



Space and National Security

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**Towards a Theory of
Spacepower**

National Defense University

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Report Documentation Page

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National Security Space: Issues and Trends, 1950-2000

- Application of Force and Arms Control
- Organization and Architecture
- Doctrine
- Acquisitions
- National Technical Means and Intelligence

Application of Force

- Firepower
 - From space
 - In space
 - With space
- Space forces, as they are now configured, cannot destroy an opposing force nor are they the instrument of victory in battle.

Organization

- Bifurcation and diffusion from the start
 - Intra-service competition
 - Civil / Security
 - Military / Intelligence
- **Goldwater-Nicholls, the most important military reform in American history, does not extend into space.**

Architecture


- Reflects organizational diffusion
- Incremental, stovepiped approach to space presence.
- **The most important point about national security space architecture is that until the 1990s, there was none.**

Doctrine

- **Space shapes larger trends in military thinking; trends in military thinking shape space doctrine.**
- 1980s - Qualitative superiority
 - Information and intangibles
 - The accidental space war
- 1990s – Formal space doctrine appears
- From national/strategic to operational/tactical
 - Integration of space assets and services

Acquisitions

- U.S. faces increased complexity and risk.
- U.S. response is decreased investment and increased oversight.
- **Could the U.S. ever again have a Corona program, with its 13 consecutive failures?**



Intelligence After the Cold War

■ Issues

- New classes of opponents
- New technologies to collect against

■ Advances

- NGA/ NSA cooperation

■ Evolving role of spatial intelligence

- Support the warfighter as core mission?

Opponent Response

- Counter U.S. informational advantages
- Concealment, mobility and deception
- Jamming and spoofing
- Anti-satellite weapons
 - Directed Energy
 - EMP
 - Kinetic attack
 - Network attack

Arms control

- US was first (1950s) to propose peaceful uses.
- Washington Naval Conference Redux?
 - Unverifiable
 - Inexperienced/untrustworthy partners
 - Inadequate venues
 - Multilateral assurances as a substitute for asymmetric advantage.
- **Every Administration since Eisenhower (even Carter!) has decided that space arms control was not in the national interest**

Conclusions

- Spacepower remains less useful than airpower, sea power, or land power.
- The diffusion of technology and an integrated global economy is reducing the historic advantage provided by space.
 - Legacy investments and the U.S. capability to utilize space assets still provide unique advantages.
- Organization and development of doctrine remain key challenges for the U.S. national security space effort.