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FUTURE WARFARE PAPER

The UAE National Security Strategy in The 21st CENTURY

**SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIRMENTS FOR THE CURRICULUM OF THE
SCHOOL OF ADVANCED WARFIGHTING**

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AY 2004-05

Mentor: _____

Approved: _____

Date: _____

Report Documentation Page

*Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188*

Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

1. REPORT DATE 2005	2. REPORT TYPE	3. DATES COVERED 00-00-2005 to 00-00-2005			
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE The UAE National Security Strategy in the 21st Century		5a. CONTRACT NUMBER			
		5b. GRANT NUMBER			
		5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER			
6. AUTHOR(S)		5d. PROJECT NUMBER			
		5e. TASK NUMBER			
		5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER			
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) United States Marine Corps, School of Advanced Warfighting, Marine Corps University, 2076 South Street, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, VA, 22134-5068		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER			
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)		10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)			
		11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)			
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT Same as Report (SAR)	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 34	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified			

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title: The UAE National Security Strategy in The 21st Century.

Author: Major Musallam M. Al Rashedi (SOC-UAE).

Thesis: The thesis of this paper is that in order to provide for the future national security of its citizens, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) must develop a new grand strategy based on the dual concepts of military jointness and broad intra-governmental and inter-state cooperation among all national, regional and international components involved in national and regional Gulf security. Developing a new strategy incorporating these concepts is necessary both horizontally within and among the UAE's civilian and military services, and vertically through interoperability and cooperation regionally and internationally.

Discussion: The UAE, as well as all of the other Arab Gulf States, has historically lacked the human resources to repel a determined conventional military attack from a larger, neighboring enemy. Traditionally, the first UK and then the USA have undertaken the role of protecting the Arab Gulf states from external attack. However, in recent years, the political costs of foreign security assistance to both the Gulf States and international allies has increased dramatically. It is time now for a new approach where we leverage national and regional and international capabilities to deal with the two predominant security threats in the Gulf, a conventional warfare (CW) threat and an asymmetrical warfare (AW) threat. At the national level, UAE conventional armed services are small, but are reasonably well trained and armed. The UAE has a small special operations command to combat asymmetric threat but is still need to be integrated with other national assets to make it more effective. At the regional level, the GCC created a regional defense force, Peninsula Shield, in 1984. A small standing force in Saudi Arabia, but it has no operational capability and needs to be strengthened to make it viable. There is no "regional" counter-CW capability. However, each member state has some kind of SOF with counter-CW capabilities. At the international level, enhancing Allies efficient joint cooperation, particularly the US, to support the national and regional collective security capabilities through maintaining daily relationship, educations, technical support, joint planning and military exercises, advising on interoperability and standardization, and other related issues.

Recommendation: I propose a national security strategy for the UAE to meet the rapidly changing threats, both conventional and asymmetrical, which will face the country in the 21st century. It consists of a major restructuring of both the political crisis decision-making process, and major changes in the missions and responsibilities of an expanded group of government agencies engaged in maintaining national security. The new strategic vision is based on the dual concepts of military jointness and broad inter-agency cooperation. I recommend creating the following: First: an Emirates National Security Council; Second, an inter-agency special operation center; and Third, a Joint Staff for the Armed Forces. Fourth, I recommend the UAE seek to persuade GCC states to pursue a similar regional strategic approach.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Disclaimer	ii
Executive Summary	iii
Table of Contents	iv
Thesis Statement	1
Military Jointness	1
Broader Cooperation	2
Threat Assessment	2
Conventional Warfare Threats	3
Asymmetrical Warfare Threat	3
Current National Security Capabilities	4
Current Regional Security Capabilities	7
Preparing For National Security In The 21 st Century: A Strategic Vision	
Recommendations	12
Bibliography	16

THESIS STATEMENT

The thesis of this paper is that in order to provide for the future national security of its citizens, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) must develop a new grand strategy based on the dual concepts of military jointness and broad intra-governmental and inter-state cooperation among all national, regional and international components involved in national and regional Gulf security. Developing a new strategy incorporating these concepts is necessary both horizontally within and among the UAE's civilian and military services that share responsibilities for national security, and vertically through interoperability and cooperation regionally and internationally.

Military Jointness:

The Desert Storm campaign in 1991 revolutionized war fighting in a desert environment, emphasizing joint operations and joint command, control, communications, computers and intelligence (C⁴I). According to General John M. Shalikashvili, "The nature of modern warfare demands that we fight as a joint force. This was important yesterday; it is essential today; and it will be even more imperative tomorrow."¹

Desert Storm demonstrated beyond doubt that the huge advances in weapons, communications and transportation technologies require that future UAE national and Gulf regional security can best be maintained through a strategy of joint war fighting by land, sea and air forces at the national level; and joint military interoperability regionally and with international partners in Gulf security as well. Conventional warfare (CW) must be countered by joint forces.

¹ Cited in General John J. Sheehan, USMC, "Next Steps in Joint Force Integration," *Joint Force Quarterly* (Autumn, 1996), pp. 41-47.

Broader Cooperation:

Desert Storm proved not only that military jointness both within and among each of the Arab Gulf states' armed forces is required to counter modern CW attacks, but also military cooperation with friendly foreign powers against large neighboring aggressors is also crucial. In addition, in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the Trade Towers in New York City and the Pentagon (9/11), asymmetrical warfare (AW) has emerged a major national security threat worldwide, including the Gulf region. Asymmetrical warfare is a term applied to a variety of unconventional armed conflicts ranging from terrorism to insurgencies. It is generally a strategy of last resort against an enemy with vastly superior military capabilities. Its primary goal is not military, but psychological: to intimidate enemy authorities through terror directly and through their constituents into taking actions that enhance the attackers' political goals.²

The psychological impact of the 9/11 attacks by a small group of terrorists against the United States, the only remaining super power, demonstrated beyond doubt that AW can successfully challenge even the mightiest military power in the world. AW extends far beyond conventional military operations. Because it is transnational, AW requires broad cooperation among UAE national security agencies, and broad regional and international security cooperation as well.

THREAT ASSESSMENT

Any national security strategy must begin with an assessment of short and long-term threats. Over the last quarter century, the Gulf region has experienced three major

² See David E. Long, *The Anatomy of Terrorism*, (1990), Chapter 6.

conventional wars: the Iran-Iraq war, 1980 to 1988; the Gulf war to oust Iraq from occupying Kuwait, 1990-1991; and the Iraq war of 2003 – present. The Gulf region has been politically volatile for many years. As we enter the twenty-first century, there are two distinct security threats facing the states of the Gulf: conventional warfare (CW) and asymmetrical warfare (AW).

Conventional Threats:

Although there is currently no imminent military CW threat to the UAE or its neighbors, the UAE must be prepared to counter any potential long-term CW threat from any of its larger neighbors. The two countries most involved in recent CW in the Gulf region, Iran and Iraq, both have human resources and an industrial base that make possible a military force that could be superior to those of all the Gulf states combined. Iran remains the greatest potential long-term threat to the Gulf Arab states simply because of its vast superiority in human resources. In addition, there are some unresolved political problems that include: Iran's continued occupation of the UAE islands; ongoing Iranian programs to develop a conventional military arsenal and possibly weapons of mass destruction; and Iran's nationalist quest to expand Persian political influence and its attempt to dominate the Gulf region as the sole hegemonic power.³

Asymmetrical Warfare Threat:

Although the lower Gulf states have experienced little sign of an imminent AW threat to date, their northern neighbors have, and it is likely that it could well be the greatest primary internal and external security threat throughout the Gulf for the foreseeable future. Saudi Arabia has had a number of terrorist attacks in the past decade,

³ Jamal S. Al-Suwaidi, "The Gulf Security Dilemma: The Arab Gulf States, The United States, and Iran", in Jamal S. Al-Suwadi, ed., *Iran and the Gulf, A search For Stability*, (1997), p. 328.

and in January 2005, a terrorist plot presumably aimed at resident American troops, was discovered in Kuwait.⁴

Internally, there is a large expatriate population required to help operate its vast oil industry. There is also a growing number of marginalized young people who due to the country's oil wealth have not been required to struggle for basic survival as their forefathers did and have lost a sense of purpose and direction. In their frustration, they could become prey to the ideological call for violence by radical terrorist groups.

The threat is not only internal. The 9/11 terrorist attacks on the New York Trade Towers and Pentagon demonstrated to the world that AW is global in reach, requires small groups of people, and does not require large sums of money to carry out. Many terrorist groups are transnational and operate across national borders, but also depend in each country on disaffected youth as local recruits. Moreover, as a part of its expansionist Islamist foreign policy, Iran has had a history of sponsoring local extremist Jihadist groups and covert operations to destabilize Arab Gulf governments.

In summary, given the volatility that pervades the region, the AW threat is currently the greatest threat to both the UAE and the entire Gulf region and is likely to remain so through the medium-term and perhaps longer.

CURRENT AVAILABLE CAPABILITIES

National Security Capabilities:

Since its independence in 1972, the UAE has developed independent national security services in defense, interior and intelligence, and an attaché corps to liaise with sister services abroad. The conventional armed services are small, as is fitting for a

⁴ BBC, January 3, 2005.

small country, but are reasonably well trained and armed. However, it has a very diverse mix of equipment that is hard to support.⁵ With the exception of the SOC, it has no joint warfare capability at the present time, however, and is not capable of repelling a major conventional or asymmetrical attack.

The force strength is set at about 50,000 men. Due to the UAE's small manpower base, about 30 percent are expatriates.⁶ In reality, however, the country has difficulty maintaining a full complement.

The army has a force structure of about 44,000 men, including 15,000 in two Dubai brigades that are not totally integrated into the other forces.⁷ The integrated force structure includes a Royal Guard brigade, two armored brigades, three mechanized infantry brigades, and an artillery brigade.

The air force has a force structure of 4,000 men, and 106 combat aircraft, 59 armed helicopters, plus transport aircraft, with more on order. It consists of three ground attack fighter squadrons, a reconnaissance squadron, a fighter squadron, a training squadron and both fixed wing and helicopter transport squadrons.⁸

The navy has about 2,500 men with bases at Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Ras al-Khaimah and Sharjah. Combat strength includes two frigates, two corvettes, eight missile patrol boats, six coastal patrol boats, five amphibious craft, two support ships and a small naval

⁵ Anthony H. Cordesman, *The Military Balance in the Middle East: Northern and Southern Gulf*, (Washington: CSIS, February 19, 2004), p. 77.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 77-78.

aviation unit with eleven helicopters.⁹ It is not yet capable of fleet operations or joint warfare operations but has considerable anti-surface ship firepower.

UAE national security assets are located in the Armed Services, the paramilitary State Security Forces, the Coast Guard, and in both military and national intelligence services. All are vital to countering both CW and AW.

The principal responsibility for counter-AW operations rests with the joint Special Operations Command (SOC), made up of a Special Forces battalion and a Special Operations battalion. It is considered the last line of defense for the country against AW attack. Because of the complex SOC selection and long lead-time maturation process, SOC personnel are given special incentives as an elite force in order to compensate for a cap on senior promotions and to insure against rapid turnover.¹⁰

SOC operations are marked by special characteristics that distinguish them from conventional military or police operations.¹¹ They usually involve high physical and political risk and are principally politico-military in nature; and are thus generally subject to oversight at the highest political level. The SOC C⁴I. architecture is permanently resident in the existing SOC structure

In summary, the UAE has made some progress in creating national CW and AW capabilities, but it does not yet have an integrated national security strategy based on military jointness and broad inter-agency cooperation. It also lacks an institutionalized

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 78

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ See LCDR Sultan Khalid Al Saud, "Saudi Special Forces: The Role of Special Operations in the Saudi Arabian National Defense," Unpublished Masters thesis, US Marine Corps Command and Staff College, (2003), Chapter 1.

capability for crisis management that is necessary in light of the AW threat. Finally, given the diversity of equipment, the UAE Armed Forces does not have adequate interoperability. Much yet needs to be done to maximize its national security capabilities based on the resources at its disposal.

Regional Security Capabilities:

The UAE has also supported the creation of regional security arrangements through the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Prior to 1979, mutual distrust paralyzed discussions about regional security cooperation, but in the wake of the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, six Arab countries: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and United Arab Emirates (UAE) formed the GCC on May 25, 1981.¹² According to the Charter, its aim was “coordination, integration, and cooperation among the member states in all fields.”¹³ For the founding members of the GCC it was also another demonstration of Arab unity.¹⁴ To other Arab states the GCC was an affront, an “exclusive club of traditional and benevolent autocracies...” whose membership lacked the Gulf’s two largest nations, Iran and Iraq.¹⁵

The Council’s charter did not create a defense alliance. In fact, not once is the word “defense” used, nor is any reference made to “collective security.” The charter

¹² John A. Sandwick, ed., The Gulf Cooperation Council: Moderation and Stability in an Interdependent World, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987), 13.

¹³ Co-operation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf Secretarial General Internet Site (<http://www.gcc-sg.org/CHARTER.html>).

¹⁴ In announcing their decision to establish the GCC, the GCC’s Foreign Ministers communiqué of 4 February 1981 stated “This step comes in conformity with the Arab nation’s national objectives and within the framework of the Arab League Charter, which urges regional cooperation that is aimed at strengthening the Arab nation.” See R.K. Ramazani, The Gulf Cooperation Council Record and Analysis (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1988), 12-13.

¹⁵ Sandwick, ed., The Gulf Cooperation Council, 13.

addressed more benign issues such as agriculture, economics, finance, commerce, and culture. The GCC diplomats went to great pains to advertise that the GCC was not a military alliance so as not to incite Iran or Iraq. Additionally, there was tension within the GCC over how to organize defensively.¹⁶

In response to the escalation of the Iran-Iraq war, the six GCC member states overcame their reluctance to address military cooperation and joined in joint military exercises. As a result of that experience and realizing the need to further increase the GCC's collective security, the Peninsula Shield Force (PSF) was created in 1984. Its mission is to provide a first line defense of any member against external attack and then augment itself into the chain of command of follow-on host nation forces.¹⁷

PSF headquarters is located at the GCC headquarters in Riyadh. Its command structure is modeled after U.S. Army staff.¹⁸ The Commanding General, by GCC agreement, is always a Saudi general officer with a prescribed tour length of four years because Saudi Arabia contributes the most forces to the PSF and provides the PSF basing facilities. The Deputy Commanding General rotates from among the GCC countries with a two-year rotation. There are naval and air force liaison officers assigned to PSF Headquarters to advise, but there is no naval or air force integration within the PSF.

The PSF engages in separate levels of training: unit level training conducted by the GCC forward elements at Hafr al-Batin, Saudi Arabia; an annual PSF training

¹⁶ Only Oman, gravely concerned with the threat to the freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, sought to engage the GCC in a defensive alliance. Oman's proposal to create an organization that sought "the closest military cooperation among the member states, leading to an eventual objective of full military integration in command, communications, supply, and strategy" was rejected. Sandwick, ed., 11.

¹⁷ <http://www.gcc-sg.org>

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

exercise; and the Peninsula Shield Exercises.¹⁹ Military exercises are the capstones for the PSF, and are combined arms events, incorporating the GCC armies, navies and air forces. As there has been no attempt to institute an integrated, joint services concept into the PSC and all exercises are scripted, however, the main purpose of these exercises is simply to demonstrate the strong ties of cooperation within the GCC.

Two separate force structures exist in the PSF. One exists purely on paper and is used by the PSF Headquarters for planning. The other is a small standing force at Hafr al-Batin in Saudi Arabia. In time of crisis, and after the GCC's Supreme Council has authorized the PSF to deploy, each country sends its obligatory contribution to the PSF. The force at Hafr al-Batin is made up of two Saudi Brigades and advance parties from the promised force of each GCC country.²⁰

Despite these steps taken to create a regional defense force, however, the PSF does not currently constitute a combat-ready force. Its creation was based on "self-security" and independent military strength for each state separately with the intention of eventual coordination and cooperation. This is in large part because there is as yet no consensus among the GCC members of what the PSF should look like as a regional defense force.²¹ The GCC was created with regional security as a major mutual concern, but it has never had the political will to develop a significant operational mutual security

¹⁹Personal Interview with BG Muhammed al-Qubasi, Washington D.C., 12 November 2002. BG Al-Muhammad Qubasi is the UAE Military Attaché in Washington D.C. The observations he provided are his opinions and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the United Arab Emirates or the UAE Armed Forces.

²⁰ <http://www.gcc-sg.org>

²¹ UAE Ambassador in Washington D.C. recently expressed the view that "border disputes among GCC members have been the main obstacles to placing gulf defense on a collective rather than a bilateral basis. Personal interview with Amb. Alasari S. Aldhahri, 12 November 2004, Washington D.C.

capability.²² It is a beginning, however, and with time and patience a viable regional defense force could be created over time.

PREPARING FOR NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY: A STRATEGIC VISION

Creating a strategic vision must never lose sight of current realities in advocating change and how rapidly change can be accepted and absorbed. The UAE is too small a country with too limited human resources to defend its borders against a major conventional attack from a much larger neighboring state or a transnational AW attack without significant outside help. That help historically came from Great Britain and in recent times comes predominantly from the United States. The UAE is likely to have to rely on international help for its national security for the foreseeable future. However, permanent dependence on outside powers is not considered a viable option because in the case of a surprise CW attack, the UAE must have sufficient capability to act as a first line of defense to hold off a conventional attack until help arrives. In case of an AW attack, the severe time constraints involved in responding necessitate the UAE be able to counter AW attacks largely on its own. Because AW is for the most part small group activity, the UAE has the financial and human resources to make building an effective counter-AW capability a realistic goal.

These realities do not argue against looking for a regional solution to lower dependence on international powers. It is the author's view that theoretically the best building block for long-term national security against both threats is regional collective

²² UAE Ambassador in Washington D.C. recently expressed the view that "border disputes among GCC members have been the main obstacles to placing gulf defense on a collective rather than a bilateral basis. Personal interview with Amb. Alasari S. Aldhahri, 12 November 2004, Washington D.C.

security. According to General Anthony Zinni, USMC, “What has succeeded in stabilizing other regions of the world in recent history like Europe and Far East has been collective security arrangements.”²³ However, given the current lack of political will to overcome national pride by the GCC members in the face of common threats, effective regional security must be a long-term goal. The place to start, therefore, in developing a national security strategy must be at the national level, building upon what already exists. Working to create an operational regional security capability is a long-term goal. However, creating a viable and efficient UAE national security strategy can greatly enhance similar strategic vision throughout the GCC for meeting the long-term CW and AW threats that face each GCC member and the Gulf region as a whole in the 21st century.

Creating an Integrated UAE National Security Strategy:

I propose a national security strategy for the UAE to meet the rapidly changing threats, both conventional and asymmetrical, which will face the country in the 21st century. It consists of a major restructuring of both the political crisis decision-making process, and major changes in the missions and responsibilities of an expanded group of government agencies engaged in maintaining national security. The new strategic vision is based on the dual concepts of military jointness and broad inter-agency cooperation.

The great advances in weapons, transportation, and communications technology in the last few decades have greatly changed the nature of threats to national security. No longer can a conventional military force succeed without a joint strategy combining air, land and sea service branches. A joint military services doctrine and staff would not only

²³ General Anthony Zinni, USMC ret. In an interview by author, 6 September 2004, Quantico, Virginia.

greatly enhance the UAE Armed Services' capability in holding off a conventional attack until help arrives, but it would also enhance interoperability with international partners assisting in repelling the CW attacks. In countering AW, jointness in the military is even more important, and special skills combining land, sea and air resources in special operations forces (SOFs) designed to take pro-active measures in the face of AW threats and provide a rapid response to counter AW attacks is absolutely necessary.²⁴

In addition, enhanced cooperation among all the civilian as well as military services involved in national security is now vital to meet the threats the country is likely to meet in the future, particularly AW threats. To be effective, a national security strategy must be based on close cooperation and coordination within and among a wide range of government agencies, including military, intelligence, internal security and law enforcement, diplomatic, information and public affairs, petroleum and finance, and other agencies as needed.

Finally, it is only after the UAE has created a strong institutional national structure for planning and coordinating national security policies and operations that it can pursue a much longer-term goal of seeking to create a regional consensus among GCC members to create a viable regional security force.

RECOMMENDATIONS

As a first step toward creating a modern UAW national security strategy, I propose the following specific recommendations:

²⁴ See LCDR Sultan Khalid Al Saud, "Saudi Special Forces: The Role of Special Operations in the Saudi Arabian National Defense," Unpublished Masters thesis, US Marine Corps Command and Staff College, (2003), Chapter 1.

1. Create of an Emirates National Security Council (ENSC):

In order to meet the necessary level of political involvement and ensure sufficient and continuing coordination and cooperation among all the national security-related ministries and agencies, it is necessary to create a national security policy-making and coordinating body at the highest level of government. Therefore, I propose the immediate creation of an Emirates National Security Council, made up of Cabinet heads and senior Agency heads, to formulate and coordinate national security policies and to advise the President and the Deputy Commander-in Chief on a regular basis, particularly in times of national security crisis.

The Deputy Commander-in-Chief, who shall be designated as the Principal National Security Advisor to the President, would chair the ENSC. He would also be the operational commander for all national security engagements. Standing Members of the Council would be the Ministers of Defense, Interior, Foreign Affairs, Petroleum, and Finance, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, and heads of civilian and military intelligence services.

Under the Council, there would be an ENSC Staff chaired by a chief of staff with the title, Advisor to the Deputy Commander and Chief for National Security. The staff would be made up of qualified personnel seconded from all the member organizations as well as other national experts. The ENSC Staff would be responsible for staffing out directives, policy analysis, and serving as a clearing house for all communications for the Council, creating and maintaining a real time secure communications network with all member elements, and maintaining liaison with member organizations.

Its first task would be to develop national security goals and objectives set forth a draft National Security Strategy, to be approved by the Council and recommended to the President. Using the strategy based on military jointness and broad inter-agency cooperation as a framework, the Staff would then draft a National Security Policy to assign responsibilities to the relevant elements within the relevant ministries and agencies, and to coordinate overall implementation of assigned tasks.

A major action, for example, might be to create separate multi-service chains of command for both CW and AW threats. For example, the Coast Guard could come under Armed Forces in time of conventional war and under the command of State Security Forces during a terrorist attack.

To coordinate policy at the working level, the ENSC would create three Interagency Groups (IGs) that would report directly to the Council: an IG for CW Security Threats, chaired by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces and made up of military and other service chiefs or their deputies directly involved in conventional warfare operations; an IG for Internal Security, chaired by the head of the State Security Authority and made up of senior civilian and military commanders (such as the commanding officer, SOC) or their deputies directly involved in counter-AW operations; and an IG for Intelligence, chaired by the Head of the National Security Authority and made up of senior national and military intelligence services.

2. Create an Inter-Agency Special Crisis Operations Center:

To meet these needs for rapid response in time of crisis, particularly an AW crisis, I recommend a National Crisis Command Center (NCCC) located in the ENSC and manned by qualified full time members of the ENSC Staff. During crises, the NCCC

would function as the Command Headquarters for all operations and the hub for C⁴I. It must have secure voice and print communications with command centers of the military, intelligence, police and other relevant organizations, particularly the SOC, in order to insure rapid communications between decision-makers and operational units, and dissemination of timely crisis situation reports. The NCCC would also serve as the communications center for the ENSC on an ongoing basis.

3. Create a Joint Staff for the Armed Forces:

In order to insure jointness in the military, I recommend a reorganization of the command structure to include a multi-service Joint Staff, headed by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, and aided by a Deputy Chief of Staff for Joint Operations who would be chosen from among the Service Chiefs on a rotating basis.

4. Seek to Persuade GCC members to Pursue a Similar Strategic Vision:

Regional defense stressing jointness and cooperation among GCC members is a long-term goal and will require patience. Cooperation and jointness will be difficult to achieve, particularly in counter-AW, because of differences in training and doctrine and arms procurement, and reaching the overall goal of viable regional defense must build on what is already in place. As a first step, I recommend creation of a permanent senior level task force of senior military officers from each GCC member state to discuss ways to encourage standardization and interoperability of training, doctrine and to the extent possible, in procurement by each country's security forces. By emphasizing personal contacts in regularly held meetings to discuss issues of mutual interest, it can serve as a forum for greater cooperation and still allow for the end result to evolve at its own pace. It will be well worth the wait.

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The UAE National Security in The 21st Century

Major Musallam M. Al Rashedi

SOC-UAE



Agenda



- Orientation
- Historical Context
- Why Collective Security
- Thesis
- Threats
- Current Capability
- Recommendations
- Conclusion



Petra
JORDAN

IRAQ

IRAN

KUWAIT

The Gulf

BAHRAIN

QATAR

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Historical Background



- The UAE, as well as all of the other Arab Gulf states, have historically lacked the human resources to repel a determined conventional military attack from a larger, neighboring enemy.
- Traditionally, first Ottoman and then the British empires have undertaken the role of protecting the Arab Gulf states from external attack.
- Two pillar strategy.
- The role of United States since the Gulf war 1990-91.
- However, in recent years, the political costs of foreign security assistance to both the Gulf States and international allies has increased dramatically.
- The Arab Gulf states, recognizing this reality, created the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in May 1981.



Why Collective Security



- Lack of success of “Two Pillar Strategy.”
- The rise of political costs of outside forces.
- Provide its own security.
- Presenting a “United Front.”
- Building a common SOP, interoperability,..etc.
- Many shared purposes.
- Other potential benefits.



Introduction: Thesis Statement



The United Arab Emirates (UAE) must develop a new grand strategy among all **national, regional** and **international** components involved in national and regional Gulf security based on the dual concepts of :

- (1) military jointness
- (2) broad intra-governmental and inter-state cooperation

Developing a new strategy incorporating these concepts is necessary both horizontally within and among the UAE's civilian and military services, and vertically through interoperability and cooperation regionally and internationally.



Gulf Security Threat Assessment



- There are two predominant security threats in the Gulf, a Conventional Warfare (CW) threat and an Asymmetrical Warfare (AW) threat:

CW Threat:

- Volatile region for the last quarter.
- Now, there is no imminent threats.
- But, there a potential long-term CW threat.

AW Threat:

- 9/11 attacks were a “wake-up” call to everybody.
- AW currently constitutes the greatest security threat to the entire Gulf.



UAE Capabilities



■ CW Capabilities:

- . Small, and reasonably well trained and armed.
- . There is a very diverse mix of equipment.
- . Limited human resource (about 50,000 men)

■ AW Capabilities:

- . SOC consists of a special forces battalion, and a special operation battalion (black role).
- . SOB is well trained and equipped.



Regional Security Capabilities

■ Counter-CW Capabilities:

The GCC created a regional defense force, Peninsula Shield, in 1984. A small standing force, stationed at Hafr al-Batin in Saudi Arabia, is made up of two Saudi Brigades and advance parties from the promised force of each GCC country. In theory it is supposed to deploy wherever needed in the GCC, but in reality it has no operational capability.

■ Counter-AW Capabilities:

There is no regional SOF, but virtually all of the member states have an SOF battalion trained in the West. However, there is no interoperability, an absolute necessity for regional special operations.



Recommendation 1



- **create of an emirates national security council (ENSC):**

In order to meet the necessary level of political involvement and ensure sufficient and continuing coordination and cooperation among all the national security-related ministries and agencies, it is necessary to create a national security policy-making and coordinating body at the highest level of government. **Therefore**, I propose the immediate creation of an emirates national security council, made up of cabinet heads and senior agency heads, to : (1) formulate and coordinate national security policies; and (2) advise the president and the deputy commander-in chief on a regular basis, particularly in times of national security crisis.



Recommendation 2



- **Create an Inter-Agency Special Crisis Operations Center:**
 - Meet these needs for rapid response in time of crisis
 - Particularly an asymmetric warfare crisis
 - Recommend a National Crisis Command Center (NCCC)
 - Located in the ENSC and manned by qualified full time members of the ENSC Staff



Recommendation 3



- **Purpose:** Ensure Jointness in the military
- Recommendation:
 - Create a Joint Staff for the UAE Armed Forces:
 - Include a multi-service Joint Staff
 - Headed by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces
 - Aided by a Deputy Chief of Staff for Joint Operations
 - Chosen from among the Service Chiefs on a rotating basis.



Recommendation 4



- **Seek to persuade GCC states to pursue a similar regional strategic vision.**
- **Regional defense** is a long-term goal and there must be patience in seeking to spread the concepts of jointness and cooperation in standardization of training and doctrine, and interoperability among its members' national security services. Cooperation in counter-aw operations will be particularly difficult because of differences in training and doctrine. Nevertheless, achieving the overall goals of regional jointness and cooperation is worth the time it will take, and by emphasizing personal contacts and allowing the end result to evolve at its own speed is well worth the wait.



Conclusion



. Final Thoughts.

. Questions and/or comments.