

INTEGRATION AND INTEROPERABILITY OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES  
AND CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN IRREGULAR WARFARE

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JEFFREY ORTOLI, MAJ, USA  
B.S., U.S. Military Academy, West Point, NY, 1993

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas  
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Name of Candidate: MAJ Jeffrey Ortoli

Thesis Title: Integration and Interoperability of Special Operations Forces and  
Conventional Forces in Irregular Warfare

Approved by:

\_\_\_\_\_, Thesis Committee Chair  
LTC James W. Spence, M.B.A.

\_\_\_\_\_, Member  
Joseph R. Fischer, Ph.D.

\_\_\_\_\_, Member  
LTC Casey J. Lessard, M.A.

Accepted this 12th day of June 2009 by:

\_\_\_\_\_, Director, Graduate Degree Programs  
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

## ABSTRACT

INTEGRATION AND INTEROPERABILITY OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES AND CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN IRREGULAR WARFARE, by Major Jeffrey Ortolini, USA, 110 pages.

Historically a distinct cultural and operational rift has evolved between Special Operations Forces (SOF) and Conventional Forces (CF) that devalued the need for SOF-CF integration and for developing common operating procedures and doctrine. This rift intensified in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks and more specifically during Operation Enduring Freedom, and continues today.

The post-9/11 era has seen a dramatic increase in the need for SOF-CF integration and interoperability (I&I). In today's Irregular Warfare environment, SOF and CF are required to work side by side, often for long durations and sharing the same battlespace. Successful conduct of operations on today's battlefields requires a synchronized joint, combined, and multinational effort. Instituting effective SOF-CF I&I is critical to achieving the required unity of effort. It is incumbent upon higher echelon commanders to provide proper guidance and influence to improve I&I, and it is vital that lower echelon leaders and soldiers alike initiate and advance successful SOF-CF synchronization. This research endeavors to contribute to synchronizing SOF-CF effects on the battlefield and achieving better unity of effort, as well as diminishing the rift between SOF and CF.

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Lastly, I dedicate this thesis to my grandfather, Frank D'Amore, an extremely wise and giving man who has loved and guided me throughout my life. His selfless dedication to his family, honorable service to this country as an infantryman in World War II, and personal values have earned my complete respect and admiration.

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## ACRONYMS

ACM	Anti-coalition Militia
AMF	Afghan Militia Forces
ANA	Afghan National Army
AO	Area of Operation
AOB	Advanced Operations Base
BCT	Brigade Combat Team
C2	Command and Control
CF	Conventional Forces
CJSOTF	Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force
COIN	Counterinsurgency
COP	Common Operational Picture
CT	Counterterrorism
FID	Foreign Internal Defense
GWOT	Global War on Terror
HPT	High-payoff Target
HVT	High-value Target
I&I	Integration and Interoperability
IA	Interagency
IO	Information Operations
IW	Irregular Warfare
JFC	Joint Force Commander
JISO	Joint Integration and Interoperability of Special Operations
JOC	Joint Operating Concept



JP	Joint Publication
JSOA	Joint Special Operations Area
JSOTF	Joint Special Operations Task Force
JTF	Joint Task Force
LNO	Liaison Officer
NSW	Naval Special Warfare
OCF	Other Coalition Force
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OGA	Other Government Agency
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
PSYOP	Psychological Operations
SF	Special Forces
SFLE	Special Forces Liaison Element
SFODA	Special Forces Operational Detachment-A (also called ODA)
SFODB	Special Forces Operational Detachment-B (also called ODB)
SO	Special Operations
SOCCE	Special Operations Command and Control Element
SOCJFCOM	Special Operations Command Joint Forces Command
SOF	Special Operations Forces
TF	Task Force
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
UW	Unconventional Warfare

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## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

#### Background

Successful conduct of operations on today's battlefields requires a synchronized joint, combined, and multinational effort. Instituting effective integration and interoperability (I&I) of Special Operations Forces (SOF) and Conventional Forces (CF) is critical to achieving the required unity of effort. Regrettably, this requirement has proven to be very problematic.

Historically a marked separation has evolved between SOF and Conventional Forces. During the Cold War, the main effort for the U.S. Government focused on building U.S. conventional force military capabilities to prevent Soviet aggression; SOF was mainly waging small wars in remote areas along the communist periphery. In a high-intensity conflict, doctrine at the time called for conventional forces to fight the traditional, linear fight while SOF, serving as a supporting effort, operated independently and focused on the deep objectives (such as UW, FID, strategic reconnaissance, terminal guidance operations, and Scud hunting). As result, during this period SOF-CF integration was limited to sporadic and short-term training venues.

In the 1990s the Army's Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) attempted to integrate SOF and CF but failed chiefly because of opposing training objectives between SOF and CF units, which focused heavily on organic capabilities and not on SOF-CF integration. Consequently, a distinct cultural and operational rift intensified that devalued the need for SOF-CF integration and for developing common operating procedures and doctrine. This malignant rift became readily apparent in the aftermath of

the 9/11 attacks and more specifically during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), and continues today.

The post-9/11 era has seen a dramatic increase in the need for SOF-CF integration and interoperability. The contemporary battlefield requires SOF and CF to work side by side, often for long durations. In most cases SOF share battlespace with, and have often been placed under the command and control of, conventional forces. In the post-9/11 era, integrating these units has proven to be very difficult.

According to the results of the Joint Integration and Interoperability of Special Operations (JIISO) study, observations from Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) saw significant improvements in SOF-CF integration since OEF. Nevertheless, numerous problems still exist. The JIISO study outlined the following areas:

Inconsistent interpretations and expectations between SOF and CF

- Different planning cycles
- Different interpretations of information exchange requirements (Essential Elements of Information) and mission selection criteria

Use of Ad-hoc solutions to account for new ways of doing business

- Current joint doctrine and JTTP (Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures) were not designed to support the level of joint force actions, tempo of operations and proximity of cross component forces in a non-linear battlespace
- Rigid business rules, translator applications, or manual workarounds to achieve limited interoperability (e.g., UNIX-to-WINDOWS)

These issues led to SOF-CF integration and interoperability issues at the tactical level including:

- Stovepipe planning and disjointed execution
- SOF-CF planning and execution unsynchronized
- Fratricide
- Fire support delays based on a fear of fratricide

- Joint Special Operations Areas (JSOAs) too fluid. JSOAs were activated and control passed with inadequate time for coordination with other components.<sup>1</sup>

Despite the fact that numerous commands and working groups have identified and studied the problems of integration and interoperability, and proponents have written new doctrine, problems of SOF and CF I&I continue to plague operations. Successful integration and interoperability has occurred and continues to occur within many units. However, it is ad-hoc and based on the commander; I&I has not become institutionalized throughout the U.S. military. The author contends this is a significant problem that leaders and doctrine must endeavor to correct.

As stated, the U.S. military has attempted to communicate in writing the need for furthering the integration and interoperability of SOF and conventional forces. In order to take the next step and affect institutional change, leaders and soldiers at all levels need to understand this change and why it is necessary. Leaders must communicate the need for I&I, then create a climate that fosters it. It is incumbent upon higher echelon commanders to provide proper guidance and influence to improve integration and interoperability, and it is vital that lower echelon commanders, leaders, and soldiers alike initiate and advance successful SOF-CF synchronization.

Effective I&I essentially means the ability of SOF and CF to operate effectively and efficiently together in the execution of assigned tasks. The primary question this thesis seeks to answer is: How can military leaders best achieve integration and interoperability of Special Operations Forces and Conventional Forces at the tactical

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<sup>1</sup> Joint Integration and Interoperability of Special Operations (JIISO) Joint Test and Evaluation (JT&E), “BGen Neller Update Brief” (Briefing, MacDill AFB, Florida, January 21, 2004), slide 3.

level in Irregular Warfare (IW) in order to create unity of effort and accomplish U.S. military objectives?

A corollary question to the primary, “Why is it important to achieve SOF-CF I&I?,” warrants discussion at this point. Primarily, achieving proper I&I will enable commanders to take advantage of capabilities and resources not otherwise available to their command. In addition, it can also mitigate many operational problems as well as battlespace management issues. On an individual level, a lack of I&I often leads to fratricide. Regardless of one’s opinion about another unit, without a doubt no U.S. Soldier wants to see, and especially be responsible for, killing another U.S. Soldier by friendly fire.

In order to answer the primary research question this thesis also examines and answers several secondary research questions. These questions include: What is Irregular Warfare? What is the proper employment of SOF in Irregular Warfare? What is the cause of the rift between SOF and CF? What factors are necessary for successful SOF-CF integration and interoperability? What are the most effective methods to integrate SOF and CF in order to best achieve the campaign goals and objectives? What is (are) the optimal SOF-CF command relationship(s) in irregular warfare? How can poorly structured chains of command and improper command relationships affect tactical operations?

As this paper will make clear, the author asserts that leaders at all levels must understand that attaining “unity of command” is not essential, and in most cases is not practical; what is essential is achieving “unity of effort.” Pivotal to achieving unity of effort and, accordingly, successful SOF-CF I&I, is recognizing and implementing the

proper command relationship. As this thesis will explain, a “supported-supporting” command relationship is the ideal relationship. This command relationship is one element of what the author has termed the “Tenets of Successful Integration and Interoperability,” which include command relationships, personal relationships, overcoming cultural friction, liaison, and leader and unit training. To successfully execute a mutual support relationship, the author espouses that leaders put into practice the tenets of I&I. Leaders must also appreciate that:

Joint warfare is exactly that; it is joint, not component warfare. SOF is one of the team members in the joint team. Joint warfare is about working together to get the mission accomplished. Gone are the stovepipe days where one had to own a force (for example, OPCON or TACON) to get support and unity of command. With the increase in use of the supported and supporting command relationship, synergy, trust, and confidence has grown between the members of the joint force.<sup>2</sup>

While it may be difficult for many commanders to accept this non-traditional command relationship, they must realize the necessity of such a relationship. In addition to operating in a joint environment, the contemporary operational environment (COE) requires closer coordination between the departments and agencies of the Federal Government and private sector, such as with the Other Government Agencies (OGA), Non-governmental Organizations (NGO), Inter-governmental Organizations (IGO), and contractors, as well as multinational and partnership forces. Traditional command relationships are not appropriate for these elements; synergy requires a mutual support relationship. It is not a large step, therefore, to extend the support relationship from these

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<sup>2</sup> Lieutenant Colonel Mark Jones, USA and Lieutenant Colonel Wes Rehorn, USA, “Integrating SOF Into Joint Warfighting,” *Military Review* 83, no. 3 (May-June 2003): 7.



government and non-government agencies to military forces that are not organic to a commander's unit.

In analyzing the command relationship dilemma, it is obligatory to recognize commanders' objections to support command relationships. Chiefly, the concept of OPCON and TACON command relationships, having "ownership" of all forces within a commander's geographic boundary, is part of the military culture, especially in the Army cultivated from the old Airland Battle doctrine. Another issue is the fact that irreconcilable disputes between the supported and supporting commanders must be elevated to the establishing commander, usually the Joint Task Force Commander, for resolution. Equally important are the complications to battlespace management arising from the lack of ownership of all forces operating in the same area. All of these concerns are valid and understandable. Unavoidably, given the nature of the COE, the support command relationship is nevertheless necessary and valid. This thesis will discuss how to mitigate commanders' concerns and establish successful integration utilizing a support command relationship.

### Research Design

The researcher makes several assumptions with regard to this analysis. The primary assumption is that Special Operations Forces will remain an integral part of the U.S. military. Furthermore, SOF will continue to exist as it does today--as a distinct element - and will not be absorbed into the conventional military as another Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) or Functional Area. Finally, the author assumes that Irregular Warfare will remain the dominant theme of warfare engaged in by the United States and its allies.

There are several key terms utilized in this research, defined below and analyzed in further detail throughout this thesis, which all readers must understand. Chapter 1 will define Irregular warfare in detail. The glossary provides definitions for additional terms.

Integration: The arrangement of military forces and their actions to create a force that operates by engaging as a whole.<sup>3</sup>

Interdependence: Unable to exist or survive without the other. Relying on mutual assistance, support, cooperation, or interaction among constituent parts or members.<sup>4</sup>

Interoperability: The ability to operate in synergy in the execution of assigned tasks.<sup>5</sup> The ability of the component parts of a system to operate successfully together.<sup>6</sup>

Synchronization: The arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time.<sup>7</sup> To make things work at the same time; to go or work together in unison.<sup>8</sup>

Synergy: The working together of two or more people, organizations, or things, especially when the result is greater than the sum of their individual effects or capabilities.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Joint Operations*, Incorporating Change 1, 13 February 2008 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), GL-16.

<sup>4</sup> Encarta World English Dictionary, North American Ed., 1998-2007 Microsoft Corporation.

<sup>5</sup> Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-16, *Multinational Operations*, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2007), GL-8.

<sup>6</sup> Encarta World Dictionary.

<sup>7</sup> Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2001), 415.

<sup>8</sup> Encarta World Dictionary.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

Unity of Effort: Coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization - the product of successful unified action.<sup>10</sup> Unity of effort emphasizes the need for ensuring that all means are directed to a common purpose . . . achieving unity of effort is often complicated by a variety of . . . military . . . participants, the lack of definitive command arrangements, and varying views of the objective.<sup>11</sup>

This research is bounded by certain limitations. The primary limitation is security classification. Many aspects of this topic are covered in greater detail in classified and For Official Use Only (FOUO) sources. However, in an effort to make this research available to a wide audience, thereby assisting a greater portion of the military, this thesis will remain unclassified. Chapter 2 provides references and links to sources for further research on FOUO and classified information.

In addition, the scope and delimitations further limit this research. To begin with, Special Operations Forces include units from the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines, to include Civil Affairs (CA) and Psychological Operations (PSYOP). When using the term “SOF” in this research, the author does include the joint affiliates of the SOF community, but focuses on Army Special Operations Forces and does not include Civil Affairs and PSYOP (though both are part of the SOF community).

The U.S. military has designed Special Operations Forces to achieve strategic and operational objectives. However, it is at the tactical level where SOF predominantly

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<sup>10</sup> Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2007), GL-11.

<sup>11</sup> Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-07.3, *Peace Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2007), ix.

interacts with conventional forces. As such, this research will confine its examination of the interplay between SOF and CF to the tactical level.

Joint Publication 3-0 provides a phasing model for designing joint campaigns and operations that consists of six phases (see figure 1). It is important to note that this research has not limited the scope of analysis to any specific phase of operation. It is the author's analysis that while the levels of SOF-CF involvement and priority of effort will vary by operation and phase of operation, the principles required to maintain integration and interoperability do not change.




Figure 1. Phasing Model

Source: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), IV-27.

Lastly, this research will further limit the scope of analysis to a specific theme of warfare--Irregular Warfare. It is in this theme of warfare where SOF and CF units are

required to work most closely together, and thus where integration and interoperability of SOF and CF units is the most crucial. Even so, many of the principles discussed in this research are also applicable to the other operational themes. In addition, as a basis of analysis, the focus of this research is on the post-9/11 period and looking into the future. The author contends that the principles established through an analysis of operations conducted during the War on Terror will be applicable to future conflicts in the IW theme.

### Irregular Warfare

There is another type of warfare--new in its intensity, ancient in its origin--war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins; war by ambush instead of by combat, by infiltration instead of by aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him . . . It preys on unrest.

- President John F. Kenney, 1962

IW is a relatively new term that the IW Joint Operating Concept (JOC) formally defined in September 2007. In view of the fact that Irregular Warfare scopes this thesis, it is necessary to thoroughly define IW. Moreover, a clear understanding of IW is important not only for the purpose of understanding this thesis, but more importantly for military leaders in general given that, in the author's opinion, IW will be the dominant form of warfare our nation will face for the foreseeable future.

As a side note, the author does not argue the point that major combat operations have become obsolete. On the contrary, as a global superpower, the author contends the United States cannot afford to sideline or allow the degradation of its conventional military capabilities. The U.S. cannot permit the military to fall behind on technology, or risk being unprepared for high intensity combat. The U.S. military has a need to remain ahead of other militaries in capability, strength, and force projection. Nonetheless,

conflict among non-state actors and failed states, criminal anarchy and religious extremism form the contemporary operational environment. The United States has been embroiled in irregular warfare across the globe; according to most theoretical predictions, the U.S. and the international community as a whole will continue to face this threat for some time. With this in mind, an in-depth analysis of IW is purposeful.

The Continuum of Operations includes the spectrum of conflict and the operational themes. IW is an operational theme falling between Peace Operations and Major Combat Operations. It can occur across the continuum of the spectrum of conflict. Figure 2 illustrates the continuum of operations.




Figure 2. The Continuum of Operations

Source: Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008), 2-1.

According to the IW JOC:

Irregular Warfare (IW) is defined as a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will. It is inherently a protracted struggle that will test the resolve of our Nation and our strategic partners.<sup>12</sup>

The IW JOC uses the term “Irregular Warfare” in two contexts: (1) IW is a form of armed conflict, and replaces the limited and restricting term “Low-intensity Conflict (LIC);” (2) IW is a form of warfare, encompassing insurgency, counterinsurgency (COIN), terrorism, and counterterrorism (CT).<sup>13</sup>

More encompassing, operations and activities that can be conducted as part of IW include: Insurgency; COIN; Unconventional Warfare (UW); terrorism; CT; Foreign Internal Defense (FID); Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations (SSTRO); strategic communications; PSYOP; Information Operations (IO); Civil-military Operations (CMO); intelligence and counterintelligence activities; transnational criminal activities (e.g. narco-trafficking, illicit arms dealing, illegal financial transactions); and law enforcement activities focusing on countering irregular adversaries. Insurgency and COIN are at the core of IW.<sup>14</sup> The preponderance of these listed operations and activities are core SOF tasks (UW, CT, FID, PSYOP, IO, and Civil-military Operations); thus, SOF is well suited to be a major participant in IW operations.

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<sup>12</sup> US Department of Defense, *Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC)*, Version 1.0 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2007), 1.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, 6.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, 10.

The IW umbrella also encompasses transnational threats and non-state actors. Transnational threats include terrorism, insurgency, opposing factions in civil wars, and members of organized criminal groups. Such groups generally do not restrict themselves by the same constraints as nation-states, nor share the same motivations, and they often pose significant threats to the interests of the nation states. Transnational threats are a global problem which ignore the political and territorial boundaries of a country and which often arise from non-state actors. Non-state actors are participants on the international level that are not states. Non-state actors include armed groups, terrorist organizations, criminal organizations, religious groups and ethnic groups.<sup>15</sup>

Understanding that IW is about *people*, not technology is fundamental to comprehending IW. Success in IW does not depend solely on military proficiency. The key to success in IW is an understanding of the social dynamics of the conflict region, to include tribal politics, social networks, religious influences, and cultural traditions.<sup>16</sup>

Realizing that IW is about people, it follows that the focus of IW is the *control or influence of the population*, not the control of the adversary's forces or territory. According to Mao Tse-Tung, "A guerrilla can always sink back into the peaceful population which is the sea in which the guerrilla swims like a fish." As well, without the consent of the people, which bestows legitimacy, the guerrilla becomes merely an outlaw and cannot survive for long. Moreover, without the support of the population, the

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<sup>15</sup> Federation of American Scientists, "The Transnational Threat: Dangers from Terrorism, Insurgencies, Civil Wars, and Organized Crime," <http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/prolif96/transnational.html> (accessed December 20, 2008).

<sup>16</sup> US Department of Defense, *IW JOC*, 1.



guerrilla would not exist, as there would not be a war to begin with. Thus, the population is key to the struggle.<sup>17</sup> As such, population control is paramount.

Population control is a means to collect intelligence as well as to deny support to the insurgents. It encompasses several objectives. Denying insurgents access to the population and resources is a fundamental objective. Influencing the populace to choose a side is another main objective. The final objective, protecting the populace, implies that HN forces should provide the primary means of population security, coupled with training the local population to provide their own local security.

Conventional Warfare differs from IW primarily on the focus of operations. The focus of operations in conventional warfare, in contrast to IW, is the adversary's armed forces, with the objective of influencing the adversary's government. Warfare that focuses on the population requires a different mindset and capabilities than conventional warfare with its focus on terrain and defeating an adversary's military.<sup>18</sup> In practice, however, most wars are a hybrid of conventional and IW operations.<sup>19</sup> Figure 3 provides an overview of IW according to the IW JOC construct.

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<sup>17</sup> Florian Louis-Ferdinand Waitl, "Mao Tse-Tung and General Vo Nguyen Giap On Guerrilla Warfare," *MilitaryHistoryOnline.com*, December 9, 2007, <http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/20thcentury/articles/maotsetunggiap.aspx> (accessed February 14, 2009).

<sup>18</sup> US Department of Defense, *IW JOC*, 8-9.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, 11.




Figure 3. Irregular Warfare JOC Logic

Source: U.S. Department of Defense, *Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC)*, Version 1.0 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2007), 2.

Three predominant areas comprise the IW environment: operational environments, key elements, and supporting ideas. The first area, operational environments, designates three primary environments where military forces can conduct IW. These environments include: (1) within friendly states; (2) within hostile states; and (3) within non-belligerent states.<sup>20</sup> Deliberately broad, the scope of the IW operational environments indicates that IW can be conducted anywhere around globe, in contrast to the limited scope assigned to low-intensity conflict.

The key elements of IW include indirect approaches, protracted nature, transnational threats, non-state actors, global scale, focus on the will of the people, and unified action.

According to the IW JOC, the term “Indirect Approaches” has multiple meanings within the context of IW:

(1) Focus on addressing the underlying economic, political, cultural, or security conditions that fuel the grievances of the population, rather than on applying military power directly against the military and paramilitary forces of adversaries. Both approaches are necessary, but the direct application of military power is unlikely to be decisive.

(2) Disrupt, dislocate, and defeat adversaries by attacking them physically and psychologically where they are most vulnerable and unsuspecting, rather than attacking where they are strongest or in the manner they expect.

(3) Empower, enable, support, or leverage IA and other partners to attack adversaries militarily or confront them non-militarily, rather than relying on direct and unilateral military confrontation by U.S. joint forces.

(4) Take actions with or against third-party states or armed groups in order to influence adversaries rather than taking actions to influence adversaries directly.

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<sup>20</sup> Ibid., 2.

(5) Attack adversaries using a combination of conventional and nonconventional methods and means rather than relying only on conventional military forces. Nonconventional methods and means might include clandestine or covert actions, operations in combination with irregular forces, or the nonconventional use of conventional capabilities.

(6) Subvert the power and influence of adversaries over the relevant populations by isolating them physically and psychologically from their local and international support through the use of PSYOP, public diplomacy, and public affairs activities; security operations; population and resource control measures; and other means.

Protracted IW Campaigns. IW historically has required a prolonged and persistent effort of at least a decade to achieve a political outcome. The protracted nature of IW means that a persistent presence and a sustained effort are required over a much longer duration than is typical of conventional major combat operations.

Increasingly Global Scale of IW. IW will be fought not only within a single country or region, but increasingly will be waged on a global scale. While some conflicts may occur in a single country or region, the globalization of emerging transnational threats requires that U.S. joint forces, working in concert with their interagency (IA) and multinational partners, prepare for multiple, comprehensive, and coordinated IW campaigns across multiple theaters of operation.

Focus on the Will of the People. The focus of IW is on the will of the people. Joint forces often must set the conditions that enable long-term diplomatic, informational, and economic means to gain the popular support of friendly elements and undermine the popular support of adversaries.<sup>21</sup>

Furthermore, in order to exert control and influence over the populace, the joint forces, in concert with the host nation government, must provide stability for the populace and security from the insurgents. When the joint force or the host nation government fails to provide security, at a minimum, they will be unable to influence the local populace, regardless of the beliefs and desires of the people. For example, in the Tagab Valley, Kapisa Province, Afghanistan in 2006 villagers burned humanitarian

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<sup>21</sup> Ibid., 19-21.

assistance drops of clothing and blankets, supplies that they very much needed for the approaching winter. The villagers refused the assistance not based on a lack of want or support for the Government of Afghanistan, but because the coalition had not first provided security from the insurgents.

Foundation of IW Activities. The foundations of IW activities are those that produce a positive psychological effect on the populace in order to gain their support and weaken their support of an adversary. Assessing psychological effects on contested populations must take into account existing cultural and social norms. Without this focus on the will of the population, IW will degenerate into a struggle marked by brutal suppression and intimidation to force the people to submit to the will of the belligerents.<sup>22</sup>

Unified Action. To achieve unified action in IW, the [U.S. Government] will have to consider and develop alternative integrated military-IA command relationship and staffs at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.<sup>23</sup>

Lastly, the supporting ideas area of IW includes the concepts of persistent presence, interpersonal relationships, operations and intelligence fusion at the tactical level, expanded role of the conventional forces, and alternative command and control (C2) for IW.<sup>24</sup> Understanding these supporting ideas is critical to enabling effective synchronization of SOF and conventional force operations in an IW environment. Chapters 4 and 5 will discuss these areas in detail.

In short, doctrine summarizes the key facets of IW according to the ends, ways and means. The IW JOC defines these elements as follows:

Ends: Friendly political authority and influence over host population are secured and adversary control, influence, and support are denied. Ways: IW emphasizes winning the support of the relevant populations, promoting friendly

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<sup>22</sup> Ibid., 21.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., 21-22.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., 22-26.

political authority, and eroding adversary control, influence, and support. Means: Fully integrated U.S. and partner conventional and unconventional forces and capabilities.<sup>25</sup>

The significance of the subject matter of this thesis is of great consequence.

Irregular warfare has become the dominant theme of warfare today and has required SOF and conventional forces to work closely together. This has caused substantial operational problems, oftentimes resulting in mission failure and loss of personnel and equipment.

As SOF and CF are forced to work together more often, for longer duration, and in closer proximity, it is imperative that these units are integrated and synchronized, able to work together in order to achieve complementary effects and unity of effort. This research may contribute to synchronizing SOF-CF effects on the battlefield and achieving better unity of effort. This research may also serve to diminish the rift and increase the harmony between SOF and CF units.

This chapter has identified the problem of SOF and conventional force interoperability and integration and discussed the importance of this issue. This chapter also defined key terms and discussed research factors. The next chapter will discuss the key works utilized to research and analyze the issue.

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<sup>25</sup> Ibid., 19.

## CHAPTER 2

### LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter consists of four principal sections. The first section provides an overview of the doctrinal material available on the subject of SOF-CF I&I, followed by a discussion of the published materials in the next section. The third section discusses the case studies used to analyze this issue. Finally, the fourth section discusses studies conducted by some of the major military commands.

#### Doctrinal Overview

There are quite a large number of sources dealing with the integration and interoperability of SOF and conventional forces. The issue has become a significant topic that has received General Officer level involvement. The U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), along with its subordinate commands and agencies, have conducted numerous studies and focus groups, translating the results of this research into publications and doctrine, such as Joint Publication 3-05, Joint Special Operations. The purpose of JP 3-05 is to provide

basic concepts and principles to guide the Services, combatant commanders, and subordinate joint force commanders (JFCs) to prepare for and conduct special operations (SO). It describes these military operations and provides general guidance for military commanders to employ and execute command and control (C2) of special operations forces (SOF) when assigned to a geographic combatant commander, subordinate unified commander, or a joint task force (JTF) commander. Specific SO operational guidelines are provided in Joint Publication (JP) 3-05.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations*, JP 3-05.2, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning*, JP 3-07.1 *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID)*, JP

3-53, *Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations*, JP 3-57, *Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations*, and JP 3-57.1, *Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs*.<sup>26</sup>

This doctrine, however, does not go into great depth on SOF and conventional force integration and interoperability, especially at the tactical level, obliging leaders and soldiers on the ground to deduce viable constructs. Notwithstanding, the key element is that the new doctrine sets the benchmark calling for the integration and interoperability of SOF and CF and builds the framework of how to accomplish this.

### General Sources

Several sources dealing with this issue focus on the topic directly, while many other sources discuss the topic as part of a broader subject, such as an analysis of battles and operations. Most sources were written after the start of Operation Enduring Freedom, where the problems with the integration and interoperability, or lack thereof, between SOF and conventional forces became very evident. Alternatively, many other sources dealt with the topic prior to OEF, indicating that while the problem may have taken on more significance during the GWOT, it is certainly not a new issue.

This research utilized journal articles, most written by military personnel; interviews; lessons learned through the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) and the Army training centers; command studies and work groups; as well as books and case studies to identify causes of the problems with integrating SOF and conventional forces. The author drew on these sources along with doctrine, to include Army Field Manuals and Joint Publications, to determine ways to overcome identified problems and

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<sup>26</sup> Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-05, *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2003), I-1.



recommend ways for SOF and CF to operate together successfully on the battlefield. The author has also taken into account numerous unpublished sources. These primarily include unit After Action Reports (AAR) and conversations with other CF and SOF leaders from the U.S. Army.

### Case Studies

This research utilized case studies to illustrate failed and successful SOF-CF integration during the GWOT. The case study illustrating successful SOF-CF I&I is Operation Restoring Rights from OIF.<sup>27</sup> Unfortunately, there are no published sources available on Operation Restoring Rights. The author derived data on this operation from the personal experiences of the Special Forces company commander who conducted the operation, as well as those of the author, who was also present during the operation.

Operation Anaconda, conducted during OEF, serves as the case study used to illustrate failures in SOF-CF integration. Military and civilian analysts have studied this operation ad nauseam; consequently, there are a myriad of sources on the topic. The author selected a few articles and books, including the well-known *Not a Good Day to Die* by Sean Naylor to highlight the central lessons learned.

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<sup>27</sup> Note: Operation Restoring Rights conducted by the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment in the Sarai district of Tall Afar, Iraq, contains numerous published sources. The case study in this research refers to a sequel operation conducted as part of Operation Restoring Rights. This operation was conducted in the Qadisiyah district of Tall Afar following the Sarai operation. In this thesis, “Operation Restoring Rights” refers specifically to the Qadisiyah operation.

## Command Studies

The U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) is one of the Department of Defense's nine combatant commands and has several key roles in transforming the U.S. military's capabilities. The Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC), a subordinate command of USJFCOM, coordinates the U.S. military's overall joint training efforts. Along with the JWFC, the Special Operations Command--Joint Forces Command (SOCJFCOM) is the Department of Defense's primary joint Special Operations Forces trainer and integrator. The mission of SOCJFCOM is to train conventional and special operations joint force commanders and their staffs in the employment of SOF, focusing on full integration of SOF and conventional forces in planning and execution to enhance warfighting readiness. SOCJFCOM, along with the JWFC, has produced several studies that address the issue of SOF-CF integration.

USSOCOM and CALL have written several FOUO documents on this topic, including the following:

- USSOCOM PUB 3-33 Handbook on Conventional and SOF Integration and Interoperability dated September, 2006
- CALL Handbook No. 07-8, Feb 2007
- JIISO JT&E Conventional Forces and Special Operations Forces Integration and Interoperability Checklist, September 2006

Although these documents will not be included in this thesis in order to keep this research open to the widest audience, the author recommends reading them for supplementary study. Further unclassified references and resources are also available in web postings on AKO, NKO, and USAF. Readers can find additional classified references and resources at the following links:

- <http://jiiso.jte.osd.smil.mil> (JIISO)
- [http://www.socom.smil.mil/sokf/j7/Lessons\\_Learned](http://www.socom.smil.mil/sokf/j7/Lessons_Learned) (SOCOM)

- [http://call.army.smil.mil/focus/sof/sof\\_inter.asp](http://call.army.smil.mil/focus/sof/sof_inter.asp) (CALL)
- [http://www.jwfc.jfcom.mil/jko/trng\\_resource/jdlchandbook.html](http://www.jwfc.jfcom.mil/jko/trng_resource/jdlchandbook.html) (JKO)

### Summary

In addition to the published sources discussed, the author's personal experience is also a valuable element to this research and provides an advantageous viewpoint with which to help bridge the gap between SOF and conventional forces. As an Infantry and Special Forces officer, the author can relate to the culture and operational requirements of both elements. The author's varied operational experiences in both OEF and OIF as well as numerous other operational deployments also provide significant input to this research.

Despite the fact that the issue of SOF-CF I&I has received much discussion and debate, there are still significant problems hampering operations in the field. This study adopts a unique approach to analyzing the issue. By utilizing AARs, case studies, and doctrinal frameworks, combined with the significant impact of cultural friction and personal relationships, this research attempts to convey the problem in a different light. Chapter 3 further delineates the methodology utilized to conduct this research.

## CHAPTER 3

### RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The ultimate purpose of this research is to provide a framework for military leaders to improve SOF-CF integration and interoperability with the aim of achieving synergy and unity of effort. The purpose of this chapter is to explain the design and construction of the research methodology used in this thesis, to include an explanation of the methods of data research and analysis.

SOF-CF integration and interoperability remains a problem facing leaders and planners, which is the motive for conducting this research. The lack of institutional and doctrinal information poses an obstacle to generating appropriate solutions and recommendations to resolve the problem. Notwithstanding, positive and negative operational experiences have given rise to numerous sources of information. By analyzing this information, consisting of after action reports, command studies, working groups, historical analyses, and observations from current leaders in the U.S. military, and integrating these sources with available doctrine, it is possible to determine appropriate recommendations for successful SOF-CF I&I.

#### Chapter Design

This thesis is comprised of five chapters. Chapter 1 is an introduction to several key definitions, including a detailed examination of the contemporary operational environment, focused on Irregular Warfare as the predominant operational theme facing the United States and its allies. The chapter defined Irregular Warfare and explained IW doctrine and requirements.

Chapter 2 reviewed the available literature pertaining to SOF-CF integration and interoperability during the Global War on Terror period. It also reviewed literature specific to two case studies that the author selected for analysis. Chapter 3 described the research methodology and explained the use and selection of the case studies.

After defining the problem and the scope of research and ensuring the general reader understood the key terms, chapter 4 of this research endeavored to bridge the gap between conventional force and SOF knowledge of special operations and conventional operations. The preponderance of special operations officers (as well as many of the non-commissioned officers) began their military careers in the conventional military. Thus, they understand the culture and practices of conventional forces. Few conventional military leaders, on the other hand, understand special operations. In order to determine the best way to integrate SOF and conventional forces, leaders must clearly understand both units. Recognizing the one-sided knowledge among military leaders, it was necessary to fully describe special operations, to include SOF units and personnel, special operations doctrine, and culture. This research provided a comprehensive review of these subjects. As a basis for analysis, this research examined SOF-CF operations during the Global War on Terror, investigating the problems, failures, and successes. To this end, this research studied two case studies that accentuated failed and successful SOF-CF integration.

Finally, chapter 5 concluded the research and provided recommendations for areas of further study. Here the author presented an analysis of the factors necessary for successful SOF-CF integration and interoperability and achieving unity of effort in order to ensure mission success.

## Research Methodology

This research conducted an extensive analysis of joint and U.S. Army doctrine, along with historical analysis of SOF-CF integration. From this qualitative analysis, the author selected case studies to serve as illustrations of the issues and problems facing SOF and conventional leaders when planning and executing operations involving the use of SOF and conventional forces.

Two case studies were selected from the GWOT period to portray the complexity and problems associated with SOF-CF I&I. From OIF, the author selected Operation Restoring Rights to illustrate successful SOF-CF I&I. From OEF, the author selected Operation Anaconda to illustrate what can happen when leaders and planners fail to synchronize SOF and conventional force operations.

Several factors led to the selection of the case studies used in this research. Primarily, each represents an operation employing SOF in concert with CF (distinct from operations where SOF provided an indirect supporting role, such as in Operation Desert Storm where SOF operated unilaterally in support of preparation of the battlefield). Second, each represents operations conducted in either Iraq or Afghanistan during the Global War on Terror. Furthermore, the author selected Operation Anaconda because it is a well-known operation, and it served as the genesis for improving joint operations. The author selected Operation Restoring Rights based on his assessment that this operation should serve as a textbook example of proper SOF-CF I&I. Because there are no published sources on this operation, an interview was conducted with MAJ (Ret) Douglas Overdeer, who served as the commander of C Company, 1st Battalion, 5th

Special Forces Group during the operation. Chapter 4 described and analyzed these case studies.

This research also took into account experiences from current military leaders. Reported dynamics, both positive and negative, that SOF and conventional force leaders contended with while deployed to OIF and OEF served to further develop solutions, as well as to validate the results derived during this research. These sources provided valuable insight into the issues and concerns units are facing when conducting SOF-CF operations in the same battlespace. By taking into account the issues and concerns raised by the force, this research probes down to the user level to uncover the roots of the I&I problem, as well as potential solutions.

#### Methodology Strengths and Weaknesses

The strength of this research lies in the fusion of current doctrine, major command studies and working groups, and reports from the field, combined with historical perspectives in the form of case studies. By analyzing case studies to identify problems, corroborating this data with that from the major commands and operational units, and aligning these results with doctrine, the author derived several “tenets of successful SOF-CF I&I” which offer leaders and planners an appropriate framework to ensure joint force commanders achieve unity of effort.

Notwithstanding, the methodology used in this research has its weaknesses. Primarily, the classification of this study prevents the use of classified and FOUO sources. The issue of SOF-CF I&I has received a good deal of command emphasis based on the seriousness of the problem, which has resulted in numerous recommendations, most which are classified or FOUO and thus are restricted from this research. The fact

that the open sources used in this research, all of which provided highly valuable and relevant input, contained much of the information found in classified material mitigates this weakness.

### Summary

By understanding the fundamental dynamics of integration and interoperability, military leaders can mitigate the negative consequences that result from a failure to integrate SOF and conventional force operations. For this purpose, this research analyzed numerous sources. Trends exhibited in these sources, incorporated with current doctrine, produced a set of “tenets of successful I&I” for use by leaders and planners to ensure SOF and conventional forces are integrated and interoperable. It is the author’s objective that this study serves as a guide to assist in educating conventional and SOF leaders alike on how to successfully integrate on the modern battlefield.



## CHAPTER 4

### ANALYSIS

This chapter will explore the nature of SOF-CF I&I, examining I&I requirements and challenges. The chapter begins with a discussion of the problems leaders and planners are facing on the contemporary battlefield. This research then endeavors to bridge the gap between conventional force and SOF knowledge of special operations by discussing special operations, special operations forces, and unit culture. To accentuate failed and successful SOF-CF integration, this chapter next analyzes two selected case studies, followed by a discussion of certain key concepts.

#### The Problem

As previously discussed, the contemporary battlefield requires SOF and CF to work side by side, and in most cases share the same battlespace. Under these circumstances, SOF and CF I&I has come to the forefront of military study due to the numerous challenges I&I has posed for planners and leaders in today's battlespace.

Figure 4 below depicts these challenges.




Figure 4. The Problem<sup>28</sup>

Source: Joint Integration and Interoperability of Special Operations (JIISO) Joint Test and Evaluation (JT&E), *BGen Neller Update Brief* (MacDill AFB, FL, 21 January 2004), slide 2.

In this battlespace, the tactical level of execution is the level where SOF and CF operate closest together to achieve JTF objectives. This level is also the most challenging based on cultural friction; undeveloped relationships and trust; and lack of knowledge of the other force's capabilities, limitations and mission sets. An often-shared attitude that the other force is not "value added" or does not have the "need to know" further contributes to I&I challenges. Lastly, "task saturation" contributes to preventing

<sup>28</sup> In Figure 4, per the JIISO JT&E briefing note, JTTP (Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures) is the actions and methods that implement joint doctrine and describe how forces will be employed in joint operations.

effective I&I. Task saturation refers to the situation where tactical operators focus on their own operations, causing a lack of desire or need to collaborate with other forces.<sup>29</sup>

Compounding “the problem” are numerous friction points, including a lack of understanding of special operations and cultural discord. To reduce these friction points, U.S. military leaders must truly understand special operations forces and special operations. Just as studying the culture, demographics, and topography of an area prior to conducting operations assists leaders in developing proper courses of action, so too will an understanding of SO and SOF assist leaders in integrating and synchronizing SOF and conventional forces.

### Understanding SOF

A discussion of the characteristics of special operations and special operations forces, as well as the capabilities and limitations of SOF, SOF tasks and mission criteria, and SOF culture should help the reader develop an understanding of the purpose of SOF and the reasons for their employment by the JFC. Moreover, the reader should gain an appreciation for the nature of special operations and the soldiers who comprise SOF units. As a military leader, this understanding is requisite for achieving successful SOF-CF I&I.

Before examining some key aspects of SOF doctrine, it is first beneficial to understand the origins of and inputs to SOF doctrinal development. Influential leaders and proponent organizations have developed and refined SOF doctrine throughout the

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<sup>29</sup> General (Ret) Gary Luck and Colonel (Ret) Mike Findlay, *Insights & Best practices: Special Operations and Conventional Force Integration, Focus Paper #5* (Suffolk, VA: Joint Warfighting Center, October 2008), 14.

history of SOF. Examples of SOF unconventional warfare campaigns include the operations of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) Detachment 101 in Burma, the Jedburgh Teams, and the OSS along with the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) in Yugoslavia during World War II. Current examples include the initial phase of OEF and SF operations with the Kurds in OIF I.

BG “Wild Bill” Donovan established the OSS in 1940. The OSS had several divisions, primarily focused on conducting special operations and gathering secret intelligence. They maintained a very close partnership with the British SOE. The Special Operations branch of the OSS eventually expanded to include Operational Groups with the mission to conduct operations with guerrilla forces in occupied territory. OSS operations groups trained thousands of indigenous personnel to combat the Japanese. Detachment 101, the most famous of the groups, organized over 11,000 Kachin tribesmen in Burma. The U.S. Army also conducted guerrilla operations behind Japanese lines in the Philippines when Colonel Russell Volckman, who was instrumental in the birth and development of Special Forces, escaped from the enemy and formed a Filipino guerrilla band in northern Luzon.

During OEF, Special Forces (SF) waged unconventional warfare in order to destroy the Taliban regime. Special Forces Operational Detachments--Alpha (SFODA or ODA) also linked up with and coordinated the actions of the Northern Alliance. SOF elements additionally conducted numerous reconnaissance and strike operations. During OIF, SF conducted UW with the Kurds in Northern Iraq and with the Shias in the south, as well as eliminated the threat from SCUD missiles in the West. Other SOF elements conducted several raids to seize key terrain and capture high value targets.

## Characteristics of Special Operations and SOF

[Special operations] are operations conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or economic objectives employing military capabilities for which there is no broad conventional force requirement. Special operations often require covert, clandestine, or low visibility capabilities. SO are applicable across the range of military operations. They can be conducted independently or in conjunction with operations of conventional forces or other government agencies and may include operations by, with or through indigenous or surrogate forces. SO differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets.<sup>30</sup>

Of importance is the verity that SOF is distinct from conventional forces. The nature and demands of SO require personnel with different characteristics and attributes than those required by conventional force soldiers and leaders. During the entrance and qualification process for SOF candidates, SOF carefully selects personnel for their maturity and high level of competency. Most are mid-grade officers and NCOs who already possess advanced military skills. Furthermore, SOF candidates undergo a rigorous selection process and lengthy training; consequently, it is not possible to rapidly replace or create SOF personnel.<sup>31</sup>

SOF is not a substitute for conventional forces; as such, leaders and planners should not use SOF for operations that CF is better suited to conduct. Bear in mind that SOF is an operational and strategic asset and exists to provide strategic utility; it is advantageous to employ SOF in this capacity. Moreover, when employed in conjunction with CF, the JFC must fully integrate SOF into the campaign plan. When properly

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<sup>30</sup> Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-05, I-1.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., II-2.

utilized, integrated and synchronized, SOF can enable the joint force to achieve objectives that would be unattainable by conventional forces alone.<sup>32</sup>

SOF provides commanders with a rapid, tailored military response across the full spectrum of operations. SOF special skills can reduce the U.S. military signature and level of force when required. SOF deploys with a lower profile and reduced signature than CF, to include the ability to conduct covert and clandestine operations. SOF can provide unconventional capabilities, operating in hostile or denied territories, working closely with regional military and civilian populations and surveying, assessing, and reporting on local situations.<sup>33</sup>

Special operations forces are inherently joint, stemming from the reality that providing the resources needed to conduct SO requires the support of multiple services. As such, SOF elements habitually plan and execute joint operations. SOF also routinely operates with U.S. government agencies, international organizations, NGOs and foreign military forces. To this end, the SOF command structure is proficient in conducting joint and combined planning and execution; commanders and planners should utilize this element to integrate SOF into joint force mission planning and execution.<sup>34</sup>

SOF of course also has limitations. As already discussed, important considerations regarding the use of SOF include the reality that improper employment could result in the loss of forces that the services cannot replace easily or rapidly. Accordingly, leaders and planners should employ SOF against targets with operational or

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<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid., II-3.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., II-2.

strategic value, avoiding the temptation to use SOF as a substitute for CF. In addition to employment considerations, austere logistic support further limits SOF capabilities. Most SOF units cannot logistically support themselves for extended periods without support from conventional forces.<sup>35</sup>

### SOF Core Tasks

According to special operations doctrine, SOF has nine assigned core tasks. These tasks consist of direct action (DA), special reconnaissance (SR), foreign internal defense, unconventional warfare, counterterrorism, counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, civil affairs operations, psychological operations, and information operations.<sup>36</sup>

In essence, SOF conducts two types of tasks: those that conventional forces cannot perform; and those that conventional forces can conduct but not under the same conditions and to the same standards as SOF.<sup>37</sup> For example, CF conduct the DA missions of raids and ambushes. However, when these missions are conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas, require specialized military capabilities, or utilize indigenous forces, they should be conducted by SOF.

### SOF Culture

The antecedents for the friction between SOF and CF go back as far as the American Revolutionary War. American militia forces, when operating independently similarly to today's SOF, created chaos in the British rear areas and

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<sup>35</sup> Ibid., II-3.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid., II-3-II-4.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid., II-3.

achieved results that the American regulars could not match. Despite their contributions, senior Continental Army officers regularly disparaged the irregulars' reliability, discipline, and submission to orders. This disdain for SOF and irregular operations in general would become a recurring theme throughout U.S. military history.<sup>38</sup>

The author asserts this disdain for SOF is still present in the U.S. military, and that SOF and CF leaders must bridge this cultural divide in order for these units to conduct integrated and synchronized operations on the modern battlefield. To accomplish this, SOF and CF personnel have to develop a complete understanding of each other, to include unit history, characteristics, training regimens, roles and missions, operational requirements, and soldiers.

SOF's greatest strength and, ironically, a major cause of the rift between SOF and CF, is its individual soldiers. Former USSOCOM commander General Wayne Downing, speaking about the goals of SOF selection, assessment and training, provides some insight into the type of soldier SOF requires. Downing commented: "Our assessment and selection programs are designed to get people who do things in an unconventional manner. Who are accustomed to working in scenarios and in situations that are very unstructured...Our people will generally come up with a very novel approach of how to solve problems, and many times people on the conventional side of the armed forces are very uncomfortable because our people do not do things in the traditional way."<sup>39</sup> Thus, SOF personnel are specially selected to possess certain personality traits and an ability to

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<sup>38</sup> Colonel Kevin A. Christie, USA, "Synchronizing Chaos: Command and Control of Special Operations and Conventional Forces in Shared Battlespace" (Research Paper, Naval War College, Newport, RI, 2006), 3.

<sup>39</sup> Susan L. Marquis, *Unconventional Warfare, Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1997), 47-48.



conduct divergent missions. Yet, incongruously, in meeting the required criteria and executing their unique missions, SOF personnel are denigrated by the conventional military.

To the conventional military, “nothing is more contentious than [SOF’s] perceived lack of discipline and military decorum.”<sup>40</sup> Conventional disdain for SOF is often clearly evident. Stated about SF: “Their willingness to defy convention, and discipline at times, would prove troublesome to many in the Army.”<sup>41</sup> Many generals could not hide their open disdain for Special Forces; in fact, three consecutive Army Chiefs of Staff in the 1960s voiced their contempt for SF. GEN Harold Johnson, Chief of Staff from 1964-1968, gave the most poignant criticism, describing SF troops as “‘fugitives from responsibility’ who ‘tended to be nonconformists, couldn’t quite get along in a straight military system...’”<sup>42</sup>

This perceived lack of discipline and decorum results from SOF culture. Leadership and discipline are more informal in SOF units, normal military protocol is more relaxed, and SOF uniforms and equipment are often unique. Mr. Elliot Cohen confirms, “An almost universally observed characteristic of elite units is their lack of

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<sup>40</sup> Colonel Bernd Horn, Canadian Army, “When Cultures Collide: The Conventional Military/SOF Chasm,” *Canadian Military Journal* (Autumn 2004): 8.

<sup>41</sup> Bob Seals, “The ‘Green Beret Affair’: A Brief Introduction,” *MilitaryHistoryOnline.com* (November 24, 2007), under paragraph 3, <http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/20thCentury/articles/greenberets.aspx> (accessed November 22, 2008).

<sup>42</sup> Joseph R. Fischer, Stanley Sandler, and Richard Stewart, *To Free From Oppression: A Concise History of U.S. Army Special Forces, Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, and the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School* (Fort Bragg, NC: Government Printing Office, 1994), 65.

formal discipline...Elite units often disregard the spit and polish or orders about saluting”<sup>43</sup>

The characteristics, capabilities, and attributes that set SOF apart from conventional forces are the very qualities that enable SOF operators and units to succeed in highly complex, uncertain, and ambiguous environments; to think unconventionally.

Susan Marquis accurately describes SOF culture:

Special Operations Forces were developed to solve problems that could not be resolved by a conventional military force. Special operators are selected and trained to take advantage of their independence, courage, teamwork, and refusal to be bound by conventional solutions to unconventional tasks. Since WWII special operations forces have stood slightly to one side of conventional military culture, with its own values and mission that is separate from conventional American military culture.<sup>44</sup>

SOF organizational culture has also been maintained through the inculcation of organizational values through selection, assessment, and training. Special operations training attempts to find and develop within individuals an extraordinary inner strength and an ability to think and innovate. At the same time, training emphasizes the sanctity and necessity of small teams, the unit that undertakes most operations. Only through belief in the team and trust among its members will special operators be successful.<sup>45</sup>

In a similar vein, Seals describes Special Forces as “...unconventional, more concerned with substance over form, and quite willing to defy conventions in order to accomplish a mission... [SF is] a unique organization that attracted square pegs that often would not fit into the round holes of the spit and polish Conventional Army.”<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> Elliot A. Cohen, *Commandos and Politicians: Elite Military Units in Modern Democracies*, (Cambridge, MA: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1978), 74.

<sup>44</sup> Marquis, 57.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, 264.

<sup>46</sup> Seals, under paragraph 3.

Many CF leaders seem to believe the eccentric customs of SOF will negatively affect their command, accordingly discriminating against SOF units and personnel. This attitude is consistent with Mr. Cohen's assessment that "...almost all of the elite units we have studied here faced considerable bureaucratic hostility-enmity translated into effective harassment."<sup>47</sup> Often a CF leader has disdainfully questioned SOF soldiers to the effect of, "How do I control my soldiers when they see you acting inappropriately?" However, this leader should discern what construes "inappropriate?" Different units have unique standard operating procedures, customs, and values, albeit more unique among SOF units than in the conventional force. Nonetheless, the 82nd Airborne Division and 101st Airborne Division, for example, although both conventional units, still have different procedures, customs, and values.

Whether one unit condones the culture of another unit is immaterial. Cultures develop based on a unit's missions and traditions; a unit cannot change its culture without altering its essence and consequently rendering it incapable of performing its mission. SOF culture is ideally suited to irregular warfare and the special mission sets assigned to SOF. As Susan Marquis describes, SOF requires operators with specific characteristics, capabilities, and attributes in order to successfully execute its missions. Although these qualities are detrimental to and unacceptable in a conventional unit, they are indispensable in a SOF unit. By understanding this dynamic, the author hopes CF leaders will gain an appreciation and, most importantly, an acceptance of SOF culture.

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<sup>47</sup> Cohen, 95.

## SOF Imperatives

The SOF imperatives are a set of requirements designed to ensure the joint task force properly and successfully employs SOF. They can serve as a reliable checklist to aid planners when considering operations which involve the use of SOF. As with any other force, commanders must employ SOF at the right time and place and with the correct force structure and appropriate equipment in order to be successful. Based on the unique operational characteristics of most SOF missions, failure by leaders and planners to seriously consider these imperatives could easily cause mission failure.

There are 12 SOF imperatives as follow:

1. Understand the operational environment. Leaders and planners must understand what defines success or failure and to whom. They must understand all aspects of the operational environment, to include the political, economic, sociological, psychological, geographic, informational, and military aspects. SOF personnel must identify the friendly and hostile decision makers, their objectives and strategies, and their means of interacting. SOF commanders must remain flexible and adapt their operations to changing situations.<sup>48</sup>

2. Recognize political implications. Planners must consider the political effects of military activities. Political, more than military, concerns are often dominate in SOF operations.<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>48</sup> Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-05, *Army Special Operations Forces* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), 1-11.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

3. Facilitate interagency activities. In brief, planners must know who is in charge and work to facilitate operations in joint, combined, and non-Department of Defense (DOD) environments. SOF leaders expect ambiguous missions, conflicting interests and objectives, compartmentalization of activity, and disunity of command. SOF must alleviate these obstacles and promote unity of effort. As well, SOF must coordinate its activities actively and continually with all relevant groups.<sup>50</sup>

4. Engage the threat discriminately. SOF is a limited resource that the services cannot replace easily or rapidly. SOF mission objectives require careful management of when, where and how the joint task force employs SOF to maximize its capabilities and minimize the risks.<sup>51</sup>

5. Consider long-term effects. SOF must consider the second and third order political, economic, informational and military effects of planned actions. To this end, SOF must operate within legal and political constraints. As well, SOF operations must not sacrifice national and theater level long-term objectives in order to achieve an immediate, short-term effect. Moreover, SOF must ensure their policies, plans and operations support their assigned national and theater level priorities; failure to do so can lead to a loss of credibility and legitimacy.<sup>52</sup> For example, loss of rapport with the host nation could cause mission failure. Consequently, SOF must consider the host nation attitude toward the U.S. and follow-on units in all plans and operations.

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<sup>50</sup> Ibid., 1-12.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid.

6. Ensure legitimacy and credibility of special operations. The U.S. cannot support a foreign government or foreign indigenous elements without legitimacy and credibility. Likewise, the U.S. cannot gain the support of a foreign government or foreign indigenous element without legitimacy and credibility. As such, legitimacy is the most vital factor in developing and maintaining both international and domestic support.<sup>53</sup>

7. Anticipate and control psychological effects. All SO produce significant psychological effects, some intentionally created and others inadvertently produced from perception. In order to maintain control of the operational environment, SOF must anticipate perceived public notions and enemy propaganda, integrating PSYOP and Civil Affairs operations in order to mitigate negative and promote positive psychological effects.<sup>54</sup>

8. Apply capabilities indirectly. The primary mission of SOF is to train, advise and assist indigenous forces. These forces then serve as force multipliers, enabling the U.S. to pursue national objectives indirectly, with minimum U.S. visibility, risk, and cost (both in terms of money and U.S. troops committed). To this end, SOF must avoid assuming responsibility when supporting a foreign government or force, instead encouraging the foreign element to assume primary authority and responsibility for all operations, both successful and unsuccessful.<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>53</sup> Ibid.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid., 1-12-1-13.

9. Develop multiple options. A principle most operators are familiar with is that few plans survive past infiltration or enemy contact. Consequently, given the small size of SOF elements and lack of immediate support and reinforcements, thorough contingency planning is critical to SOF mission success. SOF must also maintain operational flexibility by developing a broad range of options and maintaining the ability to shift from one option to another both during mission planning and execution.<sup>56</sup>

10. Ensure long-term sustainment. U.S. funding for foreign programs is finite. Accordingly, SOF must avoid initiating programs that exceed the means and capabilities of the host nation to support and maintain without U.S. assistance. SO policy, strategy, and programs must be durable and sustainable by the host nation.<sup>57</sup>

11. Provide sufficient intelligence. SOF elements do not possess the combat power, support and reinforcements necessary to deal with unanticipated hostile actions. Therefore, SO require detailed, all-source, near real-time intelligence for success.<sup>58</sup>

12. Balance security and synchronization. Because security is a dominant factor in SO, insufficient security may cause a SOF mission to fail. Likewise, excessive security may result in deficient coordination, also causing the mission to fail. As such, SOF leaders and planners must constantly strive to balance security and synchronization requirements in order to best facilitate proper mission planning and execution.<sup>59</sup>

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<sup>56</sup> Ibid., 1-13.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid.

## Special Operations Mission Criteria

Given the nature of SOF personnel, they will often accept and successfully execute any operation they are assigned. Consequently, there is a tendency for leaders and planners to assign inappropriate missions to SOF for which they are not suited to conduct, and for which other forces would be more apposite. Commanders must resist this temptation. To mitigate this problem, as well as to enhance SOF-CF integration, Special Operations Command, Central (SOCCENT) developed SO mission criteria during Desert Storm. These criteria serve to ensure that commanders assign missions to SOF that are appropriate and feasible, and for which the objective justifies the risk involved. SOF and CF leaders and planners alike apply these criteria when developing proposed courses of action. Accordingly, CF leaders should understand these criteria when operating with SOF.<sup>60</sup>

1. Is the mission appropriate for SOF? SO differs from conventional operations primarily in two ways. One is the degree of risk, meaning senior leaders expect SOF missions will not fail. When they do fail, the effects often reach the national and even international levels. The second is the techniques used. Along with utilizing specialized techniques, the founding fathers designed SOF for use against targets of operational or strategic value. The joint task force should avoid employing SOF against tactical targets unless such employment will achieve operational or strategic effects. SOF is not a substitute for other forces and commanders should never employ SOF as such. If a target is high value and prosecution requires the unique skills and capabilities of SOF, then SOF

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<sup>60</sup> Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-05.20, *Special Forces Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), 1-13.



is most likely the appropriate force. If not, planners should consider utilizing conventional forces.<sup>61</sup>

2. Does the mission support the theater campaign plan? SO must support the campaign plan. SOF must understand the JFC's priorities, goals, and end state, and avoid operations that do not support the commander's strategy.<sup>62</sup>

3. Is the mission operationally feasible? SOF is comprised of specialized units that are not designed for attrition or force-on-force warfare. Leaders and planners must understand SOF's unique structure, capabilities, limitations, and vulnerabilities and should not assign missions to SOF that are outside of these standards.<sup>63</sup>

4. Are the required resources available to conduct the mission? SOF elements at times require additional support from other SOF or conventional forces in order to conduct an operation. Although a target may be an acceptable SOF mission, lack of required support may decrease SOF's chance for success and thus render the mission unsuitable for SOF. Accordingly, planners must ensure all required support is available to SOF or assign the mission to another force.<sup>64</sup>

5. Does the expected outcome justify the risk? Some operations may provide only minimal value to the JFC, while at the same time imposing great risk to the force. Commanders must appreciate the high value as well as the limited resources of SOF and ensure the operation's desired outcome justifies the risk. When conducting risk

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<sup>61</sup> Ibid.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid., 1-13-1-14.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid., 1-14.

assessment, commanders must consider not only the potential loss of SOF personnel and equipment, but also the potential adverse political and military outcomes of mission failure. In essence, the JFC should not conduct special operations merely because the capabilities exist.<sup>65</sup>

Based on the explanation of the characteristics of SOF and SO, SOF core tasks and imperatives, and the unique SOF culture, the reader should have an appreciation for the SOF organization and its soldiers. More importantly, the reader should have developed an appreciation of SOF's unique capabilities and limitations, as well as comprehend proper planning considerations for the employment of SOF. With this perspective in mind, it is now beneficial to examine a few successful and unsuccessful combat operations that will serve to bridge the gap between doctrine and practice, and assist with developing appropriate guidance to achieve successful SOF-CF I&I.

### Historical Analysis

The following case studies illustrate I&I successes and failures in combined SOF-CF operations and highlight central lessons learned.

#### Operation Restoring Rights

Operation Restoring Rights as commonly known was conducted by 3 ACR in the Sarai district of Tal Afar, Iraq, in September 2005. The following case study, however, refers to a sequel operation conducted as part of Operation Restoring Rights. A combined SOF, CF and coalition force conducted this operation in the Qadisiyah district

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<sup>65</sup> Ibid.

of Tal Afar following the Sarai operation. In this case study, “Operation Restoring Rights” refers exclusively to the Qadisiyah operation.

Operation Restoring Rights illustrates a textbook example of proper SOF-CF integration and interoperability. The key players included C/1/5 SFG(A) (named Advanced Operational Base (AOB) 530), its Iraqi Army (IA) counterparts, and its partnership force, the 3rd ACR. The mission was for AOB 530, combat advising IA and Commando elements and supported by elements of 3 ACR, to conduct a cordon and search of the Qadisiyah neighborhood in Tall’ Afar on 14 September 2005 in order to deny the enemy a safe haven to operate against coalition forces.

#### Forging Command Relationships

COL H. R. McMaster, the commander of the 3rd ACR, established his headquarters at FOB Sykes in Tal Afar and operated in the MNF-NW sector of Iraq. Prior to Operation Restoring Rights, MAJ Doug Overdeer, commander of C/1/5 SFG(A), was headquartered at Al Kisik and operated in the western section of Iraq with his company’s SFODAs.

When MAJ Overdeer occupied his area of operations (AO) upon first deploying to Iraq, he was given minimal guidance and orders, and the C2 relationship between his company and 3 ACR was not defined. 3 ACR owned the battlespace, and AOB 530 was neither TACON nor OPCON to 3 ACR. The dilemma facing leaders of both elements was how to create unity of effort without unity of command. To ensure unity of effort and synchronization of all operations conducted in the AO, COL McMaster, MAJ Overdeer, and the 3 ACR squadron commanders convened and defined and agreed upon the command relationships in the AO. They established the boundaries for AOB 530 and

3 ACR elements, and set operational responsibilities. In essence, they established a command relationship of “mutual support.”<sup>66</sup>

To further enhance synchronization, COL McMaster included MAJ Overdeer on his operational command net. He also included MAJ Overdeer on his daily net calls, which contributed immeasurably to maintaining a common operational picture. On numerous occasions, COL McMaster had even sent his personal helicopter to pick up MAJ Overdeer and fly him to 3 ACR headquarters to participate in command meetings. Complementing the liaison between MAJ Overdeer and COL McMaster, throughout both commands the individual ODAs conducted liaison with the 3 ACR squadron and troop commanders. As a result, leaders in both organizations developed positive personal relationships based on mutual trust and respect.<sup>67</sup>

### Planning the Operation

Prior to the initiation of Operation Restoring Rights, COL McMaster requested that AOB 530 and its ODAs relocate from the western provinces of Iraq to Tal Afar. This request did not include all of the ODAs’ Iraqi counterparts, which MAJ Overdeer would not agree to, resulting in a major dispute between the two commanders. However, based on their development of a solid personal relationship, MAJ Overdeer and COL

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<sup>66</sup> Major (Ret) Douglas Overdeer, interview by author, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, November 25, 2008.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid.

McMaster resolved the issue amenable. COL McMaster authorized the ODAs to bring their Iraqi counterparts, and they occupied urban patrol bases throughout the city.<sup>68</sup>

Developing these urban patrol bases enabled the ODAs and IA elements to live in and among the local populace, and consequently exert influence over the populace. They conducted regular dismounted presence patrols throughout the city to collect intelligence. Based on these operations, AOB 530 made the assessment that the big fight would not be in the Sarai district where 3 ACR was about to launch its operation, but would actually be in the Qadisiyah district.<sup>69</sup>

During the execution of 3 ACR's operation in the Sarai district, MAJ Overdeer was located in the 3 ACR tactical operations center (TOC). Seeing the results of the battle confirmed his assessment that the primary insurgent threat remained in Qadisiyah, not Sarai. At the conclusion of the Sarai operation, MAJ Overdeer developed the plan for a cordon and search operation in the Qadisiyah district. In less than 24 hours a plan consisting of multiple U.S. and indigenous elements and multiple commands was developed, briefed, approved, rehearsed, and initiated.

MAJ Overdeer developed the plan with his staff, wrote the operations order (OPORD), and then gained approval from his SOF chain of command. He then convened with COL McMaster and the 1/3 ACR squadron commander to brief the plan and request approval, which COL McMaster granted. After gaining approval from COL McMaster, MAJ Overdeer briefed the OPORD to all key leaders participating in the operation.<sup>70</sup>

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<sup>68</sup> Ibid.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid.

## Concept of the Operation

The situation assessed by AOB 530 was that the Qadisiyah district remained a safe haven for insurgents and served as a launching area for insurgency cells operating in northwestern Tal Afar.

The task organization for the operation included:

- AOB 530
- 4 ODAs
- 3 companies from the 3rd IA Division
- 50 commandos from the 36th Commando Battalion, Iraqi Special Operations Force (ISOF) Brigade
- 2 troops from 1/3 ACR
- 2 OH-58s from 4/3 ACR
- Intelligence element from 1/5 SFG(A)

The key tasks for the operation included infiltrating the Qadisiyah district; clearing the major roads through the neighborhood by 1/3 ACR; establishing the outer cordon by 1/3 ACR; inner cordon and search of the neighborhood by AOB 530, IA and Commando elements; and detaining suspected insurgents and processing them in accordance with 3 ACR procedures.

The operation consisted of four phases. Phase I initiated the operation with elements from 1/3 ACR clearing all the major phase lines and routes through the sectors. During Phase II, the ODAs with their IA counterparts infiltrated the objective area. Phase III consisted of conducting the cordon and search. Elements from 1/3 ACR established the cordon and moved through the sector to provide immediate support and assist with boundary control. The ODAs, with their IA counterparts, searched the sector. Phase IV concluded the operation when all elements exfiltrated the objective area. Two OH-58 helicopters would isolate the objective and report any movement leaving the

objective area. They also had an on-order mission to destroy enemy forces in vicinity of the objective area. An external quick reaction force (QRF) was provided by elements from 1/3 ACR.

## C2

Command and control of the operation continued under the established mutual support relationship. The plan designated the 1/3 ACR commander as the overall commander for the operation. MAJ Overdeer served as the overall assault force commander, and each ODA commander became the ground commander within his sector.

Prior to executing the operation, MAJ Overdeer moved his headquarters inside the AO, occupying one of the ODA's urban patrol bases. Throughout the conduct of the operation, each ODA and cavalry troop executed C2 in their assigned sectors. MAJ Overdeer utilized multiple radio systems in order to monitor both the 3 ACR and the AOB 530 networks and synchronize operations. The combination of terrain masking and the effects of the jammers each element operated rendered radio communication between the ground elements virtually ineffective. To overcome the problem the OH-58s took on the vital role of relaying communications between elements.<sup>71</sup>

## Operational Summary

The operation commenced at 140600DSEP05 and ended ten hours later. During this period, the ODAs and IA elements searched every house in the Qadisiyah district, covering an area of approximately one kilometer by one kilometer. The combined force

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<sup>71</sup> Ibid.

encountered two improved explosive devices (IED) and became engaged in several firefights. They killed four insurgents and detained 53 personnel, of which they subsequently released 47 personnel. 1/3 ACR transported the remaining six detainees to the Regimental Detention Facility. The combined force also captured 38 weapons. Friendly casualties from the IA/Commando elements included one killed and six wounded; there were no American casualties. However, the non-quantifiable results of the operation are the most important accomplishments.

The operation served as an education process on multiple levels. During this operation, AOB 530 allowed the IA to lead the operation while their SF counterparts, always with them, remained in an advisory role. This operation was not simply an American operation with an Iraqi “face” on it; it was, by design, an IA operation. Following this ideal, the operation served as a model for 3 ACR on how to properly employ an indigenous force. As well, the operation served as the same model for the local populace.

The operation further signified a turning point in Tal Afar. Operation Restoring Rights was truly an Iraqi led and executed, American advised, operation. Most importantly, the local populace knew the Iraqi Army led and executed the operation, and that it was successful. As a result, this operation generated for the first time the local populace’s trust in the ability of their army. For the effort in OIF, winning the support and trust of the local populace in the former insurgent stronghold of Tal Afar was a major success.<sup>72</sup>

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<sup>72</sup> Ibid.



For AOB 530, the operation marked a transition in their training of the Iraqis; the IA elements transcended from a level of ability to conduct only individual soldier skills to a level of conducting and leading tactical operations. The operation validated the principle that even a poorly executed plan led by indigenous forces is better than a perfectly executed plan led by advisors.<sup>73</sup>

The operation also demonstrated to 3 ACR how tactical interrogation conducted by IA soldiers can be extremely valuable. The Iraqis, advised by the ODAs, conducted the tactical questioning of the detainees. 3 ACR initially provided the source used to positively identify (PID) detainees as insurgents. During the conduct of detainee operations, a Special Forces team sergeant noticed that information provided by the source was questionable, and decided to test the reliability of the source. Using a vetting system developed by one of the IA soldiers, he assembled a line-up of IA soldiers from outside of Tal Afar and ran these personnel through the source. The source quickly identified these IA soldiers as insurgents with various roles in cells operating inside Tal Afar, proving that the source was bad. Consequently, the detainees were re-screened, resulting in the PID of six insurgents and the release of the other detainees. By conducting this source vetting procedure, AOB 530 demonstrated to 3 ACR that their sources were questionable due to varied agendas. More importantly, AOB 530 was able to assist 3 ACR with developing competent source vetting procedures.<sup>74</sup>

Most significantly, the operation demonstrated how SOF and conventional forces could operate successfully together. SOF and conventional commanders were able to

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<sup>73</sup> Ibid.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid.

integrate multiple SOF, conventional, and indigenous elements, synchronize operations, and achieve unity of effort under a command relationship of mutual support. Both elements contributed to vital aspects of the operation. AOB 530 advised the indigenous force, conducted the search operation, and assisted with source vetting. 3 ACR provided the cordon force, MEDEVAC, QRF, fires, and rotary wing support. In the realm of SOF-CF integration, Operation Restoring Rights was a resounding success. Table 1 following summarizes the key operational aspects of the operation with respect to I&I, and compares them to those of Operation Anaconda.

#### Operation Anaconda

Approximately 2,000 troops, including over 900 U.S. soldiers from two different infantry divisions, 200 U.S. SOF operators, 450 Afghan Militia Forces (AMF), and 200 allied SOF soldiers conducted Operation Anaconda in the Shahikot Valley in eastern Afghanistan from 2-18 March 2002. Enemy forces consisted primarily of non-Afghan al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters.<sup>75</sup> Planners predicted a three-day battle with light combat; in the end, the battle raged for seven days of intense combat, finally culminating after 17 days. Coalition casualties consisted of eight dead and 50 wounded; enemy casualties totaled almost 800 dead.<sup>76</sup> Despite the coalition claim of victory, the operation was not without significant failures.

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<sup>75</sup>Adam Geibel, "Operation Anaconda, Shah-i-Khot Valley, Afghanistan, 2-10 March 2002," *Military Review* 82, no. 3 (May-Jun 2002): 72-73.

<sup>76</sup>Richard Kugler, *Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan: A Case Study of Adaptation in Battle* (Washington, DC: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, 2007), 1.

Key leaders in Operation Anaconda included General Tommy Franks, Commander, U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM); Lieutenant General Paul Mikolashek, Combined Forces Land Component Commander (CFLCC); Major General Franklin Hagenbeck, Commander, 10th Mountain Division; Colonel Frank Wiercinski, Commander, 3 Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (TF Rakkasan); and Colonel John Mulholland, Commander, 5th Special Forces Group.<sup>77</sup> 5th Group comprised the core of TF Dagger, and also functioned as JSOTF-North.

### Planning the Operation

Following the defeat of the Taliban and the failed attempt to capture Osama bin Laden at Tora Bora, SOF was planning where to focus future operations. SOF planning concentrated on the Shahikot Valley based on the CIA's collection of numerous reports that al-Qaeda forces were regrouping there. SOF, however, was not the only U.S. force developing an interest in the Shahikot Valley.<sup>78</sup>

In December 2001, yearning to get his 10th Mountain Division into the fight, Hagenbeck ordered his staff to collect all intelligence available on Afghanistan. His intent was to develop a concept of operations where the Division headquarters would C2 SOF and conventional forces. Presumably, Hagenbeck's goal was to demonstrate the Division's value to Mikolashek and thereby merit the lead in a major combat operation. Hagenbeck's staff identified the Shahikot Valley as a hot spot of enemy activity.<sup>79</sup>

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<sup>77</sup> Sean Naylor, *Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda* (New York: Berkley Books, 2005), xiii-xv.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*, 10-11.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*, 11-13.

By January 2002 Mulholland, based on reports from ODA 594 operating in Gardez, combined with other intelligence and his staff's analyses, designated the Shahikot Valley as TF Dagger's top priority and ordered his staff to begin planning an operation in the valley. Concurrently, Franks tasked Mikolashek to plan an operation to defeat enemy forces in the Khowst-Gardez region, southeastern Afghanistan. Franks and Mikolashek conceived of an unconventional operation with the main effort comprised of Afghan Militia Forces and TF Dagger elements supported by airpower. Mikolashek ascertained that Mulholland should command the operation.<sup>80</sup> Mikolashek tasked Mulholland in January to begin initial planning. One month later, however, CENTCOM and CFLCC ordered Mulholland to turn planning for the operation over to Hagenbeck. Planners assessed that the Division was better structured to integrate a large joint force. Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain was thus created around the 10th Mountain Division with Hagenbeck serving as the JFC.<sup>81</sup>

On 2 January ODA 594 received a group of 30 Pashtun fighters commanded by Zia Lodin, the intended main effort. The ODA worked diligently to get this force trained and ready to conduct combat operations. Inopportunistly, by early February the ODA assessed that Zia and his force were far from ready to conduct combat operations against hardened al-Qaeda forces. Mikolashek, aiming to attack the Shahikot Valley as soon as possible, was displeased. As an alternative, three battalions from the 101st Airborne Division and 10th Mountain Division were ready and available to assume the main effort.

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<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*, 42-47.

<sup>81</sup> Richard B. Andres and Jeffrey B. Hukill, "Anaconda: A Flawed Joint Planning Process," *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 47 (4th Quarter 2007): 136.

CENTCOM ruled out this option based on its desire to minimize the use of U.S. conventional forces. Mikolashek and Mulholland did opt to use these forces to establish the blocking positions due to a lack of AMF.<sup>82</sup> As such, this operation marked “...the first time that CENTCOM acknowledged that we could use conventional forces for offensive operations [in Afghanistan].”<sup>83</sup>

As planning continued, heated disagreements arose between the Dagger and Rakkasan planners over the best course of action for the operation. Dagger planners proposed conducting a night air assault by the blocking force using landing zones (LZ) primarily in the upper (northern) portion of the valley; from these LZs they would walk to their assigned blocking positions. Only the troops occupying the southern blocking positions would land in the lower portion of the valley. The Rakkasan planners opposed this concept, seeking instead to insert the entire air assault element into the southern portion of the valley during daylight. This disagreement caused friction amongst the joint force. Many Dagger and Mountain planners believed the Rakkasan argument was an attempt to usurp the main effort role. They further felt the Rakkasans lost focus of the plan’s original intent, concerned only with making a “magnificent air assault and claiming victory.” Emotions ran high over which force would have the mission of assaulting the main objective. The ODAs were equally concerned that the Rakkasan argument was unsound. The Rakkasans countered these accusations, but numerous friction points and a cultural divide had clearly developed; as well, personal relationships

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<sup>82</sup> Naylor, 47-48.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid., 48.

were severely strained. The impression among the SOF community was that Mulholland's advice and recommendations were being ignored.<sup>84</sup>

Hagenbeck ended the dispute by siding with the Rakkasans, deciding the air assault element would land in the south during daylight. The decision did not appease everyone. Furthering friction and mistrust, the Mountain staff, siding with their conventional force brethren in the Rakkasans, questioned the ability of the AMF to achieve their objective.<sup>85</sup>

The ODA team leaders were also not optimistic about the plan. The plan called for the AMF to conduct their portion of the operation as part of a tightly synchronized plan, to the extent of crossing phase lines at precise times. The team leaders clearly understood the complexities involved in maneuvering an indigenous force, especially one as relatively untrained and inexperienced as the AMF at this time. As the main effort, the team leaders rightly believed that preparatory fires and air assaults should be triggered by their movement, not the other way around. To mitigate the perceived risk, the team leaders suggested landing at least one Rakkasan company behind their force to provide extra firepower if needed; the planners rejected this idea.<sup>86</sup>

In the author's opinion, the decision to employ the AMF in a decisive role was not a bad one; quite the opposite, given the strategic goals for OEF, it was actually an advantageous decision. In COIN operations, as previously discussed, always consider the addage that a poorly executed plan led by the indigenous force is better than a perfectly

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<sup>84</sup> Ibid., 122-126.

<sup>85</sup> Ibid., 126-129.

<sup>86</sup> Ibid., 144.

executed plan led by U.S. advisors with merely an “indigenous face” on it. Where planners erred in Operation Anaconda is that they failed to understand the requirements of such an employment, and to adjust the plan to capitalize on the strengths and mitigate the weaknesses of the AMF. Consequently, the operation’s main effort was supported by a flawed plan, effectively ensuring failure.

Rehearsing the operation caused further problems for the joint force. Although all elements conducted detailed rehearsals, they were not integrated. The conventional forces and Dagger elements each conducted independent rehearsals. As a result, the supporting effort leaders did not see how the main effort force intended to conduct their portion of the operation, and vice-versa. Consequently, none of the elements thoroughly understood each other’s intent. Moreover, serious contentions to the plan, especially concerns of the ODA team leaders which were shared by the entire SOF command, went unaddressed. Disagreements over the soundness of the plan caused further friction between SOF and CF elements. As the operation unfolded, resultant misunderstandings would have serious repercussions.<sup>87</sup>

During the later course of planning, a CIA local source informed the CIA that 580-700 al-Qaeda fighters now occupied the Shahikot Valley. Moreover, these fighters were not occupying the villages in the valley floor as the plan envisioned and upon which the planners based their course of action. Instead the fighters, aware of the force gathering in Gardez, were living higher in the mountains arranged in small groups and occupying fortified positions. The fighters consisted of al-Qaeda and Taliban members. The Taliban were providing outer security for the al-Qaeda fighters. While the Taliban

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<sup>87</sup> Ibid., 149-154.

were armed only with AK-47s, the al-Qaeda fighters were armed with small arms, DShKs, mortars, sniper rifles, and two Stinger missiles. None of this information was passed to Hagenbeck, held instead by Hagenbeck's operations director and senior military intelligence officer on the basis that they did not trust "single source" intelligence. As well, this crucial information was not passed to the other task forces, another deficiency of the ad-hoc and unintegrated organization.<sup>88</sup>

SOF estimated the enemy strength at 1500-2000 fighters, yet the Mountain staff downgraded the estimate to 150-200 fighters. Based on this faulty assessment, Mountain planners removed the planned, integrated air operations and thus did not include the Combined Forces Air Component Command (CFACC), commanded by Lieutenant General Michael Moseley, in the planning. Not until two days prior to the scheduled D-Day did CFLCC request Moseley's input.<sup>89</sup>

### Concept of the Operation

Operation Anaconda was a classic hammer and anvil operation. The main effort, AMF elements advised by two ODAs, would occupy the Shahikot Valley from the north and south, serving as the hammer to force the enemy fighters into the mountain passes to the east. U.S. light infantry from the 10th Mountain Division and 101st Airborne Division would deploy by helicopter into the mountain passes on the eastern side of the

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<sup>88</sup> Ibid., 156-157.

<sup>89</sup> Andres, 137.



Shahikot Valley. Their task was to prevent enemy fighters from escaping through the passes, thus serving as the anvil to the Afghan forces hammer.<sup>90</sup>

The concept was fraught with reservations and misgivings by the individual task forces that comprised the joint force. In addition to conducting a daylight air assault with all forces landing in the southern portion of the valley, employment of the AMF element in this type of operation posed significant risk. Prior to this operation, Afghan forces served primarily to sweep the objective for enemy survivors following a heavy bombing operation. For Anaconda, the AMF's hammer mission forced them into a more conventional force role for which they were untrained and unprepared. In essence, the Afghan forces were untrained tribal fighters serving as the main effort in a major combat operation against fortified enemy positions and competent enemy fighters, without extensive preparatory airstrikes. The SOF planners understood the risk and were not optimistic about the chances for success.<sup>91</sup>

#### Forging Command Relationships and C2

The addition of the Rakkasans increased the force structure considerably from the initially envisioned Dagger and AMF force to a SOF-CF force doubled in size. This growth caused Mikolashek to rethink the C2 structure for Anaconda. Moreover, Mikolashek also worried that Mulholland and Wiercinski being the same rank would cause issues if the force remained under Dagger C2. He therefore concluded that he needed a higher tactical headquarters to integrate SOF and CF. Mulholland, concerned

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<sup>90</sup> Ibid., 139.

<sup>91</sup> Ibid.

about his limited resources, agreed. Notwithstanding, Mulholland was the ideal choice to command the operation based on his knowledge of the plan, considerable experience with operations in Afghanistan, and AMF supported by SOF serving as the main effort. As well, many of the SOF officers were opposed to placing SOF under CF command. Nonetheless, CENTCOM and CFLCC gave Hagenbeck command of the operation.<sup>92</sup>

On 14 February Hagenbeck's staff assumed control of planning for the operation. Significantly, CFLCC's order assigning command of the operation and its forces to Hagenbeck did not officially take effect until 20 February. Until then, Hagenbeck had no authority over elements not organic to the 10th Mountain Division. Hagenbeck conducted regular synchronization meetings, but key personnel from the other units rarely attended until after 20 February.<sup>93</sup>

The combined force under Hagenbeck's command was completely ad-hoc. The Afghans were drawn from different clans and provinces, and had only received less than a month of formal training. The Special Forces contingent was comprised of two ODAs from two different Special Forces Groups commanded by a battalion commander to which neither ODA was assigned. The blocking force comprised three light infantry battalions from two different infantry divisions. The helicopter force was also an ad-hoc element consisting of units from different commands. Allied SOF forces were further added to the mix. This varied assortment of units under a shaky command structure did

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<sup>92</sup> Naylor, 59-61.

<sup>93</sup> Ibid., 129.

not provide a recipe for success. “[I]nvisible walls had to be broken down and cultural barriers breached before an atmosphere of cooperation and mutual trust would prevail.”<sup>94</sup>

An exchange of LNOs between SOF and the conventional forces aided in reducing the cultural and operational divide between the two communities. To further reduce the friction Hagenbeck selected Brigadier General Mike Jones (Special Forces), and Brigadier General Gary Harrell (Delta), as his deputy commanding generals. Nevertheless, a seamless organization was never created.<sup>95</sup>

Readers should understand that ad-hoc organizations are not necessarily bad; furthermore, they are not inherently a cause of failure. On the contrary, the author suggests that on today’s battlefield they are in many cases unavoidable. The goal should therefore be to understand how to properly employ such organizations, effectively achieving synchronization along with mission accomplishment. In chapter 5 the author provides a construct to achieve this goal.

### Operational Summary

The Anaconda plan unraveled on the first day of the operation when enemy resistance proved far greater than planners had expected, coupled with the AMF failure to successfully execute their hammer mission in accordance with the expectations and standards of the conventional planners in the joint force. The operation finally achieved success when the joint force employed airstrikes.<sup>96</sup>

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<sup>94</sup> Ibid., 88.

<sup>95</sup> Ibid., 89.

<sup>96</sup> Kugler, 1.

The first wave of the air assault element, consisting of six Chinook helicopters loaded with approximately 200 troops from the 101st Airborne Division and 10th Mountain Division, landed in the southern portion of the Shahikot Valley according to plan. Shortly after landing, however, these elements encountered unexpected heavy enemy fire that drove many of the troops to seek cover, remaining in these defensive positions in the southern portion of the valley for the remainder of the day. The second wave of the air assault element with the remaining 200 troops arrived on the second day of the battle. This element inserted in the northern portion of the valley where enemy resistance was minimal. From the landing zone they marched south in an attempt to occupy all seven planned battle positions. With the employment of the tactical reserve consisting of two infantry companies, total troop strength exceeded 500 soldiers. Over the following days, after finally receiving growing close air support, the U.S. force managed to gain control of the valley's eastern mountain passes.<sup>97</sup>

Intelligence was another failure of the operation. When the coalition force reached the objective, they found 10 times more enemy soldiers than they expected. The force did utilize HUMINT from the local Afghan people, but failed to appropriately utilize their available SOF assets. As previously discussed, CJTF Mountain downgraded the SF enemy strength estimate. The CJTF then removed the SF teams and tried to utilize other assets. TF Mountain did employ ISR assets that were able to identify numerous enemy positions and cave locations, but planners ignored this intelligence and in some cases, leaders were completely unaware of this intelligence.<sup>98</sup>

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<sup>97</sup> Ibid., 16.

<sup>98</sup> Andres, 135-140.

SOF proved instrumental in planning and executing the battle, providing advanced reconnaissance of the Shahikot Valley, leading the AMF, and spotting targets and guiding close air strikes against them. Overall, unfortunately, Anaconda planners failed to properly integrate and synchronize SOF and CF operations, causing significant problems throughout the operation.<sup>99</sup>

Enemy resistance ended on 11 March 2002. American casualties included eight soldiers killed and another 48 wounded. Enemy casualties totaled 517 fighters confirmed killed, with an additional 250 estimated killed. Air power produced the preponderance of enemy casualties.<sup>100</sup> The original plan called for a three-day battle with light resistance. In the end, the battle raged for seven days with fierce resistance, officially ending after 17 days on 18 March. Operation Anaconda was the largest pitched battle of the Afghanistan war to date; it was also the last time that year enemy forces chose to engage U.S. forces in major conventional combat.<sup>101</sup>

According to local Afghan village leaders, al-Qaeda had been building up in the Shahikot Valley for months in preparation for a spring offensive. Operation Anaconda successfully forced them out of the valley, much to the elation of the local inhabitants. Nevertheless, the operation failed to effectively close the noose on the valley, thus allowing several hundred experienced al-Qaeda fighters to escape to Pakistan. More significantly, the operation proved a dismal failure in SOF-CF integration. Table 1

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<sup>99</sup> Kugler, 24-25.

<sup>100</sup> Andres, 136.

<sup>101</sup> Kugler, 1.

summarizes the key operational aspects of the operation with respect to I&I, and compares them to those of Operation Restoring Rights.

### Case Study Comparison Matrix

The following Table 1 pictorially depicts a comparison of the analyzed case studies. Of primary importance is the fact that during Operation Restoring Rights neither the CF nor SOF headquarters obtained unity of command. They did, however, achieve unity of effort and the operation was remarkably successful. During Operation Anaconda, again neither the CF nor the SOF headquarters obtained unity of command. In contrast to the former operation, they failed to achieve unity of effort and the operation was a failure in the realm of I&I.

Table 1. Case Study Comparison Matrix

	Achieved Unity of Effort	Developed Efficient C2 Structure	Developed Good Personal Relationships	Leaders Encountered Major Disagreements	Utilized Liaison Elements	Avoided Cultural Friction
Operation Restoring Rights	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Operation Anaconda	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✗

✓ Successfully achieved / Yes      UNK Unknown  
 ✗ Failed to achieve

## Views From the Force

Reports from current U.S. Army leaders indicate the perception that military leadership has developed an increased awareness of and cooperation with SOF. Notwithstanding, in the opinion of these leaders, several key friction points still exist between SOF and conventional forces. These areas include battlespace coordination, logistic support, and airspace management.

Battlespace coordination appears to be the primary friction point between SOF and CF. There are many cases when SOF has conducted operations in CF battlespace without informing the battlespace owners and staffs, causing significant disruption to CF operations. Furthermore, SOF operations often cause significant ramifications; after SOF conducts its operation, the CF battlespace owner is obliged to contend with the fallout. Moreover, insurgent forces are often able to successfully portray a favorable SOF operation as a failure because the CF IO cell was not prepared to manage the operation. Gen (Ret) Luck<sup>102</sup> reiterates this theme in the July 2008 Joint Operations Insights and

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<sup>102</sup> Gary E. Luck, a retired four-star U.S. Army general, was sent to Iraq in early 2005 to investigate areas of operation there, identify any weaknesses and assess what could be done to install democracy in Iraq, and to set a date for the withdrawal for American and coalition forces. Gen. Luck's last military assignment before retiring from active duty was Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command, Korea. He also served as an advisor to Tommy Franks prior to the US led invasion of Iraq in 2003, and as Commanding General of the XVIII Airborne Corps in the Gulf War. Prior, he served as commander of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), as well as in numerous conventional force and Special Forces assignments. Gary Luck currently serves as a senior advisor at the U.S. Joint Forces Command's Joint Warfighting Center. His combination of CF and SOF experience makes him well suited for this position.

Best Practices. Luck also argues that these incidents are usually the result of limited crosstalk between SOF and CF elements, resulting especially from a lack of liaison.<sup>103</sup>

These incidents are also the result of excessive security measures often maintained by SOF elements. Referring to the SOF Imperative “balance security and synchronization,” SOF leaders must avoid excessive security measures that result in insufficient synchronization. TF Ranger in Somalia in 1993 provides a well-known example of this issue. TF Ranger elected not to inform their quick reaction force (consisting of elements of the U.S. 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division) of their planned operation to capture warlord Mohammad Farah Aideed on 3 October. This over-compartmentalization of information caused a significant delay in the ability of the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division to react when TF Ranger called them for help.

In addition to exchanging liaison officers, staffing procedures can assist with battlespace coordination. CF and SOF units should develop clear staffing procedures and processes for coordinating and integrating SOF operations with battlespace owners. Processes to develop may include site exploitation, casualty evacuation, fire support, intelligence fusion, quick reaction forces, and detainee procedures.<sup>104</sup> USSOCOM Pub 3-33 provides a good checklist to assist with these processes.

On a smaller scale, logistics support has often developed into a friction point between SOF and conventional forces. CF units often provide common logistic support to SOF due to SOF’s austere logistics structure. In general, this is not problematic for CF

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<sup>103</sup> General (Ret) Gary Luck and Colonel (Ret) Mike Findlay, *Joint Operations Insights & Best Practices, 2nd Edition* (Suffolk, VA: Joint Warfighting Center, July 2008), 46.

<sup>104</sup> Luck and Findlay, *Focus Paper #5*, 13.



units and more often than not, SOF and CF units develop positive working relationships based on mutual respect. As a rule of thumb, SOF units should strive to request CF logistic support in a timely manner, forecasting ahead when possible. Additionally, the requesting SOF element should share as much information as operationally feasible. Following these practices will not only improve personal relationships, but will also enable the CF unit to provide tailored and timely support for SOF. On the other hand, cases exist where SOF units initiated no contact with their sister CF units aside from when they needed support, and no personal relationships were developed. In several instances, the SOF unit would appear in the middle of the night demanding CF logistic support. Worse, when these SOF units required support, they expected to receive it immediately. SOF personnel's refusal at times to adhere to necessary logistic procedures creates further friction points. Many of the tenets of successful I&I for combat operations also apply to logistics and other support. Following these principles will aid in reducing SOF-CF friction points.

Lastly, a SOF short notice airspace closure within a CF unit's area of operations not only creates significant friction, it may also affect operational requirements. There has even been at least one case when the sudden opening of a SOF Restricted Operating Zone (ROZ) temporarily prevented a CF medical evacuation flight from landing at the hospital. Negative incidents of airspace management are typically the result of poor or nonexistent coordination, often despite the exchange of LNOs.<sup>105</sup>

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<sup>105</sup> Lieutenant Colonel (Ret) Mark A. Tolmachoff, interview by author, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, December 12, 2008.

## Key Concepts

Evaluating the research presented thus far, several factors emerge as key concepts in analyzing SOF-CF I&I. These concepts, discussed below, include C2 relationships, misuse of SOF, operational support capabilities, and I&I challenges at the tactical level. Chapter 5 expounds on these concepts and related aspects, and generates a set of criterion to assist SOF and CF leaders and planners in synchronizing operations and achieving successful I&I.

### C2 Relationships

The author contends that, at the tactical level, only a SOF chain of command should execute C2 of SOF; CF headquarters often have limited knowledge of SO and minimal capability to employ SOF. A mutual support relationship is the optimal command relationship to achieve integration and synergy on the battlefield while simultaneously maintaining appropriate C2. According to Luck, “Operational Control (OPCON) and Tactical Control (TACON) provide authority to “own” and directly control the necessary forces to take on the fight alone, while Support Command relationships focus on providing access to the capabilities of other forces that can bring more to the fight and help mission accomplishment.”<sup>106</sup> Problematically, commanders traditionally prefer the ownership of forces provided by an OPCON or TACON relationship. However, CF lacks the expertise and capability to properly C2 SOF. Consequently, an OPCON-TACON relationship can result in mission degradation, while support relationships can overcome this problem.

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<sup>106</sup> Luck and Findlay, *Focus Paper #5*, 6.

## Misuse of SOF

“One obvious conclusion is that the overlap between light and SOF missions will very quickly lead to the use of SOF to fill in for absent or very over-stressed light forces.”<sup>107</sup> In other words, based on the similarities between light forces and SOF, a tendency exists to use SOF elements to conduct traditional light infantry missions. Commanders and planners must reject this inclination and ensure they properly utilize SOF at all times. As discussed previously, the SOF imperatives, mission criteria, and characteristics aid commanders in deciding on the appropriate use of SOF.

## Operational Support Capabilities

Based on lessons learned from OIF, it was evident that when SOF and CF willingly and effectively integrated, they enabled the JFC to achieve tactical, operational, and strategic objectives that would not have been possible by elements operating independently. When employed properly, SOF can provide support to conventional forces and conventional forces can support SOF operations.

SOF rely heavily on conventional forces for much of their support, such as common logistics, force protection, base operations support, fire support, medical evacuation, outer cordon security, and detainee processing and holding. Conventional forces should be prepared to provide logistical support on an area basis to SOF; staffs should proactively plan to provide this support.<sup>108</sup>

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<sup>107</sup>Thomas K. Adams, *US Special Operations Forces in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional Warfare*, (Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers, 1998), 294.

<sup>108</sup> Luck and Findlay, *Joint Operations Insights & Best Practices*, 47.

SOF can also provide invaluable support to CF operations. SOF, working with indigenous forces, can set the conditions for the introduction of conventional forces into theater. For example, Special Forces and Peshmerga soldiers secured the drop zone for the 173rd Airborne Brigade's airborne infiltration during OIF. By training, organizing, and employing indigenous units, SOF also provides a strategic economy of force in support of CF operations. SOF can contribute to intelligence preparation of the battlefield. During the post-conflict phase of operations, SOF can support the transition to civil government.

In essence, SOF and CF are interdependent such that SOF requires support from conventional forces, and conventional forces significantly benefit from support provided by SOF. By successfully operating in synergy, SOF and CF can achieve complementary effects and far more capabilities than either force operating independently. A mutual support command relationship enhances this interdependence.

### I&I Challenges at the Tactical Level

At the tactical level, commanders must integrate the operations of disparate forces in order to prevent mission degradation and reduce the risk of fratricide. However, at this level, commanders face significant challenges to integration. These challenges include land management, fratricide, and mission accountability.

Battlespace in the COE consists of multiple units (joint, combined, and multinational) operating in the same area of operations without a common commander. At the same time, the battlespace owner is responsible for all military activities conducted in that area of operation. Other forces must deconflict their operations with the battlespace owner. When units fail to deconflict operations, fratricide is often the result.

To avoid fratricide, deconfliction involves not only informing the battlespace owner of operations, but also such requirements as establishing a friendly force marking system, developing a common operational picture, and common communication methods.

Mission accountability refers to the concept that the battlespace owner is responsible for his assigned area of operation while other units, such as SOF, are conducting operations in that area of operations. To solve mission accountability issues, positive personal relationships are key, as well as establishing viable command relationships and maintaining situational awareness between all elements operating in the battlespace.<sup>109</sup>

### Summary

Based on case studies, lessons learned at the combat training centers and reports from leaders in the field, this chapter has identified that there is a lack of knowledge and understanding of SOF and CF roles and missions, capabilities, limitations, requirements, and culture that has created a friction engendering severe challenges to SOF and CF I&I. Furthermore, SOF operating not under the control of the CF battlespace owner poses a serious situational awareness challenge to the CF battle staff, which often does not know how to integrate and monitor the presence of SOF on the battlefield. Most significantly, the traditional OPCON and TACON command relationships are not appropriate for conducting SOF and CF combined operations. Compounding these issues is the fact that current doctrine is far too broad to be useful for actual operations. Available doctrine provides leaders and planners general concepts, not detailed or specific guidance for conducting SOF and CF combined operations or achieving I&I. Based on the findings of

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<sup>109</sup> US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), “SOF LNO Handbook C2” (After Action Report, Suffolk, VA, 2004), 5.

this research, chapter 5 provides recommendations to assist SOF and CF leaders and staff officers in achieving unity of effort in conjunction with optimal I&I.

## CHAPTER 5

### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### Conclusions

The primary question this thesis set out to answer is how military leaders can best achieve I&I of SOF and Conventional Forces at the tactical level in IW in order to create unity of effort and accomplish U.S. military objectives. The ultimate purpose of this research is to provide a framework for military leaders to improve SOF-CF integration and interoperability with the aim of achieving synergy and unity of effort.

To be clear, the desired I&I end state is for SOF and CF to understand the value of unity of effort, working together to achieve common objectives without fretting over a struggle to achieve unity of command, as well as synchronizing operations on the battlefield.<sup>110</sup> Based on the stated thesis question, purpose, and end state, assimilating the results and analysis of the research, and evolving from the key concepts discussed in chapter 4, the author developed five tenets that, if adhered to, will assist leaders and soldiers in achieving SOF-CF I&I. These Tenets of Successful Integration and Interoperability include command relationships, personal relationships, overcoming cultural friction, liaison, and leader and unit training.

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<sup>110</sup> Jones and Rehorn, 4.

## Tenets of Successful Integration & Interoperability

### Command Relationships

JP 0-2 provides several key declarations reference the *support* command relationship. “Support is a command authority.”<sup>111</sup> The support command relationship is, by design, a somewhat vague but very flexible arrangement. The establishing authority (the common superior commander) is responsible for ensuring that both the supported and supporting commanders understand the degree of authority he has granted to the supported commander.<sup>112</sup>

The support command relationship is concerned with access to capabilities, not ownership of forces; it provides the supported commander access to capabilities he does not own. Further, it makes the supporting commander responsible for the success of the supported commander. As such, a supporting commander cannot accomplish his job merely by providing forces; he must remain involved with the supported commander, continuing to provide assistance throughout the conduct of the operation. This symbiotic relationship creates synergy and harmony.<sup>113</sup>

Support relationships often better serve achieving effective C2 in IW over the traditional command relationships based on the fluid operating environment and varied operational units. The author bases this assertion on several important factors. To begin with, CF units operate in designated areas of operation, in contrast to SOF elements that

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<sup>111</sup> Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2001), xii.

<sup>112</sup> Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 0-2, III-9.

<sup>113</sup> Luck and Findlay, *Joint Operations Insights & Best Practices*, 41.



are regionally and functionally oriented. When commanders place SOF elements under a conventional unit using TACON or OPCON and assign limited geographic boundaries, SOF may lose much of its operational capability. Of greater consequence, as previously discussed, CF headquarters lack the expertise and capability to properly exercise OPCON or TACON of SOF. Parent unit commanders know how best to C2 their organic elements. Assuming ownership of forces which are radically different in mission sets, standard operating procedures, equipment, and culture is often ineffective, even detrimental to unit operational ability and mission success. Furthermore, SOF maintains a far more responsive C2 structure than conventional forces, a requirement for SO. In light of this, support relationships that retain a SOF chain of command and ensure SO expertise in planning and execution provide the most appropriate command relationship for SOF-CF combined operations.

Support relationships have proven successful in combat operations; they have also served to improve trust and confidence among varied forces. At the tactical level, support relationships provide clear priorities and mission approval authorities, allowing SOF the required flexibility to best accomplish the mission. Success requires SOF and CF commanders to mutually address the requirements of sharing a common operational picture, develop means of preventing fratricide, and provide situational awareness. This relationship works very well when SOF and CF commanders co-locate during mission execution. Co-locating helps ensure common situational awareness and improves synchronization.<sup>114</sup>

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<sup>114</sup> USJFCOM, 3.

Authorized in joint doctrine, a support relationship is a command relationship. As such, the supported commander has the authority to articulate his needs and expect support to meet those needs. The supporting commander is obliged to fulfill those requests. The supporting commander provides support based on the guidance and priorities established by the higher commander who established the command relationship.<sup>115</sup>

When analyzing support command relationships, the reader must be aware of the issue of joint versus service doctrine, which do not correspond in reference to support relationships. For example, U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0, *Operations*, does address support command relationships in their application to joint doctrine. However, FM 3-0 also points out the fact that “[a] joint support relationship is not used when an Army commander task-organizes Army forces in a supporting role. When task-organized to support another Army force, Army forces use one of four Army support relationships.”<sup>116</sup> This divergence between joint and service doctrine contributes to the resistance of many commanders to accept support command relationships. Without a change in doctrine, it is an objective of this thesis to demonstrate to commanders the practicality and necessity of support command relationships.

Assuming the validity of support command relationships, there are several factors that can contribute to success. These factors apply to both the supported and supporting commanders. According to Luck, best practices for the supporting commander include

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<sup>115</sup> *Ibid.*, 2.

<sup>116</sup> Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008), B-7.

the following: 1. “Recognize your role in ensuring the success of the supported commander.” The ‘one team, one fight’ mindset often fosters success. 2. Share your risk assessment with the supported commander, and assist the supported commander in developing a sound plan with minimum risk. 3. Understand the supported commander’s requirements and the priority of the supported commander’s mission. Balance these requirements with your own assigned tasks and requirements. 4. Send liaisons to the supported commander.<sup>117</sup> Equally important, request liaisons from the supported commander.

Best practices for the supported commander, according to Luck, include the following: 1. Identify your requirements to the supporting commander in order to assist him in providing support. This is a continuous requirement, not a one-time effort. 2. When developing support requests, account for potential hardships or risks each request may impose on the supporting commander. 3. Request liaison from the supporting commander. 4. Address lack of support issues with the supporting commander first.<sup>118</sup> Personal relationships, along with the other tenets of I&I, are key to the success of this command relationship.

### Personal Relationships

Personal relationships are paramount to developing and maintaining trust and confidence between leaders of different units, and are especially important at the tactical level. Most challenges to integration often occur early in deployments before the units

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<sup>117</sup> Luck and Findlay, *Focus Paper #5*, 9.

<sup>118</sup> *Ibid.*

have had the opportunity to build mutual trust and confidence and develop positive personal relationships. Combined training can often mitigate this deficiency. Essential to building good personal relationships and reducing friction is to create a command climate that does not allow for “biases, stereotyping, and ego challenges that could otherwise develop due to differences in various Service and SOF culture.”<sup>119</sup>

Developing positive personal relationships requires open interface between SOF and CF leaders. Based on the differing rank structures, this works best when SOF LNOs and tactical level commanders (team leaders and company and battalion commanders) have access to conventional force division and brigade commanders and their S3 officers.<sup>120</sup>

The repercussions of poor personal relationships can be unrecoverable. If SOF and CF leaders have a severe conflict early in the development of their personal relationship, they may lose the desire or even the ability to overcome this loss of rapport. Poor personal relationships between SOF and CF leaders can have a cancerous impact on their ability to conduct integrated operations. This in turn may have a negative impact on the JFC’s ability to effectively utilize all the assets at his disposal, thereby reducing operational effectiveness.

### Overcoming Cultural Friction

Former Department of the Army Chief of Personnel, Lieutenant General Stroup stated, “Cultural assumptions will always be best reflected not by written statements or

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<sup>119</sup> Ibid., 1.

<sup>120</sup> Ibid., 14.

procedures, but by how we as leaders act.” It is important for SOF and CF leaders to recognize, respect, and accept each other’s different cultures, avoiding endeavoring to change or alter the other’s culture and corresponding operational methods. Each unit has a unique mission to accomplish, and should execute those missions in accordance with their particular cultural characteristics and operational procedures. As such, differing cultures should not form the basis for creating friction. By recognizing and respecting each other’s differing cultures, SOF and CF units can conduct integrated and synchronized operations while simultaneously maintaining their unique culture and modus operandi.

SOF’s divergent personnel, uniforms, equipment, and operational methods often generate animosity and disdain from the conventional military. As previously discussed, these characteristics are derived from the type of missions SOF conduct and the type of personnel required to conduct these missions. When conducting joint operations, CF leaders must avoid trying to influence or change how SOF operates. As well, SOF personnel must understand conventional operational requirements and avoid imposing their culture on conventional soldiers.

Security concerns have also become a significant source of SOF-CF friction. SOF often refuses to cooperate with conventional forces based on “security concerns.” In the past SOF units have arrived in a theater or battlespace, conducted operations, then exfiltrated the operational area without ever informing the CF battlespace owner. Complicating this issue is the reality that the CF becomes responsible for any negative repercussions of the operation. A corollary consequential effect to SOF’s maintenance of secrecy and refusal to operate with conventional forces is that SOF is often either

misunderstood or not understood at all. “Secrecy in and of itself often becomes a tool to avoid scrutiny and build barriers to the outside world.” Thus, the secrecy intended to protect SOF actually becomes counter-productive, contributing to the rift between SOF and CF.<sup>121</sup>

Fortunately, the efforts of leaders and soldiers on both sides have substantially diminished the SOF-CF cultural rift. Nonetheless, there is still more to accomplish, and the successes already achieved are perishable and must be continually maintained and improved. By seeking to understand the characteristics, limitations, requirements, capabilities, and roles of the other force, SOF and CF can operate in harmony without changing their specific unit cultures or operational procedures.

### Liaison

Exchanging LNOs is a good practice, even when the higher echelon commander does not specifically task or require a unit to do so. If utilized properly, liaison elements can serve to enhance situational awareness and maintain a common operational picture. Commanders should ensure their LNOs have planning, current operations information sharing, and intelligence liaison capabilities.<sup>122</sup>

SOF units traditionally provide LNOs to CF units; there are also advantages to the conventional force providing LNOs to SOF. These LNOs can provide the conventional force access to information and resources that it otherwise would not have. CF LNOs can

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<sup>121</sup> Horn, 10-11.

<sup>122</sup> Luck and Findlay, *Joint Operations Insights & Best Practices*, 46.

also reduce the burden of SOF elements to provide liaison elements “out of hide” when they are already over-tasked and in high demand.<sup>123</sup>

Commanders should strive to avoid the common pitfalls of utilizing LNOs, the primary pitfall being selection of LNOs. When commanders provide LNOs, more often than not the initiation was a tasking from a higher headquarters. In this case, the trend is for the tasked unit to select a substandard soldier to serve as the LNO. Even when commanders select a quality soldier to serve as an LNO, that soldier is often disgruntled at being “punished” and forced to serve in an “undesirable” position. Accordingly, the soldier may not know his job, nor seek to learn how to best serve in his assigned capacity. It is imperative that leaders reverse this trend, both at the unit and soldier level. Commanders must transform unit culture to understand and appreciate the vital importance of liaison, and the significant contribution to successful operations an adept LNO can make.

Commanders should not wait for a tasking to dispatch LNOs; they should constantly assess when and where exchanging LNOs will benefit the operation and initiate LNO exchange. Commanders have an obligation to select the best-qualified individual to serve as the LNO, and the selected individual is required to understand the importance of his role. The LNO has a duty to take an interest in knowing his profession and doing the best job possible to assist his command and the supported command in synchronizing operations.

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<sup>123</sup> Major William J. Carty, USA, “An Unconventional Look at Training and Education to Improve Conventional and SOF Integration” (Paper, National Defense Industrial Association-Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict Division and Joint Special Operations University for competition in the 2004 SO/LIC essay Contest, 2004), 11.

SOF liaison consists of a variety of different elements. The Special Operations Coordination Element (SOCOORD) advises Army corps and Marine expeditionary force commanders. The Special Operations Liaison Element (SOLE) provides liaison to the JFACC. At the tactical level, the primary liaison elements include the Special Operations Command and Control Element (SOCCE), the Special Forces Liaison Element (SFLE), and SOF liaison officers and NCOs.

The SOF commander normally establishes a SOCCE when SOF is supporting a conventional unit. The SOCCE should collocate with the supported force command post, and will remain OPCON to the establishing SOF commander. The mission of the SOCCE is to synchronize and deconflict SOF and CF operations. SOCCE functions include the following:

1. Advise CF on the proper use of SOF, ensuring that conventional force leaders and planners understand SOF capabilities, limitations, and requirements.
2. Exercise command, control and communication of SOF elements. Provide the required communications link between SOF and CF elements.
3. Coordinate, deconflict, and synchronize SOF and CF current and future operations.
4. Force protection.
5. Intelligence fusion, to include providing intelligence from the ODAs to the CF intelligence staff and ensuring the intelligence is clear, timely, accurate, and understood.<sup>124</sup>

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<sup>124</sup> Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-05, III-10-III-11.



The SOCCE advises both the CF and SOF commanders, keeping both commanders informed of each element's future and current operations, fire support coordination measures, unit locations, current situation, and communication procedures. The Special Forces Operational Detachment-Bravo (SFODB) typically deploys and task organizes to operate the SOCCE.<sup>125</sup> Commanders must understand that "The SOCCE is a command element and should never be subordinated to a staff element."<sup>126</sup>

The SFLE, like the SOCCE, provides tactical-level coordination and synchronization with the CF headquarters. The primary difference between these liaison elements is that "the SOCCE can command and control SFODAs and assigned forces, while the SFLE is meant for liaison and coordination only."<sup>127</sup> The SFLE is normally built around an SFODA, which can operate as a split team to form two SFLEs; the SFODB may also conduct this mission. The SFLE should deploy to and collocate with the supported unit's headquarters.

### Leader and Unit Training

SOF and CF should strive to conduct combined training as often as possible. Combined training provides an opportunity to develop mutual trust and confidence between SOF and CF leaders and soldiers. During combined training units can share

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<sup>125</sup> Frank J. Malkin and Stephen Graybill, *Special Operations Command and Control Element (SOCCE) Preliminary Analysis of Equipment and Personnel Requirements for the Digitized Battlefield* (Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD: U.S. Army Research Laboratory, April 1999), 4.

<sup>126</sup> United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS), *Special Operations Command and Control Element (SOCCE) Handbook* (Fort Bragg, NC: Government Printing Office, 1994), iv.

<sup>127</sup> Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-05.20, 4-3.

capabilities and limitations, and gain cultural understanding and acceptance. Combined training also affords soldiers the opportunity to share individual unit procedures, contributing to a better understanding of how each force operates and the contributions each unit can bring to the fight. During training, leaders should focus on building personal relationships and trust, especially prior to and during initial combat deployments.<sup>128</sup>

The combat training centers are an excellent means for conducting combined training, but are certainly not the only venue. SOF and CF units should develop their own combined pre-deployment training. This training will enable the deploying units to develop positive personal relationships, trust and confidence prior to deployment. As well, the training will provide familiarization with each unit's capabilities and limitations; develop an understanding of each unit's roles and missions; and develop an awareness of how to support each other. Most importantly, combined training will significantly enhance SOF-CF I&I and contribute to enhanced mission accomplishment.

### Recommendations

By utilizing doctrinal frameworks, after action reports, command studies, working groups, historical analyses, and observations from current leaders in the U.S. military, this research identified the problems affecting proper SOF-CF I&I, and developed a framework to assist leaders. The primary area for recommended improvement is for SOF and CF leaders and planners to integrate the tenets of I&I into training and operations. Additionally, I&I has not become institutionalized throughout the U.S. military. The

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<sup>128</sup> Luck and Findlay, *Focus Paper #5*, 15.

author contends that institutional change is a relevant problem that leaders and doctrine should attempt to correct. The final area for recommended change is progression in professional military education.

Military leaders must have a thorough understanding of SOF roles and missions, capabilities and limitations, and culture. One method to provide this understanding is to implement training in military professional development schools. The U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) has inserted two short lessons on SOF capabilities into the curriculum, but these alone are insufficient. The author recommends that CGSC develop a comprehensive block of instruction on SOF capabilities and limitations, roles and missions, and culture; command relationships in SOF and CF combined operations; battlespace management; and the fundamentals of SOF and CF I&I. As well, the Center for Army Tactics should completely integrate SOF into the tactical exercise scenarios students execute in the advanced warfighting portion of the course. Furthermore, proponent administrations should incorporate this instruction into pre-command and officer advanced course curriculums. As discussed, a complimentary method is for commanders to implement training at the unit. These training venues will prepare future operations officers, executive officers and commanders to properly conduct SOF and CF combined operations on the modern battlefield.

Lastly, given the nature of the COE and the requirement to conduct joint and combined operations, the author recommends that the services change service doctrine to reflect the requirements of the modern battlefield and to interact more closely with joint doctrine. Of course, each individual service still requires service-specific doctrine tailored to the uniqueness of its organization, but this doctrine should be compatible with

joint and multinational requirements. Bringing service doctrine in line with joint doctrine may help to alleviate issues caused by doctrinal discrepancies and deficiencies.

## GLOSSARY

Clandestine: Operations that conceal that an activity has occurred.

Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF): A task force composed of special operations units from one or more foreign countries and more than one US Military Department formed to carry out a specific special operation or prosecute special operations in support of a theater campaign or other operations. The combined joint special operations task force may have conventional nonspecial operations units assigned or attached to support the conduct of specific missions. Also called CJSOTF.<sup>129</sup>

Common Operational Picture (COP): A single identical display of relevant information shared by more than one command. A common operational picture facilitates collaborative planning and assists all echelons to achieve situational awareness. Also called COP.<sup>130</sup>

Contemporary Operational Environment (COE): The overall operational environment that exists today and in the near future (out to the year 2020). The range of threats during this period extends from smaller, lower-technology opponents using more adaptive, asymmetric methods to larger, modernized forces able to engage deployed U.S. forces in more conventional, symmetrical ways. In some possible conflicts (or in multiple, concurrent conflicts), a combination of these types of threats could be especially problematic.<sup>131</sup>

Conventional Forces (CF): 1. Those forces capable of conducting operations using nonnuclear weapons. 2. Those forces other than designated special operations forces.<sup>132</sup>

Covert: Operations which conceal only the identity of who conducted the operation, not the action itself.

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<sup>129</sup> Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-05, GL-6.

<sup>130</sup> Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-0, GL-9.

<sup>131</sup> GlobalSecurity.org, "Operation Enduring Freedom Tactics, Techniques and Procedures Handbook No. 02-8," under "Section I: Introduction," [http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/call/call\\_02-8\\_toc.htm](http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/call/call_02-8_toc.htm) (accessed May 3, 2009).

<sup>132</sup> Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-05, GL-6.

Irregular Warfare (IW): A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will. It is inherently a protracted struggle that will test the resolve of our Nation and our strategic partners.<sup>133</sup>

Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF): A joint task force composed of special operations units from more than one Service, formed to carry out a specific special operation or prosecute special operations in support of a theater campaign or other operations. The joint special operations task force may have conventional non-special operations units assigned or attached to support the conduct of specific missions. Also called JSOTF.<sup>134</sup> When a JSOTF is established and combined with elements from one or more allied or coalition nations, it becomes a Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force. (CJSOTF).

Special Forces Liaison Element: A Special Forces or joint special operations element that conducts liaison between U.S. conventional forces division-level headquarters and subordinate HN or multinational forces brigades and battalions. It is formed only as needed. SFLEs conduct these functions when host or multinational forces have not practiced interoperability before the operation, do not share common operational procedures or communications equipment, or when a significant language or cultural barrier exists.<sup>135</sup>

Special Operations Command and Control Element (SOCCE): A special operations command and control element (SOCCE) that is the focal point for the synchronization of special operations forces activities with conventional forces operations. It performs command and control or liaison functions according to mission requirements and as directed by the establishing special operations forces commander. Its level of authority and responsibility may vary widely. It normally collocates with the command post of the supported force. The SOCCE can also receive special operations forces operational, intelligence, and target acquisition reports directly from deployed special operations elements and provide them to the supported component headquarters. The SOCCE remains under the

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<sup>133</sup> US Department of Defense, *IW JOC*, 1.

<sup>134</sup> Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-05, GL 8-9.

<sup>135</sup> Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 100-25, *Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1999), 4-16.

operational control of the joint force special operations component commander or commander, joint special operations task force. Also called SOCCE.<sup>136</sup>

Special Operations Forces (SOF): Those Active and Reserve Component forces of the Military Services designated by the Secretary of Defense and specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. Also called SOF.<sup>137</sup>

Supported Commander: In the context of a support command relationship, the commander who receives assistance from another commander's force or capabilities, and who is responsible for ensuring that the supporting commander understands the assistance required.<sup>138</sup>

Supporting Commander: In the context of a support command relationship, the commander who aids, protects, complements, or sustains another commander's force, and who is responsible for providing the assistance required by the supported commander.<sup>139</sup>

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<sup>136</sup> Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-05, GL-11-GL-12.

<sup>137</sup> Ibid., GL-12.

<sup>138</sup> Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-0, GL-26.

<sup>139</sup> Ibid.

APPENDIX A

SOF-CF I&I AREAS IN SCOPE

When analyzing SOF-CF I&I, leaders and planners should consider the following areas:

Areas	In Scope
<b>Scenario</b>	<b>Combat Operations</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• SOF Supporting CF and CF supporting SOF</li> <li>• SOF operating in CF Area of Operations and/or SOF and CF operating close enough to require deconfliction</li> </ul>
<b>Functions</b>	<b>Planning and Execution</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Maneuver</li> <li>• Fire Support Coordination (surface-surface and air-surface)</li> </ul>
<b>Forces</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• “White” SOF</li> <li>• Conventional Forces (air, land, and sea)</li> </ul>
<b>Organizations</b>	<b>Joint Force Commander-Level and Below</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Current Operations, Future Operations, and Fire Support Elements</li> <li>• Coordinating Elements</li> </ul>
<b>Systems</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Force Employment (e.g., AFATDS)</li> <li>• Blue Force Situational Awareness (e.g., C2PC)</li> <li>• Collaborative Planning and Execution (e.g, IWS)</li> <li>• Messaging (e.g, DMS)</li> </ul>


Source: Joint Integration and Interoperability of Special Operations (JIISO) Joint Test and Evaluation (JT&E), *BGen Neller Update Brief* (MacDill AFB, FL, 21 January 2004), slide 8.



## APPENDIX B

### A JOINT PROBLEM

Common themes of OIF reports from the services and major commands indicate that SOF-CF I&I must be improved and institutionalized.



Source: Joint Integration and Interoperability of Special Operations (JIISO) Joint Test and Evaluation (JT&E), *BGen Neller Update Brief* (MacDill AFB, FL, 21 January 2004), slide 4.

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SOF Education Element  
USACGSC  
1 Reynolds Ave.  
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352

Dr. Joe Fischer  
Department of Military History  
USACGSC  
1 Reynolds Ave.  
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352