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Executive Summary

Title: Supra-means Warfare

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Thesis: To best prepare itself for future conflict, the United States should incorporate supra-means warfare into a new American way of war.

Discussion: America's infatuation with conventional warfare has displayed the limitations of conventional means in conflicts of both the past and present. Recognition of this fact reveals the need for the nation to redraw its boundaries with regard to warfare, in order to make America more dangerous to its future enemies. One way of achieving this change is to expand the array of warfare tools available to the nation. A greater selection of means or an arsenal of "supra-means" will make the nation more diverse and thus, more dangerous to its enemies. The employment of supra-means warfare incorporates the use of a wide array of warfare means, to include several which lie outside the conventional paradigm of modern warfare. The concept of supra-means encourages war-fighters to explore how the nation's relative dominance in the fields of science, technology, industry, and finance may be used to influence or affect adversary entities, outside of the military sphere. Supra-means warfare is an inclusive concept of warfare that includes both conventional and alternative means of warfare. Alternative or supra-type methods of warfare include means such as smuggling warfare, financial warfare, ecological warfare, and resource warfare. Use of these types of means, in a comprehensive supra-means methodology of warfare, is better than the present American concept of warfare for three basic reasons. First, the current American concept is tied to the old nation-state paradigm, which is no longer adequate in describing the modern security environment. Second, supra-means warfare enhances the nation's capacity to prosecute war against non-state entities. Finally, supra-means warfare provides the USG with greater flexibility and diversity of options in the prosecution of war. However, for supra-means warfare to work, there are a number of areas in which the U. S. must sharpen or create supporting skill sets. Specifically, the USG needs to focus initially on adapting intelligence activities to support supra-means and it must create an interagency management system to employ effectively the full gamut of supra-means available to it.

Conclusion: The nation struggles to adapt to the evolving security environment due to its adherence to conventional thinking on warfare. The nation must quickly learn that passive adaptation to a changing environment is a likely path to disaster. It must overcome the friction to change, in pushing the nation toward better preparation for future conflicts. The development of a supra-means warfare strategy can take America along that path. The nation's leaders must seriously consider abandoning the old doctrines of security in pursuit of a new paradigm for warfare. A promising candidate for this new paradigm is supra-means warfare.

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Preface

This paper is my attempt to emphasize the limitations of the American concept of warfare. Its restricted approach to war impedes the innovative or “out of the box thinking” that is necessary to keep pace with the evolving security environment. The emergence of new threats to America has highlighted this weakness in the past decade and the U. S. has historically proven to be its own worst enemy in this regard. Vietnam, Somalia, and Iraq are all examples of conflict where the mighty hammer of the U. S. military was unable to achieve the nation’s political goals. It may be unfair to assume a more diverse or different approach to these conflicts would have been more successful, but success through other means was unlikely given the mindset of the American leadership throughout these periods. It is time to break the conventional paradigm of American war, in order to preserve the nation’s status as the only, and possibly last, super-power of the world.

I would like to thank Dr. Bradley J. Meyer for his mentoring and guidance in the research and writing of this paper. I would also like to thank Dr. Gordon W. Rudd, Dr. Wray R. Johnson, Lieutenant Colonel Christopher I. Woodbridge, USMC, and Lieutenant Colonel James Vohr, USMC, for shaping me into a critical thinker and better writer. Finally, I owe a great deal of gratitude to my wife, Crystal, and my daughters, Nina and Rachael, whose patience and support enabled me to complete this project while balancing the demands of other commitments in my life.

Introduction

During the Revolutionary War, British General Frederick Haldimand stated, “The Americans would be less dangerous if they had a regular army.”¹ At the time, the General was speaking in the context of partisan warfare, but his statement clearly communicates a valuable learning point with regard to the use of restricted means in warfare. The lesson from this quote is that an adversary who confines himself to a narrow array of means is much less dangerous than one whose methods are unbound. In light of this assertion, America today may be proving Haldimand’s point. The nation’s infatuation with conventional warfare has displayed the limitations of conventional means in both past and present conflicts. Recognition of this fact reveals the need for America to redraw its boundaries with regard to warfare, in order to make the nation more dangerous to its future enemies.

One way of redrawing the restrictive box that defines American warfare is to expand the array of warfare tools that the nation uses to prosecute war. A greater selection of warfare means will make the nation more diverse and thus, more dangerous to its enemies. As well, this arsenal of “supra-means” will provide the nation with the flexibility to address the ever-increasing assortment of power players in the evolving security environment.² **Hence, to best prepare itself for future conflict, the United States should incorporate supra-means warfare into a new American way of war.**

Defining Supra-means warfare.

Supra-means warfare, as defined by the author, is the use of a wide array of warfare means, to include several which lie outside the conventional paradigm of modern warfare. Supra-means thinking, with regard to American warfare, explores how to exploit the nation’s relative dominance in the fields of science, technology, industry, and finance in order to influence or

affect adversary entities. Differently stated, the term supra highlights the emphasis on using means of warfare outside the normal confines of conventional thinking. Application of America's technological and economic strengths can be leveraged to directly target an enemy's economy, industrial base, or psyche without the use of military force. Going beyond the normal limits of conventional thinking is the essence of the supra-means philosophy.

The author has borrowed the idea of supra-means from the work *Unrestricted Warfare*. The author's perspective is similar to that found in the book, which emphasizes thinking outside of the box with regard to methods of warfare.³ The primary meaning of this concept is to transcend existing ideologies or paradigms in finding new and innovative ways to leverage resources and power in war. Beyond this, the author's concept of supra-means diverges from that of the PLA colonels who authored *Unrestricted Warfare*. Specifically, the author advocates a more measured approach in "exceeding limits" in the application of supra-means with regard to legal and moral limitations. Supra in the context of this work applies primarily to transcending the mental hurdles that impede innovative and imaginative thinking on the application of power in war and not, necessarily, the breaking of the rules that govern it.

The transcendent nature of supra-means warfare requires a holistic approach to warfare. Similar to the designing of any effective warfare strategy, supra-means warfare requires the understanding of three elements: self, the environment and circumstances, and the threat.⁴ A systemic or holistic approach is the best means to achieve this understanding. This holistic education process informs supra-means thinking in identifying and shaping alternative methods that are useful and appropriate for the user. The traditional Western approach to warfare fails to explore how a nation's strengths and capabilities can contribute to warfare directly, because it generally fixates on improving the efficiency and efficacy of military force application. Supra-

means looks to exploit these resources or capabilities in developing methods of warfare that enable the nation to attack its adversaries with greater means than just military force. It encourages the discovery of innovative ways to leverage the nation's relative superiority in such areas as technology, finance, and industry to bring war to an adversary from an angle where they are unprepared or unable to defend. This type of innovation and discovery requires a holistic thought process that sees warfare beyond the scope of military on military engagement.

Supra-means warfare is an inclusive concept of warfare that includes both conventional and alternative means of warfare. For this discussion, conventional means of warfare include military force, economic sanctions, and diplomatic actions - those means normally associated with America's view of warfare. Alternative or supra-type methods of warfare include means such as smuggling warfare, financial warfare, ecological warfare, and resource warfare. These methods of warfare normally focus on attacking an adversary's will to fight, but they may also be effective in destroying the capacity to resist as well. Smuggling warfare, for example, can directly break an adversary's will by disrupting their economy, causing them to sue for peace well before achieving the destruction of their capacity to support resistance financially. When combined with conventional means, alternative warfare tools become a supra-means arsenal that can address a diverse array of threats. (Appendix 1 provides some examples of supra-means.)

In order to create and employ a supra-means arsenal as part of a new American way of war it is necessary to first understand the what, why, and how of this basic concept. Those hoping to employ these alternative tools must understand what type of supra-means may work for the United States. Then, an analysis of the pros and cons of these alternative methods will reveal why supra-means warfare will be more effective than the current paradigm in addressing future security threats. Finally, practitioners of war must develop an understanding of how to

make supra-means work, in developing the tools necessary to facilitate and coordinate its use.

The author will address these three questions in promoting the use of supra-means in future war.

American Supra-means.

As part of a new American way of war, the U. S. needs to develop an arsenal of alternative warfare means that will allow it to address present enemies and adapt to the evolving security environment. The United States may already possess capabilities that resemble those described as methods of alternative warfare, however; the reshaping of capabilities already present and the creation of other needed means is necessary to support a true supra-means capacity. The author believes that the U. S. government (USG) should focus on three specific warfare means in the early development of this new way of war - smuggling warfare, financial warfare, and media warfare. Several other methods should complement these supra-means, but there is other work that must be done, outside of means development, that is critical to making supra-means warfare work. The author will address these issues later in this paper, after a short discussion on the aforementioned supra-means.

The first such capability the United States should refine and expand is Financial Warfare. Not to be confused with economic warfare, financial warfare is used within international financial systems that deal with money, credit, and trust. Alternatively, economic warfare aims to manipulate the hard and soft outputs of an economic system. It employs trade sanctions, embargoes, and blockades that create “carpet bombing effects” in a nation’s economy.⁵ Financial warfare, on the other hand, is much more timely and accurate in its effects. It facilitates precision strikes on targeted organizations with little or no collateral damage to the economy.

The application of this method of warfare is useful for two reasons. First, it allows the U. S. to strike at nation-state and corporate supporters of terrorism with means that are much

more politically acceptable than force. Second, it provides the nation with a viable method to attack non-state organizations that may be difficult to target with other means. Although network-centric organizations are difficult to locate geographically, they often must interact with financial systems to support their operations, therefore they are vulnerable to financial attack.

There are several advantages to this means of warfare. In the context of politics, financial warfare is more politically acceptable than military force or economic warfare because of its inherent ability to limit collateral damage. As well, the range of measures available allow for its use in an escalation framework that is tailorable to circumstance, both political and otherwise. The flexibility to escalate and adapt financial warfare measures allows the government to pursue effects ranging from international notoriety to financial collapse, and it provides a tool that can target both non-state and nation-state entities.

A financial warfare method that has demonstrated great efficacy is divestment. Divestment is a means of attacking an enemy's finances through the investment organizations with which it conducts business. Exposing a company's dealings with disreputable partners can incite morally conscious investors to pressure a company to cut its ties with unsavory clientele. A successful example of divestment is the Apartheid model of the 1980's. Several investors, to include colleges and public pension funds, made the decision to divest the stocks of companies that had financial relationships with the business partners of the racist regime in South Africa.⁶ The divestment strategy of these morally conscious groups brought the regime to its knees, as it subverted the support it was receiving from its financial partners. Public activism, in the form of divestment, played a significant role in ending Apartheid, demonstrating the efficacy of it as a tool of supra-means warfare.

The USG can employ divestment in a number of ways. First, it can enact legislation to prohibit participation in investing activities with financial institutions that have proven connections to criminals and terrorists. Although legislative action is the preferred method of enacting divestment as a form of war, the legislative process is onerous and time consuming, often requiring the use of other methods to achieve the same effects. Second, it can encourage public activism through awareness, similar to the example of the Apartheid model. This method requires a strong sense of public consciousness and must overcome the inertia of financial institutions that are reluctant to sever ties with actors who operate in perceived gray areas. Third, they can take a more indirect approach of identifying such investments as high risk, preying on the fear of investors. This last method is accomplished with global security risk assessments.

A global security risk assessment is an alternative strategy to pursue divestment through investor fear. In simple terms, the Security Exchange Commission's (SEC) office of Global Security Risk identifies companies that do business with sponsors of terrorism.⁷ This assessment is conducted to identify investments that may suffer catastrophic financial repercussions if a tragic event occurs and its perpetrators are linked to the parent investment company. Global security risk assessments serve to protect the American financial system from such events. They also provide the added benefit of subverting support to notorious organizations by classifying investments associated with them as high risk.

The United States should also expand its arsenal of warfare means to include other subversive tools such as smuggling warfare. Smuggling warfare is a means of "sabotaging a rival country's economy by flooding its market with illegal goods."⁸ This method of warfare can have a severe impact on an economy and for this reason, some may view it as an unlimited

form of warfare. However, the author contends that the USG can use smuggling warfare to achieve limited objectives in lieu of more damaging means, such as military force.

At first glance, smuggling warfare appears to be an irresponsible and draconian form of warfare. A thorough evaluation of its merits, however, reveals its benefits over other means. Smuggling warfare can provide an intermediate means of warfare between economic sanctions and military intervention. It offers a way to reduce an enemy's will and capacity to resist, short of physical violence. As well, when used in conjunction with overt measures, such as economic sanctions, it can achieve results that otherwise would require large-scale military intervention.

Morally, smuggling warfare can be justified as more humane than the employment of violence. Military conflict often results in the physical destruction of infrastructure that has severe, long-term effects on an economy. Smuggling warfare, on the other hand, does not bring about the destruction of infrastructure that may hinder a state's ability to recover economically. Thus, it is a means to inflict a high level of pain that is much easier to recover from than military intervention. Alternatively, it may also assist in bringing high-level military conflicts to quicker endings through its use in a multi-pronged warfare strategy.

In the present era of warfare, information warfare is an integral part of any warfare strategy; supra-means warfare is no exception. The author will not venture to tackle the full spectrum of information operations that are presently under consideration for use by the USG. Instead, the discussion that follows will focus on media warfare, an element of information warfare that has received little fanfare.

Media warfare, like information warfare, is a tool that is used to win the contest of messages. It can provide a means of countering an adversary's message through subversion of public trust in its media. Alternatively, it can facilitate the spreading of a message via the

infiltration of the target nation's media. Media warfare takes the war of words directly to the battlefield of the enemy's media. As briefly alluded to, this is possible through several methods.

Human infiltration and bribery are ways of employing media warfare in the fight for popular support. These tools are not solely restricted to use on journalists, they are also useful for influencing information sources, media distributors, and other personnel tangentially connected to the media. Bribery can be very effective in encouraging people to support positions on topics that they might otherwise remain silent on. As well, money can also buy support for the dissemination of fabricated stories that are intended to subvert public confidence in an enemy's public or private media.

Alternatively, infiltration is useful in directly planting themes and messages. It is also effective when more subtly applied to influence or tilt the balance in favor of a certain message. Similarly, infiltrated operatives can subvert the efficacy of enemy propaganda from within, through both direct and indirect methods. Infiltration is also useful for intelligence collection. Information provided by sources of this nature can inform counter-message preparation and dissemination. Additionally, intelligence gathered can provide valuable insight into what are the most effective methods for both delivering messages and assessing their effects on the targeted audiences.

Airwave dominance is another tool at the disposal of the U. S. for media warfare. The nation's technological superiority in this realm enables it to deny or dominate the use of airwaves for media transmission. Although, the current availability of assets for this is limited, the USG possesses the "know-how" and ability to mobilize efforts to develop a robust capability in this field. Airwave dominance is useful for spreading an attacker's message or for subverting an enemy's public support by mimicking their broadcast with bad information. It is not realistic to

expect to dominate the airwaves in their entirety, but selective use of this tool can effectively support other forms of media warfare to help win the battle of messages.

Several other alternative warfare tools may be necessary to realize a true supra-means warfare capability for the United States. The USG must create or refine the tools and technical skills necessary to conduct financial, smuggling, and other types of warfare necessary for the nation's future needs. The scope of this paper cannot address the great variety of means that the nation has to choose from because few are outside the reach of the nation's capabilities and resources. America's greatest limitation to discovering new weapons of war is a lack of imagination; the same paucity of imagination that precludes comprehension of why this method of warfare is better than the present American concept.

Better than the current concept of warfare.

The author proposes three reasons why supra-means warfare is better than the present American concept of warfare in preparation for future conflict. The current American concept of warfare is tied to the old nation-state paradigm, which has dominated the international security environment through the end of the 20th century. This system is no longer adequate in describing the modern security environment, rendering the concept of warfare associated with it obsolete. Second, the alternative tools of supra-means warfare enable the United States to prosecute war against entities that fall outside of the Westphalian nation-state template. Finally, supra-means warfare provides the USG with greater flexibility and diversity of options in the prosecution of war. A more detailed discussion of these three reasons follows in the next few pages.

The evolution of the international security environment has created a new paradigm, which is not compatible with the security measures of the last century. If America wants to continue to be a superpower in the future it must recognize this phenomenon and embrace the

idea that the “winners are not necessarily the best, but those who are most compatible with the existing order.”⁹ Failure to do so probably will not result in the catastrophic destruction of American democracy, but it will ultimately lead to what Robert D. Kaplan describes as “America’s Elegant Decline.”¹⁰ Or, what could be described as the slow but progressive erosion of America’s power, due to complacency and a lack of vision, which prevents the nation from adapting its concept of warfare to the changing environment.

The new paradigm of the international security environment redefines the international power players in the evolving world order. This new international order includes nation-states, both those that are relevant and irrelevant, and non-state organizations. Within this system, power, not state-hood, is the defining characteristic of key players.¹¹ Non-state entities such as Islamofascists, crime syndicates, and private businesses now wield more power than many nation-states.¹² The entry of these power players into the security environment has shattered the basic principles that governed the nation-state paradigm: (1) state sovereignty, (2) the principle of nonintervention, and (3) the separation of religion and politics.¹³ The nullification of these principles requires a radical adjustment to the mindsets of political leaders in their approach to national security interests. The unique desires, fears, and power bases of non-state organizations have changed the dynamics of foreign affairs, with regard to the use of diplomacy and coercion.

The alternative tools of supra-means warfare give the USG means to target non-state organizations outside the sphere of military force. Although non-state threats appear nearly invulnerable to attack within the current paradigm of American warfare, they have significant vulnerabilities that are exploitable. Non-state organizations operate within existing networks and therefore, they are vulnerable to disruptions and attacks on those networks. Although networks are difficult to destroy because of their nodal structure, supra-means warfare provides methods of

creating friction in networks that can cause their collapse, reduce their efficiency, or make them vulnerable to physical destruction. Financial, media, and other supra-means can provide this type of friction by targeting the financial and political support bases of non-state organizations. Because of their dependence on this support, these operators must address the disruptions, exposing themselves or other vulnerabilities in their networks to further attack.

An increased capability to strike out at non-state organizations can serve as a useful deterrent. Presently, America's deterrence means are largely limited to military force and economic sanctions. Neither of these means are universally applicable deterrents in the modern security environment, particularly for non-state organizations that will likely present a greater threat to U. S. security interests in the future. The threat of retaliatory measures, which can reach both state and non-state organizations, will allow America to use a robust program of carrot and stick diplomacy to deter potential threats to its security. Supra-means warfare offers a large and diverse variety of warfare means to provide this deterrent effect.

The nation must develop an array of innovative warfare means that provide it with both flexibility and diversity to counter emerging threats to its security. In light of the changing security environment, it seems apparent that military dominance alone will not suffice to protect the nation's interests in the future. As well, present and past conflicts have proven that military force is no panacea, despite the overwhelming superiority of America's military forces. The use of supra-means can resolve this problem and their incorporation into America's arsenal will give it much needed diversity in the conduct of war.

The diversity of a supra-means arsenal provides a two-fold benefit to the United States. First, it makes the U. S. a much more difficult adversary to fight against because of its multidimensional nature. The use of supra-means enables the USG to strike at its adversaries

from “dimensions that they do not perceive.”¹⁴ An increased variety and number of means available would make America a less predictable and hence, a more dangerous foe to its enemies. As well, victory against a more diverse array of actors in future war will likely require a greater variety and combination of means than historically used against past enemies.

The second benefit is the flexibility supra-means provides in the shaping of warfare strategies to address the specific circumstances of a conflict. The availability of more means provides decision makers with an array of options which may enable the reconciliation of means and ends that was not possible without a supra-means arsenal. This quality is not only significant for finding the most effective means to defeat an adversary but it is also useful in addressing the political concerns that are woven into any war. Political restraints often preclude or prohibit the use of some means of warfare; therefore, the flexibility to work around these obstacles is essential to ensuring political victory as the ultimate goal. A broader array of means can facilitate the achievement of political victory, through war, by allowing a nation to use means that are in consonance with its political aspirations. Failure to do so can result in political repercussions that may prevent an administration from converting a war victory into a political victory.¹⁵

Intelligence support and interagency management.

For supra-means warfare to work, there are a number of areas in which the U. S. must sharpen or create supporting skill sets. Specifically, the USG needs to focus initially on adapting intelligence activities to support supra-means and it must create an interagency management system to employ effectively the full gamut of supra-means available to it.

The United States needs to expand and adapt its capabilities in the intelligence field with regard to supra-means warfare. The author’s intent is to address two broad areas that are necessary for employment of these alternative warfare tools. These two areas are: (1) intelligence

estimates on enemy capabilities outside of the military sphere, particularly for non-state entities and (2) effects assessment capabilities for supra-means.

Any security strategy aimed at influencing or defeating an adversary requires accurate intelligence that reveals their strengths and weaknesses. The USG must expand its ability to develop an intelligence picture of our nation-state adversaries outside of the military domain. As well, it must also create the capability to build a complete picture on non-state organizations. The emergence of a greater number of non-state players in the future is very likely and the intelligence community must continue to evolve to meet this need. Intelligence of this type is a prerequisite for the application of supra-means. The USG must fully understand where its enemies are most vulnerable in order to make the most effective and efficient use of supra-means. This basic concept is no different from conventional warfare; however, the task initially will be much more difficult because present expertise focus on the military domain of war. This transition will be a painful growth process, but it is necessary for both future war and supra-means warfare.

In execution of a war campaign, it is necessary to conduct assessments on performance and effectiveness in order to evaluate the accuracy of initial assumptions and for adaptation to the evolutionary nature of a conflict.¹⁶ As well, in-stride assessments can help assist leaders in determining if their campaigns are on track for success or failure. Historically, the United States has demonstrated shortcomings in its assessments capabilities, specifically with regard to measuring the effectiveness of its actions on its enemies. Supra-means warfare, more so than military force, will require an effective assessment capability because of its focus on resolve rather than the capability to fight. At present the nation's capabilities are much better suited to evaluating the success of an air campaign as opposed to determining the native consumer

confidence in a foreign market. The USG needs to improve its capabilities in both realms, with greater work necessary in the non-military sphere.

Once a supporting intelligence base is in place, the U. S. must develop the capability to combine its entire array of supra-means into a coordinated warfare strategy. This coordination will require an organization capable of integrating the work of government organizations, private businesses, international partners, and transnational actors. This task may look like a tall order in light of America's record on interagency cooperation. Nonetheless, it is a necessity for an effective supra-means warfare strategy and the reality of this capability is not far off.

The efforts of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) have shown remarkable progress in integrating the efforts of historically uncooperative organizations. Specifically, the creation of the Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group (CRSG) for Iraq shows promise that government agency coordination is possible with the use of interagency control groups. Significant hurdles to progress still exist, but the groundbreaking work of the S/CRS provides a useful model for future organizations.

The S/CRS, a standing Policy Coordination Committee (PCC), and regionally oriented CRSGs provide the best templates upon which to build an interagency coordination capability. The administration should restructure the Defense Strategy, Force Structure Policy, and Planning PCC to serve as the lead agency for supra-means warfare design and development.¹⁷ During peacetime, this organization would employ a Security Threat Reduction Group (STRG) planning cell to develop and integrate a regional supra-means warfare strategy to pursue national policy and address security threats. During war, this planning cell would serve as the foundation for the creation of a regional Security Threat Reduction Group. This interagency control group would replace the ad hoc mechanisms, such as war czars, that are necessary for unifying the efforts of

the USG for war. The STRG would be elevated to the level of a NSC Deputies or Principal's Committee with an Assistant to the President appointed as the senior member. This senior member would report directly to the President and would have tasking authority to issue directives to government agencies. In this manner, the integration of government agency efforts is achievable. The leadership, integration, and coordination provided by an organization like the STRG can orchestrate a unified effort in leveraging the entire strength of the nation against its adversaries. (Appendices 2 and 3 provide a possible structure for a supra-means warfare interagency management system)

Conclusion

History has several lessons to offer on the dangers of restricted thinking with regard to warfare. Despite this fact, the nation still struggles to adapt to the evolving security environment due to its adherence to conventional thinking on warfare. However, there are indicators that change is occurring with America's slow adaptation to the current threat environment. This transition must gain greater momentum. The nation must quickly learn that adapting passively to a changing environment is a likely path to disaster.¹⁸ It must overcome the friction to change, in pushing the nation toward better preparation for future conflicts. The development of a supra-means warfare strategy can take America along that path. In pursuit of strategic reform to preserve the nation's status as a superpower, its leaders may need to pause and consider remaking their policies on warfare. That is, America must seriously consider abandoning the old doctrines of security in pursuit of a new paradigm for warfare. A promising candidate for this new paradigm is supra-means warfare.

Appendix 1: Supra-means¹⁹

- Financial Warfare is the targeting of a country's financial systems through the subversion of the banking system and stock markets and the manipulation of the state's currency.
- Ecological Warfare is the weakening of a rival nation by altering its natural environment.
- Psychological Warfare is the imposing on one's interests by influencing a rival nation's perception of its strengths and weaknesses.
- Smuggling Warfare is the sabotaging of a state's economy through the introduction of black market goods into its formal and/or informal economies.
- Media Warfare is the manipulation of foreign media, either through intimidation/bribery of journalist or the buying of airtime, to impose one's own perspectives on a targeted nation.
- Drug Warfare is the introduction of illicit drugs into a state with the intent of breaking the fabric of society with their use.
- Cyberspace Warfare is the domination of subversion of transnational information systems to restrict and control the flow of information to a nation or state.
- Technological Warfare gaining of control of and denying to others advance technologies that can be used in both peace and wartime.
- Resource Warfare is the control of scarce resources and the manipulation of their availability and market value.
- Economic Aid Warfare is the controlling of a targeted country through aid dependency.
- Cultural Warfare is the influencing of cultural biases by imposing you own cultural views.
- International Law Warfare is the joining of international or multinational organizations in order to subvert their policies and the interpretation of legal rulings.

Appendix 2: Supra-means interagency management - peacetime²⁰

Appendix in attached power point file

Appendix 3: Supra-means interagency management - wartime

Appendix in attached power point file

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Notes

1. Russell F. Weigley, *The American Way of War* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1973), 18.
2. The term is borrowed from the book *Unrestricted Warfare*. In this work, supra-means thinking is described as a paradigm busting method of discovering “new concepts of weapons,” by exploring ways of using anything integral to daily life as tool to harm or create turmoil. Colonel Qiao Liang, PLA and Colonel Wang Xiangsui, PLA, *Unrestricted Warfare: China’s Master Plan to Destroy America* (Panama City, Panama: Pan American Publishing Company, 2002), 21.
3. Liang and Xiangsui, 155.
4. Lieutenant Colonel Bill Flynt, USA, “Threat Kingdom,” *Military Review*, Vol. 80, July-August 2000, 13.
5. Paul Bracken, “Financial Warfare,” *Foreign Policy Research Institute*. September 2007, <<http://www.fpri.org/enotes/200709.bracken.financialwarfare.html>> (4 November 2007).
6. Frank J. Gaffney, and colleagues, *War Footing: 10 Steps America Must Take to Prevail in the War for the Free World* (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2006), 68.
7. Gaffney, 66.
8. Liang and Xiangsui, xii.
9. Jamshid Gharajedaghi, *Systems Thinking: Managing Chaos and Complexity* (Boston, MA: Butterworth Heineman, 1999), 33.
10. Kaplan attributes this mindset to “democracy and supremacy [that] undermine the tragic sense required for long range planning.” Vigilance is necessary to combat this complacency in order to keep pace with the changing world order and secure America’s future as a superpower. Robert D. Kaplan, “America’s Elegant Decline.” *The Atlantic*, November 2007, 104.
11. Dr. Karl P. Magyar, *Global Security Concerns: Anticipating the Twenty-First Century* (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, 1996), 89.
12. The term Islamofascists is meant to represent Islamic fundamentalists with agendas to overthrow incumbent governments with Islamic caliphate-type totalitarian regimes.
13. Bryan Hehir, “The Use of Force in the Post-Cold War World,” *Clausewitz Homepage*, 3 June 1996, <<http://www.clausewitz.com/CWZHOME/hehir.htm>> (4 November 2007).
14. Montgomery C. Meigs, *Slide Rules and Submarines* (Washington, D. C.: National Defense University Press, 1990), 214.
15. The India-Pakistan War of 1971 is a good example of a campaign with well aligned political and war objectives. Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and her military chiefs planned and executed a limited war against Pakistan in which their limited objectives and warfare strategy allowed them to convert military victory into political success. The Indian administration chose to fight differently on their east and west borders to achieve the ultimate goal of securing East Pakistan’s independence. In fighting a “lightning war” of conquest in the East, they quickly achieved the military defeat of Pakistani forces of the West Pakistan dominated government. While on the western front, they fought a defensive battle, quite different from their previous two wars with Pakistan in which they attempted to seize disputed territory along their border. Through their quick victory in the East and their hold the line strategy in the

West, they were able to make a strong case to the United Nations and international community for the liberation of East Pakistan. Their quick victory in the East was necessary to prevent foreign intervention into the conflict. The Indian's hold the line stance in the West allowed them to present their case in the international forum as a liberator of an oppressed people and not as a nation seeking to expand its borders. The political savvy of the Indian PM and her well-designed campaign allowed her to convert military victory into a political victory. In such matters of limited war, choosing the right objectives and means are necessary for political success. The array of means provided with supra-means warfare supplies leaders with many more options to choose from in selecting means that can give them the best chance of facilitating the victory conversion.

16. Presently the U. S. military refers to these as measures of performance and measures of effectiveness. Performance assessments measure how well the plan and tasks are being executed. Effectiveness assessments help measure if the right things are being done to achieve the intended effects or results that are desired. These necessary tools help a commander adjust his plan in conjunction with his continual development of the situation. These assessments can help the commander both learn about the nature of the conflict and how it is evolving throughout the course of the campaign.

17. The author recommends executive branch action to facilitate this change in the short term, but legislative action is preferable. Binding legislation is the only means to ensure that a functional organization, like the CRSG or Security Threat Reduction Group, survives through changes in administration. National Security Presidential Directives can easily be eradicated by incoming administrations that have different preferences on how to handle national security matters. The history of the National Security Council is evidence to support this.

18. Gharajedaghi, 54.


19. Liang and Xiangsui, xii-xiii.

20. "DoD Work Plan to Support NSPD-44 Implementation Briefing," Draft work plan PowerPoint brief, 4 December 2007.




STRG Interagency Management System

Peacetime planning and coordination structure



17



STRG Interagency Management System

War structure

PLANNING / EXECUTION

