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Employing the Social Psychology of Persuasion and Influence to Win the Global War
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Executive Summary

Title: Employing the Social Psychology of Persuasion and Influence to Win the Global War on Terrorism

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Thesis: The mid-range theories of the social sciences can provide the United States and its allies useful frameworks for amplifying civil and military actions to defeat Islamic Totalitarianism.

Discussion: The United States' experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq have once again demonstrated the limitations of conventional, kinetic military force, regardless of its precision and lethality. The effective use of information can demonstrate to vulnerable populations the disingenuousness of Islamic Totalitarianism's message and help garner greater acceptance of the United States' culture, history, governmental policies, and role in the world. Today, technology dramatically increases the rapidity and breadth of information exchange. Technological advances in the future are likely to further increase the interconnectivity of the world and magnify the results of well-conceived and well-coordinated communication efforts. To defeat the ideology of Islamic Totalitarianism, the United States and its allies must amplify civil and military actions by harnessing the social psychology of persuasion and influence. The Global War on Terrorism, as largely a war of ideas, can only be won by employing the social sciences as the essential amplifiers of successful performance. This paper presents three social psychology theories and then highlights two or three ways each might be employed in the Global War on Terrorism to defeat Islamic Totalitarianism's ideology when used to amplify traditional counterinsurgency lines of operation (LOOs) such as security, governance, justice, humanitarian assistance, indigenous security forces, and economic development. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate, not just the utility, but also the urgency of the U.S. Government collaborating with experts in the social psychology fields to win the current conflict.

Conclusion: The mid-range theories of the social sciences can provide the United States and its allies useful frameworks for amplifying civil and military actions to defeat Islamic Totalitarianism in the same manner as chemistry, physics, and computer science amplified our efforts in winning the wars of the Twentieth Century.

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Preface

The United States and its Allies partnered with science to win the major conflicts of the past century. During World War I, the decisive strategic advantage on the battlefield was driven by new applications of chemistry and chemical engineering. Germany, for example, exhausted its supplies of gunpowder nitrates in 1915, but the synthesis of nitrates by German scientists allowed the war to continue for another three horrible years. The Allied Powers' superior manpower and economic resources in concert with its own application of modern science eventually prevailed. The Allies defeated the Axis Powers in World War II largely because they more effectively partnered with physicists. To paraphrase Churchill, the atom bomb ended the conflict, but the exploitation of the electromagnetic spectrum in the form of the wireless radio and radar won it for the Allies. During "World War III", or what is commonly referred to as the Cold War, intelligence and knowledge of the enemy and the ability to fully exploit that knowledge through information technology allowed the United States to defeat the Soviet Union with relatively small loss. True to the assertions of the most renowned military theorist, Carl von Clausewitz, war retained its immutable nature and the human element remained central throughout the Twentieth Century. The problem in the past was that the human factor could never be a decisive amplifier simply because its influence was relatively fixed and difficult to exploit. Humans have been considered constants more than variables.¹

As the chapter closed on the "information researchers'" war with its precision guided munitions (PGMs) and unmanned aerial vehicles, America's enemies were no longer content to strive against her in an effort to wage war more efficiently. They resorted to the recourse of the materially weaker by pursuing Clausewitz's "people's war" on a global scale. Guerrilla warfare, to include the tactic of terrorism, carried out by non-uniformed, non-state combatants minimizes and in many cases negates the technological superiority of the United States and its coalition partners. Especially in light of our experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq, many in the military intellectual community understand the value of psycho-culture factors in war. In the current war, psychological and information operations are

decisive and must be considered an inherent component of all of our civil and military activities. In this conflict, the human element is not just central; it is fundamental to victory. If the single most important objective for the first three wars was to make better machines, then surely the fourth world war corollary is to make military service people and civil servants, more effective humans.²

Because the social sciences, often referred to as “soft sciences”, are more qualitative than quantitative their usefulness to mankind has not always enjoyed universal consensus. There continues to be little movement toward consensus on what methodology might have the power and refinement to serve as a "grand theory" of social science. Regardless, the midrange theories of the social sciences have developed to provide usable frameworks for massive, growing data banks of research.³

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate to the reader the utility of the United States Government partnering with professionals and educators in the social psychology fields of persuasion and influence. The approach of this paper is to outline three social psychology theories and then highlight two or three ways they might be employed in the GWOT to defeat Islamic Totalitarianism’s ideology when used to amplify traditional counterinsurgency lines of operation (LOOs) such as security, governance, justice, humanitarian assistance, indigenous security forces, and economic development. By demonstrating the applicability of social science in amplifying civil and military activities at the strategic and tactical levels, I hope to impress upon the reader not just the utility, but the urgency of the U.S. Government collaborating with experts in the social psychology fields to win the current conflict. The United States can secure victory in the first world war of the Twenty-First Century through an affiliation of the Government and science communities similar to the partnering that garnered victory in the Twentieth Century’s conflicts.⁴

The study of this topic has been enjoyable and of tremendous value to my professional knowledge and understanding of the complexity and urgency of influencing the perceptions and behavior of Islamic societies. To the degree that I have been able to impart that value to the reader, I am indebted to a host of “supporting characters”. First, I owe an eternal debt of gratitude to God who

has given me “all things that pertain to life and godliness” (II Peter 1:2-4). Secondly, this work and other such humble accomplishments would not be possible without the unfailing support, patience, and love of my wife, Amber, and our understanding boys, Trey, Reagan, and Owen. My ideas presented in this paper were strongly influenced by Lieutenant General Paul K. Van Riper’s (USMC, Retired) writings, lectures, and seminars. I credit the genesis of this paper to Major General Robert H. Scales’s (USA, Retired) unpublished paper, “Clausewitz and World War IV”. Finally, and certainly not lastly, I am indebted to Doctor Brad Meyer, my Future War Paper mentor, who provided me sound recommendations and guidance in the writing of this paper. I most appreciate his patient tolerance during the early stages of this assignment as I struggled to transform rough, undeveloped ideas into the basis for an academic paper. He provided me the intellectual space and thought-provoking feedback that allowed me to develop a subject I believe has tremendous utility for the service member or civil servant charged with achieving lasting and sustainable results in the GWOT. Two years of dedicated study at the Marine Corps’s Command and Staff College (CSC) and School of Advanced Warfighting (SAW) have given me the opportunity to peer into the breadth and depth of military professional education from the vantage of point of “a dwarf standing on the shoulders of giants”. The totality of these experiences has contributed to the ideas presented in this paper and is cause for me to be humbly appreciative.

Note to the Reader

A variety of designations have been attributed to the declared enemy of the United States and its allies in the GWOT. Many of them such as “Islamist” and “Islamic insurgent” are more apt than the U.S. Government’s present mantra of “terrorist”. In this paper, I have chosen to refer to the enemy in the manner that I believe best describes who they are, what they hope to accomplish, and the strategy by which they have chosen to pursue their strategic objectives. Hence, I refer to the enemy throughout this paper as “Islamic Totalitarians” and to their movement as “Islamic Totalitarianism”.

WHY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT MUST EMBRACE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

The mid-range theories of the social sciences can provide the United States and its allies useful frameworks for amplifying civil and military actions to defeat Islamic Totalitarianism. The social sciences can empower the United States' efforts in raising and training indigenous security forces. The importance and multi-faceted challenges of performing this task in the GWOT has already been demonstrated in Iraq, Afghanistan, Georgia, and the Philippines. Additionally, social science theories can provide the United States and its allies useful frameworks for building capacity in local, regional, and foreign national governments. Social science can provide governments the structure for providing relevant education opportunities, modern and equitable judicial systems, and prosperous economic prospects to their constituents. Effective governance can potentially increase the allegiance of citizenry to their public institutions and reduce the sway of Islamic Totalitarianism.

The United States' experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq have once again demonstrated the limitations of conventional, kinetic military force, regardless of its precision and lethality. In the world's previous war of ideology, the Cold War, the decisive actions that eradicated Communism's growing influence did not occur on the battlefields of Korea or Vietnam, but rather as the collective intellect of the world observed Communism's insincerity with the economic and social collapse of the political philosophy in the Soviet Union. The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), as largely a war of ideas, can only be won by employing the social sciences as the essential amplifiers of successful performance to influence local and international populations.

Satellites, the Internet, and cell phones combine with television in the Twenty-First Century to increase the rapidity and breadth of information exchange. The enemy feeds real-time information from the modern battlefield to influence millions of viewers around the world today. Technological advances in the future are likely to increase the interconnectivity of the world and the effectiveness of a well-conceived and well-coordinated strategic communication strategy. In their recent military engagement with Hezbollah along the Lebanese border, the Israelis suffered a defeat in the eyes of

Arab countries and in world opinion writ large, despite significant tactical and operational successes on the ground.⁵ Damage is amplified when inappropriate, untimely, culturally insensitive, or false messages are sent over the most sophisticated information networks.

Similarly, Americans charged with directing efforts to win the peace and security of Iraq and Afghanistan are often outmaneuvered by enemies that effectively influence the populations of these countries and the Muslim world as a whole to oppose the United States' civil and military activities. The United States Government's strategic communication policies and programs are not as effective as they could be, as evidenced by the prevailing, and perhaps even growing, fear and abiding hatred many people in the world have for the United States. The country's efforts are disjointed and uncoordinated. Presently, the United States Government lacks a coherent plan to communicate a message to targeted populations in the world that will gain greater acceptance of our culture, history, and governmental policies while simultaneously demonstrating the repugnance of Islamic Totalitarianism.⁶ As a result, we run the risk of losing the "war of ideas".

On the other hand, the United States' effective use of information can demonstrate to vulnerable populations the disingenuousness of Islamic Totalitarianism's message and help garner greater acceptance of the United States' role and influence in the world. To defeat the ideology of Islamic Totalitarianism, the United States and its allies must amplify civil and military actions by harnessing the social psychology of persuasion and influence. In the same manner as chemistry, physics, and computer science amplified our efforts in winning the wars of the Twentieth Century; social science can amplify our actions to win the Global War on Terrorism.⁷ A sample of three social psychology theories will demonstrate the utility of a partnership between the United States Government and the social science community.

PERSUASION AND INFLUENCE THEORIES IN OVERVIEW AND APPLICATION

Inoculation Theory – In Overview

During the Korean War, the American public was introduced to the idea of “brainwashing”. This word was invented to explain the inexplicable acts of treason some military servicemen committed when captured by the enemy. The initial assumption was that the North Koreans had employed a combination of torture and punishment to beat our military servicemen into committing unthinkable acts of betrayal. The evidence suggested otherwise. The “brainwashing” sessions did not actual entail torture, but were rather a lengthy debate between the captured servicemen and a skillful questioner about America and American beliefs about freedom, democracy, and equality. Amazingly, many of our soldiers had great difficulty in defending their political and social beliefs. They believed in the American ideas of democracy, but could not explain to their captors why. Their captors merely began to attack these simply held beliefs until the servicemen began to doubt their validity. From this point of departure, actual acts of treason were made easy.⁸

The lesson learned translated into important changes for American military education. The military services began providing political instruction to members of the armed forces. Through the experience of captured American combatants, the services determined that mere education was insufficient in strengthening important beliefs. Members of the armed forces could receive a lecture on the benefits of capitalism well enough to pass a true-false test on it, but when a skilled captor mounted a serious attack on the information, many captured servicemen crumbled. The American military determined that employing the principles of Inoculation Theory was necessary to get people to hold a belief or attitude more strongly.⁹

The main point of Inoculation Theory is “attacks make beliefs stronger”. Inoculation Theory is drawn from the public health practice of giving shots containing a weak dose of a particular virus to prevent serious diseases by building the person’s immune system to the point where it can naturally ward off an attack from the virus. The Inoculation Theory suggests that if we want to strengthen

existing attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors we should present a weak attack on those attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors.¹⁰

Here are the steps: (1) Warn the receiver of the impending attack, (2) Make a weak attack, then (3) Get the receiver to actively defend the attitude. Warning the receiver of the imminent attack is critical. The warning serves to activate the existing defenses in the receivers. An attack is imminent and they must get ready for it. The warning awakens people and gets them to think for themselves. When people are threatened this way they will begin to produce an array of ideas that they may or may not in actuality employ to defend against the attack. People become stronger by over-preparing for the attack. Next, make a weak attack by attempting to change the thoughts, feelings, or behaviors of receivers. The attack must be strong enough to force the receivers to defend against it; however, it must not be so strong as to overcome the defense. The goal of the weak attack is to make the receiver actively defend against it. Many years of research have shown that the more actively the receiver defends against the attack, the stronger the existing attitude will become. An active defense occurs when the receiver does more than merely think, but rather performs actions. It is also crucial that the receiver does the defending with as little outside assistance as possible. The whole point of inoculation is to get people to think for themselves. When people actively generate their own ideas and thoughts, then have to vigorously defend them; they will develop considerably stronger attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors.¹¹

Inoculation Theory – A Possible Application in a *Governance* LOO

There are a variety of ways in which the Inoculation Theory might be employed in the GWOT. One such way could be to strengthen the commitment of people under democratic governments that are nonetheless vulnerable to Islamic Totalitarianism. The Inoculation Theory could be used to strengthen the democratic attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors of people in new democracies like Iraq and Afghanistan or traditional, yet weak, democracies like Nigeria or the southern islands of the Republic of the Philippines. These democracies have populations that are mostly Muslim. Their governments

are religiously diverse and often characterized by graft, corruption, and ineffectiveness in providing basic goods and services to all of their citizens. Although the populations within these democratically elected governments may be familiar with some of the advantages of living in a democracy, they are nonetheless vulnerable to the theocratic promises of Islamic Totalitarianism. People in these at-risk democracies could be asked to complete a survey that asks them to provide their personal perspective in the form of short written or verbal answers to questions about the advantages of living under a democratic government when compared to a totalitarian form of government. As an effort that is well-publicized in advance, participation in this “inoculation” could be incentivized as a prerequisite to receiving a basic government service. To further increase the connection between a government and its constituency, this survey, in the form of a weak attack on the democratic beliefs of those being questioned, would be most effective if conducted in concert with a survey that solicits input from people on how their government could be more responsive to their needs.

Historically, young Muslims with low esteem have been more likely to actively support Al Qaeda and affiliate organizations than young people with high esteem.¹² Interestingly, studies have shown “inoculation” to be most effective in strengthening and maintaining preexisting beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors in people with low esteem.¹³ In combination with other civil and military activities, the Inoculation Theory may be a simple, yet effective approach to preventing at-risk Muslims in democratic countries from supporting Islamic Totalitarianism.

Inoculation Theory – A Possible Application in a *Security* LOO

As the United States redefines its strategy in Iraq and in particular its approach to securing the capital, the United States military in concert with the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) is moving away from a policy of sweeping through Baghdad communities in an effort to root out and kill or capture insurgents toward a more traditional counterinsurgency approach of clearing and holding neighborhoods.¹⁴ While the goal of this historically proven strategy may be to deny insurgents the passive and in some cases even active support from and safe haven within the populace, the strength of

this strategy, if it is executed properly, is it will strengthen the support provided by the Iraqi people to their security forces and government. As Iraqi troops and policemen live and work amongst the citizens of Iraq, they will require assistance from the people. The people's support of and pride in their national government could potentially grow as they are "inoculated" to support the ISF through garrisoning, feeding, and the provision of information. In time, the population's support of their democratic government can be emboldened as they actively invest in the success of the government's efforts.

Social Judgment Theory – In Overview

The Social Judgment Theory consists of five principles: (1) People have categories of judgment by which they evaluate persuasive positions. (2) When people receive persuasive information, they locate it within their categories of judgment. (3) A person's level of "ego-involvement" affects the size of his latitudes. (4) People tend to distort incoming information to fit their categories of judgment. (5) Small to moderate discrepancies between people's anchor positions and the one advocated will cause them to change; large discrepancies will not.

According to the Social Judgment Theory, when people evaluate persuasive positions they categorize each position into one of three zones: the latitude of acceptance, the latitude of non-commitment, and the latitude of rejection. Within the latitude of acceptance is contained all the positions on a particular topic a person finds acceptable. Within this latitude there is one special position called the "anchor." This is the single position that a person finds the most acceptable. At some border point, a person no longer accepts some position, but he doesn't reject it either. This is the latitude of non-commitment. This latitude contains things about which they have no real opinion. As they move out of the latitude of non-commitment, they reach the second border or the latitude of rejection. Here are the positions on an issue that a person rejects.¹⁵

When people receive persuasive information, they determine which category of judgment a given position belongs. The implication of this principle is direct. Judgment is crucial to persuasion.

If someone offers positions that people judge as "reject," they are not going to be persuaded. When new information is put in the latitude of rejection, the receiver essentially stops listening to it or, even worse, responds to it in an extremely negative and argumentative way. According to the theory, this judgment happens very rapidly. Judgments of rejection make influence extremely difficult.

Judgments of non-commitment and acceptance offer the only chance for change.¹⁶

According to the third principle, a person's level of "ego-involvement" affects the size of his latitudes. Ego-involvement is defined as the importance of an issue to a person's self-identity. An ego-involving topic is one that defines who a person is and addresses critical aspects of himself. It is not surprising that as people become ego-involved in an issue, their latitude of rejection gets larger and their latitudes of acceptance and non-commitment get smaller. Chances are, because the topic is so important to them, they have already done a lot of thinking about, decided what they think is the "correct" position, and then built their self-concepts around that position. Thus, according to Social Judgment Theory, ego-involved people will think in terms of "for me or against me" with sharply defined categories of judgment.¹⁷

People tend to distort incoming information to fit their categories of judgment. The theory holds that people will distort incoming information depending upon the "anchor position" they hold on a given issue. If incoming persuasive information falls within the latitude of acceptance and it is close to the anchor position, then people will "assimilate" the new position. That is, people will pull the new position closer to them and make it seem to be even more acceptable than it really is. By contrast, if incoming persuasive information falls outside of the latitude of acceptance, then people will "contrast" that new position. That is, they will push the new position even farther away from them and make it seem worse than it really is. Realize that both assimilation and contrast distort the "true" position of the new information. Through assimilation and contrast people alter the "true" position of the incoming information and make it seem closer or farther away from their anchor than it really is. When distortions like this occur, no persuasion will result. The new information cannot persuade a person for

one of two reasons. First, if he contrasts, he pushes the new information out of his latitude of acceptance and probably into the latitude of rejection. No persuasion here. Second, if he assimilates, he pulls the new information to his anchor and makes it seem like it is already a position he accepts. No persuasion here, either.¹⁸

Finally, according to the Social Judgment Theory, small to moderate discrepancies between a person's anchor positions and the one advocated will cause him to change; large discrepancies will not. According to the Theory, persuasion is a very difficult process. First of all, persuasion cannot occur if new information is judged to fall within the latitude of rejection. Second, if the person is ego-involved in the issue, then the latitude of rejection is larger than usual and persuasion is even more difficult. Third, people tend to distort new information through assimilation and contrast, which dilutes the persuasive potential of new information. There is not much room left for change.¹⁹

According to Social Judgment Theory, then, for persuasion to occur the new information must fall in the latitude of acceptance or non-commitment, must be different from the anchor position, and, while discrepant from the anchor, can't be assimilated or contrasted. As long as there is the "prescribed" amount of discrepancy between the anchor position and the new position, then persuasion can occur. If the amount of discrepancy is too small or too large, then persuasion will not happen.²⁰

The Social Judgment Theory offers some powerful guidelines for persuasion. Changing people's attitudes, beliefs, or behaviors is difficult, but exceedingly realistic. To persuade people, one must find a common ground in the areas upon which agreement can be made. One must work within the latitude of acceptance or, perhaps, the latitude of non-commitment. The best way to discover these latitudes is through communication and careful observation of those whom one is attempting to persuade.²¹

Next, expect change to happen in many small steps over a long time period. Influence is most likely to occur when the influencer avoids assimilation and contrast effects. These conditions obviously limit both short- and long-term effectiveness. It is folly to expect influence miracles where

receivers undergo massive, immediate change. Finally, when attempting to persuade others be wary of ego-involvement.²²

Social Judgment Theory – A Possible Application in a *Governance* LOO

By way of example, the Social Judgment Theory can inform the United States' efforts to significantly improve security in Iraq. Much of the turmoil in Iraq is caused by the Sunni insurgency and the resulting sectarian violence of the Shi'a militias.²³ In general, expecting Sunnis to enthusiastically accept their reduced role as a political minority in Iraq's national government has proved challenging. It is not within their latitude of acceptance. The Sunnis desire a return to their previous status as the beneficiaries of power and wealth in Iraq. This is their anchor position. A political agreement through constitutional review that provides them a much larger and proportionate share of political power and share of oil revenue is necessary to avoid significant contrast with their anchor position. This proportionate sharing of wealth and political power would have to fall within the latitude of acceptance or, perhaps, the latitude of non-commitment of the Kurds and most significantly, the Shi'a majority as well. Here in lies the challenge, but understanding the Social Judgment Theory may help identify areas where the sectarian latitudes of acceptance and non-commitment of Iraqis overlap. Areas where these sectarian latitudes of acceptance or even non-commitment converge ultimately will form the basis of an agreed upon system of power and wealth sharing. Ultimately, application of the Social Judgment Theory may provide the mental construct that serves as the basis for a much-needed political agreement that will in turn lead to a dramatic reduction in Iraqi violence.

Social Judgment Theory – A Possible Application in a *Humanitarian Assistance* LOO

Another potential application of the Social Judgment Theory pertains to a means of strengthening Muslim societies and reducing their vulnerability to Islamic Totalitarianism's subversive message. The susceptibility of impoverished and disenfranchised populations to Islamic Totalitarianism specifically and rebellion in general is historically documented. Education is one of the key components to lifting populations out of economic and social despair into hope and

opportunity and may in turn help make people less vulnerable to Islamic Totalitarianism's imprisoning lure. However, given the disparity between the educational rights and opportunities afforded to women in many Islamic societies, half or more of the population in these countries may be denied an education. This as a practical matter is a policy that is counter to the strength and progression of a society in the post-modern world. While these societies generally acknowledge the familial role women play as wives and mothers, an education system that is designed to elevate women to the positions held by men in fields such as science and technology, business, and politics is not likely to fall within the latitude of acceptance or even latitude of non-commitment of many in these Islamic societies. For many men in ardently conservative Muslim countries, the role and therefore education of women is an "ego-involved" issue, because it directly pertains to their identity as an Islamic man. On the other hand, an education system that provides women a liberal arts education where family and consumer sciences (formally known as home economics) are emphasized is likely to be within the latitude of acceptance for many in these societies. This more modest approach may not only be more enthusiastically supported by these societies, but it may also open the door for more incremental educational reforms as globalization influences these societies to embrace more modern views of the roles of women. By encouraging and sponsoring education reform that is more culturally and religiously attuned to Islamic societies, the United States may be able to help strengthen and reduce the vulnerability of Islamic societies with an approach that falls within their latitude of acceptance.

Social Judgment Theory – A Possible Application in a *Justice* LOO

In tribal societies like those found in Afghanistan, violations of societal norms are often "settled" by blood feuds and revenge killings. Never truly settled, these methods of recourse take on a life of their own, perpetuating violence, instability, and the impotence of government to provide security for the common good. The anchor position for many who have a legal grievance in these societies is colored by complex emotions like honor, glory, humiliation, and spite. Therefore, their natural recourse is revenge, vengeance, and vendetta.²⁴ If the accused is a member of another tribe, a

woman, a child, or an “infidel”, he is viewed as an inferior by the aggrieved.²⁵ Under these circumstances the drive for retribution is strengthened, as the grievance becomes an ego-involved issue for the aggrieved. Beyond the immediacy of the grievance, the act the alleged perpetrator is accused of committing threatens the very identity of the aggrieved.

Formal Islamic systems of law in tribal-based societies like Afghanistan are often weak and ineffective at reaching rural inhabitants.²⁶ Western-modeled justice, with its liberal emphasis on the rights of the accused and avoidance of excessive punishment, will likely fall within the latitude of rejection of many in these societies. However, tribal methods of exacting punishment and recompense for violations of societal behavior through an Islamic-based, formal system of law might fall within the latitude of acceptance of people accustomed to resolving differences according to a tribal code, if such a formal system of law were made available to them. In order to garner acceptance of a formal legal system in these societies, rather than seeking to impose Western ideas of law such as individual rights or democratic legislative processes, focus should be placed on strengthening the access and scope of the law in existing Islamic judicial systems. Reform of Islamic judicial systems with their tribal overtones will likely moderate as they are infused with the knowledge of more modern legal systems through the process of increased globalization. Revitalized and strengthened Islamic judicial systems may afford tribal societies the security, order, pride, and honor today that they historically unwittingly seek through the chaotic, divisive, and destructive practice of vindictive vigilantism.

Modeling Theory – In Overview

Just by watching what other people do, humans acquire new ideas and behaviors. Modeling is a dominant way people acquire new behaviors. Whenever people are in a new situation, they almost always look around to see what others are doing. Modeling is faster and simpler for people in new situations than trying to figure out everything that is going on and determine appropriate behavior. The marvel of this theory is that people are influenced simply as a result of observing other people. From the observation of others, people learn what to do, what not to do, when to do it, and what to

expect when they do it. Modeling Theory operates in three simple steps: (1) Observe a model. (2) Imitate the model's actions. (3) Get a consequence. After a person observes the model, he then imitates the model in a similar situation. He produces the same behaviors he saw the model produce. His imitation should lead to the desired consequence. If the imitation produces the expected and desired consequence, he has truly been influenced. If his imitation fails, then he will drop the model.²⁷

When employing the Model Theory, three practical implications must be kept in mind. First, know what is being modeled. Modeling can influence everyone who observes the model, not just the target. Negative behaviors can be learned as a result of modeling, too. Second, Modeling Theory is designed primarily to explain behavioral influence. It is less useful in creating or understanding changes in thinking or feeling. To influence behaviors, consider modeling. To influence thinking or attitudes, use other persuasion tools. Finally, modeling is to be seen, not said. The best way to influence a behavior through modeling is to demonstrate it rather than describe it.²⁸

Modeling Theory – A Possible Application in an *Indigenous Security* LOO

There are a variety of areas in which the Modeling Theory may aid the United States in influencing behaviors. One such area is in the United States military's effort train Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) through the employment of Military Transition Teams (MiTTs). These teams of ten to fifteen American Soldiers and Marines provide assessment of and training to Iraqi battalions, brigades, and divisions.²⁹ While these teams are increasing the operational capability of Iraq's military, they have struggled to raise the proficiency of an army that has had limited exposure to a model of a professional military force since the days of British colonialism. The Modeling Theory might offer a more effective approach to instilling an appreciation for and sense of professionalism in the ISF's leadership than the methods presently being employed. Iraqi commanders and senior noncommissioned officers (NCOs) should be assigned to American battalions, brigades, and divisions to observe and interact with proven American commanders and senior NCOs at the same level of command for a period of one to three months. By observing professional military officers and NCOs

in the lead, Iraqi military leaders can gain appreciation for the art of command and military leadership in a variety of complex, dynamic scenarios. When these Iraqi military leaders return to their assigned units, American MiTTs will need to provide them proportionately less course direction and guidance than they presently do and will instead focus on reinforcing the positive behaviors the Iraqi military leaders observed in their American counterparts and naturally model now that they are in their positions of responsibility.

A similar approach to training Iraqi police forces using the tenets of the Modeling Theory may also prove useful. While transition teams made up of military police, other military specialists, and international police liaison officers and trainers are presently embedded within Iraqi police forces, the corruption and enemy infiltration of these forces have severely degraded their contribution to Iraq's security.³⁰ To observe best police practices in a similar cultural setting, senior personnel within Iraq's national, regional, and local law enforcement agencies could be assigned to short-term fellowships with reputable, well-functioning law enforcement agencies in the Middle East, like Jordan's Public Security Directorate. By first having the opportunity to observe professional leaders in the performance of their duties, Iraqi military and police leaders will be better positioned to fulfill their professional responsibilities under the tutelage of Police Transition Teams (PiTTs).

Modeling Theory – A Possible Application in an *Economic* LOO

Societies that provide economic hope and opportunity for their people are generally more peaceful and stable than impoverished societies with high unemployment rates. The Modeling Theory may provide governments the opportunity to create an environment where citizens enthusiastically invest in the growth of their economy, creating a vibrant, rapidly expanding economy that benefits its entire population. Consequently, this creation of a self-sustaining, growing economy will help to foster an environment that dissuades citizens from rebelling against their democratically elected government and supporting the violent and disruptive activities of Islamic Totalitarianism. The Modeling Theory provides an intellectual construct for how cash-strapped governments can stimulate

latent economies. By way of example, roads were built under the *Corvee* System in Haiti during the U.S. Marine Corps occupation of that country from 1915-1934 by providing Haitians the opportunity to pay their “taxes” to the government by working a specified number of hours in support of road construction projects.³¹ Not only were people less likely to seek financial opportunity in Haiti’s ongoing rebellion, the country’s economy grew as citizens modeled their neighbors by flocking to make an economic contribution to the future of their families and their communities. Similarly, in 2002, JTF-510’s Naval Construction Task Group (NCTG) employed up to 2,000 people on the southern Philippines island of Basilan in its four-month effort to work with the Philippine government to eliminate a safe haven for the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) by building roads, bridges, and piers.³² Because Filipinos observed their neighbors engaged in worthwhile efforts to improve the safety, economic opportunity, and general productivity of their local community, the economy on this small island continues to grow as more residents emulate their fellow-citizens’ efforts to provide economic opportunities for themselves and their community. Most telling, the previously uninspired government of Basilan Province has begun to follow the lead of its constituency by petitioning international aid organizations to construct additional infrastructure enhancement projects.³³ In both the Haiti and Basilan examples, through minimum capital outlay, governments were able to make substantial and urgently-need infrastructure improvements that provided immediate employment to their citizenry and through modeling compelled local residents to become personally and increasingly involved in growing vibrant and rapidly expanding economies. The flourishing economies that developed increased the allegiance of citizens to their governments and eliminated the ties of support to the respective insurgencies.

CONCLUSION

The interrelationship of people throughout the world and the seeming receptiveness of the planet’s 1.3 billion Muslims to Islamic Totalitarianism’s message increases the urgency of the United States and its allies effectively influencing the attitudes and behavior of Islamic people.³⁴ The

effective use of information can demonstrate to vulnerable populations the disingenuousness of Islamic Totalitarianism's message and help garner greater acceptance of the United States' culture, history, governmental policies, and role in the world. Today, technology dramatically increases the rapidity and breadth of information exchange. Technological advances in the future are likely to further increase the interconnectivity of the world and magnify the results of well-conceived and well-coordinated communication efforts. The mid-range theories of the social sciences can provide the United States and its allies useful frameworks for amplifying civil and military actions to defeat Islamic Totalitarianism.

In the same manner as chemistry, physics, and computer science amplified our efforts in winning the wars of the Twentieth Century; social science can amplify our actions to win the GWOT³⁵. A sample of three social psychology theories demonstrates the utility of a partnership between the United States Government and the social science community. As the examples illustrate, the applicability of social science across the spectrum of counterinsurgency efforts is only limited by the knowledge and imagination of those charged with executing its actions.

¹ Major General Robert H. Scales, USA (Ret.). "Clausewitz and World War IV." Unpublished Paper, 2006.

² Ibid.

³ "Social sciences" (2007). Available from: Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_sciences#Social_theory_and_research_methods> (accessed 1 April 2007).

⁴ Scales, "Clausewitz and World War IV."

⁵ Tom Gross, "Media Missiles," *National Review* (2 August 2006). Available from: National Review <<http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=YjVIMmRjNDIINzhkZmE1OWM3NmE1OGQ4OGQxMDA1YjQ=>> (accessed 25 April 2007).

⁶ Robin Wright and Al Kamen, "U.S. Outreach to Islamic World Gets Slow Start, Minus Leaders," *Washington Post*, (18 April 2005): A02.

⁷ Scales, "Clausewitz and World War IV."

⁸ Steve Booth-Butterfield, "Healthy Influence, communication for a change" (2007). Available from: <<http://www.healthyinfluence.com/Primer/inoculation.htm>> (accessed 1 April 2007).

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Paulo Pontoniere, "Lessons from the Al Qaeda Cult Handbook" (2001). Available from: AlterNet <<http://www.alternet.org/story/11895/>> (accessed 1 April 2007).

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ralph Peters, "Battle for Baghdad," *New York Post* (1 March 2007). Available from: New York Post <http://www.nypost.com/seven/03012007/postopinion/opedcolumnists/battling_for_baghdad_opedcolumnists_ralph_peters.htm?page=0> (accessed 1 April 2007).

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- ¹⁵ Steve Booth-Butterfield, "Social Judgment Theory" (1996). Available from: <<http://www.as.wvu.edu/~sbb/comm221/chapters/judge.htm>> (accessed 1 April 2007).
- ¹⁶ Ibid.
- ¹⁷ Ibid.
- ¹⁸ Ibid.
- ¹⁹ Ibid.
- ²⁰ Ibid.
- ²¹ Ibid.
- ²² Ibid.
- ²³ Michael Howard, "Sunni-Shia schism 'threatening to tear Iraq apart', says conflict group," *The Guardian* (27 February 2006). Available from: Guardian Unlimited <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,,1718646,00.html>> (accessed 1 April 2007).
- ²⁴ Richard H. Shultz, Jr. and Andrea J. Dew, *Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias* (N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 2006), pp. 5-6.
- ²⁵ Steven Pressfield, "The Citizen and the Tribesman" (2006). Available from: <<http://www.stevenpressfield.com/content/op-ed2.asp>> (accessed 1 April 2007).
- ²⁶ These Islamic systems of legal justice are generally based upon the *Qu'ran* and are interpreted by authenticated *hadiths* and the details of the *sharia*.²⁶ Cases in these Islamic legal systems are represented and tried by the studied interpretations of a defense and prosecuting counsel and judge who are clerics or learned "scholar-jurists". *Hadiths* are sayings and traditions of Prophet Mohammed that help to formulate Islamic law. www.jeansasson.com/glossary_of_terms.htm *Sharia* is legal precedent. The term means "way" or "path"; it is the legal framework within which public and some private aspects of life are regulated for those living in a legal system based on Muslim principles of jurisprudence. "Sharia" (2007). Available from: Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia <<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sharia>> (accessed 1 April 2007).
- ²⁷ Steve Booth-Butterfield, "Healthy Influence, communication for a change" (2007). Available from: <<http://www.healthyinfluence.com/Primer/modeling.htm>> (accessed 1 April 2007).
- ²⁸ Ibid.
- ²⁹ "Military transition team" (2007). Available from: Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_transition_team> (accessed 1 April 2007).
- ³⁰ Donna Miles, "Embedding Concept With Iraqi Army to Extend to Police Units," *American Forces Press Service* (4 January 2006). Available from: U.S. Department of Defense. <<http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=14703>> (accessed 1 April 2007).
- ³¹ Ivan Musicant, *The Banana Wars: A History of U.S. Military Intervention in Latin America* (N.Y.: Macmillan, 1990), p. 290.
- ³² Daniel A. Miller and John P. Sullivan, "The Value of Expeditionary Engineering in Theater Engagement and Combat Support," *Marine Corps Gazette* 87: 14-16+ (December 2003).
- ³³ "With guns silent, town in Basilan is now on the road to economic dev't." (2007), Available from: GEM <<http://www.mindanao.org/news/0701/08a.htm>> (accessed 1 April 2007).
- ³⁴ "Major Religions of the World Ranked by Number of Adherents" (2005). Available from: Adherents <http://www.adherents.com/Religions_By_Adherents.html> (accessed 1 April 2007).
- ³⁵ Scales, "Clausewitz and World War IV."

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