ISSN 1936-1815

Report Documentation Page

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

1. REPORT DATE	2. REPORT TYPE	3. DATES COVERED
2008		**00-00-2008 to 00-00-2008**

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE	5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
Strategic Studies Quarterly. Volume 2, Number 3, Fall 2008	5b. GRANT NUMBER
	5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
6. AUTHOR(S)	5d. PROJECT NUMBER
	5e. TASK NUMBER
	5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) **Air University,Strategic Studies Quarterly,155 N. Twining St BG 693,Maxwell AFB,AL,36112-6026**	8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)	10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)
	11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14. ABSTRACT

15. SUBJECT TERMS

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT	b. ABSTRACT	c. THIS PAGE			
unclassified	**unclassified**	**unclassified**	**Same as Report (SAR)**	**149**	

Strategic Studies Quarterly

An Air Force–Sponsored Strategic Forum for Military, Government, and Academic Professionals

VOLUME 2 FALL 2008 NUMBER 3

Editorial

Feature Articles

Letter to Editor

The Requirement for a Future Strategy

> *We must also look at the world as it is, not as we'd like it to be, and we must acknowledge that much of the world does not necessarily see us as we would see ourselves. And we must look clear-eyed beyond Iraq and Afghanistan. Only with that understanding can we determine where we want to go and how we want to get there. But as this vision develops, we must keep in mind that it is no good if we cannot provide the means to achieve it, nor is it useful if it is not a realistic fit with the rest of the world.*
>
> —Representative Ike Skelton (D-MO), 10 July 2008

First of all, I want to take the opportunity that writing this editorial presents to thank former Air Force secretary Mike Wynne and Gen Buzz Moseley for their many contributions to our Air Force. Among these contributions are the establishment of the Air Force Research Institute and the *Strategic Studies Quarterly*. We will do our best to live up to their great expectations.

Today, our Air Force is the best in the world. However, to remain the best we must take on some of the most critical challenges we have ever faced—especially with regard to modernization. Having said that, in my view, the most significant challenge all of us in the military face today concerns developing a unifying strategy that will guide our contributions to solving the problems our nation confronts. This challenge has at least two components.

First, our leaders must institute a balance between meeting the needs of the present and preparing for those of the future. This is not an either/or proposition; both are essential strategic tasks. Our country finds itself in a particularly difficult era with respect to this strategic component because of the immediacy of the present conflicts and the ill-defined nature of the future threat. Achieving our strategic objectives in Iraq and Afghanistan after removing the regimes in those two countries has required our forces to develop new skills and operating concepts in the crucible of irregular warfare. While critics may argue about the decision to become involved militarily or about the pace of progress, no one can dispute that US and coalition forces have demonstrated unparalleled operational flexibility in adapting to the post–9/11 environment. That adaptation has provided the fledgling

democracies in Iraq and Afghanistan time and security to organize and start the process of resolving core issues for their societies. Regardless of the justifiable pride in our progress, we must seek to do even better in the near term. We must also integrate the lessons from this experience into our Services so that they become part and parcel of our doctrines, organizations, and capabilities.

Regarding the future, our challenge is to present to our national leaders a realistic assessment of the threats we expect to face. With the fall of the Soviet Union, our national security planning lost its focal point. Instead of a single enemy against which to plan, program, and budget our military capabilities, we now find few states that confront our interests and capabilities directly in the same way the Soviets had. Instead, we see failing states, humanitarian disasters, genocides, transnational criminals, and the rise of transnational terrorism. The picture becomes even more complicated with the addition of interconnected trends spawned by globalization, environmental degradation, global demographic imbalance, and energy and resource scarcity. This stream of nontraditional challenges came into sharp relief in the form of the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001—we are no longer in just a post–Cold War era, we find ourselves also in the post–9/11 era. But as important and immediate as the complex threats that coalesced into the terrorists attacks of 9/11 are, their immediacy can tend to obscure potential threats from nation-state adversaries. To repeat, this is not an either/or proposition—our national security depends on fielding capabilities and forces to cope with the full range of security challenges.

The second component of our strategic challenge involves presenting options that provide national leaders and operational commanders the flexibility to gain a return on our Services' investments in training, organizing, and equipping. This is an intellectual challenge that requires us to question our preconceived notions of how best to employ military capabilities to serve the national interest. It requires integrating policy development with planning and programming rather than dealing with those essential activities as if they were divorced from each other and from the ends of strategy and national defense. This intellectual activity requires research, discussion, debate, and engagement with a wide range of public policy, strategy, academic, and defense professionals. On occasion we will find that our partners in these discussions will disagree with our perspectives—that is part of the process. We need to be effective and knowledgeable advocates of our positions as Airmen as well as sufficiently confident

to listen carefully to the range of perspectives presented by those outside our community or technical specialties. Our charge is to synthesize the best options for securing the nation by engaging with the most creative, perceptive, professional, and thoughtful people who, like us, dedicate themselves to providing for our nation's security.

Research, debate, publication, outreach, and engagement are some of the lines of operation that converge into solutions to these components of strategy. Those of us in the military, in the government, and in academia must evaluate our progress, question our assumptions, and propose creative alternatives that help us confront the complex challenges of today's and tomorrow's global security environment. *Strategic Studies Quarterly* is one forum for these exchanges to take place—I look forward to participating in these engagements as we move ahead, serving our nation.

JOHN A. SHAUD
General, USAF, Retired
Director, Air Force Research Institute
Maxwell AFB, Alabama

USAF Cyberspace Command
To Fly and Fight in Cyberspace

William T. Lord, Major General, USAF

Safeguarding our own cyber capabilities while engaging and disrupting our opponents' capabilities is becoming the core of modern warfare.

—Michael W. Wynne

We are a nation at war. Our military is engaged in a fight against groups and individuals who follow an ideology that has as its fundamental tenets a hostility toward our people, our beliefs, and our values. Airmen, Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, and representatives from across our government who are engaged in this bitter fight will emerge with perspectives shaped by their experiences in combat against extremists who use terror as their primary weapon to achieve their objectives. And we are also at war in cyberspace—a relatively new domain that, like air and space, crosses military, civilian, economic, and especially information aspects of our national interests.

We have already witnessed and experienced hostile incursions in cyberspace. Nothing demonstrates the contested nature of cyberspace more than how its capabilities were used to support physical attacks on our governmental and financial infrastructures on 9/11. Encrypted communications and cellular phones were used for the first attacks on the World Trade Center buildings in 1993. Aided by computer-based flight simulators, hijackers trained, planned, and funded a more successful attack. The attacks against the World Trade Center in New York had, as a secondary objective, the catastrophic degradation of the financial information upon which a large segment of the United States' economy depends.[1] Until 9/11, nonstate

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Maj Gen William T. Lord is commander, Air Force Cyberspace Command (Provisional), Barksdale AFB, Louisiana. He is responsible for establishing cyberspace as a domain in and through which the Air Force flies and fights to deliver sovereign options for defense of the United States. In his current duty, he is creating the Air Force major air command for organizing, training, and equipping combat forces to operate in cyberspace. General Lord has commanded at the detachment, squadron, group, wing, and joint levels. Prior to his current position, he was director, Cyberspace Transformation and Strategy, Secretary of the Air Force Office of Warfighting Integration, and Chief Information Officer, the Pentagon, Washington, DC.

actors such as al-Qaeda were not considered threats to our national survival. But the reach, concealment, financing, and flexibility they acquired in cyberspace have allowed them to plan and execute attacks against our homeland that were considered nearly impossible just a few years ago.

In 2007, Estonia experienced a cyber attack that targeted government, media, and economic systems. The attack was insidious, rapid, and difficult to trace, and it denied service to information users for three weeks.[2] Much as the 2007 Chinese antisatellite missile test did for space, the incident in Estonia signaled a change in the international security environment for cyberspace. Cyber infiltrators routinely attempt to penetrate Department of Defense, government, economic, and industrial networks to gain access to information that could be vital for activities in each of these arenas. The advantages that such adversaries gain through cyberspace afford them the ability to pose serious, if not fatal, threats to our homeland. Until recently, however, our understanding of this new domain, our organization for operating in this domain, and our ability to act—offensively and defensively—was limited largely to local network operations.

The publication of the classified *National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations* in 2006 and the announcement by the secretary of the Air Force incorporating cyberspace into the US Air Force mission set the stage for organizing, training, and equipping forces for operations in cyberspace. Earlier this year, the Air Force chief of staff, Gen T. Michael Moseley, signed orders establishing Air Force Cyber Command (Provisional) (AFCYBER [P]). Through this new command, the Air Force will continue the process of understanding the domain and integrating capabilities required to "fly and fight" there with those that exist in the air and space domains.

The United States maintains a preeminence in warfare rarely seen in human history. Our military is adapted to defeating opposing forces in traditional combat environments, which have expanded from the land and sea battlefields to include air and space. In the emerging security environment, however, the organizations, skills, and equipment that we have used to great effect may not be enough. As scholars at the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory have noted, "The United States is presently encountering a national security threat different than the conventional warfare for which we have been preeminent in the world. This new threat is becoming known as 'Unrestricted Warfare.' . . . What is new and different is that the few can impact the many, with a

global reach enabled by advanced information technology. The first rule of unrestricted warfare is that there are no rules; nothing is forbidden."[3] In an era of unrestricted warfare, the only way to ensure that our preeminence in air and space remains secure is to defend our cyberspace capabilities and to hold those of our foes at risk by living and fighting virtually in the domain. This will lead us to what today are considered unconventional, distributed organizational structures but may later become standard ones as we secure and defend our cyberspace capabilities, our critical command and control (C2) nets, and hold those of our foes at risk to maintain our dominance in air and space.

These are complex tasks. Unlike traditional military systems, cyberspace capabilities are relatively cheap and easy to obtain for our adversaries and competitors, and unlike in air and space, today we have true peer competitors. To meet the challenges that cyberspace presents, the US Air Force has approached the problem carefully, examined the issues that cyberspace presents, and taken steps to address them. While the Air Force has clear responsibilities for organizing, training, and equipping its forces to operate in cyberspace as a result of its mission, this does not preclude other government agencies or military services from engaging as well—we look forward to partnering with those who do so to the mutual benefit and defense of our nation. Nevertheless, the threats in cyberspace are as vast as networks themselves and will keep coming regardless of which governmental department has the charge to defeat them.

Cyberspace
A Contested Domain

The Air Force recognized that dominance in cyberspace is contested by peer competitors and, therefore, developing capabilities to operate in cyberspace must account for not only the capabilities the domain offers but also the threats it can present. Dr. Lani Kass, former director of the chief of staff of the Air Force's Cyber Task Force, states the United States is perhaps fifth in the world in the cyber domain.[4] An accounting of different nations' cyberspace capabilities in table 1 confirms the scope of the competition we face in this domain.

Thus, we acknowledge that we are competitive in the cyber domain, but we are not yet dominant. The threats stem from a confluence of the very communications and computing technologies upon which our C2 networks

Table 1. Summary of nation-state cyber capabilities

	China	India	Iran	N. Korea	Pakistan	Russia
Official cyber warfare doctrine	X	X			Probable	X
Cyber warfare training	X	X	X		X	
Cyber warfare exercises/simulations	X	X				
Collaborating with IT industry and/or technical universities	X	X	X		X	X
IT roadmap	Likely	X				
Information warfare units	X	X		X		
Record of hacking other nations	X					X

Adapted from Charles Billo and Welton Chang, "Cyber Warfare: An Analysis of the Means and Motivations of Selected Nation States," Institute for Security Technology Studies, Dartmouth College, December 2004.

depend. There is a tension between those who develop and operate systems to gain benefits from cyberspace capabilities and those who seek to exploit them. Well-documented successful attacks on the Naval War College demonstrate the need to secure our systems and to prevent the theft of our intellectual property and secrets necessary to defend our nation.[5] Our military networks are under a constant barrage of probes and intrusions daily from threats ranging from the curious "script kiddies" to criminals seeking data to exploit about our members to nation-states seeking our secrets. Our partners in industry have also suffered losses of information. Financial and banking institutions in the US also labor under the weight of attacks of increasing sophistication as shown in figure 1.

To compete effectively in cyberspace, Airmen are already oriented toward and have been performing missions in the domain for some time. Some basic tenets of our culture lend themselves well to this work. First, the Airmen's perspective equips us well to operate across domains—we approach national security issues and military challenges from a global perspective. This was apparent from the earliest days of our experience with airpower. Airmen were able to transit large distances with relative impunity to achieve effects against enemy surface forces, the sources of enemy industrial strength, and the enemy governments. This global perspective expanded with the addition of space capabilities and has now



Figure 1. Cyber attack trends. (Reprinted from Carnegie Mellon CERT Coordination Center, "Incident and Vulnerability Trends, 2003," 18.)

expanded further with the multiple dimensions represented in cyberspace. This perspective does not mean that we have all the answers—it does mean, however, that our experience with the similar domains of air and space equips us well to operate in another unconstrained environment.

Our perspective was inseparable from the pace of advances in aviation and space technologies. From the aviation arms race during the First World War—in which combatants achieved innovations that translated directly into tactical and operational advantages—to the industrial production that resulted in the massive air force that fought a global war in World War II to the technological revolution that produced our space capabilities to the revolution in military affairs represented by stealth, precision targeting, and C2, Airmen forged a culture of innovation and experimentation that prepared us well for the technological challenges that operations in cyberspace present.

A global perspective combined with our technological acumen leads us to approach challenges with an eye toward achieving specific and relevant effects in air, space, and cyberspace. The earliest effects-based campaign, the Combined Bomber Offensive during World War II, aimed to dislocate what air planners characterized as the "industrial web" that sustained Axis war-making capabilities. This thought process that seeks to link tactical

actions to operational and strategic effects—some of which may be realized far from the first-order effect of the tactical mission—is part and parcel of the Airman's culture. From our origins as a separate service—uniquely positioned to achieve strategic effects against an adversary's war-making capabilities—we have offered our operational and national leaders sovereign options to achieve the effects they desire.

Airmen also think about effects in cyberspace as primary goals of campaigns rather than as interesting supporting capabilities for tactical missions. This does not mean that Airmen do not support joint operations or that Airmen want to conduct independent campaigns. Rather, it means that the linkages between tactical, operational, and strategic objectives drive how we think about preparing for and fighting wars. The characterization of cyberspace as a domain rather than as a tool reflects this approach. Because we treat cyberspace capabilities as primary weapons, we are particularly adept at weighing their effects on the long-term prospects of campaign success.

The above characteristics shape how the US Air Force approaches the challenge of operating in the cyber domain. Our global perspective, technological acumen, effects-based approach, and emphasis on operations in the domain as primary options for achieving national goals will shape how we build toward access, influence, and control in cyberspace and across the other domains in the future. The establishment of a new major command is the first step on this journey toward integrating capabilities across air, space, and cyberspace.

A New Kind of Major Command
Both Virtual and Distributed

Secretary of the Air Force Michael Wynne was certainly aware that adding cyberspace to the Air Force mission would not be enough either to secure our interests or to develop credible operational capabilities in the domain. There must be a cyberspace advocate within the Air Force to fulfill the Title 10 "organize, train, and equip" responsibilities—in other words to provide an organization charged with harmonizing cyberspace capabilities with those in air and space, to train specialized warriors, and to procure and field relevant systems for operating in that domain. This advocacy is essential—the people, organizations, and missions in the Air Force's cyberspace enterprise require high-level support if they are to succeed.

In creating the command, Secretary Wynne foresaw the opportunity to lead the Air Force into the twenty-first century. He challenged AFCYBER (P) leaders to "lead turn the AF into the future, building the first 21st century command." It needed to be unlike the typical "brick and mortar industrial age command." It needed to be virtual. Guided by this vision, members of AFCYBER (P) are working diligently to build an organization as agile as the domain within which it operates. When it achieves initial operating capability on or about 1 October 2008 as a major command on par with the other major commands, AFCYBER (P) will ensure the Air Force delivers the required war-fighting capabilities to the combatant commanders while also defending our operational infrastructure. For now, the provisional command's mission is to ensure the rapid establishment of this new command by publishing a program plan to organize it, preparing program objective memorandum submittals and a budget baseline, and developing criteria for basing new portions of the command.

AFCYBER (P) Mission and the National Ends, Ways, and Means

> *Sovereign options refer to the spectrum of choices air, space, and cyberspace capabilities offer US policy makers for solving problems.*
>
> —Michael W. Wynne

Various arms of the US government exist to develop options across the spectrum of its diplomatic, informational, military, economic, and cultural (DIME-C) means to meet the national ends. The Air Force exists to serve national policies, and the Air Force Cyberspace Command will ensure that the Air Force can do its part in supporting the national strategy to secure cyberspace.[6] As discussed above, there are unique characteristics of Air Force culture that make the Air Force particularly suited to operating in cyberspace. However, the Air Force's focus is on preserving its ability to access and maneuver within cyberspace and in the air and space domains while preventing our adversaries from doing the same. This leads the Air Force to focus on developing capabilities that lead toward cross-domain access, influence, and control while better integrating kinetic and nonkinetic effects. The true power of cyber lies in the creation of synergy by integrating with air and space.

The AFCYBER (P) mission and vision statements define who we are, why we exist, and what we seek to achieve. Specifically,

> Our mission is to provide combat ready forces trained and equipped to conduct sustained combat operations through the electromagnetic spectrum and fully integrate these operations with air and space operations.[7]

Our vision statement defines our nonnegotiable commitment to deliver USAF sovereign options for the United States through cross-domain dominance of air, space, and cyberspace.

> Secure our nation by employing world-class cyber capabilities to dominate the cyberspace domain, create integrated global effects, and deliver sovereign options.[8]

Make no mistake: if we cannot dominate in cyberspace, we place air and space dominance at risk. For example, if an adversary is able to inject malicious software into the F-22 fleet, we may not be able to fly the Raptor when it is needed in battle. Similarly, if an adversary jams or dazzles the GPS constellation, precision strike may not be possible. The Air Force can neither afford unnecessary collateral damage caused by negation of our cyber capabilities nor can we achieve victory on the battlefield without cyber dominance.

As mentioned earlier, the Air Force has chosen to move forward in cyberspace by establishing a new major command. By leveraging a modern, robust, unified communications architecture (i.e., merging of telephone and data networks), AFCYBER (P) will be able to create a virtual command from distributed centers of excellence. At first blush, cynics may claim that going virtual is a solution looking for a problem. However, the facts do not support that conclusion. The virtual command construct paves the way for optimizing partnerships across the Air Force major functional areas. Using a model pioneered by corporate counterparts, AFCYBER (P) will place a headquarters presence with or near strategic partners to facilitate stronger alliances. For example, placing key staff near research centers, logistics supply points, and combatant commands facilitates and thus establishes and maintains strong, face-to-face ties with partners in those functions. So far, AFCYBER (P) has identified 11 such locations where partnerships are vital for mission success. This organizational model shifts the emphasis from organizing to support communications within the command to supporting communications and relationships with other commands and partners. These partnerships come in many forms, including participation in the National Counterintelligence Joint Task Force, which includes participation

from the FBI and much of the national intelligence community. It also involves day-to-day coordination between the Defense Cyber Crime Center (for which the Air Force is executive agent) and all other departments of the federal government. Numerous discussions with our NATO allies and partners have been ongoing since the inception of this provisional command. These broad relationships give us access to capabilities well beyond those the Air Force currently possesses and greatly improves our means to achieve national ends. This includes leveraging the Air Force's significant investment in National Guard and Reserve forces.

The National Guard and Reserve are already fundamental to the functioning of the Air Force's cyberspace capabilities. The majority of force structure the Air Force has today in providing expeditionary, or combat, communications resides in the Air Guard and AF Reserve, and the new command will inherit responsibility for all of it. Likewise, over 90 percent of Air Force personnel capable of engineering and installing large communications systems exist only in the Guard and Reserve. Aside from communications-related activities, unique, cyberspace-focused units have already been created and contribute to the total force. The 262nd Information Warfare Aggressor Squadron, a Guard unit out of Seattle, Washington, is one of the first Guard units created to address new cyberspace missions, but there will be many more. Total Force elements will be at the core of the Air Force's Cyberspace Command's operations, spanning every level of the cyberspace enterprise from unit level all the way to command headquarters and the air operations center.

Not only will the virtual headquarters leverage long-standing relationships with the Total Force and other functionals and agencies, it will also provide the command with much greater means to effect operations across the spectrum of conflict. The Air Force already has an extensive collection of capabilities that will fall under control of the new command but will not physically relocate. For example, the distributed nature of the command allows us access to established and operating networks and their operators along with fully functioning physical plants. Bringing these mission sets under the authority of one operational commander opens doors for better synchronization of resources.

Another issue critical to fulfilling Air Force Title 10 responsibilities involves establishing and developing a specialized career force through the creation of a new Air Force specialty code (AFSC) series for enlisted and officer forces. The new cyberspace career field will include a diverse mix of

skills to cover the span of mission areas that range from information operations to electronic warfare, communications and intelligence, expeditionary cyber capabilities, and network warfare. Many years of expertise exist in cyberspace-related functions today. We will harness this intellectual capital and focus on developing a new form of orientation known as "cyber-mindedness."[9] Similar to the concept of "air-mindedness" already imbued into every Airman, cyber-mindedness involves the unhindered development of cyberspace capabilities to achieve desired effects.

Air Force Cyberspace Command will consist of a headquarters, one numbered air force, and four wings organized as depicted in figure 2. While many of cyberspace's capabilities cost little in terms of actual hardware, this is not to say that no additional resources are required to realize dominance in cyberspace. On the contrary, some cyberspace capabilities will require integration into traditional military missiles and aircraft with all the attendant costs. Supplemental training for the new cyberspace career field will also be required. Certainly network-specific programs to defend and integrate Air Force effects across air, space, and cyberspace will be critical to the future improvement of the effectiveness of our cyberspace forces. Although underpinned by technology, mission considerations drive AFCYBER's path to virtualization. Matching the command's organizational structure and operating philosophy to the domain within which it will function provided the Air Force strategic agility while retaining the ability to meet emerging challenges.

Challenges on the Road to Dominance in Cyberspace

Although we do not anticipate requesting changes in law to accommodate cyberspace operations yet, we will lean heavily on existing statutes to work through some particularly thorny legal challenges required in the cyber domain. Some of these legal challenges include the boundaries between law enforcement, intelligence, and military activities. For example, while AFCYBER can execute certain tasks such as defending critical military infrastructure inside the CONUS based on Title 10 responsibilities—and we will present AFCYBER forces to the COCOMS to carry out that mission—if the attackers are criminals, our partners in the FBI and other agencies must counter these actvities by exercising Title 18 law enforcement authorities. The Title 50 authorities vested in the intelligence community are also essential to efficient and legal operations within cyberspace.



Figure 2. Proposed organizational chart

Operational challenges overshadow the legal challenges, and most center around the pace at which cyberspace threats present themselves compared to our present speed in responding. Globalization has created an unprecedented interdependency between the national economies that can cause a very rapid shift from peace to conflict. Ensuring that sufficient authorities to blunt a cyberspace attack are in place and understood is critical to guarantee that our government and our Air Force can respond in time.

The opening salvo of a cyberspace-based attack could potentially leave our air and space capabilities in disarray, thus leveling the playing field for our adversaries in other domains. This is why the Air Force seeks the capability to defend its cyberspace, and especially its C2 and weapons systems, from cyber attacks and to dominate our foes in this domain. The Air Force is not seeking to usurp the authorities of anyone; rather, it seeks to develop

specific cyberspace intelligence and weaponry to create effects that preserve its ability as an air force to fight in air, space, and cyberspace. Keeping up with the rapid pace of development in cyberspace capabilities will be one of the most difficult tasks the command faces. In an austere budget environment, keeping up with new technologies and the threats they present can be an expensive and consuming task. Funds to refresh technology and weapons and to maintain excellent analytical capabilities will be required.

The most expensive and difficult task will be recruiting and retaining a workforce necessary to achieve dominance in this arena. Because these skills are so marketable in commercial industry, access to talent will become a critical factor in cyberspace war fighting. I say access to talent because we will require unconventional approaches to obtain talent we could not otherwise afford. Access to part-time patriotic experts over AFCYBER's virtual enterprise may be crucial to success in this area. This will require a cultural shift within the Air Force to allow us to leverage the skills that we would otherwise be unable to develop through our traditional force development programs.

Concluding Thoughts

We are often reminded that we live in uncertain times and that uncertainty comes from the many emerging disruptive threats. Cyberspace presents both potential threats but also promises to advance our war-fighting capabilities substantially. AFCYBER (P) has begun to move the ball forward by integrating with air and space in ways our fathers could never have imagined. We are on track to deliver on the commitment to create an operational cyberspace command by 1 October 2008, which will provide a coherent initial operating capability to defend the Air Force's capabilities across all domains while respecting the authorities of other departments and agencies. With strong investments in training our cyberspace warriors and developing the tools they require, the command will preserve the heritage and traditional role of the Air Force as America's first choice for achieving strategic, operational, and tactical effects. Most importantly, AFCYBER (P) will integrate with air and space to provide the global reach, power, and vigilance to preserve our nation's security for the future. For the good of the nation, we must meet the challenges that cyberspace presents to preserve our ability to achieve our national goals and to provide security for ourselves, our partners, and our allies. SSQ

Notes

1. On the effects of the 9/11 attacks against the World Trade Center, Osama bin Laden said, "And if the fall of the twin towers was a huge event, then consider the events that followed it. . . . Let us talk about the economic effects that are still continuing. According to their own admission, the share of the losses on the Wall Street Market reached 16 percent." See Bruce Lawrence, ed., *Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden* (New York: Verso, 2005), 111.

2. Ian Traynor, "Russia Accused of Unleashing Cyberwar to Disable Estonia," *Guardian,* 17 May 2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/may/17/topstories3.russia.

3. Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, "What is Unrestricted Warfare?" http://www.jhuapl.edu/urw_symposium/previous/2007/index.htm.

4. Dr. Lani Kass, former director of the CSAF Cyberspace Task Force, has commented widely that the United States is "fifth" in the world in attaining dominance in cyberspace.

5. Bill Gertz, "Chinese Hackers Prompt Navy College Site Closure," Washington Times.com, 30 November 2006, http://www.washingtontimes.com/national/20061130-103049-5042r.htm.

6. *The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace* (Washington, DC: The White House, February 2003), ix, http://www.whitehouse.gov/pcipb/cyberspace_strategy.pdf.

7. US Air Force Fact Sheet, AFCYBER (P) Vision Statement, http://www.afcyber.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=10786

8. Ibid.

9. Lt Col Sebastian M. Convertino II, CDR Lou Anne DeMattei, and Lt Col Tammy Knierim, *Flying and Fighting in Cyberspace*, Maxwell Paper no. 40 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, July 2007), 69.

A China Policy for the Twenty-First Century

Ambassador Chas W. Freeman Jr.
US Foreign Service, Retired

If today were January 20, 2009, the 44th president of the United States would be in his first day on the job. Our new president will have inherited a dismaying list of foreign policy messes that clamor for urgent fixes, but, barring the unexpected, relations with China probably won't be on that list. During the Bush administration, the best relationships the United States has had have been with the nations of the Asia-Pacific region, among them—much to the surprise of many—China. If nothing goes badly wrong between now and the inauguration, Mr. Bush's successor will be able to savor memories of the cathartic China-bashing of the campaign but to succumb to the temptation to put the actual development of a strategy for handling China onto the back burner.

After all, the new president will have to deal with recession; inflation; mounting foreign debt amidst a credit crisis; public and private pension systems that are slouching toward insolvency; a massive budget deficit with a built-in fiscal time bomb of unsustainable tax cuts that are due to expire; a health insurance system that is driving individual Americans to distraction and businesses over the edge; an educational system that saps rather than fuels the competitiveness of the US economy; a workforce unnerved by broken immigration policies and the fact that industrial jobs are now less than 10 percent of our labor market and falling; an energy policy

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that celebrates self-indulgence and continually deepens import dependence; increasingly shabby infrastructure, complete with collapsing bridges, terminally gridlocked traffic, and man-eating potholes; almost universal disbelief in the capacity of Washington politicians to do anything about any of these things; and so forth.

And then there's foreign policy. Unless something fundamental changes, when the next president takes office, Osama bin Laden will still be at large, and al-Qaeda will be planning something to one-up 9/11; most of our land combat capacity will still be committed to reinforcing strategic failure in Iraq; no one will have yet come up with a plausible endgame for our intervention in Afghanistan; Pakistan will still be a catastrophe waiting to happen; the threat of terrorist reprisal for our intrusions into the realm of Islam will continue to escalate; an outmoded international monetary and reserve system will still menace our prosperity; withering alliances will ensure that we are without international cover or backup for our foreign policies and overseas operations; Israel will remain a pariah state in its own region, besieging others in anticipation of their besieging it and losing friends and alienating people throughout the world; Iran will be farther along in its efforts to develop a complete nuclear fuel cycle as the basis for an independent nuclear deterrent; Russia will continue regression toward its tsarist past; Turkey's estrangement from the United States will be a work in progress nearing completion; transatlantic relations will remain rancorously adrift, and Western values will still lack the long-term, unified backing they need to prevail over competing ideas; Venezuela and other Latin American nations will be working on new and ingenious ways to undermine US leadership of hemispheric affairs; Africans will stay on the road to alignment with a resurgent China and reinvigorated India; the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) will persist in preferring Chinese attentiveness and flattery to American scolding and neglect; Japan will remain strategically perplexed; no one will be doing much to stop the earth from warming; the United States will still be isolated, resented, or ignored in the United Nations and other multilateral fora; very few foreign nations will accept American leadership; and so forth.

Thus, we arrive at the question at hand. How should we deal with China, in all its dimensions—global, regional, bilateral, multilateral, and domestic? Given everything else on the plate, the new president could well decide that the condition of US-China relations is good enough for government work and defer the task of developing a comprehensive strategy

for dealing with it. But that would be a mistake. China and our relations with it will determine a good deal of what happens in this century and how we fare in it.

It would be nice if China were on our side or at least not against us on the formidable range of foreign and domestic challenges we have accumulated since the end of the Cold War. It would be reassuring to be confident that we are not headed into a new cold war, this one with China—a nation that manifestly lacks the ideological rigidity, military overextension, and economic dysfunctionality that enabled us to box in the Soviet Union until it collapsed of its own infirmities. We were able to encapsulate our strategy for dealing with the Soviet challenge to our values and interests in a single slogan, "containment." Both China and the international context in which it is rising are vastly more complex. No bumper sticker suffices to describe a relationship that is simultaneously cooperative and competitive, distant and close, wary and warm.

In economic terms, China is already a world power. It is beginning to extend its diplomatic influence well beyond its immediate region, to recover its ancient cultural eminence, and to resume its historic contributions to the advance of science and technology. It is a significant regional military power with an increasingly formidable capacity to defend its borders and the approaches to them. China is a growing contributor to peacekeeping operations under the United Nations flag. It may, in time, extend its military reach more widely, though, at this moment there is no clear evidence that this is its intention. The global expectation that China is destined to assume a world leadership role, however, gives it political influence that its unappealing political system would otherwise deny it.

There is no American consensus about how we should deal with growing Chinese power. Nor is there a unified US government strategy for doing so. Members of Congress, as usual, are too busy seeking favors or passing condemnatory resolutions on behalf of special interests and single-issue activists to think about how their actions could affect the broader national interest in a cooperative relationship with China. A small group of members seeks to equate hostility toward China with patriotism. These members have sought to raise public alarm about China through special commissions and annual reports and the passage of legislation to bar contacts and dialogue with the People's Liberation Army (PLA). The lowest common denominator of these disparate views is very low indeed—a

tapestry woven of a little bit of pandering and a whole lot of slandering that is the opposite of strategy.

Amidst the cacophony, the executive branch has often seemed to consist of disconnected departments and agencies, each doing its own thing—or not doing it—with Beijing. In a speech in 2005, former deputy secretary of state Robert Zoelleck made a noteworthy attempt to synthesize a strategy from all this bureaucratic Brownian motion, quirky indiscipline, and ideological knuckle dragging. He coined the phrase "responsible stakeholder" to describe the kind of China we would like to work with, but the incoherence didn't really go away. The phrase lingers on but not the ideas behind it. More recently, Treasury secretary Henry Paulson has tried to pull together a comprehensive approach to economic aspects of our interaction with China.

It is a long time since there has been an effort at the presidential level to articulate a comprehensive statement of objectives vis-à-vis China, and there is no overall plan. Nor has there been any effort by the executive branch to educate the public on the challenges we face or do not face in our relations with China and the Asia-Pacific region. Perhaps this reflects the fact that China has become the subject of such a wide range of celebrity and interest-group politics that our leaders fear that saying what they want to do with China might get in the way of actually doing it.

Whatever the reason, the absence of a unifying concept has left us and everybody else to figure out for ourselves what the United States is actually trying to do *with* or *to* China. The Chinese, it must be said, are particularly bad at this kind of analysis. The majority of Chinese appear to believe, for example, that public reaction here to the recent race riots by Tibetans and to unrest among other Chinese minorities proves the existence of a plan by the United States and its Western allies to divide, dismember, weaken, and humiliate China. The admirably stiff upper lip and unwillingness to politicize the Olympics that President Bush has shown in the face of these events will, I hope, help to convince them that they are wrong. But I wouldn't count on it. The level of patriotic indignation in China against posturing by American and European politicians over Tibet is already so high that a long-term clamp-down in Tibet seems inevitable, while public support in China for continued cooperation with the West can no longer be taken for granted.

Even if we make it through the Olympics without more riots and recriminations, there will still be a good deal to be said for taking the guesswork out of our China strategy and its supporting policies. Doing so could

help establish a better coordinated, more disciplined approach in executive branch departments and agencies while dispelling counterproductive misimpressions abroad and rebutting conspiracy theories in China itself.

It is not enough simply to have relations with China. Those relations should be grounded in reality and calculated, directed, and managed to advance our interests or to at least save them from harm. The next president needs to find an early occasion to restate our objectives with respect to China and the reasoning behind them. I hope he will do so both realistically and with a selfish regard for American interests.

Before I outline some of the elements of such a statement of objectives, I'd like to put forward a few sobering observations about the post–Cold War era and the limits of American coercive power in relation to the rise of China. There is, after all, no point in responding to China's return to wealth and power with daydreams about options that do not in fact exist.

Even if we wanted to do so (and it is not immediately obvious why we should), we could not hold China down. In the globalized economy of today, no effort—even by a country as great as our own—to organize the isolation of China could succeed. Opposing China's rise will not stop it. It will simply earn us the enmity of China's once-again proud people. The observation of the founding father of modern conservatism, Edmund Burke, applies. "The heart of diplomacy," he said, "is to grant graciously what you no longer have the power to withhold." Only by co-opting what one cannot stop can one hope to direct its trajectory and thereby shape the future to one's advantage.

Some of the same Americans who promised marvelous strategic results from the invasion of Iraq continue to argue for the containment of China. The fact is that an attempt to implement such a policy would isolate the United States from our allies and friends to an even greater extent than our policies in the Middle East have. It would raise almost as much distrust of our intentions in Delhi, Hanoi, Islamabad, and Tokyo as in Beijing. From Japan and Korea, through Southeast Asia, to India and Pakistan, and onward through Central Asia and Russia, every nation on China's periphery is well along in a wary accommodation of it. None of China's neighbors see an effort to isolate, weaken, or divide it as feasible, and none are prepared to incur the high costs of attempting to do so.

Though all nations desire continued participation by the United States in the Asian-Pacific balance of power, none want the United States to act as the sole balancer of Chinese power. None favor American confronta-

tion with China or the division of Asia into spheres of influence like those of the Cold War. All wish to see a regional and global balance that incorporates rather than excludes China, India, and other emerging great powers, as well as Japan, which cannot forever hide behind Uncle Sam. This is as true outside the Asia-Pacific region as within it. Although the European Union bans weapons sales to China, it does so on human rights—not geopolitical—grounds, and in deference to American concerns, not out of strategic conviction.

The strategically inclusive approach to China favored by our allies is not contradicted by the Taiwan problem, the only issue that anyone has been able to identify that could ignite a war between China and the United States. There is broad regional and international appreciation of the United States' role in blocking unilateral moves to alter the status quo by either Beijing or Taipei. Still, no US ally has committed itself to participating in a defense of Taiwan's continued separation from the rest of China. Our most stalwart allies in the Pacific—the Australians and South Koreans—who have fought alongside us in every other conflict over the past half century have made it clear that they would sit out such a fight. Despite its oft-expressed apprehensions about China's return to Asian primacy, even Japan is undecided about whether and to what extent it would facilitate military operations from US bases on its territory in a war to define Taiwan's relationship to China.

In the only war with China that anyone can imagine, then, for all practical purposes, we would be on our own. Given how much more capable our Navy and Air Force are than those of the People's Liberation Army, and despite the disagreeable experiences of the Korean War, I have little doubt that we would prevail in any battle with the PLA. What no one can tell me is how we would limit the conflict or win the war. Unlike Korea and the proxy war we fought in Indochina, a US-China war over Taiwan would not be fought in a third country. It would take place on territory that all Chinese agree is theirs and in the Chinese homeland. Strikes on the Chinese homeland would elicit counterstrikes by the PLA on ours, by fair means or foul. After we took out Chinese forces in the Taiwan area and beyond, much of Taiwan would be a smoking ruin, and China and its nationalism would still be there to rebuild the capabilities to have another go at it. We would have made a permanent enemy of China. This is not an appealing scenario, and it's hard to see much in it for us or anyone else.

These are some of the reasons that the aim of US policy with respect to Taiwan has wisely been to ensure that no war over it ever occurs. This policy now seems once again to be bearing fruit, as Taipei and Beijing prepare for negotiations on a wide range of initiatives to further the already extensive integration of their economies and societies and to establish a long-term framework for peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. Americans need to make clear that there is a corollary to our opposition to coercion and unilateral efforts to change the status quo and that is our willingness to embrace and act to support changes that are mutually agreed between the two sides of the Strait. We should do nothing to disrupt their crafting of such changes. We must ensure that as Taiwan negotiates, it does not do so from a position of weakness, but we should encourage it to negotiate. Asia, and the world, would be a better place, and US interests would be well served if the Taiwan issue were peacefully resolved.

The Taiwan problem has been a persistent constraint on the development of US-China relations and an intermittent source of bilateral crises that destabilize the region and alarm our allies and friends. Ironically, the principal beneficiaries of Sino-American tensions over Taiwan have been Russia and other countries with territorial disputes with China. They have been able to exploit Beijing's obsession with the great rent in China's territorial integrity that Taiwan represents. One result has been border demarcation agreements and military confidence-building measures along their borders with China that were considerably more generous than they might otherwise have been. Another has been the emergence of China as Russia's biggest arms market, alongside India. Of course Taiwan has also become a major destination for US arms sales, a market we monopolize because no other arms-exporting country is prepared to sell there. It is a fact that our military-industrial complex has acquired a vested interest in demonizing China while talking up Taiwan's defense needs.

To the dismay of some, Taiwan has recently become much more selective about what it buys from us. This reflects its recognition that an island of 23 million people cannot hope to sustain a long-term military balance with a society of 1.3 billion plus. This would be true even if China were not driven by other factors unrelated to Taiwan to reequip and modernize its military; but it is. Even as the PLA builds preparedness for Taiwan contingencies, it must mount a credible defense along 14 land borders and against other powerful nations that, like Japan, have a history of invading China. Ironically, any US military planner charged with planning China's

defense would demand a vastly greater level of defense spending than the PLA has been able to wangle.

Both Beijing and Taipei want to end their military confrontation. Both now seek to negotiate a formula that would permit the long-term peaceful coexistence of Taiwan's political economy with the quite different systems now flourishing on the mainland, in Hong Kong, and in Macau. Working out such a formula, consistent with the principle of "one China," is the stated objective of the administration that took office in Taipei on 20 May. Doing so will not constitute "reunification." Discussion of arrangements for that could be deferred, perhaps indefinitely. In the meantime both sides are committed to exploring—I quote—"a formal ending to the cross-strait state of hostilities" and "the establishment of a military mutual trust mechanism, to avoid cross-strait military conflict." The United States should express willingness to help secure any new status quo that may be agreed between Taipei and Beijing and to act accordingly.

If Taipei and Beijing can achieve what they now hope they can, Taiwan's democracy will, for the first time, be unthreatened, and a major burden on our relationships in the area—not just with China but with other countries as well—will be lifted. Concern on the part of the Republic of Korea about our embroiling Koreans in a war with China over Taiwan has been the principal obstacle to the transformation of our alliance into a partnership for power projection. A somewhat similar concern has kept our alliance with Japan from achieving its full potential. Obviously, new possibilities for a strategic relationship with China, leveraging its capabilities to serve our purposes, would also arise.

The downside is, of course, that the credibility of China as a putative "peer competitor" of the United States would be greatly diminished. Our defense industries would be thrust back into another season of "enemy deprivation syndrome"—the queasy feeling they get when their enemy goes away and they have to find a new one to justify defense acquisition programs. I am sure they would prove up to that challenge! A moment of disorientation in the military-industrial complex would, in any event, be a small price to pay for greater security in the western Pacific and the end of any serious prospect of armed conflict with China.

With this prospect in mind, let me return to the broader issue of US objectives vis-à-vis China. I think these should be to ensure, to the extent possible that,

- Americans benefit rather than suffer from China's emergence as an economic great power;
- China becomes a committed guardian and follower of good practices of global governance within a rule-bound international order favorable to American as well as Chinese interests;
- China pulls with us rather than against us as we tackle global, regional, and transnational problems;
- The Taiwan issue is resolved peacefully on terms acceptable to both sides of the Taiwan Strait; and
- Disputes, including those few remaining territorial issues that China has with its neighbors, are also resolved by peaceful means.

Serious pursuit of these objectives would demand of us a degree of farsightedness and diplomatic creativity like that we evidenced six decades ago, when the now-vanished world for which we built our present international institutions and practices was still new. It would require us to recognize that the alliances and multilateral structures we set up to deal with the threats of fascism and Soviet communism need reform, supplementation, or replacement to be able to deal with the very different challenges and opportunities of the post–Cold War era. These challenges cannot be met with coalitions or through gatherings that do not include those with the capacity to wreck the solutions we craft as well as those essential to craft them. We need new diplomatic and security architectures to manage new global and regional problems. Creating them will require us to combine vision with pragmatism and to set aside our rigid insistence that nations demonstrate democratic credentials before we will work with them.

China is very relevant in this regard. There is a growing range of problems that cannot be addressed and opportunities that cannot be seized without China's cooperation or acquiescence. Such issues now embrace every element of our national interest and every facet of national power. They may sound abstract, but they can help ordinary Americans—or hit us where it hurts. Fortunately, the prospect for Chinese cooperation on many of them is good, especially if Taipei and Beijing succeed in taking the Taiwan issue progressively off the Sino-American agenda. Whether that happens or not, let me mention just a few things the next president could usefully take up with the Chinese to serve the objectives I've outlined.

One of these is the trade imbalance and the dollar-yuan exchange rate. These problems are linked politically. They now also connect to a broader issue of global concern. With about one-fourth of the global economy and a much higher proportion of its debt, our currency can no longer bear the burden of providing three-fifths of the world's reserves. Americans need to return to funding our economic advance with our own savings rather than through foreign borrowing. China and other high-dollar-surplus countries need to know that their long, free ride on the dollar is coming to an end. They will have to pick up their fair share of sustaining the health of the global economy and the international monetary and reserve system on which it depends. We need urgently to sit down with the Chinese and others to begin to work out a new system that would include full convertibility for the yuan but preserve as much as possible of the value of China's, Japan's, and other countries' hard-earned dollar reserves. The aim should be to begin to craft a joint proposal for international monetary reform that we could put before the world's great financial powers.

Consider also the questions of international good governance and the rule of law. One of the lessons Americans may well take away from Iraq is that we should get out of the business of trying to propagate democracy in foreign lands and instead focus on making it work here, counting on the good example we set to inspire others to emulate us. But we have a big stake in the extent to which China internalizes the idea of the rule of law. This is not just because China is becoming an increasingly important element in the forces shaping world order, but also because no nation that is scofflaw at home can be trusted to follow the rules abroad. (The reverse of this, that scofflaw behavior abroad fosters unconstitutional corner cutting at home, is also true, as our own government has recently reminded us.) We need to set a good example at home to have credibility abroad. But we must do more than that.

We need to work with the Chinese to improve the performance of their courts, enhance their legal education, upgrade their forensics standards, and modernize their law enforcement practices. This, not public condemnation and verbal abuse, is how we helped South Korea and Taiwan become democratic societies characterized by a high degree of respect for human rights. Twenty years after the student uprising in Tiananmen, it is time to do away with the sanctions—self-imposed restrictions—that prevent us from working with the Chinese government to help the vastly larger society of the mainland attain comparable standards of civilized behavior.

Yet another challenge that tests our willingness to explore partnership with China is environmental degradation and climate change. Nothing the United States can do will have much effect on the deteriorating global environment without parallel or complementary action from China. It has been all too easy to use this fact as an excuse for doing nothing. The next president should use it as a reason to challenge China to join us in tackling the problem.

If the Bush administration succeeds, as it yet may, in removing the nuclear issue as an obstacle to a permanent peace on the Korean peninsula and normal relations with North Korea, its successor will have something to build on in terms of creating a Northeast Asian security system that can help with crisis management and dispute resolution in that region. China would be an essential partner in any such arrangement, as it has been in the Six-Party Talks. China would also be an indispensable participant in any broader concert of Asia-Pacific powers, including not just our allies in Japan and Korea, but also India, ASEAN, Australia, and others. Such a gathering could advance our objective of assuring that territorial and other disputes are worked out by measures short of war.

Finally, to return very briefly to military matters, it is shocking that we had more contact and were more familiar with the reasoning processes of our Soviet enemies than we are today with the Chinese, who are not and need not become our enemy, and with whom we share many common concerns. At present, if there were an abrupt transition in Korea or Pakistan or an incident in Central Asia, we would not have the mutual confidence and familiarity necessary to work with the Chinese to address the resulting problems, despite the almost certain desire of both of us to do so. Military dialogue and exchanges need a lot of work on both sides.

The United States faces a daunting array of foreign and domestic problems, many of which we cannot hope to solve on our own. We cannot take China's cooperation with us on these problems for granted, even though in some cases it is indispensable. Equally, however, we have no basis for presupposing China's opposition or indifference on these issues. How the United States conceives of our relations with China and how we approach these relations will determine whether it is helpful or hostile on matters of concern to us. We will do better, I think, with a less stridently critical and militaristic approach than we have recently followed.

Diplomacy is not just about preventing problems or deterring others from creating them, though both are part of it. Diplomacy is equally, as

the Truman and Nixon administrations showed in the past century, about responding to broad strategic challenges, about redefining the world and regional orders, about creating opportunities to advance the national interest, and about crafting strategic architecture that embraces the capacities needed to pursue these opportunities. In 2009, Sino-American relations are likely to be ripe for redefinition, renewal, and mutually beneficial enlargement.

It will fall to the president who takes office next January 20th to compose a comprehensive strategy to accomplish this and to devise realistic policies to implement that strategy. But, as former secretary of state Henry Kissinger once wisely remarked, "No foreign policy—no matter how ingenious—has any chance of success if it is born in the minds of a few and carried in the hearts of none." The next president must also lead the American people toward a better informed consensus on how we can best compete and cooperate with an increasingly influential and powerful China.

The potential for partnership between the United States and China is great; the costs of antagonism are greater. China's leaders have said on many occasions that they want a strategic partnership with America. To test whether that is possible, Americans must decide what we want from such a partnership and be constant in our pursuit of it. SSQ

A Time for Action

The Case for Interagency Deliberate Planning

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The debate over interagency reform has been raging for many years, and the emerging consensus is increasingly clear. Current US national security execution mechanisms, conceived and resourced for a Cold War security environment, now exhibit a systemic inability to achieve national strategic objectives in the dynamic post–Cold War era. Although various diagnoses and prescriptions abound in a growing body of literature, they collectively describe a failure of the interagency to effectively integrate and employ America's considerable advantages in each of the military, economic, diplomatic, and informational instruments of national power. Now, nearly two decades since the implosion of a coalescing Soviet threat, these systemic weaknesses can no longer be explained away by differences in the stated strategies or leadership styles of three US presidents. Now, as the United States prepares to elect its fourth president and 20th Congress since the fall of the Berlin Wall, it can no longer afford to allow political, cultural, or structural barriers to prevent progress toward systemic reform. Now—as the opportunities narrow to influence a globalizing world toward peace, prosperity, and the rule of law—is a time for action.

This policy analysis proposes the statutory establishment of interagency deliberate planning as a necessary and practical first step to mature interagency execution. The primary purpose of this initial step is to evolve national-security-related operations from mere coordination of individual

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agency efforts to an objectives-oriented synchronization, integration, and interdependence of combined interagency operations. The secondary purpose of interagency deliberate planning is to identify specific capability gaps and overlaps that may then be resourced appropriately over time within an integrated and prioritized national security budget. The article presents this proposal by leveraging the extensive body of national security reform literature to characterize both the problem and the major categories of options already proposed. The article then draws a parallel between the unity of effort challenges now faced at the interagency level with those successfully addressed on a smaller scale among the military services through reforms in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Through this historical parallel, the authors highlight the portions of the Goldwater-Nichols Act reforms that established clear strategy-to-task links between ends, ways, and means as the most prescient missing ingredients now required to achieve interagency unity of effort. Finally, the article establishes a rationale and action plan for implementing interagency deliberate planning in a manner that is responsive to the systemic problems identified and overcomes the barriers that have frustrated significant national security reform in the recent past.

The Debate over Interagency Reform

The Cold War presented a complex long-term challenge for national security practitioners who manage the US instruments of power: military, diplomatic, economic, and informational. However, the well-defined and pervasive threat of Soviet expansion also served as a coalescing force that enabled interagency unity of effort without systemic process controls. The post–Cold War environment presents US national security practitioners with an equally complex yet far more dynamic security landscape that lacks a predominant coalescing threat. This major shift in geopolitics and the vacuum of influence left by the abrupt departure of a second superpower now require effective process controls to prioritize US national security objectives and to plan and execute coherent interagency strategies to counter threats and shape the future. Two foundational questions underpinning the current debate over interagency reform are (1) Why is the existing system no longer sufficient to generate unity of effort? and (2) Is legislation required to achieve real reform?

The National Security Act of 1947

Why do the interagency reforms in the National Security Act of 1947, that presumably enabled sufficient unity of effort during the Cold War, now appear insufficient as the US faces another long-term challenge to security? Clearly whatever the failures of the 1947 legislation to achieve its stated intent to generate integration at the highest levels of government, the benefits certainly outweighed the shortcomings throughout the Cold War competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. The National Security Council (NSC) system was broad enough to incorporate the equities of all national security departments and agencies yet flexible enough to adapt to the needs and styles of different presidents. Perhaps the answer lies in the classic security dilemma posed by the Cold War environment. The necessary yet overriding emphasis on global military deterrence and the resulting alignment of resources may well have masked a lack of sufficient depth in the statutory reforms to the interagency process.

This lack of depth in the 1947 interagency reforms only became apparent in the post–Cold War environment. The crafters of the National Security Act of 1947 envisioned that the coordination mechanisms established by the law would lead to "integrated policies and procedures." It is now clear that did not happen. The last two decades are replete with well-documented examples of interagency planning and execution shortcomings. The ends articulated by US national security strategy in the 1990s shifted almost immediately to emphasize the growing importance of the nonmilitary instruments of national power. Interagency planning and execution mechanisms in the NSC system as conceived in 1947, however, were insufficient to link those ends with interagency ways and means through integrated plans and budgets. Persistent disparities in personnel systems, planning and budgeting processes, cultural norms, and operational capabilities as well as a lack of clear authorities have conspired to make interagency unity of effort difficult to achieve. In addition, the "clean slate" flexibility of the National Security Council's structure, responsibilities, and authorities from president to president have made lasting links between ends, ways, and means unsustainable without further statutory reform. The NSCs of Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush each recognized the need for reforms in interagency planning and execution but considered congressional interference unnecessary.

Is Statutory Reform Necessary?

The National Security Councils of Presidents Clinton and Bush each attempted to reform interagency planning and execution from within by presidential directive. In 1997 President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Document (PDD)-56 aimed at reorganizing the NSC structure to better deal with complex contingencies such as Haiti and Somalia. At the time, the initiatives of PDD-56 were seen as a step in the right direction toward improving the interagency process. However credible and well-intentioned, PDD-56 could not break through disparities across agencies to improve the process of translating national security objectives to well-coordinated and interdependent tasks across the US government. As such, the initiatives of PDD-56 failed to achieve the intended improvements during the Clinton administration, and the directive was eventually superseded by a whole new structure once the Bush administration was sworn into office.

President Bush's first national security presidential directive reorganized the interagency coordination mechanisms inherited from the Clinton White House. The event-oriented interagency working groups established by PDD-56 were disbanded and replaced by regional and functional policy coordination committees. This new structure was well organized and offered important advantages in responding to global and regional national security issues. The *US Commission on National Security for the 21st Century* report, however, still concluded in 2000 that a major weakness of interagency national security planning persists. This weakness is the lack of attention paid to long-term planning.[1] Like the Clinton NSC initiative that preceded it, the Bush NSC's efforts to improve the performance of the 1947 National Security Council system failed to produce an interagency planning and execution system that drives unity of effort. This repeated inability to reform the system by presidential directive seems to be a strong indication that some form of statutory change is necessary.

Even so, national security experts such as John Deutch, Arnold Kanter, and Brent Scowcroft have repeatedly cautioned against dramatic statutory overhauls. They caution against a "wholesale overhaul" of the system yet acknowledge significant defects in the US national security structure and interagency process. Instead, they recommend delineating clear lines of responsibility in the interagency process, giving the NSC greater authority for

coordination of interagency programs and more efficiently aligning policy instruments to primary national security threats and objectives.[2]

Where We Are Today

Two key ingredients necessary to achieve unity of effort are unity of command and clear strategy-to-task links between ends, ways, and means. Some experts argue that unity of command is simply unachievable within the US system of checks and balances. The president, however, clearly enjoys considerable authorities, both express and implied, over national security issues. Article II of the US Constitution expressly designates the president as both the commander in chief of the armed forces and the chief diplomat of the United States. The president has also historically been afforded considerable latitude over economic and trade issues, particularly when connected to matters of national security. It is not at all clear that a president's unity of command over the instruments of national power is necessarily nullified, or even seriously impeded, by the express or implied authorities granted to either the Congress or the judiciary. Congress' unsuccessful attempt to force a reversal of unpopular national security policy in Iraq using its express "power of the purse" is just one recent example of how much practical latitude the president is afforded. It is much more likely that systemic unity of command deficiencies affecting the interagency process stem from the lack of clear statutory accountability between the president and the interagency processes at various levels within the NSC system. The customary practice of delegating presidential power by designating a "lead agency" to preside over various national security policy committees, for example, dilutes unity of command and subjects key interagency planning and execution questions to the potential for bureaucratic power plays between agencies. Once a clear connection is made to the president's existing constitutional authorities, however, it is unlikely that further statutory reform would be necessary to empower the president with effective unity of command over interagency planning and execution for national security.

Establishing clear strategy-to-task links between ends, ways, and means is a much more urgent and vexing problem that must be addressed to achieve a sustainable unity of effort. This idea is neither novel nor untested. It is, however, lost in a cacophony of prescriptions large and small. The current administration has undertaken a number of well-intentioned efforts attempting to address a variety of specific issues. The Department

of State's (DoS) new office to coordinate stability and reconstruction efforts, a new Civilian Reserve Corps, the National Counterterrorism Center, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, and enhanced budget support for the secretary of state's "Transformational Diplomacy" initiatives are all examples of this. What has yet to be addressed, however, are the systemic and sustainable improvements to the process of translating national security strategy objectives to specific interagency roles, missions, and operations that can effectively integrate the instruments of national power and align national resources accordingly.

Emerging Schools of Thought: Ad Hoc Initiatives and Comprehensive Reform

Proposed reform solutions generally fall into two broad schools of thought: ad hoc initiatives and comprehensive government-wide reform. Numerous ad hoc initiatives proposed in recent years have merit but tend to be narrow in scope and largely reactive to negative trends in world events or shifts in public opinion. They often provide piecemeal corrective actions that, while they may be well-founded, address the results of interagency planning and execution breakdowns and not the underlying causes. In contrast, proposals for comprehensive reform contain a broad range of systemic reforms intended to address several perceived problems identified within the military and the broader national security community. While they typically consist of credible recommendations from top experts, they seem to ignore some practical barriers that make their wholesale implementation extremely unlikely without some extraordinary forcing function. Nevertheless, the compelling arguments made by these comprehensive reform proposals for replacing the National Security Act of 1947 leave little doubt that extensive reform is already overdue.

So why, in the aftermath of multiple well-documented interagency planning and execution failures, have comprehensive reforms not been enacted or even seriously debated? Whatever the answer may be, a new national security act is not a priority for the last year of the Bush administration, and it is unlikely to be a priority in the first year of the next administration. What can be learned from the ad hoc initiatives and comprehensive reform schools of thought to achieve the right balance? Examples from each school of thought will be analyzed further within the context of both the systemic problems that must be addressed and the barriers that have prevented reform in the recent past.

A Time for Action: Incremental Systemic Reform

With the country heavily invested in a long war with many fronts and America's century-long reputation for overcoming great challenges in the balance, now is clearly a time for action. Systemic statutory reform is long overdue, but a comprehensive national security act of 2010 is unlikely. The national security system needs practical yet statutory solutions to systemic problems; incremental steps within a larger framework of comprehensive reform over time.

The Department of Defense's (DoD) Joint Operations Planning and Execution System model of translating national security objectives down to specific fielded military capabilities and tasks is effectively accomplished through a deliberate planning process. Adapting this proven model to the interagency level would integrate and align the instruments of national power toward accomplishing US strategic objectives and would establish clear strategy-to-task links between ends, ways, and means. As President Eisenhower once observed, the process of planning is infinitely more important than the actual plans produced. However, the existence of specific interagency plans intended to achieve clearly established objectives in time would provide important information on capability gaps and overlaps that must be addressed across the interagency.

These identified shortfalls may require significant time, effort, resources, and maybe even subsequent legislation to overcome. Within the DoD, these capability gaps and overlaps inform the budgeting process that results in the six-year Future Years Defense Plan submitted to Congress every two years as a part of the president's budget submission. Although this DoD process is not immune to problems and politics, it does present a much more informed forecast of what is needed over time to achieve the military portions of the national security strategy. It also provides a much more transparent and rational baseline for Congress to exercise its appropriate oversight function on behalf of the American people. By contrast, the nonmilitary national security departments and agencies are only able to submit a budget one year at time with little or no connection to the objectives of national security strategy.

Effect of the Goldwater-Nichols Act on Enabling Unity of Effort

The coordination, unity of effort, and interoperability challenges now facing the interagency level of the US government are strikingly similar to those tackled with remarkable success by the military over the last 30–40

years. Prior to the defense reforms enacted by the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, achieving unity of effort from the considerable air, land, and sea warfare capabilities of the military services was roughly analogous to a professional football team approaching the line of scrimmage after three separate huddles for the runners, passers, and blockers. There were, of course, credible ad hoc attempts to implement reform from within the DoD after the lessons of Vietnam. However, the failed hostage rescue attempt in Iran, the barracks bombing incident in Beirut, and the "patchwork" invasion of Grenada galvanized support for comprehensive statutory reform. According to James Locher III, a former Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) staffer, current director of the Project on National Security Reform, and a central figure in the buildup to passage of Goldwater-Nichols, the powerful service chiefs bitterly opposed statutory reform and jealously guarded service equities in operations planning and execution.[3] In a 1983 hearing before the SASC, former secretary of defense James Schlesinger characterized the intransigent and competitive service cultures resisting reform: "In all of our military institutions, the time-honored principle of 'unity of command' is inculcated. Yet at the national level it is firmly resisted and flagrantly violated. Unity of command is endorsed only if it applies at the service level. The inevitable consequence is both the duplication of effort and the ultimate ambiguity of command."[4]

Despite this initial resistance, Goldwater-Nichols reforms have been remarkably successful over time at maturing unity of effort between air, land, and sea power from simple coordination to synchronization, integration, and more recently, true interdependence. The extensive reforms spanned eight explicit objectives. In essence, however, the Goldwater-Nichols Act enabled unity of effort by:

1. Simplifying and reinforcing unity of command; and,
2. Assigning statutory responsibilities that, taken together, greatly enhance the strategy-to-task links between US National Security Strategy (ends), joint strategic and operational planning and execution (ways), and defense-wide requirements, programs, and budget (means).

The Goldwater-Nichols Act simplified and reinforced unity of command by, in effect, removing the service chiefs from the operational chain of command and reducing their direct access to the president and secretary of defense. The chain of command for joint operations was simplified to flow

from the president and secretary of defense directly to the applicable joint force combatant commander. In addition, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) became the sole and independent (no longer elected by the joint chiefs) military advisor to the president, the NSC, and the secretary of defense. The geographic and functional combatant commanders were also designated authorities commensurate with their responsibilities to carry out assigned missions and operations. The role of the service chiefs was thereby refocused on organizing, training, and equipping forces to be presented to combatant commanders in support of worldwide contingencies. This gave the war-fighting combatant commander unambiguous operational control over all assigned and attached air, land, and sea forces. Given the ambiguities of authority and command present before Goldwater-Nichols, this newly clarified unity of command was indeed essential, but not sufficient, to enable true unity of effort.

Fortunately the Goldwater-Nichols Act also established statutory responsibilities that enhance the strategy-to-task links between US National Security Strategy (ends), joint strategic and operational planning and execution (ways), and defense-wide requirements, programs, and budget (means). Perhaps the most important of these responsibilities was for the president to prepare and submit a formal report on national security strategy. The *President's National Security Strategy* (*NSS*) became the cornerstone of joint strategic and operational planning for the use of the military instrument of power. The Goldwater-Nichols Act charged the CJCS with formal oversight responsibilities for strategic direction; strategic planning; contingency planning and preparedness; advice on requirements, programs and budget; and joint doctrine, training, and education. As part of these responsibilities, the chairman was required to prepare fiscally constrained strategic plans. This statutory requirement resulted in the *Chairman's National Military Strategy* (*NMS*). The *NMS* was subsequently codified with a biennial review requirement by the National Defense Authorization Act of 2004 and outlined the chairman's vision to provide military capabilities necessitated by the *NSS*.[5] The act also required the secretary of defense to provide written contingency planning guidance to the CJCS containing planning priorities and baseline political assumptions.[6] The secretary's guidance was then passed down to the combatant commanders and service chiefs by the CJCS in a classified Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan along with the specific apportionment of forces to be considered available to the combatant commanders as they develop specific contingency plans.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act emphasis on unity of command over joint forces and establishment of a clear connection between strategic ends, ways, and means enabled the unity of effort that was clearly missing since before the Vietnam War. These reforms, at least in part, translated into unprecedented dominance of US combat forces in Panama, the Persian Gulf, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq.[7] Although many challenges and imperfections persist in the planning and execution of joint military operations, it is difficult to ignore the increased effectiveness of America's combined air, land, and sea power when they approach the proverbial line of scrimmage from the same huddle. As this proven process is adapted for use at the interagency level, it is important to consider key benefits and potential liabilities.

Key Benefits and Potential Liabilities of Deliberate Planning

Implementing deliberate planning has some key benefits as well as potential liabilities that officials in the next administration should consider as the military process described above is adapted at the interagency level. To take full advantage of the benefits and avoid potential liabilities, interagency planning should not seek to replace functional planning activities within departments and agencies. Rather, the interagency planning process should be used to mobilize and integrate the specific capabilities of those departments and agencies to enhance their collective ability to achieve the objectives of national security strategy. Simply assigning a lead department or agency to address strategic policy objectives with no connection to specific interagency plans and resources to accomplish them is no longer sufficient. The key benefits of interagency deliberate planning include clear strategy-to-task links, integrated capabilities and competencies, early identification of risks and shortfalls, enhanced resource allocation, and eased transition to crisis action planning. Potential liabilities include time and resource intensity, perceived or actual inflexibility, political sensitivities, and cultural resistance.

Key Benefits at the Interagency Level

Clear strategy-to-task links. Strong strategy-to-task links impose discipline in both the implementation of national security strategy and, ironically, the strategy-making process itself. These links ensure that the many decentral-

ized tasks from all contributing efforts have a clear link back to the intended outcomes. They also force important practical considerations such as prioritization, task description and resource allocation, timing and tempo, and the evaluation of counteractions, branches, and sequels. A methodical approach to establishing clear strategy-to-task links is the first and best defense against unintended results and also serves to expose unrealistic or unattainable strategic objectives.

For example, the national security strategy has for many years included the objective of supporting the establishment of modern democratic governments. Depending upon how such an objective is operationalized, an interagency deliberate planning process would quickly reveal significant limitations in achieving that end state in certain regions within the means available to apply toward that objective. This, in turn, might drive a restatement of the objective itself or it could bring more restraint to administration rhetoric concerning that objective to manage expectations.

At the interagency level, it is likely that any given operation plan, whether it is shuttle diplomacy in the Middle East, counterproliferation in Central Asia, or disaster relief in East Asia, would include an overarching plan with supporting plans from multiple agencies. Even so, it is essential that all tasks in both the supported and supporting plans have a clear connection with a carefully documented end state approved by the president.

Integrated capabilities and competencies. If the progression of the military services from simultaneous operations toward true joint operations in the wake of the Goldwater-Nichols reforms is any indication, the interagency whole could also one day be greater than the sum of its parts. As interagency deliberate planning matures, it would begin to drive synergies among mutually supportive instruments of national power and greatly enhance America's ability to shape and respond effectively to world events. None of the objectives found in the *2006 National Security Strategy* can be achieved through the efforts of a single department or agency. There is perhaps no greater example of this than Operation Iraqi Freedom.

At the outset Operation Iraqi Freedom was, practically speaking, almost entirely a DoD task. Despite perhaps the most impressive invasion and occupation in military history, the military alone could not achieve the desired end state. Would Iraqi Freedom have been more effective or efficient if the joint operation plan were a supporting plan to a broader interagency plan to achieve the desired end state? That interagency plan may have been better still if it contemplated the potential to employ a variety of private as

well as public sector capabilities in addition to robust military security and stabilization operations. An effects-based interagency plan may well have integrated capabilities such as

- Multilateral economic aid, development, and humanitarian assistance,
- Targeted nongovernmental organization and intergovernmental organization support,
- Regional and sectarian diplomatic engagement,
- Omnibus support contracts requiring the employment of Iraqi nationals, and
- Targeted tax incentives for US corporate direct investment in Iraq.

It is impossible to know for sure if an interagency deliberate planning process would have achieved a superior result. What is certain, however, is that it would have forced planners to carefully consider how all the instruments of national power might be integrated and applied as necessary to achieve the desired end state. This process would have undoubtedly raised questions that were never addressed.

Early identification of risks and shortfalls. During the course-of-action development and analysis process, there are certain risks and shortfalls identified that either can or cannot be overcome or mitigated. Understanding these risks and shortfalls, both within individual plans and across interagency capabilities and competencies, before crisis situations develop can be an important advantage. Early analysis of risks and shortfalls empowers policy makers to make choices about whether to accept those risks as limiting factors, take alternative actions that avoid those risks, or acquire capabilities or competencies over time to remove those risks for the future.

One potential source of risk in interagency operations, for example, is that the NSC, the DoD, and the DoS do not have commonly defined geographical regions of the world. The combatant commanders have regional control while ambassadors under State almost exclusively represent the United States on a country-by-country basis. These differences could introduce risk by confusing authorities and coordination channels between the White House, the president's diplomatic representatives, and regional combatant commanders. Early identification of such risks and their potential impact upon desired end states gives the president the ability to address those risks as appropriate.

Enhanced resource allocation. Interagency deliberate planning would undoubtedly reveal capability gaps and overlaps within and between departments and agencies that must be addressed in future years' budgets. These investments and divestitures would, over time, ensure the best use of resources to achieve national strategic objectives. In addition, they would serve to build critical capabilities and competencies based upon well-understood shortfalls identified during the planning process. In the absence of this longer term perspective, neglected capabilities simply cannot be corrected by planning budgets one year at a time or even by simply doubling or tripling the budgets in one year for organizations that seem to be under resourced or are failing to achieve required results.

Eased transition to crisis action planning. The current NSC system already provides a tremendous crisis action response capacity to prepare coordinated options for presidential action. The existence of a robust deliberate planning process, however, provides for a much smoother transition into developing complete and executable interagency crisis response options. Although it is unlikely that a specific contingency plan would be executed without significant adaptation to the instant crisis, many of the execution details may still be valid, and the reasons why certain courses of action were either rejected or supported after significant analysis can be critical information to support better presidential decision making.

Potential Liabilities at the Interagency Level

Time and resource intensity. Deliberate planning is hard work. It takes dedicated participation from all planning stakeholders as part of a continuous cycle of developing and updating plans. Planning generally continues even during execution of a given plan in reaction to changing conditions. This presents a problem at the interagency level of how much actual planning can be credibly accomplished within an organization like the National Security Council without growing the staff to a degree that is more harmful than helpful. At the same time, however, if the interagency deliberate planning process is effectively "outsourced" by assigning lead departments for specific plans, then unity of command is diluted to a great extent. The challenge then in implementing interagency deliberate planning is to focus the White House staff level on overarching plans that integrate the instruments of national power toward specific end states to make clear connections from the National Security Strategy to the more detailed supporting plans of the departments and agencies.

Perceived or actual inflexibility. As with any complex process over time, interagency deliberate planning could become, or at least be perceived as, too inflexible to adapt to changing realities. Interagency plans could also serve to impede necessary flexibility within the various supporting departmental or agency plans if the process for updating those plans becomes overly burdensome. Even the perception of such inflexibility could jeopardize the credibility of the interagency planning process. This could lead decision makers to simply ignore the process and its products in favor of seemingly more responsive decision-making models. For this very reason, the DoD and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) have begun to reform the joint operation planning process to make it more adaptive and responsive to changing conditions.

Political sensitivities. The mere existence of specific plans, no matter how highly classified they might be, could result in domestic political exposure for the president and could complicate international diplomacy in certain situations. In domestic politics, the president could conceivably be significantly weakened, for example, by questions and recriminations related to the existence, content, or approval of certain plans. It is also possible that the existence of certain interagency plans could complicate the ability of US diplomats, who may have contributed to such plans, to negotiate or mediate effectively in delicate situations.

Cultural resistance. The deliberative process of achieving stated national security strategy objectives through unity of command and clearly established strategy-to-task links is likely to be countercultural for some departments and agencies. The DoS and the US Agency for International Development (USAID) are taking intentional steps to strengthen the links between diplomacy, foreign aid, and the president's National Security Strategy in their "Transformational Diplomacy and Development" strategic plan.[8] Even so, the typical rank-and-file USAID official, for example, still may reject the notion that foreign aid decisions should be based upon whether a clear connection can be made to a national security strategy document. In some cases, these workers have spent much more time deployed than either their Defense or State Department counterparts, and they undoubtedly have a keen understanding of the cultures and needs in different countries. The suggestion that they might achieve US objectives more effectively by taking a targeted and effects-based approach to foreign aid investments in concert with other economic, diplomatic, or military activities may well appear foolhardy or shortsighted to some.

Options and Barriers to Interagency Reform

For all the attention and resources devoted to proposals for interagency reform, few have overcome barriers to implementation (or enactment), and fewer still have addressed the systemic problems evidenced by several well-documented failures of interagency execution since the end of the Cold War. It is increasingly clear that to be enacted, effective and enduring interagency reforms considered by Congress and the next administration must meet certain criteria. They must be *pragmatic* enough to overcome significant barriers to enactment, *responsive* enough to address underlying problems, and *systemic* enough to drive fundamental change that enables interagency unity of effort. Considering the substantial barriers that have prevented reform of the national security system over the last two decades of the post–Cold War era, these criteria provide a meaningful basis upon which to analyze, compare, and contrast the various options to achieve meaningful national security reform in the near term.

After almost 20 years since the end of the Cold War, systemic national security reform is still nowhere on the national agenda. This remains true despite repeated failures in interagency planning and execution. While national security practitioners differ on the specifics according to their own experiences, four categories of barriers to meaningful reform are clearly apparent: environmental, political, cultural, and structural.

Environmental Barriers. The dynamic post–Cold War security environment itself presents a significant barrier to achieving interagency unity of effort in the implementation of national security strategy. Although several serious threats to America still exist, the post–Cold War security environment is mostly about opportunities and choices rather than the imperatives of countering concentrated existential threats. The threat of communism's spread during the Cold War, by contrast, was a coalescing force that preoccupied all the instruments of national power. Although no less complex, this concentration helped generate interagency unity of effort in much the same way that Adam Smith's "invisible hand" guides free markets. Containing the spread of communism was clearly the central objective, and the military was the primary instrument of power. Seven years after the end of the Cold War, the *National Security Strategy of 1996* called for global engagement and enlargement of freedom and democracy. A decade later, the *National Security Strategy of 2006* declared it "the policy of the United States to seek and support democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending

tyranny in our world."[9] The threats to national security in the post–Cold War era include transnational terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, rising global powers, global warming, energy dependence, and economic security, to name a few. Dealing with this complex variety of opportunities and threats requires a much more deliberate integration of the instruments of national power.

Political Barriers. Political barriers are also a significant challenge to national security reform. The political dimension of bureaucratic self-interest, the inertia of the status quo, and the risk of losing influence or budget authority naturally expose any significant reform idea to intense skepticism. This is particularly true if any "big idea" does not originate, or at least develop, from within the existing political order. Reorganizing the national security architecture through a comprehensive national security reform effort will undoubtedly lead to a significant redistribution of power, responsibilities, and authority in both the executive and legislative branches. In addition, the likely redistribution of resources between departments and agencies will generate winners and losers in a manner that is difficult to predict beforehand. Entrenched bureaucracies faced with losing oversight or fiscal authority over programs will almost certainly resist, as will some House and Senate authorizers and appropriators who perceive a threat to their positions or oversight jurisdictions. It is equally probable that any legislation affecting the NSC or the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is prone to be viewed as a usurpation of executive branch powers or an attack on the president's executive privilege. As formidable as the political barriers to reform may seem, they can and must be acknowledged and overcome for systemic reform efforts to succeed.

Executive and congressional commitment to reform is critical and was one of the key ingredients for the eventual success of Goldwater-Nichols. Championing such a complex and contentious reform agenda would require the expenditure of significant political capital. Unfortunately national security reform does not enjoy widespread demand from the majority of the US public, so the constituency and incentives for congressional or executive action are accordingly low. Consequently, successful reform will require strong leaders that are able to clearly articulate the problem, the proposed solutions, and the costs of inaction. Reform leaders must also translate the many public concerns over interagency performance in Afghanistan, Iraq, Hurricane Katrina, and the global war on terrorism into widespread support for reform. Only then can the already significant interest in national

security reform within academic circles, think tanks, and some top government officials be mobilized to generate the required momentum to overcome significant political barriers. Ignoring them is not feasible.

Cultural Barriers. Another key barrier to reform is organizational culture. While diversity of organizational culture between departments and agencies can be an asset, it can also breed parochialism, unhealthy competition, and a stovepiped approach to problem solving. The cultural barriers between government departments and agencies are very similar to those that existed between the military services within the DoD prior to the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. The services conducted military operations with a service-centric mind-set and attempted to maximize their portion of the defense budget by expanding their core competencies or by attempting to marginalize the benefits of the other services' roles and missions. Each military service attempted to support national objectives within its own traditional war-fighting domain of air, land, or sea. Mission overlap and ill-defined core competencies, however, led to significant gaps and overlaps in capabilities and serious interoperability deficiencies.

Overcoming the entrenched cultural dimension of bureaucratic self-interest among the pre–Goldwater-Nichols military services required national attention and the sustained commitment of the legislative and executive branches. The gravity of the problem and the urgency for a solution became part of the national debate after a number of interoperability failures during military operations and the dramatic and embarrassing national failure to rescue American hostages in Iran. The ill-fated Desert One rescue operation ended in a disastrous crash that was traced to lack of interoperability, lack of joint training, and failures in command. The defense reform process that followed was long and arduous including nearly five years of debate and coordination before the act was even passed. Since then, more than 20 years of hard work have followed to make significant progress towards the desired end state.

Interagency reform will, without a doubt, face the same cultural challenges; however, they will likely be an order of magnitude more severe than what the DoD has experienced on its journey towards interdependence. Short of clear statutory mandates requiring change, it is not at all clear that the next three presidents will have any more success overcoming cultural barriers to interagency unity of effort than the last three. Recent failures in interagency planning and execution can become the catalysts for elevating systemic national security reform to a national debate. The

key issue is whether the need for reform can be turned into actual legislation and related policy directives that even opponents and critics at the highest levels in departments and agencies must support and implement or step aside.

Structural Barriers. The last category of barriers to systemic national security reform is organizational structures across the legislative and executive branches. This includes both the organizations themselves and the rules that govern them. There are at least three major structural obstacles that complicate meaningful reform. They include an insufficient NSC structure, stovepiped congressional oversight committees, and ineffective budget planning and execution.

The first, and perhaps most daunting, structural barrier is the National Security Council's limited capacity and ever-changing structure. The interagency centerpiece of the National Security Act of 1947, the NSC has proven to be nothing more and nothing less than the president's own staff, to be used or ignored at the pleasure of the president with all the executive privilege and protection from direct congressional oversight as is extended to the president himself. The NSC literally starts from scratch with the inauguration of each new president, and all of its previous directives or supporting structures are subject to replacement or inattention. Incremental steps towards enhancing interagency coordination through NSC organizational structures rarely survive the transition from one administration to the next. Some do not even survive the tenure of one administration. The constantly changing organizational structures of the national security coordinating mechanisms based on presidential preferences present a significant challenge to comprehensive and systemic national security reform. Overcoming this challenge through legislation is likely to be perceived as an effort to usurp presidential authority and prerogatives, which is certain to generate resistance.

Stovepiped congressional authorizations and appropriations committees are another structural barrier preventing reform. The Goldwater-Nichols reforms clearly belonged to the Senate and House Armed Services Committees, whereas jurisdiction for comprehensive national security reform is likely to cross many committees within the House and the Senate. The potentially paralyzing effect that cross-cutting committee turf battles can have on interagency reform and subsequent oversight cannot be overstated. Overlapping committee jurisdiction is already a problem in some areas of oversight within the existing nonmilitary departments involved

in national security functions. An increased oversight focus toward interagency execution and resource management could exacerbate this structural problem.

Closely related to the lack of clear congressional oversight jurisdictions are ineffective budget planning and execution processes. With the exception of the DoD, there is currently little or no connection between the budgets of organizations involved in national security and the national security strategy they support. In fact, the nonmilitary budgets are planned one year at a time. This makes the rationale for budget initiatives, trends, and trade-offs for future capabilities difficult to explain or defend. Until very recently, only the budgets for defense and intelligence agencies were formally considered national security related. In addition, current laws and regulations make the movement of resources between national-security-related functions nearly impossible. This structural barrier serves to embolden departmental parochialism and reduces America's flexibility to react to changing world conditions to an unacceptable level. In addition, it results in the instrument of power used to achieve a given effect to be determined by which department or agency has the resources rather than which instrument of power is appropriate to achieve the desired effects. Although congressional oversight is still essential, this barrier must be overcome for systemic national security reforms to succeed.

Examination of Comprehensive Reform Proposals

Major universities and Washington-based think tanks have, in recent years, expended an enormous amount of effort and resources to develop proposals for comprehensive defense and national security reform. As discussed earlier, advocates point out that today's national security landscape is significantly different than the environment faced by the nation in 1947. Proponents of comprehensive reform highlight the need for a new national security architecture that is designed to meet current and future challenges more effectively and with an interagency approach using all the instruments of power.[10]

No matter how logical and complete such reform proposals may be, however, they must be sufficiently *pragmatic* to overcome the barriers discussed above, *responsive* to the problems preventing unity of effort toward national objectives, and *systemic* in nature to drive fundamental change within and between departments and agencies. How likely is it that the

leading proposals for comprehensive reform will be enacted, effective, and enduring? Two such efforts warrant close consideration: "Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: US Government and Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era" and the "Project on National Security Reform."

Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: US Government and Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era

The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) undertook a massive multiple-phase study in 2003 called *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: US Government and Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era*. The CSIS study addressed persistent deficiencies within the DoD, proposed improvements in interagency and coalition operations, and offered perspectives on the future of guard and reserve functions. It relied heavily on the experiences of an impressive array of former defense and national security officials. It also had a clear intent to be pragmatic and measured in its approach to avoid change for the sake of change and reduce the risk of unintended consequences.

Even so, the numerous and thoughtful recommendations, taken together, would represent nothing less than a "stem-to-stern" overhaul of the DoD, the NSC, and various key processes to include budgeting, acquisition, personnel management, training, and education. Although the report acknowledged the need for some of the recommendations to be implemented by statute, it seemed to favor implementation by a series of national security presidential directives and cabinet-level reform initiatives that did not require congressional action.

Project on National Security Reform

Another credible and comprehensive reform initiative currently underway is the Project on National Security Reform sponsored by The Center for the Study of the Presidency. The objective of the project is to improve the US government's ability to effectively provide for the nation's security in the twenty-first century through comprehensive reform of statutory, regulatory, and congressional oversight authorities that govern the interagency system. In contrast with the CSIS report, the Project for National Security Reform study acknowledges up front that the centerpiece of implementation must be a new national security act. Consequently, the project aims to produce recommendations for updating the 1947 act, to propose required supporting presidential directives, and to outline new congressional committee structures required to facilitate the desired outcomes.[11]

The key question is whether either of the two comprehensive reform proposals discussed above will be *pragmatic*, *responsive*, and *systemic* enough to be implemented and put America on the path toward unity of effort in the pursuit of national security objectives. Right away there is little doubt that both of the reform proposals described above are responsive and systemic. Whether either proposal is pragmatic enough to overcome barriers to wholesale implementation is another question entirely. Despite clear efforts within both proposals to reduce likely sources of opposition, the sheer depth and breadth of the various reforms proposed could make the barriers that have prevented real reform for the last two decades insurmountable. Since it is clear that comprehensive reform is necessary, there is good reason to hope that one of these proposals will indeed be implemented within the next year in its entirety despite the ever-present risk of unintended consequences. It may even be worth the risks resulting from the administrative distractions it would undoubtedly create across the national security community while the country is at war. It took close to five years of debate to enact the Goldwater-Nichols legislation and over 20 years and counting to fully realize its intended outcomes. With national security reform lost in a cacophony of reelection-year politics, comprehensive reform may not be feasible in the near term.

Examination of Ad Hoc Initiatives

A growing number of reform proposals recommend various ad hoc prescriptions as the keys to progress. Some advocate more engaged and thoughtful leadership-driven initiatives to include national security education and training as the key to interagency cooperation. Other studies propose transformations in organizational culture through better communication and information sharing as the central keys towards improving the interagency process. Still others point to fixing the long-antiquated budget development process and the ineffective allocation of resources across government agencies as the cornerstone to real reform. Several internal reform initiatives undertaken by the president and the Congress appear to be reactions to very specific issues that have arisen as a result of poor interagency cooperation in the past. Clearly, not all ad hoc initiatives fit neatly within one of the broad themes described above. Examining the broad range of ad hoc initiatives by these major themes, however, is a useful construct to evaluate a variety of credible ideas to determine whether

they are *pragmatic*, *responsive*, and *systemic* enough to produce interagency unity of effort in the post–Cold War security environment.

Leadership-Based Initiatives

Some argue that the key to improving interagency execution is more-engaged and decisive leadership from the president specifically and the executive branch in general. To be sure, strong and engaged leadership is necessary for the success of any large organization. In *Harnessing the Interagency for Complex Operations*, three Washington scholars cite unclear relationships among top-level interagency officials and undefined spans of control and authority as the key impediments to interagency execution.[12] Although no such confusion exists with respect to the president's authority, the practical ability of the president to influence individual departments and agencies is sometimes overestimated. There is a theoretical argument to be made, however, that leadership-based reform initiatives could be responsive to the problems preventing interagency unity of effort if the right leader is elected. The president has complete control over the structure and functions of the NSC and, in theory, could direct a number of organizational, procedural, and budgetary reforms across and within the federal bureaucracy through a series of presidential directives. Ironically, the plausibility of this argument may be precisely why the last three presidents have attempted in vain to resolve interagency coordination problems without statutory interference.

However responsive leadership-based initiatives could be, they are neither pragmatic enough to overcome the barriers discussed nor are they systemic enough to drive enduring reform.[13] As powerful as the presidency may be, significant political, cultural, and structural barriers render purely leadership-driven reform unrealistic without a legal mandate. This is especially true within a bureaucracy where many of its authorities and responsibilities, not to mention funding, are established by laws not easily circumnavigated by presidential fiat. For much the same reason, purely leadership-driven reform initiatives are, with rare exceptions, not systemic enough to endure beyond one presidency. In their book, *Keeping the Edge: Managing Defense for the Future*, former top defense officials Ashton Carter and John White underscore this point in their argument that the lack of formal organizational structures and coordination procedures cannot be overcome through leadership alone.[14] Closely related to leadership-based reform initiatives are those that call for changes in organizational culture.

Culture-Based Initiatives

Some scholars and practitioners argue that poor interagency execution can be overcome by changing organizational cultures that discourage coordination and interdependence. An International Affairs Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Maj Sunil B. Desai, USMC, concludes that while most of the tools for cooperation exist, the essence of the problem is that the interagency community is dominated by individual cultures rather than by a common interagency culture.[15] Unhealthy interagency competition and a tendency to retain, and even build, seemingly redundant capabilities between departments are the results of culturally motivated bureaucratic self-interest, and they underscore the need for unity of command. They are also primary reasons that the practice of appointing "lead agencies" to oversee interagency issues does not work. Even experts who believe statutory reform is necessary concede that disparate cultures between departments and agencies represent a significant barrier to interagency reform. Assuming the relevant organizational cultures can be changed to foster a single interagency culture, would such changes be *pragmatic*, *responsive*, and *systemic* enough to drive interagency unity of effort?

In the absence of a clear, unassailable mandate driving systemic changes to interagency processes and structures, it is not clear that attempts to change organizational culture alone would rise to any of the criteria required to make lasting progress. Organizational cultures are not developed quickly or changed easily. They typically affect every aspect of an organization, from training and communication to promotion and compensation. While conflicting interagency cultures are undoubtedly a source of unhealthy competition that must be addressed, they are also a source of organizational identity and pride that must be approached with caution. Transforming the DoD culture from "service operations–centric" to "joint operations–centric," for example, required an overriding statutory mandate, talented and persistent leadership, regulatory and personnel system changes, and a significant amount of time. Any credible attempt to replace the individual cultures of departments and agencies involved in national security with a common interagency culture must be preceded by a mandate that directly or indirectly necessitates the change. This provides an important impetus that all organization members can understand and support. Attempts at significant cultural change in the absence of a clear external forcing function could unwittingly become a large difficult step

in the wrong direction. Perhaps a less risky set of ad hoc initiatives, albeit no less difficult or emotional, can be found in budget-based initiatives.

Budget-Based Initiatives

Budget reform is an increasingly common theme in prescriptions for improved interagency execution that merits very careful consideration. Some experts cite large interagency budget imbalances as the key factor while others point to the antiquated budget process itself. Proponents of resolving budget imbalances point out extreme limitations in civilian operational capacity and the dangers associated with a military-centric foreign policy. Critics of an outdated budget process point out that the current system lacks a rational basis of tying resource allocation decisions to national security strategy objectives. The US Commission on National Security for the 21st Century, for example, pointed out that the budget process needs to be revamped since there is no single process or document that links the national security strategy to executive branch resource allocation.[16] In fact, critics of the budget process suggest that national security budget priorities are inherently suboptimized when developed independently by departments and agencies without considering interagency trade-offs, gaps, and overlaps. Perhaps the critical missing link is that interagency budget development and execution processes are not guided by an integrated strategic planning process.[17]

Do Budget Imbalances Put a Military Face on all US Instruments of Power? What, if anything, do the stark budgetary disparities between military and nonmilitary functions say about our strategy for achieving national security objectives? A wise pastor once challenged his church by saying, "Don't tell me you love God with all your heart. Let me see your checkbook, and I'll tell you where your heart lies." Ironically, it was the secretary of defense that made a passionate plea in testimony on Capitol Hill for an increase in the State Department's budget, noting that State's total budget of $34 billion is less than what the DoD spends on health care alone. He highlighted the dramatic resource disparity between the military and nonmilitary agencies as a significant barrier in dealing with the post–Cold War security environment.[18] An American Forces Press Service article, "Increased Interagency Cooperation Vital in the Global War on Terrorism," highlights the budget-driven lack of a credible civilian surge capacity as the critical shortfall prevented meaningful cooperation.[19] These and other credible studies in the literature specifically contend that

civilian agencies like the DoS lack sufficient resources and personnel to execute critical roles in achieving national security objectives.[20]

Significant gaps in civilian department and agency capabilities to effectively shape and respond to global events are often highlighted as a reason that the military instrument of power is too often the tool of choice. At first glance, this mismatch seems to be evident in Iraq and Afghanistan where the building of roads and schools is often overseen by US battalion commanders wearing body armor and helmets instead of engineers wearing jeans and hard hats. Commanders in Afghanistan have become more interested in deployed National Guard members' agricultural prowess than their combat readiness. These points certainly make a compelling prima facie argument for moving funds and personnel from the DoD into civilian agencies. Is the solution really that simple?

Why Is Any Budget Too Much or Too Little? What should drive budget reforms intended to resolve apparent budget imbalances? There is little doubt that the resource allocation mechanisms must be reformed. Certainly a global military capability is a much more expensive proposition than global diplomatic engagement or even global economic aid and development assistance. Why is any budget too much or too little? All too often the solution chosen in these situations is to radically increase funding in a given year for a seemingly under resourced or ineffective function. Sometimes this occurs without a clear idea of the desired outcomes of the increased spending or any indication of whether the new funding levels will be sustained in future budgets. This, in turn, limits the choices on what can be done with the increased funding. The return on these kinds of investments may be quite limited.

Another common solution is to reduce the overall military budget, increase seemingly under-funded civilian departments, and let the winners and losers sort out the best ways to allocate the respective gains and losses. Since the budgets are typically developed one to two years prior to enactment, there is little chance of understanding the consequences of such a trade-off decision until it is too late. Returning to the earlier example, what if the funding for the battalion overseeing reconstruction in Iraq was diverted to a civilian agency two years prior to perform the same function within the context of development assistance? What are the consequences when the civilian, or surrogate contractors, cannot or will not oversee construction while insurgent threats to security persist? What then is the correct allocation of resources between military capabilities across the

spectrum of conflict to include civil-military affairs specialists and civilian agency reconstruction experts trained to provide economic development assistance in purely permissive environments?

Budget-based reform initiatives, even in the absence of traceable systemic links to the objectives of national security strategy, may well be pragmatic enough to overcome barriers to implementation. They may even be partially responsive to interagency problems associated with the underfunding of civilian department and agency capabilities. They are not, however, systemic enough to drive enduring reform and unity of effort without a robust interagency deliberate planning process that informs budget trade-offs across the interagency and connects the ends, ways and means of national security. In essence, the gains would likely be greater efficiency and transparency of the budget process rather than gains in effectiveness of the integrated capabilities funded by the resulting budgets.

Issues-Based Initiatives

The last major theme of ad hoc initiatives involves those that the president and Congress implement to correct specific issues resulting from poor interagency cooperation in the past. While it may be too early to judge the success of each reform, initiatives such as the National Counterterrorism Center, the Stabilization and Reconstruction Civilian Management Act, and the DoD Joint Interagency Coordination Group are clearly intended to improve the interagency process for specific priorities like counterterrorism, stability and reconstruction operations, and joint military operations. Organized under the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the National Counterterrorism Center may well become a model for future reforms involving regional or functional interagency teams. If it is ever appropriately resourced, the Office of Stabilization and Reconstruction and the National Civilian Reserve Corps, established by the same legislation, could grow into significant civilian operational capabilities, although it is unclear how the unsuccessful model of "lead agency," raised to a statutory level by assigning these interagency functions to the DoS, will overcome unity of command problems that will undoubtedly arise if they have not already.

Issues-based initiatives of the president and Congress have proven to be *pragmatic* enough for enactment and may contain important seeds for future reform efforts. They are, however, only *responsive* to a narrow subset of interagency problems based upon the specific issue involved, and they are clearly not *systemic*.

Why Deliberate Planning?

So what makes interagency deliberate planning the first and most critical step to enable incremental systemic reform of national security planning and execution mechanisms? The answer is found not only in the practicality of applying a proven process that led to unity of effort across the military services but also in the outcomes of the deliberate planning process that are necessary to inform operational and resource allocation decisions within and between departments and agencies.

The proposition that the statutory implementation of interagency deliberate planning become the foundational step toward incremental national security reform may well be unique. The idea, however, that a fiscally constrained planning link is necessary to connect the objectives of national security ends with the operational ways and budgetary means of individual departments and agencies is widely recognized. Several national security reform proposals identify interagency strategic planning as a key shortfall.[21] CSIS researchers Michèle Flournoy and Shawn Brimley complain that some 15 years after the conclusion of the Cold War, the US government had yet to adopt a strategic planning mechanism for foreign or domestic policy.[22] Interagency deliberate planning is *pragmatic* enough, if sponsored by skilled and respected reform leaders, to overcome barriers to enactment, it is *responsive* to the problems preventing interagency unity of effort, and it is *systemic* enough to drive enduring reform.

We Have Been Here Before

The Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reform Act passed in 1986 was aimed at solving very similar problems within the Department of Defense. At the time, the DoD lacked unity of effort due to unclear command relationships and a lack of strategy-to-task links between ends, ways, and means. The four services operated in stovepipes with very little joint coordination; each fending for its own programs and initiatives. Roles, missions, and force structure were primarily determined based on service-centric preferences. Individual service planning and budgeting efforts led to significant mission overlap and very little coordination between the services. The Goldwater-Nichols legislation has been extremely effective in driving the services to support joint deliberate planning and execution mechanisms that establish strong strategy-to-task links between ends, ways, and means. Unity of effort has been the result, and the US armed forces have become the most formidable fighting force the world has ever known.

America Cannot Afford Objectives it Cannot Afford

Deliberate planning is a proven and effective process of establishing strategy-to-task links between military ends, ways, and means. At the interagency level, the same methodical approach to planning would drive a disciplined decision-making process that forces the consideration of end states, desired and undesired effects, appropriate integration of the instruments of national power, and the specific capabilities and resources required. Deliberate planning at the interagency level could prevent the fruitless pursuit of objectives for which the United States is either unwilling or unable to apply the necessary means. This discipline could also result in more realistic and achievable national security strategies and the many benefits that come from a renewed clarity of intent communicated to America's friends and adversaries alike.

Table 1 – Reform Options Assessment Matrix

	Pragmatic			Responsive				Systemic
	Political Barriers	Cultural Barriers	Structural Barriers	Unity Of Effort	Unity Of Command	Strategy-To-Task Links	Fiscally Constrained	Enduring
Comprehensive Reform								
PNSR	–	–	–	+	+	+	+	+
BGWN	–	–	–	+	+/–	+	+	+
Ad-Hoc Initiatives								
Leadership Based	+/–	+/–	–	–	+	–	+	–
Cultural Based	–	+/–	+/–	–	–	–	–	–
Budget Based	–	+/–	+/–	+/–	–	+/–	+	–
Issue Based	+	+	+	–	–	–	–	–
Incremental Systemic Reform								
Interagency Deliberate Planning step-1	+/–	+/–	+/–	+	+	+	+	+

The Road Ahead

The US Government has come to a crossroads. For the first time since the National Security Act of 1947, the "how" of national security has become a more pressing concern than the "what." On a cold day in January 2009, a small group of brilliant people will leave the Inauguration

Day festivities and enter the Old Executive Office Building for their first day of work. As they climb the majestic spiral staircase and enter their respective offices at the NSC, they will marvel at how thorough their predecessors were at disposing of every last piece of paper. No evidence of a nation at war will be found at the epicenter of interagency coordination. In time they will send the next president a new National Security Strategy of the United States. It will have many similarities and some important differences from those of the last three post–Cold War presidents. Many of the members of this small staff will see that moment as the end of an important statutory process to determine what America will do to make the nation and the world more secure. As the signed document makes its way to Capitol Hill and is uploaded to the public White House Web site, only a handful may really ponder how it will get done.

Will post–Cold War national security planning and execution continue to be largely the simultaneous pursuits of individual departments and agencies into the next administration? The answer may be determined by whether the new White House and Congress recognize the need to address the question of how, in addition to what, national security objectives will be planned and executed. Interest in national security reform is rising rapidly as a result of the public debate and the dissatisfaction with interagency outcomes. The walls of bureaucratic self-interest are weakening as the secretary of defense and the flag officers he leads repeatedly challenge Congress to support greater resources for the Department of State and other civilian national security organizations.[23] The presidential elections in November 2008 will provide a unique opportunity for action. New administrations are not politically or rhetorically anchored to the processes and policies they inherit. Consequently, they typically have increased latitude to address systemic problems. They are also more willing to spend the political capital required to overcome barriers and resistance when they perceive the new president's agenda may be at stake. The trap set for them by the current "clean slate" national security system is the belief that the new agenda will be compelling enough to overcome any systemic process weaknesses that can be addressed at a later time.[24] This dogmatic cycle can be broken despite significant barriers and the many competing domestic and international priorities, but the time to act is now.

This section outlines a framework for near-term actions as necessary to implement interagency deliberate planning within the current national security system in a practical yet sustainable manner. It also examines the expected outputs of the interagency deliberate planning process that en-

able fact-based decision making for further incremental national security reform as appropriate. If these recommendations are acted upon, 2009 will be the last presidential transition in which America's interagency national security planning and execution process will start over.

Near-term actions to implement interagency deliberate planning are necessary to benefit from the political timing of a new administration and the subsequent reevaluation of national security strategy objectives. With a clear focus on the desired end state and the equivalent of a "commander's intent," the key tasks are described below for both congressional and presidential action as necessary to implement interagency deliberate planning in a manner that is pragmatic, responsive, and systemic. These tasks are not meant to be exhaustive, but they do describe a framework that may be necessary to achieve the desired end state. An interagency planning and execution process marked by unity of effort through indelible links between ends, ways, and means as well as clarified command relationships, appropriately prioritized budgets, and strong congressional oversight.

Within the symbolic first 100 days of the next administration, the president, after close consultation with key House and Senate leaders and the Congressional Caucus on National Security Reform, should forward to the Congress a legislative proposal to establish a new and permanent Interagency Planning and Policy Directorate within the National Security Council. Unlike the existing structure of the NSC, which would continue to operate under executive privilege, the new directorate would be subject to congressional oversight. Congress should establish a Deputy National Security Advisor for Interagency Planning and Policy to lead the new directorate. This individual would also serve as the Deputy Director for National Security in the Office of Management and Budget, to be appointed by the president with the advice and consent of the Senate, with statutory authorities, responsibilities, and reporting requirements. The president should issue directives as may be required to enable or facilitate the planning, policy, and budget responsibilities of the new position.

The actions outlined below provide further clarification of the key tasks that should be implemented in the near term to achieve the desired end state without being overly prescriptive. Implementation details should be left up to the respective branches of government as much as possible, yet with an uncompromising focus on the specific outcomes to be achieved. The key task descriptions are divided into two categories, those that primarily

require congressional action (the main effort) and others that require action on the part of the executive branch (the enablers).

Congressional Actions

The political, cultural, and structural barriers to reform cannot be overcome without legislation as the cornerstone forcing function. National War College scholars Martin Gorman and Alexander Grongrad conclude that nothing short of a legislative mandate will solve the current problems of the interagency national security system.[25] The legislative process is also critical to achieve the level of government-wide participation and commitment required for the reforms to endure over time. This section outlines seven key elements of an interagency reform statute that will be required to begin the process of incremental systemic reform as proposed:

1. Establish an Interagency Planning and Policy Directorate within the NSC,
2. Assign oversight of the directorate to a Deputy National Security Advisor for Interagency Planning and Policy, who also serves as the Deputy Director for National Security in the OMB and is subject to the advice and consent of the Senate,
3. Mandate an annual National Security Implementation Plan to be submitted with the president's budget submission to Congress,
4. Change the *NSS* submission requirement from annual to quadrennial,
5. Authorize, fund, and oversee an interagency roles and missions commission,
6. Require the president, with the advice of the Deputy National Security Advisor for Interagency Planning and Policy, to issue national security planning guidance every two years to departments and agencies as necessary to establish direct links to interagency plans consistent with the *NSS*, and
7. Establish a legal mechanism to facilitate the reprogramming of national security funds across departments and agencies within the execution year subject to responsive congressional notification and approval procedures.

Interagency Planning and Policy Directorate. Congress should issue legislation that directs the establishment of an Interagency Planning and

Policy Directorate at the NSC level that is solely focused on interagency deliberate planning. Crisis action response and current operations would continue to be the focus of the current NSC structure. Unlike the organizations within the current National Security Council, the new directorate would focus on establishing clear strategy-to-task links between the ends, ways, and means of national security strategy. The "ends" are the objectives outlined within the *National Security Strategy of the United States*, which would become the responsibility of the new directorate to establish and assess. The "ways" would be established through interagency regional and functional plans generated by this new directorate through the deliberate planning process in concert with the various supporting plans generated within the departments and agencies as appropriate to establish clear strategy-to-task links. The "means" would be established through a six-year Future Years National Security Plan, to be updated on a two-year cycle.



Figure 1. Connecting the ends, ways, and means of national security

The Interagency Planning and Policy Directorate should be a part of the overall NSC organization, yet it should have continuity and congressional oversight characteristics similar to those of the departments and agencies. To enable this hybrid identity, the staffing of the new directorate should be roughly one-fourth political appointees and three-fourths career civil servants. In addition, the plans, products, and records of the Interagency Planning and Policy Directorate must be maintained without regard to changing administrations. While this may require an amendment to the Presidential Records Act and is likely to be seen by some as an incursion on presidential power, it is critical to the efficacy of the interagency planning and execution process and its ability to drive systemic change.



Figure 2. Proposed structure of the National Security Council staff

In his article, "Rethinking the Interagency System," former NSC deputy executive secretary Michael Donley assessed the interagency mechanisms within the current NSC, noting, "It is clear that the statutory framework for the National Security Council and presidential directives describing the National Security Council System may no longer reflect the scope of activities now occurring in the interagency space above the level of individual departments and agencies, or across agencies below the policy making level."[26]

The new directorate for planning and policy outlined above will bring greater clarity to both the new and old functions of the NSC system. This directly addresses the observation highlighted by Secretary Donley and echoed by other national security practitioners and think tank studies.

Deputy National Security Advisor for Interagency Planning and Policy. As mentioned previously, Congress should issue legislation that establishes a deputy national security advisor for interagency planning and policy to oversee the Interagency Planning and Policy Directorate. This position should also be dual hatted as the deputy director for national security in the Office of the Management and Budget to advise and oversee presidential decisions related to the Future Years National Security Plan budget and execution year reprogramming decisions. The individual nominated by the president would be subject to confirmation by the Senate, yet would report directly to the national security advisor and must

serve as the president's principal advisor for interagency planning and policy matters. The specific responsibilities of the deputy national security advisor for interagency planning and policy are outlined in figure 3.

- Oversight of the Interagency Planning and Policy Directorate
- President's director of national security interagency planning
- Resource-constrained National Security Implementation Plan
- Oversees regional and functional supporting plans as directed by the president
- Appointment of interagency capabilities
- Dual role: deputy director for national security, Office of Management and Budget
- Future Years National Security Plan
- Oversees and assesses the National Security Unfunded Priority List

Figure 3. Responsibilities of the deputy national security advisor for interagency planning and policy

National Security Implementation Plan. The implementing legislation must require the Interagency Planning and Policy Directorate to produce a National Security Implementation Plan, with classified annexes as required, on an annual basis to be delivered to the Congress with the president's budget submission. The plan should summarize interagency regional and functional plans implementing the National Security Strategy. It should also include specifics on what capabilities are required (by department and agency) within the Future Years National Security Plan to achieve the stated objectives, clear assignments of roles and missions, and an assessment of major risks to interagency execution implied by the trade-offs within the president's budget.

Quadrennial Updates of the National Security Strategy. Congress should also consider adjusting the requirement to deliver a National Security Strategy every year to every four years. The NSS has not, does not, and should not change every year. NSS objectives must serve as a foundational, long-term baseline for interagency deliberate planning. Formal statutory clarification on the time horizon of the NSS adds important context to its objectives and provides for more effective interagency planning and budgeting.



Figure 4. Establishing strategy-to-task links

Interagency Roles and Missions Assessment. An initial interagency roles and missions assessment conducted by a nonpartisan commission or federally funded research and development center with periodic updates thereafter as required should be authorized and overseen by the Congress. A roles and missions assessment is critical for establishing an interagency capabilities baseline for planning to be updated and refined as the national security objectives change and the global security environment evolves. Additionally, this assessment is necessary to identify unnecessarily redundant capabilities; clarify investment, personnel, and recapitalization decisions; and set the conditions for future interdependence.

Requirement for Presidential National Security Planning Guidance. Legislation implementing interagency deliberate planning should also require the president to issue biannual national security planning guidance to the applicable departments and agencies. As a practical matter, this guidance is necessary to ensure the planning processes of all national security functions within the departments and agencies are properly aligned with regional and functional interagency planning. The rationale for inclusion of such a requirement in statute, however, is to institutionalize the accountability and singular unity of command vested in the president. The law must make clear that formal direction regarding national security

planning and execution must come from the president except as provided by the US Constitution itself. The delegation of such powers to lead departments and agencies or to appointed "czars" dilutes this crucial element required to achieve interagency unity of effort.

Legal Mechanisms for National Security Budget Reprogramming. The ability to reprogram resources across national security departments and agencies, and by extension, between the instruments of national power within the execution year to react to unforeseen requirements is absolutely critical. Budgets are often originated by departments and agencies up to two years prior to the year that budget will be executed. In addition, moving funds between the DoD, the DoS, and the USAID is not practical within the current legal environment. In a dynamic post–Cold War security environment in which nonstate actors with extensive and flexible resources constitute a significant threat, American national security functions must have as much resource flexibility as possible to seize opportunities and counter threats as they emerge. Although congressional notification or even approval is completely appropriate, there must be sweeping and flexible legal mechanisms established to enable the execution year movement of funds at least within and across the national security budget accounts. The absence of these mechanisms produces poor interagency cooperation and a tendency to use the wrong mix of capabilities based upon budget trade-off decisions made more than a year in advance.

Presidential Actions

In addition to congressional actions, four presidential actions as a minimum may well be necessary to create the conditions for success even with legislation:

1. Direct the structure and staffing of the Interagency Planning and Policy Directorate,
2. Nominate a deputy national security advisor for interagency planning and policy to also serve as the deputy director for national security within the OMB,
3. Direct the OMB to establish a unique coding system to all national security functions and organizations within the president's budget; and

4. Direct all government departments and agencies to reorganize as required to conform to a common organizing construct for global geographic regions.

Direction Regarding the Structure of the Interagency Planning and Policy Directorate. The president should direct the national security advisor to stand up a National Security Interagency Planning and Policy Directorate headed by the deputy national security advisor for interagency planning and policy to be formalized by a National Security Presidential Directive or the equivalent. The presidential directive should clearly establish:

- The authorities and responsibilities of the deputy national security advisor for interagency planning and policy,
- The authorities and responsibilities of the deputy director for national security within the OMB,
- The structure and staffing requirements of the NSC's Interagency Planning and Policy Directorate,
- Other direction as deemed appropriate by the president to potentially include target dates for initial and full operational capability of the new directorate, description of the interagency planning system and products, and so forth.

Upon establishing the structure and staffing policies for the new directorate, the president should eliminate overlapping responsibilities between the new directorate and the preexisting NSC staff organization. Although a common organizing construct with regional and functional teams is advisable, the preexisting NSC staff should focus on current operations and crisis response while the new directorate takes over interagency planning and policy functions not related to crisis action response. Also, the new directorate should be staffed by one-quarter political appointees and three-quarters civil servants hired through a competitive selection process from the departments and agencies for rotational assignments. Clear career advancement incentives must be established to attract the best staff possible and to ensure that future senior national security civil servants and general officers have interagency experience.

The task of interagency deliberate planning should not be added to the responsibilities of the existing NSC organizations for several reasons. The

current structure and staffing levels are often strained to keep up with the workload of reacting to unforeseen crises and challenges, and expanding the staff to accommodate the additional planning requirements would dilute its current strengths.[27] The NSC is an advisory body to the president. The need for its current operations and crisis action response staff to be flexible and subject to frequent changes to suit the leadership style of the president cannot be overstated. Furthermore, attempting to subject the current NSC to congressional oversight and testimony would detract from its primary role as an advisory body to the president.

Nomination of a Deputy National Security Advisor for Interagency Planning and Policy. The president should nominate a deputy national security advisor for interagency planning and policy to the Senate for confirmation. This Senate-confirmed position should also serve as the deputy director for national security within the OMB. The rationale for this "marriage" of policy and funding is to provide authority commensurate with the responsibilities of the new deputy national security advisor for interagency planning and policy. This will likely be a controversial role that will face initial resistance from departments and agencies that currently "own" their budgets without direct oversight or interference from the White House staff. Giving the new directorate specified budgetary oversight authorities within the Future Years National Security Plan is an essential element of the new directorate to drive systemic changes not only to the interagency structures of the NSC but also within and between national security departments and agencies. This must start by effectively "fencing" the national security budget to set it apart from other governmental functions.

Transparent National Security Budget. To that end, the president should direct the OMB to establish a national security budget coding system that will uniquely identify funds allocated to national security organizations and functions. This system will allow Congress and the executive branch to have a much clearer picture of the total resources dedicated to national security initiatives across all government agencies. The increased visibility is critical to tying resource allocations across government agencies to the objectives and priorities of the national security strategy. The higher priority status given to national security funding initiatives will allow smaller departments with national security functions to compete on a level playing field in zero-sum budget battles.

Common Definition of Geographic Regions. Finally, the president should direct all government departments and agencies to reorganize as

required to conform to a common organizing construct for global geographic regions. The current mismatch in regional definitions between the DoD, the DoS, the USAID, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) results in a significant breakdown in regional coordination efforts. Common regional definitions across government agencies are an important step in facilitating an effective interagency deliberate planning process. President Nixon directed a similar effort across state agencies to provide a standard approach to interstate and national programs. The initiative proved to be effective in improving the overall coordination and implementation of federal as well as local programs. For interagency planning and execution to be effective, US national security officials at all levels need the same enhanced clarity in international settings.

Presidential commitment to national security reform is absolutely critical. Successful implementation of incremental reform initiatives aimed at improving the process of interagency planning and execution will require the unwavering commitment and resolve of the president, the Congress, and the American people.

Looking Toward the Future with a Sharper Eye

The ways and means outputs of the strategy-to-task links established through the interagency deliberate planning process can actually facilitate future national security reform. Many of the barriers preventing comprehensive reform are buttressed by underlying concerns over unintended consequences, expensive missteps, and the dangers associated with parallel system-wide change. Advocates of comprehensive national security reform may argue that the difficulties of maintaining political focus on any one issue realistically preclude more than one opportunity for statutory reform. The outputs of interagency deliberate planning, however, may remove significant underlying concerns that would otherwise prevent further reform. The outputs that connect the ends of National Security Strategy with the ways and means necessary include

Ways:

- Fiscally constrained interagency plans linking National Security Strategy to the integrated application of the instruments of national power

- Fiscally constrained supporting plans within the departments and agencies linking the interagency effort with specific operational capabilities and tasks

Means:

- Future Years National Security Plan providing budget projections necessary to resource the current National Security Strategy
- Documentation of capability gaps to be funded and capability overlaps no longer necessary with the synchronization and integration of interagency capabilities

The resulting data from these outputs enables fact-based decision making about future reforms. Once the "ways" connecting the "ends" and "means" are clearly and methodically established, quantifiable data on capability gaps, personnel and training deficiencies, strategic and operational risks, and unnecessary operational or administrative duplication become available to support and prioritize future reform. This could serve to mitigate the current concerns with comprehensive reform that stem from untested ideas based on nothing more than strong theoretical connections to the national security environment and objectives to guide decision makers.

It is Time to Act

It is a fact that even the best plans do not survive initial contact with the enemy, yet the alternative to planning is far worse. The increasingly expensive results of systemic failures in interagency execution, in terms of cost and lives, in the complex and dynamic post–Cold War security environment make systemic reform long overdue. The interagency process established by the National Security Act of 1947 is no longer sufficient to respond to the wide diversity of global threats and opportunities of the post–Cold War security environment. The problems are systemic, and the barriers preventing reform are significant. With the dawn of a new presidential administration and increasing national attention on interagency cooperation, however, there may not be a better time than now. Despite the din of partisan election-year politics, a growing body of thoughtful national security reform literature is emerging into choices between "soup-to-nuts" comprehensive reform proposals fighting for political momentum and a variety of ad hoc initiatives that may be advisable but do not fundamentally change the system. America cannot afford to squander this moment.

Another alternative is needed. Interagency deliberate planning—as the foundational first step toward incremental systemic reform—is pragmatic enough to overcome barriers preventing reform, responsive to the underlying problems preventing interagency unity of effort, and systemic enough to drive enduring change. SSQ

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US Foreign Policy toward North Korea

A Way Ahead

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Since 2001, the Bush administration has been following an ineffective foreign policy toward North Korea that has failed to meet the security interests of the United States. Contrary to the national security interests delineated in the *2006 National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States of America,* North Korea has developed and tested a nuclear weapon, continues to demonstrate the propensity to proliferate high-lethality weapons, and threatens regional stability with these weapons and its aggressive military posture.

Recently, in what can be seen as an acknowledgement of the failure of the policy of the past six years, the United States has reversed its policy toward North Korea in Six-Party Talks (i.e., United States, China, Russia, Japan, South Korea, and North Korea) aimed at resolving the nuclear issue. Shifting from a policy of isolation and suffocation to force the regime into submission, the United States has turned to a policy of appeasement, offering concessions reminiscent of the 1994 Agreed Framework that halted the North's plutonium program.[1]

Equally noteworthy has been the speed at which recent negotiations have progressed, with North Korea once again shutting down its Pyongyang plutonium production facilities, allowing the return of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors, and agreeing to disable

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the plutonium reactor and account for all nuclear materials. This rapid progress has absorbed politicians and pundits alike with great, even almost unguarded, optimism—so much so, that it appears many have ignored or forgotten the regime's past behavior. Indeed, North Korea has already achieved its goal of nuclear weaponization with potentially dozens of nuclear weapons in its arsenal—a feat it has accomplished over not just a few uncomfortable and arguably instigative years as an "axis of evil" but through decades of persistent development.

Yet, US problems with North Korea extend well beyond the nuclear issue. As delineated in the 2006 *NSS*, North Korea presents numerous other security challenges to the United States. Besides its propensity to proliferate weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the threat to regional stability with these weapons, and its aggressive military posturing, North Korea consistently violates the human rights and dignity of its own population. The possession of nuclear weapons itself undermines US efforts to prevent the spread of WMDs and places the technology in the hands of an unpredictable adversary, while continued military tension on both sides of the demilitarized zone (DMZ) increases the chances of miscalculations that can result in a regional conflict. Meanwhile, the ongoing economic instability in North Korea poses a potential humanitarian and economic crisis to the region and encourages such illicit activities as narcotics trafficking and US currency counterfeiting, which undermine general US national security interests.

A History of Policy Failure

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and concerns over suspected North Korean nuclear aspirations in the early 1990s, the focus of US policy toward North Korea shifted from a Cold War containment policy to nuclear nonproliferation. Though this new era brought dialogue between the North and the United States, little attention was given to addressing broader US interests outside of nonproliferation. Soon, revelations of North Korea's plutonium extraction program led to a flurry of intense diplomatic activity, culminating in the 1994 Agreed Framework, mentioned above, that provided for improved diplomatic relations and economic ties along with energy assistance to the North in exchange for shutting down plutonium production facilities. Despite guarantees from the United States, little more than the promise of oil deliveries was fulfilled. Instead, with

North Korea's nuclear facilities shut down, US obligations of developing diplomatic and economic relations succumbed to political pressures in Washington, DC, as politicians followed a "wait and see" policy, believing that North Korea would soon either follow the path of post–Soviet era Eastern Europe or, at any rate, not survive the power transition from Kim Il Sung to Kim Jong Il.

Contrastingly, but with even greater detrimental effects, the Bush administration shifted policy by closing the diplomatic door and halting fuel oil shipments to North Korea over a suspected uranium enrichment program. The Bush policy established five objectives toward North Korea: terminate the 1994 Agreed Framework, suspend diplomatic engagement until North Korea unilaterally halts its nuclear program, apply economic pressure through an international cooperation, plan for "future economic sanctions and military interdiction against North Korea," and draw redlines to discourage North Korea from processing plutonium.[2] Once again, nonproliferation took precedence over other interests.[3] The response was predictable. In 2003, North Korea declared the 1994 agreement dead and restarted its plutonium-producing reactors. In October 2006, the policy failures were unmistakable: North Korea conducted its first nuclear test.

Two common denominators that contributed to the failures in the policies of both the US Clinton and Bush administrations were a narrow focus on the nuclear issue and a tendency to either ignore or otherwise not meet North Korean interests. While the distastefulness of dealing with a repressive regime may have contributed to the poor policy decisions, North Korea has not made determining its interests easy, either. On the contrary, North Korea has been all too eager to sign agreements seemingly contrary to its own interests, making it easy for policy makers to overlook the North's real interests. Over the last two decades, North Korea has repeatedly signed declarations and agreements with several countries, committing itself in practice to a nuclear-free peninsula, only to ignore its obligations under the agreements. Among these agreements have been the 1992 Joint Declaration of South and North Korea on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the 2005 Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks, Beijing.[4]

A third, less obvious, common denominator exists. Under both administrations, the United States has not effectively coordinated its policy with other regional players. Under the Clinton administration, talks began at a bilateral level, excluding North Korea's closest neighbors—South Korea,

China, Russia, and Japan—ultimately leaving the United States to negotiate support for its Agreed Framework ex post facto. Fortunately for the Clinton administration, South Korean president Kim Dae Jung was leading a "sunshine policy" very amenable to the administration's agreement. While cooperation gradually gained momentum, disagreements over financing provisions of the Agreed Framework ensued, creating delays in delivery of energy development concessions that may have added to skepticism by North Korea of US commitment.

Cooperation with regional players gradually developed throughout the Clinton administration and into the Bush administration until negotiations evolved into Six-Party Talks that included North Korea's aforementioned neighbors. However, an unwelcomed shift in US policy from one of rapprochement to a more hostile position hampered further progress on the nuclear issue. Furthermore, the Six-Party forum has hindered progress on other issues by continuing to focus mainly on the nuclear nonproliferation in lieu of a more comprehensive solution to issues surrounding North Korea.

The glaringly obvious effect of the failure to leverage partners has been under the Bush administration. Put off by the administration's intransigence on North Korean policy—and eager to see progress on the peninsula—regional players have engaged North Korea bilaterally in both military talks and economic trade. Most notably, South Korea has encouraged joint business ventures in Kaesong and has opened a tourist destination in Kumgang. China and Russia have similarly worked to establish joint ventures in North Korea, though with lesser degrees of success. On one hand, these actions have made small but significant steps in drawing North Korea out. On the other hand, it has created a dichotomy of policies that North Korea has been able to exploit, thus undermining US attempts to isolate the regime.

It is clear that while both the Clinton and Bush administrations have taken different approaches, in both cases US policy has focused on the nuclear issue, tended to ignore the interests of North Korea, and ineffectively leveraged our partners. Not surprisingly, the results have been the same. North Korea remains an adversarial country with nuclear ambitions, and comprehensive US interests have not been met. The solution to the problem is not to drum up old policies but to develop a new policy[5]—a way ahead that addresses the shortcomings of past policies.[6] More precisely, substantial and enduring results can only be realized when the

United States develops a policy based on a comprehensive analysis of its own national security strategy and other supporting policy documents, as well as those of the "Group of Four" (four key regional players—Japan, China, South Korea, and Russia) and North Korea. This analysis must include identifying and acknowledging the legitimate interests of North Korea, comparing them to US security interests, and defining the challenges and incorporating opportunities the United States has in working with regional parties in addressing US interests.

National Security Interests of the United States

> *In the world today, the fundamental character of regimes matters as much as the distribution of power among them.*
>
> —2006 US *National Security Strategy*

The *NSS* defines the "worldwide interests, goals, and objectives of the United States that are vital to the national security."[7] Under law, it also delineates foreign policy and the uses of elements of diplomatic, information, military, and economic (DIME) power necessary to achieve these goals and objectives. Such information yields the ends (goals and objectives), ways (foreign policy), and means (elements of the DIME) toward our national security strategy.

The ends in the *NSS* are succinctly stated in the president's foreword message in the document: "to protect the security of the American people."[8] The security interests of the United States are those objectives that collectively contribute to this "end." The objectives relevant to North Korea are extracted by studying the essential tasks laid out in the *NSS*. They are halting terrorism, preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons, promoting regional stability, encouraging economic development, and promoting human dignity.

"America is at war." So starts the president's forward to the *NSS*, referring to the global war on terrorism. The *NSS* describes the "grave challenge" of terrorism as a battle between both the terrorists and their ideology.[9] This ongoing war and the threat of terrorism have shaped the US security posture since 2001 and places defeating *terrorism* as a national security interest.

The United States has committed itself to a four-pronged approach as the way to accomplishing this interest: "preventing attacks . . . before they occur," denying "WMD to rogue states and to terrorist allies," denying terrorists sanctuary in rogue states, and denying terrorists control of nations for basing operations.[10] The means include taking the fight to the

enemy by the use of "military force and other instruments of national power" in a lead effort with partner nations.[11]

Though North Korea is not mentioned as a terrorism concern in the *NSS*, it remains on the State Department list of state sponsors of terrorism. This dubious distinction is the result of past involvement in terrorist activities and harboring terrorists. Despite inactivity from terrorist activities since 1987, North Korea remains on the list. Concern over WMDs that can be sold to terrorists or other state sponsors of terrorism may contribute to the North's continued presence on the list,[12] though the Bush administration has indicated a recent willingness to remove North Korea's status as a state sponsor of terrorism as a concession at Six-Party Talks.[13]

The *NSS* places the proliferation of nuclear weapons as "the greatest threat to our national security" and specifically labels North Korea as a "serious nuclear proliferation challenge." Furthermore, the *NSS* acknowledges the pursuit of WMDs by terrorists "in order to inflict even more catastrophic attacks on us."[14] With the North's development of nuclear weapons, it is yet unclear whether it will attempt to sell that technology or weapons in exchange for much-needed cash or other resources. However, North Korea is known to have sold sophisticated military hardware in the past to rogue states that have supported terrorists, such as Syria and Iran, portending the possible future disposition of its nuclear weapons.[15]

North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons makes it a national security interest to prevent the *proliferation of nuclear weapons*. The *NSS* states that the way to prevent proliferation is to deny rogue states or terrorists the legitimate ability to produce fissile material and to prevent states with this capability from transferring fissile material to these actors (ways).[16] Accomplishment is through closing loopholes in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); international diplomacy; improving "security at vulnerable nuclear sites worldwide and bolster[ing] the ability of states to detect, disrupt, and respond to terrorist activity involving WMD [means]"; and use of force.[17] These means will likely require the assistance of the IAEA to secure nuclear sites and support of allied nations to block or interdict WMD shipments.

The *NSS* states that the "survival of liberty at home increasingly depends on the success of liberty abroad" while recognizing that the greatest challenges to liberty worldwide are from those countries that tyrannically rule over their subjects through brutality and suppression. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) is explicitly listed in the *NSS* as one of these tyrannies. Hence, it is a national security

interest of the United States to stop *human rights* abuses in the DPRK. To meet this interest, the *NSS* establishes a goal of ending tyranny and promoting democracy (ways) through a "full array of political, economic, diplomatic, and other tools" (means).[18] Some of the tools mentioned include sanctions, support of reformers, and partnering with other democratic nations to bring pressure to bear.

The *NSS* states that "if left unaddressed, [regional conflicts can lead to] failed states, humanitarian disasters, and . . . safe havens for terrorists."[19] Inexplicably, despite the United States military's nearly 60-year presence on the peninsula to maintain peace and stability, the Korean peninsula is not among the numerous countries specifically mentioned in this section of the *NSS*. Nevertheless, conditions on the peninsula meet the criteria of the *NSS* for potential future regional conflict, including poor governance and competing claims (such as waters in the Yellow Sea). Therefore, it is a security interest of the United States to promote *regional stability*.

To stabilize the region, the United States has established conflict prevention and resolution as a key element (way). The *NSS* identifies the promotion of democracy as the "most effective long-term measure." However, in the short term, using "free nations" of good rapport in order to assist with short-term resolutions with a preference toward regional players and addressing the problems in a "wider regional context" are the preferred methods (means).[20]

The *NSS* defines economic freedom as a "moral imperative." The United States views countries lacking economic freedom as inclined to violate intellectual property rights, suffer from poverty, encourage black markets, and involve themselves in other illicit activities, including money counterfeiting and narcotics trafficking. Illicit trade, in turn, "undermines effective governance; facilitates the illicit transfer of WMD and advanced conventional weapons technology; and compromises traditional security and law enforcement," which "if left unaddressed can threaten national security." Furthermore, the *NSS* recognizes impoverished states as "not only a threat to their people and a burden on regional economies, but are also susceptible to exploitation by terrorists, tyrants, and international criminals." These matters make North Korea's *economic development* a national security interest of the United States. Again, the *NSS* does not name North Korea directly, but the concerns expressed in the *NSS* for developing countries, such as corruption, poverty, and illicit trade, are applicable to North Korea. In meeting the ways and means, the *NSS* states that the United

States will assist the world's poor to enter the global economy (ways) through various programs, including providing foreign assistance through existing regional and international organizations and initiatives, "creating external incentives for governments to reform themselves," and promoting regional initiatives to disrupt illicit activities (means).[21]

National Security Interests of China

> *Countries should resolve their disputes and conflicts peacefully through consultations and not resort to the use or threat of force. Nor should they interfere in others' internal affairs under any pretext. China never imposes its social system and ideology on others.*
>
> —"China's Independent Foreign Policy of Peace," 2003

China's national security interests are derived from the defense white paper *China's National Defense in 2006*, foreign policy papers, and other selected policy white papers.[22] The State Council Information Office published the most recent defense white paper in December 2006. Foreign policy papers, consisting of six short papers addressing specific policy issues, were published in 2003 by China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

In addition to the above-mentioned documents, *China's Peaceful Development Road* (previously *China's Peaceful Rise*) and *China's Endeavors for Arms Control, Disarmament, and Non-Proliferation* round out pertinent policy papers. These papers are influenced by China's "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence." Originally introduced in the 1950s, these principles have been reaffirmed throughout the years, including in the most recent defense white paper. The five principles are mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual nonaggression, noninterference in other nations' internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.[23] Combined, these numerous documents provide the basis for China's national security strategy and from which interests with the United States may be compared.

China's defense white paper states that "the threat of terrorism remains serious,"[24] while a diplomatic policy paper adds that "China is firmly opposed to all forms of terrorism."[25] "China's Peaceful Development Road" identifies the need for cooperation between countries to defeat terrorism in order to "stamp out both the symptoms and root causes."[26] China's defense white paper provides several examples in which the country has

involved itself in confronting terrorism, including the Regional Antiterrorism Structure (RATS), an antiterrorism body set up between China and several Central Asian countries along China's northwest border that has participated in information sharing as well as military and civilian exercises.[27] China has also addressed terrorism in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum.

As an ally of North Korea, further supported by information contained in China's various strategy and policy documents, China does not perceive North Korea as a terrorist nation. Based on the United States' own ambiguous stance regarding North Korea's connection with terrorism as indicated by the willingness to remove North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, it is highly unlikely that the United States would be able to gain Chinese support for antiterrorism actions against the North.

China regards the problem of nuclear weapons proliferation as "grave and complex"[28] and officially holds that it is "firmly opposed to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery."[29] This stance extends to the Korean Peninsula, where China shares the common goal of a nuclear-free peninsula with the United States.[30]

In consonance with its five principles, China contends that "the issue of nonproliferation should be dealt with by political and diplomatic means within the framework of international law [which] should be maintained, further strengthened, and improved."[31] Supporting this position, China has routinely rejected other means, including the US-backed Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).[32]

Current policy notwithstanding, China has a strong incentive as an aspiring regional leader to bring pressure to bear on North Korea. First, the nuclear test has reopened discussions in Japan over its own moratorium on nuclear weapons.[33] Despite the current Japanese administration's strong commitment to its own ban on nuclear weapons, the debate demonstrates the corrosive effect a nuclear North Korea has on the liberal will of a nation. Furthermore, the race for nuclear weapons in any of China's more Western-minded democratic neighbors has a direct bearing on China's own security interests.

Second, the development of nuclear weapons in the North strengthens the pro-West, conservative position in South Korea. Conservatives in South Korea have long contended that the liberal engagement policies enacted by Kim Dae Jung and carried on by his successor, No Moo-Hyun, have only aided in supporting the North's military and its nuclear program

by allowing funds to be diverted from economic to military projects.[34] Such actions could tip the scales under the newly elected South Korean president in favor of the staunchly pro-West conservatives and set back years of progress China has made in gaining political favor in the South, contrary to China's regional political interests.

China states that the "government has attached importance to human rights"[35] in its foreign affairs, adding that "[China] should actively promote and guarantee human rights to ensure that everyone enjoys equal opportunities and right to pursue overall development."[36] China's growing awareness towards human rights is reflected in a provision added to its constitution in 2003 that says "the state respects and safeguards human rights."[37]

Based on China's preference for international diplomacy and its involvement in numerous human rights conventions, China can be expected to use these tools for pushing its interests.[38] However, there are two significant challenges in aligning China's human rights interests with those of the United States: China's definition of human rights and policy of noninterference.

Probably the greatest challenge to aligning China's support for human rights with US interests is how each defines human rights. The US view of human rights focuses on individual liberties and political expression, while China's human rights are centered on collective rights and maintaining the social structure. In other words, China pursues those human rights that favor social harmony over political discord, measuring success in terms of social and economic well-being, health care, and basic subsistence.[39] On the other hand, individual freedoms such as freedom of speech, freedom of press, and freedom of religion are often curbed since a strong civil society challenges the state control.[40]

The second challenge posed is China's policy of noninterference. China's foreign policy paper states that China will "never impose [its] social system and ideology on others."[41] This policy of noninterference is reflected in numerous other official Chinese government documents as well and has been a cornerstone of national policy since the 1950s.

China has little self-interest in North Korea's human rights. Unlike South Korea and Japan, which both have unresolved human rights claims against North Korea such as abductees and POW cases, China has neither. Furthermore, since both countries are run under communist ideology with an unstated premise of maintaining social harmony for the benefit of the state, China's human rights views align closer to North Korea's than to the American position. Success in addressing human rights may best be approached by con-

vincing China that helping to resolve outstanding issues will enhance its position as a power broker and valuable partner to Japan and South Korea.

China acknowledges the growing interdependence of nations by economic globalization and the need for cooperation in an international security environment. In addition, the defense white paper recognizes the 2006 nuclear test and missile launches as factors that have made the situation in Northeast Asia "more complex and challenging."[42]

In resolving the issue of regional stability, China looks to "establish fraternal relations with surrounding regions and promote cooperation in maintaining regional security."[43] To this end, China has actively participated in regional-level organizations, including ASEAN+3 (the "+3" includes Japan, China, and South Korea).[44]

China's concern for regional stability in regards to North Korea can mostly be addressed in resolving the nuclear row. Beyond that, China's greatest concerns for regional stability focus on the Taiwan-US relationship and the evolving and outward-looking role of Japan's Self Defense Force[45] and the missile defense cooperation between Japan and the United States that they argue will "bring new unstable factors to international and regional peace and security."[46]

China recognizes that "some countries face growing internal problems caused by social and economic transition"[47] and suggests that, "address[ing] development and security issues through coordination, cooperation, and multilateral mechanism is the preferred approach of the international community."[48] In line with South Korea's stance on economic development, China holds that "developed countries should shoulder the responsibility to . . . increase development aid [and] help relevant countries shake off the troubling financial crisis and enhance cooperation with developing countries."[49]

National Security Interests of Japan

> *Japan will continue to ensure deterrence against any movement that might destabilize the Asia-Pacific region by maintaining the Japan-US Security Arrangements.*
>
> —*Diplomatic Bluebook 2006*

Japan's national security interests are drawn from three documents: the defense white paper *Defense of Japan 2006*, the foreign policy document *Diplomatic Bluebook 2006*, and the policy paper *National Defense Program Guidelines*. These three documents form the nexus of Japan's security interests.

Also worthy of mention is *The Council on Security and Defense Capabilities Report*, an official government assessment providing recommendations for Japan's national security strategy. Many of the recommendations were incorporated into the most recent *National Defense Program Guidelines*. However, a formal national security strategy is not yet published.

As a longtime US ally whose democratic institutions, capitalist market system, and national defense have been significantly influenced and shaped by direct US involvement, Japan shares many common security interests with the United States. Yet, Japan's options of addressing these interests are considerably hampered by its own constitutional limits and an imperial past that has produced lingering suspicion by surrounding nations of any Japanese lead role in the region. Hence, Japan's ways and means require a carefully considered balance of diplomatic and economic instruments of power and a healthy reliance on a continuing and active US role to provide the necessary pressure to address common international and regional security issues. This approach is evident in the Japanese national strategy documents. The defense white paper states that "in order to meet its security objectives, Japan will support UN security initiatives, strengthen ties with the United States under the Japan-US Security Arrangements, develop 'cooperative relations' with other countries through diplomacy, develop the military, and ensure political stability at home."[50]

For Japan, "activities of international terrorist organizations . . . pose a serious threat" to the economic welfare and safety of all Japanese citizens.[51] Hence, "Japan regards counter-terrorism as its own security issue."[52] In addressing terrorism, Japan intends to "strengthen vigorously counter-terrorism measures in cooperation with the international community in a wide range of areas including the provision of assistance to other countries and reinforcement of the international legal framework."[53] Past means have included logistical support of military operations in the war on terror, inclusion in international, regional, and bilateral agreements aimed at disrupting terrorist networks, and technical and financial assistance to poor countries to assist in counterterrorism capacity building.[54]

Japan acknowledges that North Korea has not been linked to terrorism in the past two decades. However, Japan's National Police Agency labels North Korea as a terrorism concern,[55] and the government continues to encourage the United States maintain North Korea's status as a state sponsor of terrorism.

Japan's defense white paper ranks alongside terrorism the proliferation of nuclear weapons and "ballistic missiles that serve as a means of delivery for

these weapons,"[56] adding that "halting WMD proliferation has become an urgent issue."[57] This statement draws in line Japan's national security interest of stopping nuclear and missile proliferation with the US interest.

Japan has remained active in supporting international efforts to block nuclear weapons proliferation through a mechanism Japan terms as "dialogue and pressure." (Dialogue includes multilateral talks and governmental consultations. Pressure has been with soft power, ranging from decrees by the UN to general awareness of Japan's allies.)[58] In addition, Japan "considers that the maintenance and strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime as one of its major foreign policy objectives."[59] In halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, Japan intends to use diplomatic efforts to actively encourage nations to support and strengthen existing regimes while physically involving itself in the enforcement of those regimes through cooperative efforts such as the Proliferation Security Initiative.

Japan has addressed the threat of missiles issue by teaming with the United States to build a ballistic missile defense system. Furthermore, Japan considers international cooperation in numerous nonproliferation regimes (including the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, the Proliferation Security Initiative, and the Missile Technology Control Regime) as essential.

Japan shares many of the same values concerning human rights as does the United States. However, concerning North Korea, Japan's interest is predominantly focused around Japanese abductees, which Japan considers a "very grave problem" to the safety and security of Japanese citizens[60] and "of the highest priority" of numerous issues it seeks to resolve in its bilateral Comprehensive Talks.[61] Japan's actions to resolve this issue include Japan-North Korea bilateral talks, support for international efforts to increase awareness such as the 2006 UN resolution titled "Situation of Human Rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea," and appointment of an ambassador for human rights to address this and other human rights issues.[62] These efforts form Japan's "dialogue and pressure" to human rights.[63]

In the Six-Party Agreement reached in February 2007, Japan stated that it would not assist in providing energy aid to North Korea until the North made progress in resolving the issue of abductees.[64] North Korea, for its part, considers the case resolved with the repatriation of five Japanese citizens in 2002, claiming that the remaining eight in question are now deceased.[65]

Referring to the North-South military standoff, Japan's defense white paper states, "Maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula is vital for the peace and stability of the entire East Asia,"[66] while noting, "a more stable international security environment has become a common interest of all states."[67] In maintaining stability, Japan expresses its ways and means straightforwardly: "Japan regards the improvement and strengthening of multilayer frameworks for bilateral and multilateral dialogue while securing the presence and engagement of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region to be a realistic and appropriate way to develop a stable security environment surrounding Japan and to ensure peace and stability in the region."[68] These ways and means reflect the limits Japan faces in achieving its own interests independently as a result of sensitive relations with neighbors due to its wartime past.

Japan is a major Official Development Assistance (ODA) contributor to Asian nations, contributing over 2.5 billion dollars in aid in 2004.[69] Japan's contributions reflect awareness that "Asia . . . has a major influence on Japan's security and prosperity."[70] Despite this fact, North Korea is not a beneficiary of Japan's ODA contributions. Instead, most economic assistance from Japan to North Korea has come through economic aid packages directly from Japan or indirectly through the World Food Bank. In addition, remittances from Koreans living in Japan have provided significant cash to the North. However, with the current row over abductees, the July 2006 missile launch, and the October 2006 nuclear test, Japan has restricted food and energy aid and cash remittances to the North.[71]

National Security Interests of South Korea

South Korea is "pursuing the realization of a comprehensive security [that includes] not only military issues but also non-military issues pertinent to politics, economy, society, environment and so on."

—2004 Defense White Paper

The South Korean national security interests, ways, and means are described in the country's 2004 national security strategy titled *Peace, Prosperity, and National Security*; the defense white paper titled *2004 Defense White Paper*; and the Korean government policy papers, the president's "Top 12 Policy Goals" and "Key Diplomatic Tasks."

The national security strategy reveals several principles that guide South Korea's ways and means:

1. Opposition to any war and support for peaceful conflict resolution.
2. Mutual recognition, mutual trust, and reciprocity.
3. International resolution of issues of the Korean Peninsula with recognition that North and South Korea are the central parties.
4. Public approval of government initiatives.[72]

These principles show that South Korea's "realization of a comprehensive security" will come through a soft approach in contrast to US policies. It should also be noted that these principles tend to align the South's ways and means more closely with China than with the United States.

The defense white paper states that "unpredictable threats of terrorism posed by non-state rogue organizations or forces have been recognized as an important aspect of national security,"requiring international cooperation and information sharing. [73] Though little else is provided regarding the ways and means for addressing terrorism, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade identified in a speech the containment and eventual eradication of terrorism as the ultimate goal.[74] South Korea has been an active partner in both Afghanistan and Iraq in maintaining peace and reconstruction.[75]

For South Korea, the North Korean nuclear impasse "has emerged as the paramount threat to national security."[76] South Korea sees the resolution of the nuclear issue as a diplomatic challenge that needs to be addressed through a combination of Six-Party Talks[77] and inter-Korean dialogue that offers "significant assistance" to North Korea for abandoning its program.[78]

South Korea has pursued a policy of positive engagement with North Korea since 1998, favoring soft diplomacy and economic assistance to foster positive behavior. This policy, referred to as the "sunshine policy," was instituted by Kim Dae Jung in 1998 and lives on in the current administration under the banner "policy of peace and prosperity." The sunshine policy shunned coercive diplomacy in favor of "cooperative engagement," even in the face of adversity.[79] This path has run counter to US attempts to pressure North Korea into abandoning its nuclear program and has been criticized by conservatives as indirectly propping up the regime and allowing the North to continue its nuclear weapons program.[80] However, proponents of the sunshine policy argue that the United States' antagonistic policies increase military tensions across the DMZ and increase the probability of

suffocation and subsequent collapse of the North Korean regime, which would be exorbitantly costly to the South.[81]

In regards to missiles, South Korea's defense white paper states that "along with nuclear and biochemical weapons, the proliferation of missiles or the delivery means of those weapons has emerged as a fresh threat posing a stumbling block to international and regional stability."[82] The Republic of Korea (ROK) has worked in the past to coordinate diplomatic efforts with the United States and other countries to resolve outstanding missile issues, indicating that such an approach is likely to continue.[83] However, more active participation, such as in the PSI, has been avoided to prevent confrontations with the North.

South Korea establishes the "promotion of liberal democracy and human rights" as one of the national security interests.[84] For South Korea, the main human rights issues of concern include abductees and unrepatriated POWs.[85] South Korea has sought inter-Korean dialogue to resolve these human rights issues.[86] More broadly, South Korea commits itself to actively supporting international efforts to advance human rights.[87]

The South Korean government has come under criticism on several occasions by human rights organizations and its own population for ignoring human rights issues in favor of improving relations with the North.[88] However, South Korea continues to delicately approach the issue for fear of derailing current progress on other issues.

South Korea "has placed the establishment of a peace regime on the Korean peninsula as a top policy task."[89] It has also taken significant steps in cooperation with North Korea to maintain stability in the region, including establishing a system to prevent at-sea confrontations and seeking participation in "various cooperative security programs."[90] Additionally, South Korea seeks to "win support of the international community for its Policy for Peace and Prosperity" while working to improve inter-Korean cooperation and "increase international assistance" for ongoing North Korean reforms.[91] For South Korea, the North-South issues (excluding the nuclear and missile issues) are first and foremost a matter that must be resolved by the two sides.[92]

South Korea identifies the "common prosperity of South and North Korea and Northeast Asia" as an objective to meet South Korea's national security interests.[93] In engaging the North in economic development, South Korea has stated that it will develop projects "that will mutually benefit South and North Korea."[94] To this end, South Korea has made notable attempts to move the North along in economic development,

including development of the Kaeseong Industrial Complex and the Mount Kumgang tourist destination, as well as direct financial assistance.[95]

National Security Interests of Russia

> *Attempts to ignore Russia's interests when solving major issues of international relations, including conflict situations, are capable of undermining international security, stability, and the positive changes achieved in international relations.*
>
> —2000 Russian *National Security Concept*

Russia's national security interests are described in three documents: the *National Security Concept* (*NSC*), which "outlines a systematic approach to providing security for the individual, society and state against possible internal or external threats";[96] the *Russian Federation Military Doctrine*, a defense white paper that "identifies the key political, strategic and economic factors essential to ensuring Russia's military security";[97] and the *Foreign Policy Concept* (*FPC*) *of the Russian Federation*, which "provides for a systematic approach to the content and direction of Russian foreign policy."[98] These documents collectively provide a basis from which Russian interests can be compared to US interests.

Russia's national security interests are significantly shaped by three factors: social and economic problems associated with the transition to a free-market economy, the diminishing role and influence of Russia in the international community, and transnational crime and terrorism inside and along its borders in former Russian states. These factors have fundamentally narrowed the national interests to a regional focus. Nonetheless, Russia still shares some critical interests with the United States concerning North Korea, including the proliferation of WMDs.

The *NSC* states, "Terrorism represents a serious threat to the national security of the Russian Federation."[99] Russia identifies the development of international cooperation to fight terrorism as one of its policy goals. Specifically, Russia suggests international agreements and "collaboration with foreign states and their law-enforcement and special agencies, and also with international organizations tasked with fighting terrorism" to counter terrorism.[100]

The *NSC* lists the proliferation of nuclear weapons and missiles as one of the "fundamental threats in the international sphere"[101] and specifically

commits the country to an "unswerving course toward strengthening the regime of nonproliferation of mass destruction weapons and their delivery vehicles"[102] as a principal task. To confront this challenge and strengthen the regime, the *FPC* states that Russia will work "jointly with other states in averting the proliferation of nuclear weapons . . . and means of their delivery."[103]

Russia does not address the problem of human rights in North Korea. However, more broadly, the *NSC* defines two general goals: "to seek respect for human rights and freedoms the world over on the basis of respecting the norms of international law"[104] and "to expand participation in international conventions and agreements in the human rights area."[105]

Regarding Asia, the *FPC* states that "the greatest concern is the situation in the Korean Peninsula."[106] Despite this clear indication of the importance of the Korean Peninsula to regional stability, the issues of the peninsula are not further addressed. For dealing with regional stability, the *FPC* states that "the emphasis will be on the invigoration of Russia's participation in the main integration structures of the Asia-Pacific Region—the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum [and] the regional forum on security of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)."[107]

The *NSC* states, "It is an important priority of state policy to ensure national interests and uphold the country's economic interests."[108] To accomplish the economic interests, Russia seeks "to expand markets for Russian products."[109] The *FPC* adds, "Russia must be prepared to utilize all its available economic levers and resources for upholding its national interests."[110] While Russia's strategy documents do not directly address North Korea in its economic strategy, the shared border with Russia and possible railway access to South Korea make North Korean economic well-being an important aspect for Russian national and economic security.

National Security Interests of the DPRK

> *The main tasks of the Government of the Republic are to achieve the total socialism in North Korea and get the peaceful unification with South Korea rejecting the external forces.*
>
> —DPRK Government Home Page

Walter Mondale once said, "Anyone who calls themselves [*sic*] an expert on North Korea is a liar or a fool."[111] This statement underlines the challenges faced by policy makers in developing effective foreign policies that deal with

the duplicitous behavior of North Korea. Unfortunately, US policy makers have struggled to define clearly just what North Korea's interests are.

Mondale's words notwithstanding, determining North Korea's national security interests are an essential task in developing a meaningful foreign policy. In doing so, it is not merely enough to consider the expressed interests of North Korea as an accurate measure of its true interests. Consider that North Korea has freely entered into past agreements that are clearly contrary to its national interests. What seems irrational is actually quite rational, according to George Kennan. Kennan, the scholar-diplomat known best for his 1954 *Foreign Affairs* article, described similar Soviet conduct, explaining the communist mind-set that leads to this contradictory behavior: committing to agreements without the intent to abide by them is considered acceptable since it is viewed as "a tactical maneuver permissible in dealing with the enemy (who is without honor)."[112] For North Korea, a win-lose scenario exists through which the good faith commitments of other nations can be garnered while the tightly controlled North secretively continues its pursuit of nuclear weapons. Therefore, the decision to enter into "binding" agreements should not be taken as an indication of North Korean national interest.

Clearly, agreements alone are a poor indicator of North Korea's national interests. Where then, do we turn to find the North's true interests? History and ideology combined with the interests expressed in past agreements all help to remove the cloud from a consistent pattern of deception and bad faith dealings and shed light on the true national security interests. With these tools, we find that North Korea's security interests are regime survival (protecting the regime from external forces), security of the state (protecting the political ideology of the state against internal forces), and reunification.

Keeping Kennan's thoughts in mind and recognizing North Korea to be a socialist country of similar ilk to the former Soviet Union with its own peculiarities introduced by Kim Il Sung, it is clear that analysis of North Korea's national security interests would be incomplete without a solid understanding of the ideology which leads the country. To establish this baseline knowledge, various ideological works by Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il must be taken into account. Armed with a reasonable understanding of the ideology, interests expressed in negotiated agreements, open source information, and a historical perspective of the peninsula, information can be collected and analyzed to determine the security interests. Due

caution was taken when gathering information from the state-controlled Korea Central News Agency (KCNA) to ensure that propaganda was supported by actions or interests expressed in negotiations. Some of the resources used to determine North Korean interest are the Open Source Center (opensource.gov); the DPRK official news agency (KCNA); the DPRK official Web site; Kim Jong I1's works "10-Point Programme of the Great Unity of the Whole Nation for the Reunification of the Country," *Let Us Advance under the Banner of Marxism-Leninism and the Juche Idea*, "Giving Priority to the Ideological Work is Essential for Accomplishing Socialism," and "On Preserving the Juche Character and National Character of the Revolution and Construction"; and declarations and agreements (1992 Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, 1993 DPRK-US Joint Statement, 1994 Agreed Framework, 2000 South-North Joint Declaration, 2001 DPRK-Russia Moscow Declaration, 2002 Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration, 2005 Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks, Beijing, and 2007 Denuclearization Action Plan).

As may be recalled from the *NSS*, America's end is "to protect the security of the people." One may analogously conclude that the ends of any communist state would be "to protect the security of the State." However, for North Korea, such an application would be an oversimplification, as the challenges facing North Korea are unique, even for a communist regime. First and foremost, perceived external threats have made regime survival an end. Second, security of the state in its ideological identity is an end. (In this article, regime survival refers to protecting the sovereign control of the state against outside forces, whereas the security of the state focuses on protecting the political ideology of the state against internal forces.) Finally, reunification, though overshadowed by regime survival and state security for the foreseeable future, remains a persistent end.

Regime survival is an objective that extends to the Korean War era, but its prominence has been thrust to the forefront by various changes in the security environment, including the collapse of the Soviet Union and increased belligerence toward the regime exhibited by US policies. Among these policies are stricter arms controls, tighter monetary control in international financial transactions, and increased attention to human rights.[113]

Efforts to ensure regime survival are evident in North Korea's repeated attempts to receive assurances against the use of force from the United

States during bilateral and multilateral talks. These talks help highlight three avenues North Korea has pursued for ensuring its survival: a large *conventional military*, *nuclear weapons*, and *economic development*.

Conventional Military

North Korea maintains the fourth largest military in the world in terms of troop strength.[114] A large number of these troops and their artillery are positioned near the DMZ. Originally regarded as a tool for reunification, there is little evidence to support this continued focus in the current environment. On the other hand, there is a clear reason to believe that the military now serves in the national interest of deterrence and defense. This conclusion is based on five premises: (1) North Korea faces a credible opponent along the DMZ, (2) rhetoric from North Korea has maintained that the troops are for defense, (3) North Korea has worked with the South to defuse cross-DMZ conflicts, (4) the balance of military power and likely outcome of a war favors South Korea, and (5) the political environment in the South is no longer conducive to forced reunification.

First, the large US and South Korean military contingent along the DMZ compels the North to maintain a sizable military presence to defend against the possibility of attack. North Korea's insecurity along the DMZ is further justified by antagonistic statements from the Bush administration that have distinguished North Korea as a member of the "axis of evil" and one to which the president has taken a personal disliking: "I loathe Kim Jong Il."[115] North Korea is all too aware of the fate of Saddam Hussein's Iraq, also one of the axes of evil. These statements and actions along with the preemptive option the United States denotes in the *National Security Strategy* have encouraged an ongoing sense of insecurity in the North Korean regime.

Second, the use of the military as a defensive tool against outside aggressors has been a consistent thread in the North's habitual and aggressive blustering, with articles in the state-run media routinely praising the military for its role in defending socialism and sovereignty. The importance of this role is succinctly captured in the following 10 January 2007 KCNA article: "The practical experience gained by the DPRK proves that a country can prevent a war and protect its sovereignty and peace only when it attaches importance to the military affairs and bolsters its self-reliant defence capability."[116] The defensive role of the military is also defined in North Korea's constitution: "The mission of the armed forces of the DPRK

is to safeguard the interests of the working people, to defend the socialist system and the gains of the revolution from aggression, and to protect the freedom, independence, and peace of the country."[117]

Third, North Korea has taken steps to reduce military tensions along the DMZ. Though occasional unpredictable behavior is seen from the North, efforts seem to have produced some results. Pointing to North-South meetings and economic relations and describing the situation along the DMZ in the fall of 2006, one US Army captain stated that the situation was "the calmest it has ever been," an assessment supported by Swedish major general Sture Theolin, who described the attitude on his visit to the north side of the DMZ as "more relaxed."[118] Indeed, though North Korea's motives cannot fully be known, the North has in general made a good faith effort to reduce tensions along the DMZ through military talks. These talks have met with limited success, leading to an elimination of propaganda broadcasts along the DMZ and the establishment of a hotline to reduce the potential for naval clashes at sea.[119]

Fourth, the balance of power on the peninsula favors the South. Some experts argue that the North's disproportionately larger troop strength and higher heavy equipment count favor in the North. However, even with the North's numerical advantages, the military balance on the peninsula debatably favors the South. Specifically, much of North Korea's equipment is old, with nearly all major weapons systems of 1960s vintage or older;[120] maintenance is questionable since much of the parts and equipment came from former allies whose regimes are no longer in power;[121] and training has suffered through the economic slowdown (despite the "military first" policy).[122] Even without the US military commitment, South Korea's rapidly modernizing military is qualitatively far ahead of North Korea, while training and modernization continue to be fueled by an economy that is 20 times larger than the North's.[123]

Finally, North Korea lacks support for military action. Unlike his father who had fought against Japanese colonialism in Manchuria, Kim Jong Il does not enjoy the same close personal and historical relations with China's leaders,[124] and, despite the mutual defense treaty, China has indicated that it would not provide support if the North were to run into trouble,[125] a decision likely influenced by China's close economic ties with the South and its need to maintain the perception of "peaceful development." With the former Soviet Union, close security ties have been replaced by modest diplomatic relations focused on mutual economic interests.

If North Korea's regime survival could somehow be guaranteed, one might conclude that the DMZ could be disestablished. However, there is another role the military could be perceived as playing along the border: immigration enforcement and ideological preservation. Conventional forces along the border act to keep South Korean culture out and the North Korean population in.

Nuclear Weapons

North Korea has consistently stated its desire for a denuclearized Korean peninsula. This interest has been repeated under both Kim Il Sung and the current Kim Jong Il regime in various agreements and statements. North Korea first signed a declaration with South Korea in 1991, agreeing in principle to a nuclear-free peninsula, and it has agreed to the same in nearly every subsequent security agreement.[126] This agreement was preceded by a unilateral good faith gesture from the United States announcing the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from South Korea in order to pave the way for successful talks.[127] Even during North Korea's announced withdrawal from the NPT in 2003, North Korea stated, "We have no intention to produce nuclear weapons."[128] Yet, the evidence available unequivocally indicates that *North Korea is committed to the development of nuclear weapons* as a tool for regime survival, contrary to its publicly stated policy.

Biding its time under each new agreement, North Korea has deliberately and secretively pursued nuclear weapons. Agreements to halt its program have not dampened the North's appetite for the bomb. Under the 1994 Agreed Framework, North Korea agreed to IAEA monitoring of plutonium nuclear facilities in exchange for various economic concessions. It should be noted that, even with generous concessions, North Korea didn't consent to the agreement of its own free will. Only under an ultimatum of force in which the United States revealed its intent to strike nuclear facilities did the North capitulate. Unable to continue on its current path for nuclear weapons development, North Korea responded by turning its attention to a covert uranium enrichment program, acquiring centrifuges and technical assistance with the aid of Pakistani nuclear physicist Dr. A. Q. Khan from 1997 through 2001.[129]

In an official statement in February 2005, North Korea announced that it had nuclear weapons, stating that it had "manufactured nukes for self-defence."[130] This statement was followed up 18 months later with North Korea's first nuclear test. In announcing the successful test, a spokesman

for the Foreign Ministry stated that the nuclear test was "entirely attributable to the US nuclear threat, sanctions and pressure."[131] North Korea has gained a sympathetic ear in Russia and China, where the governments have placed blame on US policies for North Korea's nuclear weapons program.[132] With weapons in hand, North Korea now states that "the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula [was Kim Il Sung's] dying wish."[133]

It is hard to say that North Korea has missed a heartbeat in pushing ahead nuclear weapons development. Actions clearly contradictory to its statements provide sufficient evidence that North Korea is committed to possessing nuclear weapons. What remains to be answered is Can there be another reasonable argument other than regime survival for North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons?

There are three possible reasons that stand out as to why North Korea would pursue nuclear weapons. The first involves guaranteeing regime survival, addressed above. The second is to use its nuclear program as a bargaining tool to gain US attention and draw economic and diplomatic concessions. The third is as a tool for reunification.

Many liberal pundits have argued that North Korea's nuclear program is a call for help—a means of drawing the United States to the negotiating table for improved relations or economic assistance. This argument fails to recognize that the nuclear program dates back as early as the 1960s. Furthermore, it does not explain why, following the 1994 Agreed Framework in which the United States offered improved relations and economic aid, North Korea duplicitously pursued an alternative covert weapons program. More aptly, North Korea's trade of its plutonium program for economic and diplomatic concessions from the United States can be explained as a necessity rather than an intentional effort on the part of the North. Kim Jong Il increasingly felt pressured by US rhetoric and military posturing as the United States privately announced its intentions to the North to strike nuclear facilities should the nuclear program continue. Backing up the threat was the deployment of strike fighter aircraft and an enhanced naval presence to South Korea.[134] Therefore, the "call for help" theory is not supported by the facts.

Regarding unification as an objective for its program, the rational choice theory would rule out a nuclear attack. North Korea would be virtually guaranteed a swift military response from the international community, including China. However, one conservative proposes a case in which military action could be perceived as rational. Using a "double-or-nothing" logic, if a rational North Korea were to feel it had nothing left to lose, it may take the gamble.[135] While theoretically possible, it is hard to see a

double-or-nothing situation grave enough beyond a preemptive strike by the United States that would lead North Korea to take such a gamble. Of course, that would lead us back to regime survival.

Economic Development

Economic development is at the core of regime survival. North Koreans view US economic policy toward their country as an attempt to collapse their government and, therefore, look to economic self-reliance as one means through which they can "frustrat[e] the vicious sanctions and blockade of the imperialists and reactionaries and achiev[e] a victory in the offensive for the building of an economic power."[136]

Ideologically, North Korea desires a national economic model based on self-reliance. Economic dependence is viewed as a weakness: "To try to build national economy through the introduction of unreliable foreign capital is little short of giving [a] trump card to capital investors."[137] However, the realities of the economic situation have made North Korea dependent on donor nations for its survival. The loss of Soviet donor support and unreliable support from China have created economic hardships for North Korea. These economic problems have been compounded by internal food shortages and the recent US crackdown on North Korean financial transactions in the international banking system. Finally, Japanese government control over trade and cash remittances from Japanese-Koreans add to the North's economic woes.

Internally, the economic plight has caused the military to assume a central role in economic development. A 2004 KCNA notes that "economic construction by the *Songun* political mode means putting forward the People's Army as a core and main force and carrying out economic construction by the concerted efforts of the army and people."[138] (emphasis added) *Songun*, or the "military first" policy as it is commonly known, conceptually postulates that regime survival can only be guaranteed by developing and giving priority to a strong military force. Softening the military to divert funds to other activities would lead to an eventual collapse of the system. Though the idea of using the military for economic development did not appear in the earliest mentions of *Songun*, North Korea appears to have realized economic viability cannot be sustained with the military-first policy as it stands. Therefore, as described in the above quote, North Korea has tasked the military with carrying out or directing various agricultural and industrial tasks to build economic capacity.

North Korea's response to external efforts to use economic leverage to draw down the regime has been mixed. On one hand, North Korea has been forced to reach out to international investment, contrary to its own ideology. Some of the most significant economic forays include opening Mount Kumgang as a tourist resort in cooperation with the South;[139] launching a large industrial park in Kaesong—also a joint project with South Korea—which once fully completed in 2012 is expected to employ a half million North Koreans;[140] initiating the Najin-Sonbong economic zone in cooperation with China to test market economics;[141] and negotiating with Russia and South Korea to reopen the railroad connections.

On the other hand, North Korea has increased its attention to its own strengths—illicit activities and military hardware sales—to draw in capital. Illicit activities have included drug trading, counterfeiting, and money laundering. North Korea negatively reacted to US accusations of money laundering, stalling Six-Party Talks from September 2005 until December 2006 after the US Treasury Department acted against the Banco Delta Macau.[142]

Not surprisingly, in Six-Party Talks and bilateral negotiations, in conjunction with its demands for a security guarantee, North Korea has consistently pushed for three main economic concessions: energy, food, and fertilizer. These demands reflect the dire economic situation in North Korea and, along with the above-mentioned economic activities, are designed to keep the regime alive.

Reunification of the Korean Peninsula is a long-stated goal of the North Korean government. As early as 1948, the constitution had designated Seoul, not Pyongyang, as the capital,[143] followed shortly after by an attempt to reunify the country by force. Since then, various indirect attempts have been made to subvert the government of the South to bring about reunification, including the 1983 assassination attempt of then-president Chun Doo Hwan.[144]

In 1993, Kim Il Sung published a reunification roadmap, "10-Point Programme of the Great Unity of the Whole Nation for the Reunification of the Country," which outlined a "one country, two systems" policy and called on both sides to put aside differences for the realization of reunification.[145] Beyond a public relations coup to gain a receptive audience in the South, it is not clear what North Korea had hoped to gain from this roadmap since, by the North's own account, the two systems are inherently contradictory and incompatible, described as a difference "between revolution and counterrevolution."[146]

In 1998, a new constitution was approved stating, "The DPRK shall strive to . . . reunify the country on the principle of independence, peaceful reunification and great national unity," repeating the theme of past constitutions.[147] Adding to this, the official Web site of the DPRK describes the government's main task as "to achieve total socialism in North Korea and get the peaceful unification of South Korea rejecting the external forces."[148]

Based on the above information and actions, there is ample evidence to indicate that reunification remains a national interest of the North. However, North Korea shows no intent of giving up its system of government to facilitate unification. North Korea also lacks the international legitimacy and military capability for reunification by force. Therefore, reunification for the time being has been relegated to an intensive information operations campaign against the South Korean government and pro-US elements in the South, with the focus of this campaign targeted at the economically poor, the idealistic youth, and the politically disenfranchised population of the South by exhorting the values of the North Korean system and promoting and encouraging anti-US and anticonservative activities. To this end, the KCNA regularly publishes articles identifying "corrupt" politics in the South, denigrating the economic policies, and praising the "nationalistic spirit" of the young generation.[149]

External forces are not the only forces with which North Korea must contend. Even if external threats were to vanish overnight, the regime would have to continue to manage its own population. North Korea invests heavily in maintaining a structured internal environment, with ideological control as its primary tool.

It is difficult to exaggerate the role ideology plays in North Korean politics and society. According to Kim Jong Il, "The ideological transformation for all the members of society . . . is the most important of tasks and should be carried out as a matter of priority in defending and completing the cause of socialism."[150] The relation of ideology to state security is highlighted in many of Kim Jong Il's published writings. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kim Jong Il wrote, "Slighting ideological work when building socialism amounts to overlooking the key to socialism," adding that the state must "give priority to ideological work over everything else."[151] Therefore, the collapse of the Soviet Union was merely an example of the failure of the communist regime in preparing the masses ideologically and allowing "imperialist" culture to corrupt: "The former Soviet Union and east European socialist countries collapsed not because

their military and economic potentials were weak and the level of their cultural development was low. It was entirely because they opened the door wide for the imperialist ideological and cultural poisoning."[152]

North Korea has been known to take extreme measures to enforce ideological behaviors, incarcerating its people in reeducation camps for seemingly minor infractions.[153] Such actions reflect the importance that North Korea gives to enforcing ideology to maintain state security.

On occasion, North Korea has found it necessary for humanitarian or other reasons to deviate from its own ideological principles. The mass starvation in the mid-1990s was one such example. However, when the crisis subsided, North Korea quickly moved to push out aid workers to prevent ideological corruption despite aid workers' insistence that continued aid was necessary. This seemingly contrary behavior should not come as a surprise from a socialist country. Describing socialism in Russia, George Kennan in "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" wrote, "When there is something the Russians want from us, one or the other of these features of their policy may be thrust temporarily into the background."[154] For North Korea, these actions are designed to prevent the ideological dilution of society.

Comparing US Interests to the Group of Four

Terrorism

All countries analyzed share a common interest in combating terrorism and agree on the need for international cooperation and information. However, a significant divide appears when determining whether North Korea is a terrorist state. South Korea, China, and Russia contend that North Korea is not. On the other hand, the United States and Japan classify North Korea as a terrorist concern, seeming to indicate an insurmountable difference. However, further evaluation of information reveals ambiguity in the United States' and Japan's positions.

The continued presence of North Korea on the Department of State's state sponsor of terrorism (SPOT) list is linked at least in part to the Japanese abductee issue and at Japan's insistence. Actively seeking support from the United States, Japan contends that removal from this list should not occur until this issue is resolved. Yet, simultaneously, Japan officially

acknowledges that there has been no record of terrorist involvement by North Korea since 1987.[155]

Also contributing to North Korea's presence on the SPOT list is the North's transfer of missile technology to other countries identified as SPOTs and to its continued harboring of airline hijackers from the 1987 incident.[156] Even on these issues, the US position has been shaky in recent years. On several occasions over the past decade, the United States has expressed a willingness to commence removal of North Korea from the list as a concession to progress in Six-Party Talks on nuclear weapons, reigning in efforts when talks fail to progress.[157] Therefore, it is more apt that the continued inclusion of North Korea on the SPOT list is only slightly more than a bargaining chip at the WMD negotiating table.

WMD Proliferation

A clear pattern exists in the strategies that various countries take to address WMD proliferation. The Group of Four unanimously agrees that WMDs should be approached from a multilateral cooperative effort that includes information sharing, and all but one indicate a preference for tightening of existing arms control regimes. Though not specifically addressed in ROK strategy documents, having consistently supported the implementation of arms control regimes in the past, it is unlikely that South Korea would be opposed to any action to strengthen the regime.

The more contentious issues in addressing WMD proliferation are in the use of economic and military instruments of power. Following the 9 October nuclear test, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1718 condemning the test and authorizing sanctions against the North. Among the many guidelines, the resolution stipulates that states should take action necessary to prevent the shipment of restricted goods into and out of North Korea. Japan and the United States have showed a significant commitment to enforcing the articles, favoring aggressive enforcement of existing arms control regimes and participating in initiatives to prevent the proliferation of WMDs such as the PSI. China and Russia have both indicated that they would not participate in the interdiction of aircraft or shipping to enforce the sanctions on North Korea, and South Korea has similarly expressed a strong unwillingness to participate.[158]

Beyond the Security Council resolution, South Korea, China, and Russia have shown general opposition to actions that apply economic and financial pressure to North Korea, while the United States and Japan have favored

such pressures. South Korea's unwillingness stems from an interest not to undo progress made separately in inter-Korean talks. China's motivation is arguably driven by a desire to avoid a flood of economic refugees that would likely result from a tightening of financial and economic sanctions. Some strategists also argue that China is concerned actions that may lead to a collapse of the North could ultimately lead to a peninsula unified under pro-Western South Korea, thus opening up another front in a future US-China conflict. This point, though somewhat valid, is exaggerated since China and South Korea have become economically connected with South Korea being China's fifth largest export destination and second largest import source. Turned around, China is South Korea's largest trade partner, both in exports and imports.[159] It also neglects that South Korean sentiment toward China is the same as that toward the United States.[160]

Regional Stability

Attaining regional stability follows a congruous effort between the five parties. All nations indicate a strong desire for a multilateral regional approach to addressing the problem in lieu of bilateral or international efforts. Not surprisingly, South Korea, faced with a military threat on the DMZ and a simultaneous desire to socially unite its people of common history and ancestry, also finds bilateral cooperation to be central to stability of the peninsula, a position not favored by any of the other actors.

Both Japan and South Korea view economic assistance as playing a critical role in the stabilization of northeast Asia. However, despite the seeming commonality between the two, Japan has shown little commitment to economic assistance when it comes to North Korea, instead focusing developmental assistance in more friendly countries. On the other hand, South Korea's economic assistance to the North has been reasonably steadfast considering the bad faith North Korea has displayed in negotiations, which has often resulted in a backlash from conservatives in the South. The remarkable success in continuing this assistance results from a desire to prevent snags in negotiations from unduly hindering progress in the development of inter-Korean relations. Recognizing the progress made through inter-Korean dialogue, South Korea announced intentions to continue its economic relations with the North regardless of the progress on denuclearization.[161]

Human Dignity

Addressing human dignity is a unique challenge. Though countries may agree in principle on the means to address infringement on human dignity, ideological and cultural differences create different interpretations of human rights. Furthermore, efforts to promote human rights are often sidelined by more pressing and palpable self-interests.

While the United States, Japan, South Korea, and Russia find common ground in supporting diplomatic pressure to North Korea, in practice each country has acted variedly. South Korea is inconspicuous in applying diplomatic pressure to avoid potential detrimental consequences to inter-Korean relations. Similarly, Russia's commitment to diplomatic pressure has also yet to be proven. With its socialist history and own economic problems and social ills, Russia sees little interest in promoting idealistic goals of advancing human dignity abroad. Indeed, the two remaining countries willing to apply diplomatic pressure are also the two democracies that propose partnering with other democracies.

Japan and South Korea have both shown willingness for bilateral talks over human rights issues with North Korea. In general, these talks are narrowly focused to address the issue of abductees or ROK POWs. While their means diverges with the US approach, it is unlikely a substantive concern to the United States and is probably welcomed as a means in supporting overall diplomatic pressure.

A clear divide exists in the use of informational and economic instruments of power. South Korea, China, and Russia do not include either as a national strategy, whereas the United States and Japan have both indicated such in their national strategies and have implemented them. Both the United States and Japan launched an aggressive awareness campaign aimed at exposing North Korea's human rights abuses to the international community.

Economic Development

With the exception of Russia, all countries place economic development of poor nations as one of their national strategies. The United States, Japan, China, and South Korea all support coordination of development assistance through established multilateral and international institutions such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) or the United Nations Development Program.

Though the United States and Japan both provide for economic assistance in their strategies, each has placed conditions that the North must

meet before economic development assistance can take place. For the United States, this condition is "good behavior," whereas Japan refuses to provide any aid until North Korea resolves the abductee issue.

South Korea and China have approached the North with comparatively "unconditional" economic development assistance. South Korea has pushed inter-Korean development assistance to create interdependence between the two countries as part of the comprehensive effort to build confidence and reduce tensions on the peninsula. China, too, has pushed bilateral economic development on the peninsula, possibly to reduce the number of economic refugees, tap into North Korea's natural resources, or reach the cheap, educated labor force.

Part of the United States' economic development strategy is to disrupt illicit activities that are deemed counter to effective economic growth. This position is incongruous with priorities for the other nations and poses challenges for developing support for the US position in poorer economies such as China and Russia.

Combining means in a visual depiction of flags in tables 1 and 2 readily shows that Japan is the United States' strongest partner. Separately, Russia and China can be grouped as nations with means complementary to each other, while South Korea is caught in between, finding itself generally siding with China and Russia in means.

Table 1 shows that Japan can play a role as a key partner in addressing any US interest. In general, China and Russia can play a significant role in addressing both regional stability and WMD proliferation but are poor partners in addressing human dignity. South Korea is also a poor partner in addressing human dignity and does not well support the US approach to regional stability.

Looking at the instruments of national power to address North Korea, Table 2 shows there is general agreement on the way diplomacy should be used, whereas a cooperative approach to interests using the economic instrument of power would be difficult. Finally, the military instrument of power is generally lacking of support from regional partners.

Comparing US Interests to North Korean Interests

The concerns about WMD proliferation and human dignity are the most difficult interests to address. The proliferation of WMDs is arguably

Table 1. Complementary and Conflicting Means of Various Countries to US Means by Interest

Interest	*Means*		*Complementary*	*Conflicting*
Proliferation	Diplomatic	Multilateral Cooperation		
		Arms Control Regimes		
	Economic	Economic Sanctions		
		Financial Restrictions		
	Information	Information Sharing		
	Military	Physical Enforcement		
Regional Stability	Diplomatic	Regional Diplomacy		
		International Diplomacy		
		Bilateral Cooperation		
	Economic	Economic Assistance		
	Information	None		
	Military	None		
Human Dignity	Diplomatic	Diplomatic Pressure		
		Partner with Democracies		
		Bilateral Talks		
	Economic	Economic Sanctions		
	Information	Awareness Campaign		
	Military	None		
Economic Development	Diplomatic	Coordination w/Institutions		
	Economic	Economic Assistance		
	Information	None		
	Military	Disrupt Illicit Activities		

Table 2. Complementary and Conflicting Means of Various Countries to US Means by Instrument of Power

Interest		*Means*	*Complementary*	*Conflicting*
Diplomatic	Proliferation	Multilateral Cooperation		
		Arms Control Regimes		
	Regional Stability	Regional Diplomacy		
		International Diplomacy		
		Bilateral Cooperation		
	Human Dignity	Diplomatic Pressure		
		Partner with Democracies		
		Bilateral Talks		
	Economic Development	Coordination w/Institution		
Economic	Proliferation	Economic Sanctions		
		Financial Restrictions		
	Regional Stability	Economic Assistance		
	Human Dignity	Economic Sanctions		
	Economic Development	Economic Assistance		
		None		
Information	Proliferation	Information Sharing		
	Regional Stability	None		
	Human Dignity	Awareness Campaign		
		None		
Military	Proliferation	Physical Enforcement		
	Regional Stability	None		
	Human Dignity	None		
	Economic Development	Disrupt Illicit Activities		

the United States' foremost interest on the Korean peninsula as indicated by the time and effort put forth in addressing it. However, North Korea views possession of nuclear weapons as inherent to the long-term survival of the regime. An even more frank assessment from the regime is the statement from the office of the foreign ministry following its nuclear test in 2006: "The DPRK was compelled to substantially prove its possession of nukes to protect its sovereignty and right to existence."[162] Those who would believe that North Korea's decision to shut down its nuclear reactor is proof that North Korea and the United States have turned a corner in relations are too eager to embrace the likelihood of a country to give up a nuclear arsenal it spent five decades lying and deceiving to conceal. Instead, we offer two other possibilities. First, North Korea's nuclear reactor is nearly obsolete, having been built in the 1960s, and has fulfilled its purpose of producing enough weapons-grade plutonium for several nuclear bombs. The facility, therefore, may be viewed as expendable for much-needed short-term economic gain. A second possibility is that negotiations may be a ploy to allow North Korea to bide its time through the end of the Bush administration. By dragging out negotiations and feigning commitment to agreements, as it has done so often in the past, North Korea may look to survive through the administration in hopes of finding a softer counterpart in Bush's successor. Fortunately, for Kim Jong Il, many of the Bush advisors who would see past the regime's attempt at fooling the United States have been purged from the administration over the past two years, replaced by those who are willing to overlook history and believe that North Korea is genuinely ready to cooperate with the international community.

Human dignity, as defined by the United States, conflicts with regime survival, state security, and reunification. The promotion of human dignity is tantamount to ending communist socialism and establishing democracy, thus conflicting with regime survival. Internally, North Korea finds it a necessary part of the socialist fabric to "reeducate" dissenters or even those who attempt to leave the North for economic reasons. Promoting human dignity would equate to a direct challenge to state security by opening up the government to scrutiny. It would further undermine the North's political ideology and its vision of reunification.

While US concerns over both nuclear proliferation and human dignity conflict with North Korean interests, US interests of regional stability and economic development provide opportunities for progress. In spite of the

possibility that North Korea may perceive to benefit from regional instability, regional stability can directly contribute to regime survival and reunification by reducing the perceived threats to the North while setting the proper atmosphere for eventual reunification. (This does not imply that the preferred end states of each country are desirable to the other. Clearly, reunification for North Korea means reunification under its system of government—an outcome unacceptable to both the United States and South Korea. Nonetheless, opportunities that increase regional stability, such as talks to reduce tensions along the DMZ or other inter-Korean exchange, also complement North Korea's goal of moving toward reunification.) The challenge in addressing regional stability depends on the context in which viewed. From a militarization standpoint along the DMZ, regional stability is attainable with confidence-building initiatives and a reduction of forces on both sides. However, when intertwined with the problem of nuclear-armed missiles pointed at the North's neighbors, regional stability and resolving WMD proliferation become inseparable.

Economic development would enhance regime survival by expanding the legitimate business practices and contributions of North Korea in the global community. Adding to this, economic development would reduce poverty and the subsequent disaffection of the public. The unique challenge for the North would be in maintaining its ideological control over the population (keep out "corrupt" Western values) while promoting greater international involvement in its economy. Finally, economic development would contribute to closing the economic gap between the North and South, a necessary precursor to smooth reunification. Among several possible approaches to economic development, North Korea could be encouraged to follow the Chinese model, thus allowing it to maintain its communist central government while promoting a gradual expansion of capitalist ideas. North Korea has shown interest in the past, having set up a special economic zone in the Rajin-Sonbong area. Unfortunately, plagued by its past defaults on credit payments and inadequate basic infrastructure to support businesses, North Korea was unable to attract significant investment. One exception has been investment by South Korea in the Mount Kumgang and Kaesong ventures. By guaranteeing private investments of South Korean firms in North Korea, South Korea has been able to attract many businesses into risky ventures with the North. Similarly, the United States would have to stimulate investment by providing guarantees to companies willing to invest in North Korea and by lifting restrictions

on North Korean access to international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. While these actions may not be politically popular in the West, each step toward establishing international economic exchange with North Korea increases awareness of the general North Korean population to the outside world, expands the international community's ability to influence change in North Korea, and increases the economic stakes for North Korea on actions counter to regional stability.

Recognizing the opportunities and challenges these interests present is critical. In this case, the most difficult interest to address, WMD proliferation, is also the greatest security interest. Tackling the problem head-on has yielded negative results, while other interests have been ignored. Plaguing both sides on the issue is mutual distrust. By choosing to address complementary interests, these interests become "entry-level" tasks acting as confidence builders necessary to reach the more complex conflicting interests that require deeper trust and confidence. As such, the United States must be willing to accept limited progress in conflicting interests while forging ahead with complementary interests.

Conclusions

Constructive engagement with US partners on various common security interests related to North Korea is extremely challenging. The challenges and opportunities in addressing US interests expand with each new country added to the problem-solving process. Each country introduces a set of unique interests and, sometimes, divergent means and ulterior motives that can end up complicating efforts. On the other hand, the opportunity for mutual support and cooperation can lead to unprecedented leveraging of instruments of power and burden sharing, enhancing likelihood of a desirable outcome. Therefore, the challenge is in identifying real interests and aligning efforts with partners in such a manner that addressing one problem contributes to efforts in addressing another. This process recognizes that many issues are intrinsically interlinked, and success in addressing one may fall incumbent on progress in another. For example, WMD proliferation weighs heavily on regional stability; regional stability can only flourish with economic stability; and economic stability is difficult to develop in a country where the basic elements of human dignity, such as the sharing of ideas and the ability to move freely, are not protected.

Recognizing the problems it has encountered in leading efforts to address its interests regarding North Korea, the United States should give the lead to a regional player that has common interests, can be trusted and influenced, and has a record of success in engaging the North. South Korea has made considerable progress in addressing some of the common security interests through soft diplomatic and economic means. Though costly, this approach has shown positive results in opening up the North. In addition, South Korea is a democratic state and a close US ally with a strong vested interest on the peninsula. Therefore, the United States should give the lead to South Korea in addressing common security interests, using the following guidelines in supporting lead-country efforts.

First, addressing terrorism cooperatively with partners has no hope of progress with the weak explanation the United States provides for North Korean terrorism concerns. North Korea's continued presence on the state sponsors of terrorism list is intrinsically linked to the Japanese abductees issue and WMD negotiations vice terrorism in its own right. This contention is supported by the absence of mention of North Korea in the terrorism chapter of the *NSS*. Defensibly, one can argue that the US position on terrorism as it relates to North Korea is not far off from China, Russia, and South Korea in that *North Korea does not pose a terrorist threat*, a position to which all three countries will hold steadfast. Hence, attempts to encourage cooperative engagement with the three countries in the framework of combating the North Korean terrorist threat will be for naught. Indeed, even the United States has shown no real interest in addressing North Korean terrorism in its own right.

Based on the weak premise under which North Korea is listed as a sponsor of terrorism, serious attempts to address this interest directly will falter. North Korea's continued presence on the state sponsor of terrorism list is more aptly a political tool to use as leverage in addressing other interests, and removal from the list will follow accordingly when diplomatically expedient. Therefore, *addressing terrorism in its own right is not necessary.*

Secondly, addressing human dignity holds little hope for immediate and direct progress. It is the most difficult interest to address, complicated by different definitions of human rights between partners and a general lack of willingness of many countries to involve themselves in the affairs of other sovereign states. The United States' strategy has been the use of economic sanctions to pressure North Korea into improving human rights. However, sanctions run counter to the United States' economic development interests

and are counterintuitive to the goal of improving regional stability. Furthermore, US attempts to promote human dignity are in conflict with both North Korea's interests of regime stability and state security. Hence, attempts to force North Korea into compliance will have the opposite effect, with the North hardening its position and further closing society, inadvertently decreasing regional stability and deepening human rights abuses. With little promise for immediate progress in addressing human rights and the lack of cooperation with other regional players, the United States should seek a gradual change in North Korean human rights behavior by linking it to US interests complementary to North Korean interests.

Thirdly, progress on addressing WMD proliferation, though of great interest to all partners, will not come until basic trust in other areas is established with North Korea. WMD proliferation is the most contentious issue facing the United States. Unlike terrorism, in the context of North Korea all parties recognize the proliferation of nuclear weapons as an issue that must be addressed. However, it is at this point of agreement that views rapidly diverge. The countries are polarized into two groups, with China, Russia, and South Korea staunchly supporting diplomatic efforts for addressing nuclear weapons proliferation, and the United States and Japan favoring a full array of diplomatic, economic, and police-enforcement efforts to resolve the problem.

China's policy reflects a long-standing commitment to noninterference in the sovereign affairs of other states in accordance with "The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence." Furthermore, China is likely averse to actions that might aggravate the already precarious economic situation in the North, which could precipitate an economic crisis with a flood of economic refugees crossing the Yalu River into China. Then there is the prospect of a unified peninsula, allied with the West, along the Chinese border.

South Korea maintains a noninterference policy analogous to China's national policy. This policy is reinforced by the South's sunshine policy toward the North. South Korea also shares China's concern that an economic collapse in the North would be costly. Furthermore, excessive coercion would threaten to undo the goodwill South Korea has worked 10 years to build—efforts that have led to the reconnection of a railway across the DMZ and the establishment of a tourism zone and an industrial park in the North.

Russia has steadfastly argued that only a diplomatic solution can solve the North Korean problem and has placed the blame on US international

aggression for North Korea's behavior. Based on Russian attitudes, Russian policy will continue to fall in line with the policies of China and South Korea.

Not surprisingly, history has also shown that resolution of WMD proliferation will not be simple. Despite attempts to resolve the issue and improve relations in the 1990s, North Korea continued to pursue a nuclear weapons program. Unfortunately, ignoring the interest and hoping the problem will fade away is not a choice. The stakes are too high. North Korea has already developed long-range missiles that could potentially place nuclear weapons on US soil, and the continued relevance of the NPT has come into question by North Korea's actions. Facing unlikely support from China, Russia, and South Korea for a hard-line approach and recognizing the conflicting interests WMDs represent to the United States and North Korea, *proliferation would best be addressed in conjunction with other interests*.

Fourthly, regional stability, though complicated by the divergent means of Six-Party Members, holds great promise for progress and, along with economic development, can provide a foundation from which to build upon for addressing human dignity and WMD proliferation. Regional stability is divided into three issues. The first is the proliferation of nuclear weapons and missiles, which has already been addressed. The second is the economic situation, which is discussed later. The third issue is the military threat North Korea poses by its million-man army along the DMZ.

Based on the mutual benefits to be gained by the United States and North Korea and by the alignment of means of the Group of Four with the United States toward a regional diplomatic approach in addressing stability on the peninsula, there is a great opportunity for cooperation in addressing the military threat on the peninsula. This is not meant to oversimplify the problem of greater regional stability. Beyond the issues addressed in this paper, BMD, Taiwan-China relations, and Japan's wartime past all provide challenges to cooperation. Nonetheless, on the peninsula itself, from the perspective of North Korea, the DMZ has become a deterrent against US and South Korean military action and an immigration border keeping South Korean culture from polluting North Korean ideology and preventing the mass migration of poverty-stricken North Koreans to the wealthy South. The North has shown significant restraint along the DMZ in preventing an escalation of tensions, even following isolated firefights, despite the antagonistic rhetoric that follows. In addressing the role the

conventional military threat has on regional stability, *the United States should leverage regional players in a lead role* on reducing tensions on the peninsula proper. In addition, *regional stability should be a cornerstone for addressing other US national security interests*.

Finally, economic development is a bright spot for future success. Economic development is complementary to North Korean interests, contributing to regime stability and state security, and is viewed as mutually beneficial by China, Japan, and South Korea. China and Japan have both taken a bilateral approach to development, making inroads that have been impossible with the use of hard power.

Recognizing the success and the need to carry on with economic engagement, South Korea announced intentions to continue its economic relations with the North regardless of the progress on denuclearization. The interaction with North Korea in economic development has increased contact with North Koreans that will, over time, loosen the ideological grip the North has on its people. Therefore, *the United States should encourage and support economic development as a cornerstone in a broader approach to addressing other US national security interests*. SSQ

Notes

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Harnessing the Islamist Revolution

A Strategy to Win the War against Religious Extremism

Dan Green

A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY to deter religious extremists from engaging in terrorist attacks should seek to reduce the support mechanisms and recruitment and propaganda opportunities they need by embracing a holistic, nonkinetic approach that aims to separate the terrorist from the population. It should be done by addressing the legitimate grievances of the global Islamist insurgency while maintaining US interests and working by, with, and through surrogates while bolstering their nonkinetic, security, and unconventional warfare capabilities. It should be for the long-term with targeted nonkinetic approaches that eliminate safe havens, promote good governance, and provide a peaceful path to conflict resolution while simultaneously refuting Islamist ideology.

As our country continues to face the challenge of religiously inspired terrorist attacks, it is not uncommon to hear at least four general views within political, diplomatic, and military circles of how we should deal with this sustained threat. The first of these views is the "kill 'em all" approach, which sees success as coming about through significant military action against those who support and conduct terrorist activity.[1] It typically eschews any concern for civilian casualties and hopes that through intimidation, deterrence, and the total destruction of terrorist safe havens, US citizens will be safer. The second view takes the exactly opposite approach and sees US foreign policy, especially its military policy, as the root

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The title of this paper was inspired by the 1965 Vietnam War strategy paper, "Harnessing the Revolution in South Vietnam," by John Paul Vann. His essay formed a large part of the intellectual justification for the creation of the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program.

of the problem and recommends a comprehensive retrenchment of US advocacy of its interests abroad.[2] This view can be characterized as the "withdrawal" approach. A third view proposes that the United States remove the political, economic, and military "provocations" that inspire religious extremists to attack it, effectively addressing their grievances while ruthlessly attacking them.[3] This approach of "concession and kill" is a blending of the first and second views.[4] The fourth and final perspective advocates more of a bunker strategy. This view sees "[p]unishment [as] irrelevant" and posits that there will be no "dawning of reason" within the communities that create religious extremists and that the attacks of suicide bombers "can only be forestalled."[5] This approach only hopes to prevent attacks through an active defense and a robust early warning system thereby seeking to "weather the storm." For many policy makers, navigating between these treacherous shoals of kill 'em all, withdrawal, concession and kill, and weathering the storm while maintaining and expanding US interests, upholding commitments to our allies and our own position in the world, and moving beyond rhetoric to concrete courses of action can seem quite daunting.

There is a better approach to the challenge of combating religiously inspired terrorism than these former approaches advocate. It draws upon all of the national government's capabilities including military, diplomatic, economic, development, intelligence, and information operations resources and those of American civil society. It does this while maintaining our fealty to allies, robbing opponents of propaganda and recruitment opportunities, upholding American values and standing in the world, and allowing us to separate the terrorists from the support networks they depend upon so that they can be killed, imprisoned, or rehabilitated. It does not inflame the problem through a wholesale military solution or by giving in to the demands of the terrorists or simply hoping that we can limp along, praying for some sort of reprieve from terrorist violence. It recognizes that the safe haven of a person's mind—how one sees the world, what one thinks, and the actions one hopes to take—cannot be discerned with all of the advanced technology in the US arsenal. It requires a nuanced, interdisciplinary approach that removes concerns, addresses legitimate complaints, eliminates jihadist enablers, and provides a peaceful path to the resolution of conflict.

But which countries should be targeted in this type of campaign and with what tools? Where should they be employed and for how long? What kinds of policies, bureaucratic organizations, and other structures should be created or reformed to deal with a foe that actively seeks death? Before we begin to answer these questions it is useful to rethink our general approach to how we confront al-Qaeda and its affiliates.

The Global War on Terror and Global Counterinsurgency

> *Ngo Dinh Diem [president of Vietnam in the late 1950s to the early 1960s] did not believe in representative government, although he had learned enough about Americans during two and a half years of exile in the United States to give [USAF Major General Edward] Lansdale the impression that he did. He was not interested in social justice.*
>
> —Neil Sheehan, *A Bright Shining Lie*, 1989

A useful intellectual framework in constructing a comprehensive approach to dealing with the problem of religiously inspired terrorist activity is to think of today's struggles against radical Islamists as part of a global counterinsurgency campaign.[6] Reconceptualizing the Islamist challenge in this manner provides us with viable solutions, or at a minimum, several possible ways with which to deal with the nonstate threat of al-Qaeda and its affiliates. The first aspect of this problem is to recognize that nonstate Islamist radicals are waging their own insurgency, not only against the United States and the West in general, but also within the broader Muslim community. Al-Qaeda, for example, as articulated by Osama bin Laden's deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri, seeks to "force the US out of [the Middle East]. This would be followed by the earth-shattering event, which the West trembles at: the establishment of an Islamic caliphate in Egypt."[7] Their second step would be to use the newly established caliphate to begin a global jihad against the West "in order to re-make the world order with the Muslim world in a dominant position."[8] To this end, al-Qaeda and its affiliates are challenging the governments of several Muslim countries in the Middle East, most prominently Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia; in Afghanistan and Pakistan in Central Asia; in South Asian countries such as Indonesia; and in Africa such as in Somalia, among many other countries and regions. In non-Muslim countries such as Russia, the Phil-

ippines, and India, they are waging wars of insurgency against "infidel" central governments. Additionally, their advocates vie for the loyalty and support—the hearts and minds, if you will—of the broader Muslim world to buttress their cause in expatriate Muslim communities in Europe and the United States, minority Muslim communities outside of the developed world, and those within majority Muslim countries. These sources of sympathy facilitate financial and material support, provide recruits, bolster propaganda opportunities, and provide other assistance to these extremist groups.

A second aspect of this problem is that typical counterinsurgency approaches of the past—most often gleaned from national wars of independence during the Cold War—offer ideas, plans of action, and lessons learned that are, to a significant degree, inadequate to address the challenge.[9] Typically, traditional counterinsurgency takes place within one country, and counterinsurgent policies are a blend of military, diplomatic, political, development, and information operations approaches, usually led by a single individual and highly synchronized, with the express goal of isolating the insurgents from the surrounding population that supports them so that they can be killed, arrested, or rehabilitated.[10] A key component of this strategy is securing a country's borders to prevent the insurgents from receiving outside support. In countries with armed Islamist insurgencies, these approaches can be quite effective although they have been imperfectly applied.[11] A key difference between today's nonstate Islamist insurgency and past insurgencies is that the former draw their resources globally and virtually over the Internet and readily take advantage of the growth of international transportation opportunities and communications technology. Additionally, their inspiration is religious and not secular, as were most of the insurgencies during the Cold War, although aspects of secular insurgencies have taken on religious overtones; therefore, they must be confronted on not only the temporal plain but the spiritual as well.[12] Furthermore, unlike many past insurgencies, nonstate radical Islamist insurgencies are not structured in as hierarchical a fashion as past insurgencies such as the Vietcong. They often operate in cells with little to no direction, and their amorphous nature complicates their eradication.[13] And finally, any attempt to centralize a global counterinsurgency campaign, which one might imagine would naturally fall under the auspices of the United Nations, is almost completely impossible; not only due to the difficulty in getting common agreement about the

problem, but also due to the resource shortfall of those who would need to be involved.[14]

Because the logistic, political, diplomatic, and military challenges of mounting a centralized global counterinsurgency campaign are very steep, a selective approach should be used that seeks to deny the "insurgent systems of energy." What this means is that the number of recruits, amount of financial assistance, sympathy, and other types of support for the insurgency will dissipate following certain types of actions from the global counterinsurgent. To accomplish this goal, a "constitutional path" must be established "that addresses Muslim aspirations without recourse to *jihad*, thus marginalizing Islamists." This approach, which one author refers to as "disaggregation," recognizes that not all points of contention between, within, and across the West and the Muslim world can or should be solved.[15] For example, the ongoing dispute over the disposition of Kashmir would be a prime candidate for US and global diplomatic initiatives. Not only would a resolution of this issue significantly diminish the "energy" to the global Islamist insurgency, but it would also reduce the strategic logic of Pakistani military and intelligence support to local combatants who are sent to fight the Indian military in Kashmir. Additionally, by resolving this issue, the Pakistani military may then be able to direct its energies to extending the government's authority to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and other parts of its domain that are ungoverned, undergoverned, or misgoverned. The disaggregation approach should also be supplemented by more conventional approaches, where appropriate, although modified in light of the global nature of religious extremist violence.

At the heart of any successful counterinsurgency strategy, including a global one, is recognition of the primacy of nonkinetic efforts to any favorable solution and the awareness that kinetic endeavors need to play a supporting role.[16] The goal of the conflict is "the right to win the hearts, minds, and acquiescence of the population. . . . Injudicious use of firepower creates blood feuds, homeless [internally displaced] people, and societal disruption that fuel and perpetuate the insurgency."[17] Accordingly, "[t]he most beneficial actions are often local politics, civic action, and beat-cop behaviors."[18] These subtler forms of persuasion build confidence and trust between the people and their government, whereas indiscriminate firepower that kills innocent people creates enemies. A successful nonkinetic strategy to defeat al-Qaeda and its affiliates should have five levels: global, strategic, national, operational, and tactical.[19] But the solution is

not one of simply changing certain US foreign policies and how they are implemented; it is also concerned with modifying the national policies of countries that are part of the insurgent network, both within their country and between other countries. Thinking of politics and diplomacy on these several levels and undertaking an integrated approach with other nonkinetic capabilities, we will be able to create "a political program designed to take as much wind as possible out of the insurgent's sails,"[20] thus denying the "insurgent systems of energy."[21]

Unlike conventional warfare where "military [kinetic] action . . . is generally the principal way to achieve the goal" and "[p]olitics *as an instrument of war* tends to take a back seat," in unconventional warfare, "*politics becomes an active instrument of operation*" and "every military move has to be weighed with regard to its political effects, and vice versa."[22] At their core, insurgencies are about political power struggles, usually between a central government and those who reject its authority, where the objective of the conflict is the population itself and the political right to lead it.[23] Thus, the center of gravity in this type of warfare is not the enemy's forces per se, but the population,[24] where "the exercise of political power depends on the tacit or explicit agreement of the population or, at worst, on its submissiveness."[25] Due to the centrality of politics to this type of warfare, counterinsurgent forces must craft a political and nonkinetic strategy that is sensitive to the needs of the population; seeks to secure their loyalty to the government; mobilizes the community to identify, expel, or fight the insurgent; and extends the authority and reach of the central government.[26] If done effectively, the political strategy will have succeeded in "separating the insurgents from popular support" so they can be killed, imprisoned by the government's security forces, or rehabilitated.[27] If a political and nonkinetic plan is implemented poorly or not at all, insurgent forces will capitalize on the grievances and frustrated hopes of a community to entice them away from the government and to the political program of the insurgent force. The community may then actively assist the insurgent force, providing them with a safe haven to rest, rearm, and redeploy to fight another day. In the long run, because this conflict is not about how many casualties counterinsurgent forces can impose upon the insurgents but upon the will to stay in the fight, counterinsurgents tend to grow weary of the amount of blood and treasure they must expend to defeat the insurgent. Though the insurgent force could conceivably lose every military engagement it has with counterinsurgent security forces, it can still win the war if the political

program of the government does not win the population over to its policies, plans, and initiatives.

Putting the US Government on a War Footing

> *If the forces have to be adapted to their new missions, it is just as important that the minds of the leaders and men—and this includes the civilian as well as the military—be adapted to the special demands of counterinsurgency warfare. Reflexes and decisions that would be considered appropriate for the soldier in conventional warfare and for the civil servant in normal times are not necessarily the right ones in counterinsurgency situations.*
>
> —David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*

Following the attacks of 9/11, the US government undertook a series of reforms to centralize and synchronize its intelligence and homeland defense departments, bureaus, and offices. The National Counterterrorism Center and the Department of Homeland Security were established, and in 2004 the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) was passed. Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell sees the IRTPA as providing "the means to do for the US intelligence community . . . [w]hat Goldwater-Nichols did for the military."[28] A global threat required a centralized and synchronized national response. Much like the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 was a further revision of the centralization of US military forces by the National Security Act of 1947 and its amendments, originally passed to help the military combat global communism; we need to examine the possibility of undertaking such a reform of some nonkinetic and unconventional warfare capabilities. We must become the focal point of a global counterinsurgency effort and put our "hearts and minds" agencies on a war footing. Unfortunately, we have yet to see such a comprehensive effort to unify and synchronize nonkinetic capabilities at the national level, although tentative steps have been taken in that direction.[29]

What is required is an interagency organization that centralizes all nonkinetic efforts of the US government while integrating unconventional warfare military capabilities into one place. The organization, which could be called the Irregular Warfare and Stability Operations Center (IWSOC), would focus on using nonkinetic efforts, coordinated with the military, as part of a broader strategy to defeat extremist religious violence. It should

be located in the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT) at the Department of State (DoS), in part to emphasize the central role politics plays in a counterinsurgency effort, but also to give it the bureaucratic heft it would need to achieve its mission. Additionally, the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) should be collapsed into S/CT, and then S/CT should be renamed the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Irregular Warfare, and Stability Operations (S/CIWSO). While the coordinator position would continue to require Senate confirmation and would function as a policy advisor to key national decision makers, the director of IWSOC would be a career civil servant with deputies from the US Agency for International Development (USAID), Special Operations Forces (SOF), and the intelligence community. Additionally, the IWSOC would issue an annual report, coordinated with the SOF's Asymmetric Warfare Group, on the status of US efforts at eliminating the causes of extremist religious violence and the implementation of counterinsurgency plans.

The center would have a core staff in Washington, DC, along with additional staff at key embassies and military commands around the world and in the field. This staff would be supplemented by other nonkinetic agencies such as the departments of Treasury, Justice, Education, and Health and Human Services, among others. Collectively, this DC-based staff would be charged with drafting global, strategic, and country-specific unconventional warfare plans in conjunction with the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (JFKSWCS), evaluating their progress, and participating in the interagency process. The center would also be responsible for accumulation of lessons learned; the recruitment, resourcing, and training of personnel; and planning. It would host fellows from selected countries, much like the JFKSWCS, who would learn the "best practices" of counterinsurgency, stability operations, and irregular warfare, among other topics. Additionally, the center would be charged with training traditional diplomats, soldiers, development experts, and intelligence officials as they prepare for their tours. Ideally, each government employee preparing for a tour in a selected country would either undertake a tour at IWSOC or rotate among the various core nonkinetic and kinetic agencies involved in the fight. For example, a USAID official who is interested in working in Pakistan would plan for a tour at the IWSOC or go to the Special Operations Command. Similarly, a member of the military deploying to Chad would complete a tour at USAID or the DoS. The goal is

to broaden the skill sets, contacts, and knowledge of government officials who are undertaking a traditional career path. In addition to this training, the IWSOC would also have a core group of dedicated unconventional warfare nonkinetic advisors focusing on the expeditionary side of irregular warfare.

The Diplomatic Field Service
Toward an Expeditionary Force

He did not expect to be looked after and rarely asked permission to do anything. His kind of American still had a bit of the frontier in him.

—Mark Etherington, *Revolt on the Tigris*

These advisors would be part of a separate service called the Diplomatic Field Service (DFS), which would be distinct though not completely isolated from the personnel systems of the Foreign Service and USAID, and would consist of a group of professionals with training and experience in diplomacy, development, intelligence, and unconventional warfare.[30] The members of the DFS would deploy with and be assigned to military units from the tactical to the global level with a special emphasis on SOF, with embassies in selected countries, and would embed with subnational groups. They would have the ability to reach back to an embassy, spend USAID money on development projects, conduct limited intelligence operations, and participate in unconventional warfare to facilitate their mission. A key goal of the DFS would be to advise in-country US officials and their host country counterparts on the nonkinetic side of unconventional warfare. They would also be charged with living among the people, facilitating connections with nontraditional power centers such as tribes, clan groups, families, religious organizations, and other parts of civil society, to work against extremist religious groups. By utilizing their unique skill sets, they would also be able to extend the reach of the central host government by facilitating reconstruction, development, good governance, and improved security. The advisors would undertake a career in either their chosen country or region, developing the personal connections needed to leverage relationships against religious extremists, and would remain in constant touch with the embassy, local US military units, and IWSOC through regular reports. Over time, these personnel would move into leadership positions as unconventional warfare and stability operations advisors, political officers, political/military

officers, or regional or counterterrorism experts within the DoS, including USAID and IWSOC, and at military commands. Their efforts would not only be part of an interagency team effort at the US embassy but would also be distinct from the more traditional responsibilities of diplomacy.

An excellent example of the kind of person the DFS should seek to recruit, train, and promote is John Bagot Glubb who served in the Middle East as a military officer for the British Government in the 1920s and stayed in the region where he eventually worked as an administrator and military leader for the Iraqi and Jordanian Governments into the 1950s. During the 1920s, Glubb organized and led the Iraqi tribes who lived along the border with Saudi Arabia into a very successful defense against the raiding parties of the Ikhwan, who were ardent followers of the Wahhabist view of Islam. What is unique about these efforts is that Glubb had spent roughly seven years traveling and living in the southern region of the country, befriending local tribes and gaining their respect and trust while seeking ways to reduce their grievances against the new central government. He did this largely by himself, with only the assistance of a local guide and regularly kept in touch with his superiors in Baghdad through reports detailing the politics of the area's tribes and their respective concerns. Prior to Glubb's efforts at defending the Iraqi tribes, they had lived in constant fear of raids by the Ikhwan who regularly slaughtered every living male they captured, contrary to the accepted Bedouin tradition of warfare where casualties were kept to a reasonable limit. Over the course of several years, Glubb single-handedly coordinated numerous local tribes and a small complement of Iraqi security forces in their efforts to resist Ikhwan raids and visit their winter grazing areas.[31] Due to his efforts the Ikhwan stopped their raids and the border between the two countries became settled.

Several lessons can be learned from Glubb's experience. The first is that working by, with, and through Muslim surrogates effectively reduced the appeal of the Ikhwan's fight against the infidel and facilitated the creation of an effective intelligence system and military strategy to deal with the Ikhwan.[32] A second lesson is that personnel systems need to be flexible with respect to allowing an employee to take additional risks (e.g., Glubb living alone with the tribes) in order to achieve other goals, such as protecting the southern Iraqi tribes. Such policies need to move beyond a force protection mindset and toward an expeditionary point of view that accepts casualties as an unfortunate but necessary cost of realizing our

goals. Furthermore, personnel need to reside in a country or region for a lengthy period of time, perhaps over the course of a whole career, to establish the language, cultural, political, and geographical knowledge of an area and to establish the relationships with local actors that allow them to effectively stand against extremist threats and to alter perhaps strongly felt though counterproductive policies. A final point of the personnel system is that Glubb was not only a military officer but also had diplomatic and intelligence skills and the ability to reach back to Iraq's capital for necessary support from the government. A third lesson is that religious identity is but one of many competing loyalties for the affections of people. Loyalty to family, clan, tribe, region, and nation are among many other rival claims for the hearts of men and can be used to mitigate the appeal of extremist religious ideologies. A fourth and final lesson is that the Ikhwan rebels had no safe haven left to flee to once Glubb had turned them back and after they had been militarily defeated by Ibn Saud, forgiveness and punishment were doled out in generally equal measure, in keeping with the Bedouin tradition. Ibn Saud, the leader of Saudi Arabia at that time, allowed the rebellious tribes to return to the fold through a process of reconciliation and rehabilitation through acts and expressions of loyalty and contrition. This carrot and stick approach, blending military strength with political and diplomatic flexibility, was very valuable to Ibn Saud and has its uses in our current conflict.

The Long Career
Leveraging Relationships for the Long War

> *The British Empire was created by such men, who had spent lonely and devoted lives in far-away stations in the East.*
>
> —John Bagot Glubb, *A Soldier with the Arabs*

In selected countries, diplomats, development experts, soldiers, and intelligence officials on a traditional career path should have a longer tour than the normal two- to three-year rotation. These officials, who would tend to be the most senior at the embassy in their respective field, would stay in the country or region they have chosen, knowing beforehand the obligations this would require, for a significantly longer time than presently occurs. They would seek to adjust the policies of the host government to address the legitimate grievances of the insurgency or dimin-

ish that country's role in the global insurgency while working with the government and maintaining and expanding US interests. They would also seek to erase cultural "practices while preserving and transforming others" that are harmful to successful counterinsurgency approaches.[33] They would not exclusively focus on the national political leadership of the country but would work with the host country's military as well, helping them develop a counterinsurgency doctrine, facilitating the training, manning, and resourcing of counterinsurgency efforts in the host military, and enhancing their deployment capabilities to possibly serve in other countries that have an active extremist religious insurgency.[34] They would also work to bolster and develop the nonkinetic institutions of the host country, such as the Ministries of Health, Education, Justice, and Transportation, to improve their capabilities. Improving the performance of these indigenous ministries will significantly reduce the grievances that jihadist enablers utilize to enlist support. The goal for these officials is to make the ostensibly more secular regime—whether it is monarchist, authoritarian, nationalist, democratic, or so forth—more dynamic, efficacious, and representative, thus undermining the attraction of radical Islamist beliefs and political programs.

If, for example, Egypt were selected as a key state for a sustained campaign of denying the "insurgent systems of energy," the ambassador would have to be carefully selected and would have to have the proper temperament and mix of skills in order to deradicalize the global insurgency by working with Egypt to modify its national policies. This process would have to be gradual to reduce nationalist complaints about foreign meddling and to successfully alter how the Egyptian government deals with Jamaat al-Islamiyya and the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, among other groups. As John Glubb viewed it, "In general, whenever possible, development should be in the nature of the gradual modification of existing institutions."[35] This approach would require a diplomat of rare abilities leveraging traditional diplomatic influence, supplemented by DFS staff, along with USAID, military, and intelligence personnel working with the government of Egypt to embrace nonkinetic approaches. The DFS would also embed with members of civil society to reduce the appeal of extremist religious beliefs and to cultivate relationships with members of civil society. DFS and SOF advisors would work with the Egyptian military to foster a counterinsurgency doctrine, making sure it was properly resourced, and assess their ability to deploy their counterinsurgent ca-

pabilities to a theater with an extremist religious insurgency, such as in Afghanistan. They would also work with the nonkinetic ministries of Egypt to bolster their capacity and to facilitate their deployment.

A model for the type of ambassador we might seek to cultivate is Evelyn Baring (later Lord Cromer), who served from 1884 to 1907 as the British consul-general and diplomatic agent of Egypt. His 23 years in Egypt brought a period of stability and justice to the country that greatly enhanced the interests of the Egyptians and the United Kingdom. Because of his strong interest in promoting justice for the Egyptian people and focusing on education, finance, agricultural reform, and administration of the courts, Cromer's tenure was also marked by much admiration from the Egyptian people while they simultaneously viewed their own government with strong contempt.[36] This is certainly an admirable place to be if you are an ambassador of another country seeking to end an insurgency. This case was mentioned not to suggest that any kind of American pro-consul or consul-general should be imposed upon Egypt, or any other country for that matter, or that whatever democratization has taken place should be rolled back, but only to make the point that longevity in position by the right sort of public servant who supports a correct policy conveys many advantages. Our career paths and political timelines in the United States do not presently support any kind of policy of "gradual modification." Lord Cromer's four subsequent successors each governed for less than three years.[37] Each man brought his own particular interests to the position, so consistency of effort was a challenge, and much of their collective tenure was marked by intense political acrimony as they abandoned Cromer's policy of trusteeship and replaced it with more abstract theories of government. They began to abstain from Egyptian politics, and subsequently good governance declined and the state focused less on long-term development and the interests of the people to more ephemeral topics and considerations.[38] The relationship between Egypt and the United Kingdom was never the same, and the Egyptian people suffered because of it.

Enhanced Stability Operations Eliminating Safe Havens

When you break bread with people and share their troubles and joys, the barriers of language, of politics and of religion soon vanish. I liked them and they liked me, that was all that mattered.

—Julien Bryan

In states that are suffering from an armed insurgency or have areas of their country where they lack control or do not have a government presence, thus creating a safe haven for religious extremists, another tool must be available to US policy makers besides longer careers and an expeditionary force of nonkinetic advisors. In these cases, enhanced stability operations, sometimes taking place side by side with war fighting, are key. It is here that Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) can help provide nonkinetic capabilities to host governments by facilitating reconstruction, development, good governance, and security while expanding the reach and capabilities of the government to these ungoverned, undergoverned, or misgoverned insurgent safe havens. PRTs were started in Afghanistan in 2003 as part of the US effort to expand the reach of the Afghan government into the provinces. These teams largely focused on facilitating reconstruction, development, good governance, the reach of the central government, and through these efforts, enhancing security.[39] In Afghanistan, the PRT has typically consisted of a core group of nonkinetic personnel: a diplomat, a development expert, an agricultural advisor, and a military civil-affairs capacity, along with a representative from the Afghan Ministry of Interior.[40] They usually have a dedicated military force-protection element, although instances exist where this has been supplemented by local tribal assets and indigenous security elements, and they work very closely with local government officials to achieve the national government's goals.

The tools the PRT brings to the nonkinetic fight are development dollars and expertise; diplomatic skills, including conflict resolution and cultural understanding; technical expertise, such as in the fields of agriculture, construction, and engineering; political skills, like fostering government institutions and mentoring leaders; and management and policing skills, among a host of other capabilities.[41] In Afghanistan, PRTs have usually been led by a member of the US military although, with the expansion of North Atlantic Treaty Organization and International Security Assistance

Force units into the provinces, this basic PRT template has been modified in light of each country's capabilities and goals. In Iraq, the PRTs are led by a DoS employee, usually with a military deputy, and they typically have a member of the USAID on their staff and a military civil-affairs advisor. These nonkinetic advisors are supplemented by members of the military who have been brought in due to their unique skill sets, and force protection is provided by the military unit with which the PRT is embedded.

Thus far the basic PRT concept has been used in Afghanistan and Iraq and essentially contains a force-protection element, a nonkinetic capacity, and a central host-government representative(s). If seen as modular units, these can be modified to reflect local conditions, central government capacity, and the goals of the US government. In some countries, it may be more useful to have a DFS member leading a PRT that is wholly manned by government representatives from the host nation protected by local tribesmen. In other instances, there may be an indigenously led PRT manned with DFS, DoS, USAID, and other nonkinetic advisors with local contract guards. However these components are selected, the US government needs to have the flexibility and wherewithal to alter PRT arrangements to effectively address the problem of safe havens. To these ends, it needs to create a standing capability of nonkinetic advisors and resources to deploy on a regular basis and not narrowly conceptualize the idea as a reserve capacity that will only be called upon during a crisis. If deployed correctly, PRTs can go a long way toward eliminating terrorist safe havens and preventing extremist religious groups from effectively organizing to challenge the host nation's central government or mount a terrorist attack abroad. When integrated with SOF and DFS capabilities, PRTs' influence is enhanced even more.

Enlisting Civil Society
A Cultural and Religious Offensive

However much the United States government reforms its kinetic and nonkinetic capabilities and policies, the long war against religious extremists who use terrorist violence cannot be won without support from the US population. In many respects, American civil society can provide more effective tools for dealing with extremist religious groups than the government, but they have to be harnessed and directed in such a way that they effectively reduce extremist religious violence. If this is done, we will be

able to confront extremist religious groups and their leaders with a cultural and religious offensive. To this end, a separate arm of the Irregular Warfare and Stability Operations Center, called the Civil Society Center (CSC), should be established. It would not be officially connected to the US government, though it could possibly receive federal grants and other assistance, but would still work in concert with government activities.

One CSC goal would be to facilitate a robust people-to-people exchange program in selected countries. This program could be loosely modeled off the State Department's International Visitor Program and would seek to build cultural ties with nontraditional sources of leadership such as tribal, clan, family, and religious leaders, among others. It would also seek to develop ties with members of governments who work in nonkinetic ministries to create lasting personal relationships. For example, a leading member of the Egyptian Ministry of Health could work or study in the United States at a leading medical college or university, burnishing his credentials in health administration or medical procedures. This type of outreach effort would also aggressively get in touch with US citizens and immigrant groups within the United States who are Muslim or who come from countries that have been selected for a focused approach. By consistently reaching out to these groups, hearing their concerns, and sharing the nonkinetic approach to addressing the challenge of extremist groups, these efforts may provide a robust network for the US government. The DFS, SOF, and other government agencies would benefit from these relationships and profit from the potential recruitment opportunities that such contacts would offer. If members of these various groups were to join the US government, they would also help efforts abroad by reducing the cultural, linguistic, religious, and ethnic barriers that sometimes exist between US entities and the populations we are seeking to work by, with, and through.

Because this entity is not officially connected to the US government, it could also actively liaise with and recruit Muslim religious scholars and leaders in an effort to create a "moderate" or legitimate alternative to the messages and narrative of Islamists.[42] Ideally, these scholars would be working full time at the CSC and would respond to an extremist religious message, in whatever form it may come, including over the Internet, with a robust and scholarly response drawn from the teachings of Islam.[43] Additionally, through their contacts with other scholars around the world, the CSC's imams could facilitate the deployment of Muslim religious leaders

with frontline units that are dealing with religious extremist groups. In Afghanistan in 2005, for example, US Special Forces (USSF) teams had what they referred to as a "Mobile Mullah" who would accompany USSF units and speak with Taliban detainees in an effort to "deprogram" them from the extremist teachings of that movement. Additionally, US forces are running a similar program at the military prisons of Camp Cropper and Camp Bucca in Iraq, where detainees receive religious instruction from 43 imams who are focused on deprogramming hardened al-Qaeda fighters by showing them how their interpretation of Islam is incorrect.[44] Because these CSC scholars do not follow extremist religious teachings, they can also seek to convince more radical Muslim leaders of their incorrect understanding of Islam. Not only can the followers of radical Islamists be deprogrammed, but their enablers can also be confronted and perhaps even convinced of the errors of their ways. The religious scholars of the CSC could also draft information operations products, provide advice during the drafting of counterinsurgency plans, and provide training to personnel who are preparing to deploy. An organized and well-resourced CSC can provide a robust capability to the US government to reduce the appeal of Islamists and confront them and their supporters with a correct understanding of Islam that is both peaceful and positive.

However influential Muslim scholars can be at counteracting radical religious teachings, the most effective means of deterring would-be terrorists is by having them listen to former terrorists recount their experiences while repudiating their previous beliefs and misdeeds. The government of Saudi Arabia, for example, has developed a robust effort to prevent radical religious beliefs from gaining currency through a program of showing taped interviews and discussions with failed jihadists on national television who encourage other Saudis not to be taken in by radical Islamists.[45] To get to this point, however, each "reformed" jihadist has to go through a program run by the Ministry of Interior that requires regular visits and conversations with Muslim religious scholars who point out the errors of radical Islamist thinking, and they have to "come clean" by detailing all of their knowledge about extremist religious groups. Eventually, they are provided with a path of integration back into society through a step-by-step reconciliation process that rewards compliance by helping the individual with employment, free medical assistance, monthly stipends, and sometimes cars.[46] While such a program should not be established by the US government, its effectiveness is certainly impressive and warrants

integration into a cultural and religious offensive against radical Islamists.[47] Any such program should be administered by the governments of Muslim countries, although they can certainly be aided by the CSC, and any lessons learned from these and any other efforts should be shared through a "best practices" process coordinated through the IWSOC.

A Strategy to Deter and Defeat Religious Extremists from Engaging in Terrorist Activity

A comprehensive strategy to deter religious extremists from engaging in terrorist attacks should seek to reduce the support mechanisms and recruitment and propaganda opportunities they need by embracing a holistic, nonkinetic approach that aims to separate the terrorists from the population so that they can be killed, arrested, or rehabilitated. It should be done by addressing the legitimate grievances of the global Islamist insurgency while maintaining US interests and working by, with, and through surrogates and bolstering their nonkinetic, security, and unconventional warfare capabilities. It should be for the long-term with targeted nonkinetic approaches that eliminate safe havens and seek to reform the policies of selected countries to remove injustices while refuting Islamist ideology. Nonkinetic capabilities should be integrated with military assets at all levels, and we should seek to reform the military policies of targeted countries so that they incorporate unconventional warfare approaches. Terrorist messages must be refuted, and an alternative and peaceful counternarrative to Islamist ideology should be crafted. If done effectively, the physical safe havens of terrorists will be eliminated, the injustices they feed off of to fuel their causes will have diminished, their messages will be consistently refuted, and US and allied nonkinetic capabilities will have improved to the point where Muslim populations actively support our efforts of separating the jihadist from the local population. All of these efforts should be done while defending and extending US interests, maintaining good relations with our allies, and always seeking to incorporate lessons learned and best practices. We should seek to isolate regimes and groups that support extremist religious violence, while cultivating links to moderate or "legitimate" powers, and actively engage organizations that peacefully represent Muslim populations (see appendix B for a list of targeted countries).[48]

If implemented with the consistency and unity of effort that is required, proponents of extremist religious beliefs will find that their physical safe havens no longer exist, and the ability of their propaganda to recruit new adherents will have diminished. Because legitimate grievances are being addressed and Islamist messages are refuted, Muslim support for their efforts will have dried up as moderate Muslims and their governments seek viable and peaceful ways to resolve conflict and address the needs of the people (see appendix A for a list of guiding principles to deter and defeat religious extremism). It is easier for these governments and Muslim populations to do this because the United States actively seeks their views and, where appropriate and feasible, tries to create solutions by working by, with, and through surrogate partners with a nonkinetic effort. And because of the long-standing relationships our ambassadors, DFS, USAID, military, and intelligence personnel have with their leadership, we have the ability to leverage these personal ties to facilitate just settlements for the population by reforming the host country's national policies. Furthermore, the poverty, oppression, and violent conditions that many jihadist recruiters take advantage of to enlist suicide attackers will also decline because the people will see improvements in their lives or, because of deployed nonkinetic assets and changes in national policy, see hope for a better future giving them the ability to resist the violent alternative that jihadist recruiters offer. For Islamists in the developed world who are college-educated and "modern," their angst and concern for how Muslims are treated by the West or by their indigenous governments will diminish as their legitimate grievances are addressed and their beliefs no longer provide the answers they seek. Seeing the United States at the forefront of helping the Muslim people, they will be hard-pressed to seek "justice" through suicide attacks or by recruiting and helping others to do so.

With all of these tools, the safe haven of would-be terrorists' minds—how they see the world, what they think, and the actions they hope to take—will be filled with peaceful alternatives to extremist religious violence. They will see their living conditions improve through a more responsive government or because the DFS or government PRT in their village is helping them; their local leadership tells them that violence is not the answer because they want to work with the government; and their local police force, largely drawn from their own tribe, and tribal sheik ask them to identify "strangers" in their village who may wish to cause violence so that they can be arrested or killed. They also hold a handbill,

listen to a mosque speaker, or see a poster refuting the violent message of the jihadist recruiter, which also reminds them of the failed terrorists they had heard about on the radio who had been duped by other jihadist recruiters. And when their village and tribe are threatened by an extremist religious group, the loyalty they have to their family, clan, village, tribe, region, and nation bolsters their confidence to effectively confront them. This is also possible because of the strong support they receive from the DFS and SOF (US, allied, or indigenous). They know that their concerns make it to the provincial, regional, and national capitals either through a government presence in their village or because the DFS representative who lives with their tribal sheik conveys them to the government through the US embassy via secure communications equipment. And finally, the ability of indigenous and US military forces to kill or capture religious extremists is easier because the community supports their efforts by sharing intelligence about extremists and by enlisting local security forces to protect their homes. They also support the military because they view them as providers of security and not as oppressors of a distant or repressive government.

Conclusion

Though significant changes in the US government's bureaucratic organization and performance have taken place since 11 September 2001, we have yet to see a serious reform of our nonkinetic departments and agencies in order to put them on a war footing. Many of our efforts are hamstrung due to limited resources, poor coordination, career tracks that are geared towards a pre-9/11 world, and rules that curtail our ability to operate in an expeditionary manner. Additionally, while our government struggles mightily to identify, train, and deploy staff to the fight against al-Qaeda, these efforts are often ad hoc and are not facilitating the development of a dedicated cadre of specialists who can focus on confronting al-Qaeda with targeted nonkinetic efforts. In this long war against al-Qaeda and its affiliates, which I regard as a global insurgency, we need to lengthen the tours of key officials in selected countries and regions, create an enduring stability operations and irregular warfare capability, build an expeditionary core of advisors, and create a counternarrative to radical Islam that is "legitimate" and peaceful.

Most of the ideas outlined in this essay are additions to or modifications of current approaches to address the problem of extremist religious groups intent on using terrorist violence. They are meant to do as little violence as possible to existing personnel systems and bureaucratic organizations while improving their performance and establishing new ways of addressing the challenge of extremist religious groups. Hopefully, the US government will be able to recruit, train, deploy, and promote American equivalents of John Bagot Glubb in our DFS and identify partners for him, such as Lord Cromer, in our diplomatic corps. Additionally, with these added nonkinetic resources, the US government will now have the ability and hopefully the inclination to embrace, integrate, and deploy the necessary unconventional warfare and nonkinetic capabilities needed to fight the long war against extremist religious groups intent on attacking our people. By embracing a holistic, nonkinetic approach that is supported by a robust kinetic capability, the US government will be able to follow a more enlightened policy than the "kill 'em all," "withdrawal," "concession and kill," and "weathering the storm" approaches that so many people advocate uncritically. SSQ

Appendix A

Basic Principles for a Strategy against Religious Extremism

1. Remove the political and military rationale for states and other groups that sponsor religious extremism and terrorist activity.
2. Work by, with, and through surrogates while bolstering their nonkinetic and unconventional warfare capabilities.[49]
3. Seek justice for legitimate grievances while isolating, arresting, rehabilitating, or killing groups and individuals that promote violence.
4. Leave no safe havens.
5. Religious identity is but one of many competing loyalties for the affections of people; cultivate those that defeat the appeal of religious extremism.
6. Integrate military strength with political and diplomatic flexibility along with other nonkinetic assets at all levels of government.
7. Counter Islamist messages and craft an alternative to the Islamist narrative.
8. Constantly incorporate lessons learned and best practices into the planning and execution of your strategy.
9. Government personnel systems need to allow employees to take additional risks.
10. The US government needs to move beyond a force-protection mind-set and toward an expeditionary point of view.
11. Government personnel need to reside in a country or region for a lengthy period of time, perhaps over the course of a whole career.
12. Government personnel need to have the skills of diplomats, military leaders, development specialists, and intelligence officers.
13. Reconciliation and punishment need to be aspects of a comprehensive approach.
14. Cultivate cultural links with targeted countries.
15. As always, adjust your plans accordingly and think unconventionally; the insurgent does, and so must we!

Appendix B

Countries with Islamic Populations

The following chart lists all the countries of the world which have at least 10 percent of their population claiming Islamic religious affiliation.[50] I have also included the countries of Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and Paraguay that, while they have small to insignificant numbers of Muslims, do play a role in the global insurgency through the presence of safe havens in their territories. Data for the "% Muslim" category was taken from the US Department of State's 2006 *International Religious Freedom* report. The "Insurgency/Civil War" category was taken from the US Department of State's 2006 *Patterns of Global Terrorism* report. Whether a country's government is democratic or not, as is indicated in the "Democracy" category, was taken from The Economist Intelligence Unit's *Index of Democracy*, which is an assessment of a country's democracy based upon an analysis of its civil liberties, conduct of elections, media freedom, participation, public opinion, functioning government, corruption, and stability. Whether the Irregular Warfare and Stability Operations Center should engage with a country or should the US government begin longer tours there, deploy DFS staff, establish PRTs, utilize SOF, or engage its people through the Civil Society Center were decided by the author. In general, if a country is not a democracy, I have opted to extend the tours of US government personnel. If a country faces an armed insurgency or is going through a civil war, I have also recommended longer tours along with the deployment of DFS, PRTs, SOF, and the Civil Society Center. I have made a judgment call as to the capacity of a state's institutions (kinetic, nonkinetic) to effectively confront an insurgency or civil war when making other recommendations of the appropriate mix of approaches. I am confident some of my colleagues may disagree with these assessments, but my general goal is to prompt debate and discussion, leaving to the hands of more knowledgeable experts which countries should be selected, for whatever reason, and how best to deal with them.

Country	% Muslim	Insurgency/ Civil War	Democracy	IWSOC	Long Tours	DFS	PRTs	SOF	CSC
Afghanistan	99	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Albania	70	No	Yes						
Algeria	99	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes
Argentina	1.5	No	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	
Azerbaijan	93.4	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes			Yes
Bahrain	93.1	No	No		Yes				
Bangladesh	88.3	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Benin	19.8	No	Yes						
Bosnia & Herzegovina	40	No	Yes						
Brazil	0.016	No	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	
Brunei	64.5	No	N/A						
Burkina Faso	52	No	No						
Cameroon	20	No	No						
Central African Republic	15	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Chad	51	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Colombia	0.024	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	
Comoros	98	No	No						
Cote d'Ivoire	35	No	No						
Djibouti	94	No	N/A	Yes	Yes	Yes			Yes
Egypt	90	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes
Eritrea	48	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ethiopia	32.8	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
The Gambia	95	No	N/A						
Georgia	9.9	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Guinea	85	No	No						
Guinea-Bissau	45	No	No						
India	13.4	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes		Yes	
Indonesia	88.2	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes		Yes	Yes
Iran	98	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes			Yes
Iraq	97	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Israel	12	No	Yes	Yes				Yes	
Jordan	95	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	
Kazakhstan	47	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	
Kuwait	80	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	
Lebanon	55	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Liberia	20	No	Yes	Yes	Yes			Yes	Yes
Libya	97	No	No	Yes	Yes			Yes	Yes
Macedonia	32	No	Yes						
Malaysia	60.4	No	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes		Yes
Maldives	100	No	N/A						
Mali	90	No	Yes						
Mauritania	99.9	No	No						
Mauritius	16.3	No	Yes						
Morocco	99.9	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mozambique	20	No	Yes						
Niger	85	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Nigeria	50	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Oman	92.66	No	No	Yes	Yes			Yes	Yes
Pakistan	96.7	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Paraguay	0.008	No	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	
Qatar	77.5	No	No	Yes		Yes		Yes	
Russia	14	Yes	Yes	Yes					
Saudi Arabia	100	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes
Senegal	95	No	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sierra Leone	60	No	No	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Singapore	15	No	Yes	Yes					
Somalia	100	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sudan	65	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Suriname	13.5	No	N/A						
Syria	88	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes			Yes
Tajikistan	90	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes
Tanzania	45	No	Yes						
Tunisia	98	No	No	Yes	Yes				
Turkey	99	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Turkmenistan	89	No	No	Yes		Yes			
United Arab Emirates	76	No	No	Yes	Yes			Yes	Yes
Uzbekistan	88	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes
West Bank & Gaza	84	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes
Yemen	99	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes

1. Diana West, "Total War, Total Victory," *Washington Times*, 13 July 2007.
2. William Blum, *Rogue State: A Guide to the World's Only Superpower* (Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 2005).
3. Michael Scheuer, *Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on Terror* (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2005).
4. Ibid.
5. Mortimer B. Zuckerman, "Putting Safety First," *U.S. News and World Report*, 16 July 2007, 60.
6. David Kilcullen, "Countering Global Insurgency: A Strategy for the War on Terrorism," *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, (August 2005) Vol. 28, No. 4, pp. 597–617.
7. Ayman al-Zawahiri, "Knights under the Prophet's Banner," in *Al-Sharq al-Awsat*, 2 December 2001. Quoted in Kilcullen, "Countering Global Insurgency," 597–617.
8. The idea is from al-Zawahiri, but the quotation is from Kilcullen.
9. Kilcullen, "Countering Global Insurgency," 597–617.
10. Ibid.
11. Although other examples exist where purely military approaches were used to good effect against insurgents, they are of limited use in waging a global counterinsurgency campaign. See Caroline Elkins, *Imperial Reckoning*: *The Untold Story of Britain's Gulag in Kenya* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2005); and John A. Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).
12. Kilcullen, "Countering Global Insurgency."
13. David Kilcullen, "Counter-insurgency Redux," *Survival* 48, no. 4 (Winter 2007–8): 116.
14. Kilcullen, "Countering Global Insurgency," 597–617.
15. Ibid.
16. David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006). Some portions of this section were published in an article titled "The Political Officer as Counter-Insurgent" in *Small Wars Journal* in 2007.
17. David Kilcullen, " 'Twenty-Eight Articles:' Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency," *Military Review* (May–June 2006): 103.
18. Ibid.
19. Any political strategy to defeat al-Qaeda, its affiliates, other extremist religious groups, and the insurgencies faced in Afghanistan and Iraq must integrate all elements of national power to include not only political resources and strategies but also economic, informational, and military.
20. Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, 72.
21. Kilcullen, "Countering Global Insurgency," 597–617.
22. Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, 4–5. Emphasis in original.
23. Ibid.
24. Kalev I. Sepp, "Best Practices in Counterinsurgency," *Military Review* (May–June 2005): 10.
25. Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, 4–5.
26. Ibid., 72.
27. Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*, 115.
28. Mike McConnell, "Overhauling Intelligence," *Foreign Affairs* (July/August 2007), 50–53.
29. Sebastian Sprenger, "DOD, State Dept. Eye Joint 'Hub' for Stability Operations, Irregular War," *Inside the Pentagon*, November 21, 2006; John Hillen, "Developing a National Counterinsurgency Capability for the War on Terror," *Military Review* (January–February 2007), 13–15; and Michael W. Coulter, "State and Navy: Partnership in Diplomacy," *Proceedings* (July 2007), 44–48.

30. An earlier version of these ideas was published in *Military Review*. Please see Dan Green, "Counterinsurgency Diplomacy: Political Advisors at the Operational and Tactical Levels," *Military Review* (May–June 2007), 24–30.

31. John Bagot Glubb, *A Soldier with the Arabs* (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1957); John Bagot Glubb, *Britain and the Arabs: A Study of Fifty Years 1908 to 1958* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1959); John Bagot Glubb, *The Story of the Arab Legion* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1948); and John Bagot Glubb, *Arabian Adventures: Ten Years of Joyful Service* (London, Cassell, 1978).

32. This "indirect approach" has long been an aspect of US unconventional warfare doctrine and was most recently stated in Joint Forces Quarterly. Please see, David P. Fridovich and Fred T. Krawchuk, "Winning in the Pacific: The Special Operations Forces Indirect Approach," Joint Forces Quarterly, issue 44 (1st Quarter 2007): 24–27.

33. Joseph A. Massad, *Colonial Effects*: *The Making of National Identity in Jordan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 159.

34. At least two SOF from the Middle East have deployed to Afghanistan, and their ability to conduct unconventional warfare due to their cultural and religious backgrounds was impressive. This indirect approach can often be more effective than any of our best efforts. Many militaries of the developing world pursue a completely conventional military or security services approach to dealing with their insurgency. We must assist them to also adopt a more counterinsurgency and nonkinetic mind-set and to resource any such approach.

35. Massad, *Colonial Effects*, 230.

36. John Bagot Glubb, *Britain and the Arabs*, 180–90.

37. Ibid., 190.

38. Ibid., 188.

39. Robert M. Perito, *The U.S. Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan* (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace, 2005), 1–16.

40. Sometimes Special Operations Forces are collocated with conventional forces and provincial reconstruction teams. The Panjshir Valley PRT is the only PRT in Afghanistan that is led by a DoS employee.

41. Other nonkinetic capabilities exist independent of the PRT such as US Army civil-affairs and psychological operations units that are attached to conventional and SOF forces. These are often the only nonkinetic resources we have in the field because PRTs are not in every province and are sometimes unable to get out to an area due to logistical or security concerns. Some portions of this section were published in an article titled "The Political Officer as Counter-Insurgent" in *Small Wars Journal* in 2007.

42. The idea of using Muslim scholars to counteract radical Islamists has been most highly developed by Dr. Rohan Gunaratna, director of the International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. Dr. Gunaratna is also the author of *Inside Al-Qaeda: Global Network of Terror* (New York: Berkley Books, 2003).

43. Ibid.

44. Walter Pincus, "Iraq's 'Battlefield of the Mind,'" *The Washington Post*, 10 December 2007.

45. MSNBC, "Truck bomber turns against jihad in Iraq: Disfigured and feeling cheated, Saudi denounces al-Qaida mind-set," *MSNBC.com*, 29 July 2007.

46. Ibid.

47. In the interest of justice, some failed jihadists may need to face the death penalty. These and other issues will be determined by each country.

48. Encouragingly, President Bush recently decided to appoint an envoy to Islamic nations to "listen" and "learn," and such efforts should be continued, expanded, and deepened. Please see Michael A. Fletcher, "Bush Plans Envoy to Islamic Nations, Appointee will 'Listen' and 'Learn'," *The Washington Post*, 28 June 2007.

49. This approach has worked very effectively in the Iraqi province of Al Anbar, which the author can verify through personal involvement in this effort. A good summary of how this process has worked can be found in: Greg Jaffe, "How Courting Sheiks Slowed Violence in Iraq," *The Wall Street Journal*, 8 August 2007.

50. I absolutely recognize that the problem of the nonstate Islamist insurgency requires us to also deal with how individual governments deal with their Muslim minorities in the *developed* world as well as in the developing world. This view is consistent with Kilcullen's prescription with how best to deal with a global Islamist insurgency; we are as much a part of the system as any other country. Having said that, I trust that the governments of the developed world are better able to adjust their internal policies in order to meet this threat than many developing countries and that most of the problems of the Islamist insurgency have their roots in problems abroad rather than at home.

Letter to Editor

The Drawdown Asymmetry

This is my first comment since retiring from the US Air Force in 1984. I just read Lt Col "Q" Hinote's article "The Drawdown Asymmetry: Why Ground Forces Will Depart Iraq but Air Forces Will Stay." Colonel Hinote tells an important story in a superior way—it is a story that must gain wide exposure.

The national debate has become centered on how we MUST get the US military out of Iraq as soon as possible. I can think of few things that would be more detrimental for our nation's interests. Certainly, we need to draw down as the situation permits, but to cave in to pressure without considering the strategic implications for our country and for our partners and allies would dishonor the sacrifices our brave countrymen and women have made to remove an evil, corrupt, and sadistic regime from power. A precipitous pullout could leave the brave Iraqis who have begun a democratic experiment to suffer even further disgraces at the hands of insurgents and those who would return Iraq to despotic rule.

This is no time for polarizing language—the issue is not one of "holding the line" versus "defeatism." Rather it should be about our national leaders making a strategic decision by carefully weighing our interests and responsibilities in the region and with respect to the Iraqi people against the costs in terms of military capabilities and national treasure. While no one wants to see our young men and women put in harm's way, it is a mission that today's professional Airmen, Soldiers, Sailors, and Marines have signed up to do as willing volunteers. They are the most recent manifestation of a long line of great generations of Americans who are defending our country far from home while bringing hope for a democratic society to a nation that has known nothing but oppression, dictatorship, and warfare for 30 or more years.

Colonel Hinote carefully makes a case that is not getting to the US public. Somehow this vital information must receive wider attention. He has placed the situation in Iraq in the proper strategic context, he has realistically portrayed our responsibilities to the Iraqi people and the Iraqi government, and he has identified the long-term costs to our nation and our Air Force.

I congratulate Colonel Hinote for his excellent strategic analysis and *Strategic Studies Quarterly* for providing a forum for such a vital discussion.

George M. Browning Jr.
Lt Gen, USAF, Retired

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Strategic Studies Quarterly (SSQ), a refereed journal of ideas and issues, serves the greater defense community by providing a forum for the critical examination of and debate about warfare, strategy, national and international security, and defense policy. The intent is to explore significant issues of current and continuing interest to the United States Air Force and the Department of Defense and to serve as a vehicle for the intellectual enrichment of senior military officers, members of the government, and academia.

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Strategic Studies Quarterly (SSQ)
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