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REBALANCING GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES TO MEET EXPANDING WORLDWIDE
IRREGULAR WARFARE REQUIREMENTS

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Executive Summary

Title: Rebalancing General Purpose Forces to Meet Expanding Worldwide Irregular Warfare Requirements

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Thesis: General Purpose Forces (GPF) must rebalance current capabilities to meet expanding worldwide Irregular Warfare (IW) requirements while maintaining or, in some cases, returning to Conventional Warfare (CW) requirements.

Discussion: The global scope and irregular nature of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) has created a capacity gap in Special Operations Forces. This gap illustrates the need for the United States (U.S.) to rebalance its GPF, especially those found in the U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps. Historically, GPF has focused on major combat operations or “symmetrical” conflict capabilities and currently unmatched by any known threat. “US forces can overwhelm any standing adversary, establish and maintain air superiority, control sea lanes or littoral waters, and seize geographic territory.” A logical solution to the capacity gap would be to increase the current GPF IW capabilities or to institutionalize the ‘random acts of excellence.’ The required solution must be a long-term, comprehensive approach in the application of the instruments of national power and influence. The best path is neither the creation of peace keeping units nor the quick return to heavy armored formations; prudence demands a blending of the two with the proposed creation of the Enhanced Mission Force (EMF). The critical question is how to train, equip, and certify these organizations to meet the planning and implementation requirements of a Geographic Combatant Command (GCC).

Conclusion: The gap in capabilities and capacities can be filled in part by the EMF. Force structure and doctrine must be modified to meet today’s threat, without mortgaging our capability to defeat emerging threats. The Army has made great strides to ensure it is more modular and relevant around the globe. The Marines have maintained their ability to deploy with great agility on short notice. The EMF will meet all these requirements, provide flexibility as to force size, provide an excellent means to integrate and synchronize operations with SOF, and give these organizations the ability to adapt as a conflict becomes irregular in nature. The EMF provides a balanced, long term, sustainable solution to the unknown threats of tomorrow and continues to meet the current threat.

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Preface

I would like to thank Professor Erin Simpson for her help, guidance, and ideas throughout this process. Without her assistance, this paper would still be an unformatted white-paper. I would also like to thank LTC Michael Lewis, USA, Marine Corps University, SOF chair. His leadership and advice have provided critical input throughout this project. I would like to acknowledge Lt Col Kevin Arthur, USAF, and Dr. Pauletta Otis, the faculty advisors for Conference Group 3. Throughout this year they have provided equal parts carrot and stick to see their students be successful.

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INTRODUCTION:

*"Future Warriors will be as proficient in irregular operations, including counterinsurgency and stabilization operations, as they are today in high-intensity combat."*¹

"Irregular warfare (IW), from my perspective, is the key problem that we face today. It is the problem we've got to focus on but not to the exclusion of other areas," stated General James Mattis on 24 June 2008, "[We must] not lose our sense of balance that war remains a human endeavor."² Ensuring that our military is organized and postured to respond to current and future threats is referred to as the problem of Rebalancing General Purpose Forces (GPF) in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).³ The challenge is in undertaking a holistic approach to this problem while at the same time incorporating adjustments to the associated Professional Military Education (PME), personnel management, and an overall way of thinking. As General Mattis further noted, "IW is key today, but people are still not oriented to it. We must make this a full intellectual commitment."⁴

General Purpose Forces (GPF) must rebalance current capabilities to meet expanding worldwide Irregular Warfare (IW) requirements while maintaining or in some cases returning to its Conventional Warfare (CW) competencies. The current Global War on Terror (GWOT) capacity requirements and requisite capabilities do not match. This paper will argue in support of a specific approach to rebalance the GPF which will eliminate the delta between the force size needed and the force available to fight and win the growing commitment of the force towards more irregular form of warfare. Outside the scope of this paper are the demand signal and regional specific requirements for IW forces.

This paper calls for the creation of an organization within U.S. Army Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) and U.S. Marine Corps Regiments called the Enhanced Mission Force (EMF).⁵ I discuss the EMF in the context of the nature of Irregular Warfare and four critical areas of force

generation, training, and management: how GPF personnel or units are selected for IW, the size and scope of the GPF rebalance, the management and regeneration of GPF IW forces, and finally the mitigation of the risks associated with non-special operating units executing traditional Special Operations Force (SOF) missions.

The challenge of achieving appropriate balance begins with understanding six key terms. First the definition of the two broad types of forces in the operational inventory, Special Operations Forces (SOF) and General Purpose Forces (GPF). Second, the definition of the two types of GPF and SOF warfare used to frame their requirements and mission, Irregular Warfare (IW) and Conventional Warfare (CW). Third, the classification of the distinction between gaps in capability and gaps in capacity (see Figure 1).

For this paper, SOF are defined as relatively small military units formed and trained for reconnaissance, unconventional warfare, and special operations with operational or strategic impact that rely on stealth, speed, self reliance and close teamwork, and highly specialized equipment.⁶ GPF are defined as forces responsible for the conduct of forward presence missions, engage in a range of smaller-scale contingencies, and conduct combat operations up to and including major theater wars; these forces are capable of operating across the tactical, operational and strategic levels of war but below the division, generally remain focused on tactical operations.⁷

IW is defined as a violent struggle between state and non-state actors to gain legitimacy and influence over relevant populations. IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence and will.⁸ CW is a form of warfare conducted by using conventional military weapons (not including chemical, nuclear, or biological) and battlefield tactics between two or more states in open confrontation. The forces on each side are well-defined and fight using weapons that primarily target the opposing army.⁹

Rebalance implies that GPF must orient a portion of its force structure to Irregular Warfare (IW) capabilities. Expanded GPF capabilities include execution of traditional SOF missions such as building partner nation capacities (BPC), fostering development of civil society in ungoverned and under-governed areas, and conducting Intelligence Preparation of the Environment (IPE) and Operational Preparation of the Environment (OPE).¹⁰ The gap is between the current force structure's capacity for global engagement beyond Iraq and Afghanistan and the current capability of GPF to conduct required IW missions.¹¹

IRREGULAR OR CONVENTIONAL THREAT - OR BOTH?

*"[Hezbollah] displayed impressive flexibility, relying on the cellular units to combine rapidly for specific operations, or when cut off to operate independently after falling in on pre-positioned stockpiles of weapons and ammunition. Hezbollah's combat cells were a hybrid of guerrillas and regular – a form of opponent that U.S. forces are apt to encounter with increasing frequency"*¹²

The global scope and irregular nature of the GWOT illustrates the need for the United States to rebalance its GPF, especially those found in the U. S. Army and the United States Marine Corps.¹³ Historically, GPF has focused on major combat operations or "symmetrical" conflict capabilities, and is unmatched. "US forces can overwhelm any standing adversary, establish and maintain air superiority, control sea lanes or littoral waters, and seize geographic territory."¹⁴ Because of the success of GPF in conventional style warfare, potential adversaries, buttressed by the examples of Iraq and Afghanistan insurgencies now concentrate on asymmetric warfare or IW.¹⁵ However, GPF is limited and challenged by its inability to shed its conventional focus and redirect its efforts toward IW activities such as counterinsurgency (COIN), Unconventional Warfare (UW), stability, counterterrorism (CT), and security force assistance (SFA).¹⁶ GPF have responded quickly to the requirement for training host nation forces but is focused solely on one region and in its current configuration has limited ability to be refocused worldwide.

Historically, SOF units have been the preferred force of choice for the mission sets encompassed by the term IW¹⁷. SOF possesses the characteristics and attributes necessary to prosecute conflicts that focus on the human terrain rather than the defeat of enemy forces by arms alone. What makes these forces unique also precludes multiplying them to cover the gap in capacity needed in today's environment. SOF ranks can be increased modestly, but not to the numbers required without diluting their necessary qualities. The current gap in force capacity can be covered by GPF but they must holistically change their focus.¹⁸

In reference to the Army's new doctrinal manual, FM 3-0, GEN William Wallace said, "Victory [is achieved] in this changed environment of persistent conflict only by conducting military operations in concert with diplomatic, informational, and economic efforts. Battlefield success is no longer enough."¹⁹ The QDR further supports this assertion by identifying two shifts in emphasis. The traditional emphasis on ships, guns, tanks and planes has shifted to an emphasis on information operations, timely and actionable intelligence, and the prominence of major conventional combat operations has been adjusted to incorporate multiple, irregular, asymmetric operations.²⁰ Finally, Gen. James Conway, Commandant of the Marine Corps, stated in the Marine Corps Operating Concepts for a Changing Security Environment, "[The Marines must develop] flexible organizations that adroitly apply a mix of combat and non-lethal actions; interagency capabilities and joint warfare applications; innovative use of airpower; and synchronization of intelligence activities."²¹ In short, GPF must become as proficient in IW as they are in conventional conflict. The result of GPF focusing on more SOF-like skill sets will be improved capability and capacity to operate against adversaries who employ IW, while developing an expanded ability to wage IW against state and non-state adversaries to achieve US strategic objectives.²²

The required solution must be a long-term, comprehensive approach in the application of the instruments of national power and influence. However, any solution must be balanced

against the requirement to remain or, in some supporting arms such as indirect fire and mobility/counter-mobility, regain conventional superiority.²³ This is the fundamental argument of the adversaries to rebalancing elements of the GPF toward IW. Of the four countries were specifically mentioned in the 2008 National Defense Strategy (NDS), only two were projected to have future peer or near-peer capabilities, an ascendant China and a resurgent Russia.²⁴ But the constant desire to indentify and in some case project near-peer capabilities on a threat for the purpose of hastening the return to a Cold War mindset looks toward a possible future but fails to engage the threat of today. The likely threat identified in the NDS was categorized as “prospective adversaries, particularly non-state actors and their state sponsors, [with] strong motivation to adopt asymmetric methods to counter our advantages.”²⁵ The threat today and in the likely future is an IW threat.

Therefore the best path is neither the creation of peace keeping units nor the quick return to heavy armored formations; prudence demands a blending of the two.²⁶ While we are naturally predisposed toward quick, decisive conflict resolution, our conventional military preeminence virtually guarantees present and future adversaries will resort to irregular means to gain whatever small advantage is available and to attempt to bleed America of her will and resolve as demonstrated by the current situation. This was best illustrated by David Kilcullen, “I think we are in an analogous position to those WWI commanders, knowing that our traditional approach is not working but still struggling to find a new tactical and technical formula that works.”²⁷

THE NATURE OF IRREGULAR WARFARE:

“The application of purely military measures may not, by itself restore peace and orderly government because the fundamental causes of the condition of unrest may be economic, political, or social. There may be many economic and social factors involved completely beyond military power.”²⁸

What makes IW “irregular” is the focus of its operations, the population, and its strategic purpose, to gain or maintain control or influence over, and the support of, that population

through any method.²⁹ Creating and maintaining an efficient, functioning state requires the government to be viewed as legitimate by the population. An oppressive government, such as a dictatorship may control a population.³⁰ However, that control will eventually lead to unhappiness and displeasure that can be exploited by an irregular adversary, such as an insurgency.³¹

Insurgency and counterinsurgency are at the core of IW. The purpose of insurgency is to overthrow and replace an established government.³² Terrorism and counterterrorism are activities conducted as part of IW and are frequently sub-activities of insurgency and counterinsurgency. However, terrorism may also stand alone when its purpose is to coerce or intimidate governments or societies without overthrowing them.³³ SFA is the external support component of counterinsurgency. UW most frequently refers to the military and paramilitary aspects of an insurgency intended to an established government or to expel a foreign occupying entity, such an army or terrorist group. Many of the IW activities are related to armed groups seeking increased power and influence relative to its political rivals, be they a central government or a foreign power. Each of the IW activities has the population as its "focus of operations (See Figure 2)."

Two primary fundamentals required for an effective insurgency include: underlying social grievances that result in a population that is dissatisfied with the status quo; insurgent leadership that provides catalysts to move a population from dissatisfaction with its government or ruling authority to active support of the opposition. In general, insurgencies can survive almost any setback except the loss of popular support from the local population.³⁴ There several examples in both Iraq and Afghanistan where the local populace, tired of bearing the brunt of insurgent violence, has attacked and killed insurgent leaders and their forces.³⁵ The armed militias in Iraq provide the most positive example of the effect on reconciliation; groups that

were emplacing improvised explosive devices (IEDs) one day are now fighting beside coalition troops the next day.³⁶

States in flux or at a developmental crossroads are the most likely targets of internal insurgent groups. These groups either seek to establish a version of the 21st Century Fascist Government or as external terrorist groups they seek to emplace a government that will support or ignore their presence. Failed and failing states that harbor transnational terrorists, foment insurgencies against friendly governments, or promote irregular warfare against our allies present problems whose resolution is critical to our national security.³⁷ These actions also directly threaten the security and interests of the U.S. allies and other liberal democracies.³⁸ The insurgent's primary means of rising to a position of influence are attacks against the local population, the exploitation of the people's frustration from the lack of security, economic plurality, or the unavailability of commonly needed life-support infrastructure.

Insurgents will use spectacularly orchestrated attacks to exploit a weak Host Nation security system. This will erode the credibility of the Host Nation Government and in doing so will establish conditions that threaten the U.S. regional security strategy.³⁹ The enemy cannot match the symmetric might of the United States and therefore will engage in Irregular Warfare where they can set off a bomb in the morning, allow the international media to blanket the airwaves with the story, and claim responsibility while blaming the Host Nation Government and the U.S. for failing to provide security.⁴⁰

The most obvious form of insurgent action is violence visited on the population or its security forces. This violence is the critical vulnerability of insurgents and terrorists. In this case subduing the insurgency must be separated from blanket support of the unpopular government.⁴¹ Fighting irregular threats or insurgents is about countering the effects of the violence and the

perception of the people. To achieve lasting effects, the host nation must make concessions that alter the conditions that allowed insurgent thought to flourish.

Countering insurgency requires the U.S. to develop a comprehensive understanding of the complex character of a conflict, of its social, political, historical, cultural, and economic contexts, and of its participants. Popular support for insurgency is often about the population seeking a better life or relief of suffering by overthrowing the existing regime either through omission or commission.⁴² Human beings hesitate to move to radical action, so popular support for an insurgency is evidence that the people have reached the point where they consider any hope for government or societal reform as futile.

Efforts to counter irregular threats may primarily focus on the political and cultural aspects of the conflict rather than combat. General Purpose Forces, specifically the Army and Marines, will be asked to execute many operations other than combat to achieve victory.⁴³ Additionally, this victory will be difficult to define through traditional means, it will not be as easy as seizing an objective and tallying the number of enemy troops killed or captured. In fact, major combat operations may be conducted by surrogate forces trained but not accompanied by Americans, such as counter-narcotic and hostage rescue operations in Columbia or where Americans and Host Nation Security Forces conduct combined operations in Iraq or Afghanistan.⁴⁴

In short, the U.S. and the host nation must stop the military insurgency. That action must be followed by the execution of a political insurgency by the HN government to regain the support of the people. "IW is about people, not platforms. IW does not depend on military process alone. It also relies on the understanding of such social dynamics as tribal politics, social networks, religious influences, and cultural mores. Although IW is a violent struggle, not all participating irregulars or irregular forces are necessarily armed. People, more so than weaponry, platforms, and advanced technology, will be the key to success in IW."⁴⁵

CURRENT SOF AND GPF CAPABILITIES

*"We must never forget that war is fought in the human dimension. Therefore, technology will always play an important but distinctly secondary role, because even our most sophisticated satellites and computers cannot get into the mind of the enemy, interact with local leaders, understand other societies and cultures, or make the instantaneous life or death decisions required to meet our 21st century challenges. Men and women with their "boots on the ground" are necessary to do all this."*⁴⁶

SOF has long engaged the enemy on key terrain that is traditionally foreign to GPF, the civilian population or human terrain.⁴⁷ SOF educational, language, and cultural initiatives have been designed to give them a significant advantage in this area.⁴⁸ The enemy will hide in plain sight, operate within the population, know the terrain, and understand the culture. The challenge for the U.S. is that the available capacity of the SOF units that can match the enemy order of battle and irregular warfare advantages is not enough to sustain the world wide requirements in addition to the current struggles in Iraq and Afghanistan.⁴⁹

GPF has learned many of these techniques and, in certain areas, has increased its IW capability during the prosecution of the GWOT and, in some small sense, its intervention in the Balkans during the mid 1990s. Clear GPF advantages are the technological advancements and robust force size. Digital data, integrated feed of all live sensors to include persistent "eyes on target," UAS's, immediate recovery of data in formats that promote decision-making, and enormous technical competence of battle staff personnel are hallmarks of the system currently used in the combat theaters.⁵⁰ An Army Brigade or Marine Regiment with its new force structure can now cover enormous areas and are fully versed in the "Clear-Hold-Build" approach.⁵¹

The GWOT soon will shift from operations in the Iraq and Afghanistan theaters to a largely indirect, covert, irregular form warfare in multiple countries with which the United States is not at war, such as those in Africa or Central and South America.⁵² This will place a premium

on the specific capabilities SOF can provide. Substantial resources have been provided to SOF since 11 September 2001, but many of these resources have been expended on staffing global and theater headquarters, providing full strength operational units, and replacing or acquiring combat-equipment.⁵³ SOF force structure has increased by 25% but the operational tempo has nearly doubled. Nearly 86% of deployed SOF are concentrated in Iraq and Afghanistan, leaving little additional capability to meet global requirements.⁵⁴

GPF units have difficulty matching the order of battle, small unit tactics, Information Operations (IO), and focused operations of the current threat. GPF's largest asset is often the most cumbersome detriment, the weight of the organization, both from a force structure and logistics standpoint. Often due the organizational heft, the question of when to fight with weapons and when to fight with information, humanitarian aid, economic advice, and a boost toward good governance for the local people is not immediately asked. These questions confront leaders at every level throughout the combat theaters today. This is not to say GPF does not understand the principles of COIN, that defeating an insurgency is first about winning the support of the local people and second about fostering the idea that life can just be better where a population determines its own free will.⁵⁵

GPF inherently has more kinetic or lethal options on the menu of capabilities. As a result, they may use violence to suppress an insurgency for a time, but the only way to destroy it is by changing the way people think about the insurgency and more importantly those that foster the insurgency. Kinetic might alone is not an advantage in irregular warfare.⁵⁶ GPF likely will be called upon to conduct a wide range of irregular warfare missions in the future.⁵⁷ These missions likely will run the gamut from training and advising foreign mission partners to conducting counterinsurgency operations and campaigns from battalion- to multidivisional-

size.⁵⁸ GPF is not currently optimized in its Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Logistics, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) processes for IW prosecution.

RANDOM ACTS OF EXCELLENCE:

*"I remain concerned that we have yet to create any permanent capability or institution to rapidly create and deploy these kinds of skills in the future. We need to develop a permanent sizeable cadre of immediately deployable experts with disparate skills."*⁵⁹

A logical solution to increasing the current GPF IW capabilities involves institutionalizing the "random acts of excellence" conducted by GPF units in the various combat theaters of operation.⁶⁰ Examples of these operations include the work accomplished by Task Force Falcon, Task Force Troy, Task Force Paladin, and the Army's Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG).⁶¹ These organizations execute tasks normally accomplished by SOF including Sensitive Site Exploitation (SSE), and Small Kill Teams (SKT).⁶² The Army is also developing Advisory BCTs to facilitate the transition of security in Iraq once major combat formations have redeployed. In spite of these growing specialized requirements, the Army has argued against "specialized forces" to conduct Stability Operations.⁶³

The Marines have experimented with several organizational IW solutions. Two examples of the Marine's effort are Enhanced Company Operations (ECO) and Distributed Operations (DO). However the Marines have approached both of these concepts from a materiel standpoint.⁶⁴ The Marines are also developing Security Cooperation Marine Air Group Task Forces (SCMAGTF). SCMAGTF will be based on a MEU construct but will be task organized to meet the specific requirements of the security cooperation agreement. However, the Marines have resisted any notion of supporting the Advisory Brigades in Iraq or BCP, the number one Regional Security Matter in the Middle East and the Islamic World.⁶⁵

Finally, GPF has adopted new strategies; the most recent example is the Surge in Iraq, and a likely Surge approach in Afghanistan. The Surge forced units away from the “dining facility” based timelines and forced them to maintain contact with the civilian population, and by extension the enemy through smaller security outposts.⁶⁶ In March of 2008, LTG Raymond Odierno, in reference to the change of tactics, said: “Obviously, it's entirely too early to declare victory and go home, but I think it's safe to say that the surge of Coalition forces--and how we employed those forces--have broken the cycle of sectarian violence in Iraq. We are in the process of exploiting that success.”⁶⁷

Instances where GPF has adopted SOF-like force structure and followed IW tenets have yielded great success. However, these instances or acts have not been institutionalized. By providing education and training, GPF can create or in some cases restore its institutional prowess and capability in dealing with foreign militaries, the local population, and other IW tasks. In the current operating environment, there is an increasing probability that small units commanded by young company and field grade officers will find themselves in remote locations conducting combat or stability operations with little close supervision.⁶⁸

SOF or SOF-LIKE, THE FORCE OF CHOICE FOR IW:

‘The enemy is likely to be employing a combination of political, economic, psychological and military measures, so the government will have to do likewise to defeat him, and although an officer may regard the non-military action required as being the business of the civilian authorities, they will regard it as being his [the military officer] business, because it is being used for operational reasons.’⁶⁹

The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and its constellation of units have a capability that is second to none.⁷⁰ They are deadly in the art of target acquisition and direct action. The comprehensive intelligence system that supports these forces is phenomenal, capable of true global pursuit.⁷¹ SOF are a national strategic asset with nearly

unlimited capability but very limited capacity. However, these special operations formations cannot by themselves win the nation's wars. SOF are not a substitute for conventional forces, but a necessary adjunct to existing conventional capabilities.⁷² Two of the SOF truths (see Figure 2) state that SOF cannot be mass produced and competent SOF cannot be created after an emergency occurs.⁷³ With them, the United States has a tool of enormous and decisive strategic significance which has crucial importance in the global war on terror, but with limited numbers.⁷⁴

In his testimony before Congress, Air Force Brigadier General O.G. Mannon, Deputy Director of the Joint Staff for Special Operations, outlined "five broad subject areas or Lines of Operations. The areas include: transforming the way DoD manages people; rebalancing General Purpose Forces; increasing Special Operations Forces capability and capacity; increasing DoD's capability and capacity to conduct counter-network operations; and redesigning Joint and Service education and training."⁷⁵ The key areas for rebalance underpinning BGen Mannon's statement are found in the crosswalk of IW tasks (see Table 1) to SOF Core Tasks (see Figure 4) and compared the COIN Lines of Operation (LOO) (see Figure 5) used by GPF. In short, IW relevance is found in the development of SOF-like capabilities in GPF. Admiral Eric Olson, Commander, USSOCOM, says more succinctly, "increasing the IW capabilities of the general purpose forces will serve to increase the availability of SOF to perform activities for which they are specially trained and equipped."⁷⁶

The Army and Marines have increasingly committed to train and develop adaptive leaders and units that can operate effectively in today's complex environments, more jointly and at lower levels.⁷⁷ To meet joint force requirements for rotational and contingency operations in the new security environment, the Army adapted and implemented the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process.⁷⁸ AFORGEN, within limits, matches capabilities and requirements from

the individual to the unit collective level.⁷⁹ The desired goal is sustain 20-21 trained and ready Active component modular brigades (see Figure 6).⁸⁰

These modular BCTs have three maneuver battalions, one support battalion, and one field artillery battalion. Of the three maneuver battalions there are two matching battalions with approximately 1,000 men and whose structure varies depending upon which brigade set (i.e. Light, Heavy, or Stryker).⁸¹ The third maneuver battalion is a Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA) Squadron. This squadron's structure is also dependent upon the type of brigade it is assigned to and generally possesses many of the inherent SOF-like capabilities within a BCT.⁸²

The RSTA Squadron works in conjunction with the brigade intelligence officer and is complemented by a Military Intelligence Company (MICO), with substantial access to information from higher-level commands and intelligence organizations.⁸³ The RSTA has a density of non-commissioned officers as compared to other formations and is trained on a broad number of tasks, from intelligence collection to small unit combat. In addition, the RSTA Squadron also possesses the logistical capabilities to be self-sustaining as well as the ability to sustain additional organizations. The RSTA Squadron also has a fully functional staff to plan, coordinate, and execute operations in accordance with all six war fighting functions (WFF).

Part of the GWOT capacity gap for SOF can be compensated for by answering the capability gap for GPF by specially training each brigade's RSTA squadron. Expanding the training and mission profiles can produce a very capable IW asset. In addition, expanded training produces a standing IW capable force of 20-21 Active Component battalions (12,500 Soldiers strong) with 2-4 Army Reserve Battalions.⁸⁴

The U.S. Marine Corps established the Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) [MEU(SOC)] in response to an identified capability gap for the Geographic Combatant

Commanders (GCCs). The MEU (SOC) provided the GCC a SOF capable force that could be used when the CinC's In-extremist Force (CIF) or other CT units were not available.⁸⁵ The SOC concept is focused on training and maintaining special operations capabilities. These are defined, by the Marines, as Maritime Special Operations (MSO) or select direct action missions.⁸⁶ Specifically, the MEU (SOC) s possesses the capabilities to not only support the ongoing war on terror but also a wide range of unknown contingencies.⁸⁷

The MEU (SOC) concept originally started in 1985 when the Marine Corps established a standardized training and evaluation program for all outbound MEUs. In the months prior to receiving their SOC designation, MEUs are "built up" through the assignment of a ground combat element (GCE), aviation combat element (ACE) and combat logistics element (CLE) to an existing MEU command element (CE). Prior to its traditional six-month deployment cycle, each MEU then undergoes six months of "train up" that focused on a combination of conventional and selected special operations missions.⁸⁸ It is at the successful conclusion of the train-up cycle that the unit undergoes an extensive evaluation to qualify for the SOC designation.

The bulk of MEU (SOC) missions fall under the broad category of supporting operations.⁸⁹ Specific capabilities include rapid response planning; terminal guidance operations; enhanced urban operations; intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; fire support planning, coordination, control in a joint/combined environment; providing command, control, communications and computers; airfield/port seizure; limited expeditionary airfield operations; security operations; enabling operations; employment of non-lethal weapons; tactical deception; information operations; and anti-terrorism.⁹⁰

The onset of the Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC) has changed the way the MEU (SOC) operates. The MEU (SOC) still possesses all the same elements but the command relationship has significantly changed. The two major GCE elements of the MEU (SOC) are the Battalion Landing Team (BLT) and the Marine Special Operations Company

(MSOC).⁹¹ It is the presence of the MSOC that gives the MEU its SOC designation. The MEU conducts a six month work-up, gains significant capabilities, and receives its SOC designation.

However, without the MSOC, the MEU with all its training loses its SOC designation. Without the MSOC, a Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC) is unlikely to use the MEU in any significant SOF or IW role. A Battalion of specially training Marines and Sailors reverts back to traditional GPF missions due to an 'all or nothing' mindset. A standing GPF capability is lost due to pre-conceived notions.

ENHANCED MISSION FORCE (EMF)

*"American readers...will find to their surprise that their various seemingly 'new' counter-insurgency gambits, from strategic hamlets to large-scale pacification, are mere rehashes of old tactics to which helicopters, weed killers, and rapid firing rifles merely add a new dimension...without changing the character of the struggle."*⁹²

The solution to the IW capability and capacity gap is answered by the development of SOF-like capable GPF forces, trained, organized, and equipped. These forces include the RSTA squadron within the BCT and the MEU associated with the MEU (SOC). The MEU (SOC) and the Army RSTA have a great deal of capability and have been organized to accomplish many SOF-like tasks. The RSTA and MEU (SOC) given expanded or enhanced training to execute SOF-like tasks associated with IW gives GPF an incredible asset. This proposed force is known as the Enhanced Mission Force (EMF). The parent Army BCT and the Marine Regiment maintain the conventional focus for the Services, and focuses on the training requirements as established by the GCC and Service.

EMF training focuses on three areas: Building Partner Capacity (BCP), Combat Operations, and Intelligence and Surveillance. First the EMF concentrates on BCP by training or developing Host Nation (HN) Security Forces (SF).⁹³ The current GPF model consists of two strategies. The first strategy consists of the BCT or Regt. reorganizes its own units to partner

with HNSFs and adopts a “cradle to grave” methodology. Traditionally built around the Army RSTA, the unit conducts all phases of military training beginning with initial entry training and ending with a combat adviser role as the HNSF assumes terrain. The second model is based on a Military Transition Team (MiTT) model where the unit is comprised of an *ad hoc* organization that has been organized, trained, and equipped for about 60 days.⁹⁴ This unit is deployed into theater to immediately assume a combat advisor role with a partner unit, not necessarily commanded or controlled by the BCT.⁹⁵ Each option possesses specific challenges. The organic option satisfies unity-of-command requirements but often these organizations were not previously prepared to assume this role. The MiTT unit is prepared and receives great training but it is *ad hoc* in nature. As a hybrid concept, the EMF is specially trained and organized to fulfill the BCP requirement and has the ability to leverage all the supporting functions of the BCT as the HNSF increases its capability.⁹⁶

The second area of focus for the EMF is Combat Operations. This area cuts across many of the aspects of the EMF and does more to make them SOF-like. First, advanced combat skills such as Advanced Military Operations in Urban Terrain (AMOUT) would mitigate many of the risks associated with the EMF deploying in smaller units to more austere locations. Second, the expertise associated with many of these combat skills gives the EMF the requisite skills when performing HNSF training or Personal Security Detachment (PSD) missions. Better trained Soldiers and Marines will make better trainers. Third, the EMF would have units specifically trained for PSD mission including driving, close target security, and area security missions. Finally, various insertion and extraction techniques such as FAST roping, Helo-casting, and Water-borne operations will give the commander options for employment of his EMF and allow them to assume or support an increased number of traditional SOF missions. More importantly, due to their advanced training, the EMF could be employed in support of other GPF or SOF units, thus reducing the strain on and required footprint of SOF organizations.

The third focus area is in Intelligence and Surveillance. The RSTA Squadron is familiar with the role of gaining intelligence for the BCT Commander. With the addition of MSO and some of the other enhanced skills will increase the amount of information collected that can be synthesized into intelligence. The availability of national-level assets may represent the largest change in readily available resources.⁹⁷ Close work with civilian agencies (i.e. FBI, DIA, and CIA COLTS) that traditionally work with SOF and higher echelons will be made available to the EMF. Increased training on systems that assist with intelligence gathering (i.e. Biometrics, Sym Card Readers, and Gossamers) on a secured objective are issued and standardized across units with greater density.⁹⁸

Access to the SOF Operational Control Element (OCE) assists the EMF in its intelligence collection, management, and dissemination, as well as access to other intelligence databases. MSO capabilities and special close target and clandestine reconnaissance training allows the EMF to find and potentially fix insurgent forces operating within the Joint Force or BCT battlespace. To maximize the potential of this capability, GPF commanders must shift current thinking and consider the methods of EMF reconnaissance asset employment. Non-standard uniforms and relaxed-grooming standards must be authorized for these forces as they attempt to blend in with the local populace. Risk factors for these operations due to the complexity, potential for enemy success, and the relative small size of the EMF unit might be higher than is typical for GPF organizations.

The EMF maintains its conventional requirements and trains to meet the requirements of irregular warfare. The key to maintaining both conventional and irregular focus is recognizing which conventional tasks are closely associated with irregular tasks and then adapting training models to the irregular or SOF-like standard (see Figure 7).⁹⁹ For example, Army Battalions are now authorized snipers as part of the MTOE. A prospective sniper must attend and pass the U.S. Army sniper school at Fort Benning, Georgia or U.S.M.C. Sniper Course at Quantico, Virginia to

obtain the Additional Skill Identifier (ASI) associated with being a sniper.¹⁰⁰ The same soldier in the EMF should receive SOF-like training similar to that offered at the Marine SOTG or Special Operations Target Interdiction Course (SOTIC) at Fort Bragg, N.C. and then followed by advanced training at the Mountain Warfare Training Center in Bridgeport, California.¹⁰¹ This soldier would then possess basic sniping skills but also urban and high-angle sniping skills. The investment of the unit would be additional training days, but the return on that investment is a very skilled, highly-trained capability.

Similarly, the same model can be used for Military Source Operations (MSO). The U.S. Army Intelligence School at Fort Huachuca, Arizona operates a course called the Advanced Source Operations Course (ASOC).¹⁰² This course only certifies senior intelligence Soldiers as source managers and gives the Military Intelligence (MI) community a capability similar to Advanced Special Operations (ASO).¹⁰³ If managed, expanded, vetted, and screened, 'line' Soldiers or Marines of the RSTA and MEU (SOC) at the company and platoon level will provide an additional capability to manage intelligence sources.

RE-BALANCING GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES:

*"We must improve the capability of our General Purpose Forces to conduct counterinsurgency operations and to partner with and train foreign forces to defeat insurgencies and terrorist organization on a global scale and for an indefinite period. Our Special Operations Forces must also rebalance to devote a greater degree of effort to counter terrorism operations, defeating terrorist networks, and combating the threat of WMD proliferation"*¹⁰⁴

The critical questions are how to train, equip, and certify these organizations to meet the planning and implementation requirements of a GCC? One of the key advantages of training and equipping SOF are the numbers and sizes of the units. Various selection courses whittle -down the overall pool of potential candidates ensuring only the best are selected. This limits the actual training class size and the potential throughput of the courses, at the same time yielding an advantageous student-to-instructor ratio. This, more than any other item, may be the real reason

that SOF is so proficient at almost any task. These men have volunteered several times, are motivated to excel, and have the type of learning environment that maximizes their potential. To achieve a SOF-like capability, the EMF has to determine the manner in which the unit will be assembled, trained, and managed.

First, will the organization be composed of individuals specially selected? Will the GPF use the existing SOF courses to meet its training requirements? Will the SOF-like training be afforded to the entire force? Will a special Additional Skill Identifier (ASI) or some type of designator be associated with these newly trained and organized forces? How does the force mitigate the inherent risks associated with GPF SOF-like forces executing traditional SOF missions?

It is improbable to assume that a specially-trained GPF organization will be made of individuals that have been specially assessed, selected and assigned. This type of manning process would create undue pressure on the already taxed personnel assignment system. The assumption must be made that the EMF would be comprised of traditional line-units, manned and resourced by existing, albeit altered, MTOEs. However, there is some capacity for internal unit movement of assigned personnel to match individual ability with desired unit capability, senior leader oversight and unit cross-leveling.

Training only one battalion would answer the second question as it pertains to training the entire force for these types of missions. The training resources required to train the entire force would be enormous and all-consuming. The size of SOF organizations and the associated personnel processes allow them to train and maintain their force. They are able to train to high levels on most tasks; this again is due to the size of the force. The opening of traditional SOF courses to the entire military would have a detrimental effect on SOF readiness. The ability for GPF to train to an 'expert' level would be hindered by the size of the training pool. The

inclusion of GPF cadre in SOF training, however, would reduce the strain on the SOF courses and allow GPF to grow its own experts and alter Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) to meet the GPF Commander's requirements. In time, GPF would create its own courses tailored to its mission requirements and TTPs. The way ahead must be a SOF focus in GPF schools instead of attempting to include large numbers of EMF members in SOF schools.

GPF organizations would obtain the ability to train, equip, and certify its SOF-like forces. The focus of this effort would be directed at the force to be trained and not the military as a whole. This affords GPF the ability to train to an expert level and achieve a student-to-instructor level to maximize its potential. This is not to say these critical skills would not be proliferated throughout the military. The focus on IW would be a holistic approach to the current and future threat. Both officer and enlisted basic entry courses, PME courses, combined training events, gunnery densities, and other cross-over training events will always ensure good training and good TTPs effect the military as a whole, especially over time as units move up the capability ladder. Additionally, personnel movements within the military will aid in the migration of these capabilities to the force as a whole. To attempt to train the entire military on all IW tasks or obtain a 3+/3+ language qualification, for example, would overburden the specialized language training courses and have a secondary effect of shifting the GPF focus away from conventional warfare. Another critical aspect of training one battalion inside a BCT or Regt. allows the overall unit to remain capable of performing either its conventional or irregular tasks. The BCT or Regt. Commander would have a great deal of agility and options in responding to any type of threat.

The most probable scenario for GPF to achieve and maintain a SOF-like force would be establishment of an ASI or identifier for individuals that complete this SOF-like training and certification. First-term soldiers would be selected for assignment in these units based on initial entry scores physical fitness scores, and basic training course scores. As individuals move from

unit to unit the EMF would get priority for filling to the required manning levels. Once the unit is filled individuals with this ASI could be assigned to any unit within the BCT, this would also assist in the migration of skills throughout the force.

In addition to enhanced training levels and unit integrity, another SOF advantage is the size of operational units, minimizing the support requirements associated with those units and the mitigation of risk. SOF units have the ability to operate in 12-16 man units and can continue to task organize into smaller groups for specific operations. With increased task organization and distance from established bases or Lines of Communication (LOCs), comes increased risk. SOF training, equipment, and organizations mitigate this risk and allow the operators to focus on the mission at hand. It is this risk mitigation that must also be accomplished during the deployment of the EMF to achieve a true SOF-like capability.

In addition, mitigating dependence on larger units is a critical SOF-like capability. First and foremost is the requirement for security. Some of the hard skills that SOF possess such as advanced marksmanship and force protection would allow a smaller GPF organization to live further from its LOCs. The next skill that must be migrated is some of the medical training that is available to SOF. These courses extend the 'Golden Hour' from point of injury to Level Three Care. This too will extend the GPF ability to remain away from its parent unit's LOCs. The second order effect of this training is twofold. First, the training allows the GPF unit to train HN medical personnel and provide some level of care to the local populace which is critical to maintaining a relationship that assists in fostering security. Second, better-trained soldiers are better prepared to train and advise HN forces.¹⁰⁵ The overall effect of this training supports the most fundamental IW tenet of remaining engaged with the local populace.

The final series of skills that must be migrated are the intelligence and source management skills.¹⁰⁶ In IW intelligence must drive an operation which in turn generates more

intelligence.¹⁰⁷ Source management is probably the most widely disputed but largely moot argument. The disagreement centers on the authorities for tasking contacts and sources. Legally, only trained and certified graduates of FTC, ASOT, or ASOC can execute this task. The reality is that GPF units are executing source management out of necessity in theater, regardless of the legal implications. This has damaged Human Intelligence Collection two fold. First, the GPF contacts or sources are not fully vetted in many cases and often are wholly motivated by money, lead to questionable or untrustworthy intelligence. Second, the SOF units are worried that their HUMINT networks will be compromised so they in turn have recoiled to point of absolute secrecy, sharing only limited information. Two examples of immediate solutions include the extensive and successful use of Fusion cells in Ballad and Bagram and ASOC Level I operators fully trained in tradecraft, throughout Iraq and Afghanistan.

CONCLUSION:

"IW specialists can only come to be "if the Military Services change the way they identify, access, educate, train, develop, utilize, and retain Irregular Warfare specialists." ¹⁰⁸

Since the inception of warfare in North America through the start of the Global War on Terror, Americans have been actively engaged in Irregular Warfare. The French and Indian War, Indian Wars, Poncho Villa Raids, Philippine Insurgency, small deployments in South America, the Cold War, surrogate wars in Afghanistan, Vietnam, Cambodia, Columbia's war against the FARC, and support of Israel in the Arab Wars all provide an illustrative history of the U.S. experience in IW.¹⁰⁹ In most cases, the force structure and doctrine was modified or adjusted to meet the enemy or threat. United States Special Forces and U.S. Navy Sea, Air, and Land (SEAL) units were created to meet the need for small specially trained units capable of conducting strategic level operations in austere locations. Most recently, MARSOC was established to meet rapidly increasing demands and new challenges facing SOF.

In an age where the enemy knows no boundaries and can access all areas of the world either physically or virtually, the American force structure must again be altered. GPF must rebalance to become more SOF-like in the development of IW capabilities, while maintaining dominance in CW. The players of IW remain unchanged but the impact of those players has greatly increased.

Currently GPF and SOF each host various collaboration and fusion cells that provide of the necessary information sharing. The creation of these cells has been as a result of the lessons learned through combat in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Army has made great strides to ensure it is more modular and relevant around the globe. The Marines have maintained their ability to deploy with great agility on short notice. The EMF will meet all these requirements, provide flexibility as to force size, provide an excellent means to integrate and synchronize operations with SOF, and give these organizations the ability to adapt as a conflict may turn more irregular in nature. The EMF provides a balanced, long-term, sustainable solution to the unknown threats of tomorrow and continues to meet the current threat.

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- ²⁴ 2008 National Defense Strategy, June 2008, <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/2008%20National%20Defense%20Strategy.pdf>, (14 March 2009), 3-4. China is one ascendant state with the potential for competing with the United States. For the foreseeable future, we will need to hedge against China's growing military modernization and the impact of its strategic choices upon international security. It is likely that China will continue to expand its conventional military capabilities, emphasizing anti-access and area denial assets including developing a full range of long-range strike, space, and information warfare capabilities.
- Russia's retreat from openness and democracy could have significant security implications for the United States, our European allies, and our partners in other regions. Russia has leveraged the revenue from, and access to, its energy sources; asserted claims in the Arctic; and has continued to bully its neighbors, all of which are causes for concern. Russia also has begun to take a more active military stance, such as the renewal of long-range bomber flights, and has withdrawn from arms control and force reduction treaties, and even threatened to target countries hosting potential U.S. anti-missile bases. Furthermore, Moscow has signaled an increasing reliance on nuclear weapons as a foundation of its security. All of these actions suggest a Russia exploring renewed influence, and seeking a greater international role.
- ²⁵ 2008 National Defense Strategy, June 2008, <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/2008%20National%20Defense%20Strategy.pdf>, (14 March 2009), 4-5. U.S. dominance in conventional warfare has given prospective adversaries, particularly non-state actors and their state sponsors, strong motivation to adopt asymmetric methods to counter our advantages. For this reason, we must display a mastery of irregular warfare comparable to that which we possess in conventional combat. Our adversaries also seek to develop or acquire catastrophic capabilities: chemical, biological, and especially nuclear weapons. In addition, they may develop disruptive technologies in an attempt to offset U.S. advantages. For example, the development and proliferation of anti-access technology and weaponry is worrisome as it can restrict our future freedom of action. These challenges could come not only in the obvious forms we see today but also in less traditional forms of influence such as manipulating global opinion using mass communications venues and exploiting international commitments and legal avenues. Meeting these challenges require better and more diverse capabilities in both hard and soft power, and greater flexibility and skill in employing them.
- ²⁶ Ann Roosevelt, Mattis: Irregular Warfare Is The Key Today, But Not To Exclusion Of All Else, Defense Daily, http://www.defensedaily.com/sectors/army/Mattis-Irregular-Warfare-Is-The-Key-Today-But-Not-To-Exclusion-of-All-Else_3086.html, (13 February 2009).
- ²⁷ Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept, 11 September 2007, http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/concepts/iw_joc1_0.pdf, (15 February 2008), p 30. "I don't think it is an exaggeration to say that the internet and global communications have changed this form of conflict [IW] as much as the machine gun and quick-firing artillery changed land warfare in 1914-1918. I think we are in an analogous position to those WWI commanders, knowing that our traditional approach is not working but still struggling to find a new tactical and technical formula that works." Lt. Col. (Dr.) David J. Kilcullen, 14 September 2006
- ²⁸ United States Marine Corps. Small Wars Manual. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1987, 15.
- ²⁹ Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept, 11 September 2007, http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/concepts/iw_joc1_0.pdf, (15 February 2008), 9.
- ³⁰ Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept, 11 September 2007, http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/concepts/iw_joc1_0.pdf, (15 February 2008), 9.
- ³¹ Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept, 11 September 2007, http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/concepts/iw_joc1_0.pdf, (15 February 2008), 9.
- ³² Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept, 11 September 2007, http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/concepts/iw_joc1_0.pdf, (15 February 2008), 9.
- ³³ Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept, 11 September 2007, http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/concepts/iw_joc1_0.pdf, (15 February 2008), 9.
- ³⁴ FM 3-24, Counter-Insurgency, 15 December 2006, 1-1 - 1-5.
- ³⁵ Associated Press, *Sunni leaders vow to defeat terrorism in Anbar*, *International Herald Tribune*, <http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/07/07/africa/ME-GEN-Iraq-Anbar.php>, (16 February 2009).
- ³⁶ Associated Press, *Sunni leaders vow to defeat terrorism in Anbar*, *International Herald Tribune*, <http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/07/07/africa/ME-GEN-Iraq-Anbar.php>, (16 February 2009).
- ³⁷ FM 3-24, Counter-Insurgency, 15 December 2006, 1-4 - 1-5.
- ³⁸ Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 6 Feb 2006, <http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/report/Report20060203.pdf>, (13 February 2009), 27-30.
- ³⁹ FM 3-24, Counter-Insurgency, 15 December 2006, 5-1 - 5-11.
- ⁴⁰ Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 6 Feb 2006, <http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/report/Report20060203.pdf>, (13 February 2009), 27-30.
- ⁴¹ FM 3-05.130, Army Special Operations Forces Unconventional Warfare, September 2008, 3-17 - 3-20.
- ⁴² FM 3-05.130, Army Special Operations Forces Unconventional Warfare, September 2008, 3-17 - 3-20.
- ⁴³ FM 3-24, Counter-Insurgency, 15 December 2006, 6-1 - 6-6.
- ⁴⁴ FM 3-05.130, Army Special Operations Forces Unconventional Warfare, September 2008, 3-17 - 3-20.
- ⁴⁵ FM 3-05.130, Army Special Operations Forces Unconventional Warfare, September 2008, 1-5.
- ⁴⁶ Farewell Message, GEN Peter Schoomaker, 6 April 2007, http://www.armywell-being.org/skins/wblo/display.aspx?ModuleID=f6c229ca-03ae-4c81-8d0a-81a5a0c208f9&Action=display_user_object&CategoryID=3870d121-51a3-46c3-9d44-6b0aa25143aa&ObjectID=f6f62506-c9ea-4478-b908-5d35281db0fa&AllowSSL=true%2ctue, (15 February 2009).
- ⁴⁷ FM 3-05.130, Army Special Operations Forces Unconventional Warfare, September 2008, 3-5 - 3-8.
- ⁴⁸ FM 3-05.130, Army Special Operations Forces Unconventional Warfare, September 2008, 3-5 - 3-8.
- ⁴⁹ Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept, 11 September 2007, http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/concepts/iw_joc1_0.pdf, (15 February 2008), 20.
- ⁵⁰ General Barry R McCaffrey, Iraq AAR, 18 December 2007, Small Wars Journal, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/12/general-mccaffrey-iraq-aar/>, (16 February 2009).
- ⁵¹ FM 3-24, Counter-Insurgency, 15 December 2006, p 5-18. COIN efforts should begin by controlling key areas. Security and influence then spread out from secured areas. The pattern of this approach is to clear, hold, and build one village, area, or city—and then reinforce success by expanding to other areas. This approach aims to develop a long-term, effective HN government framework and presence that secures the people and facilitates meeting their basic needs. Success reinforces the HN government's legitimacy.
- ⁵² Michael G. Vickers, *What the QDR should say*, 18 February 2006, Armed Forces Journal, <http://www.armytimesjournal.com/200602/1813629>, (17 February 2009).


- ⁵³ Michael G. Vickers, *What the QDR should say*, 18 February 2006, Armed Forces Journal, <http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/02/1813629>, (17 February 2009).
- ⁵⁴ Michael G. Vickers, *What the QDR should say*, 18 February 2006, Armed Forces Journal, <http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/02/1813629>, (17 February 2009).
- ⁵⁵ FM 3-24, Counter-Insurgency, 15 December 2006, 1-21 -1-22.
- ⁵⁶ General Barry R McCaffrey, Iraq AAR, 18 December 2007, Small Wars Journal, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/12/general-mccaffrey-iraq-aar/>, (16 February 2009).
- ⁵⁷ Michael G. Vickers, *What the QDR should say*, 18 February 2006, Armed Forces Journal, <http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/02/1813629>, (17 February 2009).
- ⁵⁸ Michael G. Vickers, *What the QDR should say*, 18 February 2006, Armed Forces Journal, <http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/02/1813629>, (17 February 2009).
- ⁵⁹ Robert M. Gates, Secretary of Defense, "Landon Lecture," Manhattan: Kansas State University, November 26, 2007, www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1199, (14 March 2009).
- ⁶⁰ Admiral Eric Olson, Commander for the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), IW Briefing, January 2007.
- ⁶¹ William G. Adamson, Col, USA, An Asymmetric Threat Invokes Strategic Leader Initiative: The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization, Industrial College Of The Armed Forces, (National Defense University, 2007), 15-18.
- ⁶² William G. Adamson, Col, USA, An Asymmetric Threat Invokes Strategic Leader Initiative: The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization, Industrial College Of The Armed Forces, (National Defense University, 2007), 15-18.
- ⁶³ Scott G. Wuestner, BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY/ SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE: A NEW STRUCTURAL PARADIGM, February 2009, (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2009), 14-15. In spite of these growing specialized requirements, the Army has argued against "specialized forces" to conduct Stability Operations. In accordance with the *Army Position Paper: Force Structure for Stability Operations*, "operational experience supports the Army's view that a combined-arms modular force, fully trained to conduct full-spectrum operations, is more effective in the current environment and more flexible to meet the range of joint force requirements under realistic, fiscal and end-strength restrictions." The Army conducted modeling over a 7-year period that compared two different force structure configurations to attempt to validate its position. One was a BCT-based modular force, and the second was a force that contained a mix of approximately 60 percent SO specialized forces and 40 percent BCT modular forces. "The pure BCT modular structure was capable of executing 93 percent of its total mission load (including SO) and 100 percent of its Major Combat Operations (MCO) requirement. The BCT/specialized mix was capable of executing 68 percent of its total mission load (including SO) and only 20 percent of its MCO requirement." 40 Critics argue this mix is unrealistic and that the all or nothing approach is fundamentally flawed.
- ⁶⁴ Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 6 Feb 2006, <http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/report/Report20060203.pdf>, (13 February 2009), 42-43.
- ⁶⁵ U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE KEY STRATEGIC ISSUES LIST, July 2008, (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2008), 13.
- ⁶⁶ LTG Raymond Odierno, The Surge in Iraq: One Year Later, 13 March 2008, The Heritage Foundation, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/nationalsecurity/hl1068.cfm>, (16 February 2009).
- ⁶⁷ LTG Raymond Odierno, The Surge in Iraq: One Year Later, 13 March 2008, The Heritage Foundation, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/nationalsecurity/hl1068.cfm>, (16 February 2009).
- ⁶⁸ James D. Campbell, "MAKING RIFLEMEN FROM MUD": RESTORING THE ARMY'S CULTURE OF IRREGULAR WARFARE, October 2007, (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2007), 21. By providing such education and training, the Army can go a long way toward restoring its institutional comfort and facility in dealing with foreign militaries and local armed groups. In the current operating environment, there is an increasing probability that young company and field grade officers will find themselves in remote locations conducting combat or stability operations with little close supervision and no counterparts from civilian government agencies. Given this probability, it is now more necessary than ever that we educate all of our officers in the functional skills and wisdom encapsulated in the curricula of the Military Assistance Institute and its partner organizations in the 1960s. By having the largest possible number of officers educated in these areas, the Army can also ensure that military operations at the lowest levels are far better synchronized with the nation's operational and strategic goals.
- ⁶⁹ Sir Frank Kittson, *Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, and Peace-keeping*, Harrisburg PA: Stackpole Books, 1971, p 71.
- ⁷⁰ JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, 17 December 2003, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_05.pdf, (17 February 2009), vii.
- ⁷¹ JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, 17 December 2003, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_05.pdf, (17 February 2009), vii.
- ⁷² JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, 17 December 2003, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_05.pdf, (17 February 2009), II-2.
- ⁷³ JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, 17 December 2003, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_05.pdf, (17 February 2009), II-4.
- ⁷⁴ House Armed Services Subcommittee On Terrorism, Unconventional Threats And Capabilities, *Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee Hearing Focuses on Irregular Warfare Roadmap*, 27 September 2006, <http://armedservices.house.gov/comdocs/pressreleases/9-27-06hearingsummary.pdf>, (18 February 2009), 1-2.
- ⁷⁵ House Armed Services Subcommittee On Terrorism, Unconventional Threats And Capabilities, *Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee Hearing Focuses on Irregular Warfare Roadmap*, 27 September 2006, <http://armedservices.house.gov/comdocs/pressreleases/9-27-06hearingsummary.pdf>, (18 February 2009), 1-2.
- ⁷⁶ House Armed Services Subcommittee On Terrorism, Unconventional Threats And Capabilities, *Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee Hearing Focuses on Irregular Warfare Roadmap*, 27 September 2006, <http://armedservices.house.gov/comdocs/pressreleases/9-27-06hearingsummary.pdf>, (18 February 2009), 1-2.
- ⁷⁷ Addendum H (Army Force Generation), 2007 Army Posture Statement, <http://www.army.mil/aps/07/addendum/h.html>, (17 February 2009).
- ⁷⁸ Addendum H (Army Force Generation), 2007 Army Posture Statement, <http://www.army.mil/aps/07/addendum/h.html>, (17 February 2009).
- ⁷⁹ Addendum H (Army Force Generation), 2007 Army Posture Statement, <http://www.army.mil/aps/07/addendum/h.html>, (17 February 2009). ARFORGEN is not just about preparing units for worldwide deployments. It affects both the Operating Force and the Generating Force. It

- changes the way that the Army will resource, recruit, organize, train, educate, equip, source, mobilize, deploy and sustain whole, cohesive units on a recurring basis. The goal is to generate combat power on a sustained cyclic basis more effectively and efficiently.
- ⁸⁰ Addendum H (Army Force Generation), 2007 Army Posture Statement, <http://www.army.mil/aps/07/addendum/h.html>, (17 February 2009).
- ⁸¹ Brigade Combat Team, http://www.usm.edu/armyrotc/MSIII/text%20for%20302/MSL_302_Officership_Section_3_Brigade_Combat_Team.pdf, (17 February 2009), 113-115.
- ⁸² Brigade Combat Team, http://www.usm.edu/armyrotc/MSIII/text%20for%20302/MSL_302_Officership_Section_3_Brigade_Combat_Team.pdf, (17 February 2009), 113-115.
- ⁸³ Citizendium, Restructuring of the United States Army, http://reid.citizendium.org/wiki/Brigade_Combat_Team, (17 February 2009).
- ⁸⁴ Citizendium, Restructuring of the United States Army, http://reid.citizendium.org/wiki/Brigade_Combat_Team, (17 February 2009).
- ⁸⁵ Global Security.org, Marine Expeditionary Units, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/ex-meu.htm>, (17 February 2009).
- ⁸⁶ Marine Corps Order (MCO) 3120.9B, Policy for Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable), 25 September 2001, Washington, D.C.: Commandant of the Marine Corps, 2.
- ⁸⁷ Global Security.org, Marine Expeditionary Units, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/ex-meu.htm>, (17 February 2009).
- ⁸⁸ Global Security.org, SOCEX - Special Operations Capability Exercise, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/socex.htm>, (17 February 2009).
- ⁸⁹ Marine Corps Order (MCO) 3120.9B, Policy for Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable), 25 September 2001, Washington, D.C.: Commandant of the Marine Corps, 2-5.
- ⁹⁰ Marine Corps Order (MCO) 3120.9B, Policy for Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable), 25 September 2001, Washington, D.C.: Commandant of the Marine Corps, 2-5.
- ⁹¹ Thomas A. Bowditch and Laura McGuckin, Forward Afloat Expeditionary Forces: Marine Expeditionary Units and the Long War – Do We Need To Change?, July 2006, [http://www.quantico.usmc.mil/seabasing/resources/reports/CNA%20Future%20MEU%20Study%20\(Jul%202006\).pdf](http://www.quantico.usmc.mil/seabasing/resources/reports/CNA%20Future%20MEU%20Study%20(Jul%202006).pdf), (17 February 2009), 2-5.
- ⁹² Robert Asprey, *War in the Shadows*, (New York, NY: William Morrow & Company, Inc., 1975), xiii.
- ⁹³ JFCOM, Irregular Warfare Special Study, 4 August 2006, <http://merln.ndu.edu/archive/DigitalCollections/IrregWarfareSpecialStudy.pdf>, (17 February 2009), III-4.
- ⁹⁴ The Fort Riley Training Mission (FRTM) Standard (60-Day) Training Model Notes, 29 November 2007, <http://www.riley.army.mil/%7Bdyn.file%7D/873a86169e5b46a891d3de2e3cbb4899/Standard%20Training%20Model%20Notes%20-%2024%20Jan%2008.pdf>, (17 February 2009), 1.
- ⁹⁵ The Fort Riley Training Mission (FRTM) Standard (60-Day) Training Model Notes, 29 November 2007, <http://www.riley.army.mil/%7Bdyn.file%7D/873a86169e5b46a891d3de2e3cbb4899/Standard%20Training%20Model%20Notes%20-%2024%20Jan%2008.pdf>, (17 February 2009), 3.
- ⁹⁶ Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 6 Feb 2006, <http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/report/Report20060203.pdf>, (13 February 2009), 42.
- ⁹⁷ Robert R. Tomes, Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare, U.S. Army Professional Writing Collection, Spring 2004, http://www.army.mil/professionalwriting/volumes/volume2/march_2004/3_04_1.html, (17 February 2009). Intelligence is the critical enabler. The tactical use of information, which is the responsibility of the operational commander, is the only way to identify the enemy. Background information must be gathered and analyzed at all times, with operational intelligence used to bring forces into contact with the enemy. The operational intelligence effort must remain flexible, adapting to the situation as it develops, and retain the wherewithal to innovate and seize the initiative away from the enemy. Ground commanders must develop and retain a capacity to actively gather information and avoid situations where they are dependent on other organizations for critical operational intelligence. This aids identification and neutralization of causes and concerns before their exploitation for guerrilla mobilization.
- ⁹⁸ Robert R. Tomes, Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare, U.S. Army Professional Writing Collection, Spring 2004, http://www.army.mil/professionalwriting/volumes/volume2/march_2004/3_04_1.html, (17 February 2009). Intelligence tools, furthermore, must be attuned to geographic conditions, which remain a factor in the ability of the regime to defeat the insurgent. This is an area where US forces must be seeking out and applying new capabilities. Geospatial intelligence capabilities, including integration of demographic information, play an overriding role in insurgency warfare. Insurgents tend to use geography against the new government, including the exploitation of active borders to receive outside support.
- ⁹⁹ Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 6 Feb 2006, <http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/report/Report20060203.pdf>, (13 February 2009), 42.
- ¹⁰⁰ Citizendium, Restructuring of the United States Army, http://reid.citizendium.org/wiki/Brigade_Combat_Team, (17 February 2009).
- ¹⁰¹ Special Warfare, Training for SF Advanced Skills, May 2004, <http://www.soc.mil/swcs/swmag/04may.pdf>, (18 February 2009), 6.
- ¹⁰² Phoenix, Advanced Military Source Operations Course, 2007 Training Info and Full Catalog, http://www.intellpros.com/traininginfo_fullcatalog.php, (17 February 2009).
- ¹⁰³ Phoenix, Advanced Military Source Operations Course, 2007 Training Info and Full Catalog, http://www.intellpros.com/traininginfo_fullcatalog.php, (17 February 2009).
- ¹⁰⁴ House Armed Services Subcommittee On Terrorism, Unconventional Threats And Capabilities, *Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee Hearing Focuses on Irregular Warfare Roadmap*, 27 September 2006, <http://armedservices.house.gov/comdocs/pressreleases/9-27-06hearingsummary.pdf>, (18 February 2009), 1-2.
- ¹⁰⁵ JFCOM, Irregular Warfare Special Study, 4 August 2006, <http://merln.ndu.edu/archive/DigitalCollections/IrregWarfareSpecialStudy.pdf>, (17 February 2009), III-4.
- ¹⁰⁶ Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 6 Feb 2006, <http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/report/Report20060203.pdf>, (13 February 2009), 55-57.
- ¹⁰⁷ FM 3-24, Counter-Insurgency, 15 December 2006, 3-1. Intelligence and operations feed each other. Effective intelligence drives effective operations. Effective operations produce information, which generates more intelligence. Similarly, ineffective or inaccurate intelligence produces ineffective operations, which produce the opposite results.
- ¹⁰⁸ House Armed Services Subcommittee On Terrorism, Unconventional Threats And Capabilities, *Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee Hearing Focuses on Irregular Warfare Roadmap*, 27 September 2006, <http://armedservices.house.gov/comdocs/pressreleases/9-27-06hearingsummary.pdf>, (18 February 2009), 2. In his testimony, Air Force

Brigadier General O.G. Mannon, Deputy Director of the Joint Staff for Special Operations, went on to explain that IW specialists can only come to be "if the Military Services change the way they identify, access, educate, train, develop, utilize, and retain Irregular Warfare specialists." He noted further that "until recently, DoD educational and training institutions have not placed a priority on the importance of preparing DoD personnel to operate, thrive and succeed in Irregular Warfare environments."

¹⁰⁹FM 3-24, Counter-Insurgency, 15 December 2006, 1-4 – 1-5.


FIGURE 1. IW Capability and Capacity Gaps



*KEY IS TO SHAPE THE MIGRATION OF IW CAPABILITIES AND INCREASE CAPACITIES

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Shannon Hume, Approach to Rebalancing General Purpose Forces (GPF) Brief, 2 March 2007, USSOCOM, SOKF, J7-AI, 10.

FIGURE 2. Contrasting Conventional & Irregular Warfare



Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept, 11 September 2007, http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/concepts/iw_joc1_0.pdf, (15 February 2008), 9.

TABLE 1. IW Activities. The IW roadmap identified the following 10 activities (aspects) as an illustrative list. These 10 activities (aspects) were reviewed for doctrinal implications:

- a. Insurgency and counterinsurgency (COIN).
- b. Terrorism and counterterrorism (CT).
- c. Unconventional warfare (UW).
- d. Foreign internal defense (FID), now largely described as Security Force Assistance (SFA).
- e. Stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operations.
- f. Transnational criminal activities that support or sustain IW and the law enforcement activities to counter them.
- g. Civil-military operations (CMO).
- h. Psychological operations (PSYOP).
- i. Information operations (IO).
- j. Intelligence and counterintelligence operations.


JFCOM, Irregular Warfare Special Study, 4 August 2006, <http://merin.ndu.edu/archive/DigitalCollections/IrregWarfareSpecialStudy.pdf>, (17 February 2009), I-4.

FIGURE 3. SOF Truths




JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, 17 December 2003, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_05.pdf, (17 February 2009), II-4.

FIGURE 4. SOF Core Tasks




JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, 17 December 2003, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_05.pdf, (17 February 2009), II-5.

FIGURE 5. Counterinsurgency Lines of Operation




FM 3-24, Counter-Insurgency, 15 December 2006, 5-3.

FIGURE 6. Army Force Generation Process.



Addendum H (Army Force Generation), 2007 Army Posture Statement, <http://www.army.mil/aps/07/addendum/h.html>, (17 February 2009).

FIGURE 7. EMF Train-Up Model (6 Month / Tasks).



Shannon Hume, Approach to Rebalancing General Purpose Forces (GPF) Brief, 2 March 2007, USSOCOM, SOKE, J7-AI, 17.

GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

4GW	Fourth Generation Warfare
AOO	Area of Operations
AT	Antiterrorism
C4	Command and Control, Communications, And Computers
CA	Civil Affairs
Cbt	Combating Terrorism
CI	Counterintelligence
CIFA	Counterintelligence Field Activity
CIMIC	Civil Military Cooperation
CIST	Counter Ideological Support for Terrorism
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSI	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction
CM	Consequence Management
CMO	Civil-Military Operations
CNO	Computer Network Operations
COA	Course of Action
COIN	Counterinsurgency
COMSEC	Communications Security
CRO	Crisis Response Operations
CT	Counterterrorism
DEA	Drug Enforcement Administration
DHS	Defense Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Service
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DISO	Defense Intelligence Support Office
DOD	Department Of Defense
DTIC	Defense Technical Information Center
EW	Electronic Warfare
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FID	Foreign Internal Defense
GPF	General Purpose Forces
GW	Guerrilla Warfare
GWOT	Global War on Terror
HN	Host Nation
HSE	HUMINT Support Element
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
IA	Information Assurance
IDAD	Internal Defense and Development
INFOSEC	Information Security
IO	Information Operations
IW	Irregular Warfare
JCA	Joint Capability Area
JEL	Joint Electronic Library
JFC	Joint Force Commander

GLOSSARY

JIPB	Joint Intelligence Preparation of The Battlespace
JITF-CT	Joint Intelligence Task Force Combating Terrorism
JOC	Joint Operating Concept
JP	Joint Publications
JPME	Joint Professional Military Education
MASLO	Measurement and Signatures Intelligence Liaison Officer
MILDEC	Military Deception
MOOTW	Military Operations Other Than War
MSCLEA	Military Support to Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Ops	Operations
OPSEC	Operations Security
OSD	Office of the Secretary Of Defense
PA	Public Affairs
PD	Program Directive
PI	Public Information
PIR	Priority Intelligence Requirements
PSYOP	Psychological Operations
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
RAD	Revision Approval Draft
SAE	Special Areas of Emphasis
SO	Special Operations
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SSTR	Stability, Security, Transition, And Reconstruction
UAR	Unconventional Assisted Recovery
USCENTCOM	US Central Command
USG	US Government
USJFCOM	US Joint Forces Command
USSOCOM	US Special Operations Command
UW	Unconventional Warfare
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WME	Weapons of Mass Effect
WOT	War on Terrorism