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**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.**

General Lucius D. Clay: Operational Leadership in a Post-Combat Environment

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Abstract

The current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have reinforced the importance of Phase IV stability operations. A vital aspect to successfully conducting post-combat operations is effective operational leadership. To further consider the importance of leadership, a case study of General Lucius D. Clay leadership during the American occupation of Germany following World War II is presented. This paper establishes a theoretical framework by discussing key terms and concepts, to include leadership, the operational level of war, stability operations, and civil-military operations. General Clay's leadership style is defined and leadership traits key to his success are identified and examined. Finally, the paper draws conclusions and lessons learned concerning General Clay's operational leadership in a post-combat environment.

Introduction

The United States military has been involved in post-combat operations throughout the nation's history, from the American Civil War to today's conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. If current operations are any indication, the military is sure to be involved in post-kinetic efforts well into the future. As part of a post-combat environment, operational leadership and the inherent traits and qualities displayed are important to successfully conducting stabilization operations and eventually winning the peace.

Following the surrender of Nazi Germany, General Lucius D. Clay became General Dwight D. Eisenhower's deputy in 1945. A year later he was named the Deputy Military Governor of the American Zone in Germany and later served as the Commander in Chief of United States Forces in Europe and Military Governor in Germany from 1947 to 1949. Despite seeing no combat action during World War II, General Clay successfully led American efforts during the occupation of Germany and is seen as a hero for his direct involvement in the Berlin Airlift operation from 1948 to 1949.

Future leaders who face stability operations would be well served to understand General Clay's leadership during the rebuilding of Germany in World War II. This paper will analyze General Clay as a leader, identify his key leadership traits, and discuss how those qualities helped achieve successful results in a post-conflict environment. First, a theoretical framework will be established to define leadership, identify challenges faced by an operational leader, and discuss stability operations and the closely related civil-military operations. Second, General Clay's leadership style and traits will be analyzed in a chronological sequence. Finally, lessons learned from the case study will be identified and expanded upon.

Theoretical Framework

A common definition for leadership is “the capacity to establish direction and to influence and align others toward a common goal, motivating and committing them to action and making them responsible for their performance.”¹ In other words, leadership is the ability to get things done by influencing others. The effectiveness of a leader is dependent upon four basic principles - providing purpose, establishing direction, generating motivation, and sustaining effectiveness.² The method in which a leader achieves effectiveness can be broken down into two subsets, leadership style and leadership traits. Leadership style is the manner in which a leader conducts himself in commanding his or her troops. There are a number of different styles that are based on varied theories, to include charismatic leadership, situational leadership, and transformational leadership. The style employed by a leader will depend on values, beliefs, and preferences.

Leadership traits are the qualities or characteristics inherent in a leader while commanding troops. A myriad of qualities can be listed and defined; however five leadership traits will be highlighted as they were critical to General Clay’s success – vision, moral courage, unity of effort, conviction, and compassion. Vision is tied directly to the principles of effectiveness discussed above. A leader must provide a common goal and direction to guide his command. This vision will serve as the driving factor for future operations. Courage is the willingness to make a sacrifice or stand-up for the betterment of the command or mission. Typically there are two types of courage, physical and moral. Although physical courage is more often identified during time of war, General Clay’s moral courage directly impacted future

¹ *BNET Business Dictionary*, s.v. “leadership,” <http://dictionary.bnet.com/definition/Leadership.html> (accessed 18 April 2009).

² Huba Wass de Czege, “A Comprehensive View of Leadership,” *Military Review* (August 1992), page 21, <http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/index.asp> (accessed 2 May 2009).

operations in Germany. One of the principles of war is unity of effort. It is important for a leader to demonstrate and stress unity of effort as stability operations often involve interagency, non-government, international, and coalition partners. A leader must also have conviction, or a strong belief, in the mission to be successful. Demonstrating conviction will provide purpose and generate motivation for the command. Finally, compassion is a key trait to exhibit, particularly during stability operations. A leader must remain mindful of the local population and comprehend the second and third order effects of his troops' actions while planning operations. General Clay's exhibition and utilization of these leadership traits will be further discussed in subsequent sections.

In the military there are leaders at every level of command from the strategic passing through the operational to the tactical. The operational level can be further refined as a range from joint task force command on the lower end to theater-strategic command on the higher end.³ General Clay, serving as Commander in Chief, United States Forces in Europe and Military Governor, bridged the theater-strategic and operational levels. In this capacity, General Clay was responsible for achieving military strategic objectives within the European theater. These were typically not as well defined in a post-conflict environment than in time of combat. During hostilities during World War II, General Dwight D. Eisenhower was assigned the military strategic objective to achieve unconditional surrender of the Germans. General Eisenhower was provided the freedom and resources to achieve that objective at all costs. Once the Germans surrendered, the military objective was redefined as the creation of a secure and stable environment to allow transition from a military occupation to a civilian government. This objective was open to interpretation. General Clay first had to define a secure and stable environment before crafting a way to achieve it. He also had to identify and develop a civilian

³ Milan Vego, *Joint Operational Warfare* (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2007), page X-5.

government before he could transfer responsibilities. These challenges would require all aspects of operational art and imagination to develop operational objectives for his subordinate commanders.

As evidenced by the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, performance is extremely critical as military forces transition to Phase IV, post-combat operations. Dr. Conrad Crane, one of the authors of the Army's new counter insurgency manual, argues that wars are won during Phase IV operations.⁴ In discussing the phasing model, Joint Publication 3-0 identifies Phase IV as the "stabilize" phase, which is "typically characterized by a change from sustained combat operations to stability operations." This phase is required when the civilian government has no or limited capability to function.⁵ As seen in today's conflicts, military forces may be called upon to perform or enable aspects of governance, public utilities and infrastructure, reconstruction, banking, agriculture, and rule of law. The transition from combat operations to post-combat operations is not linear. In most cases, the two phases overlap, adding to the difficulty and complexity of leading operations during this transition. The operational leader must ensure security is maintained so as not to slip back into combat. Additionally, the operational leader must be able to balance his force's efforts across all aspects – political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure – of the operational environment.

During the stabilize phase civil-military operations are vitally important. Civil-military operations are those efforts that help develop relationships between military forces, governmental and non-governmental civilian organizations, and the civilian population.⁶

⁴ Conrad C. Crane, "Phase IV Operations: Where Wars Are Really Won," *Military Review* (May-June 2005): page 27-36, <http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/index.asp> (accessed 23 April 2009).

⁵ Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations*, Joint Publication 3-0, Change 1 (Washington, DC: CJCS, 13 February 2008), page IV-29.

⁶ Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Civil-Military Operations*, Joint Publication 3-57 (Washington, DC: CJCS, 8 July 2008), page I-3.

According to Joint Publication 3-57, “at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels and across the full range of military operations, civil-military operations are a primary military instrument to synchronize military and nonmilitary instruments of national power.”⁷ Civil-military operations are conducted throughout all phases of a major operation or campaign; however during Phase IV specifically, civil-military operations “facilitate humanitarian relief, civil order, and restoration of public services as fighting subsides and emphasis shifts from relief to reconstruction.”⁸ Civil-military operations also exist at the strategic, operational, and tactic level, but since most governmental and non-governmental organization lack an operational level this ultimately becomes a challenge for the military operational leader.⁹ Finally, senior leadership further emphasizes the importance of civil-military operations in Joint Publication 3-57 by stating, “operations have become more complex, the operational level has become the critical juncture at which the coordination of the overall effort takes place, making operational-level civil-military operations critical to present and future operations.”¹⁰ General Clay’s actions and successes reflected the importance of strong civil-military relations as he led the post-war efforts.

The Early Years

General Lucius D. Clay, a native of Marietta, GA, was born the sixth child of Senator Alexander Stephens Clay and direct descendent of statesman, Henry Clay. After graduating from West Point in 1918, General Clay served in various civil and military engineer positions early in his career, to include teaching at the Military Academy, directing the construction of dams and civilian airfields, and serving on the Philippines military advisory staff under General

⁷ Ibid, page I-1.

⁸ Ibid, page I-15.

⁹ Ibid, page I-5.

¹⁰ Ibid, page I-6.

Douglas MacArthur. He continued his career progression and in 1942 rose to be the youngest Brigadier General in the Army, serving as the Director of Material, Army Service Forces.

General Clay built a reputation for order and efficiency, being a hard and disciplined worker, and going long hours to complete the mission. It was during these formative years that he also developed into a quiet leader. His success was based on his thoughts and actions, not on his ego and force of character. This quiet leadership appears to be a natural fit for an engineer, who took a systematic and analytical approach to identifying the root cause of problems.

However, he continued to develop into a quiet leader even after serving under General MacArthur. General Clay saw first hand this charismatic leader operate as Military Advisor in the development of a Philippine Army in the 1930s. Despite General MacArthur's successes, General Clay did not succumb to an ego-centric, aggressive style more akin to MacArthur's leadership.

General Clay's analytical and action-oriented nature was apparent on many occasions. Shortly after the Normandy Invasion in 1944, General Dwight D. Eisenhower tasked General Clay to solve a supply bottleneck that had slowed the flow of war material into Europe. General Clay quickly identified that the port director at Cherbourg, who directed the shipment of goods, was being micromanaged. By giving the port director freedom and authority to conduct business, General Clay improved the efficiency at the French port.¹¹ After only three weeks in France, General Clay reported to General George C. Marshall and General Eisenhower on a shortage of heavy ammunition that could put a final attack on Berlin at risk. General Clay worked with ordnance officers back in Washington, DC to improve delivery of ammunition to ensure "adequate future flow."¹² Impressed by General Clay's problem-solving skills, General

¹¹ Lucius D. Clay, *Decision in Germany* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1950), page 2.

¹² *Ibid*, page 3.

Eisenhower wanted to keep him in theater and in March 1945, General Clay was named as his Deputy Military Governor.

Planning for Post-War Germany

Planning for the post-combat phase of the war in Europe began when U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt met with British Prime Minister Winston Churchill in August 1941 at the Atlantic Conference aboard warships at anchorage in Newfoundland. The resulting Atlantic Charter was a joint declaration detailing the goals of the Allied powers and laid the framework for the post-conflict environment. Although the United States had yet to officially enter the war, the Charter listed eight “common principles in the national policies of their respective countries on which they base their hopes for a better future for the world.”¹³ Of particular importance to a post-war Germany were the third and sixth principles. The third principle respected the right of all people to choose their own form of government and the desire to see sovereign rights and self government returned. The sixth principle sought the restoration of safety to allow all people to live their lives in freedom.¹⁴

Although the Allied leaders, to include Russian Premier Joseph Stalin, met numerous times in the ensuing years, no further direction on post-conflict efforts were vocalized until the second Quebec Conference in September 1944. During this conference, President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and their advisors discussed a “post-surrender program for Germany”¹⁵ drafted by Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau. The Morgenthau Plan called for the complete demilitarization of Germany, creation of zones within Germany, and

¹³ *Atlantic Charter*, 14 August 1941, <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/atlantic.asp> (accessed 24 April 2009).

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ U.S. Department of State, *Foreign relations of the United States. Conference at Quebec, 1944* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1944), page 86, <http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS1944> (accessed 24 April 2009).

removal of the German industry base.¹⁶ In further detail the plan stated, “[t]he Allied Military Government shall not ... take any measures designed to maintain or strengthen the Germany economy.”¹⁷ Not all members of President Roosevelt’s administration were supportive of the Morgenthau Plan. A counterview to a post-war German economy was headed by Secretary of War, Henry Stimson. Secretary Stimson and others felt a solid German industry base was necessary for future progress in Europe. However, in the end, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill agreed to the concepts within the Morgenthau Plan.

Following the Quebec Conference, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) finalized a directive to provide the necessary guidance for American troops to implement the concepts of the Morgenthau Plan. Directive JCS 1067 to the Commander in Chief of U.S. Forces, Europe was initially issued in October 1944 and laid out the main features of American occupation policy. The intent of the directive was to create a “stern, all-powerful military administration of a conquered country, based on its unconditional surrender, impressing the Germans with their military defeat and futility of any further aggression.”¹⁸

Further guidance and direction was developed at the Yalta Conference in February 1945. President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Premier Stalin met to discuss the post-war reorganization and establishment of occupation in Germany. The main outcome from the conference included agreement to have the three powers and France each occupy and control separate zones in Germany.

Through the planning process, General Eisenhower and the SHAEF staff translated these various strategic policies and guidelines into operational and tactical plans. Beginning with

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ U.S. Assistant Secretary of War (ASW), “German Occupation Policy,” ASW file 370.8 (October 1944), quoted in Earl F. Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944-1946* (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1975), page 104.

Operation Plan Rankin in May 1943 and “[w]ith the war’s outcome still very much undecided, the Allies began planning the peace, however tentatively, with Rankin.”¹⁹ Operation Rankin gave way to Operation Talisman in August 1944, which eventually became Operation Eclipse in November 1944. The Eclipse plan was broken into two phases. The first phase called for immediate occupation of strategic locations deep within Germany, to include Berlin and the Ruhr area. Once secured, the second phase focused on five primary objectives: “(1) primary disarmament and control of German forces; (2) enforcement of the terms of surrender or the will of SHAEF in the event there was no surrender; (3) establishment of law and order; (4) beginning of the total disarmament of Germany; and (5) redistribution of Allied forces into their national zones.”²⁰

Office of Military Government (United States)

General Clay did not receive a very warm welcome from the staff of Supreme Headquarters Allied Europe Forces (SHAEF) when he arrived in Reims on 7 April 1945. Prior to his arrival, aspects of military government had been handled by the G-5 planning staff as part of the theater command structure. On 18 April, the position of Deputy Military Governor was officially created with General Clay named to the assignment.²¹ With the title came command of the U.S. Group Control Council, which was responsible for planning post-hostilities control in Germany.²²

The relationship between the G-5 on the SHAEF staff and General Clay’s new position was left somewhat ambiguous, which allowed General Clay latitude to work directly through the

¹⁹ Kenneth O. McCreedy, “Planning the Peace: Operation Eclipse and the Occupation of Germany,” *The Journal of Military History* 65, no. 3 (July 2001), page 716, <http://www.proquest.com/> (accessed 3 April 2009).

²⁰ Earl F. Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944-1946* (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1975), page 163.

²¹ *Ibid*, page 224.

²² *Ibid*, page 93.

G-5 division.²³ General Clay saw the importance of unity of effort, but not necessarily unity of command early in his tenure as Military Governor. He felt aspects of military governance had to be separated from the war-fighting staff to be successful during stability operations. This view clashed with the SHAEF Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith, who believed military governance responsibility should remain under the G-5 planning staff. General Clay was able to convince War Department leaders to separate the duties and responsibilities of the G-5 staff and the Group Control Council, known as the Office of Military Government (United States), or OMGUS, in April 1946.²⁴ This action gave General Clay the freedom to direct the efforts of military government through a command element separate from the theater command staff. Although General Eisenhower and later General Joseph McNarney officially represented the United States as the Military Governor, General Clay was the leader responsible for making progress in the area of military government.

General Clay also saw the need to have talented civilians on the OMGUS staff to maintain continuity and facilitate transition of governance responsibility to the State Department. He recruited heavily from areas of academia, industry, and other government agencies to build a staff of subject matter experts. Additionally, General Clay personally encouraged soldiers with expiring enlistments to remain on staff in a civilian capacity. One of his closest confidants and counselors was his political advisor, Robert D. Murphy, a career diplomat. General Clay indicated although his official chain of command resided in the War Department, he believed the Military Governor really worked for the State Department.²⁵ In General Clay's words:

“[The] military government would have fallen apart if it was responsible to the tactical military command structure. I could never have gotten the type and kind of civilians I

²³ Ibid, page 224.

²⁴ Clay, *Decision*, page 60.

²⁵ Clay, *Decision*, page 57.

had if we had been down there reporting to the General Staff. And more important, I wanted to get military government out of the hands of the Army and into the hands of the State Department as quickly as we possibly could.”²⁶

Despite not meeting with the Secretary of State prior to assuming his responsibilities as Military Governor, General Clay made an effort to encourage unified action between government agencies.

American Occupation Zone

Upon departing Washington to assume the duties of Deputy Military Governor, General Clay did not have a clear vision that defined the end state in Germany nor the means by which to achieve that end state. The conflicting policies and guidance pulled General Clay in different directions, but upon arriving in Germany he quickly envisioned an end state. It became clear to General Clay that a strong, democratic Germany was vital to central Europe. Following German surrender, the Soviets worked quickly to establish communist governments in eastern Europe, starting with Poland and Czechoslovakia. It was important for the United States to provide the counterpressure of democracy to contain the spread of communism within Europe.

To create a strong democracy in Germany, General Clay saw the need to get Germans involved in the rebuilding effort. He pushed his staff to prepare for elections by January 1946 in cities with a population less than 20,000, a mere eight months following the surrender of Nazi Germany. General Clay communicated back to Washington that “if the Germans are to learn democracy, I think the best way is to start off quickly at the bottom.”²⁷ Additionally, General Clay appointed local Germans to serve as regional administrators within the American zone. These Germans assisted in drafting policy documents and advising military leaders. By instilling

²⁶ Jean Edward Smith, *Lucius D. Clay: An American Life* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1990), page 225.

²⁷ Earl F. Ziemke, “Improvising Stability and Change in Postwar Germany,” in *Americans as Proconsuls: United States Military Government in Germany and Japan, 1944-1952*, ed. Robert Wolfe (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984), page 63.

limited self governance early in the reconstruction process, General Clay and OMGUS paved the way for a democratic state in western Germany.

General Clay's vision was also influenced by his compassion for the people of Germany. He never lost sight of the fact that American occupation efforts directly affected the Germans. During his first visit to Berlin in 1945, General Clay immediately had heartfelt emotions for the Germans whose despair was striking. He described Berlin "like a city of the dead ... and decided then and there never to forget that we were responsible for the government of human beings."²⁸ This impression remained with General Clay throughout his tour as Military Governor, ensuring the effects on the German people were accounted.

To achieve his vision of a democratic Germany, General Clay demonstrated moral courage in challenging high-ranking political leaders back in the United States. As discussed above, the Morgenthau Plan did not have consensus throughout the Roosevelt Administration. As described by General Clay biographer Jean Edward Smith:

"American planning for the occupation of Germany divided the wartime Roosevelt administration as did few other issues. Secretary Morgenthau and the Treasury Department, often joined by Cordell Hull [State] and Harry Hopkins [personal advisor to the President], favored the harshest possible treatment for Germany. Secretary Stimson and the War Department, frequently joined by the career foreign service, favored a firm occupation and a swift rehabilitation."²⁹

Once his vision had been cemented in his own mind, General Clay knew a robust economy was key to a democratic Germany. An industrial-based economy flew in the face of Morgenthau's plan to strip Germany of its industry to create an agrarian state. Despite numerous appeals, General Clay was unable to achieve a timely revision to JCS 1067. He did, however, receive Secretary of War Stimson's encouragement to interpret the directive broadly. Loopholes

²⁸ Clay, *Decision*, page 21.

²⁹ Smith, page 223.

existed in JCS 1067 that allowed General Clay to increase the amount of daily rations to counter Soviet influence. He also “devoted substantial effort and resources to restarting German factories and mines,” resulting in an increase in industrial output in 1946 of 2.4 times the output in 1945.³⁰ As a direct result of his success in spurring economic and political progress, General Clay was named the Commander in Chief, U.S. Forces Europe and Military Governor, U.S. Occupation Zone in Germany in March 1947.

General Clay’s more significant contribution to the economy was a result of his conviction in a strong economy and ability to influence Secretary Of State George Marshall during the development of the Marshall Plan. The Marshall Plan envisioned a strong German economy and democracy necessary to counter the Soviets and provided the eventual exit of occupation troops. Additionally, General Clay helped draft and enact JCS 1779, a replacement directive to JCS 1067, in July 1947. Under this new directive and the Marshall Plan, General Clay was able to further increase ration levels, dismantle the two-class system, and rejuvenate the economy in the American zone.³¹

General Clay also strongly believed in unity of effort among the Allied Powers. Although Germany was divided into four occupation zones, he felt continuity and common policies across the areas were essential to Germany’s future. He displayed tremendous diplomatic skill in working with his counterparts on the Allied Control Council, the occupation governing body for the four zones. He spearheaded the movement to combine the American, British, and eventually French zones into one western Germany region bringing economic

³⁰ James Dobbins et al, *America’s Role in Nation-Building: Germany to Iraq*, RAND Report MR-1753-RC (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003), page 18, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports (accessed 23 April 2009).

³¹ Ray Salvatore Jennings, “The Road Ahead: Lessons in Nation Building from Japan, Germany, and Afghanistan for Postwar Iraq,” *Peaceworks* 49, May 2003, page 15, <http://www.usip.org/pubs/peaceworks/pwks49.pdf> (accessed 3 April 2009).

stability throughout the three areas. Although the British and French initially resisted General Clay's initiative, the Western zones did merge to form the Federal Republic of Germany.³² General Clay was one of the last members of the Truman Administration to work with the Soviets and believe that a unified Germany could be achieved.

Berlin Blockade

A driving factor throughout General Clay's time in Germany was his strong belief, or conviction, that actions taken during the occupation phase would have future repercussions throughout Germany, Europe, and the world. His conviction was most apparent during the Soviet blockade of Berlin, which began in 1948. Following failed efforts to agree on a unified currency at the Allied Control Council, the trizone government (the combined zones of the United States, Britain, and France) established its own currency to help stabilize the economy in June 1948. In reaction, the Soviets required all convoys traveling through Soviet Germany bound for Berlin to be searched. When the trizone government refused to allow searches, the Soviets cut all road and rail traffic to West Berlin. General Clay insisted that the Allies not withdraw from Berlin; however he also understood and appreciated the balance of power being formulated between the United States and the Soviet Union.

In an effort to continue to supply West Berlin and not escalate the blockade, General Clay, with the assistance of Major General William Tunner, formulated and executed the Berlin Airlift. Over the course of eleven months, the Allies successfully delivered an average of 4,500 tons of supplies daily. Convinced the Airlift could supply Berlin indefinitely, the Soviets lifted the blockade in May 1949.³³ From General Clay's perspective:

³² Dobbins et al, page 15.

³³ Clay, *Decision*, page 389.

“Although we alone had atomic power at the time, we did not want to be the first to use force. An airlift supplying a city of over two million people enabled us to break the blockade without the use of force. Since that was a success, it renewed the confidence of Western Europe in the United States and in the will of its own peoples to remain free and independent.”³⁴

It is apparent by this remark that his compassion for Germans living in Berlin also had a direct effect on his airlift plans. In the end, General Clay’s conviction that Berlin must not be abandoned to communist influence was the driving factor behind the success of the largest and longest humanitarian mission in history.

Conclusion

General Clay retired from the Army in May 1949, the same month the Soviets lifted their blockade on Berlin. Upon his return to the United States, he received a ticker-tape parade and a hero’s welcome on 19 May 1949. He appeared on the cover of *Time* three times throughout his lifetime. Although revered as a hero at the time, General Clay seems to have become a forgotten personality of World War II. Despite having faded from the spotlight, the leadership traits he exhibited during the occupation of Germany can be looked upon as the standard for leading stability operations.

General Clay developed a clear vision for the future of Germany, one influenced by his compassion for those impacted by the war. Even though his vision was never officially published or communicated, it served as the driving force to guide the Allied efforts. Receiving conflicting guidance and finding himself maneuvering between two political views within the Roosevelt Administration, General Clay demonstrated his moral courage in standing up for his beliefs. He also took constant strides to maintain a sense of unity of effort throughout his time as Military Governor. This includes unifying action between Allied Powers, between departments

³⁴ Lucius D. Clay, “Berlin,” *Foreign Affairs (pre-1986)* 41 (October 1962), page 52, <http://www.proquest.com/> (accessed 3 April 2009).

within the United States government, and between staffs under General Eisenhower. Finally, his strong conviction that Germany become a democracy based upon a solid economy to counter the spread of communism within central Europe led to defeating a Soviet blockade of Berlin through non-combative means. The common thread tying these characteristics and qualities together was General Clay's genuine compassion for the Germans and their future. These important traits implemented by the quiet leader, General Lucius D. Clay, resulted in the United States successfully occupying post-war Germany and defending Western Europe from the spread of communism.

Lessons Learned

Although General Clay's experiences in Germany occurred sixty years ago, there are pertinent lessons learned to be applied today. First, leaders should fight the tendency to be influenced by the emotions of combat operations when planning for post-combat operations. The Morgenthau Plan and JCS 1067 were very vindictive in nature. Those leaders responsible for developing these directives, which sought to strip Germany of its industry base, feared a resurgence of a global dictator as seen prior to World War I and World War II. The strategy and policies issued did not match the desired end state, which was a secure and stable environment within Germany to allow a quick transition from military to civilian government. Perhaps, since General Clay was not involved in combat operations in Germany, he did not develop a strong hatred for the German population. In fact, he was deeply affected by the devastation and immediately felt a sense of compassion and respect for the German people. Based on his fresh perspective, General Clay was able to develop a sustainable, successful vision for Germany.

Another lesson learned is to not discount the quiet leader. General Clay did not display the charisma and bravado that General MacArthur did during his occupation of Japan following

World War II. General Clay systematically and analytically went about his mission to rebuild Germany. He quietly and respectfully challenged policies and directives not in line with his vision. He diplomatically worked with coalition partners to implement initiatives to spark economic growth. He overcame an antagonistic blockade of Berlin by peaceful, non-violent means, thus keeping the confrontation from escalating. When his job was done, General Clay quietly retired from the Army.

Finally, unity of effort is a requirement during stability operations. The goal for the military in Phase IV operations is transition to civil authority. The military alone cannot achieve this end state. It must rely heavily on civilian counterparts and allied and coalition partners. To successfully achieve this end state, General Clay realized he need to have strong civilian involvement during the occupation stage. He diplomatically worked with civilian leaders and in essence subordinated himself to the Department of State. Additionally, he forged close, personal relationships with allied partners. His efforts facilitated unified action among the American, British, and eventually French occupation zones.

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