

Coordination Without Borders
Assigning US Military Officers to NGO
World Headquarters:
Rhetoric and Reality

A Monograph
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AY 2008

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			<i>Form Approved</i> <i>OMB No. 0704-0188</i>		
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1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 21-05-2009		2. REPORT TYPE Master's Thesis		3. DATES COVERED (From - To) JUL 2008 – MAY 2009	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Coordination Without Borders Assigning US Military Officers to NGO World Headquarters: Rhetoric and Reality			5a. CONTRACT NUMBER		
			5b. GRANT NUMBER		
			5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER		
6. AUTHOR(S) LTC David S. Levine			5d. PROJECT NUMBER		
			5e. TASK NUMBER		
			5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER		
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301			8. PERFORMING ORG REPORT NUMBER		
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)			10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)		
			11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)		
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
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15. SUBJECT TERMS NGOs, Stability, Support, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR), DoD, unity of effort, unity of action					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT (U)	b. ABSTRACT (U)	c. THIS PAGE (U)	(U)	69	19b. PHONE NUMBER (include area code)

Abstract

COORDINATION WITHOUT BORDERS ASSIGNING US MILITARY OFFICERS TO NGO WORLD HEADQUARTERS: RHETORIC AND REALITY by LTC David S. Levine, US Army, 66 pages.

The lack of coordination outlined in the US Institute for Peace's (USIP's) *Guide for Participants in Peace, Stability, and Relief Operations* primer is the driving force behind this monograph and its title. "Coordination without Borders" is a variation of the title of the respected Doctors Without Borders / Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) medical assistance nongovernmental organization (NGO). The Department of Defense (DoD) could meet the challenge of coordinating military operations with NGOs' operations and increasing NGO access and security by assigning officers to NGOs' world headquarters. Since 1995, every US military campaign has included significant stability, support, transition and reconstruction (SSTR) operations. During US military operations in the Afghanistan and Iraq operational theaters, military campaign plans and operations have included simultaneous combat and SSTR operations. During Operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom (or since 2001), the US Department of Defense has led simultaneous combat and Stability, Support, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq. As the lead campaign organization (vice the US Department of State, NATO, the European Union or United Nations), and despite having similar near-term objectives, military commanders have limited success working with NGOs. Effective DoD and NGO coordination and synchronization at high levels could improve both military stability and NGO operations' effectiveness. This monograph also addresses US military officer assignment courses of action that may facilitate improving DoD and NGO unity of effort.

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Introduction

In recent years, militaries have sought to improve their relationship with NGOs by creating Civil-Military Operations Centers (CMOCs) that allow military, NGO, and IO personnel to meet and work together to advance mutual goals. These centers allow the three groups to share information and views and provide a venue for practical matters. They do not, however, serve as coordinating mechanisms, and they have not always been able to bring the three communities together. NGOs have not always been willing to be engaged with CMOCs, fearing the consequences of the appearance of a too-close association with the military.¹

The lack of coordination described above in the US Institute for Peace's (USIP's) *Guide for Participants in Peace, Stability, and Relief Operations* primer is the driving force behind this monograph and its title. "Coordination without Borders" is a variation of the title of the respected Doctors Without Borders / Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) medical assistance nongovernmental organization (NGO). MSF operates as a system much like Robert Axelrod defined "system" in his groundbreaking work on complexity.² MSF leaders respect international governmental systems but are focused on their core mission.³ MSF reserves the right to access affected populations regardless of political boundaries.⁴ They do not let system members' political

¹ Robert M. Perito., *Guide for Participants in Peace, Stability, and Relief Operations* (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace Press, 2007), 121.

² Robert Axelrod and Michael D. Cohen, *Harnessing Complexity Organizational Implications of a Scientific Frontier* (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2000), 6.

³ Médecins Sans Frontières, "About MSF," Médecins Sans Frontières, <http://www.msf.org.uk/about.aspx> (accessed September 10, 2008).

⁴ Ibid.

positions hamper their operations in the name of the greater good. US Department of Defense (DoD) and NGO members would do well to emulate MSF's operational coordination, planning and execution in the same spirit.

Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 3000.05 directs military plans will contain stability operations dimensions which include integrated US Government plans for stabilization and reconstruction in coordination with relevant US Government departments and agencies, foreign governments and security forces, Intergovernmental Organizations (IOs), NGOs, and members of the private sector.⁵ The Department of Defense (DoD) could meet the challenge of coordinating military operations with NGOs' operations and increasing NGO access and security by assigning officers to NGOs' world headquarters. Since 1995, every US military campaign has included significant stability, support, transition and reconstruction (SSTR) operations. During US military operations in the Afghanistan and Iraq operational theaters, military campaign plans and operations have included simultaneous combat and SSTR operations. Commanders from the corps down to the company level continuously execute combat and nation-building, reconstruction, or counterinsurgency operations.

Before and during each campaign, NGOs have been significant, largely independent participants in high risk, austere conditions. During Operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom (or since 2001), the US Department of Defense has led simultaneous combat and Stability, Support,

⁵ Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations*, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, November 28, 2005), 3.

Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq. As the lead campaign organization (vice the US Department of State, NATO, the European Union or United Nations), and despite having similar near-term objectives, military commanders have limited success working with NGOs. In recent years, however, the US military, especially at the Joint Force Command (JFC) level, has worked to transform and reorganize itself to meet the realities of today's operational environment.⁶ Organizational initiatives include Modularity, Standing Joint Force Headquarters Core Element, Joint Interagency Coordination Groups, and Civil Military Operation Centers (CMOCs) and are aimed at improving command and control and facilitating coordination.⁷

Effective DoD and NGO coordination and synchronization at high levels could improve both military stability and NGO operations' effectiveness. This monograph addresses US military officer assignment courses of action that may facilitate improving DoD and NGO unity of effort. The National Command Authority (NCA) directed the DoD to develop a process to facilitate information sharing for stability operations among the DoD Components, and relevant US Departments and Agencies, foreign governments and security forces, International Organizations and NGOs.⁸ The assignment of US military officers to NGO world headquarters could result in more than information sharing. It will facilitate the ability

⁶ Gregory L. Cantwell, "Nation Building: A Joint Enterprise," *Parameters* 38, No. 3 (2007): 56.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 57.

⁸ Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, 5.

of NGOs to safely and quickly deploy into remote, austere and often dangerous locations that US military forces will conduct or are conducting operations. Officers assigned to NGO headquarters may change NGO members' perceptions of the US military, clarify the DoD operational methods and goals and increase the US military's and NGOs' unity of effort, resulting in coordinated, secure and effective field operations for their respective organizations.

This monograph will not address US conflict or post-conflict organizational leadership. Which US Federal government entity leads National conflict or post-conflict operations is immaterial to the potential utility of assigning senior US military officers to NGO world headquarters. Regardless of which US Federal government entity (ex: Department of State [DoS]) is the lead conflict or post-conflict organization, US government support to NGOs will always be exponentially larger from the DoD.

Since George W. Bush became President of the United States in January 2001, the National Command Authority (NCA) has repeatedly tasked the US Department of Defense (DoD) as the lead US government organization in pre-conflict, conflict and post-conflict planning and execution (ex: Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom). The DoD has executed a "go it alone" policy, i.e. US military forces have had to make the peace, resolve the issues and operationally manage the situations.⁹ This is markedly different from US operations in more permissive situations such as the stability operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. In

⁹ Jock Covey, interview by author, San Francisco, CA, July 28, 2008.

these operations, US political leadership led the missions and worked with but did not have command and control authority over military forces.

There are potential challenges to the concept of assigning US military officers to NGO world headquarters. Few NGOs, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), are exclusively relief focused. NGOs largely function along a relief-development continuum and, since the early 1990s, are increasingly engaging in conflict resolution and peace building.¹⁰

In all operations, NGOs aim to be neutral or impartial agents.¹¹ According to US military doctrine, NGOs hold neutrality as a fundamental principle, will resist being used as sources of intelligence (or the perception of) and may be hesitant to associate with the military.¹² US military officers working in NGO world headquarters, regardless of the officers' duties, may reduce the respective NGO's aim of impartiality. There will also be US military manning challenges. US military officer specialties, rank or grade structures, assignment locations, career impacts, tour lengths, rating chains and position funding are issues the US military must resolve to execute this idea. Since the November 2005 publication of DoD Directive (DoDD) 3000.05, "Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations," which made SSTR a core mission, the DoD and service components, i.e. the Departments of the

¹⁰ David Lewis and Tina Wallace, *New Roles and Relevance Development NGOs and the Challenge of Change* (Bloomfield, Connecticut: Kumarian Press, 2000), 9.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2008), 194.

Air Force, Army and Navy, are working jointly to review and revise related directive, instructions, regulations and policies.

Once the Department of Defense and NGO community resolve these issues, the assignment of US military officers to NGO headquarters could support the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's unified action doctrine. According to the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) doctrine, unified action synchronizes, coordinates, and/or integrates joint, single-Service, and multinational operations with the operations of other USG agencies, NGOs, and IGOs (ex: United Nations [UN]), and the private sector to achieve unity of effort.¹³ The assignment of US military officers to NGO world headquarters will facilitate the synchronization, coordination and integration of military operations with the operations of NGOs. With the removal of mental borders or pre-conceptions, military officers and NGOs could work together to improve mutual understanding, establish rapport, and work jointly achieve to effectively use their prodigious resources to selflessly accomplish their missions.

Literature Review

There is a great deal of literature, largely in two broad categories, which supports

¹³ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-0, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2007), xii.

this thesis. As such, the review is grouped into the following categories: NGO roles and operations and US government policies and regard US government guidance, policy and regulations as related to NGO synchronization and support and operations.

In her book *The Real World of NGOs*¹⁴, Dorothea Hilhorst analyzed NGOs not as entities but as open-ended processes. Having worked in a Philippine Islands-based local development NGO, Ms. Hilhorst explored what is organizational about them instead of what has been articulated repeatedly, i.e. what is nongovernmental about NGOs. John Boli and George M. Thomas' essay "World Culture in the World Polity: A Century of International Non Governmental Organization" in *American \ Sociological Review* outlined how NGOs form, participate in coalitions at the strategic level and in the field, and the links between humanitarian assistance NGO coalitions, and between NGO coalitions and the UN.¹⁵ It provided NGO operational context in the early monograph sections. This thesis plainly describes how NGOs operate independently of military operations and contrasts NGO operations when confronted with military commanders who manage "battle space."

¹⁴ Dorothea Hillhorst, *The Real World of NGOs* (London, UK: Zed Books Ltd, 2003), 4.

¹⁵ John Boli and George M. Thomas, "World Culture in the World Polity: A Century of International Non-Governmental Organization," *American Sociological Review* 62, No. 2 (1997): 171-190.

John Harriss' essay collection, *The Politics of Humanitarian Intervention* is insightful regarding how NGOs view their composition, roles and missions.¹⁶ The essays articulate NGOs' motivation, views of governmental and intergovernmental organizations (GOs and IOs), and how they intend to improve the NGOs' effectiveness by improving their understanding of and interaction with GOs and IOs.

Many NGOs coalesce within umbrella organizations or coalitions such as the American Council for Voluntary International Action (InterAction) and the Modernizing Foreign Assistance Network (MFAN). Even the United States Congress funds an NGO coordination organization. The Congressionally-funded United States Institute for Peace (USIP) has three stated goals: prevent and resolve violent international conflicts, promote post-conflict stability and development and increase conflict management capacity, tools, and intellectual capital worldwide.¹⁷

On July 10, 2008, InterAction's President and Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Samuel Worthington, testified before the United States Senate's Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management. Mr. Worthington's

¹⁶ John Harriss, *The Politics of Humanitarian Intervention* (New York, NY: Pinter Publishers, 1995), 1-15.

¹⁷ United States Institute for Peace, "About USIP," <http://www.usip.org/aboutus/> (accessed September 10, 2008).

Congressional testimony included proposals for the US government to form a National (Foreign) Development strategy with the goal of synchronizing the Nation’s foreign development efforts and NGO coalitions.¹⁸ In July 2007, InterAction, in conjunction with the US DoD and the USIP, published a pamphlet titled “*Guidelines for Relations between US Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations in Hostile or Potentially Hostile Environment.*”¹⁹ This pamphlet outlines guidelines for relations between US military forces and non-governmental humanitarian agencies in hostile or potentially hostile environments.

Additionally, the USIP published a 376-page guide specifically for participants of stability, support, transition and reconstruction (SSTR) operations. The *Guide for Participants in Peace, Stability and Relief Operations* was designed to inform military, IO and NGO members about their respective constructs, operations, similarities and differences.²⁰ It addressed each organization’s sensitivities, goals and communications methodologies.

There are innumerable US government policies and procedures documents that address US government policies and procedures with regard to NGO – US military operational synchronization and support. In 2008, the US DoD published DoD Directive (DoDD) 1000.17,

¹⁸US Congress, Senate, Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on Oversight of Governmental Management, *A Reliance on Smart Power – Reforming the Government Assistance Bureaucracy*. 110th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008), 1-12.

¹⁹ InterAction – Department of Defense Pamphlet, *Guidelines for Relations Between US Armed Forces and NonGovernmental Humanitarian Organizations in Hostile or Potentially Hostile Environments* (Washington, DC: InterAction, 2007).

²⁰ Perito, 1-376.

*Detail of DoD Personnel to Duty Outside of the Department of Defense.*²¹ This directive reflected no specified time restrictions for duty outside of DoD. It allowed detailing of DoD personnel only to support a specific project of minimum, pre-determined duration, if DoD personnel are uniquely qualified within the US government to accomplish a specific task.²²

In November 2005, the US DoD published DoDD 3000.05, *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations*.²³ This directive provided guidance on stability operations joint military operating concepts, mission sets, and as lessons learned developed. It also established DoD policy and assigned responsibilities within the DoD for planning, training, and preparing to conduct and support stability operations.

The Chairman of the US military's Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) published Joint Publication 3-08 (JP 3-08), *Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations*.²⁴ The JCS drafted, staffed and published this comprehensive document as the Chairman of the JCS believed successful interagency, IGO and NGO coordination enables the US government to build international support, conserve

²¹ Department of Defense. "Directive 1000.17 Detail of DoD Personnel to Duty Outside of the Department of Defense," <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/100017p.pdf> (accessed September 10, 2008).

²² Ibid.

²³ Department of Defense. "Directive 3000.05 Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations," <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300005p.pdf> (accessed September 10, 2008).

²⁴ Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Publication 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006, vii.

resources, and conduct coherent operations that efficiently achieve shared international goals.²⁵

In March 2007, the United States Army War College (USAWC) published Colonel Eric Swartz' monograph "The US Military and NGOs - Breaking Down the Barriers."²⁶ Colonel Swartz demonstrated a breakdown in US military and NGO coordination and combined operations during the 2004 Pacific tsunami emergency response.²⁷ This resulted in his proposal that US military combat commanders should plan to include NGO coordination and cross-training in the combatant commanders' Theater Security Cooperation Plans (TSCPs) and resultant training exercises but nothing more.²⁸

Based on the literature presented above, it is clear there is a link between DoD policies and procedures and the work of NGOs. It is also clear DoD policies such as DoDD 3000.05 recognize the successful integration of military and civilian efforts are key to mission success. It is also obvious NGOs are compassionate, interstate actors who understand their capabilities and limitations. The literature captured the challenge and requirement for both NGOs and the US DoD to come to a comprehensive understanding of each other's intentions, capabilities and, the significantly differing views of combat, humanitarian assistance and disaster response. Assigning

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Eric C. Swartz, "The US Military and NGOs – Breaking Down the Barriers," Monograph, United States Army War College, 2007, 1-16.

²⁷ Ibid, 2.

²⁸ Ibid., 12.

US military officers to select, large and recognized NGO world headquarters will facilitate both their understandings and operational success. Their respective constituents deserve no less.

Empirical Examples

Due to the complexity, size and risk of strategic and operational crises in the recent past, the US military has frequently planned, synchronized and led the International Community's (IC's) efforts to stabilize, secure and transition crisis areas to indigenous governments' control. Military and NGO cooperation have been critical to these operations' success. During Operations Provide Comfort in Northern Iraq, Restore Hope in Somalia,²⁹ Joint Endeavor in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Joint Guardian in Kosovo, Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and Iraqi Freedom, military forces and NGOs understood their differences, accepted them and adjusted to each other's requirements and methods for their mutual success. Although in every case understanding and synchronization progressed, there was room for improvement.

Operation Provide Comfort, the 1991 operation to provide humanitarian relief to ethnic Kurds in Northern Iraq, was a turning point for military-NGO interagency cooperation in pursuit of a common goal.³⁰ Operation Provide Comfort began in April 1991 to aid Kurdish refugees fleeing into the mountains of eastern Turkey to escape reprisal by the Iraqi government in the

²⁹Chris Seiple, *The US Military / NGO Relationship in Humanitarian Interventions* (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Peacekeeping Institute Center for Strategic Leadership, 1996), 14.

³⁰Floresita C. Quarto, "US Military / NGO Interface: A Vital Link to Successful Humanitarian Intervention" (Master's thesis, United States Army War College, 2005), 7.

aftermath of the Persian Gulf War.³¹ In this case, US military forces were first to arrive in the crisis area due to their proximity to the isolated, mountainous regions of Northern Iraq and Southeastern Turkey.³² This massive undertaking caught HA organizations off-guard.³³ In May, US congressional representatives conducted a fact-finding mission to assess the crisis's scope and requirements. In his report to the US Congress House of Representatives' Foreign Affairs Committee, Representative Matthew F. McHugh stated, "There is no better institution in the world for this than the US military."³⁴ Representative McHugh summarized the nature of the crisis and supported his statement by outlining Operation Provide comfort as having four characteristics: it was a sudden and overwhelming emergency, no one else could do the job, there was a need to incorporate professional humanitarians and there was a common understanding of the nature of the problem.³⁵

Within 10 days of the military force's initial deployment, a DoS OFDA Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) became the focal point for humanitarian relief.³⁶ In May 1991 the overall humanitarian program was turned over to the UN and a US military CMOC was

³¹ David R. Hinson, "US Military Interaction with Humanitarian Assistance Organizations During Small-scale Contingencies" (Master's thesis, United States Air War College, 1998), 5.

³² Ibid, 6.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Seiple, 28.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Hinson, 6.

set up in Zakho, Iraq.³⁷ Overall, Operation Provide Comfort, the first large post-Cold War crisis which required military forces and 28 NGO organizations' coordination and synchronization, was a success. Challenges included NGOs "just appearing" after the crisis's second week, human rights inspectors attempting to inspect military forces' operations, and the perception NGO representatives freely and with coordination moved across the operational area in order to access the media and highlight what their respective organizations were doing in the present crisis.³⁸

In Operation Restore Hope, US Marines deployed to Somalia to establish an expeditionary infrastructure that would facilitate security and the delivery of food to Somalis starving as a result of a man-made food shortage.³⁹ Just before the Marines' deployment over the beaches of Somalia on December 9, 1992 and possibly as a result of the success of Operation Provide Comfort, an assemblage of NGOs made a direct plea to US President George W. Bush for international intervention in the crisis. When President Bush announced his intent for Operation Restore Hope to the world and his constituency, i.e. the citizens of the United States, he held up a letter signed by 11 US NGOs which urged him to support military intervention through the UN to end the chaos so people could be fed.⁴⁰

The military, UN and NGOs realized the value of coordination to facilitate humanitarian relief organizations' access, security and operations. During Operation Restore Hope, US Marine

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Seiple, 39.

³⁹ Ibid, 97.

⁴⁰ Natsios, 57.

forces established a CMOC just 48 hours after arriving in Mogadishu. UN civilian staff members organized a humanitarian operations center (HOC) and the Marines co-located their CMOC with the HOC.⁴¹ The HOC's mission was to coordinate between "official" entities (national governments and UN agencies) and the NGO community.⁴² Specifically, the HOC was designed to develop and oversee the humanitarian assistance strategy, coordinate relief agencies' logistics support, arrange US and coalition military support and monitor the delivery of humanitarian assistance assets through various NGO, UN agencies, and IOs.⁴³ The co-location of these two operations centers was more than serendipitous. Operational need and lack of pre-mission collaboration between the UN, NGOs and military forces required close tactical field coordination if Operation Restore Hope was to succeed.

Although Operation Restore Hope's humanitarian relief operational structure was significantly better than the UN and military structure of Operation Provide Comfort, the missions differed in the size of the military contingent as security and lines of communication improvement requirements were exponentially larger in Somalia. During Operation Provide Comfort, over 25,000 US military troops deployed to Somalia. Three-quarters of these forces were dedicated to logistics and the engineering complement alone was 7,000 strong.⁴⁴

⁴¹ Seiple, 99.

⁴² Davidson, 32.

⁴³ Ibid, 33.

⁴⁴ Seybolt, 114.

Between 1991 and 1993, during the course of Operation Restore Hope, security across Somalia decreased. By May of 1993, Mediciens Sans Frontieres' personnel across Somalia were required to depend upon extensive coordination with and protection by military forces for personal and operational security.⁴⁵ This close association with military forces in a highly political, lawless environment compelled MSF to withdraw from Somalia in the summer of 1993.

During the late 1990s, the US military and humanitarian relief NGOs found themselves working together with common interests and disparate methods. During Operation Joint Endeavor, NATO military forces deployed to Bosnia-Herzegovina (a former republic of the failed state of Yugoslavia) to separate populations and forces Bosnians of Serb, Croatian and Muslim (Bosniac) ethnicities. Over 400 large, small, international and indigenous NGOs operated throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina. As in Operations Provide Relief and Restore hope, military forces' and NGOs' initial planning and collaboration occurred upon meeting in the field. NATO deployed Civil Military Information Centers (CIMICs) across the country and attempted to co-locate as many as possible with UN HOCs.⁴⁶ Individual NATO nations' militaries also deployed their own CMOCs which did not consistently coordinate with other CMOCs or NATO CIMICs.⁴⁷ This was a coordination challenge for NGOs and military forces.

In the Serbian province of Kosovo and as occurred in Northern Iraq, Somalia and Bosnia, the amount of NGOs that deployed into the province increased exponentially after the arrival of

⁴⁵ Seiple, 124.

⁴⁶ Davidson, 41.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

US military forces. Before NATO action against Serbian Army forces in 1999, approximately 60 NGOs operated throughout the small province (Kosovo is approximately the size of Connecticut, third smallest of the US's 50 states). In 2001, there were an estimated 400 NGOs working and living in Kosovo.⁴⁸

NATO forces learned lessons from the CIMIC, CMOC confusion in Bosnia. NATO / Operation Joint Guardian force contributing countries established no unilateral CMOCs. That was the largest military – NGO coordination improvement during Operation Joint Guard. Again, as in the previously outlined operations, military and NGO leaders' initial planning and collaboration occurred in the field. NGOs raised concerns with regard to military forces' short deployment durations. Many NATO members' units deployed to Kosovo for as short a four months, rotating three separate units to the same area every 12 months.⁴⁹ CIMICs were led by the NATO nation responsible for their assigned sector of Kosovo and often CIMIC operations often reflected the national interest of the specific NATO country.⁵⁰ NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR) headquarters did not establish a provincial CIMIC. This resulted in uncoordinated activities within five military sectors of a small province.

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was a watershed moment in the history of US military – NGO coordination. During OIF, this critical relationship began acrimoniously. During OIF's

⁴⁸ Humanitarian Practice Network, "Coordination in Kosovo: The Challenge for the NGO Sector" <http://www.odihpn.org/report.asp?id=1039>, (accessed September 30, 2008).

⁴⁹ Thomas R. Mockaitis, *Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace Operations: The Case of Kosovo*, (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2004).

⁵⁰ *Ibid*, 27.

initial operations, money distribution for aid agencies and its oversight was shifted from the US DoS to the DoD. This issue divided the NGO community.⁵¹ Ultimately, those who accepted the new relationship were able to access Iraq and begin or continue humanitarian relief operations.

The US Department of Defense was also initially in charge of reconstruction in Iraq. This impinged upon the NGOs' perception of impartiality as it made them de facto US government policy actors.⁵² NSPD-44 officially designated the US government's stability and reconstruction lead to the US DoS.

From 2003 to 2008, security for NGO personnel and operations went from dangerous to manageable. As in any NGO operation, in Iraq, NGOs wanted to be autonomous and operate without US military security, whenever possible. In Iraq, that was not always possible. Many NGOs left Iraq because their workers were being kidnapped, threatened or killed. US military forces could not be everywhere to protect them. In places like Fallujah, Ramadi, Al Qa'im, Tikrit and Baghdad, NGOs and their contractors constantly face the possibility of death or kidnapping.⁵³ In 2004 several contractors were kidnapped from Fallujah and killed as an example of what would happen to anyone who helped Coalition Forces make life better for the Iraqi people.⁵⁴ Humanitarian "space" has improved in Iraq since 2004 and the largest security threat NGO field workers face is criminal.

⁵¹ Kenneth W. Scheidet, "NGOs in the Operational Theater: What Commanders Need to Understand and How to Work Together" (Master's thesis, United States Naval War College, 2005), 8.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Captain Matthew D. Campbell, "NGOs in CMO," *Field Artillery Journal* 98 (2007): 20.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

In Operation Enduring Freedom, NATO forces lead Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). This is due to the mission of the international military coalitions in Afghanistan, both OEF and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), more than any other international mission to date, having merged security with providing relief and construction / reconstruction.⁵⁵ These reconstruction teams have been formed with civilians possessing special skills and various types of NATO military members, some of which are plainly in uniform and others which are not.⁵⁶ The majority of 12 the teams have been doing humanitarian-style missions in mixed clothing.⁵⁷ NGOs contend this has blurred the local population's distinction between NGOs and the PRTs that operate in the same locales and all non-Afghans in civilian dress are being perceived as legitimate targets by Taliban holdouts.⁵⁸

Some NGOs correctly believe access to the Afghan population is directly linked to their security. NGOs respond to the current tenuous security situation in two ways. They either remain in the nation's capital, Kabul, or hire local nationals to conduct their field work. Or they see the presence of foreign militaries through PRTs as a pragmatic security umbrella that enables their work through providing means to evacuate staff or to use military machinery and helicopters to transport aid to inaccessible areas.⁵⁹

⁵⁵ Lara Olson, "Fighting for Humanitarian Space: NGOs in Afghanistan," *Canadian Journal of Military and Strategic Studies* 9 (2006): 4.

⁵⁶ Scheidt, 11.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Ibid, 12.

⁵⁹ Olson, 15.

In the past 17 years, in myriad, diverse environments that varied from permissive (Operations Provide Comfort, Joint Guardian) to highly complex and dangerous (Operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom), military – NGO planning and collaboration and NGO access and security have changed. Despite a lack of pre-operational planning, lack of coordination and occasionally divergent goals, military and NGO members have continually refined their procedures and matured their views of each other. Given the conditions in which they have converged and worked, their successes should not go unnoticed.

NGOs

“As I speak, just as surely as our diplomats and military, American NGOs are out there serving and sacrificing on the front lines of freedom . . . I am serious about making sure we have the best relationship with the NGOs who are such a force multiplier for us, such an important part of our combat team. We are all committed to the same, singular purpose to help every man and woman in the world who is in need, who is hungry, who is without hope, to help every one of them fill a belly, get a roof over their heads, educate their children, have hope.”⁶⁰

Colin L. Powell, Secretary, US State Department, 2000-2005 addressing the National Foreign Policy Conference for Leaders of Nongovernmental Organizations, 26 October 2001

What are NGOs? According to the US military JCS, NGOs are private, self-governing, not-for-profit organizations dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education,

⁶⁰ Nicolas de Torrente, “Humanitarian Action Under Attack: Reflections on the Iraq War,” *Harvard Human Rights Journal* 17, No. 4, 2004.

health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society.⁶¹ This definition is based on the US military's combat and peace support operations-based experiences primarily with humanitarian relief NGOs. Although this is a broad and largely accurate description, the JCS definition begs important questions.

At the beginning of the 21st century, NGOs seem to be everywhere and claim to be able to do most anything. But are they? Can they? How do humanitarian relief NGOs define themselves? Deeply engaged as world politics participants, NGOs argue they can do everything: from feeding famine victims to eliminating nuclear weapons and AIDs, NGOs should not be criticized for lack of effort.⁶² Are development NGOs self-governing, not-for-profit private volunteer organizations (PVOs)?⁶³ What types of humanitarian relief NGOs exist? Which are the largest? How do these NGOs interact with intergovernmental organizations (IGOs)? How are they resourced (funded, manned)? Are there humanitarian relief NGO networks? How do they interact with US military forces? Cogent, pithy answers to each of these questions are required before analyzing the utility of the US military assigning US military officers to NGOs' world headquarters.

Not all NGOs are created equal. For almost every topic, an NGO exists to address it. Interaction, the largest Western NGO coalition currently has 180-member, highly varied

⁶¹ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 3-08, GL-12.

⁶² William E. Demars, *NGOs and Transnational Networks* (Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press, 2005), 1.

⁶³ Perito, 101.

organizations (see Appendix). These disparate, sometimes specialized and small, often activist organizations are believed to touch over 250 million people.⁶⁴ Their funding sources, addressed later, fall largely into two categories: government / IGO sponsored or directly from private donors.

In the political realm, NGOs see themselves as functioning to help under-served or neglected populations, to expand the freedom of or to empower people, to engage in advocacy for social change, and to provide services.⁶⁵ NGOs endeavor to be transnational, permanent (not ad hoc), self-governing, non-profit and acting of their own volition.⁶⁶ These organizations facilitate their operational and transnational aspirations by becoming members of NGO coalitions. Although 'coalition' occurs infrequently in the titles of international NGO groupings, it seems to have more favor at the national and regional levels.⁶⁷ Development NGO coalitions use, seemingly interchangeably, a variety of titles: alliance, association, consortium, council, league, network and union. In this monograph, the term 'coalition' will represent any intentional grouping of two or more development NGOs.

NGO coalitions operate in conjunction with other international and national actors. These vary from IGOs such as the European Union (EU), the United Nations (UN) and the North

⁶⁴ Paula Hoy, *Players and Issues in International Aid* (West Hartford, Connecticut: Kumarian Press, 1998), 115.

⁶⁵ Leon Gordenker and Thomas G. Weiss, *NGOs, the UN & Global Governance* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997), 19.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 21.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 178.

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to private companies and national governments.⁶⁸ Their relationships are sometimes symbiotic. Article 71 of the UN Charter expressly states that IGO's such as the UN rely on symbiotic relationships with NGOs. Article 71 states: "The Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organizations which are concerned with matters within its competence. Such arrangements may be made with international organizations and, where appropriate, with national organizations after consultation with the Member of the United Nations concerned."⁶⁹ In the foreword to *NGOs, the UN & Global Governance*, then-UN Secretary General (UNSG) Boutros Boutros-Ghali stated:

"Nongovernmental organizations are a basic form of popular participation and representation in the present-day world....I am convinced that NGOs have an important role to play in the achievement of the ideal established by the Charter of the United Nations: the maintenance and establishment of peace...In order for every woman and every man in the world to perceive a true stake in the great ideals of the world organization, it is necessary to continue to build nongovernmental organizations and to understand their contribution to global governance."⁷⁰

Since the mid-1990s, NGOs humanitarian relief operations have been not on the periphery of conflict but have provided assistance in the midst of on-going and resurging violence.⁷¹ Big, Western NGOs make up the majority of the private sector humanitarian relief

⁶⁸ Colleen Walsh, "Panel Addresses Effectiveness of NGOs Gives Mixed Grades," Harvard University Gazette, <http://www.news.harvard.edu/gazette/2008/05.29/09-ngo.html> (accessed September 10, 2008).

⁶⁹ United Nations Charter, *Chapter X The Economic and Social Council*, United Nations Conference on International Organization, 1945.

⁷⁰ Gordenker and Weiss, 7-12.

⁷¹ W. Donald Macnamara and Luke A. Patey, "NGOs and International Conflict: An Annotated Bibliography," Monograph, Queen's Centre for International Relations, 2003, 1.

organizations with sufficient resources and stability to engage in long-term operations in such conditions. Some of the larger Western NGOs include ActionAid International, the American Red Cross (ARC), the Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE International), Catholic Relief Service (CRS), Medicins Sans Frontieres (MSF), OXFAM International and World Vision. Each of these organizations is a member of NGO coalition organizations InterAction and BOND International.⁷² Their field workers often experience hardships similar to those of the affected populations. Additionally, they confront security issues and claims of partiality.⁷³

NGO operations in the field are unique due to their close interaction with and living amongst local populations. Humanitarian relief NGOs provide medical care, distribute food and lead infrastructure construction projects.⁷⁴ Their challenges have been accountability, coordination, and as mentioned previously, security and neutrality.

With the explosion of NGO activity in the 1990s, accountability of NGOs' intentions, actions and results became difficult for six reasons: their rapid growth, the increased amount of donor funding they attracted, the stronger voice and increased power they had in shaping policy, a crisis of charitable organizations' legitimacy based on United States-based organizations scandals and because NGOs have been continuously challenging companies, governments and multilateral

⁷² InterAction.org, "Members," <http://www.interaction.org/members/> (accessed September 17, 2008).

⁷³ Perito, 117.

⁷⁴ Ibid, 107.

organizations to become more transparent and accountable.⁷⁵ Governments, the public i.e. the donors, the media, third-party actors and NGOs themselves pushed for increased accountability.⁷⁶ Some NGOs have proven more accountable to the demands of donors instead of the beneficiaries of aid.⁷⁷ The purchase of security services from and diversion of relief supplies to warring factions and assistance to only certain sides of conflicts are all acts where humanitarian relief NGO have been accused of exacerbating and prolonging conflict and the suffering of civilians.⁷⁸ Humanitarian relief NGO coordination is routinely planned and executed by government organizations (GOs) such as the US Department of State Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (DoS OFDA), and IGOs like the Office of Security Cooperation Europe (OSCE), the UN, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and World Food Program (WFP). The UN coordinates the majority of NGO operations.⁷⁹ This is the definition of humanitarian assistance coordination according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA):

“The systematic use of policy instruments to deliver humanitarian assistance in a cohesive and effective manner. Such instruments include strategic planning, gathering data and managing information, mobilizing resources and ensuring accountability, orchestrating a functional division of labor, negotiating and maintaining a serviceable framework with host political authorities and providing leadership.”⁸⁰

⁷⁵ Julian Lee, *Report: NGO Accountability: Rights and Responsibilities* (Geneva, Switzerland: Centre for Applied Studies in International Negotiations, 2004).

⁷⁶ Ibid, 5.

⁷⁷ Macnamara and Patey, 2.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Nicola Reindorp and Peter Wiles. *Commissioned Study: Humanitarian Coordination Lessons from Recent Field Experience*. (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2001).

⁸⁰ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Glossary UN Civil-Military Coordination Emergency Services Branch,”

With the variety of large and small NGOs in an operating area, GOs, IGOs and NGOs have struggled to meet the challenges associated with critical humanitarian relief operations. According to Peter Dombrowski and Andrew Harris, death is becoming a significant operational hazard for UN and NGO field workers.⁸¹ Protection of NGOs' field workers, normally host nation nationals, and operations are often reliant on local security infrastructures (if such organizations exist in what are usually failed states). Occasionally, NGOs will hire private security firms, such as Aegis Defence Services Limited, to facilitate the security of their personnel and field workers.⁸² Some NGOs hire local "security" forces to protect workers on the ground.⁸³ One unfortunate consequence of this solution has been that this practice can aide one side or another and lead to actions that "create the market" for security protection.⁸⁴ Several local "security" personnel have been found to be participants in ethnic cleansing or banditry.⁸⁵

NGO field operations are frequently dependent on military resources for security and logistics support. Field workers seen in the presence or under the protection of military forces may be viewed by warring parties as potential targets and interlocutors of the political intentions

<http://74.125.113.132/search?q=cache:7woeurTPN10J:ochaonline.un.org/OchaLinkClick.aspx%3Flink%3Docha%26docId%3D1094344+UN+OCHA+%22systematic+use+of+policy+instruments%22&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=1&gl=us> (accessed September 20, 2008).

⁸¹ Peter Dombrowski and Andrew Harris, "Military Collaboration with Humanitarian Organizations in Complex Emergencies," *Global Governance* 8, No. 2 (2002), 157.

⁸² Aegis World Limited, "Humanitarian Support Services," <http://www.aegisworld.com/index.php/security-operations/humanitarian-support-services> (accessed September 20, 2008).

⁸³ Dombrowski and Harris, 159.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Ibid, 160.

of these foreign forces.⁸⁶ In today's operational environment, NGOs field workers must coordinate with military forces to prevent accidental casualties by host nation or occupying military units. Coordination with military forces can prevent accidental injuries and deaths of NGO field workers as a result of military forces' operations.

NGO neutrality is often inextricably linked to NGO security. In 2004, Nicolas de Torrente proposed it may be the predominately Western nature of most aid organizations, as evidenced by their history, their headquarters' locations, their funding bases, and most of their international staff, is a uniting feature that makes them vulnerable to attack in contexts where there is radical opposition to Western military and political objectives.⁸⁷ According to the Sphere Project's Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response code of conduct, NGOs endeavor not to act as instruments of government foreign policy, i.e. when nongovernmental humanitarian assistance agencies provide aid; it is not a partisan or political act and should not be viewed as such.⁸⁸

NGOs are struggling with maintaining the perception of impartiality while effectively accomplishing their missions. To maintain the perception of impartiality, some NGOs do not wish to work with the UN's humanitarian assistance coordinating organizations. In 2006, Antonio Donini and Larry Minear claimed the subordination of humanitarian action to the po-

⁸⁶ Macnamara and Patey, 2.

⁸⁷ de Torrente, 24.

⁸⁸ Sphere Project, "Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response," Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response," http://www.sphereproject.org/component/option.com_docman/task.doc_view/gid.12/Itemid.26/lang.english/ (accessed September 17, 2008).

litical designs of the UN integrated missions in Afghanistan and Iraq (which in turn support governments with weak internal legitimacy) contributed to a climate in which attacking UN and workers—and by extension their NGO counterparts — was fair game in the eyes of insurgents.⁸⁹

With an outsized amount of funding coming from Western government donors with political agendas, NGOs will continue to be challenged with regards to the perception of their impartiality. Numerous large, US-based humanitarian relief NGOs receive the majority of their funding from donor governments such as the United States, through the DoS' United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the United Kingdom, through its Department for International Development (DFID) and IGOs like the World Bank.⁹⁰ As much as 90% of CARE and the ICRC funding emanates from donor governments.⁹¹ At best, receiving a majority of their funds from governments and IGOs is a challenge for NGOs' who endeavor not to act as instruments of government foreign policy or the perception thereof.

Since its inception, US international aid has been a vital foreign policy tool. The US's first and largest government-sponsored approach to foreign assistance was the Marshall Plan. The Marshall Plan's successor, the Marshall Security Administration, was as significant as its predecessor but also dissimilar. It was intended to counter real and imagined Communist expansion, and therefore provided primarily military aid and secondarily economic and food

⁸⁹ Antonio Donini and Larry Minear, *Humanitarian Agenda 2015: Principles, Power, and Perceptions Preliminary Report* (Philadelphia, PA: Feinstein International Center Tufts University, 2006).

⁹⁰ Gordenker and Weiss, 31

⁹¹ Ibid.

aid.⁹² By 1961, the United States' focus on foreign assistance priorities returned to economic and good aid. On November 6, 1961 the United States government passed the Foreign Assistance Act. This legislation established the US Peace Corps and USAID.⁹³

The Foreign Assistance Act's Chapter 9 codified US government international disaster assistance policy, funding authorizations, natural and manmade disaster assistance coordination and disaster relief assistance priorities.⁹⁴ The US DoS, the government's primary foreign policy planning and coordination organization, leads the United States' foreign assistance funding distribution and coordination as outlined in the Foreign Assistance Act. Large, US-based NGOs receive a majority of their funding through the USAID's Department of Foreign Disaster Assistance (DFDA), making them de facto executors of foreign policy.

Some of the largest, most visible humanitarian relief NGOs refuse to accept funds from government or government-sponsored donors. MSF USA, OXFAM USA and the United Methodist Committee on Relief receive all of their combined \$56,000,000 annual revenue exclusively from private donors.⁹⁵ They appeal directly to the public for support and utilize savvy, often criticized marketing techniques. Some humanitarian organizations believe taking funds from government donors leads to a strong reliance on the donor governments and puts them

⁹² Hoy, 17.

⁹³ United States Agency for International Development, "About USAID," http://www.usaid.gov/about_usaid/usaidhist.html (accessed September 21, 2008).

⁹⁴ Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Volume I-A of Volumes I-A and I-B Current Legislation and Related Executive Orders, 106th Cong., 2d sess., 2001, 180-188.

⁹⁵ Daniel Byman, *Strengthening the Partnership: Improving Military Coordination with Relief Agencies and Allies in Humanitarian Operations* (Arlington, Virginia: RAND Corporation, 2000).

at risk of losing their ability of deciding independently on how and where to run certain projects.⁹⁶ These organizations must communicate directly with private donors through electronic media or mail solicitation.⁹⁷ Their income and thus operational support capabilities increase significantly when they combine purchased advertisements with coverage of their work on international television channels and Internet news websites.⁹⁸

On the world stage, large Western humanitarian relief NGOs are primary actors. Since the 1990s, or during a time of increased political globalization, they have consistently demonstrated their unique capabilities to function across national lines in ways that involve human rights policies, disaster relief and long-term, education and health care.⁹⁹ Policy makers and their respective institutions see them as such. There has been a general trend at the international level toward greater openness of international institutions to NGOs in terms of points of access, opportunities to participate in policy-making and implementation processes, and collaborative efforts.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁶ Thorsten Volberg, "The Politicization of Humanitarian Aid and Its Effect on the Principles of Humanity, Impartiality and Neutrality," (master's thesis, Ruhr University, 2006), 39.

⁹⁷ Andrew S. Natsios, *Foreign Policy and the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse Humanitarian Relief in Complex Emergencies* (Westport, Connecticut: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1997), 62.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Jonathan Moore, *Hard Choices Moral Dilemmas in Humanitarian Intervention* (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1998), 51-52.

¹⁰⁰ Kim D. Reimann, "A View from the Top: International Politics, Norms and the Growth of NGOs," *International Studies Quarterly* 50, No. 3 (2006), 55.

Challenges for NGOs remain. To stay relevant and effective, NGOs and NGO coalitions will have to continuously address and improve their accountability, deployment, funding, perception of impartiality, legitimacy and operational coordination and security. Assigning US military officers to large, Western NGO world headquarters could support NGO relevance and effectiveness in deployment, access and security.

The US Government and NGO Support

“There can be hope only for a society which acts as one big family, not as many separate ones.”

Anwar al-Sadat, President, Arab Republic of Egypt, 1977

The US government is a monolithic organization which moves as any large bureaucracy does: slowly. The US National Security Act of 1947 created the National Security Council under the chairmanship of the President, with the Secretaries of State and Defense as its key members, to coordinate foreign policy and defense policy, and to reconcile diplomatic and military commitments and requirements.¹⁰¹ In other words, the NSC, by managing the US government’s interagency coordination and planning, provides strategic guidance to member organizations. The secretaries of the two US government departments (DoD and DoS) which are most involved with both implementing strategic guidance and NGO deployment, access and security, are

¹⁰¹ The White House, “History of the National Security Council 1947-1997,” <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/history.html> (accessed September 29, 2008).

permanent members of the President's organization (the NSC) designed to break down bureaucratic barriers and successfully plan and implement US national security objectives based on strategic guidance.

JP 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, defines interagency coordination and planning as “within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of Department of Defense, and engaged US government agencies for the purpose of achieving an objective.”¹⁰² As the largest US government department, the DoD recognizes the hurdles associated with interagency coordination. The US military believes the essence of successful interagency coordination is the effective integration of multiple agencies with their diverse perspectives and agendas.¹⁰³

To facilitate successful interagency coordination, US military joint force commanders often form joint interagency coordination groups (JIACGs). The JIACG's function is to establish regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between civilian and military operational planners.¹⁰⁴ Composed of US government civilian and military members and tailored to meet the requirements of a supported joint force commander (JFC), the JIACG provides the JFC with the capability to collaborate at the operational level with other US government civilian agencies and departments and complement the interagency coordination that

¹⁰² Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2001), 274.

¹⁰³ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-08, I-7.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid*, xii.

takes place at the strategic level through the NSC.¹⁰⁵ Although a military organization, JIACGs are led by US government civilian employees.¹⁰⁶ The US Agency for International Development's (USAID) Office of Military Assistance normally assigns personnel to JIACGs to facilitate coordination.

There is operational and planning coordination at many levels across the interagency. A weakness of the interagency process is the lack of a planning leader. The DoS is the US government's lead agency for international stability and reconstruction operations and is tasked to coordinate the entire US government's planning, coordination and execution efforts for these complex, politically and militarily sensitive operations. Michele Flournoy, a former US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threat Reduction, thinks this is a recipe for failure. In a recent *Armed Forces Journal* commentary, Ms. Flournoy claimed if history proves any guide, this arrangement is likely to founder given the reluctance of agencies to take direction from one another.¹⁰⁷ The NSC is the only entity positioned to play an effective, honest broker role for the President in integrating interagency planning.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center Joint Doctrine Series Pamphlet 6 (USJFCOMPAM-6) Doctrinal Implications of the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2004).

¹⁰⁷ Michele Flournoy, *Armed Forces Journal Online*, "In Search of Harmony Orchestrating The Interagency for the Long War," <http://www.afji.com/2006/07/1857934> (accessed September 28, 2008).

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

Strategic Guidance

Senior US government strategic policy leaders know that to successfully implement strategic guidance, there are political and military advantages to increased coordination with humanitarian relief NGOs. The US DoD and DoS have relied and will likely increase their reliance upon NGOs as policy implementation partners. Humanitarian relief NGOs realize there is political impact inherent in their operations. Most NGO field operations personnel will incidentally or purposely associate with military personnel. Aid is valuable and therefore has a political and economic impact in conflict zones.¹⁰⁹ Skeptics of humanitarian intervention argue aid's political and economic impacts prolong wars. They contend outsiders use humanitarian aid as an excuse for not taking political action to stop conflicts and aid helps conflicts' weaker parties (the 'victims') just enough so they are not defeated.¹¹⁰ The skeptics are correct that humanitarian aid has been used as an excuse not to take strong action, notably in Bosnia, Rwanda and Sudan. Helping conflicts' weaker parties can also allow for a stalemate and an opportunity for diplomatic solutions.

In 2004, on account of interagency humanitarian relief operations lessons learned in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, the US National Security Council drafted a Presidential directive intended to "coordinate and strengthen efforts of the US government to prepare, plan for, and

¹⁰⁹ Taylor Seybolt, *Humanitarian Military Intervention* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2007), 279.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid*, 278.

conduct reconstruction and stabilization assistance and related activities in a range of situations that require the response capabilities of multiple US government entities and to harmonize such efforts with US military plans and operations.”¹¹¹ The draft directive proposed assigning the US Secretary of State to coordinate and lead integrated United States government efforts, to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities and coordinate such with the US Secretary of Defense to ensure synchronization with any planned or ongoing US military operations across the spectrum of conflict.¹¹²

In December 2005, as a result of the NSC’s interagency coordination and policy development, then-US President George W. Bush signed National Presidential Security Directive (NSPD) 44, Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization. Responsibility for coordination does not mean the DoS necessarily has all the capabilities required to perform stabilization and reconstruction operations. Many believe, in accordance with this directive, that the DoD is responsible for reconstruction efforts associated with combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.¹¹³

In March 2006, then-President Bush submitted his National Security Strategy (NSS) to the US Congress. In section two, “Champion Aspirations for Human Dignity,” the President stated the US government will “form creative partnerships with nongovernmental organizations” and “lead the effort to reform existing institutions and create new ones – including forging new

¹¹¹ Cantwell, 55.

¹¹² Ibid, 57.

¹¹³ Ibid, 58.

partnerships between governmental and nongovernmental actors.”¹¹⁴ The President’s strategy and intent were understood by and reverberated through all levels of the US government’s organizations and agencies. Two years later, in June 2008, US National Security Advisor Stephen J. Hadley stated:

“We are strengthening our partnerships with non-governmental organizations. NGOs are some of the most dynamic and energetic partners we have, and they are helping build free institutions in Iraq, Kosovo and around the world. Our challenge is to ease the culture shock that many NGOs and security forces experience when they must work closely together. The US military recognizes the strategic value added by partners who are not in uniform, and is getting used to working with NGOs that chart an independent course to achieve common objectives. In turn, we must find a way and more ways for NGOs to be able to accept the security support offered by the military, without feeling they are compromising their independence.”¹¹⁵

In accordance with the US President’s directives and guidance, the US DoD has increased its emphasis on leveraging NGOs’ capabilities to support strategic objectives. In 2008, US Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates approved and released the 2008 National Defense Strategy (NDS). The NDS directs the development and priorities of US military budgets, programs and deliberate plans. NDS 2008 outlines how DoD would support President Bush’s National Security Strategy objectives, emphasized increased coordination, planning and cooperation with interagency organizations and “partners and allies, and international and multilateral organizations to achieve our objectives...and it is only possible when every

¹¹⁴ The White House, “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2006.pdf> (accessed September 24, 2008).

¹¹⁵ The White House, “Remarks by United States National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley at Lunch in Honor of the United States Institute for Peace,” <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/06/20080605-10.html> (accessed September 28, 2008).

government department and agency understands the core competencies, roles, missions, and capabilities of its partners and works together to achieve common goals.”¹¹⁶

Based on the results of US government and coalition operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the US DoD directed stability, support, transition and reconstruction operations as core US military missions. DoD Directive Number 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSSTR) Operations, codified DoD stability operations policy. It defined the intent of US military stability operations as most humanitarian relief NGOs define their goals. With regard to stability operations, DoDD 3000.05 stated these operations’ immediate goal is often to provide the local populace with security, restore essential services and meet humanitarian needs.¹¹⁷ The long-term goal is to help develop indigenous capacity for securing essential services, a viable market economy, rule of law, democratic institutions and a robust civil society.

US Military Doctrine and Policy

The US military, based on Commander in Chief guidance and operational experiences, values NGO cooperation and support. US military doctrine reflects this. United States military

¹¹⁶ Department of Defense, “National Defense Strategy,” <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/2008%20National%20Defense%20Strategy.pdf> (accessed September 24, 2008).

¹¹⁷ Department of Defense, “National Military Strategy 2004,” <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/d20050318nms.pdf>, (accessed September 25, 2008).

doctrine, known as joint doctrine, derived from DoDDs such as 3000.05, is authoritative and directly influences the respective US military services' (Air Force, Army, Marine Corps and Navy) doctrine. The US military's capstone joint publication, Joint Publication 1-0, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, provides the fundamental principles and overarching guidance for the employment of US military forces. According to this publication, national strategic direction, ex: the President's NSS and Guidance for the Employment of Forces (GEF), the Secretary of Defense's NDS, and the Chairman of the US military's Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) NMS, lead to unified action.¹¹⁸ Unified action synchronizes, coordinates, and / or integrates joint, single-service, and multinational operations with the operations of other US government agencies, NGOs, IGOs and the private sector to achieve unity of effort.¹¹⁹

As a result of GEF and NMS directives and guidance, the US military JS develops programming, budget and planning guidance for the entire US military and the respective geographic combatant commanders. The Joint Staff develops and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) approves planning guidance in the form of joint strategic capabilities plans (JSCP) which directs US military geographic combatant commanders, ex: US Africa Command, US Central Command, US European Command, US Pacific Command and US Southern Command, to develop theater campaign plans, security cooperation plans and contingency plans. The geographic combatant commanders' security cooperation and contingency plans consist of

¹¹⁸ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication 1-0, xii.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

operations such as consequence management (CM), which require extensive interagency planning and coordination with organizations such as DoS, IGOs and NGOs.

JP 1-0 directs US military combatant commanders to coordinate, integrate, and / or de-conflict operations within and to / from their operational areas with the activities of other US government agencies, IGOs and NGOs.¹²⁰ The US military has codified its understanding of NGOs' merit as well as their security and access requirements. Although NGOs are staffed with fewer members and often dissimilar ideologies and methodologies, US military commanders value the part these potent organizations play in support of unity of effort.

The keys to US military strategic and operational unified action are synchronization, coordination and integration. Military planning is the art and science that synchronizes, coordinates and integrates all activities that military forces must accomplish to plan for anticipated (deliberate planning) and unanticipated operations (crisis action planning). US military Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, repeatedly addresses the importance of appreciating NGOs' capabilities, requirements (such as access and security), and communicating with them early in the planning process.¹²¹ According to JP 5-0, US military commanders can leverage NGOs to assist in accomplishing military missions and broader national strategic objectives.¹²²

¹²⁰ Ibid, xxi.

¹²¹ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), xii.

¹²² Ibid.

The US military plans to conduct large operations in six sequential phases: shape, deter, seize initiative, dominate, stabilize and enable civil authorities. During the 1990s, US military coordination and interaction with NGO operations occurred primarily during the ‘stabilize’ and ‘enable civil authorities’ phases. JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, initially mentions coordination with other government agencies (OGAs), i.e. IGOs and NGOs assist in setting conditions for execution of subsequent phases of the campaign.¹²³ In the ‘stabilize’ phase, military forces may have to integrate OGA, IGO and NGO mission participants until legitimate local entities are functioning.¹²⁴ While enabling civilian authorities, US military commanders, in a supporting role, will coordinate supporting multinational, OGA, IGO, and NGO participants, influencing the attitude of the population favorably regarding the US’ and local civil authorities’ objectives.¹²⁵

Although there are six operational phases in planning, commanders in US military Operations Enduring (Afghanistan) and Iraqi Freedom (OEF, OIF) conduct simultaneous offensive, defensive and stability operations in their areas of operation. The US military has repeatedly operated with NGOs during offensive, defensive and stability operations, then reviewed its operations and adjusted its doctrine. JP 3-0 directs commanders integrate and synchronize stability operations with other operations (offense and defense) within each campaign phase and to conduct these operations in coordination with and in support of host

¹²³ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication 3-0, IV-28.

¹²⁴ Ibid, IV-29.

¹²⁵ Ibid, IV-30.

nation (HN) authorities, OGAs, IGOs and / or NGOs and the private sector.¹²⁶ In 2006, the CJCS published the first edition of JP 3-08, *Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations Volumes I and II* and in 2008 published JP 3-57, *Civil Military Operations*.

JP 3-08 supports direct coordination between the US military and NGOs without contradicting NSPD 44 and is sensitive to the differences between US military organizations and NGOs. JP 3-08 make clear some IGOs and NGOs may have policies that are explicitly antithetical to those of the USG, and particularly the US military and coordination between US forces should not be equated to the command and control of a military operation.¹²⁷ The publication directs that when formed, the Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) will be where deployed US military forces coordinate any support to NGOs.¹²⁸

This joint publication repeatedly emphasizes the value of personal relationships between US military and coalition militaries organizations, IGOs and NGOs. During their 2004 Asian tsunami response operation, US Pacific Command (USPACOM) learned the impact of the lack of established relationships with military forces and NGOs. PACOM's Combined Support Force-56 (CSF-56) synchronized the relief efforts of 14 nations and worked around the clock to orchestrate the delivery of food, water, medicine, shelter and other lifesaving supplies.¹²⁹ Unfortunately, US

¹²⁶ Ibid, V-1.

¹²⁷ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-08, viii.

¹²⁸ Ibid, I-4.

¹²⁹ Swartz, 3.

military and NGOs came together without an understanding of each other's common operating procedures. NGOs were unfamiliar with the military support structure and were often inflexible with regard to bureaucratic demands of the military's support request process.¹³⁰ This is in direct contradiction of JP 3-08.

JP 3-57, *Civil Military Operations*, outlines what leads to effective civil-military operations (CMO). To establish unity of effort, successful CMO requires extensive liaison and coordination between extensive liaison and coordination between US, multinational, and indigenous security forces and engaged OGAs as well as NGOs, IGOs or the private sector.¹³¹ As a result of reviewing CSF-56's operations, Swartz agreed with JP 3-57 and recommended two ways to improve simultaneous military and NGO operations: integrating NGOs into the planning and execution of US military exercises and establishing a pre-exercise workshop for the purposes of sharing relief efforts and building relationships between military forces and civilian relief organizations.¹³²

As a result of its Balkan, Afghanistan and Iraq experiences, US military forces at the tactical level now plan for civil-military operations and establish organizations to coordinate and de-conflict military, IGO and NGO operations. Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan) Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are cogent examples of the value of military, IGO and NGO de-confliction. For example:

¹³⁰ Ibid, 4.

¹³¹ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-57, *Civil-Military Operations* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2008), I-4.

¹³² Swartz, 13.

“By early 2006, 22 provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) were operating in Afghanistan, 13 managed by the US-led Combined Forces Command, Afghanistan (CFC-A) and nine by the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF). Initial guidance on the structure and functions of US-led PRTs was agreed to by senior civilian and military leadership in Afghanistan and approved by the US Deputies Committee in June 2003. US PRTs comprised 50,100 personnel. A small number were US civilians, generally a DoS representative, a United States Agency for International Development (USAID) representative, and a representative from United States Department of Agriculture (DoA). PRTs were expected to address the most important issues in its area of responsibility, and many did so with remarkable creativity and success. In Gardez, the USAID representative supported the work of the Tribal Liaison Office, an Afghan NGO dedicated to enabling dialogue between powerful tribes in unstable areas, and the new central government. Building on this work, the Gardez PRT and the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) sponsored a provincial reconstruction workshop that brought together 100 tribal elders, local government officials, and representatives from Kabul to discuss national reconstruction plans.”¹³³

If a commander determines it is will be sufficient and necessary for mission success, joint forces, i.e. US military commands with two or more services as standing members, establish a joint civil-military operations task force (JCMOTF). The JCMOTF’s core is a civil-military operations center (CMOC). The CMOC receives, validates and coordinates requests for support from NGOs, IGOs, the private sector and regional organizations.¹³⁴ Some NGOs assign liaisons to the US military force commander and place them in CMOCs. Although many NGOs are careful to maintain the perception of impartiality, CMOCs appeal to NGOs because they avoid guesswork by providing these organizations a single-point of coordination with the military for

¹³³ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-57, II-30.

¹³⁴ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-57, xviii.

their needs, ensuring that the unified efforts of military forces' and the relief community are focused when and where they are most needed.¹³⁵

Within CMOCs, commanders often establish civil-military information management (CIM) sections. The CIM can allow military forces, NGOS, IGOs, private sector and regional organizations to reduce the potential for duplication of effort.¹³⁶ A CIM may also improve these forces' and organizations' leaders an ability to understand and evaluate the complex social, cultural and civil infrastructure dimensions of their place within an operational area.¹³⁷

The US Army's CMO doctrine addresses NGO security in high risk, austere operational areas. During planning phases, US Army civil affairs forces support commanders by developing restricted target lists' (RTLs) civilian supplements.¹³⁸ These lists include cultural landmarks, humanitarian assets (for example, hospitals, schools, and IGO and NGO offices), critical infrastructure (for example, water supply systems) and museums.¹³⁹

US military doctrine does not directly address supporting NGO access to crisis areas. JP 3-08 states there is a clear requirement for continuous integrated interagency, IGO, and NGO planning and training in order to synchronize all components of a US response to a crisis.¹⁴⁰

¹³⁵ Ibid, II-28.

¹³⁶ Perito, 286.

¹³⁷ Ibid, 287.

¹³⁸ Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-05.40, *Civil Affairs Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), 1-10.

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-08, III-26.

Although military forces often deploy to a crisis or operational area after many IGOs and NGOs are already present and active in humanitarian relief processes, there have been recent, significant exceptions where military forces arrived first and controlled access to affected populations.¹⁴¹ As described in the monograph's empirical examples, during operations to protect Kurds in Northern Iraq, offensive combat operations throughout Iraq in 2000, during the Asian tsunami crisis in 2004 and during hurricane season in 2008, IGOs and NGOs relied upon military forces to provide access and transportation to host nation populations.

US Military Personnel Assignments

US government agencies support interagency coordination and synchronization to bridge cultural divides. Former President George H.W. Bush saw the value of bridging these interagency divides. In NSPD-44, the President mandated all executive departments and agencies designate senior US government officials to participate in appropriate international reconstruction and stabilization task forces, planning and gaming drills, relevant training sessions and after action reviews (AARs).¹⁴² In a departure from past practice, the NSPD also requires other US government departments provide personnel to DoS, on a non-reimbursable basis, to support reconstruction and stabilization tasks as well as for personnel exchange programs to increase

¹⁴¹ Lisa Witzig Davidson, *Humanitarian and Peace Operations: NGOs and the Military in the Interagency Process* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1996), 24.

¹⁴² Terence J. Hildner, "Interagency Reform: Changing Organizational Culture Through Education and Assignment" (Master's thesis, United States Army War College), 2007, 13.

interoperability.¹⁴³ This NSPD is the only directive requiring US government organizations to assign personnel to another US government organization.

To broaden strategic thinking and develop future leaders, the US DoD routinely assigns officers to sister services', interagency members and, as directed by NSPD-44, US Department of State strategic and operational headquarters around the world. Within the US DoD, the Army has led this effort. In 2006, then-US Army Chief of Staff (CSA) General Peter Schoomaker established an internal task force to review army assignments, including increasing interagency assignments and training policies. His goal was to develop Army "pentathlete" leaders with four key skills: the ability to think strategically and creatively, build leaders and teams, be effective in managing, leading and changing large organizations, and be skilled in governance, statesmanship and diplomacy.¹⁴⁴ In 2007, Army units began training with interagency partners in combat training centers (CTCs) before deploying to OEF or OIF.¹⁴⁵

Although USAID has attempted to improve interagency coordination by assigning a member of their Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) team to the US military's Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), some say US government organizations, beside the DoD, can do significantly more. Sunil Desai, in a recent Hoover Institution article, declared interagency assignment policies and programs similar to the US DoD's would produce good

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ United States Army, "Posture Statement 2006," <http://www.army.mil/aps/06/> (accessed September 29, 2008).

¹⁴⁵ United States Army, "Posture Statement 2007," <http://www.army.mil/aps/07/> (accessed September 29, 2008).

results for the interagency community.¹⁴⁶ Additionally, Mr. Desai proposed personnel from all US government agencies should be required to receive training in interagency coordination.¹⁴⁷ Colonel Terence Hildner wrote NSPD-44 was an admirable initiative that fell short of the target.¹⁴⁸ It showcased the DoS's organic capabilities but did not correlate to teaching the interagency how to employ those national security tools synergistically.¹⁴⁹

Analysis

The politically complex, geographically distant and physically dangerous locations in which military forces and NGOs deploy to and operate in are as numerous as they are varied. As detailed earlier in this monograph, military forces' and NGOs' perceptions of each other differ, especially in the field. Most humanitarian relief organizations' workers, when asked what kind of relationship they have with the military (namely peacekeeping and occupation forces), many would respond "we don't and we won't." At a tactical level, due to the requirements for the perception of impartiality, the access to operational areas most NGOs have had and the expectations of their constituencies (donors), this is an understandable response. Deployed

¹⁴⁶ Sunil Desai, "Solving the Interagency Puzzle," The Hoover Institution <http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3431461.html> (accessed September 28, 2008).

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ Hildner, 18.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

military forces do not see themselves as primarily focused on humanitarian assistance. Their constituency expects them to fight and win their nations' wars.¹⁵⁰

Supporting Views

Military senior leaders and NGO presidents and private corporations' CEOs view each other's organizations more pragmatically. Military and NGO strategic leaders understand the importance of coordinating with each at the highest levels and the frequency in which they will have to do so in future operations. In the US Army's Strategic Vision 2010, the US Army CSA justified the increasing significance of land forces in stability and reconstruction operations, stating, "Most future operations will occur on the lower and middle portions of the continuum of military operations ranging from disaster relief to global war, where land forces provide unique and essential capabilities, the most options, and the most useful tools. They call for soldiers on the ground, directly interfacing with the civilians and / or military involved in the crisis."¹⁵¹

NGOs utilized US military-supported access and security to participate in recent, large scale operations such as the USCENTCOM-led OEF and OIF, and the USPACOM-led 2004 Asian tsunami disaster relief operations. During the 2008 USSOUTHCOM-led Caribbean and Eastern Pacific hurricane disaster relief mission, Operation Continuing Promise, NGOs deployed

¹⁵⁰ United States Army. "United States Army Vision 2010 The Geostrategic Environment and Its Implication for Land Forces" http://www.army.mil/2010/geostrategic_environment.htm, (accessed October 1, 2008).

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

directly with US military forces on the US Navy ship USS Kearsarge. On August 12, 2008, military and NGO personnel deployed via boats and helicopters (access) to remote coastal communities in western Nicaragua.¹⁵² Brazilian, Canadian, Dutch, German and US forces provided medical personnel, supplies and security.¹⁵³

From the Commander in Chief to the respective US military services, formal directives, strategic planning documents, joint and service-specific doctrine and manuals persistently reflect the impact on mission success of rapport establishment, relationship building and operational collaboration with NGOs to achieve unity of effort and mission success. The US military coordinates access and security for NGOs to conduct their operations. Assigning US military officers, such as medical service officers or multifunctional logisticians, to NGO world headquarters, could establish long-term working relationships with military and NGO future leaders and facilitate unity of both action and effort.

NGOs, whose lifeblood runs from their constituents' pockets, are publicly proclaiming their appreciation for the access and security collaboration with US military forces provide. Project Health Opportunities for People Everywhere (HOPE), a US-based health care NGO, deployed volunteers in support of the 2004 Asian tsunami relief and 2008 Operation Continuing Promise aboard US Navy vessels. In September 2008, Project HOPE held a reception with US senators, the US Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and Project HOPE's board of directors

¹⁵² David Axe, "Soft Power for Hard Problems," *Washington Times*, September 7, 2008.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*

celebrating their longstanding partnership with the US Navy.¹⁵⁴ In 2007, the US-based dental care NGO, Operation Smile, deployed aboard the US Naval Ship (USNS) Comfort (access, security) to multiple Latin American countries and in 2008 Operation Smile volunteers deployed aboard the USS Kearsarge in USSOUTHCOM's Operation Continuing Promise.¹⁵⁵ On their public Internet site, Operation Smile placed multiple news releases detailing their past and current collaborative successes.¹⁵⁶

USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance has begun assigning staff members to US geographic combatant commands. Currently, only USSOUTHCOM has an assigned OFDA representative (in USSOUTHCOM's Whole Government Initiatives' directorate). Mr. Erik Leklem, Chief of USSOUTHCOM's Whole Government Initiatives directorate, the office which hosts USAID's OFDA liaison officers to USSOUTHCOM, has considered requesting NGOs assign personnel directly to his office to facilitate NGO access and security during operations such as Continuing Promise.¹⁵⁷ Mr. Leklem proposed assigning multiple military officers to the US Department of Defense or US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) headquarters with duty at large NGOs' world headquarters.¹⁵⁸ According to Mr. Leklem, these officers could familiarize

¹⁵⁴ Project HOPE, "Project HOPE Celebrates Its Partnership with US Navy and 50 Years of Care" <http://www.projecthope.org/newsupdate/currentnews/view.asp?id=100273>, accessed October 1, 2008.

¹⁵⁵ Operation Smile, "Operation Smile Joins USS Kearsarge for Continuing Promise 2008 to Bring Smiles to Children in Nicaragua and Columbia" <http://www.operationssmile.org/news/news/#236>, accessed October 1, 2008.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

¹⁵⁷ Erik J. Leklem, interview by author, Miami, FL, September 22, 2008.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

NGO members with the military culture and capabilities and potentially coordinate NGO access and security requirements directly with US military geographic combatant commands.

Opposing Views

Not all senior military members, strategic leaders or NGOs believe in the long-term value of assigning military officers to NGO headquarters or support close working relationships between them. Some strategic leaders opine the US's leadership structure in current humanitarian relief-heavy operations should be led by corroborative diplomatic and military organizations. Mr. Jock Covey, the Bechtel Group's Senior Vice President for Corporate Affairs and a former NSC Middle East Expert, Deputy US High Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina and, from 1999 through 2001, Assistant to the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) Special Representative of the UN Secretary General (SRSG), Dr. Bernard Kouchner, is a strategic leader who supports the US utilizing a corroborative diplomatic and military leadership organizational structure. In a recent interview, Mr. Covey stated:

“In the last eight years, the US and DoD have acquired a go-it-alone policy. The military makes the peace, resolves the issues and operationally manage the affair. There should be a clear division of labor with the military accepting the task of establishing a permissive, post-conflict environment. These operations must have political leadership that does not tell the military what to do. The political leader expresses to his military counterpart what he requires. If the military thinks it has to do it all, then it has to take control. In a humanitarian operation, it is not effective for the military to be directive. Instead of embedding a US military officer in an NGO's headquarters, I would recommend embedding an NGO in the military organization (due to their competency and focus on compassion).”¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁹ Covey.

US Army Colonel Christopher Robertson, chief of the US Army personnel command's Officer Personnel Management System Task Force (OPMS TF), does not believe assigning military officers to NGO world headquarters would be beneficial to either party. Colonel Robertson believes this assignment would ruin NGOs' appearance of impartiality and possibly disrupt the affect military officer's potential for advancement as senior military officers' promotion potential is higher if officers have recently commanded units, preferably in Operations Enduring or Iraqi Freedom.¹⁶⁰ US military services would likely not assign higher quality officers to NGO headquarters nor would these officers seek such assignments. Colonel Robertson proposed three alternatives that could improve senior military and NGO leader collaboration and potentially improve NGO access to and security in operational areas: an annual US DoD-organized and led seminar for NGOs designed to build understanding between the organizations; military familiarization briefings by military senior service college students to NGO world headquarters; and military familiarization visits by newly-promoted brigadier generals and rear admirals during their initial tour of combatant commands (Capstone course).¹⁶¹

US Army Colonel Guy T. Cosentino, Special Assistant to US Defense Secretary Robert Gates and who was formerly assigned to a one-year fellowship with the US government-funded United States Institute for Peace (USIP) , sees little value in assigning military officers to NGO world headquarters for a standard three-year assignment. Colonel Cosentino, whose previous

¹⁶⁰ Colonel Christopher Robertson, interview by author, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, August 22, 2008.

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

military unit worked with NGOs while deployed to Iraq, believes it is extremely likely there would be few NGOs who would be willing take personnel from any government organization, let alone the DoD for three years, but a one-year tour “would add valuable insights for both parties.”¹⁶²

Interaction is the largest NGO consortium of US-based international NGOs focused on humanitarian relief. According to Linda Poteat, Director, InterAction’s Disaster Response Branch Humanitarian Policy and Practice Division, none of InterAction’s 180 member NGOs would accept US military officers in their world headquarters.¹⁶³ Most US-based NGOs understand the access and security military forces can provide before and during field operations, but view the assignment of a military officer to their headquarters as a reputational risk.¹⁶⁴ Humanitarian relief NGOs wish to maintain as liberal and unhindered access to their constituents as possible (donors and affected populations). If an image or video of an NGO senior leader working with a military officer in the NGO’s world headquarters was posted on the Internet, anti-Western or totalitarian governments could use these images to restrict NGO access to their countries or populations. For many NGOs, the near-term risks of the assignment of a military officer outweigh the potential benefits.

Conclusion

¹⁶² Colonel Guy T. Cosentino, interview by author, Washington, DC, August 10, 2008.

¹⁶³ Linda Poteat, interview by author, Washington, DC, October 2, 2008.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

Humanitarian relief agencies and US military forces are important allies. They are similar in their abilities to react quickly and flexibly to politically and ethnically complex crises. Daniel Byman's pre-OEF and OIF RAND study of military – NGO cooperation was correct in its assessment. The US military should ensure that its key personnel are familiar with organizations relevant to relief operations and NGOs should become more familiar with the military's organization and capabilities.¹⁶⁵ Military – NGO engagement could speed response and increase efficiency during all phases of a crisis, especially during the initial phase when delays might cost lives.¹⁶⁶ Assigning US military officers to NGO world headquarters would efficiently reduce Mr. Byman's five recommended actions to improve military – NGO engagement from five to one.¹⁶⁷

Even though there will always be large differences between the US military and NGOs, there is a greater need for cooperation. Because complex emergencies cannot be handled by either of them alone, they both bring essential competencies which, when used together, can have tremendous impact on the efficiency and effectiveness of the operation. Military organizations can provide security and logistical support whereas NGO's may have had an early presence in the area and thus have contacts, credibility, and critical knowledge. The issue is not if cooperation is right. The issue is what level and amount of cooperation is right.

¹⁶⁵ Byman, 142.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ Byman, 144. Mr. Byman's study recommends military organizations take the lead in military - NGO cooperation by appointing a humanitarian advisor, routinely briefing NGOs on military capabilities, integrating civil affairs capabilities into non-crisis operations, sponsoring conferences and seminars and sponsoring partnerships with the Center of Excellence.

With their focus on the perception of their impartiality, few if any NGOs will entertain hosting US military officers in the field. Assigning US military officers, dressed in suitable civilian attire, to NGO world headquarters is the appropriate level to establish working relationships (build networks of contacts), rapport, familiarity with military culture and capabilities and coordinate initial access to and security in operational areas. It would allow both military organizations and NGOs to collaboratively develop plans which take into account and balance comparative strengths.

Assigning US DoD officers to NGO world headquarters would require organizational culture change. Highly experienced, successful military officers would not request assignments to NGO headquarters regardless of the value to current and future missions. US military officer promotion and potential remains biased toward officers who commanded units in OEF and OIF. The promotion system does not value the sacrifices and significant mission impact of US military officers who train foreign military forces such as the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Iraqi Security Force (ISF). It is challenging for the current US Defense Secretary to change his organization's overall promotion culture. In a speech to the US National Defense University (NDU) on September 29, 2008, Secretary Gates said, "One of the enduring issues our military struggles with is whether personnel and promotions systems designed to reward command of American troops will be able to reflect the importance of advising, training, and equipping foreign troops – which is still not considered a career enhancing path for our best and brightest

officers.”¹⁶⁸ If DoD’s promotion system will not change to reward officers who are, in unorthodox but critical ways, exacerbating military mission success and improve the conditions which will speed up our forces’ mission completion, it will not soon recognize officers who successfully enhanced military and NGO collaboration and planning.

Due to the differences in institutional cultures and often based on field experiences, NGOs are suspicious of military methods and agendas. Combined with the potential perception of partiality and facilitating political agendas, NGO members do not view the military as viable mission partners at the strategic level. If large NGOs accept assignment of US military officers to their headquarters, even for one-year tours, the US military and NGOs will benefit. NGOs will be able to participate in pre-operations planning, exercises, and coordinate for transportation and security support if desired and necessary for their deployment. This will also improve understanding of military culture for NGO members and NGO culture and methodologies for the US military. The potential impacts are positive. In future crises or conflicts, senior NGO leaders will have established relationships with senior officers likely participating in the planning or execution in locations of mutual interest. It will also allow NGOs to improve operational planning and synchronization before sending volunteers and aid workers into dangerous, austere, often violently contested areas.

¹⁶⁸ Department of Defense, “Speech at the National Defense University as Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates Washington, DC Monday, September 29, 2008” <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1279>, accessed October 2, 2008.

The benefits to assigning officers to NGO world headquarters are almost identical for the US DoD. It will improve pre-operations coordination and planning with NGOs. Military forces can train with NGOs in mission rehearsal exercises (MREs), increasing the potential for mission success. The DoD will be more familiar with NGO senior leadership, culture, sensitivities and methodologies will improve NGO – military communication and cooperation both strategically and tactically.

Military mission success and humanitarian relief are not mutually exclusive. Inextricably linked military forces and NGOs can only achieve their aims through a process of superior coordination borne of mutual respect and understanding involving both cultures. Assigning senior US military to NGOs' world headquarters officers may be the first step.

Areas for Further Study

As stated earlier, the National Command Authority has repeatedly tasked the US Department of Defense (DoD) as the lead US government organization in pre-conflict, conflict and post-conflict planning and execution. The US DoD currently provides the majority of US government humanitarian relief funding to the DoS for distribution via the DoS's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance and USAID.¹⁶⁹ Should the US government establish co-military and political leadership in post-conflict settings as it did in Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo?

In the United Kingdom (UK), the Department for International Development (DFID) is a cabinet-level organization led by a governmental minister. It manages the UK's humanitarian

¹⁶⁹ Poteat.

relief aid planning and distribution in support of impoverished populations in 64 countries. The DoS and USAID manage just over half of the US government's foreign assistance budget.

Would a separate, cabinet-level organization that develops and refines the mission and objectives for the entire set of US foreign assistance programs and oversees the foreign assistance budget be valuable to US interests?

The US military and NGOs may not agree to the assignment of military officers to NGO world headquarters. The US military and NGOs both work with IGOs such as the UN. The UN coordinates with NGOs at the strategic level and often synchronizes multiple NGOs' operations at the tactical level. If no NGOs accept assignment of military officers, should the US military and UN consider assigning military officers to the UN's six humanitarian system organizations (UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF, the FAO, WHO and UNDP)?

If assigning US military officers to NGO world headquarters is unfeasible, what are satisfactory options? Assigning recently-retired military officers working for the US DoD? Hiring private security companies (PSCs) to facilitate NGO access, security and logistic support to and in the field? Conducting annual DoD – NGO familiarization conferences or workshops?

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APPENDIX

Sample of Interaction's Member NGOs by Type¹⁷⁰

Agriculture

Africare

Aga Kahn Foundation USA

Bread for the World

Brother's Brother Foundation

Episcopal Relief and Development

Latter-Day Saint Charities

World Cocoa Foundation

Capacity Strengthening

Christian Blind Mission USA

Florida Association of Volunteer Action in the Caribbean and Americas

International Coalition Housing

World Housing

Complex Humanitarian Emergencies

AmeriCares

Information Management and Mine Action Programs

US Association for UNHCR

¹⁷⁰ Interaction.org, "Members," <http://www.interaction.org/members/>, accessed March 12, 2009.

World Emergency Relief

Cultural Preservation

Christian Children's Fund

Development Education

ActionAid International USA

CONCERN Worldwide US Inc.

Life for Relief and Development

Mental Disability Rights International

Disaster and Emergency Relief

CARE

Food for the Hungry

Mercy Corps

OXFAM USA

Physicians for Human Rights

Save the Children

The Trickle Up Program

World Emergency Relief

World Vision

Food Security

Institute for Sustainable Communities

World Concern

Gender and Diversity

ProLiteracy Worldwide

Women for Women International

World Neighbors

HIV / AIDS

Doctors for the World Inc.

International Center for Research on Women

Project Hope

Relief International

US Methodist Committee on Relief

Microfinance / Microenterprise

Christian Blind Mission USA

International Housing Coalition

Mercy Corps

Nutrition

B'nai B'rith International

Concern Worldwide US Inc.

Counterpart International Inc.

International Medical Corps

Minnesota International Health Volunteers

Population and Family Planning

American Refugee Committee

Freedom from Hunger

International Institute of Rural Reconstruction

Pathfinder International

Plan USA

Poverty

Giving Children Hope

National Wildlife Federation

ONE Campaign

World Resource Institute

Refugees and Displacement

Ethiopian Community Development Council

Heartland Alliance

Hebrew Immigrant Society

Solar Cookers International

World Learning

Rural Development

Bread for the World

Counterpart International Inc.

Floresta USA Inc.

Institute for Sustainable Communities

Mercy-USA for Aid and Development Inc.

Society for International Development

Winrock International

Social Development

American Near East Refugees Aid

Amigos de las Americas

INMED Partnership for Children

International Orthodox Christian Charities

International Relief and Development