and coordinate all DOD actions to defeat IEDs, and maintain the current status of program execution, operational fielding, and performance of approved joint IED defeat initiatives. However, JIEDDO does not maintain a comprehensive database of all IED defeat initiatives across DOD. JIEDDO is currently focusing on developing a management system that will track its initiatives as they move through its own acquisition process. Though this system will help JIEDDO manage its counter-IED initiatives, it will only track JIEDDO-funded initiatives, not those being independently developed and procured by the services and other DOD components. Without incorporating service and other DOD components' counter-IED initiatives, JIEDDO's efforts to develop a counter-IED initiative database will not capture all initiatives throughout DOD. Additionally, the services do not have a central source of

⁶ The Quadrennial Defense Review is a comprehensive examination of the national defense strategy, force structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, budget plan, and other elements of the national defense program. It is conducted every 4 years.

information for their own counter-IED efforts because there is currently no requirement that each service develop its own comprehensive database of all of its counter-IED initiatives. Accordingly, the services are limited in their ability to provide JIEDDO with a timely and comprehensive summary of all of their existing initiatives. Furthermore, although JIEDDO involves the services in its process to select initiatives, the services lack full visibility over those JIEDDO-funded initiatives that bypass JIEDDO's acquisition process. In its process to select counter-IED initiatives, JIEDDO has approved some counter-IED initiatives without vetting them through the appropriate service counter-IED focal points, because the process allows JIEDDO to make exceptions if they are deemed necessary and appropriate. For example, at least three counter-IED training initiatives sponsored by JIEDDO's counter-IED joint training center were not vetted through the Army counter-IED focal point—the Army Asymmetric Warfare Office's Adaptive Networks, Threats, and Solutions Branch—before being approved for JIEDDO funding. Service officials have said that not incorporating their views on initiatives limits their visibility of JIEDDO actions and could result in approved initiatives that are inconsistent with service needs. JIEDDO officials acknowledged that while it may be beneficial for some JIEDDO-funded initiatives to bypass its acquisition process in cases where an urgent requirement with limited time to field is identified, these cases do limit service visibility over all JIEDDO-funded initiatives. We are therefore recommending that the military services create their own comprehensive IED defeat initiative databases and work with JIEDDO to develop a DOD-wide database for all counter-IED initiatives. We are also recommending that, in cases where initiatives bypass JIEDDO's rapid acquisition process, JIEDDO develop a mechanism to notify the appropriate service counter-IED focal points of each initiative prior to its funding.

JIEDDO's initiative transitions to the services are hindered by funding gaps between JIEDDO's transition timeline and DOD's base budget cycle as well as by instances when service requirements are not fully considered during the development and integration of joint-funded counter-IED initiatives. According to DOD's Directive, JIEDDO is required to develop plans for transitioning joint IED defeat initiatives into DOD programs of record, to be included in DOD's base budget, for sustainment and further integration into existing service programs.⁷ In a transition, one of the

⁷ For purposes of this report, we use the term "base budget program" to refer to "programs of record" as described in DODD 2000.19E, para. 6.2.8, and JIEDDOI 5000.01.

services is expected to pick up sustainment costs for an initiative by placing it into a base budget program as an enduring capability. In a transfer, one of the services may sustain the initiative through funding for current contingency operations. However, JIEDDO and the services still have difficulty resolving the gap between JIEDDO's transition timeline and DOD's base budget cycle, causing DOD to rely on service overseas contingency operations funding to sustain jointly-funded counter-IED initiatives following JIEDDO's 2-year transition timeline. According to JIEDDO's latest transition brief for fiscal year 2010, the organization recommended the transfer of 19 initiatives totaling \$233 million to the services for funding through overseas contingency operations appropriations and the transition of only 3 into service base budget programs totaling \$4.5 million. Furthermore, JIEDDO's initiative transitions are also hindered when service requirements are not fully considered during the development of joint-funded counter-IED initiatives, as evidenced during the acquisition of two counter-IED radio jamming systems. In the first example, JIEDDO funded a man-portable counter-IED jamming system to fill a U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) operational need, even though the Army and Marine Corps did not have a formal requirement for the system. Nevertheless, DOD plans to field the system to each of the services in response to the operational need, which was revalidated in September 2009. It remains unclear, however, which DOD organizations will be required to pay for procurement and sustainment costs for the system, since DOD has yet to identify the source of final procurement funding. In the second example, Army officials stated that they were not involved to the fullest extent possible in the evaluation and improvement process for a JIEDDO-funded, vehicle-mounted jamming system, even though the Army was DOD's primary user in terms of total number of systems fielded. The system, called the Counter Remote Control IED Electronic Warfare Vehicle Receiver/Jammer, ultimately required at least 20 proposals for configuration changes to correct flaws found in its design after the contract was awarded. Without ensuring that service requirements are fully taken into account when evaluating and developing counter-IED systems, this creates the potential for fielding equipment that is inconsistent with service requirements. This could later delay the transition of JIEDDO-funded initiatives to the services following JIEDDO's 2-year transition timeline. To facilitate the transition of JIEDDO-funded initiatives, we are recommending that JIEDDO coordinate with the services prior to funding an initiative to ensure that service requirements are fully taken into account when making counter-IED investment decisions. We are also recommending that the military services work with JIEDDO to develop a comprehensive plan to guide the transition of each JIEDDO-funded initiative, including expected costs, identified funding

sources, and a timeline with milestones for inclusion into the DOD base budget cycle.

JIEDDO's lack of clear criteria for the counter-IED training initiatives it will fund has affected its counter-IED training investment decisions. DOD's directive defines a counter-IED initiative as a materiel or nonmateriel solution that addresses joint IED defeat capability gaps, but does not specifically lay out funding criteria for training initiatives. Though JIEDDO has published criteria for determining what joint counter-IED urgent requirements to fund, it has not developed similar criteria for the funding of joint training initiatives not based on urgent requirements. As a result, JIEDDO has funded training initiatives that may have primary uses other than defeating IEDs, such as role players and simulated villages to replicate Iraqi conditions at various service combat training centers. Without criteria specifying which counter-IED training initiatives it will fund, JIEDDO may diminish its ability to fund future initiatives more directly related to the counter-IED mission. DOD also could hinder coordination in managing its resources, as decision makers at both the joint and service levels operate under unclear selection guidelines for which types of training initiatives should be funded and by whom. We are therefore recommending that JIEDDO evaluate counter-IED training initiatives using the same criteria it uses to evaluate theater-based joint counter-IED urgent requirements, and incorporate this new guidance into an instruction.

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD fully agreed with three of our recommendations and partially agreed with two other recommendations. However, DOD expressed concerns that our report focused on counter-IED initiative challenges from a service perspective rather than a combatant command urgency of need. While we recognize JIEDDO's mission and contribution in supporting urgent warfighter needs, as DOD's focal point for coordinating counter-IED efforts throughout DOD, JIEDDO is tasked with the integration of all IED defeat solutions, which includes the integration of service requirements during the development of counter-IED initiatives. DOD also stated that our report focused on a handful of initiatives or efforts that encountered friction during either the development phase or the coordination process to transfer, transition, or terminate the program. While we recognize JIEDDO's progress to successfully transition some initiatives to the services, the examples used in the report highlight the challenges noted in our work and identify areas for improvement. Furthermore, DOD generally agreed with our recommendations to address these challenges. DOD's written comments are reprinted in appendix II.

Background

Although the IED was not a new threat when first encountered during operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, according to DOD officials, U.S. forces were not initially concerned with the IED as a “weapon of choice” until IED attacks began to increase in Iraq at the end of major combat operations. Terrorist and insurgent groups facing overwhelming conventional forces had previously used IEDs in a variety of scenarios, including the 1983 Marine barracks bombing in Beirut, the ship-borne attack against the *USS Cole* in 1999, and the airborne attacks of September 11th, 2001. In a 2006 report examining the requirements for truck armor, we stated that the Army had previously identified the IED as a threat to U.S. forces prior to the beginning of operations in Iraq.⁸

Following the end of major combat in 2003 in Iraq, insurgents began to rapidly adjust their tactics due to the overwhelming firepower and accuracy of U.S. and coalition military forces in conventional warfare. As U.S. forces began to respond to this asymmetric threat, a new tactic emerged as the preferred enemy form of fire, the IED. Beginning in June 2003, IED incidents targeting coalition forces began to escalate from 22 per month to over 600 per month in June 2004. In June 2006, these incidents reached more than 2,000 per month. At one point in 2006, coalition forces in Iraq were experiencing almost 100 IEDs per day. The initial IED attacks in Iraq used nonconventional tactics, techniques, and procedures with a magnitude U.S. forces had not seen before. This threat involved an enemy that takes advantage of and adapts to the environment and is not restricted by conventional rules of engagement. For example, insurgents began using tactics such as buried or camouflaged roadside bombs, vehicle-borne IEDs (car bombs), and suicide bombers to attack coalition forces. Not only was the enemy flexible, but these insurgents also had the ability to rapidly respond to countermeasures.

Due to the magnitude and previously mentioned changes made by the enemy in its tactics, techniques, and procedures, several counter-IED gaps related to the IED threat were identified by DOD:

- technology gaps—shortage of jammers, robots, and other technology, almost none of which were geared towards homemade roadside bombs,

⁸ GAO, *Defense Logistics: Several Factors Limited the Production and Installation of Army Truck Armor during Current Wartime Operations*, [GAO-06-160](#) (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 22, 2006).

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- personnel gaps—lack of qualified personnel to analyze the threat and collect and distribute information on intelligence, forensic evidence, latest tactics, techniques, procedures, and other data,
 - training gaps—training on latest tactics, techniques, and procedures not available, equipment often supplied without training or instructions, and jammers interfered with communications equipment,
 - funding gaps—little to no dedicated funding for counter-IED efforts, and
 - DOD acquisition process gaps—no process for rapidly developing and fielding new equipment.

DOD's Efforts to Address Counter-IED Capability Gaps Culminated in the Creation of JIEDDO

DOD's efforts to address counter-IED gaps culminated in the creation of JIEDDO. Initially, many different DOD entities began focusing on counter-IED issues in an effort to address capability gaps. JIEDDO emerged through a series of attempts to focus counter-IED efforts, but its development did not follow a formal process. In recognition of the lack of official guidance for planning joint activities, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) is developing a formal process for establishing future joint organizations. Despite steps taken to focus DOD's counter-IED efforts, most of the organizations engaged in the IED defeat effort prior to JIEDDO continue to develop, maintain, and in many cases expand their own IED defeat capabilities.

Many Different DOD Entities Began Focusing on Counter-IED Issues in an Effort to Address Capability Gaps

As IED attacks in Iraq reached nearly 300 per month by October 2003 and over 400 per month by May 2004, many different DOD entities at the service and joint levels began focusing on addressing capability gaps in the areas of counter-IED technologies, qualified personnel with expertise in counter-IED tactics, training, dedicated funding, and expedited acquisition processes. Many of these efforts were carried out by the Army and Marine Corps, in addition to a number of joint and interagency efforts.

Army officials stated that within the Army, individual units throughout Iraq began to focus on counter-IED efforts as IED incidents increased in Iraq. Army units developed their own counter-IED tactics, techniques, and procedures as insurgent tactics evolved, and soldiers began using an increasingly wide range of electronic jammers in varying configurations to counter remote-detonated IEDs. According to Army officials, the Army also employed Explosive Ordnance Disposal technicians to disable and dispose of suspected IEDs. Army officials stated that these personnel began relying on remote-controlled robots as the number of IED incidents and the level of complexity of the devices increased, and Explosive Ordnance Disposal technicians were initially among the few personnel with counterexplosives training in-theater. To support these initial efforts,

according to Army officials, the Army relied on the Rapid Equipping Force to quickly acquire counter-IED technology such as jammers and robots. This organization was established in 2002 to identify and pursue off-the-shelf or near-term materiel solutions that could be acquired and fielded quickly without having to rely on the Army's normally lengthy acquisition processes, Army officials stated. The Operational Needs Statement, a process that enables commanders to request a materiel solution for an urgent need, was another method of rapidly acquiring technology solutions.

Marine Corps officials stated that initial Marine Corps counter-IED efforts were centered on the Marine Corps Combat Development Command, which was responsible for managing materiel requests, known as Universal Needs Statements, from deployed personnel. This organization began to receive a larger number of counter-IED-related requests as the IED threat escalated, according to Marine Corps officials, increasing from 2 in 2002 to 8 in 2003, and 26 in 2004. Overall, 13 percent of all requests during this 3-year period were counter-IED-related. According to Marine Corps officials, in response, the organization established a counter-IED cell in 2004 to focus exclusively on counter-IED-related requests. The cell was later transferred to the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, and expanded to include personnel with more specialized technical expertise. Marine Corps officials stated that the Urgent Universal Needs Statement was developed during this period as a means of providing commanders with an expedited process for requesting critically needed capabilities, including counter-IED solutions. Through this process, Marine Corps officials stated that they have been able to develop and field equipment in a significantly shorter time frame than the normal acquisition processes, sometimes within several weeks.

At the joint and interagency level, a variety of organizations were engaged in intelligence support and counter-IED technology acquisition. Early joint efforts included the Combined Explosives Exploitation Cell, which was established by the Army in 2003 to perform physical, biometric, and tactical exploitation of evidence from IED attack scenes. Staffed by a combination of Army, law enforcement, and intelligence personnel, the organization provided Army, Marines, and Special Forces units with in-theater analyses of IED construction techniques and enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures, and also collected biometric data, such as fingerprints, in an effort to identify specific bomb makers. While the organization often collected evidence from IED attack scenes itself, it also collaborated with Explosive Ordnance Disposal teams and drew on data provided by these teams in their analyses. Since 2004, the Naval Explosive


Ordnance Disposal Technology Division has served as the administrative sponsor and primary source of technical and engineering support for the organization. According to an Army official, the Technical Support Working Group was involved in developing counter-IED technology solutions as part of the Combating Terrorism Directorate of the Joint Staff Operations Center, which in turn was responsible for counter-terrorism force protection efforts, including counter-IED efforts. The Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center was established in 2003 to leverage law enforcement, the intelligence community, and military capabilities to perform technical and forensic analyses on recovered IED components in the United States and provide actionable intelligence to field personnel. Army officials told us that, in contrast to the Combined Explosives Exploitation Cell, it focused on higher-level strategic issues rather than tactical ones, and included personnel from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms, DOD, and the intelligence community.

Army and Marine Corps officials stated that communication and cooperation among these various efforts lacked overall coordination, with multiple entities independently engaged in attempts to address various facets of the larger IED problem. Although the Army had direct experience with IEDs due to its presence in Iraq, according to an Army official, it had no single coordinator for even its own IED defeat efforts. For example, Army officials stated that coordination of counter-IED efforts between Army units occurred in-theater at the working level as personnel facing similar enemy tactics exchanged successful tactics, techniques, and procedures, but little synchronization of Army-wide efforts was occurring. Army and Marine Corps officials stated that some coordination between the Army and the Marine Corps took place, for example, on the use of the different electronic jamming systems used by each service, but communication was carried out on an ad hoc basis and generally occurred only in Iraq as commanders from both services attempted to overcome IED-related threats. At the interagency level, counterterrorism force protection efforts, including the Technical Support Working Group, were coordinated by the Combating Terrorism Directorate of the Joint Staff Operations Center. However, an Army official stated that this organization was left with limited capabilities by 2003 as many of its resources had been reallocated to the Department of Homeland Security after the attacks of September 11, 2001.

JIEDDO Evolved through a Series of Attempts to Focus Counter-IED Efforts

As IED attacks increased following the invasion of Iraq, JIEDDO evolved through a series of attempts to focus counter-IED efforts. Figure 1 illustrates JIEDDO's evolution as the IED threat increased from 2003 to 2007.

Figure 1: Evolution of JIEDDO as IED Incidents Escalated in Iraq



All of the actions, noted in the above timeline, were attempts to coordinate counter-IED efforts and provide funding commensurate with the increased scale of the effort. For example, in late 2003, recognizing the need for closer coordination and greater focus on its counter-IED efforts, the Army took the initial steps toward what would later become a joint-level organization with the establishment of the Army IED Task Force.

According to an Army official, the IED Task Force consisted of a coordinating cell in Washington and two field teams in Iraq, and was largely focused on operational and training efforts in an attempt to address both the lack of personnel in-theater with counter-IED training and the need for better training on effective tactics, techniques, and procedures. The field teams, including former Special Forces personnel, developed effective tactics, techniques, and procedures, which they then relayed to the Center for Army Lessons Learned. An IED cell was established at the center to analyze these practices and incorporate lessons learned in the training of outgoing troops to Iraq, while an Army official stated that the coordinating cell in Washington provided leadership and facilitated communication between the field teams, field commanders, and the center. Army officials also stated that the IED Task Force fielded a limited amount of counter-IED-related technology in cooperation with the Rapid Equipping Force, including more sophisticated jamming equipment, vehicle armor, and Explosive Ordnance Disposal robots. However, an Army official stated that with an initial budget of \$20 million and no formal authority to coordinate counter-IED efforts outside of the Army, the IED Task Force lacked both the funding and authority to undertake a large-scale, departmentwide effort.

In 2004, senior leaders began to believe that greater emphasis should be placed on developing a technology solution rather than focusing on training as well as tactics, techniques, and procedures, according to Army officials. In June 2004, the commander of the CENTCOM wrote a memorandum to the Deputy Secretary of Defense requesting a Manhattan Project-like effort to find a technical solution to the IED problem. In response to the CENTCOM memorandum, the Deputy Secretary of Defense created a Joint Integrated Process Team in July 2004. This team was intended to identify, prioritize, and resource materiel and nonmateriel solutions, and the Army IED Task Force was elevated to the joint level and renamed the Joint IED Defeat Task Force, with a budget of \$100 million.

In an attempt to enhance visibility over all DOD initiatives and to further focus the counter-IED effort, in June 2005, DOD Directive 2000.19 elevated the Joint IED Defeat Task Force to report directly to the Deputy Secretary, gave it a budget of over \$1.3 billion, and clarified its role as the focal point for all efforts in DOD to defeat IEDs. The Joint Integrated Process Team was transformed into an advisory group to the Joint IED Defeat Task Force's director, and a retired four-star general was recruited to head the Task Force in an effort to raise its profile among other senior DOD leaders, according to a former senior DOD official. However, a DOD official stated that by 2006, the Joint IED Defeat Task Force had begun to

encounter difficulties attracting and retaining qualified personnel due to its temporary status.

In late 2005, the Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense began working with the Joint Staff and the Director of Administration and Management⁹ to give the task force more permanence and to provide more manpower continuity. Several solutions were proposed by the Director of Administration and Management, including placing the task force within the Joint Forces Command, making it a Staff Element within OSD, or creating a Jointly Manned Entity under OSD. Consequently in February 2006, DOD Directive 2000.19E turned the joint task force into a permanent joint entity and jointly manned activity of DOD—JIEDDO—with a budget of nearly \$3.7 billion, with the intention to provide the institutional stability necessary to attract and retain qualified personnel, according to a DOD official.

These various actions that led to the development of JIEDDO were done in the absence of DOD having formal guidance for establishing joint organizations. According to a former DOD official, JIEDDO developed largely through informal communication among key individuals in various services and agencies. For example, a former DOD official stated that after the establishment of the Army IED Task Force, the Secretary of the Navy became aware of its work and began meeting regularly with its director, and these meetings eventually led to the idea of elevating the IED Task Force to the joint level. Furthermore, DOD did not systematically evaluate all preexisting counter-IED resources in order to determine whether other entities were engaged in similar efforts within DOD, according to DOD officials. Although the Technical Support Working Group, for example, was already in existence at the time of the establishment of the Army IED Task Force in 2003, an Army official stated that Army officials were under pressure to find an immediate solution and that creating a new working group or task force would be the most efficient approach to overcoming the IED problem. In addition, an Army official stated that existing organizations, such as the Technical Support Working Group, were too focused on technology solutions, but even after the CENTCOM's 2004 memorandum requesting a technology solution, as noted above, a DOD official stated that the possibility of using preexisting counter-IED

⁹ The Director of Administration and Management advises the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense on DOD-wide organizational and management planning matters. Among other activities, the director develops and maintains organizational charters for DOD activities.

resources rather than creating a new organization was not considered when the decision to establish JIEDDO was made. Furthermore, according to a DOD official, the Director of Administration and Management was not tasked to evaluate potential organizational solutions until after the decision to establish a permanent organization had already been made.

OSD Is Developing a Formal Process for Establishing Future Joint Organizations

In recognition of the increasing number of joint activities and the lack of official guidance for planning them, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review called for the development of a formal process for establishing joint organizations in the future. In response, the Director of Administration and Management is currently developing a Joint Task Assignment Process with the goal of ensuring that future joint activities have the appropriate authorities, responsibilities, resources, and performance expectations to carry out their missions. This process will consist of four stages, during which preexisting resources and capabilities will be fully evaluated, the optimal organizational solution will be determined, and all stakeholders will be identified and included in the process. OSD officials stated that although the ultimate solution may range from a Memorandum of Agreement between two existing organizations to a new defense agency, creation of a new organization will be considered if no existing organizations are determined to be capable of fulfilling the mission's goals. According to OSD officials, the process will be implemented through a formal DOD directive and instruction, and all new joint activities will be required to go through the process before being established. Although development of the process is still ongoing, DOD officials stated that implementation will likely take place in late 2009.

Many Efforts to Address the IED Threat Have Continued after the Creation of JIEDDO

Despite these steps taken to focus DOD's counter-IED efforts, many of the organizations engaged in the IED defeat effort prior to JIEDDO continue to develop, maintain, and expand their own IED defeat capabilities. For example, the Army continues to address the IED threat through such organizations as the Army Asymmetric Warfare Office, established in 2006, which coordinates Army responses to asymmetric threats such as IEDs. The Army's Training and Doctrine Command provides training support and doctrinal formation for counter-IED activities, and the Research, Development & Engineering Command conducts counter-IED technology assessments and studies for Army leadership. Furthermore, an Army official stated that the Center for Army Lessons Learned continues to maintain an IED cell to collect and analyze counter-IED information. Similarly, the Marine Corps continues to address the IED threat through the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, whose Global War on Terror

Operations Division is the focal point for all Marine Corps IED countermeasures. DOD officials also stated that the Marine Corps Combat Development Command, the Training and Education Command, and the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned have all continued counter-IED efforts beyond the creation of JIEDDO. According to DOD officials, at the joint level, CENTCOM maintains its own counter-IED task force as part of the Interagency Action Group, while Joint Forces Command continues to support counter-IED training and maintain involvement with counter-IED doctrine development. At the interagency level, the Technical Support Working Group continues its research and development of counter-IED technologies.

JIEDDO and the Services Lack Full Visibility over Counter-IED Initiatives throughout DOD

JIEDDO has taken steps to improve visibility over its counter-IED efforts by, for example, involving the services in the joint counter-IED acquisition process and hosting DOD counter-IED conferences. However, JIEDDO and the services have limited visibility over all counter-IED initiatives throughout DOD in that there is no comprehensive database of all existing counter-IED initiatives. In addition, the services lack visibility over some JIEDDO-funded initiatives that bypass JIEDDO's acquisition process.

JIEDDO and the Services Have Taken Steps to Improve Visibility over Their Counter-IED Efforts

Since JIEDDO's establishment, JIEDDO and the services have taken steps to improve visibility over their counter-IED efforts. For example, JIEDDO, the services, and several other DOD organizations compile some information on the wide range of IED defeat initiatives existing throughout DOD. JIEDDO also promotes visibility by giving representatives from the Army Asymmetric Warfare Office's Adaptive Networks, Threats and Solutions Division, and the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab, the opportunity to assist in the evaluation of IED defeat initiative proposals. Additionally, JIEDDO maintains a network of liaison officers to facilitate counter-IED information sharing throughout DOD. It also hosts a semiannual conference covering counter-IED topics such as agency roles and responsibilities, key issues, and current challenges. JIEDDO also hosts a technology outreach conference with industry, academia, and other DOD components to discuss the latest requirements and trends in the counter-IED effort. Lastly, the services provide some visibility over their own counter-IED initiatives by submitting information to JIEDDO for its quarterly reports to Congress.

No Comprehensive IED Defeat Initiative Database Exists throughout DOD

JIEDDO and the services have limited visibility over all counter-IED initiatives throughout DOD in that there is no comprehensive database of all existing counter-IED initiatives. Tasked with leading, advocating, and coordinating all DOD actions to defeat IEDs, JIEDDO is also required by its directive to (1) integrate all IED defeat solutions throughout DOD and (2) maintain the current status of program execution, operational fielding, and performance of approved joint IED defeat initiatives. Another document, JIEDDO's internal standard operating procedure, requires it to maintain visibility and awareness of all counter-IED initiatives. Despite these requirements, JIEDDO does not maintain a comprehensive database of all IED defeat initiatives existing throughout DOD, which has spent at least \$1.49 billion in fiscal years 2007 and 2008 on counter-IED activities outside of JIEDDO. In a previous report, we recommended that JIEDDO develop a database to capture all DOD counter-IED initiatives.¹⁰ In its response to our report, JIEDDO acknowledged the need for such a database and cited ongoing work in partnership with the Director, Defense Research and Engineering, to develop one. JIEDDO is currently developing a management system that will track its initiatives as they move through JIEDDO's acquisition process. However, this system will only track JIEDDO-funded initiatives—not those being independently developed and procured by the services and other DOD components. Without incorporating service and other DOD components' counter-IED initiatives, JIEDDO's efforts to develop a counter-IED initiative database will not capture all initiatives throughout DOD.

Though they are required by DOD directive¹¹ to ensure that JIEDDO maintains visibility over their IED defeat initiatives, the services do not have a central source of information for their own counter-IED efforts. DOD officials stated that there is currently no requirement for each service to develop a comprehensive database of all of its counter-IED initiatives. Without centralized counter-IED initiative databases, the services are limited in their ability to provide JIEDDO with a timely and comprehensive summary of all their existing initiatives. For example, the U.S. Army Research and Development and Engineering Command's Counter-IED Task Force and the service counter-IED focal points—the Army Asymmetric Warfare Office's Adaptive Networks, Threats and Solutions

¹⁰ GAO, *Defense Management: A Strategic Plan is Needed to Guide the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization's Efforts to Effectively Accomplish Its Mission*, GAO 07-377C (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 28, 2007)

¹¹ DOD Directive 2000.19E (Feb. 14, 2006).

Division, and the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab—maintain databases of counter-IED initiatives, but, according to Army and Marine Corps officials, these databases are not comprehensive of all efforts within their respective service.¹² Additionally, of these three databases, only the U. S. Army Research and Development and Engineering Command’s database is available for external use. Since the services are able to act independently to develop and procure their own counter-IED solutions, several service and joint officials told us that a centralized counter-IED database would be of great benefit in coordinating and managing DOD’s counter-IED programs.

Two other DOD components maintain counter-IED initiative information repositories, but they also are not comprehensive of all counter-IED efforts within DOD. At the combatant command level, CENTCOM maintains a Web-based information management system to track incoming requirements from its area of responsibility, but the system does not capture nor list all available counter-IED technologies. Additionally, DOD’s Combating Terrorism Technology Support Office’s Technical Support Working Group maintains an information management system that tracks counter-IED technologies resulting from industry responses to broad agency announcements. However, this system is neither searchable by other agencies nor comprehensive of all initiatives being pursued across DOD.

The Services Lack Visibility over Some JIEDDO-Funded Initiatives

The services lack full visibility over those JIEDDO-funded initiatives that bypass JIEDDO’s acquisition process. In this process, JIEDDO brings in representatives from the service counter-IED focal points to participate on several boards to evaluate counter-IED initiatives, such as the JIEDD Requirements, Resources, and Acquisition Board, and the Joint IED Defeat Integrated Process Team. However, even with these boards, JIEDDO has approved some counter-IED initiatives without vetting them through the appropriate service counter-IED focal points because the process allows JIEDDO to make exceptions if deemed necessary and appropriate.¹³

¹² The U.S. Army Research and Development and Engineering Command’s Counter-IED Task Force maintains an online counter-IED technology interface that provides a search and organization tool of counter-IED technologies, studies, signatures, and requirements. The Army Asymmetric Warfare Office’s Adaptive Networks, Threats and Solutions Division maintains a list of all initiatives that have gone through JIEDDO’s acquisition process. The Marine Corps Warfighting Lab maintains a list of all counter-IED solutions the Marine Corps uses in-theater.

¹³ JIEDDOI 5000.1 (Nov. 9, 2007).

Specifically, the process allows the Director of JIEDDO's counter-IED training center to make exceptions when training requirements and training support activities need to be accelerated to meet predeployment training requirements. For example, at least three counter-IED training initiatives sponsored by JIEDDO's counter-IED joint training center were not vetted through the Army counter-IED focal point before being approved for JIEDDO funding. These initiatives included a \$9.5 million upgrade to counter-IED training areas, a \$19.1 million search rehearsal site to replicate conditions in Iraq, and a \$1.5 million initiative to augment the number of personnel trained on IED signal jamming at an Army training center. In addition to not having visibility over these initiatives, Army officials later rejected the transition or transfer from JIEDDO of each of these initiatives for fiscal year 2011. In particular, Army officials rejected the search rehearsal site and signal jamming personnel augmentation initiatives because the Army had already been pursuing similar efforts. JIEDDO officials acknowledged that while it may be beneficial for some JIEDDO-funded initiatives to bypass its acquisition process in cases where an urgent requirement with limited time to field is identified, these cases do limit service visibility over all JIEDDO-funded initiatives.

Army officials also cited examples where JIEDDO allowed certain science and technology initiatives with high-technology readiness levels to bypass the first stages of JIEDDO's process to select initiatives. Officials from the Army's Adaptive Networks, Threats, and Solutions Division stated that this step limits the Army's visibility over JIEDDO's funding decisions. They cited six initiatives that bypassed JIEDDO's acquisition process, including one designed to predetonate IEDs. While this method may shorten the time required for procurement, it denies the service counter-IED representatives at JIEDDO's initiative vetting boards the opportunity to review the initiatives.

JIEDDO also has bypassed its acquisition process by working directly with individual service units and organizations to address specific counter-IED capability gaps. For example, JIEDDO worked directly with the Army's Training and Doctrine Command to establish the Joint Training Counter-IED Operations and Integration Center without input from the Army's Adaptive Networks, Threats, and Solutions Division. As a result, the Army counter-IED focal point was initially unaware of the initiative and expressed confusion about how the initiative would be integrated into the Army's overall counter-IED effort. Additionally, this training center was not based on a theater-based urgent need. Furthermore, Army officials voiced concerns about the implications of assigning a service responsibility for what is essentially a joint training function. Additionally,

officials with the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab described the coordination and accountability challenges involved when JIEDDO's counter-IED training center works directly with a Marine unit to deliver counter-IED equipment, making it difficult for the Marine counter-IED focal point to monitor counter-IED activity and quantify the amount of funding it receives from JIEDDO. Overall, service officials have said that not incorporating their views on initiatives limits their visibility of JIEDDO actions and could result in approved initiatives that are inconsistent with service needs. This lack of visibility also creates the potential for duplication of effort across the services and other DOD organizations.

JIEDDO Faces Difficulties with Transitioning Joint IED Defeat Initiatives to the Military Services

Since its creation, JIEDDO has taken steps to support the services' and defense agencies' ability to program and fund counter-IED initiatives approved for transition following JIEDDO's 2-year transition timeline. According to DOD's Directive, JIEDDO is required to develop plans for transitioning joint IED defeat initiatives into DOD base budget programs for sustainment and further integration. However, JIEDDO's initiative transitions to the services are hindered by funding gaps between JIEDDO's transition timeline and DOD's base budget cycle as well as by instances when service requirements are not fully considered during the development and integration of jointly-funded counter-IED initiatives.

JIEDDO Has Taken Steps to Guide the Transition of Joint IED Defeat Initiatives to the Military Services

JIEDDO has taken steps to support the services' and defense agencies' ability to program and fund counter-IED initiatives approved for transition following JIEDDO's 2-year transition timeline. For example, in November 2007, JIEDDO developed an instruction with detailed guidance to formally document, clarify, and improve procedures for transitioning JIEDDO-funded initiatives. JIEDDO has also taken steps to keep the services informed of the status of upcoming initiative transitions. For example, it holds a transition working group to provide the services and other agencies with notification of upcoming initiative transitions. JIEDDO also gives transition briefings to several boards and councils throughout DOD to facilitate the transition of joint-IED defeat initiatives. It gives a quarterly briefing to the Joint Staff's Protection Functional Capabilities Board, a permanently established body responsible for the organization, analysis, and prioritization of joint warfighting capabilities within the protection functional area. To ensure coordination of transition recommendations, JIEDDO also provides annual briefings to the Joint Capabilities Board and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. JIEDDO also annually updates the Deputy Secretary of Defense's Senior Resource Steering Group on the transition of initiatives valued greater than \$25 million.

JIEDDO's Initiative Transitions Are Hindered by Funding Gaps within the Services' Budgets

JIEDDO and the services still have difficulty resolving the gap between JIEDDO's transition timeline and DOD's base budget cycle, causing DOD to rely on service overseas contingency operations funding to sustain jointly-funded counter-IED initiatives. In our 2008 report, we recommended that DOD develop a more effective process to ensure funds designated for sustainment costs are included in its budget cycle.¹⁴ However, DOD still lacks a comprehensive plan to ensure that the services have the proper funding to sustain an initiative following a transition.

According to DOD's Directive, JIEDDO is required to develop plans for transitioning joint IED defeat initiatives into DOD base budget programs for sustainment. As described in its instruction, JIEDDO plans to fund initiatives for 2 fiscal years of sustainment. After that, the initiative is supposed to be either disposed of or passed to one of the services for its continued sustainment through a transition or transfer. In a transition, one of the services is expected to pick up sustainment costs for an initiative by placing it into a base budget program as an enduring capability. In a transfer, one of the services may sustain the initiative through funding for current contingency operations. In comments on our prior report, JIEDDO stated that it would work with DOD to develop a more effective process to ensure that funds designated for sustainment costs are included in its base budget cycle. However, since that report, service officials have stated that JIEDDO's process has not yet been improved and that JIEDDO's transition timeline may not allow the services enough time to request and receive funding through DOD's base budgeting process. As a result, DOD continues to transfer most initiatives to the services for funding as permanent programs, with service overseas contingency operations appropriations, rather than with service base budget funding. According to JIEDDO's latest transition brief for fiscal year 2010, JIEDDO recommended the transfer of 19 initiatives totaling \$233 million to the services for funding through overseas contingency operations appropriations and the transition of only 3 initiatives totaling \$4.5 million into service base budget programs.¹⁵ Continuing to fund transferred initiatives with overseas contingency operations appropriations does not

¹⁴ GAO, *Defense Management: The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization Provides Valuable Intelligence Support but Actions Are Needed to Clarify Roles and Improve Coordination*, GAO-09-172C (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 6, 2008)

¹⁵ The three initiatives include a bomb-sniffing dog initiative for both the Army and Air Force and a homemade explosives detection initiative for the Navy. As of May 29, 2009, due to additional transfers, JIEDDO estimated that the services would be responsible for \$410 million in transferred initiatives for fiscal year 2010.

ensure funding availability for those initiatives in future years, since these appropriations are not necessarily renewed from one year to the next.

In addition to the small number of transitions and transfers within DOD, the services often decide to defer indefinitely their assumption of funding responsibility for JIEDDO initiatives following JIEDDO's intended 2-year transition or transfer point. According to the fiscal year 2011 JIEDDO transition list, the Army and Navy deferred or rejected the acceptance of 16 initiatives that JIEDDO had recommended for transition or transfer, totaling at least \$16 million.¹⁶ Deferred or rejected initiatives are either sustained by JIEDDO indefinitely, transitioned or transferred during a future year, or terminated. When the services defer or reject the transition of initiatives, JIEDDO remains responsible for them beyond the intended 2-year transition or transfer point, a delay that could diminish its ability to fund new initiatives.

Lastly, JIEDDO has delivered training aids to the Army without ensuring that it had the appropriate funds to sustain the equipment. As a result, Army officials have stated that they are unable to quickly reallocate funding from current programs to pay for these sustainment costs. For example, JIEDDO provided counter-IED training aids, such as surrogates for mine-resistant vehicles to support training at the Army's combat training centers, without first coordinating with the Army's Combat Training Center Directorate to plan for their future sustainment. Consequently, this directorate had not planned for the \$12.7 million requirement to sustain the vehicle surrogates and other training equipment. As a result of unplanned sustainment costs such as these, the services could face unexpected, long-term sustainment requirements in the future.

¹⁶ According to the Army's Adaptive Networks, Threats, and Solutions Division, nine of these initiatives were training initiatives or medical initiatives later rejected by the Army for transition or transfer in fiscal year 2011. The training initiatives were not included in the \$16 million figure cited above.

JIEDDO's Initiative Transitions Are Hindered When Service Requirements Are Not Fully Considered

JIEDDO's initiative transitions are also hindered when service requirements are not fully considered during the development and integration of jointly-funded counter-IED initiatives. According to DOD's Directive,¹⁷ JIEDDO is required to integrate joint-funded counter-IED initiatives throughout DOD. However, service officials stated that transitioning JIEDDO-funded initiatives, such as counter-IED radio jamming systems, is made more difficult when service requirements are not fully considered throughout the systems' evaluation process. In 2006, DOD established the Navy as single manager and executive agent for ground-based jamming systems for DOD. Under this arrangement, the Navy oversees several boards to review and evaluate jamming system proposals, including a program board at the general officer level and a technical acceptance board at the field officer level. Though the services participate on each of these boards, the counter-IED jamming program board approved, with JIEDDO funding, two ground-based, counter-IED jamming systems that did not fully meet the services' needs. In the first example, CENTCOM, in response to an urgent operational needs statement originating from its area of operations, published a requirement in 2006 for a portable IED jamming system for use in theater. In 2007, JIEDDO funded and delivered to theater a near-term solution to meet this capability gap. However, Army officials stated that the fielded system was underutilized by troops in Iraq, who thought the system was too heavy to carry, especially given the weight of their body armor. Since then, the joint counter-IED radio jamming program board has devised a plan to field a newer portable jamming system called Counter Remote Control IED Electronic Warfare (CREW) 3.1. According to JIEDDO, CREW 3.1 systems were developed by a joint technical requirements board that aimed to balance specific service requirements for portable systems. While CENTCOM maintains that CREW 3.1 is a requirement in-theater, and revalidated the need in September 2009, officials from the Army and Marines Corps have both stated that they do not have a formal requirement for the system. Nevertheless, DOD plans to field the equipment to each of the services in response to CENTCOM's stated operational need. It remains unclear, however, which DOD organizations will be required to pay for procurement and sustainment costs for the CREW 3.1, since DOD has yet to identify the source of final procurement funding. In a second example, Army officials stated that they were not involved to the fullest extent possible in the evaluation and improvement process for a JIEDDO-funded, vehicle-mounted jamming system, even

¹⁷ DOD Directive 2000.19E (Feb. 14, 2006).

though the Army was DOD's primary user in terms of total number of systems fielded. The system, called the CREW Vehicle Receiver/Jammer (CVRJ), ultimately required at least 20 proposals for configuration changes to correct flaws found in its design after the contract was awarded. Two of the changes involved modifying the jammer so it could function properly at high temperatures. Another change was needed to prevent the jammer from interfering with vehicle global positioning systems. Army officials stated that had they had a more direct role on the Navy-led control board that managed configuration changes to the CVRJ, the system may have been more quickly integrated into the Army's operations. As this transpired, the Army continued to use another jamming system, DUKE, as its principal counter-IED electronic warfare system. Not ensuring that service requirements are fully taken into account when evaluating and developing counter-IED systems creates the potential for fielding equipment that is inconsistent with service requirements. This could also delay the transition of JIEDDO-funded initiatives to the services following JIEDDO's 2-year transition timeline.

JIEDDO Lacks Clear Criteria for Defining What Counter-IED Training Initiative It Will Fund

JIEDDO devoted \$454 million in fiscal year 2008 to support service counter-IED training requirements through such activities as constructing a network of realistic counter-IED training courses at 57 locations throughout the United States, Europe, and Korea. Although JIEDDO has supported service counter-IED training, its lack of clear criteria for the counter-IED training initiatives it will fund has affected its counter-IED training investment decisions. According to its directive, JIEDDO defines a counter-IED initiative as a materiel or nonmateriel solution that addresses joint IED defeat capability gaps, but the directive does not specifically lay out funding criteria for training initiatives. Since our last report, JIEDDO has attempted to clarify what types of counter-IED training it will fund in support of in-theater, urgent counter-IED requirements. In its comments to our previous report, JIEDDO stated that it will fund an urgent in-theater counter-IED requirement if it "enables training support, including training aids and exercises."¹⁸ JIEDDO also stated in its comments that it will fund an urgent in-theater counter-IED requirement only if it has a primary counter-IED application.¹⁹ Beyond JIEDDO, CENTCOM officials have

¹⁸ GAO, *Defense Management: A Strategic Plan is Needed to Guide the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization's Efforts to Effectively Accomplish Its Mission*, GAO 07-377C (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 28, 2007)

¹⁹ GAO 07-377C.

stated that they will process counter-IED capabilities only if they are primarily related to countering IEDs.

Though JIEDDO has since published criteria for determining what joint, counter-IED, urgent requirements to fund, it has not developed similar criteria for the funding of joint training initiatives not based on urgent requirements. As a result, JIEDDO has funded training initiatives that may have primary uses other than defeating IEDs. For example, since fiscal year 2007, JIEDDO has spent \$70.7 million on role players in an effort to simulate Iraqi social, political, and religious groups at DOD's training centers. JIEDDO also spent \$24.1 million on simulated villages at DOD's training centers in an effort to make steel shipping containers resemble Iraqi buildings. According to Army officials, these role players and simulated villages funded by JIEDDO to support counter-IED training are also used in training not related to countering IEDs. Lastly, according to its 2008 annual report, JIEDDO used counter-IED funding to purchase authentic Iraqi furniture and other items to create a realistic environment for counter-IED search rehearsals. In March 2009, JIEDDO attempted to clarify its criteria for training initiatives not based on urgent requirements by requiring counter-IED training initiatives to be (1) counter-IED related, (2) joint in nature, (3) derived from an immediate need, and (4) unable to be funded by a service. As with JIEDDO's urgent needs criteria for training, these guidelines could also be broadly interpreted, as demonstrated by the above examples. Without criteria specifying which counter-IED training initiatives it will fund, JIEDDO may diminish its ability to fund future initiatives that are more directly related to the counter-IED mission. DOD also could hinder coordination in managing its resources, as decision makers at both the joint and service level operate under unclear selection guidelines for which types of training initiatives should be funded and by whom.

Conclusions

JIEDDO and the services lack full visibility and coordination of the wide range of counter-IED measures throughout DOD, which presents difficulties for DOD in efficiently using its resources to defeat IEDs. While JIEDDO and the services have taken important steps to focus counter-IED efforts, DOD remains challenged in its effort to harness the full potential of its components towards an integrated effort to defeat IEDs. In addition, difficulties remain in maintaining visibility over all counter-IED activities throughout DOD, coordinating the transition of JIEDDO initiatives, and clearly defining the types of training initiatives it will fund. If these issues are not resolved, DOD's various efforts to counter IEDs face the potential for duplication of effort, unaddressed capability gaps, integration issues,

and inefficient use of resources in an already fiscally challenged environment. As a result, DOD may not be assured that it has retained the necessary capabilities to address the IED threat for the long term.

Recommendations for Executive Action

We are making five recommendations to address the issues raised in this report:

- To improve JIEDDO's visibility over all counter-IED efforts, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the military services to create their own comprehensive IED defeat initiative databases and work with JIEDDO to develop a DOD-wide database for all counter-IED initiatives.
- To further provide DOD visibility over all counter-IED efforts in cases where initiatives bypass JIEDDO's rapid acquisition process, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct JIEDDO to develop a mechanism to notify the appropriate service counter-IED focal points of each initiative prior to its funding.
- To facilitate the transition of JIEDDO-funded initiatives, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the military services to work with JIEDDO to develop a comprehensive plan to guide the transition of each JIEDDO-funded initiative, including expected costs, identified funding sources, and a timeline including milestones for inclusion into the DOD base budget cycle.
- To facilitate the transition of JIEDDO-funded initiatives, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct JIEDDO to coordinate with the services prior to funding an initiative to ensure that service requirements are fully taken into account when making counter-IED investment decisions.
- To better clarify what counter-IED training initiatives JIEDDO will fund, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct JIEDDO to evaluate counter-IED training initiatives using the same criteria it uses to evaluate theater-based joint counter-IED urgent requirements, and incorporate this direction into existing guidance.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD fully agreed with three of our recommendations and partially agreed with two other recommendations. However, DOD expressed concerns that our report focuses on counter-IED initiative challenges from a service perspective rather than a combatant command urgency of need. While we recognize JIEDDO's mission and contribution in supporting urgent warfighter needs, as DOD's focal point for coordinating counter-IED efforts throughout the department, JIEDDO is tasked with the integration of all IED defeat

solutions throughout DOD, which includes the integration of service requirements during the development of counter-IED initiatives. DOD also stated that our report focused on a handful of initiatives or efforts that encountered friction during either the development phase or the coordination process to transfer, transition, or terminate the program. While we recognize JIEDDO's progress to successfully transition some initiatives to the services, the examples used in the report highlight the challenges noted in our work and identify areas for improvement. Furthermore, DOD generally agreed with our recommendations to address these challenges.

In commenting on our recommendation for JIEDDO and the services to develop a DOD-wide database for all counter-IED initiatives, DOD concurred and noted that JIEDDO is supporting the Army Research Development and Engineering Command's effort to establish a JIEDDO-hosted network solution that establishes a common collaboration tool to link these databases and provide comprehensive visibility across DOD for all counter-IED efforts. However, this initiative does not describe how the services will develop a comprehensive database for each of their own counter-IED efforts. While we recognize that this ongoing effort is a step in the right direction, until all of the services and other DOD components gain full awareness of their own individual counter-IED efforts and provide this input into a central database, any effort to establish a DOD-wide database of all counter-IED initiatives will be incomplete.

In commenting on our recommendation for JIEDDO to develop a mechanism to notify the appropriate service counter-IED focal points of initiatives that bypass JIEDDO's acquisition process prior to its funding, DOD concurred and stated that JIEDDO will take action to notify stakeholders of all JIEDDO efforts or initiatives, whether or not initiatives are required to go through the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Capability Approval and Acquisition Management Process (JCAAMP). JIEDDO will also inform stakeholders and elicit their opinions on JIEDDO developmental efforts in order to decrease duplication of efforts and allow services greater lead time to review these efforts. DOD noted that this process will be incorporated in the pending update of JCAAMP. We agree that if implemented, these actions would satisfy our recommendation.

In commenting on our recommendation for JIEDDO to develop a comprehensive plan to guide the transition of each JIEDDO-funded initiative, including expected costs, identified funding sources, and a timeline including milestones for inclusion into the DOD base budget cycle, DOD concurred and noted that the Navy and Marine Corps are

working on efforts to improve the transition of JIEDDO-funded initiatives. DOD also stated that it has developed recommended changes for DOD Directive 2000.19E that will address coordinating the transition of counter-IED solutions. DOD noted that these changes will be staffed to DOD and the services during the periodic update of DOD Directive 2000.19E. We agree that if implemented, these actions would satisfy our recommendation.

In commenting on our recommendation for JIEDDO to coordinate with the services prior to funding an initiative to ensure that service requirements are fully taken into account when making counter-IED investment decisions, DOD partially concurred. DOD noted that JIEDDO responds to in-theater requirements that have joint applications but may not have service specific applications. DOD also stated that fully vetted coordination with the services prior to funding an effort or initiative could delay the fielding of material that would save lives. DOD therefore suggested that this recommendation be incorporated with our second recommendation to notify the services of all JIEDDO-funded initiatives or the language to this recommendation be changed to reflect DOD's position. While we recognize the need to respond rapidly to support warfighter needs and that our previous recommendations will help gain awareness of JIEDDO-funded initiatives as they are being developed, we continue to support our recommendation and reiterate the need for the integration of service requirements and full coordination prior to funding an initiative to ensure that these efforts are fully vetted throughout DOD before significant resources are committed.

In commenting on our recommendation for JIEDDO to evaluate counter-IED training initiatives using the same criteria it uses to evaluate in-theater-based joint counter-IED urgent requirements, and incorporate this direction into existing guidance, DOD concurred with the intent but not the language of this recommendation. DOD noted that the JCAAMP provides the mechanism to identify, validate, and provide solutions for combatant commanders and service training counter-IED capability gaps. DOD also noted that it is currently developing a new DOD instruction on counter-IED training guidance. According to DOD's comments, the instruction directs DOD components to implement counter-IED, mission-essential tasks across all levels of war into their training regiments at the individual, collective, unit, and staff levels, and sustain relevancy through interface with JIEDDO. While we recognize these actions may be a positive step towards improving coordination of training initiatives between JIEDDO and the services, neither the JCAAMP nor the instruction cited in DOD's response to this report contain the criteria by which

JIEDDO will fund counter-IED training initiatives. We, therefore, continue to support our recommendation and reiterate the need for establishing criteria specifying which counter-IED training initiatives JIEDDO will fund.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees and the Secretary of Defense. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO's Web site at <http://www.gao.gov>. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'W. Solis', with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

William M. Solis
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management

List of Committees

The Honorable Carl Levin
Chairman
The Honorable John McCain
Ranking Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate

The Honorable Daniel Inouye
Chairman
The Honorable Thad Cochran
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate

The Honorable Ike Skelton
Chairman
The Honorable Howard McKeon
Ranking Member
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives

The Honorable John P. Murtha
Chairman
The Honorable C.W. Bill Young
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To assess the extent to which capability gaps were initially identified in DOD's effort to defeat IEDs and how these gaps and other factors led to the development of JIEDDO, we spoke with current and former senior officials involved in the evolution of JIEDDO and examined existing documentation. To assess initial DOD efforts to defeat IEDs and the early evolution of JIEDDO, we met with officials from JIEDDO, the Army Asymmetric Warfare Office, the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and other current and former DOD officials involved in the establishment of JIEDDO. We also examined documentation including DOD Directive 2000.19E, which established JIEDDO, and documentation and briefings relating to JIEDDO's evolution. To assess DOD's efforts to implement a process for establishing new joint organizations, we met with officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Office of the Director of Administration and Management, to examine documentation and conduct interviews on the implementation of the Joint Task Assignment Process and its relevance to JIEDDO.

To assess the extent to which JIEDDO has maintained visibility over all counter-IED efforts, we met with officials from JIEDDO, the Army Asymmetric Warfare Office, the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, the Army's Research Development and Engineering Command, and CENTCOM to discuss current efforts to gain visibility over all of DOD's counter-IED efforts. We also examined documentation including DOD Directive 2000.19E and JIEDDO Instruction 5000.01, which established JIEDDO's rapid acquisition process, as well as analyzed JIEDDO, service, and other DOD counter-IED databases.

To assess the extent to which JIEDDO has coordinated the transition of JIEDDO-funded initiatives to the military services, we met with officials from JIEDDO, the Army's Combined Arms Center, the Army Asymmetric Warfare Office, the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, and the Navy's CREW Office. We also examined documentation including JIEDDO Instruction 5000.01, JIEDDO's annual reports, and DOD Directive 5101.14, which designated the Secretary of the Navy as the Executive Agent for CREW and authorized the Secretary of the Navy to designate a Single Manager for CREW.

To assess the extent to which JIEDDO has developed criteria for the counter-IED training initiatives it will fund, we met with officials from organizations including JIEDDO, the JIEDDO Joint Center of Excellence, and CENTCOM. We also examined documentation including DOD Directive 2000.19E and other relevant documents and briefings, such as

published criteria for accepting counter-IED Joint Operational Urgent Needs from JIEDDO, the services, and other DOD entities.

We conducted this performance audit from June 2008 through August 2009 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

We visited or contacted the following organizations during our review:

Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization

- Operations and Training Division
- Training Counter-IED Operational Integration Center
- Joint Center of Excellence
- J-5 (Interagency) Division
- Technology and Requirements Integration Division
- Congressional Affairs

Department of Defense

- Office of the Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness
- Office of the Secretary of Defense, Comptroller
- Office of the Secretary of Defense, Office of the Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation
- Office of the Secretary of Defense, Office of the Director of Administration and Management
- U.S. Central Command
- Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell
- Office of the Inspector General

Department of the Army

- Army National Training Center
- Army Center of Excellence
- Army Asymmetric Warfare Office
- Army Research Development and Engineering Command
- Training and Doctrine Command

Department of the Navy

- Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory

-
- Marine Corps Training and Education Command
 - CREW Program Office

Joint Forces Command

- Joint Warfighting Center

Executive Office of the President

- Office of Science and Technology Policy

Combating Terrorism Technology Support Office

- Technical Support Working Group

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense



JOINT IED DEFEAT ORGANIZATION
5000 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-5000

OCT 20 2009

Mr. William Solis
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management
U.S. Government Accountability Office
441 G Street, NW
Washington, DC 20548

Dear Mr. Solis:

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft report, GAO-10-95, 'WARFIGHTER SUPPORT: Actions Needed to Improve Visibility and Coordination of DoD's Counter Improvised Explosive Device Efforts,' dated September 18, 2009 (GAO Code 351231).

Thank you for the opportunity to review the draft report. This report fairly reflects some of the natural coordination tensions the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) encounters providing Counter - Improvised Explosives Device (C-IED) capabilities to the warfighter given the unique nature of JIEDDO's rapid acquisition process. However, the report does not adequately recognize the tension between immediate combatant commander (COCOM) requirements and Service programming objectives.

JIEDDO executes its mission in support of COCOM requirements by rapidly responding to urgent warfighter needs. This primacy of effort requires the flexibility necessary for JIEDDO to provide C-IED capabilities and both material and non-material solutions in a rapid manner based upon requirement urgency and solution maturity. A "good enough" solution delivered rapidly in a dynamic war environment is more valuable than an ideal solution delivered later. Similarly, it is imperative for JIEDDO to provide up-to-the-minute training solutions that reflect a continually changing threat to ensure that our forces can train now as they will fight when they arrive on the battlefield.


As written, the report focuses on C-IED initiative challenges from a Service perspective rather than a COCOM urgency of need. This is neither a balanced nor an accurate, assessment. The report does not give appropriate weight to the fact that the single most relevant factor in JIEDDO's decision making and coordination efforts is to ensure these capabilities are available to a COCOM engaged in combat during a decisive time of need. Undue delay leads to lost lives.

The report focuses on a handful of initiatives or efforts that encountered friction during either the development phase or the coordination process to transfer, transition, or terminate the program. This does not appropriately reflect the true nature of JIEDDO's work. Through FY11, 142 C-IED initiatives have or will successfully transfer, transition, or terminate through the coordinated efforts of JIEDDO, the Services, OSD staff elements, and the Joint Staff. The samples cited tend to be the exception rather than the rule.

In coordinating this response, all DoD stakeholders recognized the fundamental requirement to meet COCOM urgent needs, while incrementally improving JIEDDO processes to be more inclusive of Service requirements and programming efforts while developing C-IED solutions. All the Services concurred that the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat (JIEDD) Capability Approval and Acquisition Management Process (JCAAMP) provides both visibility and coordination of C-IED efforts. JIEDDO is finalizing the first update to JCAAMP that will address several of the issues noted in this report. JIEDDO will complete this update by the end of November 2009.

DoD Directive 2000.19e, *Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization, February 2006*, is scheduled for its periodic update by February 2010. DoD will begin review and coordination of this directive in October 2009. The review process across DoD will provide the opportunity for departmental review, coordination and determination of any modifications of C-IED authorities. The proposed updates to DODD 2000.19e will result in process refinements that will help reduce the inherent tensions between rapid acquisition and capability development, and DoD programming requirements all of which have been identified since JIEDDO's inception.

The enclosed attachment contains a detailed response to each recommendation. Comments on technical or factual corrections to the report were provided in a separate document to the GAO audit team. The point of contact for this response is Mr. William Rigby, JIEDDO Internal Review, william.rigby@jieddo.dod.mil, 703-602-4807.



Thomas F. Metz
LTG, U.S. Army
Director

Attachment:
As stated

GAO DRAFT REPORT – DATED SEPTEMBER 18, 2009
GAO CODE 351231 / GAO-10-95

"WARFIGHTER SUPPORT: Actions Needed to Improve Visibility and Coordination of
DOD's Counter Improvised Explosive Device Efforts"

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS
TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOMMENDATION 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct the military Services to create their own comprehensive improvised explosive device (IED) defeat initiative databases and work with the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) to develop a DoD-wide database for all counter-IED initiatives.

DOD RESPONSE: Concur. Several C-IED databases have been established across DOD. Notably U.S. Army Research Development and Engineering Command (RDECOM), with cooperation from the Services and DARPA established a database for counter - improvised explosive device (C-IED) information called Technology Matrix. JIEDDO and Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E), with Service involvement, issued a Counter - Improvised Explosive Device Science and Technology (C-IED S&T) Strategy in February, 2009 to develop a common framework for identifying and pursuing longer term, multi-year science that can address fundamental challenges, capability gaps, and leap-ahead efforts. JIEDDO is supporting RDECOM's effort to establish a JIEDDO hosted network solution that establishes a common collaboration tool that links these databases and provides comprehensive visibility across DOD for all C-IED efforts.

RECOMMENDATION 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) to develop a mechanism to notify the appropriate Service counter-IED focal points of each initiative prior to its funding.

DOD RESPONSE: Concur. The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat (JIEDD) Capabilities Approval and Acquisition Management Process (JCAAMP) already provides the mechanism to notify the appropriate Service counter - improvised explosive device (C-IED) focal points of each initiative prior to its funding. JIEDDO recognized that in some cases efforts or initiatives that bypassed the JCAAMP or were expedited outside of JCAAMP were not provided to Service C-IED focal points. JIEDDO revised the JCAAMP process to notify stakeholders of all JIEDDO efforts or initiatives, whether or not JCAAMP processing is required. JIEDDO will inform and elicit stakeholder opinions on JIEDDO developmental efforts in order to decrease duplication of efforts and allow Service's greater lead time to review these efforts. This process will be incorporated in the pending update of JCAAMP.

RECOMMENDATION 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct the military Services to work with the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) to develop a comprehensive plan to guide the transition of each JIEDDO-funded initiative, including expected costs, identified funding sources, and a timeline including milestones for inclusion into the DoD base budget cycle.

DOD RESPONSE: Concur. The majority of recommended counter - improvised explosive device (C-IED) initiatives, 142 through FY 11, have successfully transferred, transitioned, or terminated through the coordination efforts of JIEDDO, the Services, OSD staff elements, and the Joint Staff. JIEDDO and the Services recognize that more collaboration can be achieved to reduce friction in this process. The Navy and USMC have undertaken internal efforts to improve their process of how Joint funded transitions or transfers will be completed. The Army uses various processes to determine the transition of each JIEDDO-funded initiative and their associated costs, funding sources and timelines. JIEDDO has developed recommended changes for DOD Directive 2000.19e that will address the coordination to transfer, transition, or terminate C-IED solutions. These changes will be appropriately staffed to DoD and the Services during the periodic update of DOD Directive 2000.19e.

RECOMMENDATION 4: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) to coordinate with the Services prior to funding an initiative to ensure that Service requirements are fully taken into account when making counter - improvised explosive device (C-IED) investment decisions.

DOD RESPONSE: Partially Concur. JIEDDO sources Combatant Command theater requirements that have joint applications but may not have Service specific application. Fully vetted coordination with the Services prior to funding an effort or initiative could delay the fielding of material that would save lives. The mechanisms described in response to Recommendation 1 and 2 will ensure that JIEDDO and the Services are fully aware of efforts and initiatives before funding decisions are finalized. Per the response to Recommendation 2, JIEDDO has unilaterally implemented revisions to the JCAAMP process to notify stakeholders of all JIEDDO efforts or initiatives. DOD recommends that Recommendation 4 be incorporated with Recommendation 2 or the language to Recommendation 4 be changed to the following:

“The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat (JIEDD) Organization (JIEDDO) to provide Services information on development endeavors and initiatives through the JIEDD Capability Approval and Acquisition Management Process (JCAAMP). This with use of the C-IED initiative database will ensure that all CIED efforts are taken into account when making counter – improvised explosive device (C-IED) investment decisions.”

RECOMMENDATION 5: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) to evaluate counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED) training initiatives using the same criteria it uses to evaluate theater-based joint C-IED urgent requirements, and incorporate this direction into existing guidance.

DOD RESPONSE: Partially Concur. DOD concurs with the intent but not the language of this recommendation. The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat (JIEDD) Capabilities Approval and Acquisition Management Process (JCAAMP) provides the mechanism to identify, validate and provide solutions for COCOM and Service training C-IED capability gaps.

A clear example of the process working effectively is development of the Home Station Training Lanes (HSTL) initiatives; a coordinated effort of JIEDDO and the Services to fix a training capability gap in individual and small unit C-IED training. A training gap was identified in that warfighters were not receiving adequate C-IED training prior to deployment. During the process to validate the capability gap it was discovered that instead of participating in advanced unit training at their major readiness exercises, they were catching up on individual training requirements. In order to meet the COCOM's immediate requirements, significant additional training resources were needed by the Services that could not have been anticipated in the POM. With JIEDDO, the Services identified the specific requirements; then the initiatives went through JCAAMP and were fully funded. In validating the requirements against emergent training shortfalls JIEDDO and the Services developed the HSTL through three reviews within JCAAMP. These initiatives are now completing the transfer process to the Services.

The HSTL initiatives support training lanes in 58 locations at a total cost of \$521M. JIEDDO, working in conjunction with the Services improved the quality of improvised explosive device defeat (IEDD) Home Station training by investing in three areas: 1. Development of IEDD Lanes at all installations at which the Joint Forces train prior to deployment; 2. Creation of a cadre of IEDD mobile trainers capable of providing quality coaching, mentorship, and feedback for up to Brigade sized units as they train on the IEDD Lanes; 3. Upgrading installation Simulation Centers and instrumentation so they can accommodate the training of Brigade and Battalion staffs on attacking the IED network while their subordinate units execute the IED lanes.

In a complimentary effort to establish policy regarding C-IED training guidance, the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) is currently staffing a Department of Defense Instruction, DoDI 1322.xx, "Implementing DoD Training" that establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and provides implementing procedures for DoD training. The instruction directs the DoD Components to:

"...shall implement {counter} improvised explosive device mission essential tasks across all levels of war into their training regimens at the individual, collective, unit and staff levels and shall sustain relevancy through interface with the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization."

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

William M. Solis, (202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov

Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, the following individuals made contributions to this report: Cary Russell, Assistant Director; Grace Coleman; Kevin Craw; Will Horton; Ronald La Due Lake; James Lloyd; Gregory Marchand; Lonnie McAllister; Jason Pogacnik; Michael Shaughnessy; and Yong Song.

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