

**Global Insurgency to Reestablish the Caliphate;
Identifying and Understanding the Enemy**

A Monograph

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Abstract

Since the attacks on September 11, 2001, the United States (US) has waged a Global War on Terror (GWOT) based upon the flawed strategy of countering a tactic, terrorism, as opposed to a strategy built on understanding and identifying its enemy. By focusing exclusively on terrorist organizations, the US failed to recognize the broader-based movement of establishing a dominant Islamic world power. Analysis should have been conducted encompassing the ways, means and ends of a known adversary, such as Islamic fundamentalists. Using this group as a source of comparison, this monograph demonstrates how other diverse groups, operating with different ideological ways but using similar means of technology, are attempting to achieve a common ends; the reestablishment of the Caliphate.

There is no “one thing” that causes, allows or facilitates the situation. It is the relationship between the various actors, agents and artifacts that contributes to understanding the system and creates the environment where conflict is probable. Germane to this article is the assemblage of Western culture based on a liberal-democratic politics and an Islamic culture based on the Qur’an, Shari’a and the Sunnah. Where these two cultures meet there is, to quote Huntington, a “Clash of Civilizations”. Where GWOT focuses on countering a tactic, terrorism, it fails to address the ideology which draws upon Islam for its legitimacy. It requires critically analyzing how Islam is able to give some form of legitimacy to those who would do Western nations harm, and how groups not normally seen as adversaries hold to the same theocratic ideology.

The internet provides a forum for loosely interconnected, semi-independent groups to maintain contact with one another and with members of other terrorist groups, providing dispersed organizational actors the ability to communicate swiftly and coordinate effectively. Where once insurgencies were forced to rely on bank robberies, blackmail, ransoming hostages and physical intimidation, fund-raising is now as simple as entering credit-card information on a website. With its anonymity and vastly diverse reach, the internet has become an integral tool in recruitment drives for active fighters, suicide bombers, and promoters to advance the ideology and cause. There is a real danger in dismissing the manner in which terrorist organizations have used technology, specifically the internet, to further their agenda and disregarding the potential to harm Western nations. There are those within the intellectual community that believe Muslims countries are too diverse to ever unite as a single nation-state. If Islam is too fractional, too nationalistic, the logistics and coordination too overwhelming for a Caliphate to be established in this day and time, then how does one explain its establishment 1400 years ago?

Finally, the West must recognize its own culpability in the actions of those who have attacked Western nations. Where others have pointed to Western colonization and the exploitation of Muslim nations as a contributing factor in attacks upon Western nations, this monograph concentrates on how Western concepts of toleration and globalization have shaped the discussion of Islam in such a fashion that to associate terrorist and Muslims, or Islam, has become a form of hate-speech. The term “Islamaphobia” sufficiently stifles discourse and criticism. When tolerance becomes a weapon, then the current concept of tolerance needs to be reexamined.

Table of Contents

Chapter 1, Introduction.....	3
A Conjunction of Circumstances.....	3
Scope of Discussion	5
Chapter 2, Ideology	6
Fundamentalist, Adhering to Scripture.....	7
Moderates; a Rose by Any Other Name.....	13
Secularists, Reforming Islam.....	20
The Umma, Jahiliyya and the Caliphate.....	23
Jihad.....	30
Chapter 3, Information Technology and Terrorist Activities	34
Information Operations	35
Finance	38
Recruitment	41
Communications and Data Mining.....	42
Summary.....	45
Chapter 4, Tolerance and Globalization.....	48
Freedom of religion	50
Political Correctness, Islamaphobia and Hate Speech.....	54
The Spread of Islam.....	58
Chapter 5, Conclusions.....	62
Significance	62
The Way Ahead.....	67
Bibliography	71

Chapter 1, Introduction

A Conjunction of Circumstances

Since the attacks on September 11, 2001, the United States (US) has waged a Global War on Terror (GWOT) based upon the flawed strategy of countering a tactic, terrorism, as opposed to a strategy built on understanding and identifying its enemy. By focusing exclusively on terrorist organizations, the US failed to recognize the broader-based movement of establishing a dominant Islamic world power. Analysis should have been conducted encompassing the ways, means and ends of a known adversary, such as Islamic fundamentalists. Using this group as a source of comparison, this monograph demonstrates how other diverse groups, operating with different ideological ways but using similar means of technology, are attempting to achieve a common end; the reestablishment of the Caliphate.

Traditional crisis management thinking relied on cause and effect. If a terrorist group attacked the US, locate and destroy the terrorist organization. When President Bush declared that the US had embarked on a Global War on Terrorism, it expanded the scope of US government's focus from a single sub-state actor to encompass the idea that terrorist organizations required state sponsorship. The US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 was conducted with the intent of replacing the regime of a nation-state presumed to have Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and known to have associations with terrorist organizations. The operation was planned and conducted as a conventional warfare operation. Once the regime was replaced the nation would resume its functions, albeit as a liberal democracy. It was not until 2005 when the US recognized it was involved in an insurgency that it began to realize the complexity of several interrelated factors actually facilitated and promoted terrorist organizations.

While the US realized it was involved in an insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan, it did not associate the two as being related. Having not conducted a thorough analysis, there was no holistic understanding of the enemy. The GWOT concept addressed several separate terrorist organizations with separate efforts. Yet there were significant similarities between the two, in method and endstate, that one could have made the comparison to historical insurgencies, albeit on a larger scale. This has led to an important discussion in the military and academic world as to whether the US has been involved in a Global War on Terrorism or a Global Insurgency. If the US is attempting to counter a Global Insurgency, then this forces a dramatic reconsideration of an appropriate strategy. Counter insurgency is successful only when the ideology of the insurgency has been delegitimized. In this instance, the common thread within the ideology is its application of religious principles based upon Islamic culture.

Islam is not solely a religion but a culture and way of life that encompasses politics, economics, and social norms as well as religion.¹ While the confrontation of Islam and Western Civilization is most often associated with the Crusades of the Medieval period, it is a viable threat today because of a conjunction of circumstances that includes a resurgence of fundamentalist Islamic ideology, the technological capacity for terrorist cells and networks to communicate and cooperate with the security of anonymity, and the West's own social concepts of tolerance and globalization that restricts discourse and actions.² If analysis shows a tangible linkage between these facets as facilitating the realistic possibility of establishing a unified Islamic nation-state,

¹ M.A.S. Abdel Haleem, trans. *The Qur'an*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, 16:89, "...We have sent the scripture down to you explaining everything..."

² Francois Jullien. *A Treatise on Efficacy*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2004, pp vii

then the current Western strategy of promoting democracy in Muslim countries must be reassessed.

Scope of Discussion³

Comparisons between Islam and Christianity are intended as points of reference for understanding the difference in cultural concepts. The intent of this monograph is not to be disparaging of Islam as a religious concept, but to show how the use of Western perceptions has become a lens to view and assess Islam. This Western lens has biased nations, the US in particular, from confronting and countering a global insurgency whose methodology and endstate are based on Islam. By not considering its opponent's ideology as a foundation of the insurgency's doctrine, Western nations' efforts may be a contributing factor to the insurgency's success in unification and operations.

“West” and “Western” are considered within this article to denote European nations with a liberal-democratic form of government, the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.⁴ With the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the absorption of many former-Warsaw Pact states which are arguably not democratic, “West” and “Western” also includes those non-Muslim nations that receive substantial influence from the European Union, are actively seeking

³ The author of this monograph has been a qualified linguist for the US Army since 1984 and fully understands that in translation from one language to another, a word may have different contextual meanings which could significantly alter the meaning of a phrase. With this in mind, secondary resources which address Islam in a doctrinal aspect have been specifically chosen where the author is bilingual in English and Arabic, and is a subject matter expert in the field of Islamic Studies.

⁴ Samuel P. Huntington. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York, London, Toronto and Sydney: Simon and Schuster Paperbacks, 1996, pp 46

membership within that organization, and whose form of government is based, to some degree, on the liberal democratic model.

Chapter 2, Ideology

In Islam, the supreme source of authority is the Qur'an, purported by Muslims to be the word of Allah (God) as dictated to Mohammed by the Archangel Gabriel. As it is the word of Allah, it is absolute and perfect, and needs no interpretation. However, historically, the Qur'an was revealed over a twenty-three year period in four distinct phases. Certain verses⁵, within chapters appeared to conflict with other verses either within that chapter or other chapters. When there is discussion of a schism in Islam, most immediately relate to the differences between Sunni and Shi'a but the differences between the two are more political than theological, originating from the succession to head the Islamic nation after Mohammed's death.⁶ The more significant distinction within Islam is between fundamentalist, moderate and secularist Muslims, distinguished by how each group rectifies the infallibility of the Qur'an and conflicting verses. The argument centers upon the distinction of abrogation, where later verses supersede earlier

⁵ Within Islam, verses of the Qur'an are referred to as "suras". The words are interchangeable and will be used within this work dependent upon the reference being made. Specific passages will be referred to as suras, where as a general reference to passages will be referred to as verses.

⁶ Hussein Abdulwaheed Amin. *Islam for Today*. August 16, 2007.
www.islamfortoday.com/shia.htm (accessed December 29, 2008)

verses, as opposed to progressive revelation, where each verse is applicable dependent upon the specific situation at a specific time.⁷

Fundamentalists, Adhering to Scripture

Terms such as “Islamist”, “extremist”, or “radical” are often used to describe those Muslims who adhere to the Qur’an in its most literal meaning, often citing the actions of Mohammed as noted in various Hadiths to give validity to their actions.⁸ Use of these terms is often intended as a way of distinguishing between moderate Muslims and those who have deviated from actual meaning of Islamic teachings. This is a misnomer and the actual sect being referred to is Salafist, or those who adhere to Salafi⁹. Ironically, to the Salafist, it is their fundamentalist adherence to the literal aspects of the Qur’an that makes them the true believers and the moderates, who are interpreting the Qur’an, are guilty of heresy.

⁷ Stephen C. Coughlin. *"To Our Great Detriment": Ignoring what Extremists Say about Jihad*. Washington, D.C.: National Defense Intelligence College, 2007, Appendix C, pp 245-254

⁸ Britannica Online. *Encyclopedia Britannica*. Undated. <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/251132/Hadith> (accessed March 22, 2009), “record of the traditions or sayings of the Prophet Muhammad, revered and received as a major source of religious law and moral guidance, second only to the authority of the Qur’ān, or scripture of Islām. It might be defined as the biography of Muhammad perpetuated by the long memory of his community for their exemplification and obedience. The development of Ḥadīth is a vital element during the first three centuries of Islāmic history, and its study provides a broad index to the mind and ethos of Islām.”; stated simply, it is the observed action and statements of Mohammed as he applied Shari’a and adhered to the Qur’an. Some Hadiths also include the actions and statements of Mohammed’s companions, but only as they relate directly to the statements and actions of Mohammed. These statements and actions assist Islamic Jurists in determining the proper intent of the Qur’an and Shari’a.

⁹ Juan José Escobar Stemmann. "MIDDLE EAST SALAFISM'S INFLUENCE AND THE RADICALIZATION OF MUSLIM COMMUNITIES IN EUROPE." *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, 2006: 1-14; Salafi – those who believe only Mohammed, the Rightly-Guided Caliphs and the first three generations of Muslims truly followed the teachings of Islam. In order to return to the original greatness of Islam, Muslims, as a society, must return to the literal dictates of the Qur’an and the Hadiths.

The three most influential figures in Salafism are Taqi al-Din ibn Taymiyyah (1263-1328), the founder of Salafism, Muhammad ibn Abd' al-Wahhab (1703-1791) spiritual advisor for the second conquest and reunification of the Arabian Peninsula (Mohammed being the first conqueror and unifier), and Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966) arguably responsible for modern Salafist ideology. Although fundamentalist organizations draw their legitimacy directly from the Qur'an and Sunnah, the writings and manifestos of most modern terrorists' organizations will use references and quotes of each of the prominent scholars as a way of further explaining their principles and adding authenticity to the organization.¹⁰

During the waning days of the Crusades and following the conquest of the Abbasid Caliphate, Islamic jurist ibn Taymiyyah explained the loss of power and prestige of the Umma as being directly contributed to Islam's deviation from its original intent and the teachings of Mohammed, as practiced by the first generation of Muslims, the *salaf*.¹¹ By returning to the righteous path, Muslims would again incur Allah's favor. Taymiyyah argued that the Caliphate had strayed from a state based upon Islam and the word of Allah, and therefore the Ulema¹² must

¹⁰ Mideast Web Gateway. "Middle East Encyclopedia." *Mideast Web Gateway*. Undated. <http://www.mideastweb.org/Middle-East-Encyclopedia/ulema.htm> (accessed April 15, 2009) Sunnah – the actions and sayings of Mohammed, intending to give clarification to the meaning and application of Islam and the Qur'an; often used interchangeably with "Hadith"

¹¹ Dan Benjamin, *Age of Sacred Terror: Radical Islam's War Against America*, Westminster, Random House Adult Trade Publishing Group, 2003, pp 45; Washington State University. *Glossery*. Undated. <http://www.wsu.edu/~dee/GLOSSARY/HTM> (accessed March 21, 2009); Umma – varying definitions; commonly accepted is the group of all Muslims, creating one society; variants include Salafists interpretation as the group of Muslims strictly adhering to the Qur'an, making them "true Muslims" and the "true Islamic Society"

¹² Mideast Web Gateway. "Middle East Encyclopedia." *Mideast Web Gateway*. Undated. <http://www.mideastweb.org/Middle-East-Encyclopedia/ulema.htm> (accessed April 15, 2009) Ulema – a group of Muslim scholars, learned in Islamic Shari'a law; An organized political body that exercises power in the name of religion in specific countries

be consulted in order to confirm any actions by the Caliph as having the authority of Allah. The purity of Islam had been tainted by Mongols and semi-pagans that adhered to aspects of Islam, but were Muslims by the merest of measures. While the Qur'an forbids Muslims to fight amongst themselves, Taymiyyah issued fatwas authorizing jihad against the Mongols, who had converted to Islam.¹³ To justify his actions Taymiyyah cited the Mongols' use of laws other than Shari'a, therefore making Mongols apostates. Furthermore, Taymiyyah raised the importance of jihad to that of the five pillars of Islam, using the words of Mohammed and the Qur'an to reinforce by implication the significance of jihad.¹⁴

In the 18th century, Muhammed ibn Abd' al-Wahhab again invoked the concept of Salafi to explain the failures of the Ottoman Empire at the gates of Vienna and Islam's diminishing influence. Al-Wahhab contributed the disorganization and partition of the Arab peninsula, the homeland of Islam, to its divergence from the teachings of Mohammed. As the spiritual leader, al-Wahhab aligned himself with a prominent tribal leader, Mohammed ibn al-Saud, and the two reunited the Arabian peninsula through conquest and conversion, much as the Prophet Mohammed had done some 1,000 years previously. This established the Saud dynasty which remains in place as modern Saudi Arabia.¹⁵

Born in Egypt to deeply religious parents, Sayyid Qutb was indoctrinated in Islam from a very early age, memorizing the Qur'an by the age of ten. Qutb attended the prestigious Dar al-

¹³ Answers.com. *Answers.com*. Undated. <http://www.answers.com/fatwa> (accessed March 22, 2009), Fatwa - a legal opinion on an issue of Islamic ritual or conduct or on issues of jurisprudence. The person who issues a fatwa is one who is versed in Islamic Law, a jurist (*mufti*).

¹⁴ Dan Benjamin, *Age of Sacred Terror: Radical Islam's War Against America*, Westminster, Random House Adult Trade Publishing Group, 2003, pp 50

¹⁵ *Ibid*, pp 52

Ulum, the Egyptian state-sponsored university, where he received a degree in Education in 1933. After college, Qutb was a prominent member of the Ministry of Education, maintaining his focus on social justice. By all accounts, Qutb was a pro-Western Arab.¹⁶

Three separate events seem to have contributed to Qutb's embracing Salafism. In 1948 Qutb was sent to the US to study western education techniques, earning a Master of Arts in Education from Northern Colorado University. While often cited as the basis of Qutb's anti-Western, anti-American sentiment, there are suggestions that the memoir of his trip, "*The America I have Seen*" merely reinforced preconceived conclusions of the West as a culture inferior to Islam.¹⁷ During his limited stay in the US, Qutb felt bombarded by the sexuality of wanton women, the excesses of alcohol, which he believed to an integral part of American social activities, the obsession by Americans with frivolous activities as exemplified by the number of well-kept, green lawns, and the apparent competition of churches for the souls of the community.¹⁸

Upon return to Egypt, Qutb resigned from his ministerial post in protest to the monarch's pro-Western tendencies and subsequently joined the Muslim Brotherhood, a marginalized Islamic

¹⁶ John L. Esposito, *The Islamic Threat; Myth or Reality?* New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, pp 135

¹⁷ Rolf Potts. *Vagabonding*. November 12, 2006. www.vagablogging.net/from-the-october-2006-issue-of-the-believer.html (accessed January 2, 2009)

¹⁸ Robert Siegel. "Sayyid Qutb's America." *NPR*. May 6, 2003. <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=1253796> (accessed December 12, 2009); Greely, Colorado, where Qutb studied, was, by all measures, a very conservative community of the time and located within a dry county.

organization that promoted the separation of the Umma¹⁹ from all exterior influences. Qutb quickly rose in prominence within the organization, becoming the editor of its journal and its principal theoretician.²⁰ The Muslim Brotherhood initially supported the military coup in July 1952, which deposed King Farouk, and assumed Colonel Gamal Abdel-Nasser, who led the coup executed by the Free Officer's Movement, would base the new nation on Shari'a. Within two years the realization that Nasser's government was secular and nationalist as opposed to pan-Islamic further turned Qutb towards radicalism and brought the Muslim Brotherhood into open and direct opposition with Nasser. The Muslim Brotherhood was outlawed in 1954, following several assassination attempts on Nasser. The Egyptian government's jailing of over 4,000 Brotherhood members, including Qutb, was considered to be an excessive overreaction and persecution of the Brotherhood for their Islamic beliefs. This solidified Qutb's determination that all nations made by man must be replaced by one nation founded in Shari'a; the Caliphate. During his incarceration, Qutb wrote and published *Milestones* in 1964, which has been a defining work and often quoted by Omar Abdel-Rahman, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and Osama bin Laden, to name only the most prominent modern Salafists.²¹ As such, this monograph will rely

¹⁹ Washington State University. *Glossery*. Undated. <http://www.wsu.edu/~dee/GLOSSARY/HTM> (accessed March 21, 2009); Umma – varying definitions; commonly accepted is the group of all Muslims, creating one society; variants include Salafists interpretation as the group of Muslims strictly adhering to the Qur'an, making them “true Muslims” and the “true Islamic Society”

²⁰ Bruce Livesey. "The Salafist Movement." *Frontline*. January 25, 2005. <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/front/special/sala.html> (accessed January 2, 2009)

²¹ Dinesh D'Souza. "Osama's Brain: Meet Sayyid Qutb, Intellectual Father of the Anti-Western Jihad." *The Weekly Standard*. April 29, 2002. <http://www.weeklystandard.com/content/public/articles/000/000/001/154cwiuw.asp> (accessed March 14, 2009); Teslik, Lee Hudson. "Profile: Ayman al-Zawahiri ." *Council on Foreign Relations*. February 26, 2006. <http://www.cfr.org/publication/9750/> (accessed December 22, 2008); Omar Abdel-Rahman – aka “the Blind Sheikh”, tried but acquitted in Egypt for the assassination of Anwar Sadat in 1974, tried and

heavily upon *Milestones* as a method of understanding fundamentalist doctrine, and will be a basis for comparison with moderate and secularist Islamic thought.

While all Muslims claim the infallibility of the Qur'an, the Qutb-doctrine is based upon its most literal and direct recitation. All concepts must be drawn directly from a passage, or in some cases, a series of passages in the Qur'an. "The Qur'an is the message of God and the Hadith the practical application in affairs by the prophet."²² Islam was not a new religion; it was the final correction of the one, true monotheistic religion. According to Qutb, Jews and Christians were actually Muslims that had strayed from the way of life as dictated by God, requiring Him to send several successive prophets to correct their actions, to include Jesus, and the final prophet, Mohammed. Therefore, in accordance to Qur'anic passages, Jews and Christians are guilty of the most heinous of sins, apostasy. Furthermore, according to Qutb, both Judaism and Christianity d the worship of a Son of God which made both religions polytheistic.²³

convicted of seditious conspiracy in 1995 for the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York; Ayman al-Zawahiri – deputy to Osama bin Laden in al Qaeda, considered to be the intelligence behind that organizations' operations; Osama bin Laden – student of Mohammed Qutb, Sayyid's brother; founder and head of al Qaeda, considered to have given approval, if not the mastermind, behind the terrorist operations in bombing the al Khobar towers in Saudi Arabia, the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, attack on the USS Cole in Yemen, and most notably, the 9/11 attacks

²² Seyyid Qutb, *Milestones*, Damascus, Dar al-Ilm, undated, pp 15

²³ Seyyid Qutb, *Milestones*, Damascus, Dar al-Ilm, undated, pp 81; Haleem, M.A.S. Abdel, trans. *The Qur'an*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, 9:30 "The Jews said, 'Ezra is the son of God,' and the Christians said, 'The Messiah is the son of God'..."

Moderates; a Rose by Any Other Name...

With the acknowledgment of an insurgency in Iraq in 2005, the military leadership in Iraq began to realize that the situation could not be resolved simply by killing terrorists. If the insurgents were basing their legitimacy on religious ideology, then the effective counter strategy would be an acceptable alternative to that religious ideology.²⁴ Since “insurgents”, “terrorists” and “extremists” were often used interchangeably, the antithesis to an extremist must be a “moderate”. However, the use of the term “moderate” is, once again, using a faulty lexicon. It is another example of using a Western concept that is inappropriate for the situation. To a great deal of Muslims, “moderate” is a pejorative when used to refer to Islam. The connotation is that somehow the “moderate” Muslim is not as devoted to his religion in comparison to anyone else, or that he has “sold out” politically.²⁵

Even when used by Westerners in a Western context, the term “moderate” is inappropriate. Dr. John Esposito, a noted Professor of Religion and International Affairs and Director of the Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding at Georgetown University defines moderate as “non violent and willing to participate within the system” and juxtaposes them not with extremists, but with “violent revolutionaries”.²⁶ Assuming Esposito’s definition to be commonly held, it is arguably an amazingly dangerous sentiment. If one accepts the premise that

²⁴ Christopher Henzel. "The Origins of al Qaeda's Ideology: Implications for US Strategy." *Parameters*, 2005: 69-80

²⁵ Muqtedar Kahn. "Who Are Moderate Muslims?" *Ijtihad.org*. Undated. <http://www.ijtihad.org/moderatemuslims.html> (accessed January 19, 2009).

²⁶ John L. Esposito. *The Islamic Threat; Myth or Reality?* New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, pp 271

fundamentalist Muslims seek the violent overthrow of the world and the establishment of global Islam, then the subversive attempt to achieve the same goal should not be considered acceptable. Moderate Muslims are not exercising moderation; they are simply applying other means to accomplish the same goal of establishing global Islamic dominance. The value of the actions should be weighed upon the anticipated or desired outcome as opposed to the method of execution.

Dr. Muqtedar Kahn is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Adrian College in Michigan. He is a member of the board of the Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy, Center for Balanced Development, and the Association of Islamic Social Scientists. As an Arab and a Muslim, his view is perhaps the most unbiased and capable of describing the “moderate Muslim”;

I believe that moderate Muslims are different from militant Muslims even though both of them advocate *the establishment of societies whose organizing principle is Islam* [emphasis added]. The difference between moderate and militant Muslims is in their *methodological orientation* [emphasis added] and in the primordial normative preferences which shape their interpretation of Islam.

For moderate Muslims *Ijtihad*²⁷ is the preferred method of choice for social and political change and military *Jihad* the last option. For militant Muslims, military *Jihad* is the first option and *Ijtihad* is not an option at all.²⁸

²⁷ Ijtihad – the ability for Islamic jurists to determine the meaning of religious passage if there is no textual sources; interpretation of unclear aspects; once a textual source and definition is established, no further analysis is permitted.

²⁸ Muqtedar Kahn. "Who Are Moderate Muslims?" *Ijtihad.org*. Undated. <http://www.ijtihad.org/moderatemuslims.html> (accessed January 19, 2009).

Kahn's definition of a moderate differs significantly from Esposito's in that moderates do not refrain from violence; it simply is not the preferred, most efficient method to achieve their goals. His point is incredibly significant; the difference between Salafists and moderate Muslims is the ways, not the ends.

There is a sector within the US that views Esposito and his manner of moderate thinking as apologetic. Much of his writings suggest that a great deal of culpability for extremists' activity belongs to the West, or that there are many mitigating circumstances that have brought about violent actions by a radical, "revolutionary" group of people that happen to all share the commonality of being Muslim. Esposito blatantly states that the rise in friction between the West, specifically the US, and Muslim nations is an attempt for the West to find a replacement threat for Communism.²⁹ A constant theme through-out his writings is the distinction and separation between the religion of Islam and the politics of Muslim nations, in direct conflict with Qutb. There is an obvious and conscious effort to disassociate the words "radical", "extreme", and "militant" from Islam or Muslim. The impression presented is that the actions of extremists are strictly political, regardless of any religious ideology the extremists may espouse. In several cases, Esposito uses circular logic to reinforce his argument of Western culpability. Non-Muslims overreact to fear created by militants and hold the Muslim society accountable for the actions of a very few.³⁰

The manner in which non-Muslims interact with Muslims shapes the perception and

²⁹ John L. Esposito, *The Islamic Threat; Myth or Reality?* New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, pp 3

³⁰ Ibid, pp 218

manner in which Muslims interact with non-Muslims.³¹ Muslims' impression of oppression and persecution produces support for radicalization.³² Esposito quotes an unidentified Muslim leader in France, stating, "Our only ambition is to become at the same time good Muslims and good French citizens. But as long as people wage campaigns on the peril of Islam, as long as we let rancors [sic] and frustrations accumulate, we will encourage all forms of radicalization." It is difficult to understand why such a noted scholar would use a transparent invocation of the victim clause; "it's not our fault, they made us like this." Dr. Esposito's credentials are beyond reproach and he is a subject matter expert in his field; however, his views are utopian and fixated on "how things ought to be" as opposed to how they actually are.

The justification of Salafists activities is not limited to non-Muslim and academic moderates. Organizations such as the Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR) were approached by the Bush administration soon after the 9/11 attacks.³³ All have participated in outreach programs initiated by the Bush administration, and the Department of Justice in particular,

³¹ Ibid, pp 215

³² Ibid, pp 240

³³ Cable News Network. "Bush Denounces Muslim Harassment." *CNN.com*. September 17, 2001. <http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/17/gen.hate.crimes/> (accessed March 17, 2009); President Bush met with several leaders of Islamic organizations outside of the Islamic Center of Washington, a mosque, stating "Those directing their anger against Muslims in the wake of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon should be 'ashamed',"; Council on American-Islamic Relations, "What They Say About CAIR." *Council on American-Islamic Relations*. Undated. <http://www.cair.com/AboutUs/WhatTheySayAboutCAIR.aspx#presidentbush> (accessed February 13, 2009); "Like the good folks standing with me, the American people were appalled and outraged at last Tuesday's attacks... This is a great country. It's a great country because we share the same values of respect and dignity and human worth. And it is my honor to be meeting with leaders who feel just the same way I do. They're outraged, they're sad. They love America just as much as I do." The statement posted on CAIR website is accompanied by a photo of Pres. Bush with CAIR Executive Director, as well as several other Muslim organization leaders, standing at the President's side outside of the Islamic Center of Washington on 17 September, 2001

as a method of distinguishing between “extremists” and “moderate” Muslims.³⁴ By interacting with these groups the Bush administration provided a sense of legitimacy and leadership of the American Muslim community that the group could not have achieved on its own.³⁵ A cursory search of the internet shows numerous associations by individuals of the group with parent organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), Ḥarakat al-Muqāwamat al-Islāmiyyah (HAMAS), and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.³⁶ By association with CAIR, and appointing it as an interlocutor between the government and the Muslim community, the administration empowered it to influence US policy for the furtherance of CAIR’s own ideological agenda.

In 1994, CAIR was founded with the vision of being a leading advocate for justice and mutual understanding. Its mission statement specifically addresses enhancing understanding of Islam, encouraging dialogue, protecting civil liberties, empowering American Muslims, and

³⁴ Council on American-Islamic Relations, "What They Say About CAIR." *CAIR*. Undated, The page is dedicated to Administration Officials, elected officials, members of Congress and Law Enforcement leaders who either praise CAIR’s role as a leader of the Muslim community, or refute criticism of CAIR. Four of the endorsements are from FBI Agents and one from the Washington, DC Field Office of the FBI.; York, Byron. "Fight on the Right; “Muslim outreach” and a feud between activists." *National Review Online*. March 19, 2003. <http://www.nationalreview.com/york/york031903.asp> (accessed March 17, 2009), The article highlights a rift within the Conservative movement over outreach programs by the Bush administration towards Muslim organizations, specifically mentioning CAIR and its linkage to endorsement of terrorist organizations.

³⁵ Stephen F. Hayes, "Uncle Sam's Makeover; The State Department's answer to Osama bin Laden is to "redefine America." ." *The Weekly Standard*. March 6, 2002. <http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/001/287hccjs.asp?pg=2> (accessed March 17, 2009)

³⁶ Steven Emerson,. "Investigative Project on Terrorism: CAIR's Hamas Ties Prompt FBI Cut Off." *Reuters*. January 29, 2009. <http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/idUS225077+29-Jan-2009+PRN20090129> (accessed March 17, 2009); *UNITED STATES OF AMERICA vs HOLY LAND FOUNDATION, et al.* 3:04-CR-240-G (The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division, May 21, 2007),

building coalitions that promote justice and mutual understanding.³⁷ While its mission statement and vision are obviously noble, closer scrutiny of CAIR's activities and associations reveal more dubious characteristics. Since the 9/11 attacks the Bush administration and the FBI have worked closely with CAIR, attending many functions, including fundraisers for the organization and have participated in continuous out-reach programs designed to include the Muslim community in the administration's active defense of the country. However, CAIR's website emphasizes not mutual cooperation to identify potential threats to the country but the organization's training of the administration, and the FBI in particular, to be "culturally sensitive" to Muslims in the US.³⁸ The evolution of its articles and statements is noticeable. Those released within the first few weeks "unequivocally denounce the vicious and cowardly acts of terror", with most going on to caution the nation to "...exercise restraint and not jump to any conclusions about the attackers."³⁹ By December, the phrase "...condemns all acts of terrorism and attacks against innocent civilians...", or some derivative thereof, becomes a prominent feature, as well as a call to determine the "root cause of terrorism".⁴⁰ These phrases seem innocuous and even supportive, in

³⁷ Council on American-Islamic Relations. *Council on American Islamic Relations*. 2008. <http://www.cair.com/AboutUs/VisionMissionCorePrinciples.aspx> (accessed February 18, 2009)

³⁸ Patrick Poole, "CAIR Fingered by Feds." *FrontPageMagazine.com*. June 8, 2007. <http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/Read.aspx?GUID=E6B526B7-1FF9-4AF1-B4F0-449B08F9829D> (accessed February 20, 2009).

³⁹ Council on American Islamic Relations. "CAIR Full Page Advertisement." *Council on American Islamic Relations*. September 16, 2001. <http://www.cair.com/AmericanMuslims/AntiTerrorism/CAIRFullPageAdvertisement.aspx> (accessed February 20, 2009); Council on American Islamic Relations. "CAIR Full Page Advertisement." *Council on American Islamic Relations*. September 16, 2001. <http://www.cair.com/AmericanMuslims/AntiTerrorism/CAIRFullPageAdvertisement.aspx> (accessed February 20, 2009).

⁴⁰ Council on American Islamic Relations. "American Muslim Response to the September Attacks." *Council on American Islamic Relations*. September 21, 2001.

and of themselves. Yet when applied with the statements of Esposito in regard to victimhood, and further investigation into CAIR's links to Islamophobia and Civil Rights, the intention begins to skew away from support for the country and more towards limiting any association of the actions with an ideology based on religion.

CAIR's website stringently cautions its readers not to assign guilt by association. Ostensibly, it appears to be a call not to associate all Muslims with the actions of a few radicals that associate themselves with Islam. However, this may be a subtle attempt by CAIR to distance the organization from its individual members and leadership. In 1995, Siraj Wahaj, a CAIR advisory board member, was named an unindicted co-conspirator in the plot to blow up the World Trade Center. Ghassan Elashi, a founder both of CAIR's Austin, Texas, chapter and the Holy Land Foundation was convicted in July 2004 of having illegally shipped computers to Libya and Syria, and convicted in April 2005 for conspiracy and money laundering with a known terrorist.⁴¹ CAIR's communications specialist and civil rights coordinator, Randall Royer, is serving a 20-year prison term for conspiring to support Al Qaida and the Taliban in Afghanistan.⁴² Most notably, CAIR has been a staunch supporter of Sami al-Arian both before his trial and after al-

<http://www.cair.com/AmericanMuslims/AntiTerrorism/AmericanMuslimResponsetotheSeptemberAttacks.aspx> (accessed February 20, 2009).

⁴¹ Jamie Glazov, "A Defeat for Islamism in America." *FrontPageMagazine.com*. May 8, 2006. <http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/Read.aspx?GUID=C3903DA7-2B4D-4DD4-B1AD-CFE518193393> (accessed February 20, 2009).

⁴² United States Department of Justice. "TWO DEFENDANTS IN VIRGINIA JIHAD CASE PLEAD GUILTY TO WEAPONS CHARGES, WILL COOPERATE WITH ONGOING INVESTIGATION." *United States Department of Justice Office of Public Affairs*. January 16, 2004. http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2004/January/04_crm_030.html (accessed March 21, 2009)

Arian pleaded guilty to being a member of, and providing support to, an organization designated by the US as a terrorist organization.⁴³ This list of members and leadership of CAIR who were convicted, pled guilty, or are under indictment is not all-inclusive. Perhaps most damning is CAIR itself being named as an unindicted co-conspirator in providing support to a known and designated terrorist organization, HAMAS, by funneling funds through the Holy Lands Foundation.⁴⁴ As of 29 January, 2009, the FBI has severed all ties and associations with CAIR and refuses to attend any function in which CAIR will provide representation.⁴⁵

Secularists, Reforming Islam

There is a third category that is rarely addressed in Western discourse; the secularist Muslim. Organizations such as the Muslim Canadian Congress (MCC) and the Institute for a Secular Islamic Society (ISIS) are ardent supporters of the separation of religion and state, democracy, the rights of women and minorities, freedom of thought, and freedom to choose ones religion (a direct reference to Islam's prohibition from renouncing Islam).⁴⁶ Such organizations

⁴³ *United States of America vs. Sami al-Arian*. 8:03-CR-77-T-30TBM (United States District Court, Middle District of Florida, Tampa Division, February 28, 2006).

⁴⁴ *United States of America vs. Sami al-Arian*. 8:03-CR-77-T-30TBM (United States District Court, Middle District of Florida, Tampa Division, February 28, 2006).

⁴⁵ Mary Jacoby, "FBI Cuts Off CAIR Over Hamas Questions." *The Investigative Project on Terrorism*. January 29, 2009. <http://www.investigativeproject.org/985/fbi-cuts-off-cair-over-hamas-questions> (accessed February 20, 2009)

⁴⁶ Muslim Canadian Congress. "The MCC Mission." *Muslim Canadian Congress*. Undated. <http://www.muslimcanadiancongress.org/mission.html> (accessed February 20, 2009). Center for Inquiry; "Our Mission." *Institution for the Secularization of Islamic Society*. Undated. http://www.centerforinquiry.net/isis/about/our_mission/ (accessed February 20, 2009).

are often referred to as being “secular Muslim” or “secular Islamic”, which, in the stereotypical Western perception, appears to be an oxymoron.⁴⁷

The distinction between secularists and the rest of the Islamic community is, specifically, enforcement of Shari’a.⁴⁸ Even amongst the very limited community of secularists, there is a difference of opinion. The MCC believes Shari’a should be applied to religious matters, but not those of a temporal nature, whereas ISIS believes Shari’a to be too oppressive in any forum.⁴⁹ A unifying theme amongst secularists is that Ijtihad, the concept of clarification of religious concepts, is a changing and evolving process.⁵⁰ Traditional Islamic edict states that once a clarification has been made by a competent Islamic Jurist, there is no more discussion on its meaning.⁵¹ Conversely, secularists believe that language, and therefore understandings, have

⁴⁷ Ask.Com. *Dictionary.com*. Undated. <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/secular> (accessed March 21, 2009), “not pertaining to or connected with religion”

⁴⁸ Rocco Galati, "Submissions by Muslim Canadian Congress Review of Arbitration Process by Marion Boyd." *Muslim Canadian Congress*. August 26, 2004. <http://www.muslimcanadiancongress.org/articles.html#sharia> (accessed March 21, 2009)

⁴⁹ Center for Inquiry. *Institution for the Secularization of Islamic Society*. April 5, 2007. <http://www.centerforinquiry.net/isis> (accessed March 21, 2009)

⁵⁰ Muslim Canadian Congress. "The MCC Mission." *Muslim Canadian Congress*. Undated. <http://www.muslimcanadiancongress.org/mission.html> (accessed February 20, 2009); Center for Inquiry. Islam and Secularization." *Institution for the Secularization of Islamic Society*. Undated; Hassan-Shahid, Farzana. "ISLAM’S NORMATIVE PRINCIPLES OR LITERALIST APPLICATIONS? ." *Muslim Canadian Congress*. June 24, 2005. http://theamericanmuslim.org/tam.php/features/articles/islams_normative_principles_or_literalist_applications/ (accessed March 21, 2009). http://www.centerforinquiry.net/isis/islamic_viewpoints/islam_and_secularization/ (accessed March 21, 2009) “Any religion that requires total obedience is not likely to produce people capable of CRITICAL THOUGHT; people capable of independent thinking.”

⁵¹ Majid Khadduri. *War and Peace in the Law of Islam*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1955, pp 36

changed in the last 1400 years.⁵² This is a direct challenge to the infallibility of the Sunnah and the concept that the Qur'an is applicable to all times and all situations.

Unfortunately, it is because of these very concepts that secularists are seen by the rest of the Islamic community as heretics and apostates.⁵³ Where moderate Islamic organizations dismiss secularists as being non-Muslim and often denounce secularists as being anti-Muslim zealots, fundamentalist Muslims are compelled to eradicate secularists.⁵⁴ It becomes a matter of religious piety to physically harm secularists because of their beliefs. The founder of MCC, Tarek Fatah, was forced to completely disassociate himself with the organization and has taken his family into hiding, specifically citing the numerous and credible death-threats he and his family have received.⁵⁵

Secularists will always be at a disadvantage to other forms of Islamic ideology because there is no basis of legitimacy for their theories. While Salafists and moderate Muslims disagree

⁵² Farzana Hassan-Shahid. "ISLAM'S NORMATIVE PRINCIPLES OR LITERALIST APPLICATIONS? ." *Muslim Canadian Congress*. June 24, 2005. http://theamericanmuslim.org/tam.php/features/articles/islams_normative_principles_or_literalist_applications/ (accessed March 21, 2009)

⁵³ Farzana Hassan. "Redefining "Practicing Muslim" ." *The American Muslim*. November 1, 2005. http://theamericanmuslim.org/tam.php/features/articles/redefining_practicing_muslim/ (accessed March 21, 2009)

⁵⁴ Ahmed Bedier. "Ahmed Bedier Exposes the "Illegitimate" Secular Islam Summit and its Funders the Intelligence Summit." *Ahmed Bedier Blogspot*. March 5, 2007. <http://ahmedbedier.blogspot.com/2007/03/ahmed-bedier-exposes-illegitimate.html> (accessed March 21, 2009), Ahmed Bedier is the founder and executive director of the Tampa chapter of CAIR at the time of this posting.

⁵⁵ Sonya Fatah. "Fearing for safety, Muslim official quits." *The Globe and Mail*. March 8, 2006. http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/Page/document/v5/content/subscribe?user_URL=http://www.theglobeandmail.com%2Fservlet%2Fstory%2FLAC.20060803.FATAH03%2FTPStory&ord=28385645&brand=theglobeandmail&force_login=true (accessed March 21, 2009)

as to the ability to interpret the Qur'an, both draw upon the dictates of the Qur'an and Sunnah to justify their actions. Neither argue about the infallibility of the Qur'an, yet they disagree as to the others application of scripture. Secularist Muslims, however, openly state that the Qur'an lacks applicability to many modern situations. As stated previously, the Qur'an explicitly states that it is perfect and applicable to all situations and all times. Therefore, to accept the secularist Muslims' premise that the Qur'an is wrong on this aspect is to begin a cascading series of questions as to what else the Qur'an states wrongly. If the very book that defines the religion is in question, then one must ask how the secularist defines its ideology. Separating religion and politics within Islam will require a significant reconstruction of the very foundation of Islam, and perhaps an adjustment of the Qur'an, itself.

The Umma, Jahiliyya and the Caliphate⁵⁶

One of Qutb's most fundamental principles was the distinction between the Islamic society, the Umma, and Jahiliyya.⁵⁷ The Umma is the community or society of all Muslims, without regard to nationality. It is the theoretical citizenry of the Caliphate, whether the

⁵⁶ Washington State University. *Glossery*. Undated. <http://www.wsu.edu/~dee/GLOSSARY/HTM> (accessed March 21, 2009); Umma – varying definitions; commonly accepted is the group of all Muslims, creating one society; variants include Salafists interpretation as the group of Muslims strictly adhering to the Qur'an, making them “true Muslims” and the “true Islamic Society”; Jahili – literally translated from Arabic as “ignorant” or “ignorance”; as applied by Qutb in *Milestones*, it is used to describe non-belief or may be used to describe decadence or forbidden by the Qur'an; Jahiliyya can refer to a community that ascribes to Jahili ways, or to the society that is not in adherence with Shari'a.

⁵⁷ Seyyid Qutb. *Milestones*, Damascus, Dar al-Ilm, undated, pp 93

Caliphate physically exists or not.⁵⁸ Qutb defined the Umma as that group of people that lived in strict adherence to Shari'a as defined by the Qur'an, Hadiths and the Sunnah.⁵⁹ The contrasting society, Jahiliyya, is simple; it is the collective group that does not adhere to the concepts of Allah as the one God, the Qur'an as the word of God, Shari'a as the rules of life, and Mohammed as the prophet of God.⁶⁰

While jahili is an all-inclusive term, it was normally considered to refer to pre-Islamic era or to modern-era non-Muslims.⁶¹ Qutb built upon ibn Taymiyyah's concept that any individual or group that did not strictly adhere to Shari'a and the Sunnah was Jahili, to include Muslims. Jahiliyya was divided into three subgroups; polytheists, "People of the Book", and the hypocrites.⁶² The importance of the subdivisions relates to the dictates of how each group will be treated. Polytheists were in direct conflict Islam, were not to be tolerated and were to be considered in a permanent state of war. Hypocrites were misguided Muslims that were not properly adhering to the Qur'an and Shari'a and therefore should be educated in order to return them to the proper life. "People of the Book" were somewhere in-between. At various places

⁵⁸ Caliphate – the single, unified nation of Muslims whose laws are solely based upon Shari'a; while there have been instances of multiple Caliphates at different periods, none ever recognized the other as legitimate; a Caliphate may contain semi-autonomous principalities, known as amirates or emirates.

⁵⁹ Shari'a – Islamic law as dictated by the Qur'an covering all aspects of life, not only for Muslims, but for non-Muslims as well; while Shari'a is not subject to interpretation, it may be "clarified" by Islamic jurist for those who lack a full knowledge of the Qur'an and; included to some degree in nearly all sects are the Hadiths, or the ways of Islam as practiced and explained by Mohammed

⁶⁰ Seyyid Qutb. *Milestones*, Damascus, Dar al-Ilm, undated, pp 93

⁶¹ Oxford Islamic Studies Online. *Jahiliyyah*. Undated.
http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e1157?_hi=0&_pos=1 (accessed March 21, 2009)

⁶² Seyyid Qutb. *Milestones*, Damascus, Dar al-Ilm, undated, pp 48; People of the Book – Jews and Christians

within *Milestones* the Qur'an, Hadiths and Islamic Jurists are cited to show how Christians and Jews come from the same lineage as Muslims and therefore are afforded special considerations. At other places in *Milestones* Jews and Christians are depicted as polytheists.⁶³ Ultimately, Qutb reconciles the various differences within the multiple sources, "After explaining these facts, the position of Islam in relation to all these jahili societies can be described in one sentence: it considers all these societies unIslamic [sic] and illegal."⁶⁴

Qutb castigated Muslim nations for professing to be Islamic, but not living by the dictates of Allah and the ways of the prophet.⁶⁵ It is noteworthy that *Milestones* was written during a tide of nationalism throughout the Middle East. There was no Islamic society because there was no single nation, no group of people that lived in accordance to the Qur'an, nor had there been since the time of the Rightly-Guided Caliphs.⁶⁶ Furthermore, all societies that dictate any law not stated in Shari'a are Jahili, contrary to Islam and the Qur'an, and must be destroyed in order to allow the establishment of the Umma and the Caliphate. This includes present Islamic nations that follow any laws other than Shari'a. All other rules or laws were attempts by men to force Muslims to obey and worship men, supplanting the authority of Allah with that of man, or the

⁶³ Ibid, pp 48, 63; "It was also explained that war should be declared against those from among the 'People of the Book' [Christians and Jews] who declare open enmity, until they agree to pay Jizyah or accept Islam." "The Jews say: 'Ezra is the Son of God', and the Christians say: 'The Messiah is the Son of God'. These are mere sayings from their mouths, following those who preceded them and disbelieved."

⁶⁴ Ibid, pp 78

⁶⁵ Ibid, pp 82

⁶⁶ The Rightly Guided Caliphs were the first four Caliphs after the death of Mohammed (Abu Bakr 632-634, Umar 634-644, Uthman 644-656, Ali 656-661), who oversaw the vast expansion of Islam from the edge of the Byzantine Empire, across the Levant, into Persia, along the Maghreb of Northern Africa and into the Iberian Peninsula. These are considered the only Caliphs to have ruled the unified state of Muslims with religious authority.

nation. In order for the Islamic society to exist in modern era, it must be founded as a nation; otherwise, the Umma would remain only as a theoretical concept.⁶⁷ Only by a popular Islamic revival could a nationalistic Muslim nation be converted to an Islamic nation as the foundation for the Caliphate, regaining the favor of Allah. Only then would Muslims be able to once again attain world leadership.⁶⁸

The emphasis on jahili is significantly diminished within the more moderate sector in Islam. The Umma, however, continues to play a significant role, albeit more conceptual as opposed to physical. Whether the definition of “decadence” or “ignorance” is applied, in accordance with the Salafists, moderates are as much a part of the Jahiliyya as non-believers. Moderate Muslims must either refute the fundamentalist perception or ignore the concept all together. Moderate Muslims can counter this perception by decrying that the Salafists have misinterpreted the Qur’an and Hadiths. Certain verses can be used to support even the most violent of actions such as beheadings, but the context of the Qur’an taken in its entirety and reinforced by the Hadiths can present a vastly different understanding. In this manner, it is the moderate Muslim that is stating that the Salafists are the ones actually guilty of jahili, either through ignorance or heresy.⁶⁹ Moderate Muslims therefore absolve themselves of any responsibility for the actions of other members of their culture, specifically Salafists and other fundamentalists.

⁶⁷ Seyyid Qutb. *Milestones*, Damascus, Dar al-Ilm, undated, pp 9

⁶⁸ Ibid, pp 11

⁶⁹ Council on American-Islamic Relations. *CAIR's Anti-Terrorism Campaigns*. Undated. <http://www.cair.com/AmericanMuslims/AntiTerrorism.aspx> (accessed March 21, 2009)

Another method of countering fundamentalist claims is for moderate Muslims to show they are just as ardent in their adherence to Islam as are Salafists.⁷⁰ For the West, this should be extremely alarming. Recognizing that the US is in a Global Insurgency as opposed to a Global War on Terror, Salafists would be the active operators, while moderates would be the auxiliary and support base.⁷¹ The Salafists, in and of themselves, cannot be self-sufficient. They cannot be both the active operatives and conduct the support required for operations. In order to merely survive, much less thrive, a small group of operatives requires a broad-based support network that is either complacent or compliant. While most moderate Muslims will not actively participate in violent promotion of their agenda, by supporting the Salafists even tacitly such as not identifying to authorities potential radicals within the community, moderate Muslims are enabling Salafist activity. By justifying the violent actions of the Salafists and mitigating culpability by suggesting the West has contributed to the environment which produced terrorists' actions, moderate Muslims are not only enabling but promoting the fundamentalist agenda. By not taking an active stance to counter the effects of Salafists, moderate Muslims provide the legitimacy required to strengthen the Salafists membership and therefore directly contribute to the cause of the Salafists. Ultimately, Westerners should remain mindful that the endstate of the moderate Muslim is the same as the fundamentalist. Only the ways, the methods of obtaining these endstates, are different.

⁷⁰ Muqtedar Kahn. "Who Are Moderate Muslims?" *Ijtihad.org*. Undated. <http://www.ijtihad.org/moderatemuslims.html> (accessed January 19, 2009)

⁷¹ Jonathan Morgenstein and Eric Vickland. "THE GLOBAL COUNTER INSURGENCY: America's New National Security and Foreign Policy Paradigm." *Small Wars Journal*. February 17, 2008. <http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/2008/02/the-global-counter-insurgency.php> (accessed March 21, 2009)

In the moderate Muslim thinking, the Umma takes on a connotation of a multi-racial group, loosely linked by a common religion. There is a deliberate effort to disassociate politics and nationality from religion completely. The concept of a literal Umma and Caliphate are along the lines of Utopia; a transcendental, noble construct for which to strive, realizing that it cannot ever be achieved. Esposito points to Egypt and Syria's attempts to unify in 1958 and again with Iraq in 1963, as well as the Tripoli Pact between Egypt, Libya and the Sudan in 1970 as clear examples of the impossibility of ever establishing a Caliphate.⁷² Yet the point to be taken away from these three failures is not that it is impossible, but that there were earnest, nearly successful attempts. Explaining these failures by citing the fractional basis of Islam is to completely dismiss the dominant personalities involved. Each national leader believed himself to be the most capable of heading the newly established, unified state.⁷³ Esposito's argument ignores the historical example of Tito in Yugoslavia where one charismatic, capable, and ruthless leader was capable of unifying several radically diverse territories under one flag for over forty years. If Islam is too fractional, too nationalistic, the logistics and coordination too overwhelming for a Caliphate to be established in this day and time, then how does one explain its establishment 1400 years ago? What capabilities and resources did the founding Muslims possess which are absent today that allowed one man under the protection of one of the many tribes on the Arabian Peninsula to establish an empire that within one hundred years would stretch from Persia, along the Levant, through the Maghreb and into the Iberian Peninsula?

⁷² John L. Esposito, *The Islamic Threat; Myth or Reality?* New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, pp 70, 76

⁷³ Ibid, pp 225

Those who would dismiss the possibility of the establishment of a single Islamic state do not need to contemplate the hypothetical. The initial fear of Iran attempting to spread its influence regionally after establishing its theocracy in the 1979 Iranian Revolution was alleviated primarily due to an eight-year war with Iraq.⁷⁴ Realizing it could not conquer the region militarily, Iran has steadily spread its influence within the Middle East until it has become, arguably, the most powerful state in the region.⁷⁵ Through the use of monetary support, weapons and materiel, and personnel for training, Iran has enabled organizations such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and HAMAS in the Gaza Strip to take power of those countries.⁷⁶ The most blatant challenge for regional power is in Iraq, where Iranian trained and equipped Badr Brigade and Jayash al-Mahdi (JAM) are not simply conducting insurgent activities such as planting Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) and sabotaging infrastructure, but openly confronting US forces in combat.⁷⁷ Iran is slowly bringing in satellites under its sphere of influence and those

⁷⁴ Gary Thomas. "Growing Iranian Regional Influence Worries Saudi Arabia." *Voice of America*. February 23, 2007. <http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2007-02/2007-02-23-voa56.cfm?CFID=149117082&CFTOKEN=99457106&jsessionid=66304400704b4942b6ab1a7f6820767f7035> (accessed Marcy 21, 2009)

⁷⁵ Melik Kaylan. "The Iranian Empire." *Forbes.com*. March 3, 2009. http://www.forbes.com/2009/03/02/mahmoud-ahmadinejad-iran-opinions-columnists_melik_kaylan.html (accessed March 21, 2009)

⁷⁶ John L. Esposito. *The Islamic Threat; Myth or Reality?* New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, pp 20

⁷⁷ David M. Walker. Comptroller General of the United States. *'Rebuilding Iraq: Governance, Security, Reconstruction, and Financing Challenges'*. Before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations; Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives, Washington: US General Accounting Office, 2006; "According to the Director of National Intelligence, the most extreme Sunni jihadists, such as al-Qaeda in Iraq, will remain unreconciled and continue to attack Iraqi and coalition forces. The remainder of the insurgency consists of radical Shi'a groups--some of which are supported by Iran--violent extremists, criminals, and, to a lesser degree, foreign fighters. According to the Director, Iran provides guidance and training to select Iraqi Shi'a political groups and weapons and training to Shi'a militant groups to enable anticoalition attacks. Iran also has contributed

that would argue that “sphere of influence” is not the same as establishing one unified state should make a comparison of Germany from 1938-1942 or the Warsaw Pact from 1954-1989.

Jihad

One of the most significant differences between moderates and Salafists centers around the understanding of Jihad. There is no disagreement on the translation of jihad being “struggle in the path of Allah”. The conflict arises from emphasis on the spiritual struggle as opposed to a physical struggle. Interestingly, the Qur’an is completely void to any use of the word jihad. However, there are numerous references to both becoming a better Muslim by adhering to the Qur’an and teachings of Mohammed, and to waging war in the name of Islam.

The moderate sector in Islam focuses upon the internal struggle of virtue as the way of promoting Islam throughout the world.⁷⁸ Legitimacy is drawn from a passage in one Hadith in which Mohammed is quoted as having said “We have returned from the lesser jihad to the greater jihad, *jihad un nafs jihad ul akbar*.” Yet this Hadith is disputed as being a weak, unsubstantiated Hadith.⁷⁹ Moderates do not disavow militaristic action, but site the numerous passages within the

to the increasing lethality of anticoalition attacks by enabling Shi'a militants to build improvised explosive devices with explosively formed projectiles, similar to those developed by the Lebanese Hizballah.”

⁷⁸ John L. Esposito. *The Islamic Threat; Myth or Reality?* New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, pp 30

⁷⁹ Bismillah Ar-Rahmân Ar-Rahiem. "Be Aware." *World of Islam Portal*. May 10, 2008. http://islam.worldofislam.info/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=729:qwe-have-returned-from-the-lesser-jihad-to-the-greater-jihad-jihad-un-nafs-jihad-ul-akbarq&catid=129&Itemid=63 (accessed

Qur'an that restrict warfare to a purely defensive manner. War can be waged only when Muslim territory is attacked, or Muslims are being oppressed and persecuted. While moderates see "oppressed and persecuted" as a limiting factor, Salafists point to these same passages as not only making war permissible but as an obligation.

Those who make the argument that Salafists take specific passages out of context, without applying the Qur'an in its entirety to draw the full meaning, are quite possibly guilty of the same transgression. The suras "Fight in God's cause against those who fight you, but do not overstep the limits:" and "If they do fight you, kill them – this is what such disbelievers deserve – but if they stop, then God is most forgiving and merciful." are often cited to support the purely defensive nature of Islam.⁸⁰ Yet adding the passage between the two, as well as following passages gives a different connotation.

Fight in God's cause against those who fight you, but do not overstep the limits: God does not love those who overstep the limits. Kill them wherever you encounter them, and drive them out from where they drove you out, for *persecution* [emphasis added] is more serious than killing. Do not fight them at the Sacred Mosque unless they fight you there. If they do fight you, kill them – this is what such disbelievers deserve – but if they stop, then God is most forgiving and merciful. Fight them until there is no more persecution, and *worship is devoted to God* [emphasis added].⁸¹

The terms "persecution" and "worship is devoted to God" appear innocuous until applied with

February 18, 2009); Benjamin, Dan. *Age of Sacred Terror: Radical Islam's War Against America*. Westminster: Random House Adult Trade Publishing Group, 2003, pp 55

⁸⁰ M.A.S. Abdel Haleem, trans. *The Qur'an*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, pp 21, suras 2:190 and 2:192

⁸¹ Ibid, pp 21, suras 2:190-2:194

So if they believe like you do, they will be rightly guided. But if they turn their backs, then they will be entrenched in opposition.⁸²

The Jews and Christians will never be pleased with you unless you follow their ways. Say, ‘God’s guidance is the only true guidance.’ If you were to follow their desires after the knowledge that has come to you, you would find no one to protect you from God or help you.⁸³

They will not stop fighting you [believers] until they make you revoke your faith, if the can.⁸⁴

Taken in this context, the meaning would be understood as “Jews and Christians will continuously fight Muslims and persecute Muslims as long as Muslims believe in Islam. Therefore, kill them wherever you encounter them until the Jews and Christians convert to Islam.” While this may appear to be quite a stretch to construe from a few, short passages in the Qur’an, this is exactly the concept espoused by Qutb and used by modern terrorists for justifying their actions, without regard to “innocent” or “civilian”, man, woman or child.⁸⁵

Milestones completely repudiates the concept of “defensive jihad”.⁸⁶ In countering moderates’ use of sura to support the premise of a defensive Islam, Qutb points to how the Qur’an was revealed in stages, and in the early stages, Muslims were not able to successfully wage jihad. Yet once Muslims were organized and had gained sufficient strength, Mohammed began a series

⁸² Ibid, pp 21, suras 2:138

⁸³ Ibid, pp 21, suras 2:120

⁸⁴ Ibid, pp 21, suras 2:218

⁸⁵ Seyyid Qutb. *Milestones*, Damascus, Dar al-Ilm, undated, pp 65

⁸⁶ Ibid, pp 55

of campaigns specifically to spread the word of Allah and promote Islam.⁸⁷ Using this example, Qutb states that it is both an obligation of the Muslim society as well as the responsibility of the individual to spread the word of Islam. Since non-Islamic governments, to include Muslim governments not adhering to the Sunnah, prevent Islam from flourish, then it becomes the obligation of Muslims, both collectively as well as individually, to remove these obstacles.⁸⁸

The counter argument is that Salafist and other “radicals” represent a very small minority within Islam, between one and seven percent, and are therefore their message is irrelevant.⁸⁹ Though this is intended to put the numbers of Salafists and “radicals” in proportion to a potential threat, it gives a false sense of security by obscuring actual numbers within statistical percentages; seven percent of 1.8 billion people is still 126 million people. It is an incredibly different concept projected when stated as “Between eighteen million and 126 million people subscribe to the most radical and militant form of Islam, dedicated to the establishment of only one global government composed of Islamic Shari’a, intent on destroying all other forms of government.” as opposed to “Salafist and other radicals compose only one to seven percent of all Muslims.”

⁸⁷ Ibid, pp 56

⁸⁸ Ibid, pp 57

⁸⁹ Bruce Livesey. "The Salafist Movement." *Frontline*. January 25, 2005. <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/front/special/sala.html>; Esposito, John L., and Dalia Mogahed. "What Makes a Radical?" *Gallup*. March 13, 2008. <http://www.gallup.com/poll/104941/What-Makes-Radical.aspx> (accessed February 19, 2009), “According to the Gallup Poll, 7% of respondents think that the 9/11 attacks were ‘completely’ justified and view the United States unfavorably.”; “By focusing on the 7%, whom we’ll call ‘the politically radicalized’ because of their radical political orientation, we are not saying that all in this group commit acts of violence. However, those with extremist views are a potential source for recruitment or support for terrorist groups. This group is also so committed to changing political conditions that they are more likely to view other civilian attacks as justifiable: 13% of the politically radicalized versus 1% of moderates say that attacks on civilians are ‘completely justified’.”

Chapter 3, Information Technology and Terrorist Activities

“In 1998, around half of the thirty organizations designated as ‘Foreign Terrorist Organizations’ under the US Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 maintained websites; by 2000, virtually all terrorist groups had established their presence on the Internet. Our scan of the Internet in 2003-4 revealed hundreds of websites serving terrorists and their supporters.”⁹⁰ This is how Dr. Gabriel Weimann, a world-renown expert on Terrorism and Information and Telecommunications Technology, begins his introduction for a special report on how the internet is being used by terrorists, summarizing an eight-year, on-going study. Weimann’s report presents a startling account of how terrorist organizations have incorporated technology into an enormously effective tool to aid their cause with information operations, fundraising and managing financial assets, data mining, and coordination of actions.

Terrorist’s most effective use of technology has been in the use of the internet and cellular telephones. Online searching capabilities allow terrorists to capture information anonymously, with very little effort or expense.⁹¹ Websites suddenly emerge, present information, and then once identified, simply disappear, modify their formats, or change their address but retain the same content. In some cases, addresses and content changes almost daily.⁹²

⁹⁰ Gabriel Weimann. "www.terror.net; How Modern terrorism Uses the Internet." *United States Institute of Peace*. March 2004. www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr116.html (accessed December 12, 2008)

⁹¹ Ibid, p7

⁹² Ibid, p2

Ironically, it was the US military that developed and released the internet as a means of securing its communications infrastructure and information systems. Inadvertently, it may have created a new arms race between small groups employing technology to create fear and panic in order to delegitimize state order, and the states attempting to prevent such actions.⁹³ As early as May, 2001, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) identified HAMAS, Hezbollah, al Qaeda, and Abu Nidal as actively using the internet, and specifically e-mail, to communicate and coordinate with terrorist agents. The FBI identified the capabilities and technical expertise these organizations possessed posed a real and potentially critical threat, warning of clear signs of a cyber-terrorism directed towards the US.⁹⁴

Information Operations

Nowhere has the difference in capabilities between the US and its adversaries been more apparent than in the success of Islamic terrorists, and al Qaeda in Iraq, specifically, in telling the story. In the US, the tone of media reporting gives the impression that the vast majority of the population has become bored with military operations in the Middle East, and simply fatigued with “The War on Terror”. Yet across the Muslim community, throngs cheer at every instance of US, Coalition, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) service members’ deaths. Terrorist organizations once had to rely on

⁹³ Brian A. Jackson. "Technology Acquisition by Terrorist Groups: Threat Assessment Informed by Lessons from Private Sector Technology Adoption." *The RAND Corporation*. 2001. <http://www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/RP1248/> p 4 (accessed February 12, 2009).

⁹⁴ Louis J. Freeh. "Testimony of Louis J. Freeh, Director, FBI Before the United States Senate, Committees on Appropriations, Armed Services, and Select Committee on Intelligence May 10, 2001 "Threat of Terrorism to the United States"." *The Federal Bureau of Investigation*. May 10, 2001. <http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress01/freeh051001.htm> (accessed December 22, 2008)

attracting media attention and accept whatever view of their actions was presented. With the internet, those organizations now have more direct control over the content of their message, can more directly shape how they are perceived by different target audiences and manipulate not only their own image but the image of their enemies, as well.⁹⁵ Thousands of internet websites post videos of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) attacks, suicide bombings, sniper attacks, and beheading individuals. Website administrators assert that some videos have over one million downloads.

The general theme of websites supporting Salafist movements has changed, though. From 2001 until 2005, 92 percent of such websites were aimed at Muslim audiences. Since 2006 there is much more emphasis on non-Muslim, specifically Western, audiences.⁹⁶ Where previous messages touted the righteousness of the cause and the assuredness of the outcome, more recent messages focus on three main themes; 1) Islamic groups have no choice other than to turn to violence as the only means with which to respond to an oppressive enemy, using language such as “slaughter”, “murder”, and “genocide”; 2) demonizing and delegitimizing their enemy, portraying government officials and Westerners as a ruthless enemy, crushing the rights and dignity of the people while portraying the organizations members as “freedom fighters”; 3) extensive use of the language of nonviolence in an attempt to counter the terrorists’ violent

⁹⁵ Gabriel Weimann. "www.terror.net; How Modern terrorism Uses the Internet." *United States Institute of Peace*. March 2004. www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr116.html p5 (accessed December 12, 2008)

⁹⁶ Manuel R. Torres Soriano. "Jihadist Propaganda and Its Audiences: A Change of Course?" *Perspectives on Terrorism*. November 2007. http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php?option=com_rokzine&view=article&id=8 (accessed February 23, 2009)

image, claiming to seek peaceful solutions using diplomacy and negotiations, along with international pressure on the repressive government to resolve differences.⁹⁷

Contrasted against this image of victimhood is a deliberate attempt to instill a sense of fear in the general population of Western nations. Claims of impending “large-scale attacks” are intended to generate a sense of dread and insecurity, and expose the government’s inability to protect its citizenry.⁹⁸ In July, 2007, a Pakistani journalist filmed a Taliban “graduation ceremony” for suicide bombers organized into six national “brigades”; British, American, Canadian, German, French and Afghani.⁹⁹ Threats to bring down commercial aircraft, disrupt power distribution, sabotage to infrastructure facilities such as dams, as well as disrupting the financial network, are all intended to create helplessness through the use of cyber-terrorism.¹⁰⁰ By creating a victim-aggressor dichotomy, it presents an “if-then” situation; “if the Western people pressure their governments to stop confronting Salafists’ efforts, then the Western people could live in peace and security.” One should question why the change in focus of the audience. One reason may be that the Salafists’ power-base, the Muslim population, may be suffering from the same exhaustion as Western populations. Therefore, the previous message no longer resonates

⁹⁷ Gabriel Weimann. "www.terror.net; How Modern terrorism Uses the Internet." *United States Institute of Peace*. March 2004. www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr116.html p6 (accessed December 12, 2008)

⁹⁸ Ibid, p4 (accessed December 12, 2008)

⁹⁹ Manuel R. Torres Soriano. "Jihadist Propaganda and Its Audiences: A Change of Course?" *Perspectives on Terrorism*. November 2007. http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php?option=com_rockzine&view=article&id=8 (accessed February 23, 2009)

¹⁰⁰ Gabriel Weimann. "www.terror.net; How Modern terrorism Uses the Internet." *United States Institute of Peace*. March 2004. www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr116.html p4 (accessed December 12, 2008)

and no longer has an audience. Another may be a perceived opportunity to exploit the Western population in much the same manner as the Viet Cong did in the '60s and '70s.

Complimentary to the Salafists' efforts, though not under direct control, is a new phenomenon, a new population unique to the internet; the blogosphere. Innumerable websites throughout Western countries as well as traditional Muslim countries are operating and giving a forum for jihadist attitudes. These sites link or load Salafists' exploits, and often have links where visitors can make donations either directly to organizations, or to the administrator to be forwarded to organizations. The typical blogger and administrator is a young male college student and an American citizen. A blogger interviewed by the New York times discussed posting letters by Ayman al Zawahiri in which Zawahiri praises Malcolm X and urges American blacks and other minorities to support al Qaeda and its efforts to lift oppression from all mankind. The blogger writes on his site that Zawahiri "cares about black people". Espousing the Salafist emphasis on jihad, the blogger proudly proclaims that there are now three ways in which to fulfill the obligation to jihad; joining fighters in Iraq, Afghanistan or Algeria, sending money, or promoting videos and ideology as part of the jihadi media.¹⁰¹

Finance

With operations that require an enormous amount of funding, modern terrorist organization use technology along the lines of a huge, continuous telethon. Where once

¹⁰¹ Michael Moss and Souad Mekhennet. "An Internet Jihad Aims at U.S. Viewers." *The New York Times*. October 15, 2007. http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/15/us/15net.html?_r=1&pagewanted=print (accessed December 12, 2008)

insurgencies were forced to rely on bank robberies, blackmail, ransoming hostages, and physical intimidation, fund-raising is now as simple as entering credit-card information on a website.¹⁰² Not only is financing more bountiful, but such anonymity greatly enhances security; there is no longer a face associated with an action, nor a person or physical evidence available. Chechnyan organizations have been discovered using servers out of Nigeria that feed to a bank in Sacramento, California, with funds being received from around the world. Websites sponsored by al Qaeda have been found directly soliciting funds to be used in jihad, listing account information from banks in Germany. As well as facilitating the collection of funds, with modern interconnectivity of financial institutions, access to these same funds is literally global and nearly instantaneous.¹⁰³ Not only are the terrorist organizations more secure but their assets are also more secure by being diversely spread amongst several banking facilities. The discovery and seizure of one account can no longer have a crippling effect upon the organization, as a whole.

Not all efforts are as obvious or anonymous. Several charity organizations, such as the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development, the Benevolence International Foundation, and the Global Relief Foundation, were all founded as legal and legitimate charitable organizations, publicly announcing their efforts to support humanitarian activities for Muslim countries.¹⁰⁴ CAIR and other main-stream Muslim organizations endorsed and promoted these

¹⁰² Brian A. Jackson. "Technology Acquisition by Terrorist Groups: Threat Assessment Informed by Lessons from Private Sector Technology Adoption." *The RAND Corporation*. 2001. <http://www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/RP1248/> pp 29 (accessed February 12, 2009).

¹⁰³ Gabriel Weimann. "www.terror.net; How Modern terrorism Uses the Internet." *United States Institute of Peace*. March 2004. www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr116.html p9 (accessed December 12, 2008)

¹⁰⁴ Ibid, p9

charitable organizations' efforts. Renowned academicians, such as Professor Sami al Arian from the University of South Florida, were intimately associated and actively participated in such organizations, all in the name of humanity. While the organizations were actually participating in charitable operations, either the parent organization or the dispersing agents were discovered by the Department of Justice to be part of terrorist organizations, including HAMAS, Hezbollah, and al Qaeda. As noted previously, al Arian was sentenced to fifty-seven months incarceration for actively supporting a known terrorist organization.¹⁰⁵

Yet even with all the benefits of high-technology, common criminal activity is still a lucrative means for raising funds. The smuggling of cigarettes and black-market sales is a multi-million dollar enterprise in which cartons are legally purchased in states with tax-rates of pennies on the pack, such as Virginia and North Carolina, and then transported to states such as New York and Michigan, where the tax-rate is as high as three dollars a pack. The profit-rate is incredibly high and law enforcement efforts are very man-power intensive, with sentences and fines relatively low. The Department of Justice has successfully prosecuted several cases with direct links from the criminal to HAMAS, Hezbollah, and al Qaeda. In one case wiretaps revealed the criminal receiving explicit instructions on how and where to transfer funds from a known Hezbollah leader in Lebanon.¹⁰⁶ Stolen credit cards are used to make purchases for terrorists' cells, such as the al Qaeda cell in Spain, or to establish banking accounts and siphon

¹⁰⁵ Ibid, pp 10

¹⁰⁶ Sari Horwitz. "Cigarette Smuggling Linked to Terrorism ." *The Washington Post* . June 8, 2004. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A23384-2004Jun7.html> (accessed February 27, 2009)

funds.¹⁰⁷ Commercial piracy is rampant throughout the Middle East. In a personal experience of the author, the day after the release of the block-buster “National Treasure” in the US in 2004, the pirated DVD was available within the Green Zone in Baghdad.

Recruitment

With its anonymity and vastly diverse reach, the internet has become an integral tool in recruitment drives for active fighters, suicide bombers, and promoters to advance the ideology and cause. Terrorist organizations may gather information on those browsing their websites and track the visitors surfing habits to determine if the visitor may be a prospective for recruitment. Seemingly innocuous questionnaires are used on some websites with subtle questions that appear to have nothing to do with jihadists movements. Those that answer the questionnaire and show a sympathy for Salafists’ actions may be contacted through an open source, and then directed through a maze of secret chat rooms where they receive instructions on direct contact.¹⁰⁸ Those with technical skills, or former military personnel who were Non-commissioned officers or officers, are highly prized by terrorist organizations. These may be slowly incorporated into the structure of the organization, as opposed to the young, eager recruits which are surprisingly not received with as much enthusiasm. Groups see these fanatics as potential spies and are met with

¹⁰⁷ Dennis M. Lormel. "Testimony of Dennis M. Lormel, Chief, Terrorist Financial Review Group, FBI Before the Senate Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism and Government Information July 9, 2002 Hearing On S. 2541, "The Identity Theft Penalty Enhancement Act." *Federal Bureau of Investigation*. July 9, 2002. <http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress02/idtheft.htm> (accessed February 27, 2009)

¹⁰⁸ Gabriel Weimann. "www.terror.net; How Modern terrorism Uses the Internet." *United States Institute of Peace*. March 2004. www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr116.html p8 (accessed December 12, 2008)

a suspicion and mistrust. When those from this group are recruited, they are isolated from the organization and almost immediately designated for suicide operations.¹⁰⁹

Terrorist organizations are not just recruiting those who can immediately contribute to their efforts, but are planning for the long-term. HAMAS and Hezbollah both operate websites specifically targeting, and indoctrinating, children. HAMAS runs television programs with characters amazingly similar to traditional Disney characters that promote the virtues of martyrdom and blatantly degrade Jews. Several organizations have produced computer games and sponsor online wars with jihadist themes specifically intended to attract, and train, children.¹¹⁰

Communications and Data Mining

The extensive investigation of the 9/11 attacks reveals that from May, 2001, until the 9 September, 2001, the extent in which the perpetrators used the internet to plan and coordinate their efforts were transmitted in thousands of messages. To preserve their anonymity, the al Qaeda terrorists used the internet from public locations and sent messages via public e-mail sites. A final message to the group from its leader, Mohamed Atta, used code-words to confirm the

¹⁰⁹ Christina Caan. "Journey of Death: Suicide Bombers in Iraq." *United States Institute for Peace*. July 2007. http://www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_briefings/2007/0726_suicide_bombers_iraq.html (accessed December 12, 2008)

¹¹⁰ David Talbot. "Terrorists Increasingly Turn to the Internet." *Technology Review*. February 21, 2006. http://www.technologyreview.com/InfoTech/wtr_16385,258,p1.html?a=f&a=f (accessed December 12, 2008).

timeframe of the operation, the number of participants, and facilities to be attacked.¹¹¹ In a communiqué from Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld to all military commanders, he quotes an al Qaeda military manual discovered on a captured computer in Afghanistan in 2002, stating “Using public sources openly and without resorting to illegal means, it is possible to gather at least eighty percent of all information required about the enemy.”¹¹²

Other captured computers and interrogations of unlawful combatants have revealed al Qaeda cells have an extensive database containing details of potential targets in the US. Cells have developed detailed target packages using the internet to collect intelligence on those targets and use modern software to study structural weaknesses in facilities as well as predict the cascading failure effect of attacking certain systems.¹¹³ One captured al Qaeda computer contained engineering and structural features of a dam, downloaded from the internet. Programs such as Google Earth™ not only provide detailed maps of potential targets, but contain actual imagery in such detail as to allow analysis of potential counter-terrorism measures.¹¹⁴ Information is passed using incredibly effective commercial encryption software or a process

¹¹¹ Gabriel Weimann. "www.terror.net; How Modern terrorism Uses the Internet." *United States Institute of Peace*. March 2004. www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr116.html pp 10 (accessed December 12, 2008)

¹¹² Donald Rumsfeld. "Secrecy and Security News." *Federation of American Scientists*. January 14, 2003. <http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2003/01/dodweb.html> (accessed February 28, 2009)

¹¹³ Gabriel Weimann. "www.terror.net; How Modern terrorism Uses the Internet." *United States Institute of Peace*. March 2004. www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr116.html p7 (accessed December 12, 2008)

¹¹⁴ *Ibid*, p7

known as steganography, whereby information is digitally imbedded within another, innocuous text message or picture.¹¹⁵

The internet provides a forum for loosely interconnected, semi-independent groups to maintain contact with one another and with members of other terrorist groups, providing dispersed organizational actors the ability to communicate swiftly and coordinate effectively. Now cells and groups can not only exchange ideas but also exchange practical information. The internet is used as a training tool and for transmitting “how to” manuals on everything from building bombs, to effectively recruiting and establishing cells, to assassination and counter-surveillance techniques. Websites offer tutorials in creating and spreading computer viruses, devising hacking stratagems, sabotaging networks and developing codes. Books and manuals such as *The Terrorist’s Handbook*, *The Anarchist Cookbook*, *How to Make Bombs*, *How to Make Bombs: Book Two*, *The Mujahadeen Poisons Handbook*, and a two volume *Sabotage Handbook* are all readily available and easily downloaded from a plethora of internet sites, potentially turning anyone with the desire into a terrorist.¹¹⁶

Access to information is not the same as being capable of using the information. A training film seen by the author of this article in 1999, made by the author of *The Anarchists Cookbook* revealed he only had two fingers remaining on one hand. Another author of an internet terrorist handbook blew off both his hands while making one of the formulas contained in his

¹¹⁵ Ibid, pp 10

¹¹⁶ Ibid, p9

own publication.¹¹⁷ Thirty percent of the deaths caused by homemade explosives are the bomb-makers themselves.¹¹⁸ Reading the principles behind effective sniping operations is in no means a substitute to the subtleties required in executing a long-distance shot, effective camouflage and concealment in order to prepare for the shot, or effective methods of escape and evasion of pursuing forces after the shot. The benefit to terrorist organizations is in the diminished threat to high-valued, experienced technical and subject-matter experts for training purposes. Groups of like-minded individuals can establish a cell and begin operations in one, or several, operational techniques, developing tactics, techniques and procedures unique effective to that specific cell, all without any risk to the overall organization.

Summary

Esposito strongly opposes the notion that Muslims may be able to unite by any means, to include using technology, to further a common effort; the establishment of a Caliphate. Using the term “global intifada” to refer to any uprising or insurgency by Muslims, he points to the diversity between Kashmir and Kosovo, Azerbaijan to Lebanon, to dismiss any notion of a common effort towards a common goal and deliberately separate a political upheaval from a cultural goal with religious aspects. For those who agree with Esposito’s theory, the logical line

¹¹⁷ Brian A. Jackson. "Technology Acquisition by Terrorist Groups: Threat Assessment Informed by Lessons from Private Sector Technology Adoption." *The RAND Corporation*. 2001. <http://www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/RP1248/> pp 25 (accessed February 12, 2009).

¹¹⁸ *Ibid*, pp25

of reasoning that technology was a fundamental enabler for terrorist organization, both before 9/11 and since, is merely circumstantial evidence that must be renounced.¹¹⁹

There is a real danger in dismissing the manner in which terrorist organizations have used technology, specifically the internet, to further their agenda and disregarding the potential to harm Western nations. To then disassociate fundamentalists' history of use with their stated ideology is intellectually disingenuous at a near-criminal level. By refusing to associate deeds with words, policy-makers, academicians and regional experts create an ostrich effect that may allow Western nations, specifically the US, to be subjugated in a piece-meal fashion. Critical thinking requires analysis of any threat for potentiality of occurrence, and assessed for its consequential impact if realized. The military refers to this process as "risk reduction".¹²⁰

The internet is seen as the epitome of free speech and the free exchange of ideas. Inherent within any efforts to monitor, moderate and limit the use of telecommunications, specifically the internet, is a conflict with civil liberties as regards to free speech. There is a very real potential that governments may abuse civil rights in an effort to protect the population or its own governmental institutions from a perceived threat. In 2006 Google™, Yahoo™, Microsoft™, and Cisco Systems™ were summoned before Congress and accused by legislators

¹¹⁹ John L. Esposito. *The Islamic Threat; Myth or Reality?* New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, pp 224

¹²⁰ Department of the Army. *FM 5-0 Army Planning and Orders Production*. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2005, pp 1-18

of abetting human-rights abuses in China.¹²¹ The Chinese government forced these companies to identify dissidents using the internet to criticize both the government, in particular, and communism in general. The American Civil Liberties Union has repeatedly argued cases at all levels, including the Supreme Court, declaring the Internet to be “a free speech zone, deserving of *at least* [emphasis added] as much First Amendment protection as that afforded to books, newspapers and magazines”.¹²²

Yet with freedom comes responsibility, from individuals, groups and especially from the government. Just as shouting “fire” in a crowded theater is intolerable and creates a clear and present danger to the welfare of common citizens, so too should the government have a responsibility to protect its citizenry from earnest efforts by persons under the jurisdiction and responsibility of the government to promote terrorist activities. According to Chief Justice Holmes in *Schenck v. United States*, 249 U.S. 47 (1919),

Words which, ordinarily and in many places, would be within the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment may become subject to prohibition when of such a nature and used in such circumstances as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils which Congress has a right to prevent.¹²³

¹²¹ David Talbot. "Terrorists Increasingly Turn to the Internet." *Technology Review*. February 21, 2006. http://www.technologyreview.com/InfoTech/wtr_16385,258,p1.html?a=f&a=f (accessed December 12, 2008).

¹²² The American Civil Liberties Union. *Privacy & Technology :Internet Free Speech* . <http://www.aclu.org/privacy/speech/index.html> (accessed February 28, 2009)

¹²³ *Schenck v. United States*, (1919). 249 US 47 (United States Supreme Court, March 3, 1919)

However, in the pursuit of protecting its population, the government, and its population, must be mindful that the process does not erode the very qualities and values that make the society worth defending.¹²⁴

Chapter 4, Tolerance and Globalization

As stated in the introduction, the current conflict and its stemming unrest within various nation-states is a complex situation. There is no “one thing” that causes, allows or facilitates the situation. It is the relationship between the various actors, agents and artifacts that contributes to understanding the system and creates the environment where conflict is probable.¹²⁵ Germane to this article is the assemblage of Western culture based on a liberal-democratic politics and an Islamic culture based on the Qur’an, Shari’a and the Sunnah. Where these two cultures meet there is, to quote Huntington, a “Clash of Civilizations”.¹²⁶ There is an almost immeasurably small Western diaspora within the Muslim world. However, there is an Islamic diaspora of between two percent and six percent within Western nations.¹²⁷ This is significant because the cultural clash will therefore most probably occur within the Western nations.

At issue between the two cultures is the assimilation of the Muslim diaspora into the

¹²⁴ Gabriel Weimann. "www.terror.net; How Modern terrorism Uses the Internet." *United States Institute of Peace*. March 2004. www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr116.html pp 12 (accessed December 12, 2008)

¹²⁵ Booz Allen Hamilton. *Art of Design*. Ft. Leavenworth: US Army, 2008, pp 9

¹²⁶ Samuel P. Huntington. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York, London, Toronto and Sydney: Simon and Schuster Paperbacks, 1996, pp 210

¹²⁷ John L. Esposito and Dalia Mogahed. "What Makes a Radical?" *Gallup*. March 13, 2008. <http://www.gallup.com/poll/104941/What-Makes-Radical.aspx> (accessed February 19, 2009)

nations and culture in which they reside. Cultural conflict is not new, nor is the demand of minorities to have their cultures recognized and accepted by the host nation and population. The difference between other minority cultures and Islamic culture is Islam's political aspect; Islam is an all-inclusive culture consisting of not only religion, but subscribing a rule of law and dictating economics. Islamic doctrine is based upon the establishment of its culture in dominance of all others. In essence, all other cultures must not only accept, but convert or submit, to Islam.

Superficial analysis may cause an initial disregard of any potential threat to Western society from within by Muslim culture, considering the relatively low demographic in comparison to the overall percentage of population. However, further investigation reveals a disproportionate level of influence which is enabled, and enhanced, by a substantial non-Muslim sector of the population which subscribes to moral relativism; the theory that one group will tolerate another group, expecting tolerance in return.¹²⁸ Yet this sector applies moral relativism with a Western bias that assumes a universality of secularism will be upheld with the same sanctity as held within liberal democracy. The Qur'an makes this fundamentally impossible by denouncing the legitimacy of any other rival form of religion, to include non-religion or atheism.¹²⁹ It also expressly forbids any criticism to its form of religion from either Muslims or non-Muslims. Any criticism becomes an affront to all of Islam and therefore becomes the basis

¹²⁸ Moral Relativism – philosophical thesis that the truth or justification of moral judgments is not absolute, but relative to some group of persons; often associated with a normative position about how societies or groups ought to consider or act towards those with whom there is a moral disagreement, most commonly that each group should tolerate the other.

¹²⁹ M.A.S. Abdel Haleem, trans. *The Qur'an*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, 5:51, “You who believe, do not take the Jews and Christians as allies: they are allies only to each other. Anyone who takes them as an ally becomes one of them – God does not guide such wrongdoers – ...”

for prohibiting any disagreement, which also prohibits any critical thought or discussion of the subject.¹³⁰

Freedom of religion

When discussing freedom of religion within Islam, one must first address the concept that Islam is a religion of peace and tolerance as stated in the Qur'an, "There is no compulsion in religion..."¹³¹ However, this raises the common theme of a single passage taken out of context within the entirety of the Qur'an. When applied with other passages previously quoted, it significantly deviates from the message of tolerance.¹³² It is essential to recognize that it is an obligation for Muslims to promote Islam, and this forms the basis of the conflict. Islam is advanced by invitation to non-Muslims to convert to Islam (proselytization), allowing non-Muslims to submit to Islamic rule and payment of the jizya as a tax for protection within the state, or for those who refuse to convert or submit to be considered in a state of war against Islam.¹³³

¹³⁰ Ibid, 7:37-38,"Who is more wrong than the person who invents lies against God or rejects His revelations? Such people will have their preordained share [in this world], but then, when Our angels arrive to take them back, saying, 'Where are those you used to call on beside God?' they will say, 'They have deserted us.' They will confess that they were disbelievers and God will say, 'Join the crowds of jinn and humans who have gone before you into the Fire.'"

¹³¹ Ibid, 2:256

¹³² Ibid, 2:120 "The Jews and the Christians will never be pleased with you unless you follow their ways."; 2:137 "So if they believe like you do, they will be rightly guided. But if they turn their backs, then they will be entrenched in opposition; 2:217 "...persecution is worse than killing. They will not stop fighting you [believers] until they make you revoke your faith, if they can."; 2:190-193 "Fight in God's cause against those who fight you...Kill them wherever you encounter them, and drive them out from where they drove you out, for persecution is more serious than killing...Fight them until there is no more persecution, and worship is devoted to God."

¹³³ Ibid, 9:29

The issue becomes more complex when the aspect of the Qur'an limiting Muslims to only waging a defensive war is added to the discussion.¹³⁴ How does one reconcile “no compulsion in religion” and the restriction to only waging defensive actions with the three methods of advancing Islam?

The Salafist first reconciles the theme of defensiveness within Islam, and then applies it to the spread of Islam. In *Milestones*, Qutb accomplishes this in a very complex, sequential manner. First, he stated that there was no Umma and therefore no Dar al Islam. This enabled him to apply his own *Ijtihad*, or scholarly interpretation, of the meaning in the Qur'an and Sunnah and freed him from accepting any other ruling on the subject. Acknowledging there was no obligation in religion, the question became how one would not openly accept Islam unless one was either mentally incompetent or oppressed to the point of being fearful of retribution for acceptance. Therefore, Qutb proposed that the mere existence of non-Islamic administrations, governments and religions forced people to submit to the will of man as opposed to the dictate of Allah. Those political and religious institutions become obstacles to allowing the freedom of man to choose Islam. As a result, it was incumbent upon every Muslim to strike down those barriers in order to allow people to have freedom of religion and convert to Islam.¹³⁵ In this way, attacking non-Islamic governments and religions was adhering to the defensive theme of Islam because anything non-Islamic was *a priori* oppressing and persecuting Muslims.

¹³⁴ Ibid, 2:190 “Fight in God’s cause against those who fight you, but do not overstep the limits.”; 2:192-193 “...but if they stop, then god is most forgiving and merciful. Fight them until there is no more persecution, and worship is devoted to God. If they cease hostilities, there can be no [further] hostility, except towards the agressor.”

¹³⁵ Seyyid Qutb. *Milestones*, Damascus, Dar al-Ilm, undated, pp 61, 74

Moderate Muslims and non-Muslim moral relativists acknowledge the commitment to promote Islam by the three methods, yet emphasize that persuasion should first be used before applying the sword to those who refuse to convert or submit.¹³⁶ There is no conflict because there is never a transition from “persuasion” to “the sword”. However, one should not assume this to be a benign manner of reconciling the conflicts. The methods of persuasion can be very coercive.

The United Nations (UN) has become a forum for Islamic organizations, such as the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), to address Islamic issues. Under the auspices of protecting Islam, the UN has passed resolutions and accepted documents into its archives that have the very real potential for actually restricting both freedom of religion and freedom of speech. At the fourth session of the World Conference on Human Rights in 1993, the Pakistani Ambassador, on behalf of the OIC submitted for inclusion the “CAIRO DECLARATION ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN ISLAM” (CDHRI).¹³⁷ In 1997, it was included by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights as the last document in *Human Rights: A Compilation of International Instruments: Volume II: Regional Instruments*. The document is significant in two manners; first the actual language within the document, and second the legitimacy afforded to the document by being accepted as a UN instrument.

Article 9 of the CDHRI makes it the obligation of the State to “guarantee educational diversity in the interest of society so as to enable man to be acquainted with the religion of

¹³⁶ John L. Esposito. *The Islamic Threat; Myth or Reality?* New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, pp 37

¹³⁷ United Nations General Assembly. "The Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam." *Contribution of the Organizations of Islamic Conference*. Geneva: United Nations, 1993. 14

Islam...” Continuing on, it states every person has the “...right to receive both religious and worldly education from the various institutions of, [sic] education and guidance, including the family, the school, the university, the media, etc., and in such an integrated and balanced manner as to develop his personality, strengthen his faith in God and promote his respect for and defence (sic) of both rights and obligations.” In essence, the State is responsible for providing the individual an education in Islam, specifically, as opposed to inclusively. Not only is the State responsible, but it is obligated to use the education system as well as media outlets to promote Islam. Article 10 states, “It is prohibited to exercise any form of compulsion on man or to exploit his poverty or ignorance in order to convert him to any other religion or to atheism.” This is a direct prohibition on any other religion’s ability to proselytize, and similar legislature has been used to prosecute missionaries in several Muslim nations, particularly Afghanistan and Pakistan. Article 14 prohibits usury, or profit by interest, directly drawn from Shari’a. Article 22, subsection (a) “Everyone shall have the right to express his opinion freely in such manner as would *not be contrary to the principles of the Shari’ah* [emphasis added]. Subsection (b) Everyone shall have the right to advocate what is right, and propagate what is good, and warn against what is wrong and evil *according to the norms of Islamic Shari’ah* [emphasis added].” Discounting any attempt to use this document to support universal declarations as opposed to regional declaration, the mere fact of limiting the expression of opinion or distinguishing right, good and evil in accordance with Shari’a directly restricts the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) to any residents not of the Islamic faith. Articles 24 and 25 ensure that any ambiguity or conflict between the UDHR and CDHRI is removed, stating “All the rights and freedoms stipulated in this Declaration are subject to the Islamic Shari’ah. The Islamic Shari’ah is the only source of reference for the explanation or clarification of any of the articles of this Declaration.” With these two articles, anyone, Muslim or non-Muslim, within the jurisdiction of the declaration, becomes subject to Islamic, religious law and any rights granted by this

declaration, such as specific, enumerated rights to women that are in conflict with Shari'a are null and void.

Moderate Muslims and moral relativists justify the actions of fundamentalist-based Muslim nations by publicizing the advances in religious tolerance by moderate Muslim nations. Most often cited are Jordan and Indonesia as examples of open-mindedness and religious acceptance. Jordan is one of only two nations with any assemblance of normal diplomatic relations with Israel, though this does not make it the paragon of tolerance as indicated. Article 3 of Law No. 6 of 1954 on Nationality (last amended 1987) states that “Any person who, *not being Jewish* [emphasis added], possessed Palestinian nationality before 15 May 1948 and was a regular resident in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan between 20 December 1949 and 16 February 1954...” are considered to be Jordanian Nationals. This blatantly discriminatory law is still in effect, enacted by arguably the most modern and moderate of Muslim nations.

Political Correctness, Islamaphobia and Hate Speech

The legitimacy of moderate Muslims and moral relativists has been enhanced by the adoption of the Cairo Declaration of Human Right in Islam (CDHRI) by the UN. While recognized as a regional document, and assumed to only apply to Muslim countries, it has, on several occasions, been referenced as justification for other actions. OIC members have promoted several initiatives within UN channels, most actively within the UNHRC, to prevent discrimination based upon religion. A constant theme within OIC submissions is the accusation

of a growing sentiment of “Islamaphobia”.¹³⁸ In a rebuttal to the UN Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Roy W. Brown, President of the International Humanist and Ethical Union, and Senior Representative to the UN Geneva for the same organization, took issue with the Special Rapporteur’s use of “Islamaphobia”, described as “baseless hostility and fear vis-à-vis Islam”. Brown took exception with the lack of distinction throughout the report of “baseless hostility and fear” and legitimate concern and discourse of Muslim extremism. By framing this report without distinction between the two, it presented the appearance that any, and all, criticism of any aspect of Islam or Muslims could be considered “Islamaphobia”.

Building upon the Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights and the Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam as points of legitimacy, the OIC has continued to attempt to shape the language and discussion in regards to Islam. On the last day of the 1997 session of the UNCHR, the representative of Indonesia, speaking on behalf of the OIC, protested a passage in the UN Special Rapporteur’s report on racism.¹³⁹ Citing a paragraph under the subheading “Islamist and Arab anti-Semitism”, in which the Special Rapporteur quoted a book on anti-Semitism, “...the use of Christian and secular European anti-Semitic motifs in Muslim publications is on the rise, yet at the same time, Muslim extremists are turning increasingly to their own religious sources, first and foremost, the Koran, as a primary anti-Jewish source.” The Indonesian Ambassador took exception, stating the report to be “defamation of our religion and

¹³⁸ David G. Littman. "IHEU comments on Islamophobia report." *International Humanist and Ethical Union*. October 25, 2007. <http://www.iheu.org/node/2817> (accessed February 28, 2009).

¹³⁹ Mark Durie. "Islam Grows Stronger at the United Nations." In *The Myth of Islamic Tolerance*, by Robert Spencer, 308-316. Amhurst: Prometheus Books, 2005

Islam and blasphemy against its holy book Quran.” That same evening, the UNCHR’s 53 member states, including the United States and several other Western nations, adopted a decision by consensus that “expresses its indignation and protests the content of such an offensive reference to Islam and the holy Qur’an, affirming that this offensive reference should have been excluded from the report and requests the Chairman to ask the Special Rapporteur to take corrective action in response to the present decision.” This censure and censorship by the UN, directed towards its own members and UN Special Rapporteurs, is not unique. There is a fundamental breakdown in the legitimacy of the organization when the Special Rapporteur finds, as a matter of his investigation, a direct link between extremist activity and Islam and is then condemned and accused of racism for reporting such a linkage to the very organization that commissioned the report. The irony is that the UNCHR is the very organization, designed and created, to protect basic human rights, such as freedom of speech and religion.

One can speculate that the genesis of CAIR’s website subsection “Islamaphobia” is directly related to, and empowered by, the UN’s actions towards its investigative agents. Coupled with US legislation on “hate speech” originally designed to stymie racially discriminatory actions, CAIR and other Muslim organizations began using litigation as a means of curtailing criticism of Islam or Muslims. From 2003 until 2006, CAIR, alone, submitted ten suits against outspoken opponents, citing libel, defamation of character and “hate speech” within its petitions.¹⁴⁰ To date, the author could not find any reports of successful litigation by CAIR or any other Muslim organization against its critics, which raises the question as to the true intent

¹⁴⁰ Daniel Pipes. "CAIR's Growing Litigiousness." *DanielPipes.org*. September 13, 2004. <http://www.danielpipes.org/blog/2004/09/cairs-growing-litigiousness.html> (accessed March 4, 2009)

the suits. One hypothesis is that it was the action not the result that was significant to CAIR. The mere act of filing the petition demonstrated CAIR's efforts to counteract what it refers to as "Islamaphobia", gaining national attention and coverage within the media against its critics. The policy seems not only to have been unsuccessful but counterproductive, producing numerous countersuits by defendants. In 2006, CAIR's Michigan branch chairman, Dawud Walid, commented that under his new tenure, education would be superior to litigation.¹⁴¹ Since that time, the number of litigations has diminished, but not ceased.

The efforts to stifle criticism are not limited to non-Muslim nations. Nearly every nation having a Muslim majority has criminal restrictions upon speech related to religion. As an example, Pakistan's legal system consists of actually two systems; one that adjudicates civil-criminal matters and one that adjudicates religious matters. By statute, within either system, a non-Muslim's testimony does not carry equal weight to, and cannot by itself, refute a Muslim's testimony. Charges of blasphemy can range from depictions of Mohammed to questioning an Islamic teaching and is not limited to Muslims. Conviction often carries the maximum penalty of death.¹⁴² The troubling aspect is not that such legislation remains in statute but that it is adamantly enforced. Accusations are as often levied for political reasons as much as religious ones, giving rise to the expression "Rushdie syndrome".¹⁴³

¹⁴¹ Ibid

¹⁴² Mark Durie. "Blasphemy Legislation in Pakistan's Penal Code." In *The Myth of Islamic Tolerance*, by Robert Spencer, 407-411. Amhurst: Prometheus Books, 2005.

¹⁴³ The Association for World Education. "The Rushdie Affair, the Rushdie Syndrome, and a Decade of United Nations Reactions." *United Nations Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights*. January 29, 1999.

The Spread of Islam

The Muslim population is approximately twenty-one percent of the global population, or 1.8 billion people.¹⁴⁴ The population growth of Muslim nations varies from .79 percent in Iran to 3.833 percent in the United Arab Emirates, with an average of 2.69 percent, compared to a global population growth listed at 2.86 percent.¹⁴⁵ The statistics appear insignificant until compared to non-Muslim regions, such as Europe, which has a growth rate of .11 percent. To enhance the significance, one must consider that Europe adds approximately one million Muslim immigrants each year and the birth rate of its Muslim population is three times higher than that of the rest of its society.¹⁴⁶ Estimates are that the Muslim population in Europe has doubled in the last four years, comprising between four and seven percent. In England, the estimate is that the Muslim population is increasing ten times faster than the rest of its population.¹⁴⁷

At issue is not the percentage of population as much as how that population is integrating and assimilating into its host nation. A portion of the Muslim population has integrated and assimilated well but the majority is established in self-isolating communities, with new

<http://www.unhcr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/8be7e25b1975ee1d80256739004212b7?Opendocument>
(accessed March 28, 2009)

¹⁴⁴ Central Intelligence Agency. "World Fact Book." *Central Intelligence Agency*. 2008.
<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/print/xx.html> (accessed March 7, 2009)

¹⁴⁵ Ibid

¹⁴⁶ Esther Pan. "EUROPE: Integrating Islam." *Council on Foreign Relations*. July 13, 2005.
<http://www.cfr.org/publication/8252/europe.html> (accessed March 7, 2009)

¹⁴⁷ Richard Kerbaj. "Muslim Population 'Rising 10 Times Faster than Rest of Society'." *The Times*. January 30, 2009. <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article5621482.ece> (accessed March 7, 2009)

immigrants typically migrating into these communities.¹⁴⁸ The friction between the Muslim communities and the rest of the population stems from a sense of religious oppression by the nation's secularist policies and the non-Muslim view of the Muslim population as a non-contributing social burden.¹⁴⁹ Denmark's Muslim population constitutes five percent of its total population, yet receives forty percent of the nation's welfare expenditures.¹⁵⁰ The effect is cyclical; Muslim communities see themselves as being disenfranchised from societal integration, which prompts unrest and demonstrations, which causes the society around them to view the Muslim community as confrontational and in conflict with the society as a whole and therefore causes division from and shunning of the Muslim community, which is a return to the beginning of the cycle.¹⁵¹

Government officials are increasingly frustrated in attempts to resolve the conflict between the two sectors of their population. In an effort to placate the Muslim population, officials are often seen as acceding to Muslim demands and criticizing non-Muslims for being insensitive and intolerant of Muslim cultural differences.¹⁵² Explosive population growth, spurred by immigration, coupled with disproportionate political power is giving rise to the

¹⁴⁸ Esther Pan. "EUROPE: Integrating Islam." *Council on Foreign Relations*. July 13, 2005. <http://www.cfr.org/publication/8252/europe.html> (accessed March 7, 2009)

¹⁴⁹ Robert S. Leiken. "Europe's Angry Muslims." *Council on Foreign Relations*. July/August 2005. http://www.cfr.org/publication/8218/europes_angry_muslims.html (accessed March 7, 2009)

¹⁵⁰ Daniel Pipes and Lars Hedegaard. "Something Rotten in Denmark?" *The New York Post*. August 27, 2002. <http://www.danielpipes.org/450/something-rotten-in-denmark> (accessed March 7, 2009)

¹⁵¹ Robert S. Leiken. "Europe's Angry Muslims." *Council on Foreign Relations*. July/August 2005. http://www.cfr.org/publication/8218/europes_angry_muslims.html (accessed March 7, 2009)

¹⁵² Bat Ye'or. "Historical Amnesia: Naming Jihad and Dhimmitude." In *The Myth of Islamic Tolerance*, by Robert Spencer, 107-114. Amhurst: Prometheus Books, 2005

concept of “Eurabia”. The suggestion is that Muslims are gaining in political power and the non-Muslim population is being relegated to a status of dhimmitude, or second-class citizen.¹⁵³ If the concept is applicable, then it should be very worrisome to the non-Muslim European population. The ascension of Muslims to power of any state previously under Western control has historically led to a massive forced-migration of non-Muslims, as can be seen when Western colonies were returned to Muslim sovereignty.¹⁵⁴

The use of immigration to further Islam dates back to its founding by Mohammed. Qutb describes the migration of Mohammed from Mecca, where he and the founding Muslims faced persecution, to Medina, where peace treaties were established with the inhabitants.¹⁵⁵ Once established in Medina, Mohammed began to proselytize until Medina was under his control. After control was established, Mohammed began to prepare for war. With his army established and prepared, he returned to and conquered Mecca. It may be thought as a “leap of logic” to suggest this is taking place with regard to Europe, but the same strategy is being employed in several other locations, as well. Nigeria and Indonesia serve as strong examples.

Nigeria is divided into three distinct regions with a Muslim majority in the north, a Christian majority in the south, and a proportionally mixed population in between. Since 2000, twelve states in the north and center regions have introduced full Shari’a, with promises that it would only affect Muslims and not apply to Christians. However, once Shari’a was in place,

¹⁵³ Ibid

¹⁵⁴ David G. Littman and Bat Ye’or. "Protected Peoples Under Islam." In *The Myth of Islamic Tolerance*, by Robert Spencer, 92-106. Amhurst : Prometheus Books, 2005

¹⁵⁵ Seyyid Qutb. *Milestones*. Damascus: Dar al-Ilm, Undated, pp 57-62

Christians began to be intimidated and restrictions were placed upon churches, Christian schools, women's dress and public transportation. In several incidents, violent rioting has taken place, destroying churches, killing thousands of Christians and causing thousands more to be displaced.¹⁵⁶

Since its inception, Indonesia, Islam's most populace state, has constitutionally been a pluralistic nation. Though constant attempts to convert Indonesia into an Islamic state by altering its constitution have failed, what could not be achieved legislatively is being realized *de facto* by piece-meal assumption of control, province by province.¹⁵⁷ In provinces with a significant Muslim majority, fundamentalist groups such as Lashkar Jihad have instituted Shari'a by plebiscite. Provinces that have established Shari'a have shifted from a Muslim majority to becoming nearly exclusively Muslim. Once the conversion has taken place, fundamentalist organizations establish a base of operations to launch intimidation campaigns into neighboring provinces in order to displace non-Muslims. The town of Poso in Central Sulawesi once had a predominately Christian population of over 40,000. By the end of 2002 it had been reduced to an exclusively Muslim population of 5,000, with all churches having been destroyed.¹⁵⁸

The Barnabas Fund, a human rights watchdog, reported that at the end of 2000 over half a million Christians have been internally displaced, with more than 5,000 people killed and

¹⁵⁶ Patrick Sookhdeo. "Christians in the Muslim World." In *The Myth of Islamic Tolerance*, by Robert Spencer, 252-256. Amhurst: Prometheus Books, 2005

¹⁵⁷ Mark Durie. "What is Happening in Indonesia?" In *The Myth of Islamic Tolerance*, by Robert Spencer, 264-266. Amhurst: Prometheus Books, 2005

¹⁵⁸ Ibid

as many as 7,000 forcibly converted to Islam.¹⁵⁹ In 2001, the Christian community in the District of Aceh Singkil were renovating a church. The leadership of the district Muslim community, citing an agreement dating to 1979, accused the Christian community leadership of attempting to disturb the harmony between the two groups. In order to “avoid the possibility of unwanted consequences which could instigate the destruction of unity and oneness between the religious Communities”, and as a display of Islamic tolerance, composed a new agreement between the communities in which the Christian community would be restricted to one church and four Houses of Worship (huts) for the entire district. All other church building would be destroyed and any remaining buildings were restricted to single-level structures. Additionally, the Christian community was restricted from worship in any personal homes and could not conduct any missionary activity. The document was signed by the leaders of both communities and witnessed by the District Council, Mayor of Aceh Singkil, Chief Prosecutor and Chief Judge for the district, as well as several military commanders.¹⁶⁰

Chapter 5, Conclusions

Significance

The US entered the Global War on Terror as retribution for an attack upon its sovereign territory, but developed a policy of aggressive protectionism from perceived physical threats to its

¹⁵⁹ Mark Durie. "Documentation of Oppression of Religious Freedom in Aceh, Indonesia." In *The Myth of Islamic Tolerance*, by Robert Spencer, 267-270. Amhurst: Prometheus Books, 2005

¹⁶⁰ Ibid

national interests and citizenry. By focusing only on actors with the most obvious intent to do significant, spectacular damage to the nation, it has failed to recognize and address the vulnerability to “a death of a thousand cuts”. A policy that concentrates on only the immediate, overt threat leaves the country susceptible to the subtle, subversive threat. That allows an organization to bide its time, awaiting the appropriate opportunity; a conjunction of circumstances.

In the vernacular of Design, it is time to reframe.¹⁶¹ This monograph has attempted to conduct such a reframe by analyzing the ways and means used by enemies of the US to achieve their ends, as well as the culpability of Western social attitudes in furthering those goals.¹⁶² Essential to the analysis was differentiating between a way or method, specifically terrorism, from the enemy’s ends, which has been defined in this article as the establishment of a Caliphate. From this determination of an end, three assemblages were identified as contributing the greatest effort towards accomplishment; ideology, technology and tolerance.

Ideology is seen as having three nodes, with distinct linkages between the three which create the significance of the assemblage. Fundamentalists have a stated goal that is unambiguous, the subjugation of the entire world under Islam. This group believes in the most literal aspects of the Qur’an and Sunnah, and uses them as legitimacy for using violence in obtaining its end. This

¹⁶¹ Booz Allen Hamilton. *Art of Design*. Ft. Leavenworth: US Army, 2008, pp 36; “Reframing is not simply adaptation to unexpected circumstances. Reframing represents restructuring of an organization’s understanding based on new learning, which reveals that the current approach is obsolete; *reframing is a paradigm shift* [emphasis added].”

¹⁶² Thomas Donnelly and Frederick W. Kagan. *Ground Truth: the Future of U.S. Land Power*. Washington, D.C.: The AEI Press, 2008, pp 14; “Al Qaeda and its associated organizations are not a ‘threat’ – they are an active enemy engaged in hostilities against the United States and its allies.”

group is irreconcilable and any reconciliation perceived by the West will, in actuality, be the employment by fundamentalists of *hudnah*, the tactic of treaty in order to strengthen itself in preparation for the continuation of conflict. The methods of appeasement and deterrence are not applicable and conflict will persist until it obtains its goals or is eradicated.¹⁶³

Moderate Muslims have the same ends, but the priority of ways is different from fundamentalists. Moderate Muslims emphasize persuasion and the use of established, legitimate systems to accomplish its goals, with violence to be used only as a last option.¹⁶⁴ While this group may be reconciled by appeasement and deterrence, constant consideration and recognition must be given to its goal, which is the same as fundamentalists. Moderates can be leveraged, but must be separated from association with and support of fundamentalists.

Secularist Muslims are the smallest and least powerful group within Islamic ideology, but most important to the West. Not only do they advocate the ideas of Westphalian¹⁶⁵ separation of church and state and the establishment and sovereignty of nation-states, but fervently attempt to

¹⁶³ Lawrence Freedman. *Deterrence*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004, pp 57, "This clearly will not work if war is part of the adversary's strategy..."

¹⁶⁴ Edward P. Djerejian. *The U.S. and the Middle East in a Changing World*. Public Address to Meridian House International, Washington, D.C.: Unpublished, 1992; Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs; "Those who seek to broaden political participation in the Middle East, therefore, will find us supportive, as we have been elsewhere in the world. At the same time, we are suspect of those who would use the democratic process to come to power, only to destroy that very process in order to retain power and political dominance. While we believe in the principle of "one person, one vote," we do not support "one person, one vote, one time."

¹⁶⁵ Westphalian – a political reference to the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648 or the Peace of Westphalia, ending the Thirty Years War. In political terms, the significance of the treaty was the affirmation of secularist sovereignty of the nation-state as opposed to concept of sectarian monarchy. The Treaty of Westphalia is considered the basis for the modern concept of separation of church and state powers.

advance that idea within the rest of the Muslim community. Because of a lack of historical precedence and a lack of theological doctrine as a base of legitimacy, this group is seen by other Muslims as heretics and subject to constant intimidation and physical threat. The West should actively embrace, and to the greatest extent possible, empower this group.¹⁶⁶ By consulting this sector of the Muslim community as opposed to moderate Muslims, governments would receive the insight into the Muslim world which it has sought from organizations such as CAIR. Promotion of secularist Muslim organizations could be used as leverage with moderate organizations, presenting the “carrot” aspect of secularism as opposed to the “stick” aspect that should be applied towards fundamentalists. The difficulty will be preventing the “Uncle Tom” perception that could arise from association of secularists with established governments. Others in the Muslim community may see secularists as tools or puppets of Western governments, invoking the impression of historical colonialism so abhorrent within the Muslim community.

The assemblage of technology focused on telecommunications, specifically the internet. At the center of the argument over the government’s policies towards countering Jihadists’ use of the internet is, ironically, free speech. Any perceived attempts by the government to monitor and regulate the internet are seen as an abridgment to one of the founding civil liberties of liberal democracy.¹⁶⁷ China’s use of Google™, Yahoo™, Microsoft™, and Cisco Systems™ to target dissidents is seen as the embodiment of governmental abuse. The right to free speech, however,

¹⁶⁶ Daniel Pipes. "[The Rand Corporation and] Fixing Islam." *DanielPipes.org*. April 6, 2004. <http://www.danielpipes.org/1704/the-rand-corporation-and-fixing-islam> (accessed March 1, 2009)

¹⁶⁷ Gabriel Weimann. "Terror on the Internet: The New Arena, the New Challenges." *United States Institute of Peace*. May 13, 2004. http://www.usip.org/fellows/reports/2004/0513_weimann.html (accessed December 22, 2008)

is not absolute, as seen when Chief Justice Holmes presented the “clear and present danger” clause to highlight not only the government’s right to censorship in specific situations, but its responsibility to do so.¹⁶⁸ There must be a balance between civil rights and governmental responsibilities. A possible solution is an unprejudiced, disinterested organization charged with oversight of governmental actions to protect the unwarranted abridgment of civil liberties, such as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) board, or an international organization with a similar mandate.

The technology exists within governmental agencies to monitor and identify jihadist websites, but the only recourse currently available to these agencies, once a site is identified, is to appeal to the Internet Service Provider (ISP) to have the site removed.¹⁶⁹ If the ISP originates from a nation, such as Nigeria, which lacks either the capability or will to remove the site, there is no recourse for the agency other than to monitor the site to determine associates. Under authorization of an agency such as the FISA board, enforcement agencies could potentially “hack” the extremist sites and either corrupt the site or the information within the site. Recipes for explosives could be altered to become either inert or sabotaged to become explosive upon mixture.¹⁷⁰ ISPs that continue to harbor Jihadist sites after a competent body has verified the site to be hostile should be held accountable by the government in which the ISP resides. If the

¹⁶⁸ *Schenck v. United States*, (1919). 249 US 47 (United States Supreme Court, March 3, 1919)

¹⁶⁹ Gabriel Weimann. "Terror on the Internet: The New Arena, the New Challenges." *United States Institute of Peace*. May 13, 2004. http://www.usip.org/fellows/reports/2004/0513_weimann.html (accessed December 22, 2008)

¹⁷⁰ Brian A. Jackson. "Technology Acquisition by Terrorist Groups: Threat Assessment Informed by Lessons from Private Sector Technology Adoption." *The RAND Corporation*. 2001. <http://www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/RP1248/> pp 38 (accessed February 12, 2009).

government is unable, or unwilling, to take appropriate actions to sanction the ISP, the ISP could, and should, be designated as complicit with jihadists' actions and rendered inoperative.

Where ideology and technology are the ways and means, it is the Western concept of tolerance and moral relativism that has synergized the effects and facilitated the efforts of fundamentalists towards their ends. Tolerance is a noble concept, but must be met with reciprocity or else it becomes one-sided appeasement. The angst concerning tolerance in Western nations comes from the perception of morality from the population and the direct association of tolerance with civil liberties. If the government acts too stringently, it will appear totalitarian, but consideration must be given to the risk assumed if the government does not act stringently enough. Potential can be determined from previous trends and, historically, Muslim nations are very intolerant of non-Muslims once they assume control, even in what are considered "moderate" Muslim nations. Establishment of the Caliphate is a valid possibility and the US must consider the risks if it does not take appropriate actions to prevent it.

The Way Ahead

The US, specifically, is losing the battle of information, both internally and externally. The US should consider three distinct audiences when projecting its messages; the US citizenry, friends and Allies of the US, and Muslim nations. The American people have reached "empathy exhaustion" and no longer are clear of the intent and objectives of US forces. Friends and Allies of the US are unsure of how actions in Afghanistan and Iraq affect their lives, and therefore question why their nations are contributing in any measure to efforts in those nations. The people of Muslim nations see US and Coalition forces as crusaders attempting to rape their lands and return their nations to colonies. All three audiences are constantly bombarded with Coalition failures and atrocities, but are conspicuously devoid of Coalition successes and contributions to bettering the lives of ordinary citizens.

Fear of “propaganda” has stifled presenting a clear, concise and, most importantly, timely projection of newsworthy events. Coalition forces must take deliberate steps to return to a partnership with media outlets as a way of projecting a legitimate, clear message specifically tailored for each audience, and the time from “bang to broadcast” must be minutes, not hours or days. That assumes the risk that not everything presented will be flattering or unbiased, but reaps the benefits of transparency and beating the enemy in shaping the message. YouTube™ is the medium of this generation, as is blogging. Public Affairs Office personnel should present the “official message” not only to print and televised journalist and military forums, but to news websites and blogs on both spectrums of the war debate.

The category of “unlawful combatant” is a pariah and should be abandoned. The average US citizen does not understand the distinction between combatant, insurgent, “unlawful combatant” and criminal, and sees nothing with which to substantiate the legitimacy of “unlawful combatant”. One could argue that the category of “insurgent” was specifically created to address what is now referred to as “unlawful combatant” and is recognized by several legitimate international bodies.¹⁷¹ Military strategy in both Afghanistan and Iraq is based on counter-insurgency operations, and has prompted the revamping of and focus on US Army FM 3-24 Counter Insurgency Operations. Therefore treating detainees as insurgent prisoners of war (POW), as opposed to criminals, will complete the mindset shift from “Global War on Terror” to

¹⁷¹ International Committee of the Red Cross. "Rules Relating to the Conduct of Combatants and the Protection of Prisoners of War, Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Convention III of 12 August 1949) Additional Protocol I, Part III." In *Basic Rules of the Geneva Conventions and Their Additional Protocols*, 21-34. Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1983

“Global Insurgency”. Acknowledging current operations as being counter-insurgency will remove the ambiguity as to the proper treatment of detainees, enhance the legitimacy of US and Coalition partners, reinvigorate the sense of morality of cause and action, and deny those who have committed heinous acts the rights of criminals within the US court system.

By replacing GWOT with the idea of countering a global insurgency that has a religious-based culture as its foundation and global conquest as its ultimate goal, one can make comparisons to the now-defunct communist movement.¹⁷² Such a comparison could suggest potentially successful strategies and policies. Those nation-states that adamantly advocate the destruction of Western society, or tolerate sub-nation actors that advocate such, should be assumed to be irreconcilable and contained. Complete containment will force the nation’s government and populace to resolve its differences and allow co-existence, or collapse in upon themselves. Muslim nations that show sympathy for fundamentalist nations or sub-nation actors must be deterred from actively or tacitly supporting fundamentalist and leveraged towards true tolerance and peaceful co-existence with Western nations. Muslim nations with similar adherence towards liberal democracy must be encouraged and treated with mutual respect as a peer in order to enhance its standing within the global community and serve as an example of mutual co-existence to other nations.

US policy needs to be reexamined in a critical manner that analyses the motivations of enemies and adversaries in order to determine their most likely goals and endstate. If one

¹⁷² Thomas Donnelly and Frederick W. Kagan. *Ground Truth: the Future of U.S. Land Power*. Washington, D.C.: The AEI Press, 2008, pp 20

assumes the endstate of organizations as al Qaeda, the Taliban, abu Sayyaf, Jemaah Islamiyyah and other fundamentalist is exactly what has been stated, the reestablishment of the Caliphate and subjugation of the world under Islam, then US policy must begin to address these various groups not as several isolated, individual enemies, but as a global insurgency being conducted by interrelated units in a unified effort. Changing to this mindset will cause the US, its allies and coalition partners to begin fighting the right war as opposed to fighting the war right.

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