

Malaysia's Experience In War Against Communist Insurgency And Its Relevance To The Present Situation In Iraq

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Preface

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the British Administration's and, later, the Malaysian Government's strategies in fighting the Malayan Communist Party (MCP). The British spent almost 12 years fighting the communist insurgency, and later the Malaysian Government needed another 29 years to bring the Malayan Communist Party to agree to lay down their arms. The Briggs Plan had a significant impact on the suppression of the communist insurgency at the initial stages. However, it is important to understand the government, long-term strategy, which focused on security and development that finally defeated the insurgency movement in Malaysia. This paper focuses on the 41 years of Malaysian experiences and compares them with the situation in Iraq today. Even though the situation in Malaya was comparatively different in terms of the aims of the insurgents, the reasons for the insurgency and the category of persons involved, one can learn from the dissimilarities in order to have a better understanding of how the war against the insurgents should be fought.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title: Malaysia's Experience in the War against Communist Insurgency and Its Relevance to the Present Situation in Iraq

Author: Major Nazar Bin Talib

Thesis: The Malayan Emergency has limited relevance to the situation in Iraq, since the fall of the Baathist Regime.

Discussion:

On the 16 June 1948, the British declared the state of emergency in Malaya against the Malayan Communist Party. This marked the beginning of a guerrilla war between the British Administration (BA) and the Malaysian Government against the ethnic Chinese-led MCP. It took 41 years for the Malaysian Government to bring them to the negotiation table on 2 December 1989, when the Malaysian Government and MCP signed a peace accord.

The implementation of the Briggs Plan, the British grand strategy to combat the communist insurgency in Malaya, had effectively suppressed the insurgency in Malaya. The British experience in defeating the communist insurgency in Malaya, has always been cited as one of successful examples on how a government could win 'a low intensity conflict'.

In Iraq, when President Bush announced the end of major combat operations on 2 May 2003, it marked the beginning of insurgency warfare in Iraq. The situation in Malaya during the emergency was not the same as the situation confronting the coalition forces in Iraq today. The Malayan Emergency is often cited as successful example of fighting an insurgency. Malaysia's experience could help military professionals understand better about counterinsurgency operation in dealing with the Iraq situation. Likewise, the promise of democracy may prevail over today's insurgency in Iraq and the Malayan experience provides some answers. However, in many ways comparisons are limited.

Conclusion:

As practiced in Malaysia during the emergency period, principles of counterinsurgency warfare are easily stated but extremely difficult when it came to applying them. The situation in Iraq is much more complex than the situation in Malaya during the Insurgency. There is no clear solution that can resolve the situation in Iraq. The success of the recent election will be a good start.

MAP OF MALAYA
(Peninsular Malaysia)



INTRODUCTION

In mid June 1948 the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) militant wing, the Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA), killed three European planters in the Sungai Siput district of northern Perak. On the same day, in two other areas, Taiping and Johore, the same group killed two Chinese businessmen. These incidents triggered a state of emergency, which was declared initially in Perak and Johore on 16 June 1948 and subsequently in the whole of the Malayan Federation on 18 June 1948.¹ There was strong evidence to suggest that the murders of the European planters in Sungai Siput were not authorized or sanctioned by the MCP leadership. Local communists who were acting on their own initiative carried out the murders.² This marked the beginning of a guerrilla war between the British Administration (BA) and the Malaysian Government against the ethnic Chinese-led MCP.

The British declared a state of emergency against the MCP instead of war because they want the insurance company to cover their properties in case of damage due to the insurgents' acts. Most of the British subjects' properties in Malaya were insured through company in London. The situation in Malaya made the London Insurance Committee reluctant to provide insurance coverage for the British properties. The British had learned from the Palestine experience that in the event of prolonged war against the insurgents and heavy damage to property, the insurance company might consider withdrawing insurance coverage under riot and civil commotion pretenses.³ In order to protect the commercial interest, the British had avoided the use of terms in official statements that might serve as a

¹Subsequently British introduced the emergency regulation throughout the Malaya Federation to take effect on 18 June 1948. (British Document on the Ends of Empire [henceforth BDEE], BDEE CO 717/167/52849/2/1948,f302, Declaration of Emergency. Telegram No 641 from Sir E. Gent to Mr. Creech Jones. 17 June 1948.

² See Philip Deery, Malaya, 1948: Britain's 'Asian Cold War' p26. Ian Morrison, 'The Communist Uprising in Malaya, p .285.

³ BDEE. Grand Lesson of the Emergency. Sir Henry Gurney. 30 May 1949.

reason for the insurance company not to provide insurance coverage. The terms included 'enemy,' 'war,' 'insurgents,' and 'rebellion.' They instead used the more preferred terms that do not have the same insurance restrictions such as 'bandits,' 'thugs' and 'terrorists'.⁴ Therefore, instead of declaring war against the MCP militant wing, the British decided to use the term emergency to ensure insurance coverage in the event of any damages resulting from MCP acts.

The Malayan Emergency has limited relevance to the situation in Iraq, since the fall of the Baathist Regime. Even though the situation in Malaya and Iraq were comparatively different in terms of the insurgents' aims, the reasons for the insurgency and the category of persons involved, one can learn from the dissimilarities in order to have a better understanding on how the war against the insurgents should be fought. This paper will analyze the British Administration's and, later the Malaysian Government's strategies in fighting the MCP. The paper will examine the Briggs Plan and analyze how the plan was implemented during the MCP insurgency in Malaysia. Finally, the paper will make a comparison between the Malaysia's experiences with the situation in Iraq today.

⁴ BDEE. Grand Lesson of the Emergency. Sir Henry Gurney. 30 May 1949.

THE INSURGENCY AGAINST THE MALAYAN COMMUNIST PARTY (MCP)

The First Emergency (1948-1960)

The MCP was established in early 1930 in Singapore with majority of its members were Chinese. In the early stage of its establishment, the MCP has a significant influence in the trade union organization. The MCP used the Trade Union Organization as their platform to pursue their objective to be recognized as a legal political party in Malaya. According to the MCP's plan to capture Malaya political power, they would first control the Trade Union Organization, before proceeding to consolidate their position through their political propaganda and oppose all government programs.⁵ Their final objective was clear and ultimate, to gain independence from British colonization and establish a communist government.

By the end of the WW II, the MCP succeeded in gaining control over the trade union organization in Malaya. The MCP used its influence in the trade unions to disseminate its political agenda to destabilize the British Administration in Malaya. The main objective of the MCP was to control the Trade Union Organization and produce maximum industrial unrest, disrupting the economic life of the country with a view to destroy the Government's authority.⁶ An analysis made by the Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade Union in Singapore, disclosed that by end of 1947, the MCP controlled 90 percent of organized labor in Kedah, 85 percent in Penang and 69 percent in Johore⁷. The MCP succeeded in influencing the Trade Union Organization to organize protests against the government with the intention to create social instability in Malaya.

⁵ BDEE. Effects of Action by Government in Malaya to Counteract MCP Plans. 15 Aug 1948.p.54

⁶ BDEE The Situation in Malaya. Cabinet Memorandum. 1 July 1948.p 41

⁷ Ibid. p .55

The British had been forewarned by the police in early 1946 about the danger posed by the Communist movement, especially by the MCP influence in the trade union organization, however they never took any serious measures to control that situation until it was too late.⁸ If the British Administration had acted more promptly and decisively in 1948, the MCP could have been neutralized at a far lower cost in lives and money than subsequent operations demanded.⁹ The failure of the British Administration to take immediate action against the MCP at their initial stage of expanding their influence in the trade unions organization, allowed the strengthening of communist ideology in the trade union.

By early 1948, the British acknowledged the danger posed by the MCP influence in the trade union organization. The first British reaction to counter the MCP influence in the trade union was to make an amendment on trade union legislation in order to stop MCP's attempts to control the trade union organization.¹⁰ The trade union legislation was amended with the intention of allowing clean and 'bona fide' organizations, which were free from any MCP influences, to register and conduct their activities legally.¹¹ Any trade union organizations, which were believed to be influenced by the MCP members, would be banned and the members who were suspected as MCP agents were captured and brought to trial. The action succeeded in reducing the protest rallies organized by the trade union against the British Administration.

When the Emergency was declared, the British introduced the Emergency Regulation to control the situation. The Emergency Regulation included the imposition of the death penalty for the offense of carrying arms, the detention of persons without trial up to two

⁸BDEE. Minutes on Internal Security by J.B. Williams. 28-31 May 1948.

⁹ John Coates. Suppressing Insurgency: An Analysis of the Malayan Emergency, 1948-1960. West View Press 1984. p 3

¹⁰ BDEE. Minutes on Internal Security by J.B. Williams. 28-31 May 1948. p 16

¹¹ BDEE. The Situation in Malaya. Cabinet Memorandum. 1 July 1948.p 40

years, and to search a person without a warrant and to occupy properties. It also allowed the authorities to impose a curfew and to control the movement of persons and vehicles.¹² The regulation was effective in curbing the dissemination of the communist ideology among the people.

A few days after the declaration of emergency, the British made a contingency plan for the operation against the MCP's insurgency. The contingency plan was made in two phases.¹³ The objectives of the first phase were to restore law and order, to maintain the economic life of the country, and to restore morale. These required comprehensive actions to be taken by the Security Forces and the Civil Authority against the MCP party and its militant wing. The Security Forces initially took defensive action by providing guards to vital key points such as power stations, police stations, public utilities, and tin mines, with the objectives to protect them from any MCP sabotage action.

The Second Phase involved offensive actions against the MCP insurgents. The Security Forces, with the participation of the Commonwealth Troops, conducted major military operations, against the MCP militant wing. The objective was to liquidate the MCP insurgents in the jungle and to destroy them. These operations involved the destruction of the insurgents' camps, the cutting of their food supply, and the uncovering of dumps of arms and equipment.¹⁴

The contingency plan was executed without any proper coordination between the security forces and the civilian authority. The security forces were under strength and were not trained to conduct guerrilla warfare in the jungles. The police were short of personnel and were poorly equipped. The security operations were carried out without proper coordination

¹²BDEE. The Situation in Malaya. Cabinet Memorandum. 1 July 1948. P 40

¹³ Ibid. 40

¹⁴ Ibid. 41

and supervision and lack of good intelligence. As a result, for the first two years of the emergency, the British Administration failed to suppress the MCP's militant wing.

At the initial stage of the emergency, Malcolm MacDonald, the British Malaya Commissioner General, believed that had British military operations occurred in open country rather than the jungle, 'six weeks would have been sufficient' to defeat the uprising. Although the initial plan did not provide the Committee with any timeline of success, his remarks conveyed optimism.¹⁵ In reality, however, the insurgency against the MCP did not end in six weeks, or 12 years, as some of the writers believe. It actually took nearly 41 years to end the MCP insurgency in Malaya.

The failure of MCP to have a better equipped and properly planned guerrilla campaign during the initial stage of the campaign saved the British Administration from being defeated by the MCP during the first emergency. When the emergency was declared, the MCP was not prepared for the outbreak of armed revolt. In retrospect, it appears that the MCP anticipated a prolonged period of increasingly intense combat activity in which both legal and illegal tactics would be employed. The ruthlessness of the British repression action against the Trade Union Organization, the disbanding of the MCP as a legal organization, and the introduction of the Emergency Regulation had taken the MCP by surprise.¹⁶ A better equipped and more properly planned guerrilla campaign by the MRLA could have brought the Malayan economy to the brink of disaster.¹⁷

¹⁵ BDEE. The Situation in Malaya. Cabinet Memorandum, 1 July 1948.P 40

¹⁶ Philip Deery. Malaya, 1948: Britain's Asian Cold War? International Center for Advance Studies. New York University. April 2002. P 25

¹⁷ Stanley. Bedlington. Malaysia and Singapore: The Building of New States. Cornell University Press.1978 P 78

The Briggs Plan

In April 1950, General Sir Harrods Briggs was appointed as the Director of Operations. He was given authority over all the security forces in Malaya and power to coordinate actions of the civil department that affected the war. Briggs was a good man for the job. He had vast experience in jungle fighting in World War II when he was a Brigadier General in Burma during the World War II campaign.¹⁸ Briggs later came out with a grand strategy to fight the communist insurgency.

General Briggs believed that to win the war against the communist guerrillas, the British Administration would need to gain the support from the Chinese, because the majority of the MCP members were Chinese. General Briggs understood that the guerillas tactics relied on the masses (people) in order to succeed in their uprising. Briggs believed that in order to end the insurgency they have to protect the population by isolating them from the guerrillas.¹⁹ The Briggs Outline Plan²⁰ for the elimination of the MCP organization and its militant wing was designed as follows:

a. The General Concept of Planning

The strategic objective of the planning was to clear the MCP militant wings and its supporters out of the country systematically, from South to North. This was done by dominating the populated area and building up a feeling of complete security in them. The police was required to obtain a steady and increasing flow of information from all sources.

¹⁸ Richard L. Clutterbuck. The Long, Long War, Frederick A. Praeger. New York. 1966. P57

¹⁹ Jerome F. Bierly and Timothy W. Pleasant, Malaya-A Case Study, Marine Corps Gazette, vol. 74, no. 74 (July 1990), P. 48

²⁰ BDEE. Report by COs for Cabinet Malaya Committee, 24 May 1950

The British believed the MRLA, operated with the help from the Min Yuen and relied on them for food, money, information, and dissemination of their propaganda.²¹

The Min Yuen was the spy network of the Malayan Communist Party in their clandestine cells throughout Malaya whose role was to channel intelligence, supplies and new recruits to the units in the jungles and to engage in espionage and assassinations.²² Min Yuen was the organized base of ethnic Chinese active support. There was a requirement to break the Min Yuen groups within the populated areas and isolate the MCP from food, supply, and information. This action was followed by military action to destroy the MCP militant wing.

The civil authorities and the police were responsible for taking any necessary measures to ensure that Min Yuen groups could not operate effectively and were to be eliminated. Thus, by neutralizing them and eventually eliminating the Min Yuen groups, it would cripple the MCP's insurgents. Meanwhile the Security Forces were tasked to conduct offensive operations to search and destroy the insurgents.²³

b. The Framework of the Briggs Plan

To suppress the communist insurgency, the government must have a full control in the country and provide security and safety to the people. It was planned that in all areas of the Malaya Peninsular, the police force would concentrate on fulfilling normal police functions. The Army was deployed in close conjunction with the police, to cover those populated areas that the police could not adequately cover. This entailed the setting up of a series of strong points where patrols were based.

²¹ BDEE, Federation Plan for Elimination of the MCP in Malaya. The Briggs Plan, 24th May 1950,p 216.

²² David Brent The Para-Military Police in Counter-Insurgency. <http://www.originplan.com/author.php>

²³ BDEE, Federation Plan for Elimination of the MCP in Malaya. The Briggs Plan, 24th May 1950p 217

At the same time, the civil administration strengthened to the greatest extent possible its effective control of the populated areas. This was done by increasing, duplicating as necessary, the number of District Officers and other executive officers ‘in the field’ to ensure that all populated areas were effectively administered. Road accesses to isolated populated areas were established. Police posts were built to control the situation in all populated areas. The provision of the normal social services that go with effective administration were put into place; e.g. school, medical and others services.

c. Security Operation/Striking Forces

The security operations were done with details planning and good sources of intelligence. On this framework, the Army superimposed striking forces in each state in order to dominate the jungle up to about five hours journey from potential guerrilla supply areas. These security forces established their headquarters in populated areas, and dominated the tracks on which the guerillas relied to make contact with their information and supply organization, thus forcing the guerillas to fight, disintegrate, or leave the area. The police and the army were operating in complete accord, with joint operational control on all levels and close integration of police and military intelligence.

d. The Civil Authorities’ Roles

The civil authority played a major role in the measures taken to suppress the insurgency. Federal War Council was set up under the Chairmanship of the Director of Operations. This council was responsible for policy and the provision for the action against the MCP militant action to State War Executive Committee. Meanwhile in each state, a War Executive Committee was established and was responsible for executive action in

implementing the outline plan for combating the MCP insurgency. This type of committee was also established at the districts' committee level.

e. The Police and Security Forces

Adequate and properly trained forces are important to ensure success in combating the guerillas. Steps were taken by the British to recruit more police personnel to boost the security force's strength. A new police Special Branch Division was established in order to meet the MCP threat. Meanwhile efforts had been made to boost the numbers of the Security Forces in Malaya. The British intensified the recruitment program. The security forces were equipped with new weapons and armored vehicles to conduct the military operations against the MCP militant wings. The police underwent the special training on criminal investigation and intelligence collections. The male population was encouraged to be the Home Guards to protect their villages throughout the country and to help the police to maintain security.

f. Squatter Resettlement

There were requirements to separate them from having any contact with the communist insurgents, which stopped the MCP militant wing from getting any logistical support from its sympathizer. The first phase of the political operations was to separate the MCP and the MRLA from the support of the people. The Briggs Plan succeeded in separating these MCP supporters and sympathizers by introducing the 'new villages program'.

The Chinese population in the rural areas was the Min Yuen's base of support and made up the majority of those who supported the communist insurgency. These people were the target groups for the British Administration. Statistically, ninety-five percent of the

communist guerrillas were from the squatter settlements.²⁴ In an effort to deprive the guerrillas of their main sources of support among the Chinese population, the British Administration launched a spectacular program to resettle Malaya's 300,000 Chinese squatters from the jungle fringes and isolated areas to new areas known as "new village." They were put under surveillance of police and auxiliary police. Local laborers in mines and on estates were also regrouped and relocated.²⁵ They were later trained to be part of the 'security personals', known as the 'Home Guards', which were tasked to provide security in the areas of the 'new village'.

g. Development and Social Works

Providing the sense of security, comfort and safety are the important aspects in winning the hearts and minds of the people in insurgency. The British launched a massive development plan and modernization effort in order to upgrade the standard of living of the people. The British Administration had authorized the Civilian Authority to conduct a series of development projects where numbers of new communities were established, new roads were built, and new land was cleared. Citizenship rights were extended to thousands not previously qualified.²⁶ Providing basics amenities such as water and electricity, new roads, school and medical in the rural areas produced the desired: many of the people appreciated the benefits of the government modernization plan.

When Sir Gerald Templer was appointed as the High Commissioner and Director of Operation in Malaya in 1952, he re-gearred the Briggs Plan. Templer was not happy with the progress and the ways in which the Briggs Plan was executed. Templer introduced a new

²⁴ Stanley. Bedlington. Malaysia and Singapore: The Building of New States. Cornell University Press.1978 P 78. See also Waller, Emergency Regulation, P.25

²⁵ Malayan Emergency. Microsoft® Encarta® Encyclopedia 2002.

²⁶ Ibid.

approach in security forces training, reorganized the security forces, and implemented new intelligence systems.

Intelligence was Templer's top priority. He stressed that the emergency would be won by a good intelligence system. At the initial stage of the insurgency, most of the intelligence and reliable information were not obtained from the government's agents or police friends or contacts, but came from communist guerrilla's corpses, prisoners of war and captured documents. The intelligence collection organizations was reorganized and restructured in order to deliver accurate and timely intelligence for the Security Forces to conduct their mission.

He appointed the first Director of Intelligence who reported directly to him. The Director of Intelligence was tasked to establish a proper intelligence organization and known as Special Branch. This new unit was responsible for the collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence. This gave the Special Branch a proper role and status. This reorganization also later played a significant role supporting the military commanders' operations against the MCP militant wing.

The Success of Briggs Plan

By early 1953, the improved Briggs Plan had a significant impact on the MCP militant activities against the Security Forces and the Malayan population. The control of food supplies and restriction of movement of food, vehicles and individuals, succeeded in disrupting Communist insurgents in some areas.²⁷ The MCP militant activities had been reduced significantly. The MCP by this time was fighting for their survival rather than causing any damage to the Security Forces.

²⁷ BDEE. White Area in Malacca. 28 Aug 1953.

On 28 August 1953, Malacca was declared the first white area in Malaya, where emergency regulations were relaxed. Within Malacca, all curfews were lifted and no food controls were imposed. People were able to take out midday meals to their work. However, the Security Forces still maintained the security checks on all roads leading out of the area.²⁸

When the first general election was held in Malaya in 1955, Tunku Abdul Rahman was elected as the first Chief Minister of Federation of Malaya. This was a major political success for the people of Malaya as they were now given the opportunity to govern themselves, leading to eventual independence from the British Government. Tunku then declared an amnesty for all the MCP's guerillas. This led to the MCP leadership decision to negotiate with the Malayan Government to end the insurgency. The meeting was held in Baling, Kedah (Northern Malaya) in December 1955 (known as The Baling Talks). The MCP agreed to end their armed struggle against the government if the Malayan Government recognized the Communist Party of Malaya as a legal political party, allowing them to take part in the independence process. Tunku refused to accept the condition and the meeting ended as a failure for both parties.²⁹ Political legitimacy had failed for the MCP and the government failed to end the insurgency prior to its independence.

By 31 August 1957, the Federation of Malaya had gained independence from the British. This had a devastating effect on MCP propaganda, which had focused on gaining independence from the British. Subsequently, this event caused the MCP to lose significant support from the majority of the Chinese population. The Malays, Chinese, and Indians formed a solid Alliance Party, and this Alliance Party, later known as the National Front (Barisan Nasional), became the dominant political party in Malaysia.

²⁸BDEE. White Area in Malacca, 28 Aug 1953.

²⁹ Stanleys. Bedlington. Malaysia and Singapore: The Building of New States. Cornell University Press. 1978 P 82

At the end of 1959, the MCP politburo had completed a broad revision of battlefield strategy. The MCP decided that if they would have any chance of survival they would have to direct future military activities from bases outside Peninsular Malaya. The MCP Secretary Chin Peng issued orders to disband highly vulnerable units and disburse their numbers. The 350 guerrillas in Perak, Kedah, and Perlis were instructed to break down into smaller groups and withdraw north over the Thailand border to establish a new base camp.³⁰

Chin Peng then called a Central Committee meeting to review Malayan battlefield prospects in the light of MCP overall physical withdrawal. They came to the realization that the only option open to them was to phase out their armed struggle and revert, to a clandestine political campaign. They envisioned a lengthy period of political preparation, perhaps as long as a decade. Thereafter, if the climate proved suitable, they would take up arms again. The MCP attempted to reintegrate back to mainstream societies in Malaya and Singapore.³¹

On 31 July 1960, the Malaya Government declared the end of the Emergency in Malaya. For the British, this date marked the end of the fighting against the MCP insurgents. They claimed that the fight against the MCP's insurgents was an unqualified success and that the MCP had been defeated. After independence, the British started to let the Malaysian Government handle security matters. Despite declaring the end of emergency, the war against the communist insurgency never really ended. The declaration only ended the usage of emergency laws, but the fight against the MCP continued.³²

³⁰ Ian Ward Chin Peng: My Side of History. Media Masters. Singapore. 2003. P. 406

³¹ Ibid.

³² The Government White Paper Report: The Militant Communist Threat to Malaysia. National Press. , Kuala Lumpur 1966. P 16

The newly formed Malay Federation Government declared the end of the Emergency, for two reasons. Economically, if the law of emergency dragged on for a long period, it would have jeopardized the Malayan economy. For a new nation like Malaya, such a situation would be detrimental to the development of the country. Furthermore, the British involvement in rehabilitation work during the emergency in Malaya was financially costly. Continuing the emergency would overly burden the new Malayan government.³³ Politically, with the MCP military capabilities reduced significantly, an end to the emergency would ‘pave a way’ for the British to leave Malaya, thereby allow the Malayan Government to handle the situation by itself. By that time, the Malaysian Security Forces were being expanded to meet the MCP’s militant wing.

Since the declaration of Malaya Independence until mid 1960, the presence of the British and Commonwealth troops was reduced gradually. The task of fighting the Communist terrorists was given to the Malaya Federation Security Forces. Malayan Security Forces were trained in anti-guerilla warfare tactics and techniques and were also exposed to jungle warfare doctrine. A military training institute, which focused on jungle warfare and guerrilla war, was established in Ulu Tiram, Johore in order to prepare the Malayan Armed Forces to conduct anti guerilla operation against the MCP militant wing.

At the end of first emergency, the MCP’s guerilla activities did not completely cease. Most of the communist guerrillas had withdrawn to the northern part of Malaya, close to the border with Thailand.³⁴ Gradually the Malayan security forces started to clean up areas where they suspected the communist terrorists were still operating. Subsequently more areas had been cleared and declared as a “white areas,” as opposed to the “new liberated areas,” terms,

³³ BDEE, Financial Assistance to Malaya for security Measures, 16 Nov 1949. P. 177

³⁴ The Government White Paper Report: The Militant Communist Threat to Malaysia. National Press. , Kuala Lumpur 1966. P 3

which were used by the Communist Terrorists to show their presence and ability to control the area. During the peak of the first emergency period in 1949, it was believed that the number of MCP's guerrillas and supporters was up to 14,000 thousand people. The British and Commonwealth troops from Australia, New Zealand, Gurkhas, and the local police numbered about 100,000. Casualty figures involved at the end of the first emergency are listed as Table 1³⁵.

	Killed	Wounded	Captured or Missing	Surrendered
Guerrilla	6,711	Not Known	1,289	2,704
Security Forces	1,865	2,560	-	-
Civilians	2,473	1,385	810	-
Total	11,049	3,945	2,099	2,704

Table 1: Source: Malaysia and Singapore. Building a New State

The Second MCP Insurgency 1968 -1989

With the declared end of the Emergency throughout the 1960 to 1968 period the MCP took the opportunity to undergo a period of streamlining, retraining, and re-indoctrination. The MRLA had established a series of safe bases, or what it called liberated areas.³⁶ Despite their defeat during the first emergency, the MCP was still very much a force to be reckoned with. The MCP had a nucleus of between five and six hundred well-trained guerillas and a reserve of about one thousand young men were available for full time service if required.³⁷ The MCP had reorganized its units and reconstituted itself by training a number of new

³⁵ Stanleys. Bedlington. Malaysia and Singapore: The Building of New States. Cornell University Press.1978 p 84.

³⁶ The Government White Paper Report: The Militant Communist Threat to Malaysia. National Press, Kuala Lumpur 1966. P 16

³⁷ Ibid. P 16

guerillas. They also developed new techniques of guerilla warfare and learned much from the Vietnam War on the techniques of fighting guerrilla warfare.

In July 1961, Chin Peng met Deng Xiao Peng in China. Deng had proposed to the MCP that it conduct a second armed struggle. Deng insisted that Malaya should revolt and used the success of Vietnam Communist Party in the Vietnam War as MCP propaganda to launch a second revolt in Malaya. Deng later promised Chin Peng that China would assist the MCP and promised to give the MCP US \$100,000 for the second insurgency in Malaya.³⁸

On 1 June 1968, the Central Command of the MCP issued a directive entitled “Hold High the Great Red Banner of Armed Struggle and Valiantly March Forward.”³⁹ The MCP was ready to start new insurgency warfare in Malaysia. On 17 June 1968, to mark the 20th anniversary of their armed struggle against the Malaysian Government, the MCP launched an ambush against the Security Forces in the area of Kroh–Bentong in the northern part of Malaysian Peninsular.⁴⁰ They achieved a major success, killing 17 members of Security Forces. This event marked the start of the second armed revolt of the MCP.

At the initial stage of their second insurgency, the MCP achieved a significant amount of success. Their actions at this stage were more bold and aggressive and caused considerable losses to the Security Forces. These successes were due to their preparation and the training that they received during the “lull periods” or the reconsolidation period after the end of the first insurgency. By this time, they also had significant numbers of new members, who were young and very aggressive. They had learned from the past that they could no longer rely on sympathizers from the poor or village people for their food and logistics.

³⁸ Ian Ward Chin Peng: *My Side of History*. Media Masters. Singapore. 2003. P.429

³⁹ Ministry of Defense Records. 2000. Tentera Darat Menentang Insurgency Komunis 1968-1989. P 6

⁴⁰ Ibid. P 6

The MCP Internal Conflicts

In early 1970, the MCP experienced a major crisis within the party. Internal disputes due to the counterintelligence problems posed by the Special Branch had caused severe conflicts among the MCP members. During this period, it was reported that the government agents and spies had succeeded in infiltrating the MCP organization. It was reported that the 'spies' were plotting a coup within the MCP Headquarters. The counterintelligence investigators appointed by the MCP Central Committee reported that they believed that 90 percent of the Thai Chinese recruits who joined the party from 1960 onward were government spies.⁴¹

Members in the militant wing started to accuse each other as government spies. Betrayal in guerrilla ranks was regarded as the most serious crime against the party and the punishment was normally death by execution.⁴² During the jungle trial held by the MCP leadership, a large number of guerrillas from Headquarters and Betong East Camp were found guilty of being enemy agents. However, the Sadao and the West Betong Group refused to conduct such trials. Instead, they refused to adhere to the MCP Central Committee orders. They in fact made an accusation that the MCP Central Committee was under the control of government agents.⁴³

By October 1974, the MCP leadership had split into two different factions, between the Maoist and the Marxist- Leninist. The MRLA in the northern part of Malaysia near the Thailand border were located in three places. The MCP Central Committee was with the East Bentong Group, and the other two groups were located at West Bentong and Sadao. When the crisis was getting worse, the Sadao groups broke away from the main MCP groups and

⁴¹Ian Ward. Chin Peng: My Side of History. Media Masters. Singapore. 2003. P 466

⁴² Ibid. P 466

⁴³ Ibid. P 467

proclaimed themselves as the MCP Revolutionary Faction (RF). Subsequently the Betong West group, who also broke from the main MCP groups, identified their party as the MCP “Marxist-Lenin” (M-L) and later renamed their guerrilla arm as the Malayan People’s Liberation Army (MPLA) instead of the Malayan Races Liberation Army.⁴⁴

Some observers believed that a new revolutionary struggle was initiated with the influence of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. They believed that the Vietnam Communist Party, backed by the Soviet Union, had agreed to provide logistical and propaganda support to the ‘new fraction’ groups, such as Bentong West and Sadao Group.⁴⁵ Later it was found out that the Bentong West and the Sadao Group ceased to exist not long after they broke away from the main groups. These groups realized that their armed struggles could not achieve any success. The West Bentong and the Sadao groups then decided to surrender themselves to the Thai Government in early 1987.⁴⁶ After that time, the MCP arms struggles and militant activities became weak and disintegrated with no clear political or military objective.

The Security and Development Program (KESBAN)

From the Briggs Plan, the Malaysian Government understood the importance of security and development and how it could be used against the MCP insurgency. The Malaysian Government, then, introduced a new strategy of fighting the MCP. It was known as Security and Development, or KESBAN, the local acronym, and focused on civil military affairs. KESBAN constituted the sum total of all measures undertaken by the Malaysian Armed Forces and other (government) agencies to strengthen and protect society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency which effectively broke the resistance. Undoubtedly

⁴⁴ Ian Ward. Chin Peng: My Side of History. Media Masters. Singapore. 2003. P 468

⁴⁵ Ibid P 468

⁴⁶ Ibid P 478

as Malaysia experienced, security and development were the most prudent approach to combating insurgencies and terrorism.⁴⁷

The KESBAN programs succeeded in developing Malaysia into a more stable and secure society. Malaysia basically had institutionalized the concept of KESBAN, with the setting up of coordinated bodies from the village, district, and state to the federal level. All the relevant agencies were represented and in this way, obstacles and problems were discussed and overcome jointly.⁴⁸ The government made huge efforts to develop rural areas with the implementation of massive development programs such as road constructions, building new school, hospital, medical clinic and public utilities such as electric and water supply for the public.

The government also instituted other security measures in order to meet the MCP menace, including strict press censorship, increasing the size of the police force, resettling squatters and relocating villages in “insecure” rural areas.⁴⁹ By mid 1975, when the MCP militant activities were at a peak, the government promulgated a set of Essential Regulations, without declaring a state of emergency. The Essential Regulations provided for the establishment of a scheme called a ‘Rukun Tetangga,’⁵⁰ ‘Rela’ (People’s Volunteer Group). The concept of “Rukun Tetangga” (Neighborhood Watch) had made the Malays, Chinese, and Indians become closer together, and more tolerant of each other.

The Malaysian Government made the right decision by not declaring a state of emergency during the second insurgency. The reason was a desire to avoid the fears of the

⁴⁷ Abstracts from the speech by Dato Sri Mohamad Najib Tun Abdul Razak, Minister of Defense of Malaysia, at the national conference on “Rethinking Southeast Asian Regional Security,” April 29, 2003, Shangri-La Hotel, Makati City

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Stanley S. Bedlington. Malaysia and Singapore. The Building of New States. Cornell University Press Ltd. 1978 p.181

⁵⁰ Means “A Neighborhood Association” where all males between the ages of 18 and 55 are compelled to participate in local security patrol.

populace (leading to increase in ethnic antipathy) and to avoid scaring away needed foreign investment. The economic prosperity achieved in the 1970s enabled the administration of Tun Abdul Razak and later Tun Hussein Onn who took over on the death of Tun Razak in 1976, to make considerable progress towards the Malaysian economy.⁵¹ When Dr. Mahathir Mohamed took over as the Malaysian Prime Minister from Dato Hussein Onn in 1980, he succeeded in making Malaysia one of the fastest developing nations in Asia. The Malaysian economy was strong and the annual growth rose up to 8 percent.

Road to Peace Accord

Since 1972 Malaysia had established a bilateral relationship with Republic of China. The Malaysian Government urged the leaders of the Republic of China to exert influence on the MCP leadership to convince them to lay down their arms. During Dr. Mahathir Mohamed's premiership, he initiated an effort to bring MCP to negotiation table to end the insurgency. Dr. Mahathir believed that the MCP was fighting a losing battle and urged them to lay down their arms and join the other Malaysians in developing the country.

In 1988, the MCP leadership in the northern part of Malaysia agreed with the Malaysian Government offer to attend a negotiation to a peace initiative. The MCP, which by that time was in a desperate situation to continue their armed struggle agreed with the proposal. Furthermore, since early 1981, Deng Xiao Peng had encouraged them to seek an avenue for a peace accord.⁵²

When the communist block in Europe collapsed in the mid-1980s, the MCP had accepted the fact that they did not have any chance to form a communist government in Malaya. Malaysia by that time was one of the newly developed nations in Asia. Malaysia's

⁵¹ Stanley S. Bedlington. Malaysia and Singapore. The Building of New States. Cornell University Press Ltd. 1978 P.178

⁵² Ian Ward Chin Peng: My Side of History. Media Masters. Singapore. 2003. P 480

economy was strong and the majority of Malaysia's citizens refused to accept communist ideology. After a series of negotiations between the Malaysian Government and the MCP, with the Thai Government as the mediator, the MCP finally agreed to sign a Peace Accord in Haadyai, Thailand on the 2 December 1989.

The peace accord did not require the MCP to surrender; it only required that the MCP cease their militant activities. With the signing of the Haadyai Peace Accord, the MCP agreed to disband their armed units and destroy all of their weapons. They also 'pledged their loyalty' to His Majesty the Yang di Pertuan Agong of Malaysia. This date marked the end of the MCP insurgency in Malaysia.

At the end of the peace accord, it was estimated that there were about 1,188 MCP members still on the active list.⁵³ Some of them chose to return to their states in Malaysia and the rest selected to stay in a "Peace Village" at the Thai border. The Malaysian Government had paid them all some compensation money. First RM 3,000 was paid on their immediate return, and another RM 5000 was paid three years after their return.⁵⁴ The total casualties involved through the second MCP insurgency are shown on Table 2.

	Killed	Wounded	Captured	Surrendered
Guerrilla	212	Not Known	150	117
Security Forces	155	854	-	-
Total	365	854	150	117

Table 2. Source: National Security Council.

⁵³Ibid. P 491

⁵⁴ 1 USD = 3.780Ringgit Malaysia

Malaysian Experience Compared To The Situation In Iraq Today

When President Bush announced the end of major combat operations in Iraq on 2 May 2003, it marked the beginning of low intensity conflict in Iraq. The coalition forces are now fighting a different type of warfare, which involves counterinsurgency operations. After nearly two years of the proclamation of the end of major combat operations, the United States' led coalition forces continue to fight insurgents in Iraq. This insurgency has become a nuisance in the establishment of democratic government in Iraq. The insurgency situation in Iraq has also caused major concern to American politicians and military leaders, as well as the population of the United States of America. It is difficult to estimate how long this insurgency situation will continue and when Iraq will be at peace again.

The situation in Malaya during the emergency was not the same as the situation confronting the coalition forces in Iraq today. The Malayan Emergency is often cited as successful example of fighting an insurgency, which could help military professionals in dealing with the Iraq situation. The situation in Iraq today, is more difficult and complex than the situation in Malaya during the emergency. Likewise, the promise of democracy may prevail over today's insurgency in Iraq and the Malayan experience provides some answers. However, in many ways comparisons are limited. Therefore, it is worth examining Malaysian success and comparing it with the situation in Iraq today in order to better understand how a war against an insurgency can be fought and won. Gordon Simson wrote in his 1999, Joint Forces Quarterly article,

*“...Like other conflict, the Malayan emergency offers lessons that have the applicability to future wars. It is one of the few examples of a low intensity conflict that was won by the government in power and thus is a favorite subject of case studies on insurgency...”*⁵⁵

As practiced in Malaysia during the emergency period, principles of counterinsurgency warfare are easily stated but extremely difficult to apply. The principles of counterinsurgency warfare include isolating the guerrillas from the populace, winning over hearts and minds, and then eliminating the guerillas without alienating the local population. How to meet these critical conditions, however, is a different matter.⁵⁶

a. Multiplicity of Group Involvement and Diversity of Its Objectives

It is important to understand the strategic aim of the insurgent groups in order to anticipate the sustainability of the groups to fight for their cause. In Malaysia, the British forces had only to face one militant group. In addition, almost 99 percent of the MCP members were Chinese. Therefore, it allowed the security forces and the civilian administration to take collective action, which weakened the MCP's insurgency. Its objective was clear and ultimate, to gain independence from British colonization and establish a communist government. When Malaya was granted independence, the MCP, lost their 'main propaganda issue' to gain support from the people and thus weakened the MCP political objective, which led to the disintegration of their militant wing.

The situation in Iraq is more complex than in Malaysia. In Iraq, there are a number of insurgent groups with many fighting for different objectives. The insurgents in Iraq have series of goals that can be described as negative ones that are defined by what they do not want. For example, the resistance to the United States and Coalition presence in Iraq,

⁵⁵ Jay Gordon Simson. Not By Bombs Alone: Lessons from Malaya. Joint Force Quarterly. Summer 1999

⁵⁶ Guerrilla War in Iraq: Some Lesson, Part 2. The Estimate Dossier. Vol XV No 5. August 8 2003. www.theestimate.com

reactionaries which seek the return of the old order, nationalist reacting to humiliation and others are fearing domination by the others.⁵⁷ This variation of insurgents' aim makes the conflict more complex and difficult to handle.

Even if many of these groups are not ideological fellow-travelers, their main goals are to hamper the pace or extent of reconstruction, to prevent Iraqis from working with the occupation authorities, to encourage U.S. forces to undertake excessive, punitive, counter-insurgency raids that disrupt the lives of ordinary Iraqis including the killing of civilians, and to raise the costs of the U.S. presence to such a level that this would have to question its commitment and determination to stay in Iraq.⁵⁸

The presence of numerous insurgent groups with different objectives and aims make fighting against them more complicated and difficult. The best possible approach to overcome this issue is to focus on securing the general population. Security forces must conduct military operations against the insurgent groups, to ensure security and safety for the general population. More police and security personnel should patrol the areas where less insurgent activities are reported' to demonstrate the presence and control of the government.

b. Establishing an Acceptable and Legitimate Government

The main issue that causes the 'instability' in Iraq today is the question of the acceptability of the present Iraqi Interim Government by the people. In order for the government to conduct good governance and control the situation in Iraq, the people must not only legitimately recognize the government; they must also be accepted as a good government. The majority of the insurgents and the "Sunni people" neither recognize the

⁵⁷ Ahmed S. Hashim, PhD. The Sunni Insurgency In Iraq. Center for Naval Warfare Studies. August 15, 2003

⁵⁸ Ibid.

present elected government nor acknowledge the present government as a 'legitimate government'.

According to Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, legitimacy refers to the government that being formed in accordance with law or with established legal forms and requirements. In order for the government to govern the country effectively, the people must also accept them. In Iraqi, even though the United Nations recognizes the legitimacy of the present Iraqi government, they are not well accepted by the majority of the Sunnis, who boycotted the election.

In contrast, in Malaya, the British had colonized and were in control of the administration in Malaya for almost 170 years. Even though their presence was not fully accepted by the majority of the people, they were recognized as a legitimate government because the Council of Malaya Rulers backed the British administration in Malaya.

In Malaysia, the first election was held in 1955 as a preparation for Malayan Independence, which was given on the 31 August 1957. The result of the first general election in 1955 was won by the alliance party, which represented the majority of the population in Malaya. The new interim government in Malaya was well accepted by the people of Malaya and this ensured the people's support of the measures taken by the Malayan government to combat the MCP insurgents. During the emergency in Malaya, in order to control the insurgency, the British introduced the Emergency Regulation that was considered to be draconian and violated personal liberties. The use of such harsh law was well accepted by the majority of people and it succeeded in surpassing the MCP insurgency.

On the 30 January 2005, the Iraqi people, for the first time in almost 50 years, were given a chance to elect their own government. Despite that, the recent election was not a

guarantee that there would be better security in Iraq. Success of the election was not appreciated by some of the insurgents, groups especially those from Sunni origins. Dr. Mohammed Bashar al-Faidi, spokesman for the Association of Muslim Scholars, said that the election lacked legitimacy because large portions of these people who represent many spectra boycotted it. The Sunni group, which did not take part in the election, saw the present Iraqi Government as a 'threat' to them because the Shiite and the Kurds were controlling the government. The legitimacy of the present Iraqi government is being questioned, and it must take steps to prove to its legitimacy.

At the same time the present Iraqi government should introduce a 'strict emergency law' in order to control the situation in Iraq and to show that they are really indeed in power. An intensive and proactive Information Operation campaign should be conducted to persuade and instill within the people with the belief that the present Iraqi government is indeed a legitimate government and well accepted by the majority of the people. There is also a requirement for the present Iraqi government to gain support from Islamic Group Leadership and Tribe leaders to recognize the present Iraqi government as a legitimate government. Until the majority of the Iraqi people accept the legitimacy of the present Iraqi government, there will be no peace in Iraq.

c. **Intelligence Collection**

Intelligence plays a crucial role in determining the way a war should be fought in counterinsurgency warfare. Many observers argued that inadequate intelligence, poor assessments of enemy strength, testy relations with Iraqi people, and inconsistent application of force remain that key problems the military must address before the coalition and Iraqi forces can quell the insurgents.

Good intelligence ensured the success of Malayan security forces during the guerrillas' insurgency in Malaysia. One of the basic imperatives of intelligence in counterinsurgency operation is that "every effort must be made to know the enemy before the insurgency begins."⁵⁹ The insurgents' modus operandi, their tactics, and their capabilities can only be understood if the government has sources that are working with the insurgents. Since the majority of the MCP members were Chinese, the British encouraged the local born Chinese to be part of the intelligence community. The Special Branch had discovered that it was easier for them to turn some members of the CPM to be the double agents for the government, rather than to implant one in the CPM organization. They hired these "turn" agents with a promise of money and rewards. The payment of huge rewards to insurgents for inducing the capture or death of their former comrades raised questions of ethics and morality in the minds of some people; however, the government's reply was that it produced results.⁶⁰

Despite significant expansion and redirection of effort the insurgency, a senior intelligence officer in CIA claims, "it has had little success penetrating the resistance and identifying foreign terrorists involved in the insurgency in Iraq."⁶¹ Cordesman, for example, reported that when he visited 1st Armored Division, responsible for Baghdad and the Green Zone;

"The unit was not trained or equipped for the mission when it arrived. The Division has had to change its whole operating style after 20 years of focusing on fighting conventional heavy forces. It has had to develop HUMINT procedures and turn away from

⁵⁹ Julian Paget, Counter insurgency Campaign, London. Faber and Faber, 1967 p 163-164

⁶⁰ John Coates. Suppressing Insurgency: An Analysis of the Malayan Emergency, 1948-1960. West View Press 1984. . P 127

⁶¹ Dana Priest. Violence, Turnover Blunt CIA Effort in Iraq, Washington Post, 4 March 2004.

*reliance on technical intelligence sources. Even now it needs twice as many HUMINT teams as it has...*⁶²

Even though the Coalition forces in Iraq have new technology that could be used as tools for intelligence collection, they still lack the advantages of having “local people” as sources of their intelligence. Efforts must be made to ‘implant’ such sources inside the ‘insurgent community’ as what the British did during the insurgency in Malaya.

The Americans made a mistake when they disbanded the Iraqi army immediately after the war. Former Iraqi soldiers would be very useful to provide security for the public. They also have the local knowledge, which could be useful for the present Iraqi government to gain control over the insurgent movement. They might be useful as the ears and eyes for the new Iraqi Authority to fight the insurgents. Normally the people who are aware and familiar about the situation in the area of conflict could collect good quality intelligence. They are the best assets as agents and informers that the Iraqi Authority has in fighting insurgency since they know the people and the area and they understand them well.

The coalition forces made a good move for intelligence gathering when they established ‘a hotline office’ for people to give any information about the insurgency. The newly opened intelligence reporting hotline, known as the Joint Operating Center in Iraq, was established for people to report any insurgents’ activities directed against the Iraqi. Since October 2004, 82 percent of callers have offered information on insurgency action directed against Iraqi Security Forces. Seven percent of the calls have reported crimes, however,

⁶² Bruce Hoffman, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq*, National Security Research Division. See also. Cordesman, *The Current Military Situation in Iraq*, Washington, D.C. Center for Strategic and international Studies. 14 November 2003, P 13-14

eleven percent of the calls have not been useful. This effort has dramatically improved a street level intelligence collection.⁶³

d. Border Control

Victory in Malaysia, it appears in retrospect, had less to do with British military tactical innovations than with the weaknesses and isolation of the insurgents.⁶⁴ The other factor, which gave the Malaysian government the advantage in dealing with the threat posed by the Communists, was the fact that there was no open border as there would be in Iraq.

While it is right to say that Malaya remains a classic example of how a counter-revolutionary campaign should be waged, it must be remembered that Chin Peng had no safe sanctuary, no open border.⁶⁵ This situation limited the movement of the MCP guerrilla and restricted them from getting any support from outside. In the broad sense, during the Malayan emergency, the government had full control of the border. By having a full control of the border, the government could keep track of the movement of the people and secure the border from the incursion of the Communist Party members or sympathizers.

The Iraqi Interim Government and the coalition forces in Iraq today have a problem with regards to the control of the border. While the coalition forces are more focused on combating the insurgents in the city in Baghdad, Samara and Falhujjah, the borders of Iraq are open for the insurgents to penetrate. The coalition can do nothing about it, because they are busy with the fight against the insurgents in Iraq, while at the same time, the present Iraqi Government can do nothing about it because they lack resources.

⁶³ Elliot Blair Smith. Anonymous Tipsters Boost Force's Security Intelligence. USA TODAY. April 20, 2005.

⁶⁴ Daryl G. Press and Benjamin Valentino. Insurgency in Iraq. New York Times Company Nov 17, 2004

⁶⁵ Lessons of Malaya 6-12 December 2002 <http://www.nepalnews.com.issue122> 10 Nov 2004

The present government in Iraq does not have the capability to control its border from any incursion of terrorists from the neighboring countries. These situations have given an advantage to the insurgents in Iraq. Iraq has a border with various Arabs countries. There is clear evidence that some of the Arab people support the cause of some insurgents group in Iraq. They can be easily be supported by any sympathizers from these regions. This will make it harder for the coalition forces and the Iraqi government to win insurgency warfare against the insurgents in Iraq. There is a need for the present Iraqi Government to have sufficient control with regards to its border.

e. Force Requirement For Stabilization Operation

According to James T. Quinlivan, a military analyst and senior mathematician at RAND Corporation, even in the absence of powerful armed resistance, “successful strategies for population security and control have required force ratios either as large as or larger than 20 security personnel (troops and police combined) per thousand inhabitants” in context of foreign occupation. “Roughly 10 times the ratio required for simple policing of a tranquil population.”⁶⁶

In the Malayan Emergency, the British had held a 20 to 1 advantage in police and troops against a guerilla force that never numbered more than 10,000 including its civilian support apparatus and they had the racial antagonism of the Malay majority toward Chinese in their favor as well. The war still lasted 12 years.⁶⁷

According to General Muhammad Abdullah Shahwani, director of Iraq’s new intelligence services, the number of insurgents today is bigger than the United States military

⁶⁶ Burden of Victory: The Painful Arithmetic of Stability Operation: RAND Review; Summer 2003. Critical Montages. www.montages.blogspot.com. Date Accessed 18 February 2005.


⁶⁷ A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam, 1989.

in Iraq and numbering 200,000 insurgents.⁶⁸ There are about 138,000 United States and 12,000 British troops in Iraq today.⁶⁹ It had been estimated that the population of Iraq is about 25 million. Statistically it would require 500, 000 security forces to meet a standard 20 troops per thousand residents in the 'nation building operation'. For a sustainable stabilization force on a 24-month rotation circle, the coalition forces would need to draw on a troop base of 2.5 million troops. Such numbers are clearly not feasible and emphasize the need for rapid creation of local Iraqi security forces even while foreign troops continue to be deployed.

⁶⁸ How Many Troops would it take To Defeat the 200,000-strong Guerilla insurgency? Critical Montages. www.montages.blogspot.com. Date Accessed 18 February 2005.

⁶⁹ Iraq War Being Lost by American. The Australian News. www.cleveland.indymedia.org. Date Accessed 24 February 2005.

Successful Nation-Building Usually Requires 20 Troops per Thousand Population^a



^aMaximum international forces for all countries (except Iraq) taken from *America's Role in Nation-Building*, Dobbins et al. Totals are as follows: Somalia, 28,000; Haiti, 23,000; Bosnia, 60,000; Kosovo, 45,000; Afghanistan, 14,000. Current total of 150,000 for Iraq is based on latest news reports.

^b1993 population of Somalia: 6,059,950. Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, International Data Base.

^c1994 population of Haiti: 6,500,213. Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, International Data Base.

^d1996 population of Bosnia: 2,656,000. Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Report WP/96, World Population Profile: 1996, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1996.

^e1999 population of Kosovo: 1,900,000. Source: UNMIK Kosovo Fact Sheet (cites a population figure for Kosovo in 2002 of 1.7–1.9 million).

^f2002 population of Afghanistan: 27,755,775. Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, International Data Base.

^g2003 population of Iraq: 24,683,313. Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, International Data Base.

Source: Quinlivan, Summer 2003

Based on the security force – insurgent ratio from the success insurgency campaign as in Malaya, it would take 4 million US and coalition troops and more than a decade to put down the 200,000 strong guerrilla force in Iraq, if the coalition forces successfully alienate the Shiite majority from the Sunni by the lure of electoral path to power and actually grants them independence.⁷⁰ It is imperative for the coalition forces now to accelerate the training of Iraqi Security forces so that the Iraqis can assume the lead role in securing town and cities.

⁷⁰ Gavin Bulloch, "Military Doctrine and Counter insurgency: A British Perspective," Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly 26.2, Summer 1996

This would allow US combat forces to reduce their ‘military signature’, withdraw to cantonments outside urban centers and remain as a quick reaction force.⁷¹

f. Unity of Effort

Insurgency or guerilla warfare cannot be dealt with alone by military means. The U.S. must devise a political, economic, and military plan first to head off, and if that is not possible to fight, a guerilla war successfully.⁷² In Malaysia during the Second Communist Insurgency, the concept of Security and Development was introduced as a new strategy to fight the MCP’s insurgency. This strategy constituted the measures taken by all government agencies, security forces and civil authorities to provide security and safety to the people from the insurgency. The program involved in the implementation of massive development programs and created more job opportunities to raise the standard of living of the people.

Therefore it is important for the ‘newly elected’ Iraqi government to focus on the economy and infrastructure development and provide security in the areas where the insurgents’ activities are relatively few, while concentrating most of the security operations in the areas where the insurgents’ activities are frequent. As the Briggs plan suggested in the Malaya insurgency, the Iraqi government should start to secure the areas from the insurgents’ activities systematically, and provide ‘reasonable’ security measures in the area, which is considered as ‘white area’. At the same time, more civil affairs projects should be implemented in the ‘white area’ in order to restore peace and to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the people.

⁷¹ Iraq War Being Lost by American. The Australian News. www.cleveland.indymedia.org. Date Accessed 24 February 2005.

⁷² Ahmed S. Hashim, PhD. The Sunni Insurgency In Iraq. Center for Naval Warfare Studies. August 15, 2003

At the same time, the civil administration should be strengthened to the utmost extent possible so that they can control the populated areas. The Iraqi Police should be tasked to provide security and safety in the ‘white area’ and they must show their presence in the neighborhood by conducting regular patrols and operating checkpoints. An emergency regulation should be introduced similar to the one implemented during the Malayan Emergency, even if the regulation is considered to be draconian and to violate some basic law of personal liberty.

The emergency regulation should have various dictatorial power decrees. The death penalty should be prescribed for carrying unauthorized firearms. Coercive powers of detention and the commencement of the registration of the entire adult population should be accomplished, and the people should be issued new Iraqi national identification cards. The re-registration will help the government to detect and identify the presence of foreign terrorists and it will stop the incursion of international terrorist groups in Iraq.

Unity of effort in preserving peace and developing Iraq from every agency, military and civil alike is very important to ensure the success of rebuilding Iraq. A solid unity of effort from every agency will ensure then present Iraqi government is in control.

g. Security and Military Operation

The Malayan Emergency suggests that the success of counterinsurgency requires a broad civil military strategy that emphasizes political and economic development and patient police work as much as military operations conducting the insurgency warfare against the guerrillas.⁷³ As the British experienced during the Malayan Emergency, it took two years to formulate an appropriate strategy such as the Briggs Plan to suppress the MCP’s militant

⁷³ Ann Scott Tyson. History’s Lessons Call for Stamina. www.csmonitor.com. Date Accessed 24 February 2005.

wing. Most of the security operations were done with the intention to minimize the ‘collateral damage’ towards innocent civilians. The coalition forces should not use its ‘military might’ to defeat insurgencies. If the coalition depends too much on the use of force, it will risk losing more ‘heart and minds’ of the people.⁷⁴

The ultimate goal of the coalition forces in Iraq is to ensure the emergence of a politically stable, democratic, and reconstructed Iraq. The present Iraqi government must restore law and order and basic services and start rebuilding Iraq from scratch. Therefore in this context, the military part of the counter-insurgency or counter-guerilla war must always be subordinated to this goal. It is not wise destroy the country in order to save it.⁷⁵

The type of U.S. force structure in Iraq – heavy armored and mechanized units and the psychological disposition of these forces, which have been in Iraq for months, is simply not conducive to the successful waging of counter-insurgency warfare.⁷⁶ There is a need to reorganize the present unit into a smaller and agile force that can respond quickly to the threat posed by the insurgents. They should also be capable of providing lethal firepower but in a proportionate manner to avoid excessive collateral damage to civilians and public property. There is also a need for the coalition forces and the Iraqi Security Forces to adopt a set of different cultural and physiological approaches to security operation. Instead of relying on raiding techniques and overwhelming firepower, the coalition forces should have to shift the focus to winning hearts and minds in local population centers.

⁷⁴ John Yaukey. U.S. Relearning Painful Lesson in Iraq. Gannett News Service. www.firstcoastnews.com. Date Accessed 27 February 2005.

⁷⁵ Ahmed S. Hashim, PhD. The Sunni Insurgency In Iraq. Center for Naval Warfare Studies. *August 15, 2003*

⁷⁶ James Ridgeway, Guerillas in the Midst, The Village Voice, July 29, 2003

CONCLUSION

The insurgency in Malaysia was defeated with comprehensive action taken by the government, which included civil affairs operations with the objective to win the hearts and minds of the people, and military action to suppress and destroy the MCP militant wing. The promise for independence by the British Government affected the communist propaganda concerning freeing Malaya from British rules and gaining independence through armed struggle.

The situation in Iraq is much more complex than the situation in Malaya. The government must have total control of the situation before any major efforts could be made to defeat the insurgents in Iraq. There is no 'silver bullet' that can resolve the situation in Iraq. The success of the recent election will be a good start for the Iraqi people because they will have their own government. The Iraqi people should support the new elected government and work together to rebuild their nation with the help of United States and other nations.

The complex situation in Iraq needs the coalition forces and the Iraqi government to devise a political, economic, and military plan first to head off before they can fight a guerilla war successfully. The presence of numerous insurgents groups with different objectives and aims, make fighting against them more complicated and difficult. There is a need for the present government in Iraq to have the capability to control its border from any incursion of terrorists from the neighboring countries in order to isolate the insurgents. It is important for the 'newly elected' Iraqi government, to focus on the economy and infrastructure, and develop and provide security in the areas where the insurgents' activities are relatively few,

while concentrating most of the security operations in the areas where the insurgents' activities are frequent.

The coalition forces and the new Iraqi Security Forces have an arduous task to help the present Iraqi political representatives build peaceful environments and protect the newly formed rights for all Iraqi people. For the military, they need to improve the intelligence collecting service in order to support military operations. The number of the security forces should also be increased to a reasonable security force-civilian ratio in order for the Iraqi government to have full control of the situation in Iraq. There is also a need for the coalition forces to reorganize its troop organization against the insurgents. Forces should be organized into smaller, agile units that can respond quickly to the threat posed by the insurgents. Instead of relying on raiding techniques and overwhelming firepower, the coalition forces should shift their focus into winning hearts and minds of the local population.

The insurgency in Iraq will not vanish in a short time. It may take longer than expected for that situation to come into existence. It will take time, maybe more than a decade, as in Malaysia, where it took almost 41 years before the MCP really surrendered. In Iraq, having a good government, which can ensure the security and the safety of the people, is the first step to success of rebuilding Iraq and is seen as a good omen toward defeating the insurgency.

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