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Despite 5 years, thousands of lives, and over \$500 billion dollars spent in its effort, there is no conclusive evidence that the U.S. is winning its Long War on terrorism. The American problem in winning its war begins with its conception what constitutes "war" in its 21st century struggle. What the U.S. conceives to be a limited war is conceived by its enemies to be an unlimited war. The U.S.'s Islamist¹ enemies fight their unlimited war with a wide array of means within a holistic concept of war while the U.S., despite rhetoric to the contrary, largely fights the war with what it defines as "military" means in a narrower, 20th century concept of what war is. Thus, U.S. tactical successes on the battlefields of Afghanistan and Iraq have not been translated into strategic success² because military means, as the U.S. currently defines them, are necessary but insufficient to translate tactical to strategic success in the Long War on terror.

In order to translate its tactical to strategic success, the U.S. must re-examine its cherished Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), acknowledge the true RMA of the 21st century, understand what war is for its Islamist opponents, and adapt to its struggle by expanding its definition of what constitutes "war" in the 21st century. Counter-intuitively, to achieve the greatest chance of success in its struggle, the U.S. must change its strategy of strategic offense to one of strategic defense. Unfortunately for the U.S., the last time that it fought a war with an adaptable opponent who had a more holistic concept of what war is and the will to fight it, the U.S. lost.

Re-examination

The U.S. immediately embarked upon war in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks determined to punish its attackers. Calling it a Global War on Terror (GWOT), the Department of Defense (DoD) entered the struggle with the idea that this war confirmed

what it already believed war to be and that the nature of the struggle fit with its cherished concept of RMA. "These attacks confirm the strategic direction and planning principles that resulted from this review, particularly its emphasis on homeland defense, on surprise, on preparing for asymmetric threats, on the need to develop new concepts of deterrence, on the need for a capabilities-based strategy, and on the need to balance deliberately the different dimensions of risk."³ The DoD believed war to be "large-scale, sustained combat operations"⁴ that place the U.S. in a "war-time state"⁵ without actually defining what the word "war" meant⁶ or if its concept of war as large-scale, sustained combat operations fit the nature of the struggle on which it embarked. Regardless, the civilian leaders of the DoD committed U.S. armed forces to fighting the GWOT within this concept of war but closely prescribed the method of conducting its campaigns.

The DoD's byword at the turn of the 21st century was "transformation." Entranced by rapid advances in information technology during the 1990s, the DoD leadership applied these advances to its existing method of warfare and called it a RMA. The DoD's leaders sought to "transform" the U.S. military from what it saw as inappropriately sized and weighted formations to lighter formations that leveraged the RMA to move faster, communicate better and delivered fires with more precision. But, U.S. armed forces already moved, communicated and delivered fires with more precision than its nearest competitors, because the U.S. had been perfecting this form of fighting for 30 years.

Following its defeat in Vietnam, the DoD turned its intellectual back on Counter-Insurgency Operations (COIN) and focused on what it was institutionally more comfortable with doing, fighting large-scale combat operations. LTG Don Starry developed a doctrine of AirLand Battle that was influenced by lessons that he took with

him to the Army's Training and Doctrine Command in 1977⁷ from intense research on the Golan Heights in 1974 where 2 heavily out-gunned Israeli brigades had defeated five Syrian divisions in the Yom Kippur War. AirLand Battle was written to solve the problem of defeating the numerically superior Warsaw Pact in West Germany in the 1970s with the accurate delivery of fires and superior maneuver. This doctrine developed in the 1980s and was tested against Iraq in 1991.

"We gasped as we saw more and more of what Morelli, and later Starry, had revealed to us in the early 1980s actually playing itself out in real life in the 1990s. Destroy the enemy's command facilities. Take out its communications to prevent information from flowing up or down the chain of command. Take the initiative...integrate air, land, and sea operations. Synchronize combined operations. Avoid frontal attack against the adversary's strong points...It all sounded very much like AirLand Battle and its updates."⁸

The spectacle of a small number of precision weapons in 1991 blinds observers to the arc of ideas from the 1970s to the 1990s, and instead formed the basis for thinking that a revolution was occurring. In fact, the arc of ideas for AirLand Battle began in the trenches of the First World War.

The arc of ideas relating to the way war should be fought to exploit fire and maneuver began in the trenches of Western Europe during the First World War where innovators striving to solve the problem of a strong defense-in-depth re-examined the relationship of fire to maneuver. Mission tactics, fire-enabled maneuver, speed, shock: all of these terms that the U.S. took to conventional perfection at the end of the 20th century were introduced at its beginning. The Germans of WWI lacked the ability to exploit breakthroughs created through evolving doctrine, techniques and organization. By WWII, they evolved the ability to do so and stunned their rivals, forcing them to adapt. The combined arms teams of the *Wehrmacht* are precursors to the U.S. teams of

2003. The U.S. ability to exploit operational breakthroughs of battlefield defenses is a much faster and more lethal version of the German model, but is still of the same genre.

The resulting successes of 2003 and 1991 appear remarkably similar to the Israeli success of 1973 and the German success of 1940 because the successes are hues of the same color. The U.S. wars contained spectacular tactical and operational successes, but the "transformation" was not a revolution at all, but only a rapid evolution in an armed force's ability to maneuver and deliver fires within a concept that war is large-scale, sustained combat operations. This concept, with its attending form and conduct of war by hierarchically-organized armed forces, ends the arc of ideas born in the trenches of Western Europe. The U.S.'s purported RMA took rapid advances in information technology and applied them within its existing concept of war.

The 2001 campaign in Afghanistan is a great evolutionary step in the trend towards smaller, highly maneuverable forces calling in accurate fires which could easily be mistaken for revolutionary. The substitution of local proxies and Special Forces was not new, but was celebrated as such. Unfortunately, the campaign was hindered by civilian insistence on proving the validity of its cherished RMA and "transformation" at the expense of the campaign's purpose, destroying Al Qaeda. Conducted within the confines of the contemporary U.S. concept of war by forces arbitrarily lightened to prove an ideology, the successful execution of the 2001 campaign in tactical and operational terms has not, as of 2007, been translated into strategic success. The U.S. concept of war was, and remains is insufficient to do so, because, unfortunately for the apostles of net-centric warfare, the true RMA at the end of the 20th century was conducted by the enemies of the United States and had nothing to do with sensor-to-shooter networks.

RMA at the Turn of the Century

"A true revolution goes beyond that to change the game itself, including its rules, its equipment, the size and organization of the 'teams,' their training, doctrine, tactics and just about everything else...even more important, it changes the relationship of the game to society itself."⁹

Revolutions change relationships. In the conduct of war, the advent of a standing army, the creation of the *levee en masse*, and the development of People's War are examples of revolutions. These revolutions changed the way societies related to war in the course of changing the way the activity of war was conducted. Standing armies led to the creation of the "soldier," a member of society whose full-time occupation was war, and removed the bulk of adult males from the part-time conduct of war. The *levee en masse* mobilized all of society to support the army in conducting war, and People's War mobilized society to conduct the war itself. Societies that did not recognize revolution found it difficult to prevail in contemporary conflicts.

At the turn of the 21st century, enemies of the U.S. synthesized a broad concept of war, technological innovations in information technology, and a cellular organization into a revolution. This synthesis was revolutionary because it inverted the 20th century relationship of war to society. Instead of mobilizing society to wage war, the Islamists *wage war to mobilize society* in order to become Islamic, as they define Islam. Sayyid Qutb, intellectual father of today's Islamists, issued a call to arms "to purge Muslim society and politics...and restore *hakimiya* to earth."¹⁰ *Hakimiya* is righteous society, and the Islamists answer this call to righteous society with war. Their concept of war is broader than the U.S. concept of war, rendering a U.S. military response insufficient. Technological innovations enable the Islamists to strike the perceptions of their supporters, the undecided, and their enemies simultaneously with speed heretofore unseen with an Islamist cellular organization suited to employ their concept.

Different Concept of War

Ideological enemies of the U.S. attacked it repeatedly and declared war on it twice in the 1990s, but only after these enemies scored a shocking success in their September 2001 attack did the U.S. finally recognize that it was "at war." Part of the U.S.'s problem in recognizing the war it was in is that these enemies were not grouped into a nation-state,¹¹ but were rather an affiliation of Islamic totalitarians, Islamists in the collective sense, now franchised¹² across the world. This non-traditional grouping made it difficult for U.S. government institutions, designed for an age when the nation-state was the politically salient societal organization, to recognize that it was at war. Another part of the recognition problem was that what the Islamists considered to be means of war, attacks by truck bombs and homicide hijacking of airplanes, were not considered "war" by the U.S. The U.S. considered Islamist attacks "terrorism" because they did not fit within the mental model of what war was to the U.S. Accordingly, the U.S. countered its Islamist enemies with limited, police means and ineffectual long-distance missile strikes. On the other side, according to Islamist *fatwas* and manifestos, these Islamists desired the destruction of the U.S., the killing of American men, women and children world-wide,¹³ and the establishment of a Caliphate modeled along a totalitarian interpretation of the *Qu'ran*.¹⁴ unlimited war in other words.¹⁵

Following their interpretation of Islam, the Islamist concept of war is holistic. All the actions of the *umma* that support the spread of Islamic governance, the *Dar al Islam*,¹⁶ are part of war,¹⁷ just as Islam provides a guide to all the actions of the *umma*.¹⁸ The Islamist totalitarians use the word *jihad* to describe their war with unbelievers, of which the conflict with the U.S. is part. The *jihad* contains, but is not limited to, the organized

employment of violence, "on the one hand, it is perceived as the ultimate step in the programmatic evangelical mission incorporative of active force legitimating violence...concurrently, it is interpreted as a non-violent yet self-reformative process to synchronize both the individual and collectivist lives within an Islamic ideal."¹⁹

Proselytizing in London or Chicago,²⁰ bombing trains to knock Spain out of a war, funding *madrassas* in Pakistan that produce *mujahideen*, demonstrating at Danish embassies that unite the *umma* in protest, doctoring photos of Israeli airstrikes in Lebanon to influence perception, collecting aid money in North Carolina for an Islamic NGO front, orchestrating attacks in Iraq to influence U.S. elections, flying hijacked planes into buildings, and the organized employment of violence are all means of *jihad*.

This expanded concept of war fits into what General Robert Scales calls the "psycho-cultural war"²¹ of World War IV, the future war arriving now. Psycho-cultural war includes, but is not limited to, *jihad*. The psycho-cultural facets of *jihad* broaden it beyond the U.S. definition of war as "large-scale, sustained combat operations."²² In this psycho-cultural war, humans displace technology as the "cultural amplifier" critical to success in modern and future conflict. This displacement occurs over time as a shift in tectonic plates, as opposed to a precise event, entailing a "shift in the classical centers of gravity from the will of governments and armies to the perceptions of populations. Victory will be defined more in terms of capturing the psycho-cultural rather than the geographical high ground."²³ Therefore, what *jihad* means to an Islamist is far broader than what "war" means to an American.

Other enemies of the U.S. have had a broad concept of war. Vo Nguyen Giap conceived war as being an armed struggle, an economic struggle but most of all a

political struggle.²⁴ A holistic concept is not revolutionary, but when synthesized with innovations in technology and an organization to employ it in a manner that changes the relationship of war to society, it becomes one.

Innovations in Information Technology

"Unlike generations of Arab boys before him, Abu-Jandal also enjoyed one other privilege we must never forget: the technology of mass communication had finally reached the Arab world...With the good news of Islamic triumph also came the fiery treatises and calls to battle from the Zawahiris and bin Ladens scattered across the Muslim Landscape."²⁵

From printed word to spoken word to visual images, the speed and volume of information dissemination has increased dramatically during the course of the 20th century. As the century ended, the dramatic rise of the internet, cellular phones and the miniaturization of video equipment has rapidly accelerated this increase. Information, to include still images and video, can now be shared nearly instantaneously, anonymously, and nearly uncontrollably by any small group of people, or individual. Information shapes perception, and this capability to strike the perceptions of multiple, geographically separated, audiences nearly simultaneously is a new phenomenon.

Islamists leverage advances in technology to disseminate information packages faster than the U.S. institutions can react, seizing the psycho-cultural high ground in the war of perception, "despite our efforts the enemy's propaganda machine remains an effective, responsive weapon that we struggle to counter. Much of that struggle is institutional."²⁶

U.S. institutions struggle to coherently synchronize information operations (IO) with kinetic actions in order to shape perceptions internationally and domestically. Islamists, for example in Iraq, use kinetic attacks to support IO by staging attacks so that the results can be packaged and rapidly disseminated by global information networks.²⁷ Neither the U.S. as a nation nor the DoD as an institution has a unitary IO structure to coherently

respond to these synchronized attacks, and the U.S. struggles to counter the Islamist messages to the undecided in the *umma*, to the Islamist sympathizers or its Allied and domestic populations. Indeed, IO is used to support kinetic attacks, in the opposite of the Islamist packaging. Even the U.S. organizations involved in shaping perceptions, Public Affairs and IO organs, are doctrinally separated. There is no organizational structure to produce a synchronized message for the DoD or U.S. government to enable the U.S. to retake the psycho-cultural high ground, "most Marines on the ground in Iraq know the United States is capable of winning the war...but like in Vietnam, we are losing the information war."²⁸

Islamist IO, on the contrary, is holistic. It is holistic because it is arranged with other activities of the *umma* to achieve concurrent effects in adherents, in the uncommitted in the *umma*, and in enemy societies in support of Islamist goals. Fast where U.S. IO is slow and holistic where the U.S. is incoherent, the Islamists are winning the war of perception. Perception is important in the 21st century psycho-cultural sense because it may not matter if a violent action is successful in 20th century conventional terms if it mobilizes people.²⁹ Mobilizing people is an effect of *how something is perceived*.³⁰

The Islamist message that the GWOT is a war on Islam has become reality to nearly 80 million Muslims. "America and its allies are waging a total war against our most sacred values, our Arab-Islamic identity. Unlike other battles, the new fault lines go beyond the military into religion and culture."³¹ This message is compelling if viewed through the paradigm of *jihad*, in which all the actions of U.S. society, from music to fashion to freedom and social mores, are threats. Because the U.S. does not understand the Islamist paradigm of *jihad*, it does not understand that its actions are perceived as

threats. The Islamist message that the U.S. is at war with Islam becomes a mobilizing reality, with a radicalized "8% of Muslims round the world-at least 80 million people-strongly support terrorist acts against America"³² a result in March 2007. Eight percent of a population radicalized to support terrorism is sufficient to support an insurgency.

Perceptions can become reality. The Israeli-Hezbollah war in 2006 was changed from an Israeli military victory in the field to a strategic victory for Hezbollah³³ in the perception of target audiences. Changing reality through perception is true "information dominance,"³⁴ and can trump 20th century military success:

"Any news of more Muslims getting killed naturally further popularises their cause among the ordinary Muslims besides exacerbating the general anguish. That is why all the American claims of victories over militants appear hollow as neither the militancy been contained, nor have the frequency of massive attacks on hotels, Western targets and resorts been halted."³⁵

Like the French use of the tank in 1940, the U.S. use of IO is not state of the art. The U.S. does not understand, and is not organized to employ, the RMA of the 21st century.

Cellular Organization

Al Qaeda's organization was and remains well-suited to implement their RMA. Al Qaeda's leader had training in business management, and in 2001 it was "a loose umbrella organization of semi-autonomous terrorist groups and organizations."³⁶ As the war progressed, Al Qaeda morphed to a "transnational movement of extremist organizations, networks, and individuals – and their state and non-state supporters."³⁷ Cellular, it used the advances in information technology within a broad Islamist concept of war to wage insurgency, "a prolonged, organized revolutionary struggle using all means, including violence, to attain certain political goals"³⁸ globally against a "Crusader" enemy.³⁹

The term "Crusader" appears often in Islamist literature. It is a term that both carries connotations of religious animosity and simultaneously reinforces the cellular model of

fighting an infidel enemy. To Islamists, the Crusaders were not defeated by an Islamic state. Small bands wore down the Crusaders, setting the conditions for final victory:

"The readers who carefully examine this time period see that the Muslims dealt with the matter of the Crusaders by means of small bands and separate, disparate organizations...there is a fortress which a family controls and beneath whose authority a group of people gather; or there is a village that accepts the rule of a learned leader among them, or there is a scholar whose students join with him and accept his guidance and so forth."⁴⁰

A cellular organization of small bands is suited to revolution, because it is not constrained by a state against which the state-based institutions of the U.S. can operate. A flat cellular organization also can use the advances in information technology to strike the perceptions of global audiences with a tempo that state institutions, unorganized to fight the 21st century psycho-cultural war, cannot match.

21st Century RMA Illustrated

To illustrate the 21st century concept, U.S. readers should view themselves as an Islamist might. The following center of gravity analysis is populated with Islamist terms and based on the Al Qaeda think-piece "The Management of Savagery":

U.S. Center of Gravity		
Centralized Power: Ability of military to compel submission in Dar al-Islam		
Critical Requirement: Cohesion of U.S. society and institutions	Critical Requirement: Complicity of local apostate governments	Critical Requirement: Global media halo that perpetuates the myth of invincibility
Critical Vulnerability: Elements of cultural annihilation*	Critical Vulnerability: Perception of legitimacy, ability to compel obedience	Critical Vulnerability: Perception of invincibility.

*corruption of religion, moral collapse, social inequities, opulence, selfishness, priority given to worldly pleasures, love of world over love of values, etc.

Working through the diagram, a terrorist attack like 9/11 causes the U.S. to expend great amounts of resources to counter. Synchronized IO actions disseminate images of

the attack to strikes through the critical vulnerability of perception of invincibility to undermine the critical requirement of "global media halo," thereby undermining the U.S. center of gravity. Enough attacks or threat of attacks in enough places world-wide will entice the U.S. to commit "imperial overstretch"⁴¹ in defense of its world-wide interests, exhausting the U.S. As the U.S. is overstretched, it will not be able to fund programs that paper over an element of its cultural annihilation, its social inequities.

The 9/11 strikes are a concrete illustration of the RMA. Small cells struck at economic and political centers of the global hegemon with means not previously considered military by the U.S. Al Qaeda affected multiple audiences simultaneously through the global media: the U.S., causing the government to expend enormous resources to counter future attacks; the neutrals in the *umma*, mobilizing them by piercing the perception of power and invincibility as scenes of incredulous but joyful Palestinians attest; supporters, as Al Qaeda members were invigorated.⁴² Video of the twin towers collapsing reinforced these multiple simultaneous messages to world audiences free of charge to the Islamists. It was "Usama bin Laden's marketing, not terrorism."⁴³ Marketing's purpose is to mobilize consumers,⁴⁴ similar to the purpose in the RMA.

Expanding the Definition of War

Doctrine is important because it is a shared set of beliefs. U.S. joint doctrine forms the intellectual basis for the military's shared mental model of war. Current joint doctrine holds an artificial delineation between activities deemed "war" and Military Operations Other than War, missing the holistic nature of the 21st century RMA and proposing a task as the purpose of the U.S. armed forces. Joint doctrine calls "to fight and win the nation's wars"⁴⁵ the purpose of the armed forces. This is a task. The purpose of the armed forces

is to "provide for the common defense."⁴⁶ This purpose is much broader and includes fighting wars, disaster relief, well-drilling, IO, peace-keeping, or any other task needed to defeat an enemy within a holistic model of war. These expanded tasks are means to be coherently alloyed with IO in future war. Because future war is not limited to large-scale combat between hierarchically structured armies, it is more useful to conceive of war in the 21st century as "organized violence perpetrated by groups of people upon each other"⁴⁷ within a larger agonistic⁴⁸ relationship that includes all the actions of a society.

Changing to the Strategic Defense

It is not necessary for the U.S. to mirror-image the RMA of its enemies.⁴⁹ The U.S. is not a global insurgent. However, the U.S. must recognize the RMA and expand its definition of what war is in order to counter all the means that its enemies consider to be war. U.S. adherence to 20th century fighting provides means for its enemies to mobilize their society, especially when the U.S. fails in the war of perception. To compete now and in the future, the U.S. must rethink and reorganize its IO structures. The U.S. must also change its GWOT strategy from strategic offense to defense.

Since Islamists use war to mobilize society, the U.S. way of war serves their purpose in the same way that a gradualist approach in counter-insurgency serves an insurgent. Islamists benefit from a gradual strengthening of resolve to fight as the *umma* is conditioned to struggle. In both Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. policy of fighting with the smallest force possible made for a perfect enemy, from the totalitarian point of view.

Islamist IO presented the GWOT as a war on Islam which became the perceived reality of many in the *umma*. "To a wide array of Muslim opinion, the war on terror had already become a war on Islam, where no self-respecting Muslim country would be

allowed to defy the hegemonic powers."⁵⁰ This perception mobilized society to become more Islamic. A continued limited approach by the U.S. became a means to victory for an enemy committed to unlimited war:

"The mere failure of America to achieve all of its military goals in this country and continuing resistance of this country throughout one or two years or more will convince the masses and some of the noble ones among the armies of apostasy that opposition to America is possible...it stirs up movements that increase the *jihadi* expansion and create legions among the youth who contemplate and plan for resistance...praise be to God for all eternity."⁵¹

Here again we see the difference between the U.S. and totalitarian concepts of war. The U.S. saw the fighting of 2001 in Afghanistan and thought it victory, so applied the same "transformation" to the conduct of war in Iraq in 2003. Now absurdly premature but then in consonance with what the U.S. defined war to be, the U.S. defined victory within its model of war. The totalitarians see the same situation as leading to victory in their long-term "generational war."⁵² By solving internal security dilemmas through increased identity with tribe and religion,⁵³ segments of Iraqi society are fulfilling the purpose of war in the Islamist RMA. Even if one group is Shi'a, it still aids the Sunni; for those who are not pulled into the Sunni ethnic identity out of fear are often pushed by threat.⁵⁴ In addition, Al-Qaeda is stronger in Iraq than before⁵⁵ and is franchised world-wide. The Islamic totalitarians are no less a threat in 2007 than they were in 2001.

U.S. troops, engaged in conventional offensives in Islamic countries or present in Saudi Arabia, provide a means in the Islamist model of war. With incoherent IO, U.S. actions are easily portrayed as threatening to Islam by Islamists. Threats to Islam provide a justification for war which in turn is used in the RMA to mobilize society for the Islamist vision of Islam. Changing to the strategic defensive, coupled with a shield of well-aimed blows of holistic means, would deny the Islamists an easy lightning rod of mobilization. U.S.-led operations in the Horn of Africa provide an example of holistic

blows alloyed together, as it is heavy in humanitarian assistance, IO, and well-drilling and light in the conventional application of violence.

U.S. doctrine must evolve to recognize the change to the rules of the game and be the intellectual basis for transitioning to the strategic defensive in the GWOT. More of the same reliance on the application of fire and maneuver is not likely to produce victory. "Military force in general may have limited effectiveness in this type of unconventional environment. Given the way opponents use casualties as political theater for generating support...will likely only invigorate a resistance that is founded more on ideology than on material power that fuels conventional militaries."⁵⁶

Conclusion

Future war is not limited to large hierarchical armies fighting on a battlefield. War's nature is constant, but as its form changes so must its grammar.⁵⁷ A new form of war has emerged that synthesizes a broad concept of war, technological innovations and a cellular structure to create a RMA. This form of war is holistic, encompassing many means that are not considered part of war by the U.S., and leverages the rapid advances in the ability to affect perceptions in using war to mobilize society in order to become Islamic, as totalitarians define Islam. This form of war seizes the psycho-cultural high ground, trumping the dominant technological factors of 20th century conventional war.

The U.S. has fought other enemies with holistic models of war, like Vo Nguyen Giap in Vietnam, and lost. Not all enemies in the 21st century may understand the RMA, but the RMA is not limited to the context of Islamists. It is likely to spread and change. Danger exists if the U.S. looks at a near-peer state like China through a 20th century paradigm, because it will be in danger of "playing the wrong game, on the wrong field,

with the wrong team."⁵⁸ Some allies also seek more weight "in the battle of images and airwaves"⁵⁹ as they seek to promote their national values. Conversely, if the U.S. understands the RMA then it may profit from employing revolutionary warfare against a pre-revolutionary rival.

This does not mean that the U.S. should abandon its advantages in conventional war, because that advantage is an important element in the alloy of future war. But this does mean that the U.S. should revert to the stronger form of war and conduct an active strategic defense of well-aimed blows of alloyed means in its current war.⁶⁰ It is far easier for the totalitarians to overcome the great schism in Islam when the U.S. provides a means to their way of war, so the U.S. should transfer the inherent costs of a strategic offensive, and risk of overstretch, to its enemies.⁶¹

Andrew W. Marshall defines an RMA as having technological innovation, operational concept (or doctrine), and organizational adaptation,⁶² all of which are part of the Islamist answer to Sayyid Qutb's call to righteous society. Others have seen the coming of future war,⁶³ calling it 4th Generation War,⁶⁴ 3-block War⁶⁵ or Hybrid War,⁶⁶ but the U.S. still clings to its 20th century paradigm of war. Whatever one calls future war, the U.S. must see that something revolutionary has happened before it can adapt to future war.

¹ I use this term to encompass militant Islam's Salafists, Wahhabists, Qutbists, Jihadists and Deobandis and radical Shi'a that share characteristics of what President Bush calls "Islamic-Fascism" and are ideological enemies of the United States. See Dale c. Eikmeier, "Qutbism: An Ideology of Islamic-Fascism," *Parameters*, (Spring 2007), pp. 83-97.

² "One could argue that America has not met its most important goals in the GWOT, as it has been defined since 9/11, in terms of denying sanctuary to terrorists, preventing further violence, and diminishing the growth of extremists." Sherifa Zuhur, "A Hundred Osamas: Islamist Threats and the Future of Counter-insurgency," *Strategic Studies Institute*, (December 2005), p. 2. For further analysis of why Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak predicted that the U.S. war in Iraq would create "one hundred new bin Ladens," see the entire document, available online at <http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil>. See the coverage of Al Qaeda's revival in Afghanistan "On the march, not on the run," *The Economist*, (January 20, 2007), p. 69, and of Iraq in "Baghdad or Bust," *The Economist*, (January 13, 2007), p. 11.

³ *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (September 30, 2001), p. 5.

⁴ Joint Publication 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*, (14 Nov 2000), p. III-14.

⁵ This definition is also in *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War JP 3-07*, (1995) "To understand MOOTW, it is useful to understand how they differ from operations in war." p. I-1.

⁶ JP 1-02 entries proceed from "wanted cargo" to "warble." "War game" and "warhead" are included, but a definition of war, putatively the purpose to which armed forces are maintained, is omitted in the *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*. The authors of the dictionary may have assumed that the definition of war available in a common English-language dictionary suffices.

⁷ Alvin and Heidi Toffler, *War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century*, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1993), pp. 47-51.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 68.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 29

¹⁰ Fawaz A. Gerges, *Journey of the Jihadist: Inside Muslim Militancy*, (Orlando: Harcourt Inc., 2006), p. 37.

¹¹ For an expose of the dangers of the "dominance of the state-sponsor mind-set" that blinded U.S. government agencies to the Al Qaeda threat in the 1990s, see "Obstacles to Understanding bin Laden," in particular "Obsolete Experts," in Anonymous, *Through our Enemies' Eyes*, (Washington, D.C.: Brassey, 2003), pp. 18-21.

¹² "Al-Qaeda seeks to expand its operations," Stephen Fidler and Roula Khalaf, *The Financial Times*, (London, April 20 2007).

¹³ "In compliance with God's order, we issue the following fatwa to all Muslims: the ruling to kill the Americans and their allies-civilians and military- is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it...we-with God's help-call on every Muslim who believes in God and wishes to be rewarded to comply with God's order to kill the Americans and plunder their money wherever and whenever they find it." Jerrold Post, ed., *Military Studies in the Jihad against the Tyrants: The Al-Qaeda Training Manual*, (Maxwell AFB, Alabama: USAF Counter proliferation Center, 2004), pp. 5-6.

¹⁴ The U.S. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism describes the totalitarian ideology of its enemy. "Some among the enemy, particularly al-Qaida, harbor even greater territorial and geopolitical ambitions and aim to establish a single, pan-Islamic, totalitarian regime that stretches from Spain to Southeast Asia." See *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, (September 2006), Section III. Available online at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nsct/2006/sectionIII.html>.

¹⁵ "The Muslims are obliged to wage struggle against the unbelievers and may contemplate tactical cease-fires, but never the complete abandonment short of the unbeliever's submission. This is the real meaning of jihad." See the analysis of the blueprint for Islamic government prepared by Islamic scholar Abu Ala Al-Mawardi nearly a thousand years ago in Serge Trifkovic, *The Sword of the Prophet Islam, History, Theology, Impact on the World*, (Boston: Regina Orthodox Press, 2002), pp. 103-105. For a European Muslim echo "there can be no peace or co-existence between the Islamic faith and non-Islamic societies and political institutions." Alija Izetbegovic, "Islamic Declaration" (1974; republished 1990). Izetbegovic was a Bosnian Muslim leader and his quote appears in Trifkovic, p. 218. In the Koran, "Make war upon them until idolatry shall cease and God's religion shall reign supreme." "The Spoils," *The Koran*, 8:40.

¹⁶ Many incorrectly translate Islam to mean peace as it means in English. "This was Islam-absolute submission or resignation to the will of God." N.J. Dawood, trans., "Introduction," to *The Koran*, (London: Penguin, 1956), p. x.

¹⁷ The Islamic community of believers, collectively. The umma lives in what Islam calls the *Dar al-Islam*, or the House of Submission. A Muslim is "one who submits" to God's will. Those infidels who do not submit, Christians, Jews, pagans, Buddhists, Hindus, atheists, Communists, Secular-Progressives, etc., live in the *Dar al-Harb*, the House of War. "In Muslim law the world was divided into two categories: the territory of Islam and the territory of war, where holy war is to be waged ceaselessly." T.P. Schwartz-Barcott, *War, Terror and Peace in the Qur'an and in Islam: Insight or Military and Government Leaders*, (Carlisle, PA: Army War College Foundation Press, 2004), p. 270.

¹⁸ Islam "is a transnational political and ethical movement that believes that it holds the solution to mankind's problems. It therefore holds that it is in mankind's own interests to be subdued under Islam's rule. Such belief therefore makes an absurdity of the project to 'democratize' Muslim nations in the West's interests, an inversion that Islam cannot accept and, in its own terms, rightly so. It renders naive, too, the distinction between political and military wings of Islamic movements; and makes Donald Rumsfeld's assertion in June 2005 that the insurgents in Iraq 'don't have vision, they're losers,' merely foolish. In this

war, if there is a war, the boot is on the other foot." David Selbourne, "Can the West Defeat the Islamist Threat? Here are Ten Reasons Why Not," *The Times*, (United Kingdom: September 9, 2006). Available online at <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article>

¹⁹ Ifthikhar H. Malik, *Jihad, Hindutva and the Taliban: South Asia at the Crossroads*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 45.

²⁰ Proselytizing may have second order effects. Muslim convert Derrick Shareef of Chicago planned to blow up a mall during the 2006 Christmas shopping season to "commit violent jihad." This attack, had the FBI not arrested this man, would have been in consonance with the jihadist way of war. See Mike Robinson, "Feds: Man planned to blow up Illinois Mall," *Associated Press*, (December 8, 2006). Available online at http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20061208/ap_on_re_us/terror_arrest

²¹ This is similar to what Gen Scales calls "psycho-cultural" war of World War IV, following Beyerchen's "the epoch when the controlling amplifier will be human and biological rather than organizational and technological." See MajGen Robert H. Scales (Ret.), "Clausewitz and World War IV," p. 2.

²² JP-1, p. III-14.

²³ Scales, p. 4.

²⁴ See Vo Nguyen Giap, "Viet Minh Theory of War Basic Doctrine and Strategy," *Inside the Viet Minh: Vo Nguyen Giap on Guerilla War*, (Quantico, Marine Corps Association, 1962).

²⁵ Abu-Jandal is a former bodyguard of Usama bin Laden quoted in Gerges.

²⁶ Major Jonathan P. Dunne, "Tactical Information Operations: Designing a Curriculum to Meet the Demand," *Marine Corps Gazette*, (September 2006), p. 78.

²⁷ This relationship of kinetic operations supporting information operations, as opposed to the U.S. model of information operations supporting kinetic operations, was eloquently made by Chuck de Gasso at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College during an oral presentation October 24, 2006.

²⁸ For an excellent piece describing how "If we do not put forth the images of our successes and attribute veracious information to the efforts and actions of our fellow Marines and sailors, we will continue to be reactive to public opinion, always chasing the enemy and playing catchup with the enemy's successful information campaign." 1stLt Anthony Andrious, "Image is Everything," *Marine Corps Gazette*, (February 2007), p. 56.

²⁹ For example, an Al Qaeda attack on a remote Afghan outpost was a failure in 20th century conventional military terms, but a success in 21st century psycho-cultural terms. See Jasper Mortimer, "Al-Qaida releases video of Afghan attack," *Associated Press*, (February 16, 2007).

³⁰ "Perceptions of success and failure can change the course of history." For a brief treatment of tactical "victories" as defined by the U.S. that were and translated to strategic defeats, see Dominic Johnson and Dominic Tierney, "The Wars of Perception," *New York Times*, (November 28, 2006).

³¹ Kamel El-Said Habib, former leader in Egypt's *Al Jihad*

³² "If You Want my Opinion," *The Economist*, (March 10, 2007), p. 58.

³³ It is immaterial that Hezbollah is a Shi'a organization and Al Qaeda is Sunni in the context of the Islamist RMA. Sunnis and Shi'a have more than their share of friction, but neither sect's totalitarians are ideologically supportive of the U.S.

³⁴ This term can be found in Joint Vision 2010, the "conceptual template" for U.S. armed forces in the 1990s. See *Joint Vision 2010* (July 1996). Information superiority's cousin, information dominance, approaches the absurd. Information is a commodity that even if owned does not guarantee good decisions.

³⁵ Malik, p. 14.

³⁶ Post, p. 3.

³⁷ National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, Section III.

³⁸ LtCol H.T. Hayden, *Shadow War: Special Operations and Low Intensive Conflict*, (Vista, CA: Pacific Aero Press), p. 205.

³⁹ For an interesting look at the War on Terror as a campaign against global Islamist insurgency, see David Kilcullen, "Countering Global Insurgency," *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, (Vol. 28, No 4, August 2005), pp. 597-617.

⁴⁰ Abu Bakr Naji, *The Management of Savagery: The Most Critical Stage through which the Umma will Pass*, William McCants translation, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard, 2006), p. 12. The totalitarians are masterful at the techniques of imagery. The image of the Crusader resonates for Islamic totalitarians as they liken their struggle with U.S. today with that of Muslims and Christians nearly a thousand years ago, but not only

for the Christian connotations. This image fits in the Al-Qaeda model of small bands cooperating to exhaust the "Crusaders" of the 21st century, but its true power lies in providing a shared image in which to organize societal activity as part of the larger struggle.

⁴¹ One sees Paul Kennedy referenced in "The Management of Savagery." For further understanding of the dangers of imperial overstretch, see Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, (New York: Random House, 1987).

⁴² The Algerian National Liberation Front also used a three-pronged IO method. "Propaganda was of crucial importance to the FLN in every phase of activity. With the ALN, each unit commander was assisted by a Deputy for Political Affairs who was responsible for indoctrination and "ideological solidarity" within the unit...Great stress was placed on spreading propaganda abroad. For not only did the FLN face the problem of proving to the world at large that its war was justified; it had to prove, first, that Algeria was not part of France....propaganda was also aimed at the people of France." Andrew Molnar et. al., *Underground in Insurgent, Revolutionary and Resistance Warfare* (Washington, D.C.: Special Operations Research Office, the American University, 1963) pp. 278-279.

⁴³ Chuck de Gasso, *Oral Presentation*, op. cit.

⁴⁴ Some onlookers were mobilized to issue statements of support for the 0/11 "freedom fighters." African National Congress stalwarts in South Africa are examples of the uncommitted middle who were swayed by the perception that Al Qaeda was "resisting" the unjust global hegemon. Author's experience in Capetown, South Africa, 12 Sep 01.

⁴⁵ JP-1, e.g., p. v. and p. III-1.

⁴⁶ *U.S. Constitution*, Section 8, Article I.

⁴⁷ Anatol Rappaport, "Approaches to Peace Research," in Nettleship et. al., *War: Its Consequences and Correlations*, (The Hague: Mouton Publishers, 1975), p. 44.

⁴⁸ From the Greek "to struggle." I use this term from peace studies research as defined by J.P. Scott "behavior which is adaptive in a situation of conflict between 2 or more members of the same species." J.P. Scott, "Personal, Social and International Violence," in Nettleship et. al., p. 173.

⁴⁹ There is room for debate as to the degree to which U.S. society is mobilized to fight its global war. "An Army at war, a nation at the mall" is one assessment of the level of mobilization in Ralph Peters, "Jaded journalism: Media Bent on Politically Correct Warfighting Fail on the Battlefield of Truth," *American Legion*, (October 2006).

⁵⁰ Malik, pp. 22-23.

⁵¹ Najji, pp. 18-19.

⁵² See the Deputy Director for the GWOT in the Strategic Plans office of the Joint Staff, BGEN Schissler's remarks in Bill Gertz, "General Foresees 'Generational War' against Terrorism," *The Washington Times*, (December 13, 2006).

⁵³ This is consistent with realist theory. The security dilemma of realist thought in international security relations applies to "the special conditions that arise when proximate groups of people suddenly find themselves newly responsible for their own security." See an excellent analysis of 'emerging anarchy' in Barry Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," *Survival* Vo. 35, No. 1, (Spring, 1993), p. 27

⁵⁴ In response to Sunni-Shi'a fighting in Baghdad, "when the rounds fell on Abu Hanifa, people were angry and looking for mortars to shoot back...in revenge," says Abu Abdullah, "there are no more normal people in Adhamiyah; all of them are angry." In Scott Peterson, "Iraq's Deepening Religious Fissures," *Christian Science Monitor*, (November 28, 2006). Other reports confirm this sentiment, "retaliatory attacks sparked by this week's massive bomb assault on a Shiite neighborhood here are driving more Iraqis into the ranks of the sectarian militias amid rising distrust of government security forces, newly recruited gunmen and residents said Monday." Solomon Moore, "Rising Violence Swells Ranks of Iraq's Militias," *Los Angeles Times*, (November 28, 2006).

⁵⁵ Al Qaeda is now an "integral part of the social fabric of western Iraq," with U.S. forces having no chance for "a decapitating strike that would cripple the organization." Colonel Peter Devlin, "State of Emergency in Iraq," reported in Dafna Linzer and Thomas Ricks, "Anbar Picture Grows Clearer and Bleaker," *The Washington Post*, (November 28, 2006). Colonel Devlin also is reported as describing Al-Qaeda as the "dominant organization of influence in al-Anbar."

⁵⁶ Sarah Kreps, "The 2006 Lebanon War: Lessons Learned," *Parameters*, (Spring 2007), p. 82.

⁵⁷ I owe this metaphor to one of this paper's mentor, Dr. Sumida.

⁵⁸ "A Special Report on China and its Region," *The Economist*, (March 31, 2007), p. 6.

⁵⁹ Jacques Chirac in "Everybody Wants One Now," *The Economist*, (December 2, 2006), p. 63

⁶⁰ The necessity, or desirability, of occupying an enemy's capital (if and when the totalitarians have a state at which to strike) may be confined to the 20th century. In the case of a nuclear Iran, for example, the new model may call for an alloyed strategic raid to destroy nuclear facilities, kill or capture nuclear physicists, supply Kurdish rebels with arms to pre-occupy the regime and concurrently conduct an IO campaign that reinforces the images of heretical shi'ism and Persian aggrandizement. In other places, the examples of the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, the pan-Sahel Initiative and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM-Philippines may be more appropriate to future war.

⁶¹ "As a general rule, the energy required to sustain an offensive was greater than that required to maintain a defensive...all other things being equal, an attacker was thus likely to reach critical thresholds of internal political difficulty over the escalating costs and risks of war before a defender. And such was the extent of the disproportionate costs of the attack with respect to the defense, that this would be so even when the attacker was considerably stronger than the defender. In either case, the ultimate effect of political crisis would be reduction of the attacker's political/policy objective to bring hostilities to a close, and by so doing forestall or resolve internal conflicts." John Sumida, "Conclusions," *Unpublished Manuscript*, p. 2.

⁶² Thomas K. Adams, *The Army after Next: The First Postindustrial Army*, (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006), p. 12.

⁶³ "With the end of the Cold War, however, the United States has been increasingly forced to confront foreign policy crises that are significantly more complicated and urgent, often involving a "witch's brew" of complex interactions between economic, military, political, cultural, religious, and other forces. These challenges came at the same time as significant decreases in military, diplomatic, and foreign assistance budgets were being implemented, reductions that only recently have begun to be reversed. Consequently, USG civilian agencies and the Department of Defense (DOD) have had to work together to a significantly greater extent, with less time to prepare for doing so. This new paradigm is exemplified by the emerging area of "complex contingency operations." Center for Law and Military Operations, *U.S. Government Interagency Complex Contingency Operations Organizational and Legal Handbook*, (February 24, 2004), p. 5.

⁶⁴ William Lind, Keith Nightengale, John Schmitt, Joseph Sutton, Gary Wilson, *The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Dimension*, quoted in Joint Publication 3-05, *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations*, pg. III-1.

⁶⁵ Charles C. Krulak, transcript of "The Three Block War: Fighting in Urban Areas," *Draft Remarks for The National Press Club*, (10 October 1997).

⁶⁶ "We expect future enemies to look at the four approaches as a sort of menu and select a combination of techniques or tactics appealing to them. We do not face a range of four separate challengers as much as the combination of novel approaches—a merger of different modes and means of war. This unprecedented synthesis is what we call Hybrid Warfare." James Mattis and Frank Hoffman, "Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars," *Proceedings*, (November 2005), p. 19.