


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COUNTERINSURGENCY LESSONS FROM IRAQ

Bing West

THE MILITARY WAR in Iraq ended in 2008, although political conflict among Sunnis, Shi'ites, and Kurds will continue for decades. At the same time, the war in Afghanistan has heated up, with more American troops committed to battle. This article, based on 15 extended trips I made to Iraq and interviews I conducted with 2,000 Soldiers and Marines, reviews the causes of the turnaround in Iraq and their importance for doctrine development and for success in the war in Afghanistan.

A Two-Front War Imperiled

From 2003 through 2008, two separate fronts accounted for about two-thirds of all American fatalities. In the west, the Sunni province of Anbar emerged as the heartland of a sectarian resistance that was gradually taken over by Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Anbar accounted for 42 percent of all U.S. fatalities in Iraq from 2004 through 2006.¹

To the east, the Baghdad region accounted for 27 percent of the fatalities in 2004-2006.² It increased to 44 percent in 2007.³ Violence in and around Baghdad erupted in the spring of 2004, then subsided inside the capital city in 2005. U.S. brigades pulled out of the city during this false lull. However, behind the scenes, the Shi'ite militias were conniving with the Ministry of Interior and the police to create death squads. When those squads surged out of the Shi'ite strongholds in Baghdad in early 2006, U.S. forces were caught out of position, while the Shi'ite-controlled government was both unwilling and unable to support a joint effort to restore order.

So by mid-2006, the coalition was losing on both fronts. In Anbar, according to an on-scene assessment, Al-Qaeda controlled the population. In Baghdad, a civil war was raging and the Sunnis were being driven from their homes. Yet, a year later the tide of war was flowing in the coalition's favor. What happened? Two events changed the course of the war: the 2006 Sunni Awakening in Anbar and the 2007 surge in Baghdad. The Awakening was the critical enabler for success of the surge.

The Awakening on the Western Front

A combat veteran once wrote, "There is a vast difference in the perception of wartime events in histories and documents written later."⁴ According to a later narrative that has achieved mythical status, in 2007 President Bush surged five brigades, enabling General Petraeus to implement counterinsurgency tactics that won the war. A *Washington Post* columnist referred

A former assistant secretary of defense and a combat Marine, Mr. West is the author of numerous military books and articles, including The Villager: A Combined Action Platoon in Vietnam, and The Strongest Tribe: War, Politics and the End Game in Iraq. He is a correspondent for The Atlantic and is currently writing a book about the war in Afghanistan and the role of courage in society.

PHOTO: House-clearing squad in Fallujah, Iraq, November 2004.

All photos courtesy of author

to Petraeus as the “Savior of Anbar.”⁵ Such myths encourage over-simplified, wrong-headed theories about a similar tribal uprising in Afghanistan. The facts about Anbar are more complicated.

Throughout the war, Anbar was an economy of force operation. In 2005, the 22,000 Marines and 5,000 Soldiers in Multi-National Force West (MNF-W), under the operational control of the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), accounted for one-fifth of U.S. forces in Iraq and two-fifths of the casualties. Anbar, according to conventional wisdom a vast land occupied by truculent tribes, would be the last province to be pacified.

A rocky road led to the Awakening. In early 2004, several key Anbar sheiks agreed to support the fledgling Iraqi government, but then refused to send their tribesmen to training centers north of Baghdad. Anbaris, they declared, would not leave Anbar. Then in May of 2004, the MEF rashly allowed local insurgents to form the so-called “Fallujah Brigade” in order to control the city of Fallujah. Al-Qaeda quickly took over, forcing 10 U.S. battalions to return in late 2004 to retake the city, amidst much destruction.

Starting in late 2005, the MEF deployed about 40 company-sized combat bases in a clear-and-hold strategy to control six cities and the surrounding farmlands. But this yielded only grudging gains and steady casualties. Several tentative offers by Sunnis to raise their own militias were firmly rejected. In early 2006, the sheiks in Ramadi did agree that their followers could join the Iraqi Army and police force. Al-Qaeda responded by murdering several sheiks and killing over 50 recruits. Things looked bleak in Anbar, while to the east, Baghdad was falling apart. In Washington, many in the press and the administration believed the war was lost.

Then in September of 2006, Sheik Abu Risha Sattar declared a tribal rebellion against Al-Qaeda. Sattar’s initiative, supported by Colonel Sean McFarland, was the third try by Sunnis to throw off Al-Qaeda’s yoke. This time, the effort caught hold, due mainly to Sattar’s dynamism. His rallying cry touched a responsive nerve among the population and legitimized a hundred bottom-up partnerships among local leaders (Iraqi battalion commanders, police chiefs, and tribal leaders) and U.S. commanders at battalion level and below. The Awakening de-legitimized the tribal members

The facts about Anbar are more complicated.

who were attacking Americans or were affiliated with Al-Qaeda.

In a brilliant analysis, Jonathan Schroden of the Center for Naval Analyses detailed how the insurgents lost the initiative. Incidents of violence in Anbar plummeted from over 450 per month in late 2006 to fewer than 100 by mid-2007.⁶ U.S. fatalities in Anbar fell from 43 percent of the total in 2006 to 17 percent in 2007.⁷ From late 2006 onwards, coalition and Iraqi forces initiated a majority of the contacts in Anbar.⁸ The number of tips from the citizens, sensing Al-Qaeda was being driven out, skyrocketed, while Sunni recruits for the police and the army (with assurances of assignment inside Anbar) exceeded the number of openings.⁹

Other factors contributed to this success. The city of Haditha swung over because a special operations team brought back a tough police chief whose tribe was resented but feared by the locals, and because an earth berm was thrown up around the city, restricting all vehicles.

Iraq was the world’s first large-scale, vehicular-borne insurgency. Al-Qaeda, Sunni resistance gangs, and Shi’ite death squads all traveled in packs



The late Sheik Abu Risha Sattar, leader of the Awakening, in Ramadi, September 2007.

of cars. Their mobility was taken away by erecting concrete walls that sealed off neighborhoods. Although this forced residents to carry food on their backs or queue up for tedious vehicle searches, it did restrict entry by outsiders. If Al-Qaeda fighters stayed inside the walls, they risked betrayal.

The capital of Anbar, Ramadi, was pacified by an American battalion commander and a police chief supported by his own tribe, vying with Sattar. Ramadi was taken back piece by piece, with barricades erected and police precincts fortified as they were reclaimed. Stubborn Fallujah finally quieted down due to a combination of a fierce police chief who had himself once been an insurgent, newly constructed barricades, Sunni neighborhood watches, and constant patrolling by American squads.

The greatest contribution of Sattar's tribal alliance occurred outside the cities, through the process of "draining the swamp." Thousands of kilometers of lush farmlands and dense undergrowth had enabled Al-Qaeda to rest and refit in the safety of that cover and concealment. But once the tribes turned, those scattered Al-Qaeda hiding places were gradually identified. The environs of Habbineah, midway between Ramadi and Fallujah, succumbed to American and Iraqi battalions in late 2006, after tribal members pointed out the Al-Qaeda sympathizers. In 2007, the surge strategy infused another 2,000 troops into the Tharthar region of northeast Anbar. While this was a helpful clean-up measure, the war in Anbar had already been won. The dominant variable that led to success on the western front was the change of sentiment within the Sunni population.

The Surge on the Eastern Front

The nascent change in Sunni attitude was dimly appreciated in Washington during the fall of 2006. The National Security Council staff, independent of a lethargic Pentagon, crafted a strategy to change the dynamic of a war that seemed on the verge of being lost. Surging more troops, the NSC staff believed, would signal that Bush was determined to prevail.

By mid-December of 2006, Lieutenant General Raymond Odierno, who had just taken over as III Corps commander, had decided on a two-pronged "gap strategy" for the eastern front. He would use about half the troops of the surge to flush Al-Qaeda from the farmlands that ringed Baghdad. The other half would join U.S. forces already inside Baghdad

The greatest contribution of Sattar's tribal alliance occurred outside the cities, through the process of "draining the swamp."

and protect the population, filling the gap caused by the absence of Iraqi security forces. Odierno and Petraeus, who would not take over until February, put on a full-court press aimed at the Pentagon to ensure they would receive five additional brigades.

As in Anbar during 2006, a pattern of bottom-up partnerships emerged in the east during 2007, shaped by four decisions at the top. As mentioned, the first two were Bush's surge and Odierno's deployment of troops in belts around Baghdad and inside the capital.

The third important decision was Petraeus' focus on protecting the population. He told me he looked for a few "big ideas" to give direction and cogency to the actions of 130,000 coalition troops. Two of these big ideas were "Don't commute to work" and "Partner with the Iraqis." He moved Soldiers out of the large bases and into Baghdad neighborhoods, especially along the fault lines where Sunnis were being driven out or where Al-Qaeda was in control. Al-Qaeda fought back against this new 24-hour presence, as evinced by the fact that the Baghdad region now accounted for 44 percent of all U.S. fatalities in 2007 as Soldiers cleared and held neighborhood after neighborhood.¹⁰

The fourth good decision was Petraeus using the Awakening as the lever to flip the war. In February of 2007, he visited Ramadi and was impressed by the thousands of Sunnis joining tribal "emergency response units." He authorized U.S. commanders across Iraq to recruit similar irregular forces. This happened only after and because U.S. company-sized outposts were set up throughout Baghdad and the surrounding belts of farmlands. By 2008, U.S. battalions were paying 90,000 Iraqis, mostly Sunnis,

Petraeus...[used] the Awakening as the lever to flip the war.

who had volunteered for neighborhood watch groups called the Sons of Iraq. Al-Qaeda fled and Shi'ite death squad attacks greatly diminished.

In 2007, in Shi'ite areas under militia control like Sadr City, the population did not dare accept American protection. While using the special operations forces (SOF) to arrest the top militia leaders, Petraeus initially left those Shi'ite areas to Prime Minister Maliki to deal with. In mid-2008, Maliki impetuously attacked Sadr's militia in Basra. Fighting spread also to Sadr City. Petraeus dispatched U.S. Special Forces, intelligence assets, and close air support to aid the Iraqi Army. Sadr's militia suffered heavy losses, with many of its leaders fleeing to Iran.

In his book *The War Within*, Bob Woodward claims the turnaround was due largely to SOF with a super-secret device that attrited Al-Qaeda leadership.¹¹ With authority to operate wherever it chose in Iraq, SOF did achieve remarkable results, accounting for the death or capture of perhaps 70 percent of high value targets. But, had it not been for the combat outposts, police precincts, and security forces among the population—the essence of the Petraeus/Odierno operational strategy—Al-Qaeda could continuously replace its losses. SOF were necessary, but they were not the critical factor. In sum, on both the western and eastern fronts, deploying American troops among the population and forging bottom-up partnerships with Iraqi battalions, police, and Sunni neighborhood groups—including former insurgents—turned the war around.

Implications for Doctrine

Success on the ground validated the doctrinal keystone of protecting the population. Field Manual (FM) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, goes much further, however. It states that “Soldiers and Marines are expected to be nation builders as well as warriors rebuilding infrastructure and basic services...[to] facilitate establishing local governance and the rule of law.”¹² The fundamental problem with that expectation is that it is written as if U.S. commanders had the authority or power to persuade the host nation's leaders to carry out benevolent Western tenets. But



Skirmish in Adamiah district of Baghdad, August 2007.

we are not colonialists with power to accomplish those tasks. Instead, we gave back sovereignty in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Our Soldiers cannot build those nations. With limited leverage, they can only advise.

The companion to FM 3-24, FM 3-07 *Stability Operations*, also stresses nation building, economic development, good governance, and delivery of services, especially SWET (sewers, water, electricity, and trash removal).¹³ It also emphasizes security “based on democratic norms and underpinned by international human rights principles.”¹⁴

While these are laudable, are they necessary for military success?

Economic Development Oversold

Field Manual 3-24 followed in the tradition of David Galula. While at Harvard in 1962, Galula, a retired French officer, wrote a treatise on counterinsurgency in Algeria. Galula's slim book advocated Rousseau's philosophy of government, asserting that an insurgency is defeated when the government protects the population and remedies its complaints.

Galula did not address the fact that an insurgency is usually defeated by controlling—not protecting—the population. In 1921, the British did not protect the Irish population from the Irish Republican Army.

Galula did not address the fact that an insurgency is usually defeated by controlling—not protecting—the population.

Rather, the Irish population reviled the British forces. The goal of Great Britain was to control the Irish, not to protect them. Similarly, Galula's theory would not have enabled the French to maintain control in either Vietnam or Algeria, because the insurgents there wanted freedom from the French.

Chinese farmers in Malaya in the 1950s were fenced in during the insurgency, not wooed with economic projects. The Viet Cong were largely defeated by 1970, while the vast majority of South Vietnamese remained subsistence farmers, bereft of economic aid and free electric power. But because Galula conjoins military power with benevolent service to the people, his theory accords with Western liberal political thought, regardless of actual historical events.

Similar to Galula's achievement in persuading academics, the theories espoused in FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, persuaded the mainstream media that General Petraeus's forthcoming campaign in

Baghdad was righteous. The FM appealed to liberals because it posited the concept of war without blood. Enemies were converted rather than killed. It was the only FM ever accorded a *New York Times* book review, written by a Harvard professor.

The proselytizing strength of the FM, however, was its operational weakness. In terms similar to Galula's economic determinism, both the counterinsurgency and stability operations FMs argued that if a government dispensed to a population projects, money, and free services—along with security—then the people would reciprocate by rejecting an insurgency's cause, be it political, religious, or nationalistic. In Iraq, every American brigade began to work along four lines of operation: economy, governance, security, and services. Together, these four lines, undertaken by Soldiers and Marines who had volunteered and had been trained for only the security mission, comprised "nation building."

In fact, economic development played a scant role. The U.S. spent more than \$50 billion on reconstruction projects that produced no enduring change in popular opinion.¹⁵ The brigades dispensed another \$3 billion through the Commanders' Emergency Response Program with the intent to buy or lease local goodwill, which would work against the insurgents. General Peter Chiarelli wrote an article for *Military Review* arguing that when U.S. Soldiers dug sewers in Sadr City in late 2004, U.S. casualties fell.¹⁶ But the increase in sewers or other services did not prevent the militia from killing Americans in subsequent years.

In Iraq, provincial reconstruction teams have become proficient at the district level, and brigade commanders point with pride to flourishing markets. There is a role for such undertakings because our military is not uncaring, not because economic development is essential for a military campaign. The Pentagon, however, has reached a different conclusion, stressing a deepening investment in development and urging that other government agencies—the State Department, USAID, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Energy, et al.—be attached to the brigades without questioning whether the fundamental goal—handing out free goods—achieves its intent of winning hearts and minds. The military should rigorously analyze what value reconstruction teams add to its mission accomplishment, and at what level of funding.



"Sons of Iraq" near Taji, July 2008.

No Rule of Law

Our doctrine calls for “the rule of law,” but does not define the term. Iraq was the first insurgency where the number of insurgents captured vastly exceeded the number killed. In 2003-2004, we locked up many of the wrong people and antagonized hundreds of thousands. By 2006, we had veered the other way, releasing too many who were guilty. Four out of five detainees were released within a few days. Of those sent to jail, the average length of imprisonment was less than a year. The troops resented the resulting “catch and release” system.

By 2008, the U.S. military had a practical system for sorting out the 15,000 or more prisoners in American custody. At least 5,000 were judged too dangerous to be released. We couldn’t risk handing them over to a corrupt and intimidated Iraq judiciary system with a 95 percent release rate. It is meaningless to enshrine the rule of law as doctrine and not dare to trust it in practice. We failed to institute a rule of law in Iraq because we lacked the authority.

The rule of law is a mess in terms of rulings by the American as well as the Iraqi judiciary. Within the U.S. Congress and the Supreme Court, there was no consensus about what to do with men in civilian clothes who killed American Soldiers. The 200-odd prisoners held in Guantanamo were accorded rights similar to American citizens charged with crimes inside the U.S. But no one wanted to extend that ruling to the thousands we held in Iraq and Afghanistan.

American officials are pressing rule of law upon non-Western countries when we cannot define it for ourselves. In these circumstances, any enemy who wears a uniform while fighting us is foolish. He gains many advantages by posing as a civilian.

Nation Building Remains an Open Issue

The FMs argue that we must build a democratic nation in our image in order to quell an insurgency. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has said an insurgency cannot be defeated by killing the insurgents, indicating that nation building is the solution.

In Iraq, the war is over, but nation building remains a work in progress, with our diplomats trying to moderate the Shi’ite preference for a tyranny of the democratic majority. Ironically, our commanders in Iraq are the ombudsmen for the Sunnis who earlier had opposed them. How Sunni-Shi’ite relations evolve will have less to do with us with each passing year, given the new, stringent Status of Forces Agreement.

Few people change character in middle age. Our advisers dealt with middle-aged officers who were crooks and incompetents before the war, including one Iraqi Defense Minister who stole hundreds of millions of dollars. Our doctrine offered scant advice about how to root out thievery or a reluctance to close with the enemy.

An effective host-nation military rests on the selection of good leaders. The Marine Corps *Small Wars Manual*, a counterinsurgency classic, stipulated that American NCOs would choose the leaders of the host-nation gendarmerie. In Vietnam, Special Forces A teams and the Marine combined action platoons exerted significant influence in selecting local leaders. Galula insisted that “the most important function of the counterinsurgents, an indispensable step toward consolidating their gains, is to select new leaders from among the population.”¹⁷

The dilemma the American military never resolved was reconciling its ethics with the behavior of those it put in power. Colonel Juan Ayala, after serving as the senior adviser to the 1st Iraqi Division, wrote: “Corruption exists. The Iraqis know that we know. *They know we would never condone it or report it if we saw it.* Never overt, the rank and file complain about it... It can’t be viewed through American eyes. It has been part of life since the sands of Mesopotamia... Seeking corruption would distract mission focus, severely strain sensitive personal relations, and worse, compromise our force protection posture (meaning there would be retaliation).”¹⁸

General John Abizaid, then commander of Central Command, strongly disagreed with the colonel. Testifying before the Senate, Abizaid said, “Corruption in this part of the world is one of the great corrosive

In 2003-2004, we locked up many of the wrong people and antagonized hundreds of thousands.

influences that causes extremism to flourish.” Yet the senior generals never issued clear guidelines, leaving advisers not knowing how to deal with the sleaze and corruption they routinely encountered.¹⁹

When the United States first set up the host government, joint review boards for military officers could have been established. Instead, mesmerized by the word “sovereignty,” we gave away our leverage over promotions in and thus the competency of the Iraqi Army. Our military should have a formal role in the military promotion system in any host nation that would not exist if Americans were not fighting and dying to sustain its sovereignty.

***...mesmerized by the word
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of the Iraqi Army.***

Perseverance on the Battlefield

Odierno and Petraeus skillfully orchestrated the deployments of the surge forces. The critical precondition was that the Sunnis were predisposed to greet the surge troops positively in 2007. This had not been the case in 2004. Al-Qaeda, resembling Robespierre’s terror in 1792 France, had killed too many sheiks, empowered the criminal class, and antagonized the Sunni population. But as those tribes were not strong enough to push out Al-Qaeda, they turned to the strongest tribe then present in Iraq—the American military.

What were our Soldiers and Marines doing on the ground? It is one thing to assign a battalion to a battlespace; it is quite another to specify its tasks. Estimating a workable troop-to-task ratio is only a first-order approximation. What counts is what Soldiers can actually do once on the ground, and with what frequency.

There was no standard format for battalion operations. Although discussions with tribes, Iraqi soldiers, and police were constant, some U.S. battalions patrolled alone, some arranged set times for joint operations, and a few operated exclusively alongside Iraqis. Casualties varied among battalions, usually ranging from 5 to 30 KIA and from

80 to 300 WIA during a tour. The rough rule of thumb was that every Soldier or Marine in a line unit patrolled outside the wire at least once a day. Many units cycled between internal guard and maintenance duties and external patrols. In a rifle company, each squad conducted one dismounted or mounted six-hour patrol each day or night. That was a heavy grind after three or four months, and it was much harder for the Soldiers who were in-country for 12- to 15-month rotations than for the Marines who generally were there for 7 to 10 months.

Iraq was essentially a police war. In 2007, for instance, 7,400 enemy were reported killed, while six times that number were detained, of whom 19,000 were imprisoned for an average term of 300 days. SOF accounted for about 4,000 of those sent to prison.²⁰ On average, each deployed conventional battalion arrested and sent an insurgent to prison every other day. Compared to police forces in the U.S., this was a very low rate of arrest, conviction, and imprisonment.

We did not do a good job of modifying military training and force structure to include police methods and measures. Soldiers are not policemen—except when they have to be. About 40 percent of an urban police force is devoted to detective work, with a goal of achieving a high (over 60 percent) arrest and conviction rate for violent crimes. Human exploitation teams or other such units dedicated to investigations and interrogations at the company level composed less than 10 percent of the force. Arrests per battalion varied greatly, driven by the priorities of the commanders.

The war would have been over in a month, had the insurgents worn uniforms. Throughout history, government forces have employed a census to sort out insurgents not wearing uniforms. It is a technique enshrined in all counterinsurgency manuals. I asked a four-star general in early 2005 why there was no census, complete with fingerprints. Why, he said, that could take a year to 18 months, implying the war would be over before then.

On average, a military-aged male in the Sunni Triangle, which includes Baghdad, was stopped once or twice a year for a cursory identification check. But we never used the existing technology to take fingerprints on the spot and send a report back to a central data base for comparison with prints associated with unsolved crimes. This was the

single greatest technical deficiency in the war. Most rifle companies tried to construct their own local census on laptops using digital photos, spreadsheets, and Google mapping. Millions of man-hours were wasted due to a failure at the top to understand how identification of the male population was equivalent to putting uniforms on the insurgents.

Over the course of six years, I embedded with and accompanied over 60 battalions. In terms of conventional war tactics and procedures (METT-T, movement to contact tactics, immediate action drills, etc.), the similarities among units—be they armor or infantry, Army or Marine—were striking. The dissimilarity in counterinsurgency tactics was equally striking. In counterinsurgency, all politics are local, but not all tactics are local. Some tactics are superior to others.

The table below, taken from my 2006 notes, illustrates the variance outside the cities.²¹ The operating areas seem vast because once away from the riverbeds, most of the terrain is farmland or flat dirt. It was difficult to ascertain by what criteria areas of operation were assigned to battalions in the rural areas, or what the battalions were expected to accomplish. The KIA number refers to losses in the battalion over the entire tour length. Arrests refer to prisoners sent to prison, not merely detained. Making arrests that stick was not considered a primary task by our battalions.

As 2005 progressed, the tactical styles in the east and west diverged appreciably. U.S. generals in 2005 endorsed falling back to forward operating bases (FOBs) in the east because American troops were seen as an antibody that provoked resistance. The strategy of transitioning to an Iraqi lead meant

pulling back. Consequently, there was less patrolling. In Baghdad, U.S. patrols (including joint patrols) fell from 970 per day in June of 2005 to 642 in February of 2006.²²

Despite the shift to FOBs in the east, in Anbar to the west, small-unit patrolling from outposts inside and outside the cities continued as the norm, but at a price. With roughly equal forces, Anbar in 2006 accounted for a third more fatalities than Baghdad, where there were fewer patrols.²³

At the same time, *The New Yorker* magazine, which quixotically assumed the mantle of judging counterinsurgency tactics, lauded Colonel H.R. McMaster for pacifying Tal Afar, while in Al Qaim along the Syrian border a Marine battalion achieved a similar success. In both instances, the key was combining U.S. forces with Iraqi soldiers and police in outposts among the population. Yet it was not until mid-2007 that I noticed a distinct similarity in approach across Iraq, namely containment barriers, outposts in police precincts, neighborhood watches, combined small unit patrolling, and routine partnering with both the Iraqi Army and police forces.

Humility in Success

The popular view of history is that nations are led from the top by “Great Men,” that leaders like Caesar and Lincoln are the ones who shape history. Most accounts of Iraq likewise subscribe to the Great Man view. Books by senior officials like Bremer, Tenet, Franks, and Sanchez have at their core a wonderful sense of self-worth: history is all about them.

The other view of history holds that the will of the people provides the momentum for change. Leaders

Unit	2 IRAQI BNS	U.S. MOUNTED BN	U.S. INF BN A	U.S. INF BN B
Operating Area	100 sq kms	1,200 sq kms	500 sq kms	800 sq kms
Population	10,000	200,000	40,000	80,000
Outposts	9	3	14	8
Patrols/Day	4 + 12 ckpts	16 mounted	65 dismount	50 dismount
Battalion KIA	4	2	17	14
Arrests/Week	less than 2	4	7	9

are important, but only when they channel popular sentiments or have the common sense to ride the popular movement. “Battle is decided not by the orders of a commander in chief,” Tolstoy writes in *War and Peace*, “but by the spirit of the army.”²⁴ Iraq reflected Tolstoy’s model. Events were driven by the spirit, or dispirit, of the people and tribes. Iraq was not a Great Man war. Iraq was a kaleidoscope. Turn it one way and you think you see the pattern. Then along comes some unexpected event and the pattern dissolves.

The Awakening changed the context of the war but wasn’t sufficient in itself to turn the war around. That took the troop surge, increasing SOF pressure on insurgent leaders, and the shrewd orchestration of forces by Odierno and Petraeus on the eastern front.

The Awakening wasn’t attributable to economic development; Anbar was starved for funds. It wasn’t due to enlightened governance; Sattar referred to the Baghdad government as “those Persians.” It wasn’t caused by the surge; that came seven months later. It wasn’t attributable to the coalition’s troop-to-task density; Anbar was the economy of force province. The “rule of law” had no bearing; Baghdad wouldn’t even accept the prisoners held in jails in Anbar.

Nor, judging by polls, can one conclude that Americans won Sunni hearts and minds. Indeed, when the Marines arrived in Ramadi in 2004, the residents called them “shotak,” or soft sugar cake. The MEF’s restrained approach elicited scoffing among the tribes. In April of 2004, hundreds of former Iraqi soldiers sneaked into Ramadi to initiate a battle that scarcely ebbed for the next 30 months and wrecked the city.

Sattar came from Ramadi, where American firepower had wrought destruction, providing ample reason for resentment. Yet his theme was that America had not come to occupy, while Al-Qaeda ruled by terror. The tribes rejected that idea in 2004; they bought it in 2006. Shortly before he was assassinated by Al-Qaeda, I asked Sattar why

Sattar referred to the Baghdad government as “those Persians.”

the Sunnis hadn’t “awakened” years earlier and spared much bloodshed among both Americans and Sunnis. He thought for a moment, and then said, “We Sunnis had to convince ourselves. You Americans couldn’t do it.”

Some military writers refer to 2004-2006 as “BC,” “before counterinsurgency,” and to 2007-2008 as “AD,” or “after Dave” (Petraeus). But the critical variable in the war—the Sunni swing—originated in Anbar before Petraeus arrived. Our COIN doctrine needs a section devoted to uncertainty and humility. We cannot predict when and why people change allegiances.

In 2003, the U.S.-led coalition overthrew Saddam because he refused to allow UN inspectors to determine that all weapons of mass destruction had been destroyed. In 2004, Bush changed that rationale to emphasize bringing freedom to Iraq. We do not know how the majority Shi’ites will use that freedom to treat the Sunnis and Kurds. While economic development, responsive governance, the rule of (Western) law, and nation building (in our image) are laudable goals, they remain unaccomplished in Iraq. But we must keep in mind that these unfinished tasks were not essential *military* tasks.

What caused the Americans to prevail? Both the Army and Marines went into Iraq with a mindset of a kinetic, decisive battle, but they turned that idea around in less than three years. The key COIN ingredients were forbearance in dealing with the people, partnering from the bottom up, and perseverance—patrolling in 110-degree heat in the dust and mud, amidst snipers and IEDs. The Sunnis grudgingly concluded that Americans were not soft sugar cake and that the Shi’ite-dominated government could not be overthrown. It was better to join with the strongest tribe and cut a deal with

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Baghdad than remain under the control of the murderous Al-Qaeda with its vision of returning to a 9th-century caliphate.

All wars end, and this one will, too. We just do not know when. Recruits for our Special Forces are subjected to arduous tasks that seem to have no finish or boundaries. That uncertainty in the face of exhaustion tests the moral fiber of the recruit. In Iraq, our Soldiers and Marines passed that test. We cannot predict when the morale of the insurgent will break. So we must persevere, determined that the enemy will break before we do.

In our military writings, we have overemphasized theories about nation building and understated the practical effect of aggressive tactics on the ground. Our Soldiers and Marines are riflemen; they signed on to be grunts. We have to reward that aggressive spirit. Colonel John Ripley, a wonderful war-fighter, once remarked that grunts like to fight; they just know it's not politically correct to say so. Of all the variables, the perseverance and grit of our Soldiers and Marines were the most critical to success in Iraq.

Lessons for the Next Fight

Afghanistan is the next test. The sanctuary in western Pakistan has enabled Al-Qaeda and the Taliban to regroup, while many of our NATO allies have been unwilling to engage. So the fighting has escalated.

Of all the variables, the perseverance and grit of our Soldiers and Marines were the most critical to success in Iraq.

Of the four tasks essential to stabilizing Afghanistan, three are military:

- We must train a government force, to include a defense system at the village level that prevents the Taliban from establishing a sanctuary for Al-Qaeda inside Afghanistan. This training means U.S. troops must be fully partnered with Afghan troops and police. The fundamental defect is the lack of training for police detective work, census-taking, and imprisonment of wrongdoers.

Operating at the village level will test whether we have become too risk-averse as a military and as a nation—whether we are willing to patrol in the mountains without body armor, whether small units are permitted to conduct multi-day patrols, whether small outposts can be protected without incurring unsustainable costs, and whether our political system can sustain the publicity attendant to casualties, year after year. We know that Afghanistan will achieve a satisfactory level of stability only when the Pashtun sub-tribes reject and stand up to the Taliban. We don't know when that will happen. We know the tribes like to fight. In the film *Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid*, Paul Newman looks at the posse in pursuit and says, "Who are those guys?" The two famous bandits decide to flee rather than fight. Placing similarly unrelenting pressure on the Taliban inside Afghanistan requires determination and endurance more than improved theories. The task is daunting, given that Pakistan's western frontier is a sanctuary.

- We must support that Afghan force (thus retaining leverage over the Kabul government) for at least a decade or more at a cost of several billion dollars a year.

- We must continuously strike at our real enemy—Al-Qaeda in western Pakistan. Although there's some hope that the western tribes and the army in Pakistan will prove stouter than in the past, Al-Qaeda remains a ticking bomb. A second dreadful attack upon American citizens would dramatically escalate the current clandestine, measured effort against Al-Qaeda. It's reasonable to assume the Joint Chiefs have a contingency plan to pursue Al-Qaeda inside Pakistan's frontier relentlessly, should a second attack occur.

These military tasks can draw on skills learned in Iraq. They are inadequate without the fourth task of linking security at the village level, through the

provinces, to the corrupt and rickety central government in Kabul. The goal is not to intentionally create tribal warlords, although the unintentional emergence of a charismatic leader like Sattar cannot be predicted. If it does happen, commanders like McFarland will recognize the potential. But the U.S. military must have a mechanism for then handing off further political development to foreign service officers. This did not happen in Anbar with the Awakening because our diplomats did not have the contacts or leverage. Indeed, U.S. troops in Iraq still provide a buffer for the Sunnis and insurance against rash acts by a serpentine prime minister and fractious legislators. We should not assign a similar mission to our military in Afghanistan. That is the political domain of the State Department.

The recent DOD Directive for Irregular Warfare states that “stability operations are a core U.S. military mission.”²⁵ Although it is inchoate in defining tasks, the directive does demand military “implementation of whole-of-government strategies.”²⁶ Whoa! This is going entirely too far.

President Obama appointed Ambassador Richard Holbrooke as Special Envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan, with the mandate to coordinate across the entire government an effort to achieve U.S. strategic goals in the region. It is his mission, not that of the U.S. military, to implement the “whole-of-government” strategy.

We should not Americanize this war. If we do, the Taliban and Al-Qaeda will say they are fighting the invaders for the sake of the Afghans. The essential problem is that the Taliban believe and preach their absolutist cause, while Hamid Karzai and his coterie have provided no competing narrative pointing to a responsible government. The U.S. military should not be the primary implement of our foreign policy.

The counterinsurgent principles enshrined in the FMs—economic development, good governance, the rule of law, and democratic nation building—are a mixture of theory and tautology that appeal to Western liberal philosophic thought. None account for the Sunni change in attitude that altered the context of the war in Iraq. In Afghanistan, those lines of operations should be placed under the State Department, recognizing that it could take 40 years and \$100 billion to pull Afghanistan into the 21st century, and that might happen long after American troops have gone. **MR**

NOTES

- 1,064 fatalities in Anbar in 2004-2006, of a total of 2,517, or 42 percent, <icasualties.org>.
- 683 fatalities in Baghdad region 2004-2006, of a total of 2,517, or 27 percent, <icasualties.org>.
- 403 fatalities in Baghdad region in 2007, of a total of 904, or 44 percent, <icasualties.org>.
- E.B. Sledge, *With the Old Breed* (New York: Random House, 1981), 3.
- Michael Gerson, “The Man Who Stayed,” *Washington Post*, 17 October 2008, 22.
- Jonathan Schroden, *Measures for Security in a Counterinsurgency*, Center for Naval Analyses, 10.
- In 2006, there were 356 fatalities in Anbar, and 822 overall, or 43 percent. In 2007, there were 163, and 904 overall, or 17 percent, <icasualties.org>.
- Schroden, 12.
- Ibid.*, 18.
- Baghdad accounted for 403 of the 904 U.S. fatalities in 2007, or 44 percent, <icasualties.org>.
- Bob Woodward, *The War Within: A Secret White House History 2006-2008* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2008).
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- MNF-C data. On 5 June 2005, there were in Baghdad 360 U.S. patrols, 250 Iraqi and 610 Joint; on 1 February 2006, there were 92 U.S., 460 Iraqi, and 550 Joint patrols.
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- DOD Directive 3000.07, 1 December 2008, 2.
- Ibid.*, 5.

Unifying PHYSICAL and PSYCHOLOGICAL Impact During Operations

**Brigadier General Huba Wass de Czege,
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PAINTING: Thomas Jonathan "Stonewall" Jackson and Sorrel, by David Bendann, 1913. (Library of Congress) Jackson was a master of mystifying his opponents through psychological manipulation.

THE PURPOSE OF THIS ARTICLE is to expand on some key ideas raised, but not fully developed, in my November/December 2008 *Military Review* article entitled "Re-Thinking IO: Complex Operations in the Information Age." That piece makes the argument that the core competencies of information operations (IO) are far less integrated and effectively employed than they should be. Psychological operations (PSYOP) and military deception (MILDEC) are two vitally important elements that are especially ineffective today because of the way we organize ourselves to use them.

Logic and experience suggest it will be more important to pursue *three* ever-present, but practical, mission needs than to pursue the grander, doctrinal, but over-ambitious task of achieving "information superiority" to "influence, disrupt, corrupt," and so on. These needs are:

- Win the psychological contest with current and potential adversaries.
- Keep the trust and confidence of home and allied populations while gaining the confidence and support of the local one.
- Win the operational and strategic, cognitive and technical "information-age applications" contest with current or potential adversaries.

It will be necessary to integrate core capabilities for meeting these needs into a combined arms pursuit of multiple objectives (rather than, as aforementioned, pursuing one separate IO LLO). As my earlier article notes:

Effective application already also requires expertise in very different disciplines. It will become even more important to reorganize IO capabilities into groupings for staff oversight that share common functional purposes, causal logic, and art- and science-based competencies. Leaving the collection of IO tools under the oversight of one staff officer has become an untenable option, and proper preparation and education will be increasingly difficult to achieve.¹

Here I am concerned only with the difficult challenge of winning the very complex psychological contest with current and potential adversaries. If this is

one of the things we want to do, our doctrine should provide the general causal logic and principles for getting it done. But neither the current Army and Joint IO doctrine nor the new Field Manual (FM) 3.0, *Operations*, provides useful guidance on this subject. (The coordinating draft of the new FM 3-13, *Information*, devotes an entire chapter to this need specifically; ideally the next FM 3.0 will expand on this subject as well.)

The psychological aspects of full spectrum operations ought to be as second nature to every commander and operations officer as psychology in general is to a sports team coach. Several decades ago the Army banished its psychological operators to the Special Forces. More recently, in the 1990s, the Army bundled PSYOP and MILDEC in an awkward conceptual construct called IO. The recent FM 3.0 returned MILDEC to the operations staff's responsibility, but re-bundled PSYOP into another awkward construct called "information engagement" that bridges the first two of the needs identified in the earlier article. The U.S. Army, as an institution, still does not appreciate the normality and utter necessity of the close relationship evinced by the fact that these specialists are today far more deeply engaged in public relations work than in leveraging the psychological impact of physical capabilities and actions. I argue the case for re-thinking this vital relationship by reviewing the logic for a natural blending of the physical and the psychological dimensions of war and by suggesting remedies on the road ahead.

...psychological aspects of full spectrum operations ought to be as second nature to every commander... as psychology in general is to a sports team coach.

Military Power and Perceptions

Excellence in the use of firepower, armor, speed, precision, and armed physical presence to "create new facts on the ground" is less than half of the whole without excellence in intimidating, demoralizing, mystifying, misleading, and surprising at the same time (as well as leveraging that reputation for excellence to influence the decisions of real or potential adversaries not yet subject to physical force). The

great captains of history naturally employed these two facets of military power as one combined instrument. The holistic approach of a Caesar, for example, not only remains valid, but also has become *essential* to success in the information age. The less we can bring brute force to bear, the more we need to get the most psychological impact possible from any action or display of potential action. The more our application of force becomes precise and discriminating, and the more rapidly our capabilities advance (and thus may not be appreciated by others), the more artful we need to be in linking deeds, images, and words to leverage the psychological impact.

Deterrence. The chief purpose of military force is to achieve political and economic ends: sometimes through deterrence, other times through offense or defense, and occasionally through pacification. Deterrence is wholly psychological. What matters is the image, not what is real. As difficult as it might be to fully project psychologically deterring images, under the right circumstances they can exert power to influence events as usefully as any physical force. A properly constructed deterrent is the most economical use of military capability. The projection of deterring images plays an important complementary role in all other uses of military force (at all levels from grand strategy of nation-states down to single combat of armed individuals). A country could more easily pursue any other of its purposes merely by positioning a detachment of force just large enough to check several options of its opponent. The art, of course, is to know how to project the right image so that it is properly appreciated and sufficiently imposing.

Offense and defense. Offense and defense are also largely psychological. Success by either side in the physical clash hardens will. Early losses, however, have an opposite effect on defender and attacker. These can stiffen the will of the defender. The stakes are high and very personal while, being early, hope is very much alive. Early losses dishearten the attacker disproportionately because they suggest misjudgments about the defender's potential and cast doubt on other judgments yet to be tested. The defender must capitalize on these. Both winning and losing has a delayed effect on the will and subsequent leadership decisions on either side, and while both sides may perceive the results of physical clashes clearly, neither can read the mind of the

other. Neither side can know the reserves of will and courage still available to the opposing side.

In the contest of will, evidence of success or failure in the contest for the initiative weighs heavily in the balance. Such evidence indicates a trend and foretells the future. Seeing evidence of a coming culmination of the attack short of success emboldens defenders and depresses attackers, the converse is also true. In the contest of will, time is on the side of the defender and is the enemy of the attacker. The attacker needs to complete his business before the people at home tire of the effort. The defender merely needs to outlast the attacker and deny him the end he sought. Irregular defenders are usually more resilient than defending states because they can translate merely continuing to exist into success and hope for the future.

Pacification. Pacification is necessary because groups of people within a state have “gone to war,” and normal policing agencies can no longer enforce peaceful and lawful behavior by potentially hostile forces, warring factions, or violent criminals.

In the past, great powers always treated insurrections with overwhelming force, often exterminating offending cities, towns, villages, ethnic groups, tribes, or clans to eliminate the source of resistance swiftly, at least for a generation, and to advertise a deterring example. Pacifying the old fashioned way (e.g., the Romans in Palestine) does not work for modern democratic states that hope to remain influential and popular in this transparent, globalized world.

Weak states, though, are still compelled to wage war on their insurgents, and, of course, strong states have that option as well, but warfare with irregulars will become increasingly challenging. Because heavy-handed, surefire tactics of a previous age can backfire in the open 21st-century information environment, states must compensate in two ways:

- The armed forces of the state have to seize the initiative from the strategic level down to the tactical, and their application of force must be unusually focused and discriminating. These demands mean knowing your enemy very well, having commensurately good intelligence, and being more creative and strategically savvy than he.
- The state has to separate the enemy from the support of the people. This means knowing the people and retaining their trust.

The worst possible conditions for making war on irregulars is in the wake of changing regimes when

the fundamental choice of *legitimate* government is between a foreign occupier and a homegrown competitor. It gets back to the basic fact that people feel sovereign over their own soil. The key to regime change is not the knocking down of the regime and its forces, but the successful immediate pacification of the resultant power vacuum.

The next worse condition for making war on irregulars is in alliance with a weak and unpopular state, because both will be judged by the people in the middle on the virtues and the vices of the least of the allies. More often than not, advanced democracies will be supporting the actual counterinsurgent in weak or failing states, over whose virtues and vices they have very little control. The rule of thumb for state policing is, when in doubt, first do no harm. As an exact analog to the physician’s Hippocratic oath, this rule of thumb contradicts the nature of war. Yet this principle of policing violence should be absolute: to suppress it while categorically taking *careful* aim to avoid property damage and harm to innocents (in all its forms) and, at the same time, reinforcing the perception that perpetrators will face a high probability of being found out, caught, and prosecuted. Only conditions of *legitimacy* can transmit a credible psychological message that there is no honor in resistance.

Pacifying unruly, ungoverned space is very difficult to do, and there are no short-cuts. It takes keeping the people safe and getting them on the side of peace and is costly in trained, armed manpower. Some studies based on rare historical successes have judged the price to be no less than 20 security personnel per 1,000 citizens. (Malaysia and Northern Ireland, for example.) This includes police, paramilitary, and supporting military of all kinds. This approach also requires legitimate and efficient courts and prisons. Finally, it takes patience, time, even-handedness, and consistency of word and deed. (Malaysia took 12 years and Northern Ireland 25.) This is a heavy price. The benefit, however, is that the state decides when “normal” is attained, and warring factions as well as insurgents are eventually integrated into a peaceful society.

Far more complex, and more common today, is to be able to do “warring and policing” simultaneously in the same area of operations. Balancing them requires keeping separate who you are fighting (prisoners of war) and who you are bringing before

the law (criminals), because confusing them incurs great penalties.

If the definition of power is the ability to influence human decisions and behavior, then the real root of military power is not destructive force, but how to use force constructively and psychologically. Napoleon's maxim "the moral is to the physical as three is to one" is as valid in the 21st century as it always was.

Defeating the Will of Our Enemies

Gaining moral ascendancy over your opponent is fundamental to fighting and pacification at all levels, and across all time. But breaking the will of an opponent is more difficult to do than is commonly thought. What might intimidate one person may simply enrage some and inspire others to greater efforts. Human beings who willingly sacrifice life for perceived gains (ideal or real) are plentiful. Combatants risk life and limb, not because they fear punishment, but because they fear letting down their companions. These soldiers will not want to be the first to yield, and they will bear great hardship and deprivation as long as they have hope either in this life or an imagined other.



Napoleon on horseback, in the background: Battle of Wagram, dated 1843. Wagram was an example of a lapse in Napoleon's normal attentiveness to psychology.

...the real root of military power is not destructive force, but how to use force constructively and psychologically.

However, there are some time-proven fundamentals. Cold, hunger, fatigue, and lack of sleep sap human will. People who are isolated from their friends and allies, or who are among strangers, will become discouraged more easily than those who are among people they trust. When people who are esteemed by others quit, the collapse in collective will can be precipitous.

In the choice of when or how to quit, context matters. In the 1991 Gulf War, the Iraqi Army was deployed far from home and in an inhospitable desert. Leaflets dropped from the air advised them to surrender as coalition forces advanced toward them. When Iraqi soldiers gave up, they surrendered in mass and often to much smaller forces. They meekly walked in the direction of internment sites: toward food, water, and shelter. During the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the Iraqi Army was most often deployed nearer to villages, towns, and cities. Similar leaflets advised them to surrender. This time when Iraqi soldiers decided to quit—and they did in great numbers even before contact with ground forces—they melted into the population, taking with them whatever things of value they could carry. Combatants who are cut off from escape in sound defensive positions have historically fought fierce battles. Those who have been given an ostensibly honorable way out have given up their positions and withdrawn.

Winning and losing is not always defined by a uniform logic. There was no doubt within the coalition about who had won the First Gulf War. However, viewed through the lens of Iraqi culture and Islamic law, Saddam Hussein's forces had won a great strategic success in spite of their tactical losses when Allah intervened to prevent the invasion of Mesopotamia and the overthrow of the regime. Celebrations that ensued were not just a façade. In the current protracted struggle against committed Islamic fundamentalist groups, physical actions without a superbly well-informed and highly tuned psychological dimension will fail.

Mystifying, Misleading, and Surprising Our Adversaries

Mystifying, misleading, and surprising adversaries, as General “Stonewall” Jackson did repeatedly in the Shenandoah Campaign of the Civil War, will continue to be a most challenging art. But underlying this art is a rudimentary and ancient logic based mostly on historical experience and human psychology. Whenever military operations aim to defeat an adversary by force, operating on the line of least expectation and least resistance has always been a shortcut to success. Such a goal has often been an elusive one, especially against competent enemies, and the most elaborate deception can be undone by chance since we will always know less than would be ideal. Even worse, what we may think we know may be wrong. To paraphrase Sun Tzu: all warfare is based on deception, but success will still depend on the determined and capable application of superior force at the decisive place and time. Cautions aside, applying the time-tested simplicity of military deception yields significant advantages over an unprepared, unsuspecting adversary.

There should be no formulaic approaches to military operations, because such formulas would become predictable patterns, encouraging enemy preparedness. Competent adversaries are always learning from each other, and neither we, nor any of our adversaries, will ever be truly “pattern-less.” Because we are the most visible and most studied, we must become better at learning and learn faster than our adversaries in every new situation. We must also remain mindful of our reputation for competence and power. Adversaries will seek and find any hollowness and predictability on our part and exploit it.

The purpose of military deception is to further the aim of plans to operate on the line of least expectation and least resistance, or to deny such an advantage to an opponent. The U.S. military tends to assume that its physical power is the enemy’s only



General Stonewall Jackson

real concern and to base operational estimates solely on the physical facts of the case. But history teaches the necessity of expanding estimates into what Clausewitz calls the “moral dimension” as well. Enemy deployments may reflect concerns of internal insurrection, prior defeat or victory, or recent training or experience. An estimate of motives, and the commander’s confidence in that estimate, should form the basis for the entire plan of operation.

Dissuading another person from a highly probable expectation is much more difficult than confirming it. In the recent past, it was fashionable to formulate courses of action that required “throwing the enemy off his plan.” This aim is overly ambitious and failure prone. The enemy is likely to ignore early indications that his plan is not succeeding. Interpreting ambiguous signals as confirmation that his plan is working is natural, until the contrary evidence is overwhelming. One commits naturally—psychologically—to a planned course of action, especially within a hierarchical organization wherein a plan has been blessed by higher authorities. In such circumstances, commanders hesitate and seek more confirmation before admitting a plan’s failure. In fact, history shows leaders are predisposed toward keeping to an agreed upon but irrelevant plan rather than changing it to respond to the actual unfolding of events. Thus, trying to cause the enemy to change his preferred course because it inhibits one’s own most favored course likely will fail entirely or bear fruit too tardy for the desired effects.

Instead of attempting to dislodge an adversary from his predisposed course of action, masters of deception have aimed to confirm the enemy’s expectations while *concurrently* doing the unexpected. One of the principles of Eastern martial philosophy is to allow an opponent’s own physical momentum to propel him into a fall. Similarly, one of the ancient principles of deception is to allow the enemy’s expectations and psychological prejudices,

...history teaches the necessity of expanding estimates into what Clausewitz calls the “moral dimension”...

attitudes, and tendencies to entice him into a trap. Hannibal did this repeatedly, achieving remarkable results at the Trebia, Lake Trasimene, and at Cannae. Even the most circumspect of Roman generals fell afoul of his studied deceptions; he had conditioned his mind to habitually exploit his enemies' qualities.

Efforts to inculcate habitual thinking about stratagem should enforce the idea that any attempt at deception must "degrade gracefully," as modern engineers would put it. There are times when it is appropriate to "dare much to achieve much," and often the most audacious courses of action are the least expected. But any organized attempt to mystify, mislead, and surprise adversaries must allow for the possibility of failure. The art of deceiving an adversary has always required overcoming many difficulties:

- Knowing how the other person, usually unknown, expects you to act and the situation to unfold.
- Knowing whether any image you portray or signal you send will reach the intended decision-maker.
- How that decision-maker will interpret your information or signal if he *does* receive it.
- Predicting what actions will follow, whatever the interpretation.

Because of these difficulties, success should never be held hostage to the enemy leadership's deciding some issue just one way.

Creating and maintaining ambiguity as long as possible—coupled with competent, agile, and relevant power and speed of execution—have often proven more useful than "daring much to achieve much." One historic stratagem for spreading risk is to place the enemy on the horns of a dilemma. Appearing to threaten two or more objectives simultaneously provides several options. A multi-pronged approach provides a way to test, learn, and rapidly reinforce opportunity uncovered in the course of operations, *while the enemy is unsure of the primary threat and holds back reserves*. Or, an initial approach feigns the main effort until the enemy reacts to it, and then the real main effort is revealed, thereby hastening a decisive result while the enemy is wrong-footed. There are many variations on these themes. But each variation has a common attribute: rather than depending on the enemy to make one particular decision for the friendly course of action to succeed, each variation produces success from multiple enemy decisions or

none at all. More importantly, rather than following a scheme in which one grand deception is followed by a grand exploitation of it, ambiguity and small deceptions which are more easily achievable combine to create the favorable condition for friendly action at significantly less risk.

Much emphasis has recently been placed on "turning inside the enemy's decision cycle." Far more important is that decisions be sound rather than rapid. Slower decision-making can sometimes lead to more rapid conclusions. The emphasis would be better placed on acting more rapidly and more *relevantly* than does the enemy. Acting relevantly means acting with the kind of force—both lethal and non-lethal, qualitatively and quantitatively—most appropriate to the situation.

Acting more rapidly and more relevantly than the enemy can be much more powerful by combining it with ambiguity and small-but-multiple surprises to create conditions for a chain reaction. Besides reducing indecision and hesitancy, the combination of surprise and strong relevant action also induces shock. Shock impairs rational thought and useful functioning, but is only temporary. In well-led, competent, cohesive, and experienced organizations, shock produces only a small window of vulnerability. A force prepared to exploit it can seize and retain the initiative with a cascading chain of events against which the adversary feels increasingly helpless. Bringing about such a cascade requires the synthesis of a chess master and the strength, determination, and agility to take advantage of the temporary paralysis. Preventing the adversary from recovering during the cascading chain of events is an imperative, lest he regain his operational and psychological equilibrium.

Less ambitious, but serial, approaches to mystifying, misleading, and surprising adversaries can be as potent as the best informed, grandest, and most elaborate deception. An additional advantage they bring is that detailed knowledge of the object of the deception is not as important. A simple understanding of human nature combined with the capability and competency to exploit the situation is enough.

The real challenge in the modern age is how to mystify, mislead, and surprise adversaries in today's open world, while at the same time not seeming deceitful and untrustworthy to neutrals that need to be won over. Two recommendations will help:

- People among whom military operations take place in grand deceptions should not be used either as the medium for transmitting false rumors to the adversary or to lend credibility to a deception story. Beyond the added difficulties of keeping the deception story straight, the attempt can backfire. Once the deception is revealed, the “credibility advantage” goes to the other side.

- The people in the organization who are identifiable as the principal practitioners of the art of deception should not also be identifiable as the principal agents for winning the trust and confidence of the media and the respect and support of the people among whom the fight against adversaries takes place.

Unifying the Two Arms of Military Power

Sun Tzu emphasized blending the “physical and moral dimensions” of military power in every line of effort of every military operation, regardless of purpose. Blending requires a disciplined coherence of words and deeds to carry one strong and clear message to all relevant audiences. The blending of acts, words, and images that influences a particular adversary in one instance (by establishing a reputation), will also influence potential enemies, irrespective of distance from the events. Both Bonaparte and Clausewitz formally endorsed this practice in their philosophies. Both extolled the advantages of attaining “moral superiority”—the psychological effect of anticipation of rewards on the one hand and fear of consequences on the other—in advance of physical action to ensure a more complete and rapid success.

Military actions may change facts on the ground, but they also change perceptions, attitudes, and subsequent behaviors. Actions speak louder than words, as the saying goes, and they also speak louder than any images a military spokesperson might deploy. Demonstrated professional competence and discipline engenders

respect and fear. Everything we do and convey in words and images must therefore resonate in harmony. Only with this resonance will words and images acquire a synergistic multiplier effect. Well-thought-out, facts-on-the-ground-changing actions remain the most convincing way to influence human behavior, but well-chosen, well-targeted words and images that build on such foundations can expand that sphere of influence. In this sense, maneuver is not just fire and movement, but also a bringing of force, a threat of force, to bear from an advantaged physical *and* psychological position to influence the behavior of specific audiences—whether to deter violence, enforce a curfew, force a surrender, or discourage further resistance.

Rather than bifurcating these dimensions into separate oil-and-water-like lines of effort, commanders should make every line of effort an integrated, cross-reinforced blending of physical and psychological effects. Blending so-called “kinetic” and “non-kinetic” and lethal and non-lethal effects is not the same as blending physical and psychological effects. Non-kinetic effects can include electronic warfare and computer network operations that still operate in the physical dimension according to physical laws. Lethal effects have psychological consequences as well as physical ones. Non-lethal



U.S. Army, SPC Davis Pridden

SSG David Ingram from PSYOP unit in the 1st Infantry Division questions locals about local activity in the area during a patrol in Baghdad, Iraq on 26 May 2007.

effects may have physical consequences but no psychological ones. We need to return to the classical view, remaining as effective as ever in the physical dimension, but gaining even more influence from the physical potential the unit possesses through deep knowledge of human and social psychology. The best outcomes depend on a comprehensive understanding of the relevant causal and influence networks in any situation in the design and planning of operations, and on skillful integration of deeds, images, and words. This is how skilled small units accomplish the work of much larger ones.

One must appreciate the difficulty of influencing desperate and creative people to do what they really do not want to do. Determined adversaries will try to avoid consequences they fear and pursue enticing rewards, and we can never presume to understand the fears of others or what rewards will entice them. Moreover, empty threats and illusionary rewards are increasingly difficult to mask in an increasingly transparent world. When life and death are at stake on both sides, and the purveyors of information are foreign, artfully employed messages may still *contribute* to mission success (i.e., influencing desperate and creative people to do what they really do not want to do). But only the artful and determined application of physical force, or the credible threat of it, can guarantee it.

Because one can never be sure how opponents will react to words and images, concrete actions designed to force choices must inevitably follow. The vital function of PSYOP is to help adversaries understand the inevitability of choice-forcing actions. Messages influence the enemy's choices to the extent they mystify, mislead, surprise, and intimidate in verifiable behavior. But, unless concrete actions limit his choices, one has no control over how the enemy chooses to respond. Conceiving of these two arms simultaneously is necessary because they have to act as one in order to produce the desired outcome. The daily operations of our

adversaries demonstrates this logic. While the insurgent enemy employs persuasion through carefully crafted messages and rewards to influence the choices of the population, he also deals harshly with those who fail to choose to cooperate. Being perceived as strong and capable enough to follow through on threats is essential to his winning. Having established his credibility, he can veil his threats. This logic is just as essential to the success of U.S. and coalition forces, and the gaze of the media will look for actions to correspond to values.

Adversaries must see such actions as relevant evidence of the futility of resistance, and the foreclosure of *every option* but the one we want them to accept. Current foes, while small in numbers, seem to be more implacable, and more enabled, than any the Nation has previously faced. At the same time, the United States faces more demands to pacify those who use force for political exploitation or mercenary gain. In pursuit of either politics or riches, they challenge the most fundamental bargain between a government and its people when they endanger indigenous populations and their property. Whether fighting political factions or organized crime, the blending of actions and words must speak with one voice. In addition, that one voice must be in the language of words and deeds understood from the unique cultural perspective of those that U.S. forces mean to influence. In every case, the *synergy* of words and actions is what counts.

Commanders and their planners must get the physics right as well. A properly sized and constituted force ensures the inevitable foreclosure of all options but the desired one, regardless of the enemy's perseverance. When countering an insurgent, such an appropriate force has to ensure its own security, build confidence amongst the local populace, and do so before perseverance and will is exhausted among the political leadership and voters at home. Too few of the right kind of forces will limit our ability to hunt down enemies, end terror tactics and indiscriminate murder, protect logistical lines of support, conduct aggressive patrolling operations, conduct community confidence building and infrastructure re-building efforts, and deliver the expected results to impatient publics at home. On the other hand, too many troops deployed for too long can fuel the insurgent cause, build complacency among the indigenous government, skew the local

***The vital function of PSYOP
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economy, grow an outsized logistical foot print, and drive up costs of blood and treasure beyond what home publics expect and will support.

Enduring Aspects of Sensemaking

Human psychology is a science all soldiers should understand better. Achieving competence in both the psychological and physical dimensions of the military art is the challenge. The art of mystifying, misleading, and surprising one's adversaries is based largely on psychology. So is the closely related and equally important reverse: how to prevent the enemy from defeating *one's own* will, and how to *avoid* being mystified, misled, and surprised. This enterprise is the province of commanders, aided by intelligence and operations officers at all levels.

Deeper knowledge of human psychology and culture is essential to all operations, thus should be much more widespread. An education in the psychological dimension of warring and pacifying should begin with learning how people make judgments and how to affect their choices. After a basic knowledge in this field, cultural knowledge becomes much more useful. Individual schooling and unit training must provide practice in combining the psychological with the physical at all levels and in all missions, and it should be achieved without losing rigor of thought and attention to detail in the physical dimension.

Considerations for Design and Planning

A unity of actions and words is a *sine qua non* for successful military operations in the globally connected world. It is human nature to think of actions first and supporting messages second. Conversely, insurgents and terrorists think of actions *as* the message. Military actions are a grammar in the discourses of the larger political context, as Clausewitz and Sun Tzu both teach. The images and implied messages of actions are so strong that they overpower messages sent by other means. Therefore, defining the message (to the U.S. public, to adversaries, to allies, and to the populations within operational areas) must begin as soon as any unit receives its mission from a higher headquarters. Such considerations are essential to a comprehen-

sive understanding of the situation and to framing the problems that action aims to solve.

Since selection of a course of action hinges on what messages need communication, each audience in the unit's operational environment has to be simultaneously considered. The collective impact of words, images, and implied messages (inherent in the chosen action) has to be carefully weighed. Since action is the strongest form of communications, the most potent voice to carry the basic message should lead off.

As aforementioned, the line of least expectation to the enemy's greatest vulnerability should be the controlling idea of campaign design. Considerations of how to mystify, mislead, and surprise should be at the core of framing operational problems. Effective deception grows from integrating all efforts of the command to portray a credible story. Today's greater transparency in the operational environment makes it harder to exploit the enemy's greatest vulnerability, the point at which there is least expectation. As such, a whole-of-staff approach requires creating synergy between words and deeds. Coordinating this relationship is as important as understanding decision criteria and the opponent's propensities and idiosyncrasies. Expertise in human behavior is paramount since war is a human enterprise that takes people to extremes of passion in understandably predictable ways. Crafting actions that speak clearly and appropriately to those expectations will reinforce the best military and political outcomes.

The campaigns of great captains of the past, notably Alexander and Genghis Khan, seamlessly integrated their psychological and physical interaction with adversaries. They always prepared meticulously for physical engagements by a thorough reconnaissance and psychological conditioning of their object of attack. They followed-up every maneuver with a psychological exploitation to extend the effects of their actions to the furthest extent possible. This should become the habit of all U.S. Army commanders at all levels.

...the line of least expectation to the enemy's greatest vulnerability should be the controlling idea of campaign design.

The psychological underpinning of the military art is well supported in military theory and the writings of experts going back to Sun Tzu in (c) 500 BCE. Wisdom that applies to maintaining morale and determination of our own troops can be turned on its head to defeat the morale and will of the enemy. Whatever the ancients advocated to avoid being misled, surprised, or deceived applies as well when reversed in logic. Such wisdom, helped by modern behavioral studies, helps in framing problems and conceiving approaches.

Clearly, success requires designs conceived in both the physical and moral dimension at once, and plans that integrate actions, images, and words along every line of operation taken together as whole. This

means that PSYOP officers—those most knowledgeable in the psychological dimension—should be integral to operational design and planning efforts from the start. The psychological aspects of full spectrum operations ought to be second nature to every commander and operations officer, and they ought to be masters of generating a combined physical and psychological impact. Specialists in human psychology ought to be advising them and not, as propagandists at work, be communicating and building relationships with the public. **MR**

NOTES


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NARROWING THE GAP: DOD and Stability Operations

Colonel David W. Shin, U.S. Army

THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD) should challenge the assumption that it must prepare to perform *all* stability lines of operations as a “core mission” as specified in Directive 3000.05 and subsequent Army operations doctrine FM 3-0 because it does not have sufficient resources to accomplish all the assigned tasks on its own. Instead, DOD should focus on its strengths—providing civil security and control—and work to create conditions for civilian counterparts to operate more effectively on the ground to fill the gap.

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PHOTO: SSG Ricardo Broderick with Team 4, Detachment II, Civil Affairs Group looks around a corner in Tameem, Iraq, 5 June 2007. Detachment II Civil Affairs Group is deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom in the Al Anbar province of Iraq to develop Iraqi Security Forces, facilitate the development of official rule of law through democratic reforms, and continue the development of a market-based economy centered on Iraqi reconstruction. (U.S. Army, SGT Timothy Stephens)



This requires general purpose forces (GPFs) to focus on security-related tasks, while a “specialized training brigade” is created to institutionalize DOD capabilities to train foreign military, police, and border guards. Without investing significantly more in the capacity for supporting governance and economic and infrastructure development, DOD can mitigate risk by adopting more innovative ways to employ civil affairs (CA), other non-GPFs, and by leveraging Africa Command (AFRICOM) to build whole-of-government approaches. In fact, AFRICOM can be the laboratory, testing the whole-of-government approach in stability operations. Finally, DOD can partner with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), its private sector partners, and others in industry to fill the gap. This requires DOD to determine new ways to manage contractors in high-paced operational environments.

Background

In recent years, many observers have concluded that the United States excels at winning wars, but has failed to develop interagency capabilities to win the peace.¹ In July 2004, this concern led to the formation of the U.S. Department of State (DOS) Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). The department gave its new office a broad mandate “to develop policy options to respond to failing and post-conflict states.”² However, Congress has yet to provide S/CRS with the resources needed to perform its mandate. Despite continuous urging from DOD and the signing

of National Security Presidential Directive 44 in December 2005, Congress failed to achieve consensus to resource S/CRS properly.³ Although making some progress by initiating strategic planning, and engaging with allies, regional, and international organizations, S/CRS only had about 10 active and 90 standby corps members in March 2008, who could deploy quickly in response to a crisis.⁴ Upon passage of proposed legislation this capacity could be expanded by adding 500 volunteers to the Civilian Reserve Corps for the near term.⁵

Many in DOD have concluded that, while building civilian capacity for expeditionary capabilities remains a top priority, DOD must assume doing so “will take years, if not decades, and require revolutionary Congressional action with respect to budgets and authorities.”⁶ This means, “U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all [stability] lines of operations when civilians cannot do so.”⁷ However, after DOD Directive 3000.05 (November 2005) made stability operations a “core mission” on par with combat operations for the U.S. military, DOD has not decided how much capacity is needed to fill the civilian gap and whether doing so requires a standing stability operations force.⁸ The Directive says stability operations tasks include—

- Rebuilding host-nation institutions including security forces, correctional facilities, and judicial systems.
- Reviving the private sector, including promoting economic activity and infrastructure development.
- Developing representative government institutions.⁹

The assumption that DOD should perform *all* of the stability operations tasks identified in the Directive as a “core mission” should not go unchallenged. DOD should instead focus its efforts on the two security-related tasks of the Army’s five stability lines of operations. It should accept limited risk by being judicious in investing in GPFs and avoid the temptation to build capabilities that the DOD is not best suited to perform.

***...made stability operations
a “core mission” on par with
combat operations***

To mitigate risks inherent in this strategy, DOD should consider more innovative ways to employ Civil Affairs and leverage AFRICOM to build whole-of-government approaches that prevent fragile states from failing or relapsing into instability. DOD should take bold steps to institutionalize lessons learned from experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq by creating a “specialized training brigade” for training foreign security forces.¹⁰ To narrow the gap further, DOD should aggressively promote interagency cooperation by supporting non-DOD members operating in insecure environments and partnering with private industry, academia, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector. This will require building a significant capability within DOD to manage contracts. It appears USAID is best positioned to help DOD partner with the private sector. More DOD-USAID cooperation could narrow the civil-military gap and improve U.S. stability operations planning and execution.

Why DOD Directive 3000.05?

The trend in recent years indicates that our foes do not want to compete with the U.S. military in conventional combat so our future success will largely depend on conducting operations in the midst of civilian populations. A recurring theme during U.S. military operations throughout the 1990s and our current campaigns in both Iraq and Afghanistan, clearly demonstrate the need to improve the U.S. military’s stability operations capabilities. While promoting an increased deployable civilian capacity is a top DOD priority, many believe it would take years to develop this capacity. In the meantime, DOD would work to “mitigate the negative effects of predictable gaps in civilian capacity by preparing U.S. military forces for likely stability operations tasks.”¹¹ The need for developing stability operations capability becomes even more urgent when one considers that from 1990 to 2006, the U.S. military sacrificed four times the lives and treasure during stability operations than they had in conventional combat operations. In 2006, the Defense Science Board concluded DOD could successfully implement the Directive without “expensive technology, new weapons acquisition, or massive re-organization.”¹² The board also determined that the key is to change mind-sets that no longer apply, but will that be enough?¹³

Stability Operations Tasks and Solutions

As the need for developing stability operations capability gained momentum, the U.S. Army identified the following five stability operations tasks in February 2008:

- Provide civil security.
- Provide civil control.
- Restore essential services.
- Support to governance.
- Support to economic and infrastructure development.¹⁴

Arguably, the U.S. military is trained and equipped to execute many of the security-related tasks, however it lacks the capacity to follow through on the governance and development-related tasks. In light of this capability gap, the U.S. military should take the lead in providing civil security and control that creates the conditions for the interagency to operate on the ground and avoid expanding DOD's capacity for governance and development. What are some implications of this strategy?

Civil Security

The Department of Defense taking the lead on U.S. government security missions means that GPFs must provide civil security to protect the local population from both domestic and foreign threats, and assist helping the host-nation's security forces to fight terrorists, criminals, and other obstructionist groups.¹⁵ In cases such as Kosovo, where there are no police, judges, or jails, the U.S. military will have to exercise full policing authority and perform other functions essential to establishing the rule of law (i.e., operating a court system and corrections facilities).¹⁶ This will require more military police units and a commitment to train brigade combat teams to support civil law enforcement. This effort must include tasks commonly associated with constabulary forces.

The 1969 military manual *Constabulary Capabilities for Low-Level Conflict* states the reason for a constabulary force is "to create order in an unstable situation while assisting in and encouraging the development of social organizations and public attitudes that are conducive to long-term stability."¹⁷ While some may question this requirement, history shows that the U.S. military has habitually filled this role "by conducting operations as a trained constabulary force or in a constabulary role until

the creation of permanent civilian institutions or the transition of operations to a competent authority."¹⁸ For example, the U.S. military has historically performed some constabulary duties in the following: the post-Civil War reconstruction effort, U.S. intervention in the Caribbean in the early 1900s, post-World War II Germany and Japan, Haiti, Somalia, the Balkans, Afghanistan, and finally Iraq.¹⁹

Furthermore, today's Army doctrine calls for civil support operations, which suggests that the Army's traditional constabulary role remains a mission essential task. Doctrine states that when required, the Army will "provide support to local, state, and Federal law enforcement officers. In extreme cases, and when directed by the President, Regular Army forces [will] maintain law and order."²⁰

Nevertheless, the goal is to transition to either international or locally trained host-nation police forces. Training host-nation security forces should remain DOD's primary role in promoting "governance and participation." DOD should take the lead in training the host-nation's military, police, and border guard forces. DOD can expect other elements of national power to participate in stability and reconstruction tasks only when it provides a secure environment through policing and border protection.²¹ When civilian officials arrive in insecure environments, DOD must protect them so they can operate to shape conditions for improved stability and civil support. To achieve this civil-military synergy, DOD must be willing to provide dedicated military escorts for civilian officials. Instead, DOD provides security support on an ad hoc basis or forces civilian government agencies to rely on private security firms for protection. In Iraq, outsourcing security soon became "prohibitive" and ad hoc approaches caused inevitable delays, schedule adjustments, and a DOS-DOD debate over "whether to use military or contract guards and who should pay for them."²² If DOD is unwilling to provide security for civilian officials, it should not expect U.S. government civilians to assume the risks associated with operating in an unstable environment. Furthermore, without protection, a fully resourced civilian corps will be ineffective, even if they are on the ground in sufficient numbers.

The most significant gap within the security sector appears to be DOD's lack of capacity to operate a judicial system. Civil affairs can help fill

some gaps. Army doctrine states that CA units are capable of providing modular packages to plan and enable rule-of-law development as it pertains to fair, competent, and efficient enforcement applications “of the civil and criminal laws of a society through impartial legal institutions and competent police and corrections systems.”²³ This CA capability includes judge advocates and related specialists trained in international and comparative law.²⁴ USAID and its partners can also assist in filling the gap, but as Lieutenant General Peter W. Chiarelli reminds us, USAID currently has only about 3,000 employees (compared to 15,000 during the Vietnam War) and is “little more than a contracting agency.”²⁵

Like many U.S. government organizations, including DOD, USAID experienced personnel cuts over the years and relied upon the private sector to fill the gap. Despite this setback, USAID still manages to maintain its presence in many fragile, failing, and developing states around the world. USAID personnel and their partners have the developmental expertise, local knowledge, and contracting capacity to be true force multipliers for DOD. In fact, USAID is probably in the best position amongst all the U.S. government agencies to leverage their knowledge about private sector support for stability operations. This includes insights regarding indigenous private sector capabilities and capacity.²⁶ In the end, closer DOD-USAID collaboration has the potential to narrow the civil-military gap and improve U.S. government stability operations planning and execution.

For example, USAID has “indefinite quantity” contracts and other contracting arrangements with the private sector (for-profit companies, nongovernmental organizations, and universities) for “strengthening rule of law and respect for human rights.”²⁷ These involve eight primary contractors and approximately 33 sub-contractors.²⁸ DOD can coordinate with USAID to access this rule-of-law private sector and fill the gap.

USAID personnel and their partners have the...capacity to be true force multipliers for DOD.



U.S. Army, SSG Christian Foster

COL Todd B. McCaffrey, commander, 2d Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division, Multi-National Division-Baghdad sits with guests from the United States Agency for International Development at the opening of the new microfinance office in Sab al-Bor, 1 March 2008.

Civil Control

According to Army doctrine, civil control “regulates selected behavior and activities of individuals and groups.”²⁹ The population’s activities are channeled “to allow provision of security and essential services while coexisting with a military force conducting [stability] operations,” and it may include “crowd control.”³⁰ This suggests civil control could be a subset of civil security. If the military is capable of providing civil security, it should be able to manage civil control. However, without this capability, the Army must rely on civil capacity that currently is incapable of responding to crisis in a timely manner. For example, the UN called for a crowd control capability in Kosovo because of civil disturbances, and the international special police units took almost a year to deploy to Kosovo.³¹

Restoring Essential Services

While restoring essential services is another critical component of stability operations, restoring electrical power is not included in Army doctrine. Army doctrine emphasizes providing emergency medical care, preventing disease epidemics, providing food and water, and providing emergency shelter and basic sanitation such as sewage and garbage disposal.³² The military can perform many of these tasks with medical, CA, engineer, and general purpose forces. Restoring electricity or



U.S. Army. SGT Jacob H. Smith, 982D Combat Camera Company (Airborne)

Pictured is the power station in Taji, Iraq, 23 December 2008, during a U.S. Army essential services survey in the city.

building additional electrical capacity can also be contracted through the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Although we should be careful not to promise something we cannot deliver, the indigenous population can perceive our failure to provide adequate electricity as a general failure to restore order and stability as was the case in Iraq.³³

As a result, from October 2003 to March 2006, a significant part of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund was spent on restoring the electrical grid for the nation of Iraq.

- The U.S. Army Transatlantic Programs Center contracted with Odebrecht-Austin company to maintain a Gas Power Plant for \$38.66 million.
- Shaw Centcom Services to rehabilitate a transmission line and substation for \$15.42 million.
- Washington International/Black and Veatch to rehabilitate a generator for \$64.29 million.
- Joint Contracting Command-Iraq-Afghanistan contracted with Fluor to construct an electric power plant for \$4.5 million.
- The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers—Gulf Region Division contracted with KEC-OZDIL to design and reconstruct a transmission line for

\$23.86 million and with “Iraqi Company I” to build an electrical complex for \$2.87 million.³⁴

The military can maintain the capacity for restoring electricity by partnering with industry to ensure this capability is available when needed, similar to the way USAID uses its indefinite quantity contracts.

Support to Governance

The U.S. Army doctrine for supporting improved governance includes—

- Developing and supporting host-nation control of public activities, the rule of law, and civil administration.
- Maintaining security, control, and essential services through host-nation agencies (includes training/equipping security forces and police).
- Supporting indigenous efforts to normalize succession of power (elections).

This effort is a natural extension of civil security, civil control, and essential services tasks, which is the foundation for supporting governance. As noted earlier, the military should play a leading role in security by helping to rebuild “indigenous institutions including various types of security

forces, correctional facilities, and judicial systems necessary to secure and stabilize the environment.” However, other agencies like USAID can and should take the lead in developing “representative governmental institutions.”³⁵

Organizing, training, equipping, and advising foreign militaries, police, and border guards have become key tasks for our GPFs, thus potentially ending U.S. Special Forces (SF) monopoly on training of foreign security forces.³⁶ The U.S. Army should institutionalize this non-SF capability by establishing a “specialized training brigade” to train foreign military, police, and border guard units. Some argue that training police and border guard units risks DOD efforts to promote civilian capacity building and DOD could end up holding the bag for these tasks. However, DOD must realize that doing all it can to provide a secure environment for others in the interagency to operate on the ground is the key to success, and that success is unlikely to occur without building a host-nation police and border guard capability. Worse yet, DOD will most likely be left holding the bag. For example, 400 Navy reservists from hospital corpsmen to explosive ordnance specialists were recently mobilized to undergo six weeks of customs inspection training to perform these duties in support of the Army in Iraq.³⁷ Until U.S. government civilian partners arrive, CA units can fill gaps and are capable of “creating, resourcing, managing, and sustaining the institutions and processes through which a society is governed, protected, and also prospers.”³⁸ This work can initially be done by “CA specialists in public administration, environmental management, and public safety areas”³⁹

To narrow the gap further, DOD should again look to USAID and its partners. USAID has approximately 15 primary contractors for governance, 150 sub-contractors, and 20 affiliates.⁴⁰ Rather than building additional capacity for governance, DOD should focus on providing security to keep the experts safe on the ground.

Support to Economic and Infrastructure Development

The final Army stability operations task, “support economic and infrastructure development,” includes helping host nations develop both the capability and capacity to support these areas. Army



DOD, CPL Shawn Coolman

Members of the Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team and USAID stop at a local business in the heart of Haditha's market place to speak with the locals on how the area is growing, 26 May 2008.

doctrine does not say what to do to accomplish the task. However, doctrine does acknowledge DOS technical sectors in this line of operation to include: reconstituting power, transportation, communications, health and sanitation, fire fighting, mortuary services, and environmental control. When these basic needs are restored, the task shifts to stabilizing the economy: providing employment opportunities, initiating market reforms, encouraging domestic and foreign investment, overseeing monetary reform, and rebuilding public structures.⁴¹

The Department of Defense's capability to provide essential services is critical to infrastructure development. Given the current gaps in DOS capacity to contract and oversee infrastructure development, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and other organizations with contracting capabilities such as USAID may have to take the lead on larger infrastructure development projects, particularly in the short-term.

Even though civilian agencies should have the lead for economic development, the military has some effective tools like the Commander's Emergency Response Program. The program is used to promote local economic activity, and in some cases (such as Iraq), allows DOD to play a significant role in economic development. For example, the Task Force for Business and Stability Operations in Iraq helps revitalize Iraq's economy by leveraging DOD's current \$10 billion per month cost of sustaining operations in Iraq. This level of spending can have a significant impact on local economic development across several sectors.⁴²

Civil affairs units can also provide expertise in economic development, civilian supply, food and agriculture, public transportation, public works and utilities, and public communications.⁴³ Private industry for this sector includes AECOM, Louis Berger, URS, Fluor, Washington Group, Perini Corporation, Parsons Iraq JV, KBR, Black & Veatch, Parsons Delaware, Lucent, and Contrack.⁴⁴

Success in narrowing the civil-military gap requires innovative use of GPFs and non-GPFs in close coordination with USAID, its private sector partners, and others in private industry. How can DOD make this work more effectively?

Thoughts on Stability Operations

Some analysts have proposed much larger investments in stability operations, while others support the status quo or oppose investing much at all in the effort. Andrew F. Krepinevich, has argued it is time for DOD to create “a standing capability for training and advising indigenous and allied military forces.”⁴⁵ He has also pushed for converting a “substantial” number of Army brigades to stability operations.⁴⁶ Krepinevich contends that post-Cold War conventional combat—the 1991 Gulf War and Second Gulf War in 2003—demonstrated the “enormous overmatch” U.S. forces have over enemies that challenge them in conventional warfare.⁴⁷ He notes that despite this dominance in conventional warfare, the U.S. Army plans to create six additional brigades, and the Marines will “add a regimental combat team to round out their three division-wing teams” with the 92,000 personnel increase in our ground forces.⁴⁸ Krepinevich also stresses that the conventionally focused U.S. military failed to respond effectively to irregular challenges in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq.⁴⁹

On the other hand, General Chiarelli believes that DOD simply does not have the luxury to divide forces into combat and stability units. He has argued for “developing full-spectrum capabilities across” the armed forces.⁵⁰ He acknowledges that the Army may need to expand some “specialized units,” like “civil affairs, engineers, information operations, and others that play critical roles in stability operations.”⁵¹ Chiarelli does not think GPFs should train indigenous security forces. He says they should have the “inherent flexibility”

to perform this mission when Special Forces lack the capacity to meet expanding requirements. According to Chiarelli, these requirements should be resourced from units already operating in the battle space, instead of cherry-picking personnel to augment externally resourced training teams.⁵² Colin S. Gray concurs with Chiarelli’s assessment and goes further by suggesting stability operations should not be viewed as a “separate matter,” but as a part of the counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategy. Gray predicts that since “protracted irregular warfare will not prove domestically sustainable [in the U.S.], it has to follow that there will be only a modest policy demand for stability and reconstruction operations.”⁵³

Perhaps even more than Directive 3000.05 itself, AFRICOM’s establishment suggests that security and development are inexorably linked and the U.S. is making a long-term commitment to stability operations.

Though Krepinevich’s call to create a standing force to train foreign security personnel has merit, it is not realistic to create several brigades solely for stability operations when DOD is under constant pressure of budget constraints, rising operating tempo, and the whole-of-government approach is a less costly way for DOD to conduct stability operations.

The proposed strategy allows U.S. departments and agencies to exercise their core competencies instead of building redundant capabilities to guard against self-fulfilling prophecies. (“Civilians will not be there to help.”) Chiarelli is correct to suggest that standing forces are not required for stability operations, but specialized units should be expanded, such as civil affairs, engineers, military police, and others to fill critical gaps. However, it is unrealistic to suggest GPFs should only train foreign security forces when Special Forces lack the capacity to do so. For the foreseeable future, the U.S. military is unlikely to have enough Special Forces to satisfy all foreign training requirements. Now is the time to institutionalize this capability by creating a “specialized training brigade” before we lose it yet again.

Africa Command (AFRICOM)

The AFRICOM model has significant implications that can enhance DOD stability operations capabilities and further refine DOD’s role in the

whole-of-government approach. In 2007, 8 of the 10 most fragile states were in sub-Saharan Africa, up from 6 in 2006.⁵⁴ AFRICOM offers a new way to respond to crises and to prevent fragile states in Africa from relapsing into instability. On 6 February 2007, President Bush declared, “This new command will strengthen our security cooperation with Africa and help create new opportunities to bolster the capabilities of our partners in Africa.”⁵⁵ He went on to say that the command “will enhance our efforts to help bring peace and security to the people of Africa and promote our common goals of development, health, education, and economic growth in Africa.”⁵⁶

Africa Command is unusual for a combatant command (COCOM), whose traditional role is fighting and winning wars. Arguably, more than any other DOD initiative, AFRICOM demonstrates that DOD recognizes that security and development are inextricably linked and must be delivered simultaneously.⁵⁷ If AFRICOM is successful, its experience could be a model for partnerships with fragile and post-conflict states and have a significant impact on the other combatant commands in terms of missions and organization.

AFRICOM offers a new way to respond to crises...

The Department of Defense should initially commit the “specialized training brigade” in support of AFRICOM to address its security-developmental challenge. As AFRICOM’s mission requirements mature and the brigade demonstrates its capability, other COCOMs could also be supported. It should also create a new, fifth civil affairs command to augment AFRICOM’s mission requirements. Instead of the new civil affairs command being entirely from the reserves, the Army should make at least one of the new CA battalions an active component. If the U.S. Military can afford to dedicate the only active CA brigade in the Army to the Special Operations Command, then DOD should be able to resource a CA battalion for AFRICOM, the only non-warfighting combatant command in DOD.

However, CA is not a “silver bullet” for filling the civil-military gap. Some analysts have recently called for ending “the practice of using CA soldiers to



U.S. Air Force, Senior Airman Jacqueline Kabluyen

U.S. Army MAJ Becky Morris, center, the commander of Charlie Company, 486th Civil Affairs, and a coalition member, left, both from Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, walk with a member of Business Executives for National Security, right, during their visit to an internally displaced personnel camp in Te Tugu, Uganda, 23 January 2008.

fill civilian vacancies where highly skilled civilians are required.”⁵⁸ Additional CA capacity is needed, but to have more credibility, CA must recruit the right kinds of professionals and properly train them to perform their missions, because CA will continue to be called upon to fill critical civilian jobs during stability operations.

Civilian U.S. government agencies should not fear AFRICOM, but embrace it. AFRICOM offers the opportunity to work with DOD on a day-to-day basis to secure and develop Africa. Assuming AFRICOM eventually becomes the model for whole-of-government approach to stability operations, it is in the genuine interest of all with a stake in stability operations to send their very best talent to help shape AFRICOM.

Need for Effective Contract Management

Finally, it is clear DOD must rely on private industry partners to fill gaps during stability operations. To strengthen rule of law, restore electrical power, support governance, and other civilian oriented tasks, DOD must create a more flexible and responsible contract management system. While private industry can provide high quality and specialized services at lower cost, inadequate DOD contract oversight has resulted in overcharges for services. One of the better-known incidents is KBR’s overcharging DOD by \$28 million for food services that were not provided in Iraq. Corruption is another issue. Some have been tempted to take small kickbacks from local sub-contractors, which auditors have often failed to detect. KBR employees in Kuwait received \$6 million in kickbacks from a local firm. Lack of accountability is another problem. Several DynCorp contractors were “implicated in sex crimes, prostitution rackets, and illegal arms trafficking” but escaped prosecution because the U.S. lacked jurisdiction in Bosnia.⁵⁹ Contractors may not always be dependable. Some may choose to abandon their contracts, and it may be difficult to replace them since contractors work in dangerous environments.⁶⁰

Nonetheless, it is almost impossible to operate without contractors today. DOD should create a CONUS contracting office with contract management specialists and subject matter experts who can ensure efficiency and security in out-sourcing.⁶¹ DOD must train select military personnel to manage and integrate these contractors better into the force

***...DOD should create a
CONUS contracting office
with contract management
specialists...***

structure. DOD can no longer afford to rely on ad hoc contractor management systems.⁶²

The Department of Defense should also consider creating a contracting command to support AFRICOM. Not only would the unit support AFRICOM’s contracting requirements, it could be the training ground for a corps of DOD contractors dedicated to stability operations. There may also be a need to designate a lead agency at the national level to manage U.S. reconstruction and stabilization contracting by establishing a code of conduct for industry standards for contracting, and overseeing all reconstruction and stabilization contracts. USAID already has contracting expertise for development-related services, so it may be able to lead or support this effort.

Conclusion

The Department of Defense should not assume its civilian counterparts will not be there on the ground. Although DOD is capable of performing some tasks across all stability lines of operations, it must do more to establish a secure operating environment. DOD simply does not and will not have sufficient resources to accomplish all the tasks related to stability operations on its own; as a result, it must *commit* to protecting its civilian counterparts, while filling gaps until they build their capacity on the ground.

To do this, DOD should employ most of its GPFs for security-related tasks, while creating a “specialized training brigade” to institutionalize non-SF capabilities to train foreign security forces. DOD should also expand CA capabilities in the active Army and build more capacity for military police, engineers, and other specialized units to fill the gaps. Even without building significant capacity to support governance and economic and infrastructure development, DOD can mitigate risks by partnering more effectively with USAID, its private sector partners and others in industry. DOD can also do a better job managing its relationship

with industry by creating contracting management organizations at DOD and COCOM-levels, and by training key personnel at all levels to manage contractors more effectively on the battlefield. Lastly, the U.S. government should make AFRICOM a laboratory for nurturing a whole-of-government approach to stability operations that goes well

beyond Africa. If done right, that is, with the full support of the interagency community, AFRICOM will not only respond to crises more effectively, but also it will be able to prevent fragile states from failing or relapsing into instability. AFRICOM's success could affect the missions of other COCOMs and how they are organized. **MR**

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TAL AFAR AND AR RAMADI: GRASS ROOTS RECONSTRUCTION

Captain Chad M. Pillai, U.S. Army

AMERICAN STRATEGY FOR IRAQ consists of three basic tenets: clear, hold, and build. U.S. ground forces have been successful in clearing and holding key areas in Iraq; however, the last tenet, build, as of February 2007 has been the most complicated to implement. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations*, states that ground forces should conduct stability operations to establish civil security and control, restore essential services, support local governance, and promote economic and infrastructure development. Most Army units in Iraq have been relatively successful at restoring essential services by using the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP), which has netted many positive short-term gains. However, Army tactics to foster local governance and economic development have produced mixed long-term results. In addition, no clear linkage has existed between small-unit short-term goals and State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) long-term development goals.

This article highlights some tactical concepts developed and applied in Tal Afar and Ar Ramadi that, if successfully sustained, could lead to a stable Iraq and offers guidelines for future U.S. nation-building efforts. To this end, the Army must counter political disenfranchisement and economic depression to address insurgency's grass-root causes and eliminate extremist ideology.

Support Local Governance

Iraq has 18 provinces, and the new Iraqi constitution gives the provinces certain powers for political and economic development; however, neither the Iraqi constitution nor U.S. policies address the powers of the local governments in detail. Shifting the focus of political reconciliation and reform to the local level gives the average Iraqi more ownership of the political process. As the saying goes, "All politics is local." As Alexander Hamilton wrote in *Federalist Paper 17*, the "people maintain stronger affection, esteem, and reverence toward sub-unit government owing to its public visibility in the day-to-day administration of criminal and civil justice."¹

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PHOTO: Tal Afar's 14th-Century, Ottoman-era castle (currently the district government center) dominates the city's landscape, evoking its long history of civilization and conflict. (DOD, CPT Lewis Messenger)

The Tal Afar district government. In 2006, Tal Afar's local district government consisted of a mayor and a council appointed by the provincial council. However, it did not reflect the 13 clearly defined internal city neighborhoods with different ethnic mixes of Sunnis and Shi'ites, or the sub-districts of Abu Maria, Zuma, Avgani, and Rab'ea. Had the council organized to do this, it would have mitigated many conflicts and much distrust. Though reorganizing the Tal Afar council was impractical at the time, such a reorganization effort was vital in developing sub-district governments in Ar Ramadi in Al Anbar Province.

Once the district government assumed power, it was critical to develop an extensive training program to allow the council to act as a true governing body. Some of the most important functions of any legislative body are developing parliamentary procedures, drafting legislation, and enacting budgets. Unlike the Iraqi Army, Iraqi Police, and provincial government, the district government had no strategy to operate independently. This created the illusion that it was a "figurehead government" in which the local mayor and council appeared to have power and authority, but in fact exercised none.

From February to March 2006, the Tal Afar district council was a governing body in name only. Calls for its dissolution and the establishment of a new council to serve the people forced it to start performing its duties. The council began to address the issue of compensation for battle damages and formed committees to discuss human rights violations and the district's operating budget. By November 2006, the district council managed \$4 million worth of compensation payments, passed a \$29 million operating budget, investigated excessive use of force by the Iraqi Police, and enacted local ordinances, including traffic and fuel distribution codes and zoning for industrial development. As the council began to work on more issues, the people's confidence in the local government increased.

From February to March 2006, the Tal Afar district council was a governing body in name only.

The Jazeera council in Ar Ramadi. At the height of Al-Qaeda's domination of Ar Ramadi, the provincial, district, and sub-district governments completely collapsed. However, once 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division security operations drove Al-Qaeda from the city, a new government began to emerge. The provincial government re-established itself, but it refused to meet in Ar Ramadi because the director generals (DG) were corrupt and complicit with Al-Qaeda. The Sheikh Awakening, a Sunni revolt in Ar Ramadi led by Sheikh Sattar Abu Risha, was the first critical development in governance and set the conditions for clearing the area of Al-Qaeda.

In December 2006, in response to the dismal services the existing district government provided, the leaders of the Sheikh Awakening and the Albu Thiyab tribe discussed forming a new council just north of Ar Ramadi. They also hoped to organize the tribes for reconciliation and economic development instead of allowing reconstruction projects to move forward on a case-by-case basis. Each of four cooperating tribes had a representative on the new council to discuss coalition project allocation, develop governing bylaws, address security and development issues, and seek recognition from the provincial government in order to receive funds for infrastructure improvement.

Word of the council spread to the other tribes in Jazeera. The coalition urged them to end their support for Al-Qaeda. As a reward, they would have a seat on the council and be eligible to receive coalition assistance in the form of reconstruction projects. The conditions for joining the council were—

- End any allegiance to Al-Qaeda.
- Reduce attacks against coalition forces and Iraqi Security Forces by at least 50 percent.
- Provide recruits for local Iraqi Security Forces.

By February 2007, all the tribes in the Jazeera area had endorsed the council. Iraqis that were once hostile to the coalition became cooperative and helped clear Al-Qaeda out of northern Ar Ramadi. After the council expanded, it began working with the coalition on large reconstruction projects and concepts to promote economic development. The key to the Jazeera council's success was the fact that it was fully democratic and each tribe had a representative on it.

Developing a budget. After a U.S.-sponsored contract that supplied the local Tal Afar government with support personnel ended, coalition forces began to train Iraqis in budgetary procedures. In 2006, a decentralized funding process required each department in the local government to seek funds for personnel and operational support from a separate national ministry. Unfortunately, the national ministers used a centralized funding matrix that did not meet local funding needs and did not consult with the legislative and executive bodies that oversaw the day-to-day operations of the government.

The Tal Afar government desperately needed an operating and maintenance budget. City department directors had no clear idea how many people worked for their departments, how many supplies they needed to run their offices, or how much it would cost to operate them. They were not accustomed to developing a budget because everything had been centralized previously. As a result, many government offices rarely had enough money to hire new workers, purchase equipment, or make repairs. The entire budgetary system in Iraq was dysfunctional, and we had to address this problem in order to empower local governments.

Federalism is not only political, but fiscal. As the International Monetary Fund (IMF) noted, fiscal federalism is important for the development of countries moving from a unitary or totalitarian regime to a democratic model. As explained by author Vito Tanzi:

The needs of the citizens and taxpayers for public sector activities are better known to the local government officials than those who represent the central government. The reason is that contiguity provides more information while distance reduces the amount of information necessary to make good decisions. This argument is assumed strong enough to neutralize the advantages that economies of scale in the production of public goods and public services and in the generation of tax revenue may give to arrangements that keep more power in the hands of the central government.²

After the district directors briefed the district council and Tal Afar city directors on the budget, they presented their budget request to the district council. This allowed the district council to better understand

The entire budgetary system in Iraq was dysfunctional...

the city's operations and funding requirements and the serious shortfalls the city had been operating under for so many years (see Figure 1). The council approved the budget on 8 August 2006, and the mayor signed his endorsement at a public hearing. The local government had acted as a unified body.

The provincial council in Mosul had received about \$203 million for capital projects from the Ministry of Finance. The Deputy Commanding General of the 101st Airborne Division proposed giving each district a percentage of this amount

Directorate	Amount (\$USD)
Education	15,827,525.00
Youth and Sports	43,276.00
Propane Distribution	212,195.33
Agriculture	86,980.08
Primary Health Clinics	2,741,743.77
Civil Defense (fire department)	4,239,086.00
Municipal Services	923,920.55
Water	568,520.96
Granary (Silo)	302,302.00
Sewerage	127,858.80
Gas Station (petroleum fuels)	138,858.67
Electricity	1,830,233.33
Census	54,160.67
Agriculture Bank	69,287.75
Veterinary Clinics	158,643.45
Rafidan Bank	86,266.60
Communications	481,647.47
Irrigation	127,858.50
Tal Afar Hospital	983,137.00
Tal Afar Tax Department	119,968.80
Tal Afar Mayor and City Council Executive Budget	380,014.78
Total	\$29,503,485.20

NOTE: Exchange ratio is \$1500 ID = \$1 USD

Figure 1. Tal Afar district budget.



The District Council signs the first Tal Afar District Operating Budget, approved in August 2006.

based on the percentage of the provincial population inside its borders. The Tal Afar district was home to 11 percent of the people in Nineveh Province, entitling it to \$22 million in capital improvement funds. The district then developed a practical plan for the projected \$22 million. (Al Anbar Province received a similar amount of money from the Ministry of Finance.)

Tal Afar's receipt of these funds reduced the demand for CERP funds, which allowed U.S. forces to focus CERP money on larger projects with long-term economic and infrastructure benefits. (If each CERP project had been added as a line item to the Tal Afar budget proposal, the local government could have accurately forecast future maintenance costs as well.)

The need for a tax base. While no one wants to pay taxes, taxes are unavoidable if governments are to function. As the 19th century economist Millicent Fawcett notes, "The legitimate functions of government are . . . the protection of life and property, and the maintenance of the equal freedom of all. These functions cannot be performed without incurring a considerable expense. To meet this expense, taxation is necessary; a great interest has always been felt in the question of how taxes should be levied."³

The district government's ministry structure currently does not allow it to generate revenue through taxes or service fees to provide incentives to establish a business; maintain, reconstruct, or modernize Iraq; or invest in education. In addition, no property or sales tax exists to generate revenue. The provincial council has to finance the entire city budget.

If the city had taxed the \$74 million in U.S.-sponsored CERP and Iraqi government-funded projects at 5 to 10 percent, it would have generated from \$3.7 million to \$7.4 million in revenue. The city could have put that tax revenue into interest-bearing accounts in either state or private banks. The tax office collects sales taxes on homes, automobiles, and other big purchases that can increase the amount of money for district operations and make them more responsive to the needs of the people.

Figure 2 depicts an example of fiscal federalism, "a system of transfer of payments or grants by which the federal government shares its revenues with the lower levels of government."⁴ Iraq's district, provincial, and national governments can follow this model and get a clearer read on the nation's budgetary needs. However, in order for this process to be successful, Iraq must modify its tax and revenue laws.




Figure 2. System of fiscal federalism.

Economic and Infrastructure Development

Successful counterinsurgency and nation building require security and political reconciliation, but they also require economic growth. As Milton Freedman reminds us, “Economic freedom is also an indispensable means toward the achievement of political freedom.”⁷⁵ Once the local population in Iraq begins to focus more on wealth creation, the incentives to participate in hostile acts lessen because the risks of doing so increase and the rewards diminish. Re-establishing state-owned enterprises, investing in private enterprises, and creating capital will help make this happen in Iraq.

Re-establishing state-owned enterprises. In the U.S., several cities have base industries that define the local economies. For instance, consider the automakers GM, Ford, and Chrysler in Detroit; Boeing and Microsoft in Seattle; and Xerox and Kodak in Rochester, New York. When these industries suffer, their suffering affects the city’s entire economy. In Iraq, the base industries were all state-owned enterprises necessary to maintain the economy, but the U.S. declined to invest in state-owned enterprises in Iraq, preferring instead that private investors do so. However, as the security situation in Iraq worsened and these facilities fell into disrepair, private investors were unwilling to risk capital on such ventures. As a result, thousands of unemployed Iraqis joined

the insurgency for economic reasons rather than ideological ones. An approach that provided modest investment to restart the state-owned enterprises and subsequently privatize them in phases might have avoided some of the conditions for economic and political chaos.

For example, in Tal Afar, the chief state-owned enterprise was the granary. The two primary mutually supporting industries were agriculture and transportation. The granary supported 25 milling companies in the area and thousands of farmers from the western portion of the province. It was decided in late March to early April of 2006 that this local economic engine would have to be repaired and re-opened for business to revive the economy. U.S. forces and the local Iraqi government determined that it would take \$1.16 million to make the granary ready for production. Once repaired, it would create a market for local farmers’ grain crops, create a demand for machinists to repair farm and factory equipment, and increase the demand for

...unemployed Iraqis joined the insurgency for economic reasons rather than ideological ones.

truckers to move grain products from Tal Afar to markets in Mosul and elsewhere. The granary could employ thousands of people directly and indirectly. Funds were approved for the refurbishment of the granary, and by the spring of 2007, it was returning to production capacity.

In contrast, the primary industry in Ar Ramadi was an old glass factory. Efforts to restore that facility began in late 2006. The factory provided employment for thousands of Iraqis and was important to many other service-sector industries that existed during the old regime. Once the glass factory was out of production, the main economic engine of Ar Ramadi shut down. The glass factory could have been an example of gradual privatization. With foreign support and mentorship from such corporations as Corning Glass, the plant could have become a viable production facility for glass products sold domestically, regionally, and possibly even internationally.

Lack of investment opportunities. In the spring of 2006, an Iraqi executive asked coalition forces for financial assistance to build an asphalt plant in Tal Afar to work on coalition road projects. He stated that the project would cost about \$1.2 million and that he and his partners could finance about \$750,000 of that amount. He sought \$500,000 from the coalition. Implementing the proposal would generate jobs in the construction of the plant and its daily operations, and the plant would provide needed asphalt at a lower price than asphalt brought in from Mosul. However, U.S. policies prohibited using CERP funds to invest in a private enterprise. Still, with over \$3 million in road projects being developed and proposed, the coalition wanted to hatch a plan to help the executive build his plant.

The business center offered to work with the banks to secure a loan for the plant, but the Iraqi executive rejected the idea of a loan because he did not want to pay the high interest rate the government banks asked. The business center proposed selling shares of stock in the plant to local investors to raise the necessary capital, and Iraq's chief accountant proceeded to explain to the businessman the risks and rewards of issuing stock and how the business center could help market the plant to local contractors. The Iraqi government was planning \$10 million in coalition-approved road projects and the provincial council managed a \$37 million

reconstruction fund and a \$203 million Development Fund for Iraq in Mosul.

Had the Iraqis sold stock to generate the \$500,000 and the plant received a minimum of \$5 million in contracts for asphalt, the owners of the plant would have received a 1,000-percent return on their money, and each investor a good return as well. Had this worked, more opportunities would have opened for private investors to invest in start-up companies tied to reconstruction efforts. Had the coalition loaned funds to the company at an interest rate of 8 to 10 percent, the return would have been \$40,000 to \$50,000. Had U.S. forces been able to invest in the company at \$1 per share and the price of each stock rose to \$2 to \$5, the coalition might have earned up to \$2.5 million for future reconstruction projects. Had it put money from shares in the asphalt plant into a private bank account at 10 percent, it would have gained an additional \$100,000 to \$250,000 for future use. Encouraging more Iraqis to take private ownership of the economy could have helped stabilize the area. The policies that prevented investment in private businesses seem to have been a strategic mistake.

The banking industry and credit. The banks in Tal Afar offered no incentive to the people to put their money in the bank. They paid no interest on money deposited into savings accounts because the bank itself had no money to provide loans and earn interest. Had the banks provided a modest 3 percent interest rate on savings accounts and used depositors' money to provide loans at 8 percent, each \$1,000 deposited in the bank would have earned \$80: a \$50 profit for the bank and a \$30 gain for the account holder. If the same account supported another loan, it would have produced another \$82.40 in interest. In Tal Afar, population 100,000, the banks and the people could have generated thousands and possibly millions of dollars of interest from basic savings accounts used to provide loans. Had the coalition put a large part of its CERP dollars into private or state banks that

The policies that prevented investment in private businesses seem to have been a strategic mistake.

paid interest, it could have generated more capital to use for reconstruction and helped the Iraqi government raise and invest capital at the local level. In addition, it would have convinced residents that the banks were safe, just as similar actions taken by the government during the Great Depression restored faith in the U.S. banking system.

Other issues discouraged Iraqis. Most in Tal Afar and Ar Ramadi complained to the coalition about the lack of capital to establish privately owned enterprises. The biggest obstacle for investors in Tal Afar and Ar Ramadi was the absence of a legal system to protect property rights, solve disputes concerning investing and lending, and no institution in place to evaluate and grant financial credit. Micro-financing and lending were difficult. Financial institutions did not expect to receive a return on their money. There was no legal action to take if borrowers did not repay their debts. (Still, the Nineveh Business Center in Mosul gave out \$1 million in loans and earned around \$800,000, with only a few minor defaults and a repayment rate of over 95 percent.)

Success would have been possible with the establishment of credit within the Iraqi banking industry because, as economist Millicent Garrett Fawcett explains, “the real service credit performs is that it enables an increased quantity of wealth of a country to be used productively as capital. It encourages the productive employment of wealth. Scarcely anyone, for instance, retains a considerable sum of money in his own keeping; people keep just sufficient money to pay their daily personal expenses; all their money above this amount is generally deposited in a bank, and there used for productive purposes.”⁶

Two proposals addressed the issue of credit at the micro-level in Tal Afar and Ar Ramadi: start-up loans for U.S.-funded projects and micro-loans for low-income individuals.

The coalition would guarantee or co-sign a start-up loan for individuals or businesses that received CERP-funded projects. Local state banks or semi-privately owned business centers would issue the loans. Contractors would be eligible for a loan of up to 10-15 percent of any total project awarded

that was less than \$25,000. Loan requests for larger amounts would require approval from the board of directors of the banks or business center and an approval statement by the coalition forces.

In the summer of 2006, the USAID designated the city of Tal Afar as a site for a Micro-Finance Institute. The Micro-Finance Institute would have started with a loan balance of \$500,000 to provide loans of \$2,500 or less to poor people without a source of income; in Iraq these are often women. (This was similar to the Micro-Loan Program developed by Muhammed Yunus of the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh.) The notion of this program was extremely popular to many Iraqis because it fell within the parameters of Islam. Unfortunately, USAID ended its funding for Tal Afar at the end of the summer of 2006.

Efforts to establish a microfinance institution in Ar Ramadi came to naught due to lack of funding and because similar efforts were underway in Fallujah and other sections of Al Anbar Province. We should dramatically expand the concept of micro-finance and integrate it into city action plans for key cities in Iraq.

Conclusion

The recent surge has created conditions of security in Baghdad and Al Anbar Province that give the Iraqi government “breathing room” to address the political and economic problems plaguing the nation. U.S. military and provincial reconstruction teams have been fanning out to meet with local leaders to find solutions to many of Iraq’s systemic problems. It is imperative to provide support and financial assistance for local governments and businesses in Iraq to build a strong foundation for this newly democratic nation. **MR**

NOTES

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Not My Job:

Contracting and Professionalism in the U.S. Army

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S EVEN YEARS into America's War on Terrorism, private contractors now outnumber American troops serving in harm's way. Pentagon officials recently informed Congress that as of September 2007, there were 196,000 contractors, along with approximately 160,000 American service members, supporting U.S. military operations in southwest Asia.¹ In fiscal year 2006, the Pentagon spent more than \$300 billion on contracted goods and services, making it "the largest purchasing agent in the world."²

There are many good reasons to privatize military functions. According to a 2007 *Congressional Research Service* report, most contracts supporting American operations in Iraq involve local companies and employees.³ Their employment creates jobs and supports economic development, a key tenet in counterinsurgency doctrine.⁴ Furthermore, many of the contracted services require unskilled labor. Without contractors, commanders would have to divert Soldiers from other, more important tasks. At the same time, modern military operations now depend heavily on high-tech weapons systems that may be too sophisticated for junior Soldiers to maintain and repair. Contractors provide expert technical support for these systems. Finally, the private sector has proven more flexible and responsive than the government's civilian workforce in providing skilled workers willing to serve in dangerous locations. The U.S. Army is particularly dependent on contractors for a vast array of services from civil engineering, foreign military training, and computer network support to laundry, showers, and mail. The vast majority of this support has been extremely effective.⁵

Nevertheless, the high cost of this support and its associated loss of transparency and government control have drawn heavy criticism from Congress

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PHOTO: Contractors provide the U.S. military with unique capabilities that can support military objectives. In this photo, contractors extinguish oil field fires in Kuwait after Operation Desert Storm, 1991. (U.S. Army)

and the media. Critiquing military contracting has become a cottage industry. Books such as *Licensed to Kill: Hired Guns in the War on Terror*, by Robert Young Pelton, do a brisk business on Amazon.com, where it became the fourth most popular title on the topic of Iraq.⁶ Like most critics, however, Pelton focuses on the highly visible, widely publicized private security contractors such as Blackwater.

This article addresses a separate but equally important challenge: military professionalism. The Army's heavy reliance on contracting erodes its professional jurisdiction over land warfare, drains its professional expertise, and undermines its institutional legitimacy within our democracy.

How We Got Here

American military operations have always relied on at least some support from the private sector. Washington's Continental Army employed contract teamsters to move supplies, and during World War II, many American plants converted from producing consumer goods to producing military equipment. Until the end of the Cold War, however, the Pentagon relied primarily on a large, expensive workforce of uniformed and government civilian personnel to perform most battlefield functions.

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the ensuing reductions in American military budgets, the Pentagon looked more and more to "privatization" as a way to sustain its forces. During the Cold War America stationed large forces overseas to deter communist aggression. America's post-Cold War "peace dividend" allowed dramatic cuts in training, equipment, and manpower in every branch of the armed forces. Between 1988 and 1998, defense spending declined from six percent to three percent of America's gross domestic product.⁷ During this same period, the Army reduced its active force from 18 to 10 divisions.⁸

Instead of a peaceful new world order, however, the end of the Cold War caused many fragile nation-states to disintegrate into ethnic, tribal, religious, and criminal conflict.⁹ A series of political and humanitarian crises in Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, and elsewhere challenged American foreign policy and placed a heavy demand on America's military services. The Army found itself particularly hard-pressed; deployments during this period increased by 300 percent, even as

troop strength shrank by 34 percent.¹⁰ Meanwhile, in an effort to deter the long-term commitment of U.S. troops to peacekeeping operations, Congress imposed troop limits on deployments to Bosnia and elsewhere.

Asked to do more with less, the Army relied increasingly on contractors as an expedient solution. In 1995, the Army paid Brown and Root (later Kellogg, Brown, and Root, or KBR) to build and manage large operating bases in Hungary, Bosnia, and elsewhere in the Balkans. The commanding headquarters was so pleased with the results that the Army extended Brown and Root's contract. By 2002, the Army estimated that it had twice as many contractors as Soldiers in Bosnia.¹¹ Brown and Root's support in Bosnia foreshadowed the Army's later reliance on contract support in Iraq.

As the Army privatized various aspects of logistical support in Bosnia, two other trends popularized the increased reliance on contractors. The first of these trends was the growth of outsourcing in private industry, as U.S. corporations struggled to compete with more efficient overseas competition.¹² The second trend stemmed from the Clinton Administration's effort to "re-invent government," which cut federal manpower to its lowest level in five decades and eased the process of privatizing government functions.¹³

Federal outsourcing gained even more momentum during the Bush administration due to the War on Terrorism, Hurricane Katrina, and a mistrust of federal civil servants by conservatives in government.¹⁴ In his 2002 "Presidential Management Agenda," President George W. Bush outlined a new "Competitive Sourcing Initiative" that was designed to improve the quality and efficiency of government services by opening federal agencies to private competition.¹⁵ Federal spending on contracts nearly doubled between 2000 and 2006 from \$219 billion to more than \$415 billion.¹⁶ The confluence of these trends has produced an Army

By 2002, the Army estimated that it had twice as many contractors as Soldiers in Bosnia.

that now relies heavily on contractors to accomplish nearly every function—from recruiting and training Soldiers to planning, supporting, and, depending on one's definition, conducting combat operations.

Consequences for Military Professionalism

The idea of military professionalism stems from a broader social concept of professionalism as “an occupational group with some special skill.”¹⁷ This concept has evolved dramatically in the past century, from the “functional” view of British scholar T.H. Marshall that professions enjoy greater social status (legitimacy) because they provide necessary social services, to the later, “monopolistic” view that professions derive their status specifically because they have obtained (and limited the access of others to) education, greater income, and power.¹⁸ More recently, sociologist Andrew Abbott has identified the importance of competition within professions for control of abstract knowledge within particular jurisdictions.¹⁹

Noting the continuing academic dispute regarding the nature of professionalism, sociologist James Burk offers a minimalist definition: “A profession is a relatively ‘high status’ occupation whose members apply abstract knowledge to solve problems in a particular field of endeavor.”²⁰ Burk identifies three characteristics—jurisdiction, expertise, and legitimacy—that distinguish professions from other occupational groups, such as bureaucracies or trades.²¹ Burk’s characteristics provide a useful framework for addressing the relationship between contracting and military professionalism.

The Army’s jurisdiction. Social and political forces have greatly influenced the military’s role, or jurisdiction, within American society. In their history of the Army’s professional development, Leonard Wong and Douglas Johnson observe that the armed services’ jurisdiction, unlike that of other professions, is often determined by civilian authorities outside the profession itself.²² During the Cold War, that jurisdiction was primarily limited to defeating a Soviet attack in a high-intensity conflict. In the post-Cold War era, however, social and geopolitical developments created new requirements for the Army, most notably peacekeeping, peace enforcement, border patrolling, and humanitarian assistance. As Johnson and Wong illustrate, these

Social and political forces have greatly influenced the military’s role, or jurisdiction, within American society.

roles actually corresponded closely with many of the Army’s traditional missions before World War II.²³

Nevertheless, the changes forced the Army to expand its jurisdiction. At the same time, the Goldwater-Nichols Act and other legislative requirements pressured the military services to operate (and cooperate) within a joint and inter-agency environment, while Congress and the Clinton administration attacked Pentagon policies excluding women from combat roles and prohibiting homosexuals from military service.²⁴ These social and political influences sparked discussion and self-examination within the Army regarding its role in protecting national security.

The advent of the War on Terrorism, however, superseded this debate. In 2001, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld initially contemplated reducing the number of Army divisions from 10 to 8.²⁵ Early success in Afghanistan and Iraq, however, suggested the continuing importance of American military land power, and the subsequent insurgencies in both theaters forced the Pentagon to keep American “boots on the ground” to secure the peace. The insurgencies also forced more changes in the Army’s jurisdiction.

Today, American Soldiers no longer focus solely on defeating a modern, mechanized opponent on the central European plains.²⁶ Instead, the Army is working to develop a “broader portfolio of capabilities to address the full spectrum of challenges we face.”²⁷ These challenges, outlined in the Pentagon’s *2006 Quadrennial Defense Review*, include homeland defense, irregular operations, sustainment of the so-called “long war” (formerly known as the Global War on Terrorism), and the continuing ability to win conventional campaigns.²⁸

These new requirements are more difficult, in part because they are new, and in part, because mid-career officers and sergeants who bear the brunt of planning and leading these operations must adapt their conventional war fighting skills to

a host of new tasks. Many of these tasks rely more on sociological skills, such as cultural awareness and political science, than on the application of lethal firepower. In recognition of this emerging challenge, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has repeatedly argued that the United States should develop more “soft power.”²⁹

As the Army updates its core competencies, it faces new jurisdictional competition from other professional organizations operating in the same regions. Some of these, such as joint and coalition military forces, have traditionally shared the Army’s battle space, albeit with mixed results. Other federal agencies, such as the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency, have contributed in small but ever-expanding ways to military operations over the past 50 years. More recently, Army deployments in support of humanitarian missions have put Soldiers into contact with nongovernmental humanitarian agencies, such as Doctors Without Borders and the International Red Cross. These agencies often operate in the same areas, providing food, water, and health care services similar to those provided by U.S. military personnel. In fact, the ability to cooperate and coordinate with these agencies has become a military competency in itself. The Army now emphasizes joint and interagency operations throughout its professional military education system.

While the Army continues to compete with external agencies for jurisdiction, it has already outsourced many of its own traditional roles and functions. Private corporations, for example, now write doctrine, including the Army’s contracting doctrine, and provide much of the Army’s training and education. Political scientist Deborah Avant argues convincingly that this development has eroded the Army’s institutional control, both over its professional identity and over its internal control system.³⁰ In addition, private American firms such as MPRI have replaced uniformed military trainers in teaching foreign military forces to conduct military operations.³¹ This practice transfers American military contractors with expertise offshore, often with the acquiescence of the American government, but outside the control of the military profession. As Avant notes, this practice represents another infringement on the Army’s jurisdiction.³²

Perhaps the most telling example of the Army’s dwindling jurisdiction is its continuing reliance

on private expertise for development of its Future Combat System. This multi-billion dollar “system of systems” is the Army’s most significant modernization program in decades. The Army has hired Boeing and the Science Applications International Corporation as lead systems integrators to oversee the program and to select other contractors who will develop its various subsystems. This approach generated heavy criticism in Congress and the media, particularly after the U.S. Coast Guard encountered significant problems while using lead systems integrators to modernize its surface fleet. According to a 2007 Congressional Research Service report, however, the Army had little choice, because it lacks the necessary scientists, engineers, and technical managers to manage a program of this size and complexity effectively.³³ The lead systems integrators approach shifts this burden to a contractor and adds another layer between Army leaders and the contractors who design and build Army weapons systems.

The Army’s expertise. As its own jurisdiction erodes, the Army continues to outsource many of its traditional battlefield tasks. As previously noted, contractors outnumber American Soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan, and this reliance on contractors implies a direct challenge to the Army’s professional role. In theory, the Army carefully distinguishes between essential military tasks that are “governmental in nature” and those tasks that may be privatized, but Peter Singer, an expert on the private military industry, argues that this distinction has all but faded from sight.³⁴ As contractors replace Soldiers, the Army either loses or fails to develop the professional skills that define its core competency, thus diminishing its own expertise.

Contractors in Iraq have replaced Soldiers in a broad variety of military functions. They include planners, translators, intelligence analysts, interrogators, construction workers, air traffic controllers,

As contractors replace Soldiers, the Army either loses or fails to develop the professional skills that define its core competency, thus diminishing its own expertise.

police and military trainers, and personal security teams.³⁵ Thanks to the complexity of modern weapons, many Army units also deploy with civilian technicians, known as systems contractors, who maintain and repair armored vehicles, helicopters, missile systems, radios, computers, and various other tools of modern war.³⁶ Meanwhile, private contractor KBR, which had earlier distinguished itself by supporting operations in Bosnia, now provides the Army with most of its logistical and life support in Iraq, from fuel and ammunition management to field sanitation.³⁷ As KBR Vice President Paul Cerjan told a PBS reporter, “We support the military [in Iraq and Kuwait] with an equivalent of over 30 battalions’ worth of support. That’s a lot.”³⁸ As the Army transitions to a new multi-vendor support contract in the coming months, it is hard to imagine that more vendors will reduce the Army’s reliance on them.

While it is now difficult to imagine conducting military operations without them, American reliance on contractors is a self-imposed risk. Due partly to force-structure reductions and partly to the increasing complexity of modern military equipment, the Pentagon implemented a formal strategy in 1999 to ensure the readiness of newly acquired weapons systems.³⁹ This strategy, known as “performance-

based logistics,” requires manufacturers to provide not only the new systems, but also the necessary test sets, spare parts, and contract repairmen to ensure the equipment’s availability.⁴⁰ As part of its effort to reform defense acquisition policies, the Rumsfeld Pentagon embraced this new strategy and issued instructions directing program managers to “aggressively implement performance-based logistics for current and planned weapon system platforms.”⁴¹

The new acquisition strategy reduces the need for manpower, and therefore expertise, but at what cost? This new guidance requires program managers to conduct business-case analyses justifying the performance-based logistics approach prior to awarding these contracts, and to update these analyses periodically in order to validate the initial assumptions. A 2005 investigation by the Government Accounting Office determined that 4 out of 15 Department of Defense (DOD) program managers studied had failed to conduct the initial analysis, and that 14 had failed to conduct the required follow-up analysis, including all 4 Army programs managers.⁴² While contractor performance met or exceeded government requirements, the lack of reliable-cost data raises questions regarding the cost effectiveness and transparency of privatized maintenance support.

Reliance on contract maintenance is especially problematic in combat. The Army’s recently fielded Stryker system illustrates the advantages and disadvantages of this approach. As originally designed, each Stryker brigade relied heavily, though not totally, on a team of 45 contractors to maintain a fleet of approximately 320 vehicles.⁴³ Although the wear and tear on Strykers in Iraq exceeded anticipated peacetime rates by 800 percent, contractors consistently exceeded goals for Stryker readiness.⁴⁴ In 2005, however, the Army expanded the mission requirements for Stryker units, which had originally been designed to deploy rapidly to conduct stability operations. Because the new mission profile included high-intensity conflict, the Army decided to gradually convert each brigade’s 45 contractor slots to 71 Soldier positions. A subsequent Government Accounting Office report raised several concerns, including the availability of competent military mechanics within the Army.⁴⁵

The Army’s chemical reconnaissance vehicle, the Fox, further illustrates how relying on contractors can stunt the Army’s expertise. The Fox has relied



U.S. Army

The U.S. Army has traditionally employed contractors in order to release Soldiers to perform specific military duties. Here contract employees provide laundry services in a KBR laundry facility in Iraq, 21 April 2008.

on contract maintenance since being fielded in 1990, and the Army recently awarded a \$333 million contract to continue privatized maintenance for the next five years.⁴⁶ Not only are Soldiers not repairing this system, they are also not learning how to fix it. As one division commander noted, “I can’t change a tire on the Fox until a contractor shows up.”⁴⁷

The Army is not alone in its heavy reliance on contract maintenance. The Air Force and the Navy, which rely even more on technically complex systems, also depend on contractor support. A senior Air Force officer, Steven Zamparelli, has argued, “There is, or will be, no organic military capability in many functions critical to weapons systems performance.”⁴⁸ Thus, the military profession is abdicating the ability to perform a basic battlefield function: repair of its own equipment.

Meanwhile, the Army finds itself competing with its own contractors for a limited pool of technical experts. The more military functions the government outsources, the greater the demand for those military skills in the private sector. Many American corporations, including those specializing in military contracting, aggressively recruit both active and retired military personnel already screened and trained at government expense. KBR’s corporate web site, for example, recently listed more than 700 job openings in Iraq. While a majority of these job openings required no specific military skills, most did require a security clearance, and some of the job openings specifically required prior military or government service. All of the KBR job openings in Iraq warned of the “dangers inherent to working conditions in a dangerous environment.”⁴⁹ MPRI, meanwhile, employs more than 3,000 persons and maintains a database of 10,000 potential employees.⁵⁰ Nearly all of them have significant military experience.⁵¹

Contracting opportunities for members of Special Forces are particularly lucrative, with private security firms such as DynCorp and Blackwater offering

to hire them for three times their active duty pay.⁵² Employees with a special operations background provide security firms with a double benefit. They are older, more experienced, and receive far more training than other Soldiers receive, and their “elite” status enhances the credibility of the private firms that hire them.⁵³

Ironically, the remainder of the all-volunteer force struggles to retain its most valuable talent pool, combat-experienced junior officers and sergeants who will become the Army’s future senior leaders. Repeat tours in Iraq and Afghanistan have persuaded many of these professionals to leave the service. As one young West Point graduate observed, “They say at the end of six years, half of their careers [have been spent] in Iraq. They’re behind in creating a life at home.”⁵⁴ In a 2006 report, the Congressional Research Service projected officer shortages of more than 3,000 per year unless the Army commissioned more lieutenants or significantly increased retention of its current officer corps.⁵⁵

In response to this problem, the Army now offers retention bonuses, targeting those with key skills. Incentives include branch and assignment choices, military and civilian training, and cash bonuses ranging from \$20,000 to \$150,000.⁵⁶ While military pay and benefits have traditionally suffered in comparison to civilian professional careers, relying on financial incentives threatens to undermine the dedication and selfless service the Army seeks to retain. Whether these incentives will supplant the military profession’s call to duty or outweigh the cost of dangerous, indefinite service in Iraq and Afghanistan remains to be seen. In the meantime, the Army’s multi-billion dollar reliance on the private sector essentially underwrites its own competition for human resources.

The Army’s legitimacy. Regardless of its shifting jurisdiction and eroding expertise, the Army’s legitimacy as a professional institution ultimately depends on the trust of the American people. That trust, in turn, relies on the Army’s competence and its loyalty to the Constitution, in the form of subordination to civilian leadership.⁵⁷ Fortunately for the Army, its loyalty has rarely been doubted. In fact, the controversies surrounding Leonard Wood, Douglas MacArthur, and the retired officers critical of the Iraq War stand out because such

***...the military profession is
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controversies are so rare, and because they contrast with the traditionally apolitical loyalty of the officer corps, as demonstrated by widely admired leaders such as Eisenhower, Marshall, and Powell. With few exceptions, public and Congressional faith in the Army's competence has also remained high. From disaster relief to high-intensity conflict, America's military competence contributed significantly to its emergence as the world's only superpower during the 20th century. Recent opinion polls indicate that despite fluctuating support for the Iraq War, American public confidence in the military remains high.⁵⁸

The Army's rush to privatization, however, threatens to undermine that confidence. A scathing report, commissioned by the Secretary of the Army in 2007, determined that the Army's expanding reliance on contractors has overwhelmed its ability to supervise those contracts. The report described a series of "key failures" that have "significantly contributed to the waste, fraud, and abuse in-theater by Army personnel."⁵⁹ The so-called Gansler Report documented a 600-percent increase in workload for the Army's shrinking and undertrained contract management force, an embarrassingly high number of Army personnel under criminal investigation for

fraud, and an Army-wide disregard for the importance of contract management.⁶⁰

The report briefly attracted media attention, but to Pentagon watchers and defense reformers, many of its findings were old news. Since the fall of Baghdad, Americans have received a steady stream of reports on waste, fraud, and abuse in military contracts. KBR attracted most of the negative coverage during the first two years of the war in Iraq because of the size and cost of its support, and because Vice President Cheney once served as chief executive officer of its former parent company, Halliburton. In 2006, the media's focus shifted to various problems in the Pentagon's multibillion-dollar reconstruction contracts, and one company's failure to rebuild health clinics seemed particularly emblematic of American difficulties in Iraq.⁶¹

Since September 2007, media attention has shifted to the alleged misconduct of various private military firms, particularly Blackwater. In fact, Blackwater worked for the State Department in Iraq, but this distinction may be lost amid the flurry of other contracting problems that have dominated American headlines. The shooting incident in Baghdad that killed 17 Iraqis, and the ongoing difficulties in prosecuting the alleged perpetrators, merely reinforces



AP Photo, Gervasio Sanchez

Plainclothes contractors working for Blackwater USA take part in a firefight as Iraqi demonstrators loyal to Muqtada Al Sadr attempt to advance on a facility defended by U.S. and Spanish Soldiers, 4 April 2004. Blackwater USA contractors were actively involved in defending the position. The Iraqi government recently rejected Blackwater's license to work in Iraq for the Department of State.

The Army's rush to privatization...threatens to undermine [public] confidence.

perceptions at home and abroad that American military contractors are out of control.⁶² This pattern of events, from allegations of fraud and murder to the Gansler Report's documentation of inadequate oversight, casts a dark shadow on the Army's reputation as an ethical organization and undermines its legitimacy as a professional organization.

Damage Control

Fortunately, senior Army leaders have taken the problem seriously. Five weeks after the release of the Gansler Report, Army officials informed Congress of plans to add 1,400 new contract administrators.⁶³ Meanwhile, the Secretary of the Army has established an internal panel to examine the Army's current contracting procedures, and the Army's Training and Doctrine Command increased efforts to educate officers about regulations, restrictions, and procedures governing military contracting. Finally, the 2007 defense bill authorizes an additional 65,000 Soldiers to expand the Army's current force structure. This expansion, endorsed by the Obama administration, will eventually reduce the Army's operational tempo and dependence on contractors to fill manpower shortages.

Unfortunately, continued reliance on contracting remains an inherent element of future Army operations. After identifying multiple problems with the status quo, the Gansler Commission offered no thoughts on reducing the quantity of Army contracts or reversing policies, such as performance-based logistics, that privatize military functions and undermine military professionalism. Instead, the commission recommended more administrators, arguing that contract administration should become one of the Army's "core competencies."⁶⁴

The Army now finds itself dependent on contractors, but several alternatives can restore the Army's jurisdiction, expertise, and credibility without undermining its current commitments. First, the Army needs to clarify the line between governmental

and nongovernmental functions. Expedience has obscured this line over the past six years. A recent Government Accounting Office investigation of Army contract management determined that contractors now perform many of the same functions as their government counterparts, particularly at major headquarters responsible for planning and oversight of contracts.⁶⁵ The Army has an obligation to clearly define functions that require military or government civilian personnel, thus building a better firewall between government and contract employees.

Second, the Army should consolidate its contract managers under a single, organic headquarters. At present, Army Sustainment Command supervises the Army's largest contract in Iraq, the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program, but it is managed by contract administrators from a different instrumentality, the Defense Contract Management Agency. The Army Corps of Engineers, the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq, the Defense Logistics Agency, the Army Audit Agency, the Army Medical Command, the Justice Department, the State Department, the Agency for International Development, and an



A contractor works with a military explosive ordnance detail at Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan, 5 May 2004.

alphabet soup of Army, Defense Department, and other governmental agencies supervise other contracts in Iraq. The Secretary of the Army recently created a new “Army Contracting Command,” commanded by a two-star general, to oversee Army installation and contingency contracting activities.⁶⁶ This decision marks an important step toward consolidation but does not address management of joint and interagency contracts.

Third, the Army should reconsider the value of its government civilian employees, many of whom provide both flexibility and a wealth of experience, without outsourcing—a significant cost of additional overhead and contract administration. Too often, Army headquarters choose to outsource a function simply because contractors are much easier and faster to hire than new government civilian employees. Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld highlighted this problem in 2003. Noting that only 17 percent of civilians deployed for Operation Iraqi Freedom were DOD civilians, Rumsfeld argued, “A complex web of rules and regulations prevents us from moving DOD civilians to new tasks quickly. As a natural result, managers in the Department turn to the military or to private contractors to do jobs that DOD civilians could and should be doing.”⁶⁷

The Army, meanwhile, has removed some of the restrictions on its civilian workforce. It recently expanded the number of “emergency-essential” civilian positions, although applicants for these positions must agree to pass a medical exam, receive necessary immunizations, and deploy or remain overseas during crises.⁶⁸ Also, the Bush administration’s flawed National Security Personnel System was supposed to streamline assignment policies and reward civilian employees for outstanding performance. Unfortunately, the implementation of this system has drawn fierce criticism from the employees it was designed to reward.

Finally, the Army has initiated several programs

to improve professional development for its civilian employees, including an expanded civilian education system. These steps, however, fail to address the civilian personnel system’s traditional and time-consuming methods for validating and filling new positions.

The Army should also re-examine its mandatory retirement policies, which require most officers and enlisted Soldiers to retire upon reaching 30 years of service. On the eve of World War II, Army Chief of Staff George Marshall famously called for younger officers to fill key leadership positions and reduced the Army’s mandatory retirement age from 64 to 60.⁶⁹ Military service remains a physically demanding profession, but American society and the demands of modern warfare have changed significantly since 1940. Americans now live healthier, longer lives than they once did, and many military organizations now require more brains than brawn, increasingly relying on highly skilled professionals with specific experience and technical skills. As an all-volunteer organization facing severe manpower challenges, the Army can ill afford to push its most experienced leaders and their accumulated skills into retirement (or into second careers with military contractors).

Current Army doctrine identifies contractor support as a critical force multiplier, and contractors have filled a significant gap in the Army’s capabilities during recent combat operations. Rather than viewing this as a virtue, however, the Army should view its current and overwhelming reliance on contractors as an unnecessary risk, one that senior leaders should reduce as soon as possible. The Army cannot put the contracting genie back in the bottle, but it should seek more opportunities to replace contractors with its own Soldiers and civilian employees, and it should carefully consider the growing threat to its professional identity. The alternative may be a military bureaucracy in which professional Soldiers become an inconvenient luxury. **MR**

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From Peddlers to Sheiks

A Contracting Case Study in Southern Baghdad

Lisa A. Verdon

CULTURAL ADVISORS in Iraq today act as modern-day Greeks among Romans, providing scholarly advice to the warrior. As a Middle East expert assigned to Forward Operating Base Falcon in Baghdad, I embedded with a brigade combat team (BCT) to explore the social phenomena of Iraqis as regards to local customs, conflict resolution, economics, and political and kinship organization. This assignment required working directly with operational commanders to offer opinions and to make suggestions based on my field observations, extensive experience in the Middle East, and prior military service. The goal was to provide an “insiders view” through the lens of social anthropology, analyzing data from a two-fold cultural perspective: U.S. military and Iraqi. The BCT’s priority was reconciliation, so this research focuses on tribal behavior within this context, and it highlights the potentially unintended outcomes of contracting decisions made during “reconciliation” and an apparent economic upturn.

The word “reconciliation” has no single definition for Iraqis. Americans in Iraq recognize reconciliation as a measured reduction in violence achieved through “peaceful means” whereby security, political processes, humanitarian efforts, and infrastructure improvements can be transitioned to the Iraqis. Reconciliation occurs when hostilities diminish and the political process begins. However, there is a causal relationship between reconciliation contracting and violence: good contracting decisions reduce violence and promote reconciliation; bad contracting decisions can have the opposite effect. While in the field, I asked the following questions:

- What impacts do coalition contracting decisions have on Iraqi traditional power structures?
- Are we challenging long-standing tribal power structures by contracting with the “wrong” tribe, brother, or cousin?
- Are our contracting decisions based on Western values that can cause long-term damage to the fragile elements of reconciliation?
- With whom do we form alliances to build a sustainable future?

The following analysis is meant to provide insight into the difficult question: Will my contracting decision promote reconciliation?

An Arabic Idiom Reveals the Dilemma

It is not difficult to imagine that empowering new local “warlords” through reconciliation contracts can cause dissension among the tribes in

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PHOTO: A U.S. Army company commander meets with reconciliation leaders in Radwaniyah to ensure equitable distribution of contracts among the local tribes, October 2007.

All photos courtesy of author

Iraq's Sunni-dominated areas. Many are familiar with the Arabic idiom, "My brother and I against our cousin, but my cousin and I against a stranger." A corollary to this adage is: eliminate the stranger through reconciliation, then cousins fight against one another when power, strongly connected to the values of honor and shame, is challenged.

Reconciliation security programs are designed to deny entry of an outside foe. Eliminating one threat may bring about another, which may jeopardize U.S. alliances with the sheiks. If this occurs, a competitor or conspirator may vie for support from the tribes. The cooperation we share with the tribes should never be assumed absolute. To maintain strong relationships, it is vital that U.S. military commanders understand the cultural, political, and economic contexts that influence Iraqi tribal behaviors.

Tribal Economics and Corruption

Iraq's oil wealth and the authoritarian rule of Saddam Hussein managed to keep the country's economy from being overly dependent on its allies and neighboring countries despite the 1990 United Nations economic sanctions imposed after its invasion of Kuwait. However, Iraq relied heavily on its oil sector, which made up approximately 60 percent of its GNP. Although Baghdad and other urban areas are relatively modernized, about 25 percent of Iraq's population is rural and mainly tribal. Saddam supported and rewarded the tribes who were loyal to him, and diminished the power of those who were not. He recognized the benefits of empowering tribal leaders and sheiks with control of local projects because he knew that, in return, the tribes would rally nationalist support in time of war.

In Al Anbar Province, the U.S. military has experienced the degree to which tribal support contributes to mission success in Iraq. As stability is achieved through successful reconciliation, reconstruction projects can be planned and executed with confidence that Iraqis can adequately provide local security. As coalition forces fund more projects, they become increasingly familiar with the informality and the oftentimes undisclosed business conduct in Iraq. The supposition that Iraqis are corrupt—especially the tribes—has influenced coalition force contracting decisions. Tribal leaders tend to skim off up to 30 percent of the money paid for contracts, and they do not always follow through

with their contract obligations. To ensure equal distribution among the tribes and rapid completion of projects, coalition forces have turned to awarding contracts to non-sheiks, which triggers tribal conflict as sheiks struggle to maintain their power and prestige, especially within their own tribes.

Corruption and competition. Corruption in the Middle East is analogous to competition in our society; therefore, Iraqis do not necessarily regard what we call "corruption" as an indication of poor character.¹ In Iraq, corruption is the norm, and the method by which leaders secure their power. Tribal leaders use force to maintain their positions over those they govern. They resort to bribes and preferential treatment as they work up the hierarchical chain or become hostile towards an inferior challenger. When coalition forces directly award lesser tribesmen contracts, sheiks react swiftly to stop any challenge to their authority.

The coalition should handle the tribal leaders and sheiks gingerly, and carefully consider to whom contracts are awarded so as to avoid any disruption to the tribal balances of power. Sheiks see bribes and other favors as simply a cost of doing business. This cost of business is translated into the patriarchal behavior of a sheik to his tribe. Such apparent corruption is challenging for Westerners who have worked in contracting positions. Competition is the cornerstone of the Federal Acquisition Regulation.² The West has grown used to a fair and ostensibly transparent free-market economy. Contracting agents who see the sheiks as corrupt individuals would prefer to deal with the more straightforward approach of a non-sheik. But often in tribal cultures, the more straightforward and transparent person engaging the coalition one-on-one is often a person with less power and influence in his community. Sheiks, who generally include fellow tribesmen when meeting with coalition forces, see such a

Tribal leaders tend to skim off up to 30 percent of the money paid for contracts, and they do not always follow through with their contract obligations...

person as a renegade upstart who is undermining their existing local power structure.

Reconciliation for hire in southern Baghdad.

In 2007, a U.S. task force commander obtained a letter that criticized one of its Iraqi reconciliation contractors—a cousin of one of the prominent Sunni sheiks in the area—for “corruption and conspiracy” against the Sunni. Evidently, the contractor’s tribe generated this letter in retaliation for the reconciliation economic activities awarded the cousin. Coalition forces also received a warning regarding local security that may have been the lesser cousin’s reaction to the propaganda letter. Irrespective of who did what, the fact is that coalition forces, relying on “bargained” stability, found themselves caught precariously in the middle of a family feud. Intertribal tensions would now test the efficacy of the new local security program intended to reduce violence.

An Iraqi security volunteer program, inspired by the Sons of Iraq in Al Anbar, is an agreement between coalition forces and local Sunnis to forcefully remove Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) from Sunni tribal areas, and then prevent future infiltration of insurgents by establishing local militias at chosen checkpoints and conducting mounted patrols. The development of a volunteer program, initially funded by coalition forces, brought immediate success as attacks against Soldiers decreased significantly in areas where such agreements were made.

However, with security now in place to keep the foreign foe out of southern Baghdad, an unexpected intertribal dispute surfaced, which began when the BCT chose to pay the sheik’s cousin directly as a security volunteer group commander. Prior to this, the sheik was the primary contractor for checkpoints, and he was responsible for paying his cousin as a supervisor of checkpoints. The cousin’s success in getting a prime contract, coupled with his projects to empower and support local Shi’ites—a goal of reconciliation—threatened the authority of the sheik. As this lesser cousin of the sheik, now referred to as the “challenger,” leveraged his relationship with coalition forces, his tribal leaders became more hostile towards him.

Threat to the sheiks. Tribal leaders protect the foundations of their power as manifested through influence, “*wastah*,” and reputation, “*wasl*.” While many sheiks have tapped into the financial rewards of a lucrative security program, they also feel they

are entitled to control the contracts awarded to members of their tribes. Controlling such resources secures the sheik’s *wasl* and gives the sheik power; sheiks maintain their dominance by leveraging their *wastah* to diminish the threat of an opponent.

Threat to coalition forces. The extent to which the sheiks protect their power includes use of force. The sheiks, with the support of coalition forces, effectively terminated AQI in Baghdad after realizing that Islamist ideology ultimately depreciates tribal power. The retaliatory letter stated that anyone who opposes the challenger or works against him “will be targeted by Americans for working with AQI.” This insinuates that the challenger receives protection from the Americans as he engages in his “wrongdoings.” Undoubtedly, the authors avoid overtly blaming Americans because of a patron-client relationship, so they instead paradoxically condemn the challenger for gaining coalition forces support. Such an assertion called for due consideration.

Bargained alliances. *They [Arabs] are always ready to flatter the mighty: sweet as lambs when faced with armed might.*³ — Andrew J. A. Mango
While the sheiks enjoy the company of Americans, often referring to them as new entrants to their tribes, the two sides were formidable enemies not long before this newfound “friendship.” Since Saddam empowered these sheiks in return for their loyalty, the U.S. invasion of Saddam’s Iraq was initially viewed as an act of aggression against the tribes. The Sunnis are also wary of the Shi’ites, whom they view as pro-Iranian, controlling their government. Shortly after the invasion, the Sunni tribes enlisted armed support from AQI, a decision that would prove fatal.

Al-Qaeda in Iraq eventually imposed strict “Islamic” rules of behavior on the tribes. Soon after, the sheiks’ alliance with AQI disintegrated as many

[Sheiks]...feel they are entitled to control the contracts awarded to members of their tribes. Controlling such resources is the basis of power...

AQI eventually imposed strict “Islamic” rules of behavior on the tribes. Soon after, the sheiks’ alliance with AQI disintegrated...

who opposed the hegemony of Islamic fundamentalism were assassinated. The sheiks sought coalition forces support because AQI’s objectives superseded the tribe’s way of life, including the sheiks’ power. An Al-Jabour sheik shared pictures of decapitated relatives whose heads had been placed ceremoniously on their torsos by AQI thugs. He presented these as evidence against AQI. Because of such terror tactics, reconciliation with Sunnis in Iraq continued to spread across the sheikdoms.

The meaning of “reconciliation” in Iraqi sheikdoms differs from the U.S. military’s understanding of the term. Sheiks are powerful in the lands they govern. One southern Baghdad sheik felt honored protecting local farmers who accompanied him to a reconciliation conference in Al Anbar; but he was

displeased when Iraqi National Police, unaware of his local status, took over as “protector” upon their arrival. Sheiks and tribesmen want to remain in their areas where people recognize, appreciate, and protect their authority. Disrupted power relationships pose a challenge to the U.S.-led reconciliation goal to integrate Iraqi security volunteers into the regular Iraqi forces. The volunteers fear being far from their sheik’s protection, while the sheiks are reluctant to lose the armed support of tribesmen they have traditionally relied on. But the sheiks may petition their tribesmen to join the Iraqi forces once Sunnis secure political influence in their new government.

Reconciliation Reciprocity

What do the sheiks want in return for offering full cooperation with coalition forces? The sheiks want to maintain power and honor above all things, and they want to continue governing in a stable and prosperous environment. Standing outside of his safe house, or “*modeef*,” a prominent sheik gazed over his barren land reminiscing when his property was well-cultivated farmland. He listed every vegetable, fruit, and flower that once grew



Sheiks’ Modeef “safe house”: Tribal leaders and local farmers meet with coalition forces to discuss contract plan for restoring agricultural production in their area, November 2007.

Sheiks...want to remain in their areas where people recognize, appreciate, and protect their authority. Disrupted power relationships pose a challenge to the U.S.-led reconciliation

from his soil as his eyes scanned the area within his field of vision. He blamed the coalition for drying up the canals by building roads over them. Although Arabs do not forget injustices, forgiveness is possible through compensation, or *fasl*. The sheik noted, “Most people here are simple and just want to farm.” In this context, the sheik wants the contract to clean up the canals so that water may flow to the farms—the “*fasl*” settlement. Receiving this contract, thereby improving the quality of life of his people, allows the sheik to validate his *wasl* by demonstrating his *wastah* with the coalition. The sheik would view awarding the contract to someone else as humiliation.

When sheiks negotiate with the coalition, they reveal the way in which a truce—intended to restore honor—is traditionally settled among tribes. The sheiks are indeed vested in stabilizing Iraq, and they expect compensation for any loss incurred from the war, even loss of power. They want to be venerated as “true sheiks” and to officiate in a manner to which they are accustomed.

The “sheik” defined. A sheik’s legacy, as defined by those I interviewed in the field, depends on where he resides, how he becomes a sheik, how much respect he has from his people, and how decisive and dependable he is. One sheik said, “Our area has real sheiks because we live in villages, not cities. When I was young, my father took me around to meet all the real sheiks. My father talked to me about the sheiks, and taught me how to be a true sheik. Many sheiks, especially the Shi’ites, are not real; Jaish Al-Mahdi (JAM) gives them money and then they call themselves sheiks.”

In private, the sheiks repeatedly stress the detriment of dealing with non-sheiks. One sheik explained, “I am telling you this so you know who you are dealing with—real sheiks and those who are not. They do not respect the invitations we offer

because they do not always show up. They cannot control their people like we can.” He added, “I prefer only to sit among sheiks. I cannot sit with non-sheiks; this is not good for us.” Here the sheiks urge the coalition to acknowledge their “noble” positions as they compromisingly sit among “fake” sheiks during reconciliation meetings. Sheiks prefer to handle matters as they have always done, so they want Coalition forces to deal with them within their tribal cultural boundaries.

Legal landscape of the Arabian tribes. Referring to an incident involving the disappearance of a local Shi’ite, one Sunni sheik complimented coalition forces for allowing sheiks to handle the matter according to local customs. “It is best to allow tribes to settle problems,” commented one sheik, who then added: “It is better that you allowed us to go on the patrol to seek the truth.” Iraqis under Saddam have always been tribal. If someone committed a crime, Saddam’s security forces would put him in jail, but the government would always resort to tribal law when seeking justice. The victim’s tribe would determine the blood price (*fasl*). This is an eye-for-an-eye culture, especially in my [rural] area. When there are conflicts with locals, the sheiks get together to discuss good things about each other.” “However,” he sharply added, “many sheiks at your reconciliation meetings are not real. I know many of the new Shi’ite sheiks; they were peddlers who used to sell me cigarettes and tomatoes . . . Bring us a street cleaner and make him a sheik, and we will sign a reconciliation agreement with him, too.”

Striking a balance between the mores of coalition forces and of Iraqi tribes is necessary. Sheiks generally prefer to resolve issues amongst themselves through consensus and by an informal “gentlemen’s agreement.” The “blood price” is reparation that equals the value of a kinsman killed or offended, or of property damaged. “An agreement to handle problems tribally is good. We have a smart and quiet way to fix our problems. There is more going on behind the scenes with sheiks. Had you come to the sheiks in the beginning, you would not have lost so many Soldiers,” noted one sheik.

Unlike the “fake” sheiks, a true sheik influences the way in which his people feel and react to perceived threats. One sheik commented, “Americans don’t understand something: all people respect the sheiks and will follow him no matter what he says

and regardless of where he resides.” The sheiks of the lesser cousin could not accept that their challenger had successfully established “*wastah*” with coalition forces and “*wasl*” among the local people, the opportunity he captured through reconciliation.

The challenger’s *wasl* tested. The challenger managed to gain influence outside his immediate community, and he was oftentimes present at the Shi’ite-dominated Rashid District Council, even while the council leadership was reluctant to accept six locally- and democratically-elected Sunni Saydiyah council members. The sheiks tested the challenger’s ability to retain his new status. The challenger said with assurance, “I am a straight guy. I don’t care what people say behind my back.” However, when he realized his *wasl*, or reputation, was in jeopardy, he said, “Losing my reputation is far worse than you losing your son.” During an earlier interview, the challenger’s sheik alleged that his cousin was untrustworthy and greedy—similar criticisms as those exposed in the letter obtained by the task force commander. The sheik apparently began a character assassination campaign to destroy the challenger’s reputation among his people, which ultimately put the challenger and coalition forces at risk. The challenger was assassinated in July 2008.

Power-Challenge Nexus

The case study of southern Baghdad is one example of the complex relations in a tribal society

and the fallout of a well-intended reconciliation contract. The BCT chose to deal with the challenger directly because he delivered immediate reconciliation success. From a Western standpoint, the challenger was action oriented, fact-based, and transparent when compared to the mysterious ways of the sheiks. However, the challenger did not have the tribal power or the blessings of the sheiks. Sooner or later, the sheiks take action to save their honor and deal with the situation in their customary ways. This is where intertribal violence begins.

Sooner or later, the sheiks take action to save their honor and deal with the situation in their customary ways.

One ought not interpret Iraqi behaviors at face value. The society has always been based on a power-challenge nexus where the sheiks and their subordinates skillfully scheme to gain more power and prestige through flattery, conspiracy, and shifting alliances. It is critical to maintain the support of the sheiks and deal directly with them. When there is conflict, tribal leaders will first attempt to resolve matters face-to-face to determine a sober solution.⁴ If that fails, they resort to violence or show of force. The sheiks expect any humiliation they may be feeling resolved directly by the offender. In south-



Reconciliation meeting in Rashid District, Baghdad: Sunni and Shi’ite sheiks, government, security forces and religious leaders discuss a unified district Reconciliation plan, 30 October 2007.

ern Baghdad, the ultimate offense was awarding a lesser cousin a contract that excluded the sheik. The murder of the challenger was investigated, but to date it has not been solved.

Local Contracting and Strategic Effects

Given the volatile and politically charged nature of most stability operations, individual and small-unit actions can have consequences disproportionate to the level of command. In some cases, tactical operations and individual actions can have strategic effects.⁵ At the tactical level in Iraq, good contracting decisions help guarantee security by providing an equitable distribution of contracts among the tribal leaders, such as was done by a business-savvy commander working in southern Baghdad. However, a bad contracting decision obstructs stability at the microtribal level. To ensure all contracts are successfully awarded and implemented—and overall security is maintained—the newly formed provisional Army Contracting Command that oversees the Expeditionary Contracting Command could emulate the process used by the American defense acquisition community, thereby modeling the fairness and transparency of our own contracting policy for the Iraqis as we transition governance and security to them.

A contracting framework to employ a sheik as “prime contractor” or “lead system integrator” could be developed, whereby the guarantee that reconciliation contract obligations will be fulfilled relies on a sheik’s *wasl*. Any non-sheik could be chosen as a subcontractor to the sheik, but this determination is based on an “equal opportunity” clause to guarantee non-discriminatory access for all Iraqis, including Shi’ites. A maximum percentage of the award, as agreed upon by the sheiks and the U.S., can be authorized for the participants. In this case, the sheiks’ cost of doing business is equivalent to the overhead applied by a prime for “program management.”

An acquisition plan would allow for consideration of competitive sheiks or a balanced award of contracting. Operational commanders and their contracting experts can review such a plan to

determine the best practice in achieving the goal of reconciliation. An elected Iraqi contracting official from either the neighborhood council or a tribal council can work closely with the sheiks and coalition forces to ensure fairness and transparency of contracting procedures.

Conclusion

Reconciliation is a guest of the sheik. The challenge for the coalition is to find the right tents in which to rest. If there was one line of reasoning the Greeks would impress upon the Romans, it would be that sociocultural understanding is the crucial ingredient to reconciling and repairing a war-torn Iraq. Whether a military unit has an embedded cultural expert or not, commanders can heed the words of the sheiks, for they teach us how Arabian tribal culture has survived since the dawn of civilization. **MR**

NOTES

1. David Pryce-Jones, *The Closed Circle: An Interpretation of the Arabs* (New York: Harper & Row, 1989).
2. Accessed at <<http://www.arnet.gov/far/>>.
3. Andrew J. A. Mango, “Turkey and the Middle East,” *The Political Quarterly* 28, no. 2, 149, April 1957.
4. Standing near his palace that was hit during the 1986 U.S. air strike, Colonel Muammar Qaddafi spoke to the Honorable Curt Weldon, A Republican from Pennsylvania who led the first, bi-partisan Congressional delegation to Libya in 2004, “I am so glad to see you. Why has it taken your country so long to speak with me? You (America) should have talked to me first. If you disagreed with me, then you could have bombed me.”
5. Field Manual, 3-0; *Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001), 9-53.

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All Our Eggs in a Broken Basket: How the Human Terrain System is Undermining Sustainable Military Cultural Competence

**Major Ben Connable,
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PHOTO: Task Force Tripoli Commander BG John Kelly and staff engage with local tribal leaders in Tikrit, Iraq, April 2003.

All photos courtesy of Lieutenant Colonel Losack, USMC.

FIELD-EXPERIENCED WARFIGHTERS and other experts in operational art have identified a range of weaknesses in military cultural training, education, and intelligence. Each “culture gap” has been painstakingly codified in military journals and official publications, most notably in Field Manual (FM) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* (COIN). Finding an effective and lasting solution to these shortcomings has framed the latest phase of an ongoing debate over how to meet operational cultural requirements.

One approach argues for comprehensive change. This method would take all the criticism of military cultural training and intelligence analysis to heart, applying recent doctrine to long-term knowledge and cultural terrain analysis programs. Forcing the services to view the cultural terrain as a co-equal element of military terrain—without abandoning core warfighting capabilities—would ensure the kind of all-inclusive focus on culture that the Army and Marine Corps applied to maneuver warfare theory in the 1990s.

The other side of the debate, represented by the advocates of the Human Terrain System (HTS), calls for an immediate solution in the form of non-organic personnel, new equipment, and the direct application of external academic support. HTS essentially adds a quick-fix layer of social science expertise and contracted reachback capability to combatant staffs. This “build a new empire” proposal is based on the assumption that staffs are generally incapable of solving complex cultural problems on their own.

The HTS approach is inconsistent with standing doctrine and ignores recent improvements in military cultural capabilities. American military staffs have proven capable of using cultural terrain to their advantage in the small wars of the early 20th century, in Viet Nam, and contrary to common wisdom,

in Afghanistan and Iraq. Whatever weaknesses in cultural capability existed had always proven most evident at the onset of low intensity conflicts but were later rectified as warfighters adapted to the environment. These first-round failures occur because a focus on cultural training and education has yet to be sustained between conflicts.

Moreover, the practice of deploying academics to a combat zone may undermine the very relationships the military is trying to build, or more accurately rebuild, with a social science community that has generally been suspicious of the U.S. military since the Viet Nam era.

Post-9/11 Joint doctrine pounds away at the solution to the systemic weaknesses identified in cultural training, education, and intelligence: Soldiers, Marines, and combatant staffs must become cultural-terrain experts. Cultural terrain considerations must be closely woven into the full spectrum of military training and operations. The excessive focus the Department of Defense (DOD) has placed on the extraordinarily expensive Human Terrain System has, and may continue to come, at the expense of precisely those long-term programs that will develop this mandated, comprehensive level of expertise.

Failure to refocus effort on sustainable cultural competency programs will eventually lead to another wave of first-round operational failures the United States can ill afford.

Addressing the Capability Gap

Initial operations in Afghanistan and Iraq revealed three interrelated shortcomings in military cultural competency. First, cultural training for troops, staffs, and commanders was utterly deficient. Second, military intelligence personnel were not prepared to read or analyze cultural terrain and lacked comprehensive data to constantly provide cultural analysis. Third, many staffs were incapable of using cultural terrain to their advantage, which resulted in an early series of wasted opportunities that fed the insurgencies and terrorist operations of the Taliban, Ba'athist insurgents, and Al-Qaeda.

In an effort to address these gaps the services and DOD provided impetus to a grass roots cultural "surge" generated in late 2003 by returning combat veterans who were frustrated with cultural training inadequacies.¹ Taking a long-term view, both the Army and Marine Corps responded to their own self-

Failure to refocus...on sustainable culture programs will...lead to another wave of first-round operational failures...

assessed requirements by creating cultural training centers.² The Training and Doctrine Command Culture Center and Marine Corps Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning were designed to meet the immediate needs of deploying combat forces while building comprehensive education curricula in support of ongoing, sustainable professional development.

Both centers have seen some limited success. The Army Culture Center has created a progressive series of short-form cultural training sessions for deploying Army troops as well as a ladder curriculum designed to be woven into existing professional military education programs. The Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning has taken a similar approach, supporting predeployment programs like Mojave Viper while embedding civilian social scientists and trainers at a range of Marine Corps professional development schools.³

In an attempt to address gaps in cultural intelligence capability, the Army and Marine Corps intelligence schools have begun to realign in order to train both enlisted and officer students in cultural analysis. Link analysis programs designed to help tear apart Al-Qaeda or Taliban networks are now also used to track tribal and sectarian relationships. The Marine Corps Intelligence Activity has further developed its existing cultural intelligence program to address the cavernous gaps in baseline-cultural data while providing reachback cultural support to deployed forces in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

Staff training has also expanded in recent years to encompass a wide range of cultural considerations. Currently, officers with direct counterinsurgency experience who have been trained by doctorate-level social scientists at professional education programs are attending predeployment staff exercises focused on cultural terrain. Military staff planning instructors facing skeptical audiences in late 2003 now struggle to keep up with enthusiastic students of Afghan and Iraqi culture: students who understand that the success of their upcoming deployments will

most likely pivot on social rather than combat considerations. The author observed this paradigm shift in attitude while teaching predeployment cultural courses from 2003–2007 and while deployed with combat staffs in 2003, 2004, and 2006.

The framework now exists for sustained focus on culture. Given the proper institutional support, these training centers and cultural intelligence programs can be used to leverage the experience of both troops and staffs to create a long-term, organic approach to cultural competence. Soldiers, Marines, and officers educated with these programs will come to embody the warriors that General Charles Krulak envisioned fighting the “three block war.” They will be able to successfully conduct interlaced humanitarian, peacekeeping, and combat operations in support of the kind of strategic missions this Nation is likely to face in the next 50 years.⁴

The HTS Approach

Between 2005 and 2008 the officers and contractors developing HTS repeatedly briefed their fundamental assumptions. Based on urgent needs statements from the operating forces, they claim that existing training and intelligence programs in the U.S. inventory have failed to provide immediate cultural support to the field; insufficient cultural expertise exists in the military officer corps; reachback capability is lacking; and staffs have proven deficient in reading the cultural terrain. According to these pundits, an entirely new system of cultural support would have to be developed and quickly deployed. The HTS staffers also believe that military intelligence and the broader intelligence community have only a very limited and finite role to play in shaping cultural terrain.⁵ They assert that fielding civilian academics in combat zones should be the linchpin to any successful program.⁶

Centered on the Human Terrain Team (HTT), the system is both comprehensive and discrete from any organic capability found in an infantry combat brigade (the targeted level of support). It injects civilian academic and military cultural expertise into the operational staff in the form of

the five-man HTT. The terrain team brings its own computers stocked with software that has been contract-designed from the ground up to crunch cultural data. A reachback team of cultural experts resides at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, adding an additional layer of academic support.⁷

Although program managers sell the image of a holistic, multi-faceted system, the Human Terrain Team is the physical, tactical embodiment of HTS. The civilian academic, the military cultural experts, and the leader of the team serve as special advisors to the brigade commander, providing a separate stream of data and advice that in theory is not “polluted” by the intelligence cycle. This separation makes it easier for the managers to sell the terrain team to academia and to recruit social scientists. If HTS is not related to military intelligence, then the fraught concept of applied academics seems more palatable.

The progenitors of HTS took a requirement that called for a comprehensive and sustainable solution—train combat units to navigate the cultural terrain—and instead created a costly quick-fix response to an immediate need. That response relied heavily on non-organic technology and contracted support. In theory, HTS could have addressed the perceived immediate need while the services addressed the long-term programs. In effect, the fundamental flaws in the HTS concept put the system at cross-purposes with the services’ short-term goals and future needs.

Fundamental Flaws

One assumption behind HTS is accurate: the U.S. military establishment did suffer from a near-critical weakness in cultural capability between 2001 and 2003. Most of the remaining HTS program assumptions are broadly inaccurate. By doctrine, mission, and organization, the U.S. military is mandated to train and maintain organic cultural expertise. Staffs are required to conduct training in the navigation of cultural terrain. Cultural information is inextricably linked to the intelligence process. Reachback centers do exist and are actively supporting combat operations. There is no justification to support a, “we fight wars, we need

***...training centers and cultural intelligence programs can be used...
to create a long-term, organic approach to cultural competence.***

to pay someone to do culture.” Despite the initial failures of poorly trained military personnel to “do culture” there is no valid, systemic requirement for nonorganic personnel or equipment.

Both the Army and Marine Corps train foreign area officers (FAOs) and civil affairs (CA) officers to serve as political and cultural advisors to combatant staffs. The counterinsurgency manual describes the intended roles of these officers developing the cultural terrain operating picture in section 3-17. For example, it states, “civil affairs personnel receive training in analysis of populations, cultures, and economic development. These Soldiers and Marines can contribute greatly to understanding civil considerations.” As another example, “Foreign Area Officers have linguistic, historical, and cultural knowledge about particular regions and have often lived there for extended periods.”

The Marine Corps defines the role of the FAO as follows: “Uses the language and knowledge of military forces, culture, history, sociology, economics, politics, and geography of selected areas of the world to perform duties as directed.”⁸ FAOs receive years of basic and advanced language training, earn an advanced degree in regional studies, and serve an immersion tour in their area of expertise. Because FAOs are commissioned officers with service in the

... there is no valid, systemic requirement for nonorganic personnel or equipment.

operating forces, they can articulate cultural advice in an operational context.

The FAO community received its first real operational exposure during the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Foreign area officers served as cultural advisors to staffs and commanders. The author served as a FAO within the First Marine Division forward command post. From 2004 to 2008, FAOs continued to advise staffs down to the battalion level, coordinating tribal liaison, providing cultural input to information operations planning, and offering mitigating options during intensive combat operations. However, based on prewar tables of organization and service manning, there simply were not enough trained and experienced FAOs to support each brigade or regiment. Fewer than 20 Middle East FAOs were serving in the active Marine Corps in 2003 and approximately half of those were colonels (too senior to serve in a unit) or in nondeployable billets.⁹

To support the need for cultural expertise DOD has mandated that the services focus attention on recruiting and training of FAOs. DOD Directive 3000.5 and the *Defense Language Transformation Roadmap*, both written in response to the perceived gap in cultural capability, require the services to strengthen their FAO programs. This requirement directly supports the doctrinal requirements found in the COIN manual and is based on recent combat experience.

In response, the Marine Corps has increased the number of Middle East FAOs in the training pipeline, but it is unclear whether this step will provide the fleet operating force with a sufficient number of trained officers. The Army has a more robust and distinct



Colonel Michael W. Manske, head of Civil Affairs and Information Operations, First Marine Division, conducts the first meeting of the “Former Senior Officer” board in Ramadi, May 2004.

program.¹⁰ It typically assigns a significant portion of its FAO community to diplomatic or military assistance missions at U.S. embassies around the world. No fewer than five Army FAOs overlapped in three-year billets at the U.S. Embassy in Jordan between 2007 and 2009.¹¹ Until the Army FAO branch shifts away from diplomatic missions it will likely be unable to meet the needs of units engaged in ongoing combat operations.

FAOs work closely with the civil affairs and psychological operations (PSYOP) sections, often riding along with them as unit members conduct tactical missions. Many of these CA officers also have significant cultural training and experience and have begun to demonstrate as much in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

Although training regimes have failed to adequately reflect doctrine, the Army's civil affairs FM states the role of the CA officer is to, "[advise] commanders on the political, cultural, and economic impacts of planned operations and their impact on overall objectives."¹² According to the HTS website, the CA staff is responsible for "developing, coordinating, and executing plans to positively influence target populations to support the commanders' objectives, and to minimize the negative impact of military operations on civilian populations and interference by civilians during combat operations." CA officers "provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance on FN/HN [foreign nation/host nation] social and cultural matters." This doctrinal description almost directly mirrors the claimed capabilities of an HTS human terrain team.¹³

Both CA units and PSYOP provide direct cultural data collection, collation, and analysis to the combatant staff. Often working side by side with CA units, PSYOP teams conduct social science derived field research. PSYOP Soldiers poll and interview locals to determine the effectiveness of both tactical and information operations. Data collected in the field is input into the intelligence cycle where it is merged with classified information. The FAO, CA staff, and PSYOP leaders all have an opportunity to provide further input as the staff develops courses of action.

A properly trained, manned, and supported team consisting of a FAO, a CA unit and a PSYOP unit should be able to provide the kind of cultural expertise that staffs found lacking in 2003 and 2004. If these advisors and special staff sections are deficient, as implied in various HTS publications, then it is the clear responsibility of the services and the commanders to better train and prepare their Soldiers and Marines so they can fulfill their roles.¹⁴ If there is an insufficient number of available FAOs then, as implied in DOD 1315.17, it is the responsibility of the services to create more. Further investment in the preexisting and combat-proven FAO program would show long-term commitment to military cultural competence.¹⁵

According to the 15 July 2008 HTS briefing, the HTT is staffed by at least two officers or enlisted soldiers with FAO, CA, Special Forces, or intelligence backgrounds. The team is led by an experienced combat arms officer. Why is it necessary to create a separate program, costing (at a minimum) tens of millions of dollars, to assign these personnel to the very staffs at which they were trained to serve? What do the Human Terrain Team FAO and CA officer bring to the table that organic FAO and CA officers do not? If HTS can find these qualified officers, why can't the U.S. military services?

Even without the FAO, CA officers, and PSYOP units, combatant staffs have proven capable of both reading the cultural terrain and devising culturally savvy operational plans. In the COIN manual, General Petraeus uses the predeployment plan developed by the First Marine Division as an example of successful staff-cultural planning.¹⁶ In late 2003, then-Major General Mattis held several conferences to build a campaign plan grounded in cross-cultural considerations.

Although this plan was initially thrown off the rails by events in Fallujah in early 2004, commanders across Anbar Province continued to devise intuitive tactics designed to take advantage of tribal relationships, meet local economic needs, and avoid

Why is it necessary to create a separate program, costing (at a minimum) tens of millions..., to assign...personnel to the very staffs at which they were trained to serve?

cultural friction. As early as February 2004, even those Marines poorly trained in cultural awareness were actively engaging with tribal, religious, and business leaders, targeting contracting monies based on PSYOP and CA cultural and economic data, and conducting census polling. They built local information operations messages derived from cultural input pulled from patrol reports and human intelligence sources. Applied with relative consistency over a matter of years, these local programs—often devised by commanders down to the platoon level—directly contributed to the growth and success of the Awakening movement in Al-Anbar. By early September 2008, violence in Al-Anbar had plummeted to negligible levels and the province was returned to Iraqi control.

On its website, HTS provides examples of programmatic successes, or “impacts.”¹⁷ These include an HTT-designed plan to engage with local mullahs in Afghanistan, to hold a tribal congress to address grievances, and to provide a volleyball net to build rapport with local villagers. These examples demonstrate common sense in a COIN environment, not breakthroughs. Hundreds of Army and Marine staffs that accepted culture as a significant element of terrain have been doing these things on a daily basis across Afghanistan and Iraq for years without HTS support.

A range of staffs have convened tribal councils to create a forum for the redress of grievances. As early as 2004, the First Marine Division held regular tribal councils and established a “graybeard” board of disgruntled former Iraqi general officers. Provincial reconstruction teams and infantry battalions often attend and support *loya jurga* meetings in Afghanistan. Without input from the Human Terrain System reachback cells, FAOs, CA officers, and PSYOP officers have been actively engaging with local leadership and proposing culturally savvy solutions since the onset of the war.

One quote published on the HTS “impact” webpage stands out. Referring to the local populace, an Army brigade operations officer states, “We don’t ask them about their needs—paratroopers just don’t think that way.” By prominently displaying this quotation, the HTS program managers imply that this officer’s inability to understand or execute simple counterinsurgency tactics is typical.

However, the author personally observed U.S. Army paratroopers demonstrating cross-cultural competency at both the tactical and operational levels in Anbar Province in early 2004 during relief-in-place operations. With little to no prewar planning and vague orders from above, the 82d Airborne Division conducted tribal engagement on a daily basis. Many local unit commanders had

developed relationships with villagers in their areas of operations. A Florida National Guard unit made up of (mostly) police officers developed excellent rapport with the leaders and citizens of Ramadi, using cultural techniques developed on the streets of Miami to reduce local violence.¹⁸ Whatever cultural friction was generated by the 82d came not from an innate inability of paratroopers to appreciate cultural terrain but instead from a near total lack of prewar cultural training at the staff and small unit level. The absence of prewar cultural training for intelligence specialists compounded these tactical failures.

From 2001 to 2004, intelligence cells at the operational level (regiment, brigade) focused almost solely on targeting military equipment and



The author and LTC Michael Groen engage tribal leaders in Tikrit, Iraq, to determine areas of influence, April 2003.

personnel, conducting insurgent network analysis, and providing raid support. Collection assets, both human and electronic, focused intently on gathering information for strategic thought pieces, constantly providing targets to raid teams or simple low-level force protection missions. Many intelligence officers could clearly see what needed to be done—tribal network analysis, economic analysis, and collection in support of engagement—but were initially unable to dedicate manpower to these nontraditional tasks.

The HTS team's response to the cultural intelligence failures of the early war period was to argue that cultural information is generally unclassified and is best processed by academic researchers.¹⁹ This proposed solution ignores the fact that the intelligence staff is, by doctrine, specifically designated to collect and analyze cultural data. The inference that cultural information is inherently unclassified shows a clear lack of appreciation for the contemporary operating environment.

A more effective solution to the cultural intelligence gap is to retrain intelligence staffs to collect and analyze cultural data and to include this data in all-source intelligence products. Joint doctrine clearly encourages the services to build and maintain this capability. Joint Publication 2.0, *Joint Intelligence*, requires the intelligence community to study human factors, which it defines as “psychological, cultural, behavioral, and other human attributes that influence decision-making, the flow of information, and the interpretation of information by individuals or groups.”²⁰

In response to this requirement, the community has created human-factor cells within various agencies and has worked aggressively to map human terrain. It has also provided extensive reachback capability to deployed units, leveraging the power of thousands of trained and experienced analysts, fully networked computer systems, and the ability to solicit high-level academic input as required.

The HTS program has attempted to create its own contracted reachback capability in the form of an expensive cell at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. This cell provides feedback to HTTs but is incapable of providing cultural support to the full range of deployed forces around the world. Despite this demonstrated limitation of capability, the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence (USDI) has seriously considered the HTS reachback cell as

the best solution to provide cultural support to combat staffs.²¹

If the Department of Defense has ascertained that the entire intelligence community has failed to provide sufficient cultural reachback support to operational units then USDI should work with the Director of National Intelligence to fix the existing system, not spend limited resources on an entirely new and unproven program.

The Army intelligence manual also clearly identifies the Army intelligence combat staff (S-2 and G-2 sections) as responsible for the collection and analysis of cultural data.²² The new Army manual on human intelligence collection, the manuals on stability and support operations, intelligence preparation of the battlefield, and perhaps most important, the counterinsurgency manual, all require intelligence staffs to become experts in cultural terrain and to provide commanders with cultural analysis.²³

Some consider doctrine the “last refuge of the unimaginative.”²⁴ That may well be, but if we are to develop an effective force, doctrine cannot be so blatantly cast aside.

Reality is that combat intelligence staffs in both Afghanistan and Iraq have received some updated training and are aggressively collecting and analyzing cultural data. Intelligence sections leverage the reachback capability of the Open Source Center to examine both open source and classified data. The Marine Tactical Fusion Center at Multinational Forces West in Iraq supports a long-standing economic and political intelligence cell that works closely with CA units and FAOs to produce daily, high-level cultural intelligence products. This cell is replicated in one form or another across Afghanistan and Iraq.

Academic Backlash

Each human terrain team fields at least one civilian social scientist. In recruiting these social scientists for active military operations, the HTS program staff has widened a long-existing schism between academics willing to work with the military and those who are not. The HTS program has provided groups like the Network of Concerned Anthropologists a legitimate target in their efforts to prevent social scientists from supporting the U.S. military in Iraq and Afghanistan.²⁵

Members of this network and others contend that the civilians on HTTs are violating academic ethical standards. These standards are in many ways akin to the Hippocratic Oath: field researchers are restricted from disturbing or harming the subject of their studies. Academic critics of HTS see social scientists wearing military uniforms, carrying weapons, and providing direct input to combat staffs that may use the information to apply deadly force.

The HTS managers legitimately point out that academic cultural support is most often used to reduce the necessity for the use of violence. However, whether the criticisms or comparisons are legitimate is irrelevant; the controversy is real, and it degrades the ability of patriotic social scientists who help the military through less controversial means. Many cultural anthropologists working with the military have been ostracized by their academic peers as a result of HTS blowback.²⁶

The alternative to deploying academics into combat theaters is to enlist their support in training and educating our staff officers. In this role they do not risk endangering their research subjects, provide no direct input into targeting cycles, and they do not provide antimilitary elements within their own community any substantial ammunition with which to undermine the military-academic relationship. Keeping them in an academic set-

ting will help build an untarnished and sustainable relationship.

Conclusion

The 15 July version of the HTS brief proposes growing the terrain teams to 10 members and greatly expanding the reachback cells. Although the cost of the program is classified, it is not difficult to determine the expense of hiring so many contractors, equipping them with computers, deploying them to combat zones, and sustaining the inevitable bureaucratic support staff that will flourish at Fort Leavenworth.

As DOD contemplates making HTS a program of record, the Army and Marine cultural training centers remain staffed primarily with contractors and subsist on fluctuating budgets.²⁷ There has been little to no concerted effort by the undersecretary of defense for intelligence to develop cultural intelligence training programs. HTS has sapped the attention or financing from nearly every cultural program in the military and from many within the military intelligence community. The human terrain teams have given a number of staff officers an excuse to ignore a complex and challenging training requirement.

We have been at war for eight years. When do the “quick fix” solutions give way to long-term, doctrinally sound programs? It is time for HTS to give way. **MR**

NOTES

1. The Department of Defense did not respond to informal demands for joint cultural initiatives until the January 2005 publication of the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap, available at <<http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/d20050330roadmap.pdf>>.

2. The Army Training and Doctrine Command created the TRADOC Culture Center at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, in 2004. The Marine Corps created the Center for Advanced Operational Cultural Learning at the Marine Corps Combat Development Command in Quantico, Virginia, in mid-2005.

3. Mojave Viper is an exercise held at the Marine Corps Combat Development Command at 29 Palms, California, designed to immerse deploying Marines in a realistic cultural environment.

4. GEN Charles C. Krulak, “The Three Block War: Fighting in Urban Areas,” *Vital Speeches of the Day* 64, no. 5 (15 December 1997), 139-42.

5. Representatives of the HTS program repeatedly stated this assertion over the course of a year at several USDI panel sessions on social science support to military operations. The author was present at these meetings.

6. The author received each evolving version of the HTS brief between late 2003 and 2008. The 15 July version of the briefing re-states these basic assumptions.

7. Human Terrain System home page available at <<http://humanterrainsystem.army.mil/>>.

8. Marine Corps Order P1200.7V, pt. I.

9. Author had access to the International Program Office manning spreadsheets that depicted FAO availability in 2003 and was familiar with all Middle East FAOs in the Marine Corps by name.

10. FAO is a secondary specialty in the Marine Corps and a primary occupation for Army officers.

11. Author served as the Marine and Naval attaché in the embassy and has direct knowledge of manning.

12. U.S. Army FM 3-04.401, *Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques and Procedures* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office (GPO), December 2003), 1-31.

13. See the Human Terrain website at <<http://humanterrainsystem.army.mil/>>.

14. HTS website.

15. Both the Army and the Marine Corps have recently increased the number of FAO trainees in their respective pipelines in response to this need.

16. FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, chap. 4-8, 15 December 2006.

17. Impact, HTS website available at <<http://humanterrainsystem.army.mil/Impact%20on%20the%20Military.htm>>.

18. Information on the deployment of the First Battalion, 124th Infantry Regiment, Florida National Guard to Ramadi is available at <<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/ramadiyah.htm>>.

19. HTS briefing 15 July 2008.

20. Joint Publication 2.0, *Joint Intelligence*, available at <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp2_0.pdf>.

21. The author was the USMC representative to the USDI committee addressing this issue between 2006 and 2007.

22. U.S. Army FM 2.0, *Intelligence* (Washington, DC: GPO, May 2004), specifically sections 1-22, 1-64, 1-83, 2-11, and 3-9.

23. The COIN manual (Appendix A-16) calls for a nonintelligence staff advisor to support the commander’s decision-making process. This role is filled by the FAO and Civil Affairs Officer by Table of Organization.

24. Various attributed to GEN James Mattis and (then) LtCol Stephen Ferrando, USMC.

25. Network of Concerned Anthropologists available at <<http://concerned.anthropologists.googlepages.com/>>.

26. The author maintains close relationships with many military cultural anthropologists who have commented on this academic schism. A good bibliography of relevant articles is available at <<http://culturematters.wordpress.com/2008/08/21/annotated-bibliography-on-hts-minerva-and-prisp/>>.

27. The CAOCL stood up the same year HTS was first proposed, 2005. According to CAOCL staff, as of mid-2008 the center is manned by four active Marines, two federal employees, and 39 contractors.



FRANCE HAS DEPLOYED some 8,000 French troops around the world, and the way they interact with foreign populations and military organizations overseas is the direct result of a successful, 100-year-old marriage between ethno-anthropology and the French military experience in the 19th and 20th centuries in Africa, Asia, and Europe.

The French military definition of operational culture takes note of this alliance: “Operational culture is the understanding of foreign cultural norms, beliefs and attitudes: it is an operationally relevant field guide used by general officers as well as infantry squad leaders to navigate a complex human terrain.”¹

Deployed French Army units learn about a foreign country’s culture by studying its customs, history, economic issues, social norms, and traditions. This anthropology angle became part of the military learning process as a result of lessons learned in two centuries of counter guerrilla wars, or what we today refer to as irregular war or “hybrid war.”² The French military experience led to two counterintuitive principles:

- Effective leaders of small combat arms units must think like human intelligence collectors, counterpropaganda operators, nongovernmental organization workers, and negotiators.
- The combat arms battalion is the nexus of operational cultural training and education for complex military and nonmilitary tasks.


French Operational Culture Concept

The colonial era influenced the development of operational culture concepts throughout the 19th and 20th century. The colonial campaigns from 1862 to 1962 linked anthropological studies with strategic and tactical military courses of action.

Marriage of anthropological studies and irregular war. During the colonial expansion in Africa and Indochina in the second half of the 19th century, French military officers returning from campaigns in Asia and Africa

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MAP: “Afrique Centrale” from Annales de Géographie Tome IV, Paris 1895. (University of Texas Libraries)



Scenes from China and Hanoi during the second French colonial empire as published in *Le Monde Illustré* in 1891.

travelled to Paris to share their observations and lessons learned with a large audience of politicians, journalists, geographers, and ethno-anthropologists.³ A common interest in unknown populations led these military thinkers to share their cultural awareness with these groups. Colonial officers hosted anthropologists overseas who assisted them in the study of violence among nonstate groups.⁴ This laid the foundation for the strong influence of ethno-anthropological studies on the colonial Army throughout the 19th and 20th century. Officers compared written reports with ethno-anthropologists' observations on lifestyle, customs, social structures, and tribal governments in the unexplored territories of Africa and Asia. In 1885, for instance, Captain Savorgnan de Brazza returned to Paris with ethno-anthropological information gathered during his exploration of the Ogooué, Congo, and Kouilou-Nari basins in Central Africa.⁵

Anthropologists also became more familiar with the planning and execution of military campaigns. Two French colonial military figures enforced this process: Marshals Joseph Gallieni and Hubert Lyautey. In 1899, building on 20 years of colonial campaign experiences, they established the first principles of expeditionary operations later integrated into operational culture.⁶ In his *The Colonial Role of the Army*, Lyautey, then a colonel, called for permanently stationing a reservoir of units overseas to develop staff and small-unit leaders with expertise in foreign cultures and languages, and in mediation and negotiation techniques. Lyautey set the conditions for integrating operational culture into irregular-warfare concepts.

Expeditionary campaigns in Upper Tonkin (1885-1897) and Madagascar (1896-1900) served as on-the-ground laboratories to develop this approach. Company- to platoon-sized units operated independently to gain control of wide areas of operations. Captains, lieutenants, and sergeants learned that collecting the right intelligence at the right time was the key to mission success.⁷

Superior in their knowledge of the terrain but inferior in their equipment, organization, and firepower, the French Army's adversaries often waged guerrilla warfare.⁸ French colonial campaigns were first and foremost expeditionary operations whose success depended on the support of the local population and the intelligence-gathering skills of infantry platoon commanders. Commanders discovered that an ethno-anthropological lens was an effective tool to develop situational awareness. It remains at the core of the French operational culture domain.

In *The Colonial Role of the Army*, Lyautey noted that "captains, lieutenants and sergeants must perform with excellence in areas such as local politics, as well as social, education and economic development of the population."⁹ Gallieni's "instructions" during the campaign of Madagascar in May 1898 stressed what is now a paramount principle in modern irregular war: "We must bear in mind that in colonial conflicts, which are unfortunately forced on us by the unruliness of rebellions, we must never destroy except in the last extremity. Every time that warlike incident obliges one of our colonial officers to proceed against a village and occupy it, he must never lose sight of the fact that his first responsibility is to reconstruct the village, set up a market, and build a school."¹⁰

***...we must never destroy
except in the last extremity.***

The success or failure of expeditionary campaigns depended on two factors about small-unit leaders:

- Their knowledge of the local population regarding cultures, traditions, customs, and languages.
- Their ability to conduct CMO and information operations.

By the end of the 19th century, operational culture was part of every layer of the military planning process, from the strategic to the tactical. Commanders integrated CMO and information operations into small-infantry-unit operational orders.

Lyautey and Gallieni's influence led to the creation of a military center for foreign cultures in 1906 that integrated anthropological studies into expeditionary or irregular war practices to prepare deployed officers and NCOs at the farthest reaches of the empire "to command inaccessible outposts, live with the indigenous population, [and] work as combat leaders, diplomats, and political administrators of areas of responsibility as vast as half the size of France."¹¹ In such environments, cultural knowledge of tribal and clan lifestyles, social organizations, and family and kinship lineage served one paramount objective: to successfully navigate and control complex human terrain.

The 102-year-old center, Ecole Militaire Spécialisée dans l'Outre-Mer et l'Etranger (EMSOME), located in Paris' western suburbs, maintains and continues to develop the anthropological knowledge to help officers and leaders understand the complexity of cultural interactions in foreign countries and regions. For instance, 1908 reports on the Tuareg, Bambara, and Dogon ethnic groups in the French Sudan provide insight into 2008 Mali sociocultural parameters.

Operational culture, HUMINT, PSYOP, and CMO. Gallieni and Lyautey's concepts influenced many officers during the first half of the 20th century, including Colonel Roger Trinquier and Lieutenant Colonel David Galula. The American military has studied their writing extensively since 2004.¹²

Over the years, operational culture became the cement holding together many tasks across the irregular war spectrum. As Trinquier and Galula note, the tasks include—

- Assessing the political effect of any military action.
- Supporting the population.
- Mapping the insurgency.
- Clearing and holding areas of operations to "box" the insurgent influence.
- Relying on a web of mobile- and light-infantry units.
- Performing a variety of nonmilitary tasks that benefit the local population.

Trinquier and Galula echoed principles already outlined by Gallieni and Lyautey a century earlier. For Trinquier, "the sine qua non of victory in modern warfare is the unconditional support of the population," because "the inhabitant in his home is the center of the conflict."¹³ Control of this center of gravity is "as necessary for the counterinsurgent as for the insurgent," Galula says, and requires small-unit leaders to train in a broad variety of tasks ranging from human intelligence (HUMINT) collection to psychological operations (PSYOP) as counterpropaganda and CMO.¹⁴

French combat arms platoon and squad leaders have used their



Joseph Simon Gallieni
(1849–1916)



Louis Hubert Gonzalve Lyautey
(1854–1934)

knowledge of local cultures to carry out these tasks. For instance, in Algeria, they spent a great deal of time trying to convince potential insurgents that politics could be a substitute for guns in the ongoing battle to control resources and power. In the countryside, commanders received substantial support from chiefs of villages with whom they were on excellent terms. (They shared common interest to keep the National Liberation Front at large.) As a result, operational culture in France acquired a strong political and ideological component, combined with anthropology studies. Some regimental and company commanders integrated this model into their combat training to prepare infantry squad leaders to become as skilled in PSYOP and HUMINT as they were in marksmanship.

In 1962, the French military began to keep a low profile in the aftermath of France's bitter Indochina and Algerian wars, and such counterinsurgency concepts as psychological and counterpropaganda operations vanished from official terminology and curricula. After 9/11, the timeless principles of irregular warfare were back in the limelight. Today, PSYOP, HUMINT, CMO, and information operations once again define the content of operational culture curricula.

The French military's operational culture syllabus examines foreign societies' cultural habits, traditional customs, social and political constructs, moral ideas, codes of honor, and ways of thinking. Such knowledge helps commanders quickly identify and take advantage of psychological points of weakness and strength of the insurgent they are—or will be—fighting, as well as the local force they are—or will be—training. Furthermore, understanding what drives local authority and identifying who is really in charge helps commanders establish and enforce lines of communication with local political, religious, and military leaders, thus working “with the mandarin, not against him,” as Lyautey advised in 1899.¹⁵

Recent counterinsurgency, stability and support, and peacekeeping operations in Africa, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan have reinforced the

French model of integrating anthropology into irregular warfare planning and execution and helped battalion commanders develop operational culture programs of instruction for small-unit leaders.

Operational Culture for Small-Unit Leaders: Win the People First

Nineteenth and 20th century counterinsurgency operations laid the foundations for modern counterinsurgency doctrine by integrating HUMINT, PSYOP, and CMO into a common warfighting continuum. As Galula demonstrated, success often comes from combined-arms battalions whose squad leaders are savvy operators in all these fields.

History teaches us that destroying the enemy is not the strategic goal of counterinsurgency operations. As Lyautey states, “The raison d'être of our colonial military operations is always and foremost economic.” A colonial commander's role was to gain control of a territory and its population to integrate the region into the French empire ideologically, politically, and economically. In this respect, the population was the center of gravity, even at the sergeant level. Knowledge about the culture of the people was paramount.

At the operational level, colonial commanders applied the now famous methodology of the spreading “ink blots” or “oil stains.” From secure bases, small light and mobile units gradually spread out over the theater of operations from one base to another until they covered the region with interconnected bases and outposts, progressively controlling each area. Gaining the trust of tribes and villages depended on proper cultural behavior by the troops.

Maneuver was the decisive tactical element at company level and below. Isolated company commanders and platoon and squad leaders had to take crucial, timely initiatives to obtain strategic goals. To control wide areas of operations, they sought to impose a stable and secure environment by interacting with villagers, training local militias, and containing hostile enemy forces by either the use of force, the threat of it, or negotiation. “Win the people first,” Lyautey ordered in 1901 in Madagascar. “Each time we find ethnic groups that are politically structured within organized institutions, we must rely on them and work with them.”¹⁶ Again, the general principle of colonial expansion in Asia

After 9/11, the timeless principles of irregular warfare were back in the limelight.

was to “work with the mandarin, not against him.”¹⁷ This policy required an in-depth knowledge of local and regional alliances and powers. Operational culture training and education programs address these irregular warfare principles.

The battalion as nexus of operational culture training. The French Army’s operational culture domain relies mainly on the combination of anthropological-centered EMSOME teaching and the combat arms battalion’s mission-oriented application of it. Although EMSOME offers a central repository for cultural knowledge, the knowledge spreads at the combat arms battalion level, the cradle of the expeditionary culture. From 1882 to 2007, more than 120 years of expeditionary campaigns have driven the operational culture training and education at the 2d Infantry Marine Regiment and provided it with unique cultural expertise.

EMSOME emphasizes the “so what” of operational culture in its seminars, while small-unit leaders convey their experiences to each other at the battalion level. The knowledge acquired does not depend on rank but on mission, task, and military-occupational specialty.

As mentioned earlier, anthropology drives predeployment operational culture programs to explore the dynamics of tribes, clans, traditional beliefs, and religion. Understanding local moral values and codes of honor helps officers and soldiers negotiate with powerful local religious, political, tribal, and administrative authorities.

What makes this program so unique is that it does not use a template approach. Each combat arms battalion has the autonomy to tailor the training to its own level of experience. The program’s purpose is to help company commanders train their platoon and squad leaders. In addition, studying a country’s culture, history, economic issues, social norms, and traditions addresses one key question: Who are the people in our area of operations? Infantry company

commanders, platoon leaders, and squad leaders learn the answer during predeployment training that covers:

- Human terrain.
- Counterinsurgency operations.
- Training and advising national forces.
- Operating civil-military operations.

Battalion commanders can easily translate each domain into two-hour classes in their programs of instruction.

Course 1. Navigating the human terrain: a combat arms skill. Learning how to navigate complex human terrain is a combat arms skill that requires more time and energy than learning how to fire a weapon, use a compass, or drive a truck. The first course, therefore, covers the traditional domains of ethno-anthropology studies through a cultural approach. Officers and enlisted members take the same classes in human geography, history, religion, traditional beliefs, moral values, social and political organization, family structure, kinship lineages, economic challenges, customs, and individual societal abilities and habits.

The studies highlight the complexity and nuances of these human structures and warn against the oversimplifications in many Western matrix approaches. The training puts into perspective concepts of land ownership, family lineage, generation networks, and traditional clan struggles for power. Further, it highlights the political influence of ethnic groups or subgroups. Officers and enlisted men learn about subtle differences within the Northern Teda group, the Goranes, and Toubous. They study the traditional influence of the Zaghawa, Tama, and Bideyat clans in the Wadai region of eastern Chad as well as the differences between “black” Saharan nomads, “Arab” Chadians, and the Chari-Baguirmi group.

EMSOME mobile teams provide much of this teaching. However, during predeployment training, they use the expertise available within the combat arms battalion itself. Officers and soldiers who have operated in the country of deployment give additional briefs based on their own experiences.

Instructors also teach their students how to interact with street vendors, local imams, and marabouts; what greetings to use; which “codes” to apply when conducting a meeting; how to quickly identify dominant families or individuals in the neighborhood; how to understand the social value of bargaining

...knowledge acquired does not depend on rank but on mission, task, and military occupational specialty.



French Marines in Chad, 2006.

with vendors in a market; how to bargain; and how to follow rules of hospitality.

At this stage, small-unit leaders benefit from a two-hour basic language course providing them with about 50 key “icebreaker” sentences and numbers. Language proficiency, however, is not a priority for the battalion commander. Proficiency in a foreign language requires years of in-depth study combined with immersion in the country and is beyond the scope of predeployment training. Instead, the combat arms battalion effort focuses on teaching officers and soldiers how to use an interpreter.

Course 2. Counterinsurgency and operational culture: conducting military and nonmilitary tasks. Examining the legacy of Lyautey and Galula, this course is military-oriented, yet covers a broad variety of nonmilitary tasks. Personnel in the battalion play an important role by conveying their knowledge of a specific country. In addition to EMSOME insights, their briefs address and update the following topics:

- The military impact of geography and climate, accessibility of the roads, and the location of available airfields and reliable medical facilities in the area of operations.
- The required combat readiness level (rapid reaction force structure, etc.)
- The history of guerrilla operations in the area. (When? Which tribes and clans? Where? How?)
- The history of counterinsurgency courses of action in the area, when relevant.

Course 3. Training and advising foreign units. This course prepares infantry platoon and squad leaders to execute ad hoc training and advisory tasks

with national forces and nongovernmental armed groups. The course goal is to teach officers and soldiers how to adapt to their counterparts’ cultures. It usually addresses the following topics:

- History of conflicts.
- Specific military traditions.
- Civil-military relationships.
- Types of recruitment and resources available.
- The level of training and equipment available.
- Types of forces and organization.
- Uniforms and ranks.
- Morale and esprit de corps issues.
- Counterinsurgency combat skills.

Operational culture remains the core of the pre-deployment course.

Course 4. Civil-military operations. This course provides in-depth information on the status of CMO in the battalion area. EMSOME updates the information provided by previous rotations in the country, giving the battalion commander situational awareness of the support the local population needs in his future area of operations: schools to renovate, wells to dig, and bridges to repair. This allows the commander to include two or three CMOs in his warning order. The number varies depending on whether it is a counterinsurgency, stability and support, or peacekeeping operation.

The warning order might tell company commanders to include soldiers who are skilled as carpenters, plumbers, and electricians. A CMO project is a critical tactical course of action to “win the people” in the area of operations. After meeting with local authorities in the country, the commander integrates the CMO into the battalion’s operation order. Then the company accomplishes the CMO mission under the battalion commander’s watch.

Cultural Understanding as a Long-term Process

The French Army developed the operational culture concept from lessons learned during more than 100 years of colonial military campaigns. These

Operational culture is a combat skill that is critical to mission success.

courtesy of author



Training Malian forces, 2006.

expeditionary counterinsurgency operations were similar to what we now refer to as irregular warfare. Three generations of officers, noncommissioned officers, and enlisted men learned the hard way how to interact with foreign cultures to “win the people.” The experience of one generation energized the expeditionary training and education of the next.

The primary lesson learned is that operational cultural understanding is a long-term process. For over a century, the marriage of ethno-anthropological studies and military experiences have developed

cultural standards small-unit leaders still follow today in operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Africa.

The history of counterinsurgency operations has taught us that winning people’s hearts and minds and changing the adversary’s mind-set always matter more than physical destruction of the enemy. Operational culture is a combat skill that is critical to mission success. Like many other Western armed forces, the French military views it as the core of warfighting for combat arms units conducting irregular wars. For all combat arms leaders, from commanders to squad level, operational culture training and education is paramount to achieving success

in both military and nonmilitary missions within a foreign environment. This training aggregates capabilities ranging from the restrained use of force to mediation and negotiation. In short, it develops the transverse capabilities required to fight a four-block war.¹⁸

Ultimately, the battalion commander’s operational culture training is driven by the idea that teaching leaders and soldiers how to think and operate in a foreign environment matters more than just teaching them what to think about it. **MR**

NOTES

1. Interview with BG Philippe Roisin, former director of the Ecole Militaire Spécialisée dans l’Outre-Mer et l’Etranger (EMSOME), 12 December 2006. Located in Paris western suburbs, EMSOME is the French Army school specializing in training and education for units and individuals deploying to overseas French territories and theaters of operations.

2. LTG James N. Mattis and LTC Frank G. Hoffman, “Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars,” *Proceedings* 132, May 2006. The “four-block war” is LTG Mattis’s expansion of former Marine Corps Commandant General Charles Krulak’s concept of “three-block war.” General Krulak claimed that today’s expeditionary unit must be able to fight in one city block, hand out humanitarian supplies in the next block, and then make peace between warring factions in yet another block. To this requirement, “Hybrid Wars” adds the necessity of conducting effective information operations.

3. Georges Balandier and Marc Ferro, “Au Temps des Colonies” *L’Histoire Seul* (1984), 76.

4. André Le Révérend, *Lyautéy*, (Paris: Fayard, 1983), 268.

5. Pierre Kalck, *Un explorateur au centre de l’Afrique*, (L’Harmattan, 1993), 9.

6. The “Report of General Gallieni on the situation in Madagascar,” by General Joseph Gallieni and “The Colonial Role of the Army” by Lieutenant Colonel Hubert

Lyautéy, an enlightened plea for the creation of a colonial army, were both published in the same year, 1899.

7. General Joseph Gallieni, “Report on the situation in Madagascar,” 1899.

8. Le Révérend, 228.

9. Raoul Girardet, *La Société Militaire de 1815 à nos jours*, (Perrin, 1998), 228

10. Gallieni [no page number given].

11. Le Révérend, 278.

12. David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare-Theory and Practice* (Westport, CT Praeger, 1964) and Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare, A French View of Counterinsurgency* (London and Dunow: Pall Mall Press, 1964).

13. Ibid., 8.

14. Galula, 74

15. Le Révérend, 203.

16. Ibid., 279.

17. Ibid., 278.

18. Mattis and Hoffman, *Proceedings* 132, May 2006.



Testing Galula in Ameriyah

The People Are the Key

Lieutenant Colonel Dale Kuehl, U.S. Army

CRITICS OF THE ARMY'S FOCUS on counterinsurgency operations (COIN) have argued recently that the Army has developed a dogmatic approach to COIN. In particular, they question the assertion in Field Manual (FM) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, that the insurgents' ability to sustain popular support [for their cause] or at least acquiescence [to it]" is essential for an effective insurgency in the long term and is usually one of the insurgent's centers of gravity.¹ However, based on 14 months of COIN operations in northwest Baghdad, including in the Sunni neighborhood of Ameriyah, I think the authors of FM 3-24 got it right. While some have argued that the Army is approaching COIN in a dogmatic fashion, I disagree. I, for one, had not completely read the new FM, since it came out after we deployed. However, based on my previous study of COIN, I saw that gaining the trust of the local populace was essential to our operations. At least for our unit, it worked.

When we returned stateside, I had time to reflect and further study COIN, this time with a level of personal experience. Recently, I read David Galula's *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* for the first time and found that, while his essay focuses on communist and colonial insurgencies, much is relevant to our current fight in Iraq. Like the authors of FM 3-24, Galula sees the support of the population as essential to defeating an insurgency. He sets forth four laws for conducting a counterinsurgency campaign:

- The support of the population is as necessary for the counterinsurgent as for the insurgent.
- Support is gained through an active minority.
- Support from the population is conditional.
- Intensity of effort and vastness of means are essential.²

First Battalion, 5th Cavalry, deployed to Iraq in October 2006 and assumed responsibility for the neighborhoods of Khadra and Ameriyah and the Airport Road from 8th Squadron, 10th Cavalry in late November. Shortly after the transfer of authority, our area of operations expanded to three times its original size to encompass the entire Mansour Security District, from Camp Liberty to the International Zone. We fell under the command of Colonel J.B. Burton and the Dagger Brigade Combat Team, 2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division. Our task organization included only two mechanized infantry company teams. We had detached two tank platoons and company headquarters to serve as a military transition team (MiTT), and one tank

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PHOTO: One of Baghdad's first Sons of Iraq in Ameriyah, June 2007. (U.S. Army, SGT Jack Androski)




Figure 1. Baghdad with Mansour Security District highlighted.³

company team was attached to another battalion. Our parent brigade, 2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, also retained our engineer company. Burton provided us the brigade reconnaissance troop (BRT) with one platoon and a troop headquarters to help us with manpower challenges.

During the deployment, we faced the challenges of trying to moderate the sectarian violence permeating our operating environment. We benefitted from the increase in troops provided by the surge. Along with the other subordinate units of the Dagger Brigade, we pushed out into sector, establishing several combat outposts and joint security stations. We saw dramatic improvements in security when

dominated by Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Although I had not read Galula before we deployed, operations generally reflected his four laws.

Support of the Population

Galula argues that the crux of the problem for the counterinsurgent is not clearing the insurgent out of an area, because the counterinsurgent can always concentrate enough combat power to force the insurgent to move. The challenge is that once the concentration of forces ends, the insurgent returns unless the counterinsurgent is able to gain the support of the local population. As a result, the counterinsurgent struggles against the insurgent to gain that support. The insurgent has the advantage in this struggle since his organization is based at the grass-roots level among the people.⁵

We have seen this phenomenon throughout the war in Iraq. We have chased Al-Qaeda from one stronghold to another. During our time in Baghdad, Al-Qaeda insurgents were pushed out of Haifa Street, many relocating to Ameriyah. Over the past several years, several attempts were made to clear Ameriyah, from Operation Together Forward in August 2006 to Operation Arrow-



Figure 2. Mansour Security District.⁴

***We just wanted them to trust us,
the Iraqi Army, and the Iraqi
government more than they
trusted the insurgents...***

head Strike 9 in April 2007. However, after each of these operations, Al-Qaeda insurgents returned because we still had not fully gained the trust of the population. The insurgents would either leave or blend into the population until the concentration of troops moved to another location. Gains were superficial and temporary. Al-Qaeda's local political and military organizations within the area remained intact.

The concept behind these operations was consistent with the clear-hold-build approach described in the *National Security Strategy for Victory in Iraq* and in FM 3-24.⁶ The intent was for a large concentration of U.S. troops and ISF to clear insurgents out of an area by conducting extensive cordon and search operations and precision raids.⁷ As the clearing force moved to another area, the stay-behind forces, relying heavily on the ISF, were to hold the area, providing security to the local populace and reestablishing an effective Iraqi government presence. With security established, we were to begin

reconstruction projects to build infrastructure, government capacity, and the local economy, and increase the locals' faith in the Iraqi government.

While this strategy is sound, we faced several problems with its execution. First, to be effective, clearing operations must rely on sufficiently detailed intelligence to allow for precision targeting and raids. We simply did not have this level of intelligence, so our clearing operations were a blunt instrument that had little long-term impact on insurgent activity. The operations disrupted insurgent activity for as long as the clearing force was present, but did nothing to attack the entrenched insurgent infrastructure. Second, the holding force was simply not capable of providing security to the population. We did not have enough U.S. troops, and the primarily Sunni local populace did not trust the Shi'a-dominated IA battalion. Finally, unable to secure the population, we were ineffective in moving forward with civic projects.

Support from an Active Minority

The challenge for the counterinsurgent is how to gain the support of the population. The counterinsurgent is not looking for just passive or moral support, but active support in fighting the insurgents. Galula argues that this support comes from a basic tenet in the exercise of political power: In any situation, whatever the cause, there will be an active minority for the cause, a neutral majority, and an active minority against the cause.

To gain support for your side of the cause, you must rely on the favorable minority in order to rally the neutral majority and to neutralize or eliminate the hostile minority.⁸

We faced enormous challenges in Ameriyah. In truth, AQI controlled the neighborhood. While the majority of the population did not actively support them, AQI's active minority ruled the area with fear and intimidation. The barrier system we emplaced to control insurgent movement was ineffective because it had numerous holes in it that allowed virtually unencumbered routes of ingress



courtesy of author

Damaged buildings from fighting in Ameriyah in May/June 2007.

and egress. The local population did not trust the Shi'a-dominated Iraqi security forces, who they felt were driven by a sectarian agenda. Targeting by AQI drove the Iraqi Army to occupy static positions on the perimeter of the neighborhood, providing little protection to the population.

In May 2007, just after completion of clearing operations during Arrowhead Strike 9, Ameriyah became an extremely violent place. With the Iraqi Army effectively out of the picture, AQI turned its operations against U.S. forces and the local population. Deeply buried improvised explosive devices (IEDs) took their toll in three major explosions the first week of May that claimed the lives of five Soldiers and one interpreter. We also saw an increase in small-arms fire, which killed another Soldier. Due to the increased threat, I pulled combat power from other parts of the battalion's area of operations in Mansour to focus on Ameriyah. I also asked for and received a Stryker company, A/1-23 Infantry.

The additional combat power allowed us to increase patrolling in Ameriyah. We limited the number of large-scale cordon and search operations of residential houses and instead specifically targeted areas in which AQI was said to be meeting or passing out literature and CDs. We continued to improve the barrier system around the neighborhood, this time using six-foot-tall obstructions and emplacing them away from the houses. The

new structures presented a more cohesive barrier against insurgent movements, denying the flow of arms, ammunition, and explosives. The Iraqi Army implemented a restrictive curfew and a ban on vehicular movement.

For several months, we had searched for a location within Ameriyah to establish a permanent combat outpost. We had established others throughout the battalion area of operations in the Mansour Security District, and they proved effective in helping us better understand the local population and in earning the citizens' trust. We settled on an area in the northwest part of Ameriyah, although it was not the optimal location. On 19 May, as we were emplacing this outpost, a buried IED exploded under a Bradley Fighting Vehicle, killing six Soldiers and one interpreter.

... as we were emplacing this outpost, a buried IED exploded under a Bradley Fighting Vehicle, killing six Soldiers and one interpreter.

Our response to this disaster proved critical in gaining the support of an active minority in the community, one that allied with us and the Iraqi Army to defeat AQI. In time, the size of this active minority grew exponentially and led to our gaining the trust of the neutral majority.

After returning to my command post that night, I called one of the local imams to demand his support in helping us drive AQI out of the neighborhood. I was certain the local imams knew who was behind the violence, but also knew that they were intimidated by AQI. Starting in February, our meetings with the imams took on a clandestine nature. They asked me to meet with them only at certain times late in the evening. I argued that my men were suffering, and I knew that these local leaders had the information we needed. Unknown to me at the time, this particular cleric was already part of the minority rallying against AQI. The effort would soon become public.

Also critical was what we did not do. Officers, noncommissioned officers, and Soldiers were all



courtesy of author

Barriers at entry control point into Ameriyah, December 2007.

frustrated with the increase of violence and our inability to positively identify our enemy and target his network. Rumbblings within the ranks included talk of doing “a Fallujah,” meaning a large-scale clearing operation with a heavy emphasis on firepower. I continued to emphasize the need for restraint, focused operations, and treating the locals with dignity and respect. Restraint was not popular, but the battalion’s leaders controlled their Soldiers, and they maintained their discipline. Months later, as we prepared to redeploy, the leading imam and most influential citizen in Ameriyah said that our restraint was key to our gaining the trust of the people.

On the evening of 29 May, I got my answer from the imam I had spoken to after the Bradley’s destruction. He told me that the locals were going to go after AQI the next day. In addition to targeting U.S. Soldiers, AQI had increased pressure on the Iraqi populace, and they had had enough. We argued for about 20 minutes as I tried to persuade him to give us the information and let us handle the targets. However, he insisted that the Iraqis had to do it. He was not asking for permission to act. They were going to attack AQI whether I agreed or not. I told him to ensure that his men did not threaten my Soldiers or unarmed civilians or else we would shoot them. Then, I wished him luck. We adjusted our rules of engagement for the following day and waited to see what would happen.

The next day was pivotal. Locals attacked and killed several AQI leaders in Ameriyah. The imam used the loudspeaker at his mosque to call the people to attack AQI and support coalition forces. Dozens of men carrying AK-47s and machine guns took to the streets to secure their neighborhood. We held our fire because none of these men posed a threat to our formations. The imam called me that night ecstatic over the success the Iraqis achieved,

[The Imam] was not asking for permission to act. They were going to attack AQI whether I agreed or not. I told him to ensure that his men did not threaten my Soldiers...

claiming they had secured two-thirds of Ameriyah. We were cautiously optimistic.

The next day was a different story. AQI counterattacked, forcing the local fighters to two strongholds around two mosques. I started getting situation reports from my own Soldiers, and the imam called me every five or ten minutes with an update. In desperation, he asked for our help when his men pulled back to his mosque. I ordered two Stryker platoons under Captain Kevin Salge’s command to go to the Iraqis’ aid. Arriving in the nick of time, they stopped the Al-Qaeda advance and established a secure perimeter to allow our new friends to rest. The mosque was a mess, with broken glass from small arms fire and RPGs. Dead and wounded littered the sanctuary.

The leading imam in Ameriyah then called me to set up a formal meeting with the leader of the Iraqi fighters. Up to then we did not know who was directing the local actions. My first meeting with the man, Abu Abed, did not go well. Clearly exhausted, he made demands I was not comfortable with. We met again the following night and hammered out an agreement on how we would cooperate to defeat our common enemy. Our relationship was tentative at first, but over time, we grew to trust each other as we saw the positive results that came from working together. The Iraqis saw that we were committed to safeguarding their neighborhood.

Galula states that the counterinsurgent that refuses to observe and follow his second law (that support is gained through an active minority) and



CPT Kevin Salge (far left) planning a mission with Abu Abed (seated on right), June 2007.

courtesy of author

is bound by peacetime limitations will drag the war out and not get any closer to victory. The challenge we faced was that security forces in the area were seen as occupiers even though they were also Iraqis. Most of them were Shi'a, and they tended to use excessive force. Complicating matters was the fact that the local population was afraid of any force connected to the Ministry of Interior (MOI). The National Police had detained dozens of men indiscriminately, and they gave no further word of their fate. Members of the MOI also had allegedly robbed the local bank.

Galula's argument that gaining the support of an active minority is essential proved to be true for us.⁹ Using a Shi'a-dominated force to provide security only served to reinforce one of the main causes for the Sunni insurgency: the lack of opportunities for Sunnis to become a part of the legitimate security force. Abu Abed and his men were the active minority we needed. They attacked the foundation of the insurgency.¹⁰




Figure 3. Support for an insurgency.

Conditional Popular Support

Galula argues that a minority hostile to the insurgent will not emerge as long as the threat has not been reasonably reduced. Even if such a minority does emerge, it will not be able to rally the rest of the population unless they are convinced that the counterinsurgent has the will, means, and ability to win. Furthermore, political, economic, and social reforms are impossible as long as the insurgent controls the population.¹¹

We saw all of these challenges in Ameriyah. I am still not sure why Abu Abed and his men came forward when they did. Undoubtedly part of the answer lies in the brutal methods AQI used to control the populace, including kidnapping, torture, and murder. Moreover, AQI actively hindered any

improvements to the local community, disrupting basic services such as trash pickup, sewage repairs, and the distribution of much needed propane and kerosene. I suspect Abu Abed and his followers also came forward because of the commitment we made to the community. In February 2007, at a meeting with local community leaders, I told them that we were committed to defeating AQI and protecting Ameriyah from the Shi'a militia.

The people had seen Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) take control of Hurriya in January. They also watched as JAM expanded to the south in Amil and Jihad, providing AQI with a great recruiting tool. Local insurgents had joined with AQI to protect their neighborhoods from JAM, but came to regret that decision. In committing ourselves to stopping the expansion of JAM, we provided the locals with another alternative. AQI's repressive yoke and its political objective of establishing a greater caliphate did not sit well with the local people or local insurgent groups. The local populace was generally well educated and more secular in its outlook. Even the imams talked about the need for a secular government, rather than one run by religious parties. Favorable minority leaders recognized our commitment, even as the violence in Ameriyah increased, because despite our losses, we continued building.

Increased patrolling, with several companies active in the neighborhood, convinced the residents that we were not leaving. Improved barriers, a curfew, and driving restrictions made it more difficult for AQI operatives to move, isolating them from the population. As our intelligence increased, we discovered the complex patterns of AQI operations and disrupted their meetings. Finally, our Soldiers' disciplined response to the casualties they suffered kept the uncommitted population from turning against us.

When Abu Abed fired the first shot on 30 May, killing an AQI senior leader in the area, he touched off a popular uprising that brought dozens of men

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When Abu Abed fired the first shot on 30 May, killing an AQI senior leader in the area, he touched off a popular uprising...

into the streets. However, AQI's violent response caused many to melt away. When we came in to help, Abu Abed had only about a half-dozen dedicated men. This number rose again to about 30 in a few days, but it was still a small group. The bulk of the population was still not convinced. Over the next two and a half months, we worked closely with this small group of fighters and the Iraqi Army to control the population. Through lethal and precise targeting, we wrested control from AQI.

We went through various name changes for the group, settling on the Forsan al-Rafaidan, or "Knights of the Land of Two Rivers." During our time in Baghdad, they were more generically known as "concerned local citizens," which has since changed to the "Sons of Iraq." As the people saw success, the numbers of volunteers grew. For the first month, the number hovered around 30, but when we signed a security contract with them 3 months later, we had almost 300. These men fought, and in some cases died, without being paid for over three months. Many have argued that the only reason the Sunnis came over to our side was because we were paying them. In our area, that claim was inaccurate.

Early on, we established a cell under the command of Captain Dustin Mitchell, commander of E/4 BRT, to work with the Forsan on a daily basis. These men served as our MiTT advisors to Abu Abed, coaching him on how to transition from being a small-unit operator to being the leader of a large organization. When Mitchell and his outfit redeployed, we established a provisional company under Captain Eric Cospier, my fire support officer, to continue the close relationship with the Forsan.

As we continued to operate with the Forsan, we found that both my battalion and the Iraqi Army battalion gained legitimacy with the local population. We worked plenty of issues with them, including complaints of intimidation and criminal activity. Some of the reports we got were part of an active disinformation operation campaign by AQI and others seeking to discredit Abu Abed and the Forsan. In truth, we did have some incidents that we had to deal with, but we received fewer complaints about the Forsan than we did about the Iraqi Army. As we investigated claims by locals against the Forsan, we did find justification for some of the complaints, and thus disciplined several members and detained a few of them.

We also received similar complaints about IA Soldiers in the area. We went through an assortment of IA commanders. The number of complaints corresponded directly with the quality of IA leadership. We found that complaints dropped significantly when we conducted operations with all three forces together, further increasing the trust of the population and isolating the insurgents from them.

Abu Abed's emergence as the leader of the counterinsurgency minority was an act of courage and faith. He had the courage to come forward, even though we had done little to reduce the threat that Galula argues is essential for this minority to come forward. However, he and the imams who supported him had faith in our efforts to support them, and they felt that the time was ripe. Their growth was slow. The majority of the populace was still not convinced that we had the will, means, and ability to win. However, as our success in targeting AQI grew, the numbers of those hostile to the insurgency also grew. Volunteers swelled the ranks of the Forsan and became local heroes for stepping forward. The populace in general became more



U.S. Army, SGT Jack Androski

Forsan al-Rafaidan fighters on a Bradley Fighting Vehicle, June 2007.

confident and began to openly denounce AQI and demonstrate support for our efforts. The partnership we formed with the Forsan and the Iraqi Army increased the Iraqi government's legitimacy. The security created set the stage for political, economic, and social development.¹²

Intensity of Efforts and Vastness of Means

Galula argues that operations necessary to relieve the population from the insurgent threat must be intensive in nature and of long duration. We cannot dilute the counterinsurgent effort all over the country; we must apply it area-by-area.¹³ The surge in troops this past year and their focus in Baghdad finally gave us the combat power necessary to have a lasting effect. Without the addition of two more battalions in our area of operations and others in our area of interest, we would not have had the success we did. The addition of 2-32 Field Artillery and 1-64 Armor into the Mansour Security District allowed us to concentrate our efforts in Ameriyah. The number of spheres of influence and partnered Iraqi units we worked with decreased to a manageable level. The efforts of these battalions also served to disrupt AQI's ability to move freely and denied it the ability to reestablish in other areas. To our north, the operations of 2-12 Cavalry and 1-325th Airborne Infantry Regiment effectively stopped the expansion of Jaysh al-Mahdi, and 2-12 CAV wrested control of southern Ghazaliya from Al-Qaeda.

While not necessarily designed to support our effort, the efforts of the 1st Infantry Division's 2d Brigade Combat Team helped reinforce our commitment to the people of Ameriyah. The campaign plan of Colonel Burton and his staff was simple yet effective: focus on stopping Shi'a extremist expansion and defeating AQI. He gave his subordinate commanders the flexibility to handle the unique challenges in the manner they saw fit. His staff ensured we received necessary resources to follow up security gains with improved services and projects to improve the infrastructure. Enabled by the surge and implemented

...partnership...with the Forsan and the Iraqi Army increased the Iraqi government's legitimacy. The security created set the stage for...development.

through a comprehensive brigade campaign plan, these efforts provided hope to local nationals who came to believe that ultimately we had the capability to win. The hope led to an increase in the number of people willing to support us openly in our efforts to defeat Al-Qaeda, and consequently, the ranks of the Forsan increased exponentially.

Conclusion

The basis of our success in Ameriyah was disciplined Soldiers who acted with restraint in the face of adversity and leaders down to the squad level who understood that we needed the support of the local population to defeat Al-Qaeda. We built upon the relationships and success of the Soldiers who went before us and passed on as much as we could to the Soldiers who followed us. Developing the trust of the local people was essential. To build that trust we had to show we were committed to



Playground in Ameriyah, December 2007. This field was called Body Drop Field due to the number of dead bodies left behind by Al-Qaeda.

their safety. To be effective we had to learn to trust the locals who came forward to fight alongside us and the Iraqi Army to defeat Al-Qaeda. The results were dramatic. We suffered no major attacks on the battalion in Ameriyah from 7 August until we departed on 2 January. The last mortar attack in the community occurred in July. Murders and kidnappings decreased from about 30 per month to only 4 for the last half of the year. Over 200 stores had opened by the time we redeployed. The success of our operations also put pressure on the Iraqi government to provide services within the community and move toward reconciliation by including Sunnis in the Iraqi Police force. Our success required intense dedication on the part of Soldiers and leaders, as well as time and patience. Once the security gains were obvious, we were able to significantly improve the quality of life of the citizens in Ameriyah.

From our experience, it appears Galula was correct in asserting that gaining the support of the population is essential for the counterinsurgent. I saw gaining the trust of the local population as a center of gravity for our operations as well as those of the insurgents. While I had the means at my disposal to take a more lethal approach, I believed that this would be counterproductive and only play into the hands of our enemies at the expense of the populace. We were not able to gain the trust of the local population until we were able to get those hostile to the insurgency to come forward. The security

thus established led the general population to support us when they saw we had the will, the means, and the ability to win. Finally, we had to focus our efforts on Ameriyah to clear the area. The surge in troops allowed us to focus the efforts of the entire battalion in the area for an extended period. We were then able to provide other resources to build the local infrastructure and economy, providing greater legitimacy to the Iraqi government. Our efforts working with the Iraqi Army, the Forsan, and the people of Ameriyah demonstrate the validity of Galula's arguments for U.S. Army operations in Iraq.¹⁴ **MR**

NOTES

1. Department of the Army, FM 23-4, *Counterinsurgency* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office [GPO], 2006), 3-13.

2. David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), 52-55.

3. National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, *Baghdad* (Washington, DC: GPO, 2006); available from University of Texas at Austin, Perry Castaneda Library Map Collection, <www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/baghdad_nima_2006.jpg> (1 September 2008).

4. *Ibid.*, 2-32 FA was one of the first surge units to arrive in Baghdad, and it took over the neighborhoods of Hateen and Yarmouk March 2007. 1-64 AR arrived in June and took responsibility for the remainder of Mansour except for Ameriyah and the Bakriyah, which 1-5 CAV controlled.

5. Galula, 52.

6. National Security Council, *National Strategy for Victory in Iraq* (Washington, DC: GPO, 2005), 18-19, <www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/iraq/iraq_strategy_nov2005.html> (1 September 2008).

7. FM 23-4.

8. Galula, 53.

9. *Ibid.*, 53

10. FM 23-4, Figure 1-2: Support for An Insurgency, 1-20.

11. Galula, 54.

12. *Ibid.*, 54.

13. *Ibid.*, 55.

14. *Ibid.*, 52-55.

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A VIEW FROM INSIDE THE SURGE

Lieutenant Colonel James R. Crider, U.S. Army

DURING THE EARLY YEARS of Operation Iraqi Freedom, too many units attempted to fight an emerging and eventually flourishing insurgency the wrong way. They over-emphasized kinetic operations against an adaptive insurgent hidden in a sympathetic or intimidated population. While there are examples of successful counterinsurgency efforts at various levels of command during the course of Operation Iraqi Freedom, those successes have been sporadic and short-lived at best. However, with the implementation of a new strategy in Iraq based on the tenets of FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, our military has proven that it can effectively conduct counterinsurgency operations on a large scale. An increase in troop density at key locations in and around Baghdad, a significant effort to move away from large forward operating bases to combat outposts (to protect the people), and a relentless attack on Al-Qaeda in Iraq were critical to the improved security levels across the country.

David Galula's 1964 treatise *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* served as the primary source behind the development of chapter five of FM 3-24, "Executing Counterinsurgency Operations." The principles Galula emphasizes have stood the test of time in various theaters of operation. Unfortunately, his work has remained largely unknown to front-line Soldiers, some of whom ventured into the Iraq insurgency relying primarily on previous experience and instinct rather than the proven principles discussed by Galula. Writing from first-hand experiences on the counterinsurgency battlefields of the 1940s and 1950s, Galula emphasized the importance of collecting intelligence from the local population to identify and then purge the insurgents from their midst.

As a battalion commander during the surge, I found that our unit had limited effectiveness during our first several weeks on the ground in Baghdad. Almost all of our tactical victories and defeats were kinetic in nature. Over time, however, we pursued a winning strategy centered on the population that resulted in a complete reversal on the ground. Previously unknown to me, I have since found David Galula's book on counterinsurgency warfare to be indispensable as an operational framework. Facing the insurgency in Baghdad, 1-4 Cavalry of the 4th Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT), 1st Infantry Division, employed Galula's tactics during the surge of 2007-2008.

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PHOTO: SFC Conrad Kaluzny of 1-4 Cavalry with three insurgents in Doura. Both men on the left were eventually detained and the man on the right fled the area. (U.S. Army, C/1-4 CAV Photo)

Background


Serving as the commander of 1-4 CAV during this time, I received the mission to reposition our unit from the Al Hadr, Saha, and Abu T'Shir neighborhoods of East Rashid in southwest Baghdad slightly north to the Doura neighborhood. Al Hadr was a violent neighborhood, but Doura was the most violent and contested neighborhood in the Rashid District. The 2-12 Infantry was fighting valiantly as the 4th IBCT main effort there with three rifle companies, but it would require a greater concentration of troops to defeat the entrenched insurgency led by Al-Qaeda. We were assigned the eastern one-third of the territory, allowing 2-12 Infantry to concentrate in the west part of Doura while 2-23 Stryker assumed control of our former area of operations.

Doura was a perfect breeding ground for the insurgency for several reasons, and a place that Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) felt it could and must hold on to. After some analysis, it became clear that our new area of operations was the gateway into Doura from the southern belts of Baghdad. Insurgents regularly met in various locations in the area to

Galula's COIN Strategy

1. Make contact with the people.
2. Protect the population.
3. Control the population.
4. Collect intelligence.
5. Win the support of the population.
6. Purge the insurgent.
7. Involve the population in the long-term solution.

plan their activities, and they brought in significant amounts of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and other materials for use throughout Doura. This Sunni neighborhood was important to Al-Qaeda because it was readily accessible from the southern belts where AQI remained largely unchallenged (this would change dramatically when follow-on



The rural area to the south of Baghdad, largely unoccupied by coalition forces early in 2007, provided Al-Qaeda in Iraq the perfect opportunity to freely gather materials and equipment and plot insurgent strategy for Doura. The surge changed all that.



surge brigades arrived in the coming months), and it offered insurgents passage over the Tigris to the Karadah Peninsula and into the Rusafa District—both Shi’a dominated areas. In addition, it sat astride the main highway into Baghdad from the south and offered AQI the ability to influence the Sadiyah neighborhood in West Rashid where Shi’a militias were working hard to expel long-time Sunni residents. But even more important than the geographic advantages Doura provided was the fact that the Sunni population there was disenfranchised from their central government. They had little sympathy for the U.S. military, which they thought responsible for allowing Doura to disintegrate into chaos.

Strategy

We developed a strategy that I later discovered is aptly described in Chapter 7 of Galula’s *Counterinsurgency Warfare*. Our first two overlapping steps were to “make contact with and protect the population.” As we began to actively patrol, it became clear to us that we were all alone. When we questioned the population, no one could provide us with any useful intelligence and simply said that “outsiders” were responsible for all of the bad activity. Galula describes this exact situation when he states that “the inhabitants will usually avoid any contact with [the counterinsurgent]. There is a barrier that has to be broken.”¹ While the insurgents knew who and where we were at all times, we were often completely deceived. We even unknowingly stood right next to them as we interacted with the population. With perfect situational awareness, the insurgents began to attack us relentlessly. Within the first 10 days we saw 15 IEDs, 7 small-arms attacks, 5 indirect fire attacks, and 1 vehicle-borne IED. Three civilians were murdered on the streets and three of our Soldiers were injured, necessitating the medical evacuation of two of them.

Mounting patrols throughout the day and evening was not sufficient to effectively protect either the local population or our own forces. Galula states, “The counterinsurgent cannot achieve much if the population is not, and does not feel, protected from

the insurgent.”² In addition to our combat outpost, I made a decision to maintain two platoons on the streets 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.³ This persistent presence had an immediate, positive effect on security. In the 10 days following this tactic, IED attacks dropped to 4—with 2 of those found prior to detonation—and civilian murders dropped to only 1. This was not a temporary adjustment. We maintained this on-the-ground presence for the next 10 months until we redeployed.

We took other steps to break down the barrier between our forces and the population. Our platoons used their digital cameras to take photos of the military-aged males that they came into contact with and followed up with tactical questioning. “What is your name?” “Where do you live?” “Do you have a job?” “Do you have some identification?” Our Soldiers did the same with shop owners, most of whom could only open up for a few hours each day. After fully realizing the depth of mistrust and hatred between our Sunni residents and the National Police we partnered with, we ceased joint patrols with them and directed them to remain at their checkpoints on the fringes of the neighborhood. Our credibility immediately went up with the people. In their minds, the National Police were Shi’a militiamen in uniform, and our joint patrols served as a means to bring that “militia” to their doorsteps. For their part, the National Police believed that everyone in the neighborhood was a member of AQI, so they readily accepted this temporary arrangement.⁴

To further improve our contact with the population, we developed projects with money from the Commander’s Emergency Response Program. The projects made an immediate impact in a variety of ways. Over 44 years ago, Galula wrote: “Starting with tasks directly benefiting the population—such as cleaning the village or repairing the streets—the counterinsurgent leads the inhabitants gradually, if only in a passive way, to participate in the fight against the insurgent.”⁵ We hired local men to improve the electrical grid with new transformers, electrical transmission wires, and a significant microgeneration project. We cleared sewage lines,

We maintained this on-the-ground presence for the next 10 months until we re-deployed.

repaired sewage pumps, and contracted for a number of trucks to clean standing sewage from the street and empty septic tanks at individual homes. We developed a contract to renovate a dilapidated clinic. Eventually, we put in new sidewalks and streetlights as well. We hired hundreds of men to pick up trash, and this turned out to be our most effective contract.⁶ All of the work was done by neighborhood men. This not only infused money into the economy and improved their lives in a tangible way, but provided the population with an alternative to accepting money from AQI for trafficking IED material or reporting on American troop movements. By being on location 24 hours a day, we were able to provide security for the contractors and their work.

During our initial effort to make contact with the people and then throughout our tour, we provided minor medical care when we encountered the injured and sick. We provided blankets, heaters, generators, book bags, and soccer balls to families throughout our area of operations. Eventually, we built parks for children and several soccer fields. These efforts, in addition to contracts to improve the appearance and functionality of the neighborhood, were provided without conditions. In other words, we never offered these things in exchange for information or good behavior. We wanted to send a message that we cared about their plight. Good intelligence and lawful behavior would come in time.

The third stage of our strategy was to “control the population.” Galula states that the purpose of control “is to cut off, or at least reduce significantly, the contacts between the population and the guerrilla.”⁷ The 1-4 CAV accomplished this through a thorough and ongoing census, concrete barriers to control movement, a curfew, and a significant effort to fill the law enforcement gap.

We adopted a strategy from 2-12 Infantry called “close encounters” to complement our constant street presence. The strategy called for our Soldiers to approach each home in the neighborhood not only to determine who lived where, but also to build a real relationship with the population one family at a time. We found that while people would not talk to us on the streets, they would often speak freely inside their homes. Since we went to every home, no one felt singled out. Galula points out that a census



U.S. Army, A/1-4 CAV

SFC Gannon Edgy and Captain Nick Cook of A Troop, 1-4 Cavalry talk to a Doura citizen through their interpreter during Operation Close Encounters.

can serve as a “basic source of intelligence.”⁸ We found that it was a tremendous source of intelligence that gave us an in-depth understanding of how people felt. We came to understand that AQI was supported only by a small minority of the population, and that most people desperately wanted things to improve. We discovered issues around which we could build an alliance based on a relationship of trust and respect. We could shape our talking points, information operations, and psychological operations to have the effect we wanted because we knew our target audience well.

Physical control of the population was important as well. A city-wide curfew was already in effect, and large concrete barriers had already begun to spring up around troubled neighborhoods. As our part of Doura was the insurgents’ gateway into the entire neighborhood, we needed walls to disrupt his movement by forcing him to bring both men and material through our checkpoint. At the checkpoint, an insurgent was subject to an overt search as well as identification by unseen sources that observed him coming and going. The walls also protected our neighborhood from gunfire originating from surrounding areas. People could now start to move

...while people would not talk to us on the streets, they would often speak freely inside their homes.

around without fear of being hit by stray gunfire. This increased security meant children could go back to school and businesses could open.


We also found it necessary to fill the law enforcement gap to maintain positive control of the population. As in any community, there were those who would steal, get into fights, have loud family arguments, speed, and commit any number of minor transgressions of the law. However, there was an overwhelming thirst for justice, and we did our best to ensure these issues were worked out by involving local leaders, including imams. Although we would never have real control over all lawless behavior, as reconciliation later took shape, we made efforts to involve the National Police (NP). Unfortunately, we found them to be more of a paramilitary organization than a true, civilian police force.

The fourth step, intelligence collection, started from the moment we began patrolling in Doura, but we were now in a position to get the type of almost daily quality intelligence that allowed us to actually detain insurgents for probable cause. Within five weeks of our implementation of a constant presence

and “close encounters,” we increased our pool of information sources from 0 to 36. In our first 30 days we detained only 16 people, but during our fourth month we detained 90 insurgents.

We often met people willing to meet with our tactical human intelligence teams who had actionable intelligence and had often worked in the intelligence field under the previous regime. We also used these encounters as an opportunity to show people the digital photos we used to identify insurgents. Since we were always on the street, insurgents grew numb to our presence and rarely attempted to escape. Our platoons would often have an intelligence source lead them to the home of an insurgent where Soldiers would simply knock on the door and detain him.

Galula tells us, “Intelligence is the principal source of information on guerrillas, and intelligence has to come from the population, but the population will not talk unless it feels safe, and it does not feel safe until the insurgent’s power has been broken.”⁹ Providing increased security, detaining a number of key suspects, offering job opportunities, improving



Children walking to school pass through an Iraqi Army checkpoint in Doura. Filtering the population through these checkpoints made it much more difficult for insurgents to move freely.

essential services, and building a personal bond between our Soldiers and the population resulted in enough quality intelligence to see the fifth and sixth step as outlined by Galula take shape—"to win the support of the population" and "purge the insurgent from the area."

Galula emphasizes the importance of involving the population in the long-term solution by recruiting local citizens for security purposes and conducting local elections to place "local leaders in positions of responsibility and power."¹⁰ Coalition efforts to create and sustain the Sons of Iraq to openly assist with security efforts are well documented. Unlike in Anbar and other rural areas of Iraq, no single sheik in Baghdad could assemble so many disenfranchised Sunni men into a viable security force. Local leaders began to emerge—primarily from our well-established source networks—and they in turn helped organize the Sons of Iraq in Doura. While some may have been former insurgents, most were not, or at least they were not irreconcilables. Regardless, we took the lead in vetting each Sons of Iraq candidate, and when we found insurgents attempting to infiltrate the program, we detained them. If we had not done this, good citizens would have had no faith in this effort.

Once in uniform and openly providing security on the streets, the Sons of Iraq had a positive effect on the population. They were proud to be a part of the solution, and wanted to be seen as a legitimate organization. However, the National Police in the neighborhood were very suspicious of them. Even our most-capable NP captain stated, "It's my personal belief that before they were 'the Awakening' they were Al-Qaeda."¹¹ In order to fight against this perception, we worked to build relationships between the Sons of Iraq and NP leaders. I invited the former to attend our weekly security meeting with the National Police, which met with great success. We frequently patrolled with the NP battalion commander to inspect checkpoints, and we posted a number of Sons of Iraq at each NP checkpoint. This proved an effective interim tactic until the Sons of Iraq could be hired or otherwise dealt with effectively by the Iraqi government.

The only local government representation upon our arrival was the neighborhood and district advisory councils. These organizations did not exist prior to 2003, when the Coalition Provisional



U.S. Army, MAJ Paul Callahan

A local leader from the Sons of Iraq walks the streets in Doura with a National Police battalion commander. The author can be seen between and behind them.

Authority established them to address local issues. Their leaders were elected in 2003 with no agreed-upon term of office. Most enjoyed the benefits of a relationship with coalition forces. We played to their egos, hoping to get positive results (whether tactical information or just neighborhood repairs), while they insisted on knowing the name of each contractor we hired, presumably to insist on a cut of the money or to provide us with a contractor of their own for the same reason. Even worse, this

The unit has come to know the neighborhood in a way that would have been unthinkable just after the war, or even into 2004 and 2005. In fact, the U.S. military has never secured Iraq or controlled it so completely as it has today, and never before has their wealth of intelligence and ability to analyze it been better.

—Daniel Pepper, *Time Magazine*
13 January 2008

organization had no budget. While better than nothing, it was essentially ineffective. We worked to replace the most unproductive representatives, but that was a challenge as well.

Early in 2008, the Iraqi government announced the formation of “tribal support councils.” Specific guidance on the makeup of the councils and how many there would be was vague at best, but we seized upon this opportunity to hold some form of local elections. While we did not know how these new support councils would interact (if at all) with the neighborhood district councils, we did know that the council representatives would have opportunities to interface with Iraqi government officials.

Following Galula’s dictums, we helped local leaders organize an election. Unfortunately, the Iraqi prime minister’s office thought nothing of calling directly down to a NP brigade commander, giving him orders and expecting immediate results. So we essentially had two choices: actively assist with a free and fair election, or allow the Shi’a-dominated National Police to hold elections, which would almost certainly result in the selection of sectarian puppets. Galula states that one must “call for absolutely free elections for local provisional self-government, thus letting leaders emerge naturally from the population, which will feel more bound to them since they are the product of its choice.”¹² We asked one of the primary non-political leaders in the area to put together a committee to help select

a set of candidates and to work with the primary sheik in Doura to organize the election. Other than offering encouragement and security, we allowed the election to take place as they planned it.

Conclusion

In just over four months, using the “close encounters” strategy, and a constant presence, we forged a strong alliance with the local population, denying the insurgents the ability to operate effectively. In fact, 1-4 CAV was not attacked inside our area of operations in any way over the final six months of our time there. We detained 264 insurgents and transferred over 80 percent of them to prison. Twenty of those cases were tried in the Iraqi criminal court system. Parks and soccer fields replaced burning piles of trash, hundreds of stores reopened, and happy customers filled formerly empty streets. The National Police were at peace with Doura residents, while local leaders took office. Most important, this community inside Baghdad now had hope and an opportunity to move forward.

As our military continues to integrate the study and practice of counterinsurgency into our professional education system and combat training centers, David Galula’s work should be required reading for all Soldiers and Marines of all ranks. A short book, it can be digested over a weekend and discussed comprehensively in a classroom environment or easily integrated into after-action discussions during training exercises.



U.S. Army, A/1-4 CAV

Before (May 2007) and After (March 2008): The main street in Doura is an example of the transformation that took place in Baghdad during the surge of 2007–2008.

**David Galula's work should
be required reading for all
Soldiers and Marines
of all ranks.**

In the future, it is likely that the U.S. will be involved in further counterinsurgency efforts or working to prevent new ones. The Army and Marine Corps must make every effort to preserve the institutional memory required to effectively prosecute counterinsurgency operations. While we will not always follow a prescribed set of steps to defeat an insurgency, it is imperative that we should embrace principles that have proven successful over time. Using Galula's theory to complement our doctrine in FM 3-24 will provide depth of understanding for leaders at all levels. **MR**

NOTES

1. David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2004), 81.
2. Galula, 83.
3. The battalion concentrated on the most contested areas of Doura. Each platoon conducted an eight-hour patrol per day during six-consecutive days, before rotating off-shift duty for the next three days. This required shared operational battlespace. During limited visibility, one troop was dedicated to patrolling the assigned area of the remaining two troops. The Command Sergeant Major constantly checked leaders and Soldiers at all levels to ensure they did not reach a point where Soldiers burnt-out and became ineffective. After approximately five months at this pace, a staff sergeant stated that even the newest private in the platoon understood the need to be out patrolling Doura all of the time. After three days off-shift, platoon members were bored and ready to get back out patrolling among the population, especially as they grew close to them.
4. This was a situation analogous to two children fighting in the backseat of a car on a long trip. We knew that they had to get along at some point but, like fighting children, had to be separated for a cooling-down period. Well before we redeployed, we reinstituted joint patrols and integrated the Sons of Iraq into a comprehensive security effort only partially dependent upon 1-4 CAV.
5. Galula.
6. This contract employed over 300 men. Eventually, these employees served to collect intelligence on AQI movement and attempted IED emplacement. Once trash was removed, IED emplacement became much more challenging for the insurgent. Having trash collected regularly returned a small amount of dignity back to the population.
7. Galula., 82.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid., 50.
10. Ibid., 89.
11. Alissa Rubin, "In a Force for Iraqi Calm, Seeds of Conflict," *New York Times*, 23 December 2007.
12. Galula, 90.



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Amnesty, Reintegration, and Reconciliation

SOUTH AFRICA

Major Timothy M. Bairstow, U.S. Marine Corps

THE GRANTING OF AMNESTY and the process of reconciliation and reintegration (collectively referred to as “AR2” in this series of articles) are typically post-conflict processes. However, potential belligerents may resort to using aspects of AR2 before armed conflict to avert more widespread bloodshed. Scholars often cite South Africa as a rare example of a nonviolent transition to conciliation between sharply divided elements within a country.¹ Since its transition to majority rule, South Africa has held three elections, including the peaceful transfer of power between

Presidents Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki. South Africa thus stands as an example of the efficacy of employing the principles of AR2.

During the transition from apartheid to majority rule in the 1990s, South Africa avoided civil war due to a combination of political compromises between the National Party and the African National Congress, the acquiescence of the military, and the need to relieve the war-related pressure on the South African economy. Economic pressures forced the ruling National Party to the negotiating table with its chief rivals in the African National Congress (ANC). The two parties negotiated a compromise through which South Africa became a majority-ruled state and individuals accused of committing politically motivated crimes prior to the transition were granted a full pardon. This compromise could not have been executed without the acquiescence of South Africa’s security forces. Unlike in other cases of AR2, the South African military did not serve the “forcing function” of an armed reconciler but instead merely allowed the process to occur.

South Africa is thus a distinctly instructive case because South Africans used the process of AR2 to prevent a war rather than mitigate the effects of one after the fact. Amnesty in South Africa fell under a well-established legal process in which individuals were absolved of criminal or civil prosecution in return for a complete accounting of politically motivated crimes. The agency charged with adjudicating claims of amnesty, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), was designed to be the catalyst for South African reconciliation. The TRC completed its deliberations and delivered its final report in 2003.

The legal process of granting amnesty is now complete in South Africa. While certainly not all South Africans have reconciled with their former opponents, a majority feels some measure of reconciliation a decade after the transition

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PHOTO: African National Congress (ANC) soldiers keep the crowd away during a mass election campaign rally addressed by ANC president Nelson Mandela in Atameleng in Boputhatswana, 9 April 1994. (AFP, Philip Littleton)

Amnesty in South Africa fell under a well-established legal process in which individuals were absolved of criminal or civil prosecution in return for a complete accounting of...crimes.

to majority rule. South African reintegration, the process by which all elements of the South African population achieved representation, has occurred in the government and military but has yet to fully occur in the economic realm.

Background to the Conflict

Although not the sole cleavage in South African society, the state-sanctioned system of racial discrimination known as apartheid was the most divisive aspect of South Africa's polity. Laws that divided South Africa into separate spheres for blacks and whites date back as early as 1911. In 1912, educated black South Africans founded the South African Native National Congress, an organization dedicated to the peaceful opposition to segregationist laws. In 1923, its members renamed the organization the ANC. The ANC continued peaceful opposition to white minority rule until the early 1960s. In March 1960, South African security forces in the town of Sharpeville opened fire on an anti-apartheid demonstration and killed 69 protesters.² The following month the South African government banned the ANC and a similar organization, the Pan-African Congress, and declared a state of emergency.

In 1961, in reaction to both the Sharpeville massacre and the South African government's departure from the British Commonwealth, the ANC formed its armed wing, the *Umkhonto*

we Sizwe ("Spear of the Nation").³ Black African resistance was relatively ineffective against South African security forces. The *Umkhonto* and similar organizations conducted numerous acts of sabotage in South Africa, but they spent more time fighting rival factions within the black resistance than attacking white South African targets. In addition to limited acts of sabotage, the black resistance in South Africa organized massive protests and strikes by urban workers and students. In 1976, police in the Soweto Township killed several protesters, igniting a series of riots that left dozens of buildings destroyed and hundreds of black South Africans dead (most at the hands of South African security forces).

Resistance by the ANC continued along similar lines through the 1980s. By the end of the 1980s, the South African government began to buckle under the economic pressure of strikes and international divestment from South African companies. Economic and demographic pressure led the South African government to begin negotiations with the ANC in 1989. At these negotiations, the ANC and the ruling National Party ironed out the Interim Constitution of November 1993. While some saw the Interim Constitution as a "disguised surrender," most scholars viewed the document as an agreement



Wounded people lie in the street, 21 March 1960, in Sharpeville, near Vereeniging, where 69 were killed when South African police opened fire on black protesters. The Sharpeville massacre led to the start of armed resistance in South Africa.

between the elites of two opposing groups that averted a bloody civil war.⁴ In April 1994, South Africa held elections observed by security forces from the ANC and the South African Defence Force (SADF), the previous government's military forces. The election, South Africa's first in which all citizens were afforded an equal vote, resulted in a victory for the ANC by an overwhelming margin.

With a new constitution and elections, South Africa took major political steps to avoid civil war. However, to keep the peace, the new government had to accomplish three tasks:

- Integrate the South African security forces with the armed wings of the ANC and other resistance movements.
- Reconcile a divided society for the abuses committed during apartheid.
- Integrate blacks into the South African economy.

The last of the three tasks listed above has yet to occur.

AR2 in the Economic Sphere

The South African government appears to have chosen the benefits of a strong capitalist society

over the benefits of redressing past economic wrongs. Although internal and external economic pressure brought the South African government to the negotiating table with the ANC, the economic aspects of reconciliation and reintegration have yet to fully play out. The ANC and other opposition organizations destabilized South Africa's labor force with organized strikes and boycotts, pressuring the South African government to search for resolutions. The strikes and boycotts imposed direct costs on South African companies through lowered productivity and decreased revenue.⁵

Foreign pressure on South Africa's economy was perhaps equally effective at bringing South African officials to the bargaining table. Labor unrest shook the confidence of international investors. These investors were less inclined to finance companies with uncertain labor pools. Starting in the 1970s, companies in the United States and elsewhere began decreasing economic interaction with South African companies. From 1970 to 1993, private investment in South African companies fell every year (except 1979, 1980, and 1981, when gold prices increased dramatically).⁶ Companies in the United States rid themselves of South African affiliates,

decreased their number of South African employees, reduced their investment in South Africa, and curtailed loans to South African companies.⁷ U.S. consumers cut their purchases of products (particularly diamonds) associated with the apartheid regime. In 1977, the international community took concerted economic action against South Africa with the passage of United Nations Security Council Resolution 418, which banned all member nations from supplying the South African government with "arms and related material of all types."⁸

By the 1980s, South African business executives worried deeply over both current interference in trade and the future of their labor pool. In September 1985, after urging the South African government to begin



AFP, Mike Persson

A South African soldier keeps watch over Soweto during a campaign meeting of African National Congress leader Nelson Mandela, 23 April 1994, three days before the country's first all-race elections.

Foreign pressure on South Africa's economy was...effective at bringing South African officials to the bargaining table.

negotiations with the ANC to no avail, a group of these executives from some of South Africa's biggest corporations met with ANC officials in Zambia to discuss the future of the South African government and economy after apartheid.⁹ The following year, executives met with representatives of the ANC South Africa, despite the government's ban on the organization.¹⁰ Only several years later did the South African government finally meet with ANC officials.

Of all the other tasks involved in reintegrating South African society since the transition from apartheid, economic integration received the least attention. While blacks and whites are fully integrated in the South African government and military, black South Africans remain under-represented in the higher ranks of private enterprises and in the middle class overall.¹¹ The South African government plan to address economic disparity was to institute an affirmative action program through land reform and "black economic empowerment." The government has done little to address land reform but recently attempted to boost black economic empowerment by passing the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act of 2004. The act requires companies that want to do business with the government to meet a range of affirmative action benchmarks.¹² Aside from this act, the South African government has taken few actions to affect economic affirmative action. Arguably, the South African government has chosen continued capitalism and growth over redress.

Some would argue that the continuing economic inequality between black and white South Africans indicates that the process of reconciliation and reintegration of the polity still has significant distance to cover. However, observers should not forget that it was economic pressure that initiated the process of ending South Africa's conflict. By the 1990s, the pressures that led South African businessmen to hold talks with the ANC increased the South

African government's receptiveness to negotiate a transition.

South African Politicians Avert a Civil War

Ultimately, South African politicians inside and outside the government prevented South Africa from sliding into civil war in the latter half of the last century. From 1989 to 1993, the South African government and the ANC conducted a series of negotiations that culminated in the Interim Constitution of 1993 and the general election held the following year. As a condition for transition, the South African government, led by F. W. de Klerk's National Party, insisted upon establishing a process of granting amnesty to members of the government for actions taken during the fight against the ANC. The ANC, under Nelson Mandela, understood that procedures for granting amnesty would be essential for both members of the outgoing government and members of the resistance movement. Mandela, more than any other figure, understood that a failure to institute a process of reconciliation between members of the government (particularly the security forces) and the ANC would doom the country to continued racial violence even after the ANC took power. Mandela's pursuit of reconciling black and white South Africans is another distinct aspect of the South African case. Arguably, without Mandela's charismatic leadership, AR2 might have had to wait until after a greater conflict in South Africa.

Prior to the 1994 elections, the two sides failed to iron out the exact procedures for reconciling and granting amnesty to past combatants. However, Mandela made reconciliation the focus of his first term as president of South Africa. The institution that the new government eventually created for investigating abuses and granting amnesty was the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). The TRC consisted of 18 commissioners and an investigative staff of 60, charged with cataloging the human rights abuses of the past, compensating victims for their suffering, and granting amnesty to the perpetrators of the same abuses.¹³ While the TRC relied primarily on the voluntary admissions of South Africans, it also had the power to issue subpoenas and order searches and seizures of relevant evidence.¹⁴ Held across South Africa, TRC hearings consisted of public airing of human rights

abuses by the victims or victims' families. In cases where the perpetrator was present and willing to testify, the perpetrator's testimony followed that of the victims'. If the perpetrator made a full and public confession of his actions, and if the TRC found his actions "politically motivated," the TRC granted the accused party amnesty.¹⁵ While the TRC denied amnesty for crimes motivated by personal or monetary gain, it pardoned any politically motivated action, including torture and murder. The confessor granted amnesty by the TRC was immune from further criminal or civil prosecution, and those who held positions in the state security forces were allowed to return to their jobs.¹⁶

The TRC completed its hearings and submitted its final report in 1999. Of the 22,000 registered victims, 2,500 received the opportunity to testify. Over 8,000 South Africans (including members of the South African government and resistance groups) applied for amnesty. The TRC pardoned several hundred of these applicants.

Beyond the statistics of applicants and pardons, the benefit of the TRC's work remains controversial. While some have stated that granting amnesty has "re-victimized" those who suffered under apartheid, most participants and observers argue that the proceedings of the TRC contributed substantially to the reconciliation of South Africa's divided parties.¹⁷ After interviewing nearly 4,000 South Africans from across the country, South African researcher James Gibson found that almost half expressed some form of reconciliation because of the TRC's work.¹⁸

Supporters of the TRC argue that numerous benefits resulted from its actions. The publicized hearings, which were broadcast on radio and summarized on television, provided a catharsis for black South Africans (and for whites not directly involved in apartheid) and built trust between the two races.¹⁹ The highly public manner in which the TRC presided also provided South Africa with a common history for all South Africans, black and white.

Some argued that the TRC denied victims true justice by circumventing trials and allowing the perpetrators to walk out of the hearings as free men.²⁰ To this accusation, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, the TRC's chairman, responded that South Africa needed an option "between Nuremburg and national amnesia." Archbishop Tutu explained that

not only were Nuremburg-like trials impractical for South Africa due to the cost and time such trials would consume, but many trials would falter under lack of evidence. More important, resorting to trials would break the agreement between the ANC and the National Party (and presumably lead to more violence).²¹ This agreement was the *sine qua non* for the National Party to accept a transition to majority rule. Thus, while the compromise of the TRC may have resulted in less than perfect justice, without the agreement that led to the TRC there would have been no reconciliation between the two sides.

South Africa would have undertaken the "national amnesia" option that Tutu mentioned if it had chosen to issue blanket pardons after holding hearings in private (as Chilean authorities chose to do when Augusto Pinochet's regime stepped down from power). This was an equally unworkable option, as it would have left wounds unhealed that would continue to harm society. In Tutu's words, "the past, far from disappearing or lying down and being quiet, has an embarrassing and persistent way of returning and haunting us unless it has in fact been dealt with adequately."²² A blanket pardon of crimes committed during the apartheid era would have absolved all South Africans of accountability for actions taken during the previous two decades, leaving past grievances unanswered.

Acquiescence of the Military

The political bargain the National Party and the ANC struck would never have come to fruition were it not for the acquiescence of the South African military (and the military wings of the ANC and other opposition movements). For the military organizations of both sides, the process of AR2 required two acts. First, they had to consent to the political agreement. Following the political agreement, the different military organizations had to integrate their forces. While either the South African Defence

In Tutu's words, "the past, far from disappearing or lying down and being quiet, has an embarrassing and persistent way of returning and haunting us..."

Force (SADF) or the *Umkhonto* could have delayed the political agreement, it was the agreement of the stronger military force, the SADF, which allowed the political process to move forward. This illuminates another distinction in the case of South African AR2; instead of an outside military force acting as an honest broker and pushing the political process forward, in South Africa the political process preceded the military role in AR2.

That the SADF would permit South Africa to proceed toward majority rule seems incredible at first, especially as some observers have argued that the SADF was deeply embedded in the decision-making apparatus of the government in the 1980s. The military was represented in the State Security Council, a government body that established government policy on all security related matters. Some have argued that the State Security Council became so powerful in the 1980s that it “effectively replaced the Cabinet.”²³ Others have asserted that South Africa was a militarized state, essentially run by the security forces.²⁴

These observers ignored several factors that kept the SADF loyal to the civilian government’s decisions. First, except during the world wars, the SADF was a small organization whose size limited its political power. Next, the SADF was a military built on the model of professional Western militaries, including the Western tradition of military subordination to civilian government. This professionalism was built into South African law in the SADF Order of 1970, which forbade members of the military from political activity. The military largely abided by this law. Further, the South African military had already demonstrated its subservience to civilian government when President de Klerk cut the size of the SADF in half after South Africa ended its involvement in Angola and Namibia. Finally and most importantly, a move toward praetorian opposition to a government decision would have provoked opposition from the ANC, white-owned businesses,

and likely from within the SADF itself. (The SADF Air Force was thought to be the least likely to support any sort of praetorian move).²⁵

Once the senior leadership of the SADF decided to go along with the government’s decision to move towards majority rule, the tougher problem of integrating the armed forces with the *Umkhonto* and other armed groups remained. The process began in a series of informal talks between the SADF and the *Umkhonto* in 1991, described as “talks about talks.” Formal negotiations aimed at integrating the various armed forces began in 1993.²⁶ These talks led to the creation of a Joint Military Coordinating Council, which stood until the 1994 election and was charged with planning for new, integrated armed forces and with monitoring the armed forces during the pre-election period. After the election, applicants to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission included not only members of the South African security forces under the old government, but members of the *Umkhonto* as well.

Negotiations between the two sides did not result in a new organization, but rather the integration of the *Umkhonto* and other armed groups into the SADF. The integrated organization would be renamed the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) on the eve of the country’s election. Integration of the various armed groups started during the pre-election period and continued slowly for



AFP, Anna Zieminski

Govan Mbeki, deputy president of the Senate and father of Deputy President Thabo Mbeki, gives evidence before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission on the fourth and final day of the Cape Town hearings, 25 April 1996.

seven years until complete in 2001.²⁷ Negotiations, which were limited to just the SADF and the ANC, seemed largely to favor the SADF. The SADF, after all, had greater technical knowledge and a bureaucratic staff arm with sufficient manpower for negotiations. As a result, the SADF ensured that the SANDF was built to mirror the structure, doctrine, and military standards of the old regime's military. The *Umkhonto* acquiesced to the majority of the SADF's demands, knowing that demographics and the process of integration would eventually make any concessions irrelevant as black South Africans filled positions in the new security forces.

This is not to say that the SADF uniformly accepted integration of former opposition militaries into the ranks. Hundreds of members of South African special operations units "voted with their feet" and left the military rather than continuing service in the SANDF. Many of them went into mercenary service with private military corporations.²⁸ The South African territorial reserves presumably experienced a similar exodus, although this has not been documented to the same extent as the mass departure of special forces soldiers.

Integration of the various armed groups started during the pre-election period and continued slowly for seven years until complete in 2001.

Conclusion

To suggest that South Africa's transition from apartheid to majority rule was a bloodless conflict would insult the memory of several thousand South Africans who died in the years leading up to the compromises of 1993. Such a suggestion would also require ignoring the fighting that continued through the 1990s between the ANC-led government and its enemies in other political parties in South Africa.²⁹

However, the number of lives lost in South Africa's conflict over apartheid pale in comparison with the potential for bloodshed had the former regime attempted to hold on to power indefinitely. While the credit for averting a protracted war lies primarily with South African politicians who were willing to make compromises for the benefit of their country, those compromises would never have occurred if not for the pressure exerted by the economic and military spheres. **MR**

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EDUCATING BY DESIGN

Preparing Leaders for a Complex World

Colonel Stefan J. Banach, U.S. Army

We tolerate the unexplained but not the inexplicable.

—Erving Goffman¹

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PAINTING: Alexander the Great, the West's genius of military art and science, fights King Porus of India at the Hydaspes River in May, 326 B.C.E. He and his generals, the Diadochi, were deliberately educated in the study of campaign design.

THE ARMY HAS MANAGED an increasingly complex global environment since 2001 with the additional dilemmas of asymmetric warfare, counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and stability operations. Both the operating force and the generating force have recognized the need for new conceptual tools to assist commanders in the planning process.

In January 2008, publication of TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5-500, *Commander's Appreciation and Campaign Design (CACD)* captured an ongoing professional dialogue about the application of design to military operations. The current challenge has been to define the Army's methodology for design. Simultaneously, the School for Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) has considered how to incorporate the art of design into officer education so design teams can apply design theory and philosophy to practical challenges. Working with theoreticians and skilled practitioners of military art and science, the school has been engaged in taking design from theory to practice on many fronts. From this rich experience, SAMS has adopted a slightly modified version of TRADOC's Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) definition of design as "an approach to reasoning and critical thinking" that enables a leader "to create understanding about a unique situation and on that basis, to visualize and describe how to generate change."² This article explores the Advanced Military Studies Program (AMSP) educational experience and is meant to share insights gained at SAMS with the Army, Joint, coalition, and interagency communities.

To do this, the paper looks at how the "art of design" is already being used by Army leaders. In doing so, it explains how SAMS has been teaching and learning about design through extensive academic and practical experience. It concludes with some of the lessons from the SAMS experience over the past two years and an exploration of the critical interface between design and planning.

Practicing Design in a Complex World

One of the primary objectives of AMSP's Art of Design courseware is to enable students to gain systemic understanding of a situation when it is not clear what action is required and no consensus exists on the nature of the problem. Social psychologist Karl Weick describes such situations as follows: "Things seem inexplicable. And to make it worse, many of our ways of making sense of the inexplicable seem to have collapsed."³ Oftentimes, sources of difficulty are not readily apparent, or, more likely, apparent problems are merely symptoms of deeper issues and problems with their own dynamics and connections. Worse still are situations where traditional methods for understanding and potential approaches to problem solving no longer work or provide erroneous solutions. Recent experience and emerging doctrine all point towards design's potential for enhancing the commander's understanding and visualization of the situation. When faced with the incomprehensible, commanders at all levels need an approach that helps them learn, understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess while conducting battle command activities.

In many respects, the operational force leads the generating force in its understanding and implementation of design. While not explicitly recognized as such, military leaders have already incorporated design tenets into their patterns of thought. When commanders find themselves asking "What's the story here?" they engage in design. Commanders and their staffs, out of necessity, have realized that contemporary situations require a deep appreciation of the operational environment. Guidance provided by a higher political or military authority may not be sufficient to frame complex situations that cross political, social, economic, and ideological boundaries, particularly in joint and coalition operations. An example might be a directive to solve an amorphous problem, like "fix the government" in your area of operations.

Absent a clearly definable military task, commanders have had to adapt existing processes. They make conscious decisions to combine their experience with the intellectual power of others to assist in managing complex issues within acceptable limits of tolerance over time. In these situations, commanders have found it necessary to engage in

...military leaders have already incorporated design tenets into their patterns of thought.

learning through action to understand the system, the adversary, and the logic of underlying events. For example, tactical organizations at every echelon conduct continuous sustained operations over long periods of time. Consequently, battalions and brigades, who doctrinally do not plan and conduct campaigns, produce their own versions of campaign plans. A campaign plan is the best way that these units have found to articulate a broad set of ideas about how to solve ill-structured problems in complex environments over time. As a result, the practical basis for incorporating design into Army operations already exists. Design provides a methodology to assist commanders in what they are already doing in an ad hoc fashion.

Another addition to the previously noted operational experience is an emerging professional conversation regarding the value of design in addressing complex situations. Authors have recently engaged readers on this subject in *Military Review*, research papers, and other professional journals. The views expressed by these writers serve to strengthen the design methodology, enhance the professional understanding of design, and sharpen the debate that will lead to an improved description of design within doctrine.⁴

Army doctrine has served and continues to serve the force very well, but current operations have revealed the need for an enhanced ability to comprehend the operational environment and its logic before detailed planning begins.⁵ Some design concepts have already been written into Army doctrine while others are conflated with planning tasks. Fully developing design theory, separating design tasks from those of planning in doctrine, and implementing new design fundamentals without losing the essence of the art of design is the challenge at hand.

Doctrine has begun to incorporate design into conceptual approaches to problem solving. Field Manual (FM) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, contains one of the most cogent doctrinal statements about design.

Design and planning are qualitatively different yet interrelated complementary activities

essential for solving ill-structured problems. The situation is particularly problematic with insurgencies. Design informs and is informed by planning and operations. It has an intellectual foundation that aids continuous assessment of operations and the operational environment. Commanders should lead the design effort and communicate the resulting framework to other commanders for planning, preparation, and execution.⁶

FM 3-0, FM 5-0, and Joint Publication 5-0 contain other doctrinal expressions of design; however, our military doctrine does not adequately capture the art of design as an approach, and a practical void exists. Current doctrine discusses design as a complement to planning. SAMS is moving forward on this critical aspect in partnership with the U.S. Army War College, TRADOC, and the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate (CADD).

While each organization uses different approaches, methodologies, and philosophies, the SAMS experience provides results to the other TRADOC agencies, which has helped to codify the language and methodology needed to transition to a practical approach for design in operational forces. The experimentation of SAMS students and faculty is intended to assist in refining the understanding of the art of design in order to be useful to the field. Future doctrinal advances will more fully describe the Army's methodology for incorporating design fundamentals into operations. In the meantime, the art of design is not an activity that will be driven from the top down in our force; indeed it is being practiced in our formations today and needs to be codified in doctrine for universal understanding and practice.

Integrating Design into Education

SAMS received the mission to further develop design thinking for the Army in July 2007, building upon TRADOC's continuing effort to assess the application of design. Creating a design culture at SAMS, which would underpin the development of the Art of Design courseware, was a top priority and required the faculty to model the agile and adaptive leadership principles that are taught at the school. The institution established an open experimental environment to encourage learning, generating the atmosphere for new thinking to flourish. Synthe-



Coin of Julian the Apostate, circa 360 C.E. The Roman emperor Julian began his campaign against the Persians' Sassanid Empire in March 363. There was no compelling reason for the invasion, it was poorly planned, and his campaign design fell apart after he failed to take the Persian capital at Ctesiphon (about 22 miles south of modern Baghdad). He was killed near Samarra when he entered battle without wearing his body armor.

sizing complex adaptive systems and emergence concepts, social influence, leadership, and design theories along with a broad range of philosophically nuanced ideas took time, but this investment resulted in new design courseware and a deeper understanding of the methodologies needed to apply design to complex problems.⁷

SAMS brings to the operating force the ability to incorporate a well-thought-out and structured design approach as a complement to what commanders attempt to do intuitively. The third evolution of the SAMS Art of Design curriculum spans subjects from the theoretical basis of design to practical application of design methodology. The AMSP design course for 2009 includes 25 lessons taught within a six-week period. The instruction is divided into five modules: critical thinking, foundations for design exploration, design methodology, communication, and leading design. Students are exposed to a wide range of theorists, specialists, and experts in related disciplines during their academic study. A series of three design practical exercises conducted over an additional six weeks spread throughout the academic year challenge the students to apply the approach they have studied

to complex situations. Students then conduct two planning exercises during the final months of the program moving from design to planning, immersing themselves in Army planning doctrine. The Art of Design course produces officers who not only can design military responses to complex situations but also who are critical and creative thinkers, culturally aware, effective communicators, and confident leaders of operational planning teams. They are able to employ a comprehensive approach to complex problem solving.

In the academic lessons, students delve into the art of design, using theory, history, and doctrine to inform their learning. This intensive period acquaints the students with philosophy and design theory. Systems-thinking lessons establish an appreciation for relationships, which is a vital competency to master before engaging in design. Socratic-style study of creativity, complex adaptive systems, emergence, and self-organization grounds the officer in complexity theory. Lessons on inquiry reinforce the appreciation of difference between western culture and other cultures, as well as the theoretical basis for discourse. In-depth study of the theoretical underpinnings of narrative, discourse, and asymmetry prepare the student to participate in the design methodology by establishing intellectual foundations for the inquiry inherent in learning. Communications theory lessons build upon existing skills, providing the means to clearly explain the team's systemic understanding to audiences both within the organization and external to the headquarters. An exploration of strategic communications follows, equipping the officer with the perspective needed to develop themes and messages appropriate to the command's design. A series of lessons on organizational theory and leadership then consider the environment of design, integrating a study of edge theory, sensemaking, adaptive leadership, power and influence, and learning organizations into the ideas developed in earlier seminars. Throughout the design course, historical and doctrinal examples link the theoretical underpinnings to reflective practice. The academic course gives the students a deep intellectual foundation, preparing them to apply the design methodology to different and wide-ranging complex situations.

In practical exercises, students apply theoretical concepts, explore the art-of-design approach,

lead operational planning teams, and develop their communication skills. Practical exercises cover the key elements of the design approach: receipt of situation, development of the environmental frame, problem frame, design concept, and design to planning. The first practicum presents the students with a complex situation from a combatant command area of responsibility. Students create an "environmental frame," "initial problem statement," and an "initial theory of action." Design Practicum Two continues the learning begun in the first applicatory experience, allowing the students to generate a "problem frame," "revised problem statement," and an "updated theory of action." In the final practicum, students continue to design with the final outcome of the practical exercises being a translation of all learning achieved in the design methodology. It includes the creation of a "design concept" as the artifact translated in the design-plan interface, resulting in a planning directive. This series of integrative experiences give substance to the academic subjects, allowing each student to develop their understanding of the design methodology.

Learning by Practicing Design

An explorer can never know what he is exploring before it has been explored.

—Gregory Bateson⁸

In addition to internal exercises, SAMS has participated in Unified Quest (UQ) exercises since 2005. As mentioned earlier, in January 2008, TRADOC introduced CACD as a part of the effort to begin moving design from theory to practice. AMSP students explored new ways of using the art of design as a viable approach in preparation for UQ 2008. Lessons learned from UQ 2008 were captured in the SAMS Design Student Text version 1.0, which was published in September 2008, as a reference for future instruction at the school. Once again, SAMS will participate in UQ 2009 with the normal complement of sixteen AMSP students. The exercise is expected to generate student insights that will continue to inform subsequent iterations of design curriculum and practical exercises at SAMS. These insights will also help to inform doctrine, and inevitably expose the need for additional study in some areas, leading to further adjustments in the Art of Design approach.

Since 2007, eight seminars of AMSP students have studied design. In addition to seminar studies, individual research forms an essential element in adapting design theory to practice. A number of students have written and are writing monographs on the topic of design. Papers such as “Philosophy of Design,” by British Major Ed Hayward which explores theoretical concepts of understanding, and “Navigating between Scylla and Charybdis,” by USAF Major Russell Driggers which explores old and new leadership concepts, have added to the understanding of design.⁹ The most recent sixteen graduates, from the December 2008—Winter Start AMSP Class, completed all of the SAMS Art of Design courseware, and eight of these officers were immediately deployed to Afghanistan. The current AMSP class 09-01, due to graduate in May 2009, has completed its first two practical exercises to be followed shortly by the third practicum and two planning exercises. As with any curricula, understanding the learning outcomes and strengths and weaknesses of various approaches has led to modification of both the course materials and the design methodology itself.

Through faculty and student after action reviews (AARs), SAMS captured student experience and made adjustments to the course material. As happens with any new concept, the transition from theory to practice yielded a rich body of experience, which has revealed innumerable insights. From these lessons, SAMS recognized the need to make adjustments to facilitate application of an inherently individual activity to collective pursuit of understanding. One fundamental insight is that design is not a process *per se*, but it needs a logical methodology. While an individual may be an effective thinker, problem solving in social groups requires some commonality of approach. By combining philosophy with method, students and faculty are gaining understanding about a methodology that can help commanders harness the collective insights and learning that takes place within their organizations.

Another discovery has been that absent boundaries for design activities, there is no progress. When designing military responses, the team is often faced with fundamental questions like, “when should we move forward through the methodology?” Lacking philosophical and methodological

markers, “paralysis by analysis” results.¹⁰ The team remains stuck, unable to progress in its learning. Broad and flexible systemization of the design approach combines the method and the philosophy to guide the design team’s learning and actions.

The companion article in this issue, “*The Art of Design: A Design Methodology*”, explains in greater detail the methodology developed based upon practical experience, as shaped by theory. Briefly, the art of design uses a simple approach to guide the design teams’ and commander’s learning. The methodology has three major elements that are interrelated, mutually inform each other, and are iterative in nature:

- Understand the operational environment.
- Understand the problem.
- Develop a solution in the form of a design concept.¹¹

The goal is to provide the commander with a cognitive tool that he can use to understand the logic of the system. Each section of the methodology provides a place to explore, learn, and synthesize information while not constraining the design team, allowing them to move between and operate in all three spaces simultaneously if necessary to gain systemic understanding. Design is non-linear in thought and application. Its methodology clarifies guidance in the consideration of operational environment, and the current system is understood within existing limitations. The design team produces an environmental frame, an initial problem statement, and an initial theory of action. As the teams’ understanding increases and the nature of the problem begins to take form, the team explores in greater detail aspects of the environment that appear relevant to the problem. Here, choices are made about boundaries and areas for possible intervention. From this deeper understanding, designers set the problem by developing a problem frame and revise the problem statement and the theory of action. Finally, the design team decides how to act to manage the problem by developing a solution in the form of a design concept and initiates the transfer of learning from the design team to the planning staff through a planning directive.

Design to Planning Interface

Perhaps the most difficult problem thus encountered is the transition from design to planning.

All creative ideas derived from extensive design thinking must be communicated effectively in a systematized approach which produces universal understanding of a complex ambiguous situation. Carrying forward the work done during design involves choices and a complex interaction between the design team and a broad array of interested parties, all of whom require tailored information appropriate to their echelon and responsibilities in using the design. As the team codifies the transition from design to planning, they define the gap between thought and action. The design to planning interface translates the learning generated as part of the design approach in a form usable to planners.

Design interacts with planning in one of three basic ways:

- It can precede planning. The commander may choose for his planning staff to engage in the planning process after design work is complete. In this approach, design provides guidance to begin planning.
- Design and planning may occur at the same time. Design and planning then interface throughout the doctrinal planning process with design informing planning.
- The need for design may emerge while executing on-going operations. In this case, the commander determines a need to utilize the design methodology when events make clear that a complex situation exists. In this context, as design continues, iterative learning and action take place, which then enable the reframing of operations to manage the situation within acceptable limits of tolerance.

To be effective, the Army should bridge the gap from abstract thought generated at the cognitive design level to guidance for concrete action, which occurs during planning. The design to plan interface must be flexible and able to react to change allowing for new inputs and new outputs. Not only does information flow from the design team to planners, critical feedback flows from the planners to the design team, which stimulates further design effort. Design, planning, and execution are inextricably linked in a symbiotic relationship. Each informs the other and each is dependent upon the other for success.¹² Nevertheless the functions of each activity are different. Design work is systemic and remains broad, fluid, and open. Planning is

systematic and produces execution instructions, while execution connotes action. These are not incompatible activities; they are the complementary and continuous tools of the military professional who must achieve a synthesis between them when faced with a complex situation.

To that end, every complex situation requires a unique approach which is best derived through the employment of both design thinking and planning activities that optimally produce successful tangible actions. The complex situations that the Army is confronting today defy checklists and templates. Instead a broad framework must be applied to describe the nature of the problem and the capabilities of the organization. These products should result in written and graphical products that clearly communicate the logic of the design. This may be done in the form of a planning directive. The planning directive serves three functions:

- Transfer of the design team's learning to the planning staff.
- Articulation of the commander's initial guidance for planning.
- Establishment of the organization's structure for continued learning about the system.

The planning directive is not an exclusive checklist; instead, commanders can and should adjust their planning directive's contents with each new complex situation.

The complex situations that the Army is confronting today defy checklists and templates.

Sample Planning Directive Contents

The Planning Directive conveys the design team's understanding, guidance for the planning effort, and a concept for continued learning created through the design methodology. This directive complements the intent and enhances the commander's communication of his visualization of and logic for the operation. This guidance may be broad or detailed. It should include an articulation of how, when, what, and where the commander sees the operation unfolding. It thus provides the basis for planning and action.¹³

Design Team Learning

- Problem Statement
- Theory of Action
- Environmental Frame
- Problem Frame
- Design Concept

Initial Planning Guidance

- Initial Commander's Intent
- Mission Narrative
- Resources
- Risk

Organizational Learning

- Gaps in Knowledge
- Structure for Organizational Learning

The three major elements of a planning directive include transfer of design team learning, planning guidance, and an outline for future organizational learning.

The design team learning includes:

- Problem statement. This statement must clearly define the problem or problem set that must be managed or solved. It does this by comparing the environment as it is to the environment envisioned in the friendly desired state; how it should be within a band of best and worse outcomes.
- Theory of action. A theory of action is a hypothesis. Where the problem statement sets the problem, the theory of action is a simple and suggestive insight about how to solve the problem. It is a creative spark that inspires the design team, provides focus to maintain coherence of the design effort, and acts as the foundation for strategic communications.
- Environmental frame. This frame captures and communicates systemic understanding of the environment. It is an artificial mental construct of the world describing, in graphic and narrative forms, the environment as it is and the logic of how it functions. This element provides an expression of the patterns of the environment. This logic is used when framing the problem so that the team has the same contextual understanding throughout.
- Problem frame. This frame captures and communicates what must be acted upon within the environment to move towards the friendly desired state. In both

graphic and narrative form, it captures broad aspects of the environment that are relevant to the problem or problem set and sets the boundaries for intervention. It also describes the logic of the system of opposition and the logic of the system of collaboration.

- Design concept. This concept should be a graphic and narrative depiction of the commander's intent and planning guidance communicating the logic of how intervention will occur and change behavior within the system. One doctrinal method is to use Lines of Effort (LOE), but it is not the only way. FM 3-0 states, "Lines of effort are essential to operational design when positional references to an enemy have little relevance."¹⁴ Design teams must have the latitude to portray the design concept in a manner that best communicates its vision and logic. The design concept organizes and sequences goals and actions of intervention in time, space, and priority.

Initial Planning Guidance entails:

- Initial commander's intent. The commander must provide a summary of his comprehensive visualization of the solution and what he wants to accomplish. This facilitates planning and orients the focus of operations, linking purpose to conditions that define the desired state.¹⁵

- Mission narrative. The initial expression of the command's information to describe intent to external audiences whose perceptions, attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors are relevant to the unit's mission.¹⁶

- Resources. The planning directive must outline parallel efforts that must take place from other agencies and units. The command may require additional resources or need a commitment from the next higher headquarters to garner outside resources to shape the operation both within the area of responsibility and in the area of interest.

- Risk. The directive addresses risk, explaining the acceptable level of risk to seize, retain, or exploit the initiative. The design concept should also address ways to mitigate risk. FM 3-0 states, "A good operational design considers risk and uncertainty equally with friction and chance."¹⁷

Organizational learning entails:

- Gaps in knowledge. There are things that the organization does not know, but need to know in order to more fully understand the operational environment and problem. In the art of design, these gaps in knowledge center on understanding the environment and problem.


- Structure for organizational learning. Design requires the commander to lead adaptive work. To that end, the commander must lead the learning in an organization and develop ways to gain information to determine if reframing of the problem or design concept is necessary. The design team may recommend methods for action that stimulate the environment in order to obtain knowledge and fill in gaps. As complex environments, problems, and desired end states change over time leaders must identify the parameters for reframing. This requires continual inquiry and reflection that challenges existing understanding and assesses the relevance of actions and the problem.¹⁸

The planning directive is SAMS's current understanding of how design can best interface with planning. The current six seminars in AMSP class 09-01 will, within the next several months, test and evaluate the design-plan interface, with officers who participate in Unified Quest using a campaign directive format that is similar to the SAMS planning directive.¹⁹ Learning from future practical exercises will continue to refine the linkages between the products required to move from design to planning.

Conclusion

Mastery of the art of design is not the only ingredient of mission success, but undertaking a mission in a complex environment without design may invite failure. Complex situations—by their very nature—present commanders with special challenges. To comprehend the situation requires deep study and reflection on the underlying system before engaging in action. For these reasons, leaders must understand the nuances associated with the structure of the problems that they will encounter. Design has significant potential as a methodology that allows planning to proceed from a systemic understanding of the situation. The Art of Design approach is one that may provide the commander and his staff with a useful conceptual tool which enables understanding through recursive learning mechanisms. The SAMS experience parallels work done within the operating force and other TRADOC institutions, assisting commanders by outlining an approach to serve as a foundation for understanding and adaptive action in the face complexity.

The ASMP Art of Design courseware has evolved in its current form over the last 18 months at SAMS.



U.S. Army, SPC Eric Jungels

CPL Michael Good, a Soldier from B Company, 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry Regiment, 10th Mountain Division, moves along a path overlooking the mountainside village of Aranas while on patrol in the Nuristan province, 18 October 2006.

As part of a broader community of practice, SAMS is committed to the use of design to augment the capacity of traditional planning processes in order to cope with the complexity that characterizes contemporary irregular and hybrid warfare. Other members of the community, including ARCIC, CADD, the Army War College, and others, are advancing their own understanding on the utility and benefits of design. Their learning will also contribute to and inform how to communicate, operationalize, and codify design in U.S. Army doctrine. Since design may have applicability beyond the Army alone, engagement with other services, allies, and government and non-government organizations is an ongoing priority.

The concepts outlined in this article capture the practical experience in applying design theory and the practice of learning and action which will continue to evolve at SAMS. What is clear is that this has been an iterative process involving significant debate and discussion while moving towards a common understanding of the art of design. While more work remains and further articulation is

needed, Army commanders and organizations in the field—and students and faculty in the educational

system—have made great strides already in taking design theory and putting it into practice. **MR**

NOTES

1. Erving Goffman, *Frame Analysis* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974), 30, quoted in Karl E. Weick, "Leadership When Events Don't Play by the Rules," <<http://bus.umich.edu/facultyresearch/TryingTimes/Rules.htm>> (24 December 2008).

2. TRADOC, Army Capabilities and Integration Center, Presentation to Design FMI Review participants, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 5 February 2009, 17. One of the essential requirements to implement design is the ability of the leader to lead adaptive work over time. In this sense, leading adaptive work means to manage organizational and individual learning, create time and space for creative thought, and develop new patterns of action in light of new understanding of the environment and problem.

3. Weick, "Leadership When Events Don't Play by the Rules," <<http://bus.umich.edu/facultyresearch/TryingTimes/Rules.htm>> (24 December 2008).

4. LTC Ketti Davison, "From Tactical Planning to Operational Design," *Military Review* (September-October 2008): 33; and Retired BG, Huba Wass de Czege, "Systemic Operational Design: Learning and Adapting in Complex Missions," *Military Review* (January-February 2009). BG Wass de Czege clearly covers the overarching philosophy and need for design, and he reviews the history and shortcomings of other operational planning systems.

5. Simple enumeration and analysis of the battlefield's "other characteristics" from Cold War era IPB doctrine no longer suffices. Field Manual (FM) 34-130, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office [GPO], 8 July 1994, 2-26-2-28 and Chapter 5 specified as: "other characteristics" as infrastructure, geographical, population, economic, and political aspects. As a result, commanders have employed creative means to identify and apply solutions to problems.

6. FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, *Counterinsurgency*, (Washington DC: GPO, 2006) 4-2. Insights gained from these efforts began with exploration of Systemic Operational Design as articulated by former Israeli BG Shimon Naveh. BG Naveh participated extensively in the initial practical exercises and academic sessions.

7. Insights gained from these efforts began with exploration of Systemic Operational Design as articulated by former Israeli BG Shimon Naveh. BG Naveh participated extensively in the initial practical exercises and academic sessions.

8. Gregory Bateson, *Steps to an Ecology of Mind Collected Essays in Anthropology, Psychiatry, Evolution, and Epistemology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), xxiv.

9. Hayward's monograph borrowed from Delanda and Deluze assemblage theory using it as a way to gain a deeper understanding of systems and introduced the concepts of relationships of interiority and exteriority. These were captured and used in the SAMS Student Text. Drigger's monograph addressed leaders having to navigate between older proven methods of leadership and newer methods. He ultimately concluded that commanders must use a balanced approach and are responsible to navigate their command through the middle ground.

10. Gary Klein, *Sources of Power* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1998), 259.

11. This methodology does not align exactly with battle command activities, but it has close parallels to the creative activities of understand, visualize, and describe.

12. Designers create the recipe. Planners draw the blueprint. Weick, *Making Sense of the Organization* (Malden [MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2001), 60.

13. FM 3-0, *Operations* (Washington DC: GPO, 2006) 5-8.

14. Ibid., 6-13.

15. Ibid., 5-8.

16. Jack Kem, "How to Think: The Mission Narrative," <<http://usacac.army.mil/BLOG/blogs/reflectionsfromfront/archive/2009/02/03/how-to-think-the-mission-narrative.aspx>> (9 February 2009).


17. FM 3-0, 6-19.

18. SAMS, "Art of Design" Student Text Version 1.0, 37.

19. UQ 2009 Campaign Directive, Appendix C, Campaign Directive Format, 3-6.



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Or, by contacting TCM-CEW Personnel Managers at
(913) 684-8538/DSN 552-8538



THE ART OF DESIGN

A Design Methodology

Colonel Stefan J. Banach, U.S. Army, and Alex Ryan, Ph.D.

It is well known that when you do anything, unless you understand its actual circumstances, its nature and its relations to other things, you will not know the laws governing it, or know how to do it, or be able to do it well.

—Mao Tse Tung¹

THE PURPOSE OF THIS ARTICLE is to describe a methodology for design to account for what military designers do and how they do it when they are confronted with a complex situation. This description is a snapshot of an evolving approach that encourages critical thought, innovation, and creativity, and as such should not be taken as prescriptive or limiting. Rather, the intent is to document current best practices to provide sufficient design guidelines for successful planning to occur. This narrative describes how design informs planning and action. It then introduces the prerequisite theory needed to explain the art of design and provides a brief overview of an approach for developing a comprehensive response to a complex situation.

America's International Technology Education Association defines design as an iterative decision-making process that produces plans by which resources are converted into products or systems that meet human needs and wants or solve problems.

According to this definition, design is iterative, meaning it does not follow a linear sequence, and it does not terminate just because a solution has been developed. Because design can be used to produce systems, not just products, and is applicable to the spectrum of human needs and wants, design is both extremely general and ubiquitous in nature. The definition implies that design is focused on solving problems, and as such requires intervention, not just understanding. Whereas scientists describe how the world is, designers suggest how it might be.² It follows that design is a central activity for the military profession whenever it allocates resources to solve problems, which is to say design is always a core component of operations.

As a professional intellectual activity, design requires both practical experience and theoretical support. Mastery of a profession can only come through mentoring, coaching, and experiential learning as a member of a community of practice, in addition to the appropriate academic development of a leader throughout the course of a career. The School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) has been fostering an experiential learning environment to create a holistic approach for the art of design. Our approach to educating by design is described in a companion article, "Educating by Design," in this issue. In addition to studying military theory, history, and doctrine, SAMS students

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PAINTING: Takeda Shingen (left) versus Uesugi Kenshin (right) at the battle of Kawanakajima, Nagano, Japan, 1561 C.E. Shingen was one of Japan's greatest operational artists. He used Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* to train his commanders in a holistic appreciation of operations, and his great standard displayed calligraphy for "Wind, Forest, Fire, and Mountain," from Sun Tzu. It referred to the Takeda motto taken from *The Art of War*: "Swift as the wind, silent as a forest, terrible as fire, and immovable as a mountain." The words embodied Shingen's policies and philosophy.

learn through large-scale exercises and interactive class activities; evaluate design theory across multiple professions; participate in critical discursive reviews; and contribute to discourse by completing a research monograph that may focus on any aspect of their education. At SAMS, we believe the art of design is a way of thinking more than it is a theory, process, or product.

Even though the design of military operations is informed by design practices of other professions, it is essential to account for the unique situations encountered in the extremes of conflict environments. In no other context does the influence of the adversary feature so centrally in design. Combat operations must account for the role of chance and friction, which Clausewitz noted makes even the simplest things in war difficult.³ A philosophy of design tailored to military operations, called systemic operational design, has been developed within a largely verbal tradition by retired Israeli Brigadier General Shimon Naveh.⁴ A recent article in *Military Review* by retired U.S. Army Brigadier General Huba Wass de Czege explains the relevance of design to the U.S. Army.⁵ Since 2005, SAMS has been closely involved with evaluating these concepts as part of its holistic approach to the art of design. Systemic operational design provides an important foundation for military design, even if some members of our community of practice have struggled to employ many of its intricacies when faced with real-world problem situations.

Through teaching and exercising design, SAMS has linked a number of broad theories with practice, which has provided insight into some of the obstacles to the successful application of design to military operations. One obstacle is that the U. S. Army already has widely accepted and well-documented methods for planning complex operations. For design to be useful in the military domain, it must complement and interact with existing planning doctrine. This means the interface between design and planning needs to be clearly specified. The companion article, “Educating by Design,” describes the design-plan interface in detail,

including a proposed format for a planning directive. Another obstacle is that a methodology for design has not been described in any detail. Wass de Czege rightly declares that there is no formulaic way of presenting design.⁶ But a philosophy of design by itself is too broad to function as a guideline for action. What is needed lies between the rigid precision of a technique and the abstract wisdom of a philosophy. Peter Checkland notes that “while a technique tells you ‘how’ and a philosophy tells you ‘what,’ a methodology will contain elements of both ‘what’ and ‘how.’”⁷

Employing Design Thinking

Design, planning, and execution are interdependent and continuous activities as illustrated in Figure 1. Design interfaces with planning in one of three basic ways. First, it can precede planning. The commander may choose for his staff to engage in the planning process after a design has been developed. In this approach, design provides guidance to begin planning. Second, design and planning may occur at the same time. Design and planning then interface throughout the doctrinal planning process with design informing planning. Third, the need for design may emerge while executing ongoing operations. In this case, the commander determines a need to use design when the complexity of the situation demands it. In all three cases, design is initiated because there is something inexplicable in the operational environment that requires a new appreciation and a perceived requirement to act. Design is depicted in Figure 1 as a separate layer,




Figure 1. A layered architecture for design.

because a layered architecture is a useful way to separate activities that occur at different levels of abstraction. Layers provide loose coupling, meaning that planners do not need to know the details of what the designers are doing, so long as they agree on the design-plan interface. This interface is the planning directive that communicates the design to planners, as well as all the feedback from planners to the design team. Design does not conclude when the planning directive is issued, because ongoing feedback is essential to iterative learning, and enables future reframing of operations.

Key Design Concepts

The language of design continues to evolve. In order to transition from theory to practice, an effort is underway to simplify the language of design as much as possible, so that it is accessible to the field. A major criticism and stumbling block in moving design forward has been an inability to define terms and use ordinary language. This article draws on both the current SAMS design language, and choices made towards a simplified lexicon during a recent design development meeting hosted by the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate (CADD) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.⁸ To avoid confusion, we define and reference those terms that have a specific meaning for the art of design. These include *problem situation*, *frame*, *reframing*, and *reflective thinking*.

Problem situation. The reader may be familiar with a number of different terms used to describe problems that are difficult to understand, such as complex problems, ill-structured problems, wicked problems, and messes. Although these terms can be a useful reminder of the dangers of simplistic solutions, they all share a common assumption. By categorizing problems into different types—for example, well-structured, medium-structured, and ill-structured—they imply that problems exist in the world and can be discovered, recognized, and classified by problem solvers.

Our approach to design makes a different assumption. We assume that design occurs in the context of situations, not problems. Designers determine their own purpose; therefore they set their own problems. When they solve the problems they have set, they will have a new situation and can set new problems. Progress may be more reliably assessed by comparing the new problems that are set to the old ones

than by directly evaluating solutions. To reflect this difference, we prefer the phrase *problem situation*, which was coined by Checkland. Problem situation refers to problems that cannot be explicitly stated without appearing to oversimplify the situation, ones in which the designation of objectives is itself problematic.⁹ For simplicity we may refer to a singular problem, but it should be understood that, in general, military operations will be conceived as a series of interlocking subproblems requiring trade-offs and compromises for their collective resolution.

Framing. According to Martin Rein and Donald Schön, a frame is a perspective from which an amorphous, ill-defined problematic situation can be made sense of and acted upon.¹⁰ Every human perspective has limitations, and at the same time, each varying perspective is important in seeing all facets of a problem. Just like framing a photographic shot, the choice of a conceptual frame will bring certain issues into focus while deliberately blurring distracting peripheral issues, and leaving most issues out of the frame entirely. The language we use to categorize and structure the world shapes our perspective—naming is framing.¹¹ Whether a conflict is labeled as terrorism, insurgency, civil war, ethnic cleansing, sectarian violence, or revolution will shape attitudes and expectations, the problems people see, and the solutions that are considered.

Reframing. Reframing is an intellectual activity to identify new opportunities and overcome obstacles to progress when interactions with the real world situation or new sources of information reveal issues with a current problem. Reframing shifts attention from trying to solve the current problem right to asking whether the right problem is being solved. It is a way for designers to pull back and reassess the operational environment, allowing them to challenge their situational understanding and review expectations of actor behavior against the evidence.¹² When operators consciously and critically select theories and hypotheses that help to structure their view of reality, they gain the freedom to operate beyond the limitations of any single perspective.

Units already implement many adaptations during operations, learning new tactics and approaches to overcome unexpected obstacles. Reframing is a more challenging and deeper extension of this natural capacity to adapt. It requires letting go of ideas

that worked in the past, which Liddell Hart observed is even harder than adopting new ideas.¹³ Reframing requires space to think and reflect, and is unlikely to occur under time pressure. It is underpinned by critical thinking, since it requires appreciating the values, perceptions, and biases of ourselves, allies, and adversaries. Critical thinking is also necessary to choose between competing explanations of events, to ensure that hypotheses within a frame are weighted in proportion to the evidence, and to assess second- and third-order effects.

Doctrine discusses the use of measures of effectiveness during planning to assess progress, and these measures may identify the need to reframe in the light of experience. However, standard measures of effectiveness may no longer be sufficient since they are constructed within a frame. A successful design necessarily transforms the environment and changes its nature. Institutions have strong motivation to reflect and reframe following failure, but they tend to naturally resist change when recent actions have been successful. To guard against complacency, it is important to maintain the design layer during planning and execution, to question the current understanding and reframe in response to environmental changes and new knowledge. Reframing is the most difficult—but most important—element of design.

Reflective thinking. Reflective thinking draws on research in developmental psychology on the topic of metacognition. Metacognition is defined as “knowledge that takes as its object or regulates any aspect of any cognitive endeavor.”¹⁴ This involves two separate kinds of knowledge. The first is knowledge about cognition—what do I know, what cognitive abilities do I have, and how does this help me to learn about the situation at hand? The second is knowledge about how to regulate and control cognitive activity—how do I avoid falling into common

cognitive traps, and how should I balance my cognitive resources among understanding the environment, the problem, and the solution? Designers need both types of metacognitive knowledge to become reflective thinkers. Through reflection, designers can continue to improve both their knowledge of their own ability and their capacity to regulate the cognitive focus of themselves and their team.

SAMS uses meta-questions as an integral part of the design activity to improve reflective thinking. Meta-questions function as probes to determine the depths of the current understanding of the system; to consider second- and third-order effects of action; to introduce alternative perspectives that may challenge the established relationships and mental models of the situation; and to help create the narrative that explains the systemic logic of the operational environment. For example, when directed to prepare a brigade-sized counterattack, many staff officers will immediately inquire about the timing, location, and logistics of the mission. Instead of these typical planning questions, meta-questions within design might ask:

- What infrastructure damage could the counterattack incur?
- How would that impact on the different actors and tribal groups in the region?
- Are we creating a disaffected minority by upsetting the power balance, risking a refugee crisis that would overwhelm the regional humanitarian capacity, or create other unintended consequences?

More generic meta-questions include:

- What is the logic of the guidance?
- What are the sources of legitimacy of the different power bases within the enemy’s social system?¹⁵

A Design Methodology

This section provides a simple, logical account of the current design methodology at SAMS. Design as practiced is a creative activity, which draws freely on terminology and a variety of theories unique to an individual problem situation. Whereas our description of design methodology needs to be logical and orderly to be comprehensible, design practice can be much more flexible in implementation. Design is a non-linear, interactive, and continuous cognitive activity. The reader should bear in mind the limitations associated with a linear presentation of a creative and iterative activity. We begin by describing

Institutions have strong motivation to reflect and reframe following failure, but they tend to naturally resist change when recent actions have been successful.

the starting criteria, the output of design, and the three cognitive spaces of design. The detailed elements of design are then explained.

As described above, design begins when the commander is faced with a problem situation and a perceived requirement to act. Once a design team has been formed by the commander to help him understand the situation, it needs to ask:

- Why has this situation developed?
- What does it mean?
- What's the real story here?

These questions provide a starting point for learning about the operational environment. The design team must review all relevant directives, documents, data, and previous guidance, considering implicit as well as explicit sources. As early as possible, the design team needs to start a conversation with its higher authority or the issuing authority to ensure that guidance is clearly understood at both levels. The team should acknowledge guidance that is clearly understood, seek clarification of guidance that is unclear, seek understanding of contradictions and conflicts between guidance and other sources of information, inform the higher authority of new information or of any difference in understanding of the environment, and confirm the desired state or end conditions for the situation.

The output of design is a planning directive. This draws on the three primary artifacts produced during design, described in greater detail below: an environmental frame, a problem frame, and a design concept. These artifacts capture the shared understanding of the environment, the problem, and its broad solution. The planning directive communicates these products in a form that is tailored to the needs of planners. SAMS is actively experimenting with new methods for effectively communicating the products of design in both narrative and graphical forms. Experience and practice are required to master effective design-communication techniques. There is no standard template or checklist flexible enough to encompass the variety of products needed to communicate the

results of design, so SAMS encourages the creative use of both written narratives and graphic portrayals of design thinking to transmit ideas.

Design can be thought of as taking place within three cognitive spaces: the operational environment, the problem, and the solution (see Figure 2).¹⁶ They correspond to three basic questions designers must answer to produce a successful design—

- What is the context in which the design will be implemented?
- What problem is the design intended to address?
- How will the design resolve or manage the problem?

While these spaces can be conceptually separated, they cannot be separated in practice, because designers need to have the freedom to cycle repeatedly between exploring the operational environment, the problem, and the solution. Developing the three spaces iteratively and concurrently allows a coherent understanding to emerge that relates the solution to the problem within the context of the environment. Inexperienced design teams may uncritically accept the initial presentation of the problem and move on with solving the problem, only to discover after detailed effort that their solution is irrelevant because they did not actually identify the true problem. Meta-questions can help to avoid this natural tendency. At the other extreme, some seminars have struggled trying to fully understand the environment.¹⁷ These teams eventually learn that moving among the operational environment, problem, and solution spaces takes their learning to a higher




Figure 2. The three design spaces.

level by revealing the interactions and relationships between the spaces. Leaders must carefully monitor and balance the amount of time spent in each space as teams proceed through design.

The Elements of Design

The elements of design include understanding the operational environment, setting the problem, creating a theory of action, working the problem, developing a design concept, and assessment and reframing.


Understanding the operational environment. Comprehending the operational environment in design requires conceptualizing the environment as a system. This representation is called an environmental frame. The environmental frame is a graphic and a narrative that captures shared understanding of the history, current state, and future goals of relevant actors within the operational environment. It emphasizes flows and relationships between the actors and identifies the propensity of the environment to exhibit patterns of behavior within certain limits (Figure 3). The environmental frame bounds the inquiry and needs to be larger than the design team's direct area of responsibility so that it includes the operational context. Boundary setting must also include areas that go beyond the tangible domain. During environmental framing, boundaries will expand and contract as learning occurs.

The design team needs to understand the current state, history, and future goals of each actor within the operational environment. The team can use all forms of reference, including available doctrinal resources, which help explain the operational environment. Mapping and exploration of this space can include the cultural and historical narrative; U.S. policies; system propensity;¹⁸ system potential;¹⁹ system tensions;²⁰ strategic, regional and local trending; contingent relationships; and consideration of the dimensions of time, space, and cyberspace. The object of environmental framing is to set a boundary for the inquiry and ask what is new or different in the emerging context that implies the current level of understanding is no longer sufficient to comprehend and explain the problem. Leaders will bound the scope and resolution of the inquiry as learning evolves and, as a result, will determine which actors will be considered and which organizations, communities and factions sharing similar goals, values, and behavior will be examined more closely. These

include, but are not limited to, states, multinational corporations, regional alliances, international terrorist organizations, and individuals. Understanding the environment as a system means thinking about the relationships between actors. The patterns of conflict, alliances, competition, and cooperation between the actors are more critical to environmental framing than the particular details of the individual actors.

Setting the problem. Even though design is highly iterative, for complex situations the design team will be unable to clearly state the problem until they have a mature environmental frame. Understanding the dynamics of the operational environment helps to explore beneath the initial symptoms towards the root causes of conflict. When the design team has a satisfactory explanation of why the situation developed the way it did, it can craft an initial problem statement. FM 3-07 articulates the principle that the purpose of friendly interventions in the present is to shape a better future.²¹ We use the term "*desired system*" to refer to the friendly vision for a better future. The problem statement is defined as a summary of the difference between the propensity of the environment and the desired system. The problem statement is a bridge between the environmental space and the problem space.

Potential Considerations



The diagram shows a large circle representing the 'OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT'. Inside this circle is a smaller, shaded circle representing the 'ENVIRONMENTAL FRAME'. The frame is depicted as a white trapezoid with a black outline, pointing upwards. The text 'ENVIRONMENTAL FRAME' is written in bold, black, capital letters inside the trapezoid. The text 'OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT' is written in a curved path along the top inner edge of the large circle.

- Historical Context
- Cultural Narrative
- Boundaries
- PMESII-PT
- DIME
- Contingent Relationships
- Alliances and Coalitions
- Trends
- Conflicts
- Points of Disequilibrium
- Current System
- Desired System
- System Potential
- System Propensity
- System Tensions
- Domain Exploration (Physical, Moral, Cognitive, Cyber)
- Dimension Analysis & Synthesis (Use of Time & Patterns of Space)

Figure 3. Within the operational environment space an environmental frame is constructed.

It is a restatement of the higher authority's current guidance in light of the deeper understanding obtained during the evolutionary learning and development of the environmental frame. The vision of the desired system needs to be feasible and within an acceptable level of risk, given the available resources and the current understanding of the operational environment.

Creating a theory of action. The theory of action is the complement of the problem statement. A theory of action is a hypothesis. The problem statement sets the problem—the theory of action is a simple and suggestive insight about how to solve the problem. It is a creative spark that inspires the design team, provides focus to maintain coherence of the design effort, and acts as the foundation for strategic communications. The theory of action combines identification of positive or reinforcing actions (to support or exploit recognized opportunities) with action to overcome anticipated resistance (to mitigate recognized vulnerabilities) in order to realize the shared vision. The theory of action does not specify the detailed solution—this is developed within the solution space—but it must be consistent with it. Figure 4 summarizes the problem statement and theory of action design elements.

Working the problem. The problem frame, illustrated in Figure 5, is a refinement of the environmental frame that defines, in written and graphical form, the areas for intervention. Intervention may focus on aspects of the actors within the environment, but usually it also requires changing the way actors relate to one another.

To develop a deeper understanding of the practical implications of changing patterns of behavior, problem framing constructs a detailed map of the parts of the environment where intervention is needed to resolve the problem statement. Detailed analysis includes identifying all of the actors that are influencing or have the potential to influence the problem. One must determine each actor's behavior in terms of composition, role, motivation, intentions, and mode of operation to include the actor's support structures. Actors belong to different groupings within the environment and will behave differently depending on the context of an event. It is of fundamental importance to examine and understand organic relationships of the actors and contingent relationships outside of their community.




Figure 4. Problem statement and theory of action.

Within the problem, environmental propensity, potential, and tensions are examined once again. SAMS practical exercises have demonstrated the utility of examining these three concepts for focusing on areas within the environment that require intervention. Propensity helps set a baseline for understanding how the environment is expected to behave. Determining realistic potential helps confirm what range of desired future behavior is in the realm of the possible and what tensions must be mitigated or enhanced to achieve the desired system.

The environment is characterized and animated by tension. Identification of tensions is important

Potential Considerations

Observed System to Desired System

- a. Friendly Logic
 - System of Transformation
- b. Adversary Logic
 - System of Opposition
- c. Strategic Communications Logic

Neutral Actions

Select Boundaries for Action

Make Choices for Intervention

Identify Areas for Exploitation

Identify Creative Tensions

Set Limits of Tolerance




Figure 5. Within the problem space a problem frame is constructed.

for several reasons. Tensions offer opportunities for exploitation and provide insight into how actors learn and how the environment evolves. Interactively complex systems contain regions of stability that mask intricate underlying feedback networks. These systems cannot be understood by passive observation. Tensions provide a way to obtain a deeper understanding of interactively complex systems. Tensions exist in the physical realm and also at the meta-level—that is, within the meaning of things. Tensions within the environment can act positively to move the system closer to the friendly, desired system, or they can act negatively to transform it towards a competitor's desired system. The combination of friendly, enemy, and neutral actions moving the environment towards the friendly desired system forms the basis for a system of transformation. Likewise, the combination of enemy, friendly, and neutral actors' actions pulling the environment towards the enemy's desired system forms the basis for a system of opposition. It is important to note that there will always be asymmetries between the system of opposition and the system of transformation. Awareness and analysis of the difference provides insights into behavior and relationships, furthering an understanding of friendly and adversary logic and why components within the environment behave in ways that the design team members may have a hard time recognizing in relation to their own cultural references or logic. There will also be tensions identified where there is not enough information to determine positive and negative implications. These tensions provide areas for further exploration and identify areas where intervention may be considered to stimulate the environment and observe how it responds.

Often systems of collaboration and systems of opposition create tensions by competing for support or attempting to influence the same population or circumstances within the operational environment. Identification of these convergent points and relationships help illuminate the true problem. As understanding of what to act on develops, the parameters for relevant intervention become clear. Practical experience with problem framing indicates that the initial understanding of the problem gained while developing the environmental frame is usually revealed as incomplete, and may be partially invalid. The design team should repetitively review and refine the environmental

frame and the initial problem statement to maintain coherence with the problem frame.

Developing a design concept. The problem frame articulates what the problem is by identifying the areas of the environment that need to change. However, it does not guide planners on how to resolve it. The theory of action provides a focal direction, but does not say how the areas for intervention interact. A design concept that resolves or manages the problem within limits of tolerance over time needs to organize interventions as patterns in space and time. The design concept is usually expressed as a strategy²² with a set of interdependent and mutually reinforcing lines of effort.

While developing the problem, analysis identifies the positive and negative implications of tensions within the system. When developing the solution, synthesis is required to create a coherent strategy of intervention. The goal is to exploit the transformative potential of the system's tensions while mitigating negative consequences of instability and change. Shifting emphasis from analysis to synthesis has implications for team dynamics. SAMS design teams will almost always organize into parallel smaller working groups to analyze the details of the environmental frame and problem frame. Such an approach cannot be applied to synthesis. Instead, the whole design team considers how to orchestrate the intervention to resolve the problem in accordance with the theory of action.

Once the broad strategy of intervention is agreed to, individual lines of effort can be developed. One way to exploit tensions, as explained in joint doctrine, is to identify the capabilities and vulnerabilities resident in the system of opposition. The team begins to discover ways to neutralize capabilities and to exploit vulnerabilities. The same approach applies to tensions with positive implications. Some positive tensions can be left alone as they are already effectively supporting the move toward a friendly desired system. Other positive tensions may need reinforcement or modification to best change behavior towards the desired system.

Intervention can take many forms and is specifically not limited to actions taken against a recognized enemy. It is the combination of all actions taken to deny the system of opposition and support the system of transformation in reaching their objectives. For example, intervention could include engaging an

ally to change a national caveat, changing a policy, or using an adversary's logic against himself.

Before determining the broad recommendations for intervention, the design team must consider both risk and resources. There are always risks to any intervention and these must be clearly determined and possible mitigation identified. Planning will determine the exact resources required but in the solution there will be resources identified as critical for enabling intervention to address the correct problem. Not all of the necessary resources will be directly controlled by the organization. The art of design requires exercising indirect influence in addition to control to persuade other actors of the mutual benefits of implementing the design concept. This is easier to achieve if all stakeholders are part of the design team from the outset. This way they can build trust and leverage their different perspectives.

In the face of uncertainty, the capacity to adapt postures the force to exploit new opportunities as well as manage the risks of a changing environment. A design concept that allocates resources to learning and adaptation can better respond to unforeseen challenges and maintain relevance. The key to adaptive action is collecting and interpreting feedback from designed interventions, so that success is recognized and built upon. The design team should endeavor to make every action an organizational learning opportunity—for each intervention, assess its effect, decide whether changes are needed, and ensure that the changes get implemented. Maintaining the design layer during planning and execution provides additional learning capacity.

Once again, the design concept is communicated in narrative text and graphical form (see Figure 6). The design concept is still broad relative to the detailed courses of action that planners will develop and analyze, but provides a construct for planning to begin. There is a transparent logic linking the design concept with the problem frame and the environmental frame. This means that when the operational environment changes, it is easier to assess the implications of the changes.

Assessment and reframing. The duration of extended operations in complex situations makes it likely that aims will change during execution. Such change is expected from a complex system, which will change not just while we are interacting with it, but *because* we are interacting with it. A key to our ability to adapt to changes in the environment is rec-

Potential Considerations

Broad approach—strategy
Pattern of parallel and sequential activities
Learning mechanisms
Orchestrate actions
Risks
Resources
Relationships
Narrative
Design Graphics




Figure 6. Within the solution space a design concept is developed.

ognizing changes as they occur. FM 6-0 discusses the concept of variances, which are differences between the situation we encounter during operations and the one that we expected when developing the plan. Both commanders and staffs use recognition of these variances to identify times and places where they might make adjustments to operations in order to better achieve goals or to defend against developing risks. Identifying these differences when conducting operations leads naturally to assessing whether our plan is valid or requires adjustment. In planning, the staff develops what latest draft of FM 5-0 calls measures of effectiveness to help identify these variances, and then articulates these in orders to ensure that systems are established to identify and report those variances.

Not only does the situation change, but the limitations of any one perspective for understanding a complex system means that learning about the system from within the frame is also limited. This insight is best captured by a quote attributed to Albert Einstein: “The significant problems we have cannot be solved at the same level of thinking with which we created them.” Because of this, the ability to reframe as a result of interacting with the environment is even more important than the quality of the initial design.

Summary and Conclusion

Design provides commanders with an additional layer of understanding for incomprehensible problem situations that promote conscious problem-setting and critical reflection. Designers develop an environmental frame, problem frame, and design

concept to describe graphically and textually the operational environment, the problem, and the solution. The commander is an active participant in every phase of design. In practice, design progress is neither smooth nor orderly, it is iterative and recursive as problems and solutions emerge, new experiments are conducted, consequences are evaluated, obstacles are overcome, and old problems are reframed.

The SAMS design methodology is summarized in Figure 7.²³ The design team develops theories and organizes information within three spaces. The environmental frame is the product that depicts the current state and trajectory of the actors and the propensity of the conflict situation. The problem statement provides a bridge to help transition between understanding the environment and the problem. The problem frame identifies what needs to be changed to realize the desired system as articulated within the problem statement. The design concept specifies the pattern of parallel and sequential activities that are required to move towards the desired system. The theory of action is a simple, unifying, higher level statement that binds together the three cognitive spaces and maintains coherence throughout the design effort. All of the design effort to explicitly frame the environment, problem, and solution is performed to enable the ability to reframe—to shift perspectives and reset the problem as circumstances change and new knowledge is created.

It is hoped that our account of the SAMS methodology for the Art of Design will have utility not only for SAMS students, but more broadly to the operational force as it confronts complex situations that cannot be fully addressed with existing doctrinal techniques. We will continue to evolve our design methodology through exercises and experiments, incorporating innovations and feedback from the field. SAMS will work closely with the Combined Arms Center's Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate (CADD) on the upcoming interim field manual on design, and continue to foster links with other U.S. Army design stakeholders. Internationally, ongoing relationships are being established with allies, such as the collaboration with the Australian Army and the Australian Defence Science and Technology Organisation to exploit complementary advances between adaptive campaigning and the art of design. Upcoming design work will test current thinking on the design-plan interface, assess key components of our design methodology, and capture student learning and innovations. To enable continued improvement in the practice of design, we will develop and maintain a suite of tools useful to design and a library of example products. The last two years have seen rapid advances in the theory and practice of design. The near future promises even greater change, as the design community of practice expands and design is codified into U. S. Army doctrine. **MR**




Figure 7. Elements of design.

NOTES

1. Mao Tse-Tung, "Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War," December 1936, in *Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-Tung* (Peking [sic]: Foreign Language Press, 1968) 77.

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3. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. and ed. by Sir Michael Howard and Dr. Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 119.

4. See for example, Shimon Naveh, "Operational Art and the IDF: A Critical Study of a Command Culture," Center for Strategic & Budgetary Assessment (CSBA) (September 30, 2007), written for the Director of Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Contract: DASW01-02-D-0014-0084.

5. Huba Wass de Czege, "Systemic Operational Design: Learning and Adapting in Complex Missions," *Military Review* (January-February 2009): 2.

6. Wass de Czege, 6.

7. Peter Checkland, *Systems Thinking, Systems Practice* (John Wiley & Sons: Chichester, 1981), 162.

8. The Commander's Appreciation and Campaign Design Integrated Concept Team; Field Manual Interim Development Meeting, 5-6 February 2009, brought together representatives from CADD, ARCIC, SAMS, AWC, ARCENT, and Booz Allen Hamilton to form an Integrated Concept Team for developing a field manual on design.

9. Checkland, 154-55.

10. Martin Rein and Donald A. Schön, "Frame-reflective policy discourse," in *Social sciences, modern states, national experiences and theoretical crossroads*, ed. Peter Wagner, Carol H. Weiss, Bjorn Wittrock, and Hellmut Wollman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) 263.

11. Tim Challans, personal communication. See also Rein and Schön, 270. This insight has implications for the insufficiency of doctrine, insofar as doctrine promotes a standardized lexicon, which necessarily inhibits the ability of officers to reframe.

12. Ibid.

13. "...the real challenge is not to put a new idea into the military mind but to

put the old one out..." Sir Basil Liddell Hart, *Thoughts on War* (Faber & Faber: London, 1944).

14. John H. Flavell, "Metacognitive development," in *Structural/process models of complex human behavior*, ed. J.M. Scandura and C.J. Brainerd (Alphen a.d. Reijn, The Netherlands: Sijthoff and Noordhoff, 1978).

15. The last two meta-questions are courtesy of retired Brigadier General Shimon Naveh, OTRI Lecture Notes.

16. The operational environment space, problem space, and solution space are called spaces because they are all highly multidimensional. Conceptually, it is useful to maintain three separate spaces, so that the information on why the environment behaves the way it does, what needs to be done, and how to do it can be organized differently. Whereas steps in a process form a linear sequence, spaces do not imply a time ordering.

17. Feedback from Rick Swain is representative of a number of observations consistent with a tendency to get trapped in system framing: "You can't just let the discourse go on and on—it has to be managed by the commander or chief of plans." Faculty after action review, midway through Design Practicum 2, 12 December 2008.

18. Propensity is the natural inclination or tendency of a system. Francois Jullien, *A Treatise on Efficacy: Between Western and Chinese Thinking*, trans. Janet Lloyd (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2004). 16.

19. Potential is the inherent ability or capacity for growth, development, or coming into being. Jullien, 16.

20. Tension is a strained relationship between individuals, groups, nations, or elements of the system. Booz Allen Hamilton, 62.

21. U.S. Army Field Manual 3-07, *Stability Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2008), para. 4-13.

22. Here, we mean "small 's'" strategy, that strategy which exists for all commanders independent of their level of war.

23. Note that this is not a process diagram—it does not represent a sequence of step-wise activities. Rather, the figure shows how the elements are interrelated and fit together to produce a coherent design.



THE RETURN

Doves knock dates on my head
 As I walk under the palms
 A flutter of wings as they
 Fly off into the desert sky.
 The west walls crumble
 In front of the setting sun,
 Stained pink with light
 As they contain me within the prison of our own making.
 My hands grow cold in the December air.
 I breathe into them to warm them from the chill.
 It's quiet.
 Again.
 No gunfire tonight
 No explosives today.
 For now, the helicopters shuttle only boredom; the cries of the wounded no longer on board.
 Iraq is different now.
 Not like before...



LEARNING FROM MODERATE GOVERNMENTS' APPROACHES TO Islamist Extremism

Major Erik A. Claessen Jr., Belgian Armed Forces

ACCORDING TO FIELD MANUAL (FM) 3.0, *Operations*, “*Land-power* is the ability—by threat, force, or occupation—to gain, sustain, and exploit control over land, resources, and people.”¹ When, in the aftermath of a conventional victory, the need arises for Army forces to control people during an occupation, it is useful to consider how and why the ousted enemy regime controlled the population in the first place. This question is especially important in Muslim countries, where Islamist militant organizations often are the predominant challenge to the government. Recent conflicts have increased the awareness that democracy is not “a kind of default condition to which societies revert” after a military victory over a repressive regime.² On the contrary, the party that won the conventional fight seems to inherit the overthrown government’s problem of controlling Islamist militant organizations. Several Muslim governments have over 50 years of experience in dealing with this threat, and their methods are worth studying. Westerners can learn a lot from moderate Arab government approaches to this problem.

This article briefly addresses the following:

- The two predominant Islamic schools of thought concerning the attitude of an individual towards his ruler.
- How Islamist militant organizations apply teachings of the more extremist schools of thought to challenge Muslim governments or foreign occupiers.
- How Muslim governments cope with this challenge.
- What happens when a conventional military victory disables these coping mechanisms.
- What important implications matter for stabilization operations aimed at controlling extremists.

Islamist militant organizations, for the purpose of this article, are groups that combine Islamic proselytism, provision of social services, and political activism (both violent and nonviolent) in an effort to establish governance on the basis of Islamic, *shari’a* law. Examples are the Egyptian and Jordanian Muslim Brotherhoods (hereafter also referred to as *Ikhwan*), Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Iraqi Sadr II movement. These organizations are insurgencies because they see the use of violence and subversion as methods to achieve their political aims.³

The Cause of the Islamist

Governments and regimes are able to control the population on their territory. In contrast, insurgents require a unifying cause, comprehensible by all, to influence people. Galula emphasizes the importance of the cause

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PHOTO: Islam’s basic creed (shahadah) written on a plaque in the Great Mosque of Xi’an, China.

by stating, “The first basic need for an insurgent who aims at more than simply making trouble is an attractive cause.”⁴ For Maoists, it was “land to the tiller.”⁵ For Islamists, the cause is “Islam is the solution.”⁶ To understand its scope and implications, it is necessary to review Muslim scholars’ main opinions concerning two issues. The first is the relationship between a Muslim individual and a despotic ruler. The second is the defense of Islam against foreign and internal enemies.

In essence, the teachings of two medieval philosophers Al-Ghazali and Ibn Taymiyya, dominate the debate. Al-Ghazali lived in an era of violent clashes between Muslim leaders in the pursuit of worldly power.⁷ His main concern was to end civil war between Muslims. Taymiyya’s outlook was completely different.⁸ He saw Islam itself threatened by Mongol invasions in the East and crusades in the West. As a child, Ibn Taymiyya himself “was forced to flee Harran for Damascus in order to escape the Mongol invasions.”⁹ Hence, he focused on the preservation of Islamic purity in the face of internal and external threats.

Al-Ghazali holds that the obligation to avoid chaos (*fitna*) in the Islamic community prevails over concerns about individual rights. “Political order is necessary because, by definition, no justice whatsoever is possible in periods of anarchy or chaos.”¹⁰ Therefore, if their ruler is a Muslim, subjects should obey, however bad he may be. Ghazali argues “the tyranny of a sultan for a hundred years causes less damage than one year’s tyranny exerted by the subjects against each other.”¹¹ *Jihad*, the defense of Islam against an external enemy, is a collective duty organized by the ruler. The problem of defending Islam against internal enemies is non-existent for Ghazali because subjects ought not judge their own ruler’s piety.

In contrast, Taymiyya considers foreign threats a product of disunity in the Islamic world. Therefore,

resisting invaders starts with strengthening the faith through a return to orthodoxy and ritual purity.¹² The Islamic scholar’s duty is to command what is good and to forbid what is evil.¹³ In practice, this takes the form of education and preaching (*da’wa*). The ruler’s duty is to conduct policies inspired by Islamic law. According to Taymiyya, the ruling power’s “goal was Righteous Rule”¹⁴ or *Siyassa shari’yya*.¹⁵ To attain this goal, strong public opinion that is capable of exercising pressure on the ruler, is necessary to strengthen the Islamic character of the institutions. Taymiyya regretted that “on the one hand, rulers think they can achieve material ends by means of force, ambition and self-interest, while on the other hand, religious people think they can achieve spiritual ends by mere piety.”¹⁶ Taymiyya’s solution was the “happy mean” or *Wasat*, meaning subjects should respect their ruler, and rulers should allow and accept justified public pressure.¹⁷

With regard to *jihad*, Taymiyya faced the problem of conceptualizing resistance against Mongol conquerors who converted to Islam, but kept their culture and habits. Inevitably, he came up with a distinction between good and bad Muslim rulers, thus opening a Pandora’s Box. “Ibn Taymiyya suggested that a ruler (or individual) who did not apply (or live by) the shari’a was in fact an infidel, apostate, or *kafir*.”¹⁸ This was a new concept. “Prior to Ibn Taymiyya, the criterion for determining whether a ruler (or any individual) was a Muslim had always been whether or not he or she had professed the *shahada*.”¹⁹ Taymiyya holds that “he who forsakes the Law of Islam should be fought though he may have once pronounced the two formulas of Faith.”²⁰ In this reasoning, *jihad* is above all the protection of Islamic identity against two types of enemies: the unbelievers or crusaders and the apostates or *kuffar*.²¹

Ghazali argues “the tyranny of a sultan for a hundred years causes less damage than one year’s tyranny exerted by the subjects against each other.”



An Islamic Flag, known as the ‘Flag of Islam’ (Alam al-Islam) or ‘Flag of Shahada’ (Alam al-Shahada) featuring the first Kalimah, the Shahada, widely used by Muslims.

Taymiyya's Revival

Nineteenth-century European colonialism revived interest in Taymiyya's teachings. Colonial conditions seemed to match those prevailing during Taymiyya's time: Christian invaders, abolishing the Caliphate, dividing the Muslim world into arbitrary pieces of territory and installing puppet rulers who, promoted Western culture and life style, even though they were Muslim.²² Therefore, Islamic leaders like the Egyptian Al-Banna started to apply Taymiyya's ideology as a way to resist colonial rule.²³ Confident that "when the people have been Islamized, a truly Muslim nation will naturally evolve," Al-Banna started preaching (*da'wa*).²⁴ Being a man of action himself, he looked for an ideology to provide his movement, the Muslim Brotherhood (*Al-Ikhwān al-Muslimoon*) with a solid theoretical foundation. The publication in 1948 of "Social Justice and Islam" attracted the *Ikhwān's* attention.²⁵ The author, Saïd Qutb, "quickly bec[ame] its chief ideologue and an integral part of its social activist strategy."²⁶ To understand this fact's significance, one must grasp

that "the issue of social justice is at the very root of militant Muslim movements."²⁷ At that time, Qutb was still relatively moderate. He had a "cooperative and long-term reform" in mind, based on two pillars, preaching (*da'wa*) and legislation (*tashrii'*), as "twin fundamental methods of Islam towards all aims."^{28, 29} His theory provided a comprehensive alternative to two Western ideologies: communism and capitalism, consistent with the message that Islam was the solution for everything.

Da'wa, Tashrii', and Jihad

Under President Nasser's harsh repression, Qutb radicalized dramatically. "The prison ordeal and the terrible years of torture suffered by Qutb in Nasser's camps are crucial in understanding Qutb's thought."³⁰ In his book *Milestones*, written in prison, he brought together Taymiyya's most extreme views and developed a strategy based on *da'wa* and *jihad*.³¹ He even pushed Taymiyya's logic further by adding the practice of *taqfir*: qualifying regimes who do not introduce the *shari'a* as *kafir* and by calling active,



A vengeful mob gathers around the burning headquarters of the Muslim Brotherhood in Cairo, Egypt, after setting it on fire in retaliation for an attempted assassination of President Gamal Abdel Nasser, 27 October 1954. A member of the Islamic fundamentalist brotherhood fired eight shots at the Premier while he was speaking in Alexandria.



Saïd Qutb, theoretician of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, drinks a cup of water behind bars in Cairo. He was executed 29 August 1966.

armed resistance (as *jihad*) against such a regime an individual duty, rather than a collective one.

Qutb's evolution illustrates that within Taymiyya's school of thought, there are a variety of opinions on the kind of pressure one is allowed to exert on a ruler and on the measure of precaution one has to take to avoid chaos or *fitna*. This pressure ranges from criticism during Friday prayer sermons to suicide attacks. Recent history has shown that Islamist organizations can oscillate between radicalism and moderation, between *jihad* and *tashrii*'. However, what remains constant is *da'wa*. *Da'wa* allows an Islamist movement to generate popular support, vital to any insurgency. If a movement acquires a monopoly on *da'wa* in a Muslim country or region, success is only a matter of time and perseverance (*sabr*). In contrast, the kind of pressure the Islamist militant organization exerts on a ruler or foreign occupier is variable. It can range from *tashrii*' to *jihad* or anywhere in between. It can be interrupted by cease-fires (*tahdi'ah*) and truces (*hudna*). Islamists even combine participation in a government with an insurgency against it.³² In short; these organizations are intransigent on principles, but extremely pragmatic and flexible in execution.

Critical Capabilities

Applying Taymiyya's ideology, three crucial capabilities allow Islamist militant organizations to challenge Muslim governments or foreign occupiers. The first, and most important, is the ability to generate popular support and adherence to an Islamic ideal through *da'wa* activities. Its "success stems from its capacity to unite, around their program, various social groups, by waging a campaign of proselytism, accompanied by an intense charitable activity, centered around dispensaries, workshops, and schools, installed in the periphery of mosques, controlled by the organization."³³

This is only possible because some governments or foreign occupiers fail to provide essential services to the population, leaving a vacuum for Islamists. "Islamic movements seem to be the only organizations that can provide opposition to the state establishment and that have the power to change the status quo in favor of the dispossessed. The social services they provide announce that they are already successful in providing what these people want and what the state is unable to deliver."³⁴

Islamist militant organizations are often better at providing these essential services than the state because of a second crucial capability: worldwide fund raising, licit and illicit. In 1961, Baqer Al-Sadr's theory on Islamic economy, *Iqtisaduna*,³⁵ laid the foundations for Islamic banking.³⁶ The Islamic banking business expanded quickly after the 1973 Yom Kippur War and the subsequent oil crisis that tripled the price of oil. Wealthy citizens from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States poured their petrodollars into Islamic bank accounts and investment funds. Key Islamic concepts are the interdiction on usury and the obligation to share one's wealth with those in need (*zakat*).³⁷ Islamic banks respect this by allocating a percentage of the generated profit to social programs. Islamist militant organizations can tap into this wealth because their *da'wa* activities and social infrastructure qualify to receive *zakat*.

***Islamist militant organizations
are often better at providing...
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With the expansion of the Islamic banking system and the growth of their fund-raising infrastructure, militant organizations gained a comparative advantage over secular resistance movements. “Over the decade of the 1980s, the Palestinian *Ikhwan* had become so popular a cause that a large proportion of the funds raised by Kuwaiti nongovernmental organizations for Palestine were channeled through the charities set up by them.”³⁸ Global fund raising is a particular focus of Islamist militants because it allows them to collect money without diminishing their constituents’ revenues. Most insurgencies revert to revolutionary taxes, racketeering, kidnapping, or drug trafficking to generate funds; thus alienating at least part of the population and the international community from their cause. In contrast, militant organizations’ fund raising actually allows them to *increase* their constituents’ wealth via the provision of essential services and social support.

The third crucial capability is the capacity to exert pressure on a ruler or occupier. This includes the ability to vary the intensity and nature of the pressure in accordance with political and military circumstances. It can be merely political (*tashrii*) or include the use of violence (*jihad*). When applying *jihad*, militant organizations intensify violence during crucial political junctures, or interrupt it by offering truces (*hudna*) or cease-fires (*tahdi’ah*) to gain political concessions. Hamas unilaterally declared cease-fires in 2002, 2005, and 2006, only to break them a couple of weeks or months later.³⁹ What matters here is that organizations can tune the level of pressure they exert without jeopardizing their financial and organizational infrastructure and without diminishing the credibility of their ideals. This ability means it is always possible to insert Islamic militancy into the regular political process. An unfortunate upshot is that these organizations can always revert to violence.

The Ruler’s Dilemma

These capabilities enable Islamist militant organizations to force governments and foreign occupiers into a dilemma. On the one hand, the government or occupier cannot eliminate the Islamist threat without attacking its *da’wa* infrastructure. On the other hand, they cannot attack the *da’wa* infrastructure without risking social distress and popular uprising. From hard-gained experience, Muslim governments

know the only thing that works in these circumstances is getting a firm hold on the Islamists’ *da’wa* infrastructure without destroying it.

Because varying the level of violence is part of the Islamists’ strategy, metrics based on the number of violent incidents are useless to gauge progress in the struggle against them. As long as Islamists retain the monopoly on *da’wa* and manage to raise the necessary funds to finance it, they can continue to shift pressure between *tashrii* and *jihad* at will. Over decades, the relatively moderate governments of Egypt and Jordan developed a delicate social, political, legal, military, and law enforcement apparatus to keep Islamist militant organizations in check. Conceptually, it takes the form of an arsenal of mutually reinforcing population control measures, and its focus is on the *da’wa* infrastructure, not on the *jihadi* operatives. The apparatus’s most important capabilities are to co-opt (parts of) Islamist militant organizations, to subject their *da’wa* activities to registration and licensing, to control their fund raising, to provide permanent surveillance of their cadres, and to intervene decisively when this surveillance detects preparations for a *jihadi* campaign.

Co-opting Islamists. Muslim governments co-opt Islamist militant organizations by partially integrating *da’wa* activities in the state’s social organization and by allowing moderate criticism on government policies. Jordan is particularly successful at this. “Jordan ha[s] contained the threat of violent Islamist militancy typically by relying on the largely co-opted Muslim Brotherhood . . . The Brotherhood . . . has become a party of peaceful political opposition that may protest government policies . . . but fully accepts, and embraces, Hashemite rule.”⁴⁰ In exchange for its loyalty, Jordan granted the Brotherhood control on the education ministry and the school curricula.⁴¹

Egyptian policies in this regard have been more ambivalent. Successive Egyptian presidents used both accommodationist and repressive strate-

Because varying the level of violence is part of the Islamists’ strategy, metrics... are useless...

gies. However, they were proven effective in the sense that after several waves of massive arrests, occasional executions, and subsequent gestures of reconciliation, “the Brotherhood acts within the existing system.”⁴² The Egyptian government and the *Ikhwan* found an “understanding” because the former focused on short-term political stability, while the latter settled for a slow but steady evolution towards an Islamic state. In Egypt, “the Brotherhood demanded no rapid time frame for the implementation of shari’a as long as Mubarak remained dedicated to it in principle.”⁴³ This quotation illustrates that co-opting Islamists works when they believe that, over time, they can obtain more with *tashrii*’ than with *jihad*.

The “awqaf.” The basis of the charitable system in the Muslim world is the *waqf* (plural: *awqaf*). *Awqaf* organize the transfer of alms from those who give it to those who need it. The *waqf* is “the institutionalized form of giving in order to guarantee sustainable development.”⁴⁴ The first *waqf* was founded in Egypt in 641, so the concept is almost as old as Islam itself. “The purpose was to set up institutions independently and separately from the state to protect them from instrumentalization by rulers and to offer a better life to the population.”⁴⁵ With this in mind, it comes as no surprise that for centuries, Muslim governments have subjected charitable organizations to strict legislation and thorough administrative scrutiny. Egypt established the first ministry to control the *awqaf* in 736.⁴⁶ In modern Jordan, the Ministry of Awqaf appoints and pays imams.⁴⁷ It also registers charitable organizations and issues licenses for charitable activities.⁴⁸ By paying their salaries, the Jordanian government gains leverage on imams who, as a consequence, are less prone to criticize the government. Registration of charitable organizations facilitates their supervision and allows control on the money flows they generate. Additionally, those active in charitable organizations know all too well that the government “knows where they live.” Consequently, they think twice before risking involvement in organizing or financing *jihadi* campaigns.

In Egypt, similar laws and administrative regulations exist. They are supplemented with laws regulating elections for civil society institutions, like labor unions and student associations.⁴⁹ The Egyptian *Ikhwan*, outlawed by President Nasser in the 1950s, started “seeking influence in other, pre-

existing and more general institutions by playing the electoral game.”⁵⁰ By mobilizing their members for union and association elections, that traditionally had a very low turnout, they managed to gain majorities in the institutions’ executive bodies. Once in control, the *Ikhwan* instrumentalize these organizations for *da’wa* activities. Legislation aims to prevent this by requiring a quorum of voters.

Restrictions on fund raising and money transfers constitute the third way Muslim governments tighten their grip on Islamist militants. Egyptian law forces all non-governmental organizations to transfer their funds via a government controlled financial institution.⁵¹ Additionally, Egyptian law only allows categories of non-financial foreign aid. These categories do not include food and medicines. In 1972, President Sadat created the Nasser bank that respects Islamic banking principles. By collecting *zakat* themselves via the Nasser bank, the Egyptian authorities aim to deny it to Islamist organizations.⁵²

Surveillance and repression. Permanent surveillance is the fourth way to control Islamist militant organizations. One report states, “Jordanians are under such thorough surveillance by the security forces that they probably cannot at this point carry out elaborate preparations for a coordinated attack.”⁵³ The way Jordanian authorities handled Hamas’ attempts to acquire weapons in Jordan is illustrative in this regard. In 1991, “working clandestinely from the offices of the Jordanian *Ikhwan* in Amman and with the knowledge of no more than a handful of top local *Ikhwan* leaders, Hamas set up an arms procurement committee . . . to purchase weapons and store them until the circumstances allowed them to be smuggled into Palestine.”⁵⁴ These attempts were immediately detected and thwarted.

When security services detect Islamist preparations for violence, the government usually orders massive arrests to destroy the organization’s military wing as well as to temporarily paralyze its *da’wa* infrastructure. The Egyptian military and police forces carried out at least five campaigns of massive arrests since 1950. As an example, “while Sadat’s negotiations with Israel . . . ‘changed the atmosphere,’ and the Brother’s opposition to this policy led them to be targeted with other opposition movements in the repression of 1980-1981, Sadat’s successor, Hosni Mubarak, released members from jail in November 1981 and has allowed the Society

a (fluctuating) degree of space since then.”⁵⁵ This example illustrates that, usually, the government does not incarcerate *da’wa* key figures for long, because disrupting social services is not in its interest. It is merely a way to make clear who is in charge. As one report puts it, “thus the Society exists in a legal limbo, a sitting duck for repression, its wings regularly clipped, but never fully disabled.”⁵⁶ However, repression is but the government’s last resort, not its primary instrument. The apparatus’ main function is to make clear that armed resistance is futile and (the appearance of) complicity with *jihadi* factions endangers the vital *da’wa* infrastructure.

The government’s overall strategy is to turn Islamist militant organizations into *Zakat-Tashrii*’ social movements: organizations, funded by religiously inspired charitable contributions, that combine Islamic proselytism, the provision of social services, and non-violent political pressure in an effort to further governance on the basis of Islamic *shari’a* law. By applying this strategy, Muslim governments seek to benefit from the Islamists’ positive characteristics while mitigating the negative ones. The policy relieves the government of most of the burden to organize education, health care, and social security at the price of occasionally yielding to political pressure. However, it’s like keeping a wolf as a pet: a short leash, constant supervision, and consistent beating and stroking are required to keep the situation under control.

Conditions after Conventional Victory

The Six Day War illustrates what happens after a crushing military victory that eliminates an apparatus holding Islamist militant organizations in check. After the dust settled in June 1967, the consequences for state actors in the Middle East were clear. Arab governments suffered a humiliating loss of credibility and Israel’s conventional military capability henceforth commanded respect, admiration, and fear. In contrast, the consequences for non-state actors, like Islamist militant organizations only became clear two decades later.

Tamimi states that “the Palestinian Islamists may be viewed as pioneers in the way they transformed their intellectual and ideological discourse into practical programmes [sic] providing services to the public through voluntary institutions. Their brethren

elsewhere in the Arab world had, for decades, been denied such opportunities because the majority of the Arab countries had imposed restrictions on any form of non-governmental activity linking religion and education, or of a voluntary and charitable nature.”⁵⁷ Paradoxically, Israel’s victory provided Islamists with opportunities they could only dream of when they were under Egyptian and Jordanian rule. “The irony was that the situation changed in the aftermath of the 1967 war and the Israeli occupation. Israel opted to revive certain aspects of archaic Ottoman law in its administration of the affairs of the Arab populations in the West Bank and Gaza. This permitted the creation of voluntary or non-governmental organizations such as charitable, educational, and other forms of privately funded service institutions.”⁵⁸ By abolishing stringent Egyptian laws, Israel courted disaster. A memo written by the Hamas Political Bureau explains how Hamas thrived in these new circumstances. It outlines in great detail how “in view of these developments, the Palestinian *Ikhwan* inside the homeland and in the diaspora proceeded along two paths:


1. The first path: that of participation in direct military action against the Zionist occupation. . . .
2. The second path: the establishment of the organizational infrastructure for a *jihadi* (struggle) project against the Zionist occupation.”⁵⁹

The Palestinian Islamists knew public support and social mobilization were crucial for the creation of this organizational infrastructure. Therefore, “the *Ikhwan* undertook to work in the following fields:

1. Arousing the enthusiasm of the members of *Ikhwan* to work in the field of *Da’wa* (calling people to Islam) and social reform.
2. Attracting the youth, especially university graduates....
3. Revitalizing the process of building mosques, considering that they constitute a principal source of influence in society.
4. Establishing numerous charitable and social institutions.”⁶⁰

The document continues to explain how the terrorist movement Hamas naturally evolved out of the *Ikhwan*. Hamas issued a statement on 14 December 1987, shortly after the eruption of the first *Intifada*, announcing its existence. However, “the communiqué was not intended to declare the birth of the movement, because it had already

AP Photo



The Mitla Pass, a strategic gateway to the Suez in the west central Sinai Peninsula, is littered with Egyptian equipment. Israeli troops killed between 7,000 and 10,000 Egyptians and destroyed or captured 700 tanks in the Sinai in June 1967.

been in existence and had already been active in the field.”⁶¹ The memo further describes how “the movement played a principal role in developing the Intifada from a popular format to qualitative forms of resistance ranging from the kidnapping of soldiers to the war of knives and finally martyrdom operations.”⁶² Overall, the document describes the inextricable links between proselytism, the provision of essential services and the use of violence, including suicide bombing.

Israeli authorities did not impede Islamist movements’ fund raising either. “Ironically, the Israelis themselves had nurtured fundamentalist groups like Islamic Jihad and Hamas by turning a blind eye to funds being sent from the Persian Gulf region to the Islamists for the purpose of building mosques, sport clubs, and community centers.”⁶³

Zakat-Jihad

The price Israel had to pay for liberalizing *da’wa* activities was the *Ikhwan*’s transformation into a *Zakat-Jihad* activist insurgency: Hamas. A *Zakat-Jihad* activist insurgency is an organization, funded

by religiously inspired charitable contributions, that combines Islamic proselytism, the provision of social services, and terrorism in an effort to establish governance on the basis of Islamic, *shari’a* law. The organization generates popular support by providing essential services which primarily serve the purpose of creating a safe haven for *jihadi* fighters among the population. Such an insurgency, once established, is extremely resilient, “as Hamas’ and Hezbollah’s growth under Israeli occupation illustrates.”⁶⁴

While the Egyptian and Jordanian apparatuses succeeded in sufficiently restricting militant organizations’ freedom of movement, thereby herding them into a social role, Israel was unable to prevent and stop Islamist terrorism. Against this reasoning, one might argue that the struggle to end Israeli occupation is much more mobilizing a cause than the fight to introduce *shari’a* rule in a Muslim country. Therefore, Egypt and Jordan are perhaps more successful only because their task is easier. However, admitting this is tantamount to claiming that in Taymiyya’s and Qutb’s ideologies, an unbeliever is more dangerous than an apostate. This

is not true. Abd-Al-Salam Farag, the leader of the Egyptian terrorist movement Al-Jihad illustrates this concisely in his rationale for the assassination of the Egyptian President Sadat. "For Farag, that Sadat had cultivated the image of *al-Ra'is al-mu'min* (the pious President), meant nothing against the fact that Egypt was not governed by Islamic law. Consequently, Sadat's professions of faith were hypocritical and *jihad* was licit. Moreover, Farag argued, the obligation of *jihad* against 'the nearer enemy' (the Egyptian regime) took precedence over that against 'the more distant enemy' (Israel)."⁶⁵

After Israel abolished many restrictions on *da'wa* activities in 1967, it took the Palestinian *Ikhwan* two decades to establish the organizational infrastructure for a *jihadi* campaign, led by their spin-off organization Hamas. The transition from charity to terrorism literally happened overnight, as the eruption of the *Intifada* illustrates.⁶⁶ Eighteen years later, this campaign culminated in Israel's withdrawal from the Gaza Strip.⁶⁷ During this period, Israel succeeded several times in decimating Hamas' *jihadi* infrastructure, only to see it rebuilt from scratch. Contrary to Egypt and Jordan, Israel never convinced militants that violent resistance is futile. On the contrary, the Israeli withdrawals from South Lebanon and the Gaza Strip seemed to be tangible proof that terrorism yields results. Furthermore, Hamas' social services have become so elaborate largely because of unimpeded fund raising, that it is impossible to target Hamas without jeopardizing the survival of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians. One report even argues that "any approach to the issue of Islamic charitable institutions... must start from the premise that they are critical in Palestinian life."⁶⁸ In light of this situation, it is unfortunate the West only recently discovered one of its main strengths in dealing with Islamist militant organizations: the ability to control and constrict international money flow. The West is actually better at this than Muslim governments. The decision to withhold subsidies to the Palestinian Authority after Hamas' electoral victory, the pressure American

legislation exerts on banks to detect and report suspicious transactions, and the physical seizures of cash by Israeli forces at the borders, destabilized Hamas.⁶⁹ However, the international community cannot use this weapon anymore without seriously diminishing the quality of life for most Palestinians. Early application of this measure, combined with regulations leveling the playing field for all kinds of nongovernmental organizations, can prevent the occurrence of a situation wherein Islamist militants dominate the provision of essential services.

Conclusion

In the Muslim world, occupying a territory in the aftermath of a conventional military victory and controlling the population inhabiting it, often means managing Islamist militant organizations. Though this problem is relatively new for most Western countries, some Muslim governments have dealt with it successfully for over half a century. The methods they developed, while not completely applicable by Western democracies, have proven successful and are worth studying.

History shows unchecked Islamist militants develop into *Zakat-Jihad* activist insurgencies. These insurgencies only start to use violence at the end of a long preparatory phase of seemingly harmless religious and social action. The transition to violence can happen overnight, after which the movement is almost impossible to eradicate.

Conversely, checked Islamist militant organizations can evolve into *Zakat-Tashrii*' social movements. Muslim governments have developed an arsenal of mutually reinforcing population control methods aimed at pushing militant organizations into social roles and keeping them there. Muscular military and police action against *jihadi* operatives is an essential part of this arsenal, but by no means the most important one. Getting a firm grip on the Islamist *da'wa* infrastructure is much more important. Co-opting (parts of) the Islamist militant organizations subjecting their charitable activities to registration and licensing, controlling their fund raising, and providing permanent surveillance of their cadres are four ways moderate Muslim governments combine to achieve this objective. Not every method used by Muslim governments would be feasible for Western democracies. Co-opting Islamists may prove extremely difficult for Westerners or

The transition from charity to terrorism literally happened overnight...

Western-backed interim governments. On the other hand, Western democracies are better at some other methods, like controlling international fund raising and constricting the resultant money flows. Although the combination of methods applied by Westerners may differ from those applied by moderate Muslim governments, they can be equally effective.

In summary, after a conventional victory that eliminates a regime hosting an Islamist militancy in check, the victor has to implement as soon as possible a system that prevents potential insurgents from being simultaneously the biggest menace to

peace and the best guarantee for survival and development of the population. To attain this objective, the victor should not remain passive until violence erupts, nor should his strategy focus solely on eliminating *jihadi* operatives. Rather, by controlling money flow and by leveling the playing field for all kinds of charitable organizations through a process of registration and licensing, the strategy should focus on preventing the emergence of a monopoly on the provision of essential services to the population, a monopoly from which militant organizations derive their popular support. **MR**

NOTES

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Major Luis Alvarado, U.S. Army

THE FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEM (FCS) program will enter a stringent design review in 2009 to make the congressionally mandated “go” or “no-go” decision on the future of this program. This discussion argues for continuing the FCS in 2009 and outlines necessary actions the Army must do to secure the future of the program. FCS provides the Army with increased relevancy and integration that allows America’s war machine to face the challenges of an adaptive enemy and succeed in future operations. The Army must communicate the level of relevancy FCS brings to the future force and the need to integrate the systems and technologies once and for all as the justification to gain buy-in, thus securing the future of the FCS program.

The relevancy of the FCS program is critical for the Army’s ability to counter emerging threats and to continue to be successful in the long-term. FCS “is the Army’s first full-spectrum modernization in nearly 40 years.”¹ In the midst of a new National Security Strategy and the Quarterly Defense Review, the Army must remain relevant and ready to face an adaptive enemy while maintaining its conventional capabilities. Representative Jim Saxton from New Jersey visited troops in Iraq and highlights that “battles are won and lost down in the mud, by warriors who are armed with the right equipment and are well-trained . . . this is the core of America’s military success story” (April 2008, page one). The FCS investment is necessary for the Army to transition from the digitalization age of the 1990s to a new era where initial equipment design activities accounts for interoperability in the early stages of the development cycle.

Another point of view argues that the FCS program entered the development phase with immature technologies and undefined requirements, thus contributing to the increase of a \$90 billion effort to one of over \$230

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PHOTO: Soldiers demonstrate an assault and breach maneuver at the future combat system facility at Fort Bliss, Texas, 1 May 2008. (DOD, Cherie Cullen)

billion.² This past June, the Army announced that it will accelerate the use of specific FCS equipment by 2011 in an effort to help deployed infantry units in Iraq and Afghanistan. This new strategy will allow FCS equipment testing to leverage the real conditions of the battlefield and provide a realistic quality control opportunity to assess how well the equipment satisfies the requirements. FCS equipment developed, tested, and certified under real conditions will achieve a higher degree of relevancy for the future Army structure. The equipment will also require integration with current and future systems.

The need for an overarching technological solution that allows for full integration of the Army's disparate technologies is more critical now than ever. The FCS program will also network existing systems with new systems in on-going development and with future systems.³ The tragic events from 9/11 proved that government and civilian agencies are unable to communicate and reminded us of the importance of integrating the distinct radio systems and networks each agency operates. Another technological challenge that directly affects operations is the effective integration of the information system applications developed for specific functional branches such as Military Intelligence, Signal, and Air Defense. These systems require ad-hoc solutions on the fly to achieve a relative level of interoperability and to provide the information commanders need in support of battlefield operations.

The newly published Field Manual 3-07, *Stability Operations*, directs more integration with interagency and nongovernmental organizations as military forces transition from major combat to


reconstruction and nation-building operations. The Army not only has to reach out to other services in the Department of Defense, but also must now consider interoperability with other key players such as the State Department and USAID (interagency). The new specified tasks in the field manual require the military to change its acquisition strategy from one that allows services to procure service-unique equipment to one that allows equipment adaptability to myriad operations from traditional to irregular warfare and even civil support operations. The systems-of-systems approach in the FCS program will enable the military to close this critical gap and increase the value of future operations.

The Army future force must remain relevant in weapons systems and technology to face the future challenges of both regular and irregular warfare. The FCS program prevents the Army from investing resources in digitizing old equipment to keep it relevant. The program also enables a cohesive environment where interoperability is paramount without compromising lethality. As such, the Army should continue to justify the FCS program in terms of capabilities, meet the milestones in the design phase, and set the conditions to conduct a successful design review in 2009 that would allow for funding stability and confidence building. Army leadership must prevent the decrease in FCS capabilities to remain within budget limits to realize the full potential of this critical program. **MR**

NOTES

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MR Classics Revisited



Featured Review

ZEN AND THE ART OF MOTORCYCLE MAINTENANCE: An Inquiry into Values, Robert M. Pirsig, HarperCollins Publishers, New York 1974, reprint 2005, 430 pages, \$13.95.

Robert Pirsig's *Zen and the Art of Motorcycle*

Maintenance (ZMM) metaphorically outlines the intellectual journey that the War Machine as an institution needs to take in order to reform itself. The perfect place for this reform to begin is in the military's first operational war fighting school, the Army's School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS). Students at SAMS are reading *ZMM* in the true spirit of the school, the spirit of intellectual reform. Brigadier General Huba Wass de Czege started SAMS in the early 1980s when he realized that the Army as an institution could not reform itself from the inside, from the top-down. SAMS students learn to think for themselves, freeing themselves from the doctrinal Procrustean bed of black-and-white thinking. *ZMM* can help us challenge our unconscious schemata of categorical thinking that force us into seeing the world in functional hierarchies made up of block-and-line charts and examine our unconscious conflation of what's in our minds with what's in the world—the reification of our mental models, theories, and myths. *ZMM* is a timeless classic accessible to anyone courageous enough to challenge his or her own convictions. The understanding gained is not about good old-fashioned heroic, warrior leadership; it is not about decision-making; it is not about problem-solving. It is about critical reasoning. *ZMM* will not leave the reflective person unaffected.

Introduction by LTC Timothy Challans, U.S. Army Retired, Ph.D.

Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance is a bizarre title for a serious piece of literature, yet the title could not be more fitting. The philosophical quandaries in which the narrator engages proffer the reader an opportunity to expand upon traditionally held Western thoughts and values. The storyline is not typical of military readings, but unfortunately neither is the subject of critical thinking, which this book is all about. The title conjures images of Buddhist monks in secluded meditation, but also draws upon imagery of motorcycle maintenance to attract an audience with a proclivity for Western thinking into “an inquiry into values” and serious dialogue on logical reasoning and intuitive judgments about “quality.”

While taking a cursory, but grounding, tour through 2,500 years of philosophical evolution, the book challenges the reader to consider the value of self-reflection in order to increase the reader's capacity for critical thinking. It is a philosophically engaging modern epic well worth reading. It is not a manual for fixing motorcycles, nor will it have you sitting cross-legged in trance-like meditation, but it will make you scratch your head, challenge the way you think, and make you rethink the way you live.

Robert Pirsig uses a father-son motorcycle trip across the northern region and west coast of the U.S. as the backdrop upon which he paints a candid picture of a well-educated, middle-aged man—presumably the author himself—struggling with his sanity. The narrator, previously subjected to electroshock therapy that left mental voids, is physically retracing his past and exploring the philosophical debates and discovery that he was previously obsessed with and which left him committed to an asylum. It is a captivating story filled with imagery to which the reader can

easily relate, but the true power of the work is found in Pirsig's ability to use the story to pull the reader through a lesson on early Western philosophy while comparing it to aspects of Eastern philosophy.

The narrator navigates through early Greek philosophical developments while drifting through periods of deep internal reflection, contemplating the meaning of artifacts that remain and memories that surface from his life before therapy. A central developing theme throughout the book is the benefit of reflection to develop intuition about what “right looks like.” How is it that societies are able to reach majority consensus on aesthetic judgments that seem impossible to quantify?

Early in the work, a stage seems set for a battle to unfold between those who hold sacred an artistic, qualitative view, and those who favor a structured and quantitative perception of life commonly associated with modern science. But a nagging question delays the onset. The narrator grapples with a peculiar relationship between the sometimes polarizing debate between proponents of science and art. He notes the almost fervent certainty given to the results of a slow and methodical scientific method while reminding the reader that its value inextricably stems from a systematic elimination of null-hypotheses in an attempt to validate a working hypothesis or theory. However, it is impossible to imagine all null-hypotheses, and the working premise is itself a product of artistic intuition. From where does this artistic capacity for intuition originate?

Intuition, or the ability to recognize the quality of an idea, is based upon one's ability to assimilate a lifetime of experiences grounded both in methodical and rational reasoning that develop from introspection. The human capacity to perform

both inductive and deductive reasoning capitalizes on the ability to synthesize experiential data obtained throughout life, and possibly from unrelated hypothesis testing. It is unreasonable to disassociate art and science. Deductive powers emanate from reflecting upon the results of scientific testing and form the basis of perceptions that lead to intuition. Intuition generates hypotheses that through scientific testing can generate data and improve a continually synthesizing perception of reality that leads to new intuitions. It is a self-fulfilling and never-ending process. Failure to recognize this symbiotic relationship impedes the ability of military professionals to understand the nature of living with complex adaptive systems that have become a part of everyday life, in both peace and conflict.

Averting a winner-takes-all battle, Pirsig helps the reader recognize

the interdependent relationship between art and science, along with the underlying imperative for self-reflection that develops a capacity for intuition regarding goodness or quality. For the narrator, reflection upon experience allows a certain innate grasp of quality, which was at the heart of early Greek philosophy. It is the foundation for the art of problem solving and allows prospective motorcycle mechanics, sans complete manuals, to develop their creative problem-solving skills.

Pirsig employs the word “gumption” to bring the entire ethereal discussion back to plain American English. Gumption describes a trait possessed by those who are able to find and see the true quality that distinguishes some solutions from others, and he similarly describes “gumption traps” as those things that tend to steal creative thought and blind or block the ability to see quality solutions.

Devoted students of philosophy might occasionally take issue with the flippant manner that the narrator discusses some of the idols of philosophy, but for the mere mortal reader, it is this same attitude that provides a sense of personal connection. Pirsig’s work is a compelling and easy to read, though lengthy, journey into the realm of philosophy. It engages the mind, inspires self-reflection, and exposes the reader to contrasting yet complementary forms of thought. It is hard to imagine someone reading or even re-reading this book without gleaned insight into the way one lives or re-evaluating the way one thinks. For the military professional, it offers a lesson in critical thinking and self-teaching that arms the mind to cope with the complex adaptive world.

**MAJ Mark E. Blomme, USAF,
Langley AFB, Virginia**

MR Book Reviews

HUMAN INTELLIGENCE, COUNTERTERRORISM, & NATIONAL LEADERSHIP: A Practical Guide, Gary Berntsen, Potomac Books, Inc., Washington, DC, 144 pages, \$19.95.

Gary Berntsen’s stated purpose for writing *Human Intelligence, Counterterrorism, & National Leadership* is “to serve as a guide to assist incoming presidents and White House staffs so they may master the subject of human intelligence [HUMINT] and counterterrorism operations.” While this is a lofty and admirable goal, Berntsen’s work fails to achieve it. The book serves as an opinion piece more than a serious critique of the current situation. It provides the reader only a biased, cursory look at HUMINT and counterterrorism.

The opening chapter of the book provides a brief background of the CIA and its Clandestine Service, an area in which Berntsen has considerable experience, having served as a

station chief on three separate occasions. However, the author asserts that 95 percent of the information needed for determining U.S. policy can be derived from open source reporting (newspapers, magazines, TV, radio, Internet, etc.) and reporting from the U.S. embassies.

The final pieces of the puzzle are then supplied by the CIA. It is here that Berntsen sets the tone for the majority of his book, which implies the CIA’s Clandestine Service is the cornerstone of the Intelligence Community (IC) and omits the vital contributions of the other 15 intelligence organizations, such as the NSA, DIA, NRO, and NGA, even as they support the HUMINT mission. The book also ignores the contributions of the CIA’s own Directorate of Intelligence, which painstakingly analyzes the information provided by the Clandestine Service and turns it into the intelligence products used by the president, policy makers, staffers, and agencies across the IC.

The chapter on covert action proposes that CIA station chiefs, needing only the approval of the U.S. ambassadors in their embassies, be allowed to initiate nonlethal covert actions in order to defend “fledgling democracies” from themselves in countries such as Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru, and Mexico. Only after initiating these covert actions would approval be sought from the president, the Senate Select Committee for Intelligence, and the House Permanent Subcommittee on Intelligence, as is currently required under U.S. law. Berntsen’s proposal would allow station chiefs and ambassadors in U.S. embassies around the world to set foreign policy and attempt to destabilize foreign governments without the prior consent of our own democratically elected officials.

The author continues to oversimplify other major global issues regarding terrorism and narcotrafficking, proposing shortsighted

solutions such as combining the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and the Army's Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) in order to better carry out covert actions around the globe. While this may be an interesting idea, research shows that covert action is only a portion of SOCOM's mission. Which organization(s) would assume SOCOM's other missions and to what gain or detriment? As for INSCOM—whose stated mission is to provide intelligence, security, and information operations for military commanders and national decision makers—which organizations will fill the void left by the loss of this intelligence asset?

Unfortunately, despite its stated goal, Berntsen's work lacks objectivity, has been poorly researched, and suffers from glaring omissions.

**LTC Randy G. Masten, USA,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

IN THE COMMON DEFENSE: National Security Law for Perilous Times, James E. Baker, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2007, 404 pages, \$30.00.

Soldiers and politicians often claim that legislation such as the Goldwater-Nichols Act or Title 10 require something more. However, almost no one who challenges the legislation has actually read it. They mistakenly assume that no one else has read it, and they trust a lawyer to read it for them. Such lapses are terrible mistakes, for national security legislation is basic to soldiering at any level.

Military Review (May-June 2008) has two articles that illuminate the important aspects of national security: Dr. Charles Stevenson's "The Story Behind the National Security Act of 1947" and James R. Locher III's, "The Most Important Thing: Legislative Reform of the National Security System." These two articles, combined with James Baker's *In the Common Defense*, will equip Soldiers and civilians alike with a basic understanding of national security legislation.

Taken together, this material will encourage Soldiers to learn for them-

selves what the law actually says. The articles serve as a good primer for Baker's book in that Stevenson describes the system that continues to plague the Armed Forces to this day, and Locher argues that our old systems need to be refined, reformed, and in some cases replaced. The National Security Act of 1947, sometimes described as unifying the Armed Forces, actually hived off the Air Force as a new service and fundamentally enshrined the Marine Corps as a separate service.

Baker's book stems from his life as a Marine rifleman, a lawyer when he was involved in national security, and finally as a judge on the bench of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. Baker knows whereof he speaks and is able to make the basis of our national security system understandable. He does not, however, make it particularly easy to read. The book is heavy going. The topic is difficult and the writing sometimes dense, but the book is well organized and finished with a lawyer's rigor.

In the Common Defense makes the taxonomy of the Constitution and the law clear and describes the system as it exists today. It primarily focuses on how that system enables the United States to anticipate and react to threats or fails to do so. It turns out there is not a lot of basic law on national defense. Much of the law that has been written stems from efforts to enable government agencies and the services to operate and do so while causing the least harm to the Constitution, particularly with regard to civil liberties and the principles of federalism.

Every Soldier, regardless of service or grade, should read this excellent work and then take the trouble to read legislation as it is passed.

**COL Gregory Fontenot,
USA, Retired,
Lansing, Kansas**

MILITARY COOPERATION IN MULTINATIONAL PEACE OPERATIONS: Managing Cultural Diversity and Crisis Response, Joseph Soeters and

Philippe Manigart, eds., Routledge, Abingdon, UK, 2008, 253 pages, \$140.00.

Soeters and Manigart have mined some gold nuggets of truth about multinational military operations in an uneven compilation of overviews and case studies. Most of the writing focuses on recent European peace experiences with the UN and NATO. A few other major players, Australia and Japan, are also recognized. Its academic style of presentation, with high levels of theory, could challenge American practitioners. It will also give them unique views on key issues, which are usually ignored in an effort to create the semblance of unity.

No issue is discussed more often than the dominant role of the English language in multinational operations. Non-English speakers are highly sensitive to the value of native fluency and the dangers of miscommunication. For instance, peacekeepers in Kabul drove through high-risk territory because they preferred to be treated by German medics with better linguistic skills. Swedish officers on a UN operation noted the dominance of English speakers in formal meetings. Canadian instructors described the native speaker preference in high profile jobs. Too often, native English speakers mistakenly assumed other officers understood them when actually the non-natives were too embarrassed to expose their comprehension inadequacies. Anthony King, in a particularly insightful piece, highlights the use of irony by British officers as a dual-edged sword. Understanding the communication challenge is sometimes an underappreciated aspect of multinational interoperability.

These essays are sometimes unflinching when discussing national traits and how they made major impacts on cooperation within peace forces. The importance of after-hours drinking habits and rank-segregation are highlighted. *Power distance*, the hierarchical relationship, is considered by a Canadian writer to be a significant military dimension. Norway and Denmark

are low on *power distance* while Turkey, France, and Belgium are found to be high with strong authoritarian leadership.

Another major issue is *uncertainty avoidance*, difficult in an innovative mission-command atmosphere, and prevalent in Portugal and Greece. Other contributors' observations about Dutch, German, Irish, Polish, Italian, Japanese, and American forces are respectful and insightful. Correctly balancing organizations, in places like Afghanistan, will be a difficult balancing act well into the future.

I recommend U.S. military libraries purchase this book to supplement the guidance in Joint Publication 3-16, *Multinational Operations*. It is probably too costly for most personal American collections.

James Cricks,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

THE BORDER: Exploring the U.S.-Mexican Divide, David J. Danelo, Stackpole Books, Mechanicsburg, PA, 2008, 256 pages, \$24.95.

Drug violence in Mexico has grabbed headlines recently, with more than 5,000 Mexicans killed in 2008—more than double the number from 2007. Much of that violence has occurred in northern border states as rival drug cartels fight over gateways to lucrative American markets. Former drug czar Barry McCaffrey compared the situation to that in Iraq, warning that millions of refugees could seek safety in the U.S.; in the same week the Department of Homeland Security acknowledged the development of contingency plans to position U.S. military forces on the border in the event of an emergency. Though some have dismissed these concerns as exaggerated, a secure border must nonetheless be acknowledged as an important element of national security.

Former Marine officer and Iraq War veteran David Danelo gives all 2,000 miles of our southern boundary his full attention in *The Border: Exploring the U.S.-Mexican Divide*. Beginning at the Gulf of Mexico,

Danelo doggedly follows the border to its terminus at the Pacific Ocean, stopping as he travels to explore border towns like McAllen, El Paso, and Nogales. He discovers that perceptions of the border change with the geography. In south Texas, he finds a vibrant cross-border culture where both bilingualism and a distaste for border fences are common, even among law enforcement officials. As he moves west, however, he finds polarization an “us against them” mentality that makes the border barrier a popular proposition, at least on the American side. Along the way, Danelo ponders the security of the border. Is it really secure, and from what and whom? Is the Border Patrol the right organization to secure it, or is this a job best done by the military? Danelo's travelogue spans both sides of the line and introduces an array of interesting characters, including a 26-year old Marxist Chicano activist, an ex-con tour guide from Matamoros, and a sociopathic Cajun trucker, all of whom see the border from radically different perspectives.

The Border is not so much a book of answers as it is a book of questions. There are more scholarly works on the topic, but this is an enjoyable, well-written, and thought-provoking look at an element of national security frequently overshadowed by overseas conflicts. As Mexico continues to feel the pressures of mounting drug violence, it's a subject that military professionals should at least have on their radar screens.

MAJ Jason Ridgeway, USA,
West Point, New York

WARRIOR KING: The Triumph and Betrayal of an American Commander in Iraq, Nathan Sassaman with Joe Layden, St. Martin's Press, New York, 2008, 305 pages, \$25.95.

This may not be the best book you will read, but it will probably be the book you will discuss the most this year. In *Warrior King*, Nate Sassaman and Joe Layden have written a controversial memoir of Sassaman's

time as a battalion commander in Iraq. Sassaman received a letter of reprimand for lying about an incident involving men from his unit. He believes he and his men were made scapegoats by the military in light of the Abu Ghraib incident and this book outlines his case.

Warrior King is not short on opinion and raises some interesting issues. Sassaman's relationship with his brigade commander serves as the basis for the larger issue surrounding how to fight an insurgency. Sassaman firmly believes the U.S. is not winning, but merely trying not to lose the war in Iraq. Sassaman's philosophy on how to win stands in contrast to the Army's current ideas on winning the hearts and minds in an insurgency; he offers the results that his battalion achieved as an example. The book offers critical assessments of the leadership, both peers and superiors alike, besides claims of selective enforcement in the chain of command.

The book is easy to read but limited to the author's perspective on what occurred, including the central incident. Although Sassaman has a perspective on many aspects of the war in Iraq, he is most effective when he stays at his level of command. When Sassaman comments about levels senior to his own, he offers little evidence to support his conclusions. Additionally, some readers may be put off by his qualifier—that “you need to get some American blood on your hands” before you can question a commander. This book offers perspective on not only a controversial incident, but also on what denotes a good leader. It raises questions on how we should fight an insurgency. For these reasons, I recommend the book. Readers may or may not agree with the author's conclusions, but it is sure to spark discussion.

LTC Robert Rielly, USA, Retired,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

EUROPE'S ROLE IN NATION-BUILDING: From the Balkans to the Congo, James Dobbins, et al., RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 2008, 342 pages, \$35.00.

This book, sponsored by the RAND Corporation and led by James Dobbins—a renowned peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction expert—is the third in a series of monographs addressing nation-building. Whereas the first two volumes focused on U.S. and the UN-led nation building experiences, Dobbins and his co-authors investigate “Europe’s role in nation-building.” The thesis of the book is “to determine how successful European powers are at achieving the objective of transforming a society emerging from conflict into one at peace with itself and its neighbors.” In doing so, the authors take an in-depth look at six post-Cold War European Union (EU)-led nation-building operations: Macedonia, Bosnia, Cote d’Ivoire, Albania, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Sierra Leone; by systematically analyzing, then comparing and contrasting these experiences.

The co-authors’ coverage of each country case is concise yet remarkably comprehensive, demonstrating their deep insight of the subject. Significant characteristics emerge from these operational country case studies: all missions had UN Security Council mandates; missions were short with few friendly fatalities; some other nation or organization accomplished the original pacification; operational commitments were rather tentative, with most European governments proving to be highly risk adverse; even though they approved them, there was a general unwillingness of European governments to contribute forces and financial assistance to support missions perceived as more difficult or dangerous; the EU was only moderately successful in mobilizing its civilian capacity in support of military commitments, likely because of funding issues; and operational success occurred most often when there was a well-defined and limited mission, particularly when a single nation took the lead role. Overall, operations were moderately successful. Most achieved sustained peace, GDP growth, and democratic freedom. However, marginal successes

were experienced in impoverished nations where it was extremely difficult to provide stable security.

The book goes one step further by comparing the European experience in nation-building with those of the United States and the UN. The authors note that of the 22 cases studied in this volume and the preceding U.S.- and UN-focused volumes, 16 nations remained at peace in 2007. Other noteworthy comparative results are the correlation between low force-to-population ratios and higher numbers of casualties, and between higher casualty rates and lack of overall success. The level of effort expended, in terms of military strength and economic assistance over time, affected the probability of operational success. Starting conditions may even more strongly affect outcome. Finally, the United States has tended to take on the larger, tougher operations, and therefore had generally lower levels of success than EU- and UN-led operations.

This volume is reader friendly, and provides extremely useful points of comparison for evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of current country or institutionally led nation-building efforts. The authors’ methodical approach, coupled with their rigorous analyses and compelling conclusions, demonstrate that there are valuable lessons to draw upon to improve nation-building operations. This unique body of work, in combination with the preceding volumes, is a must-read for nation-building practitioners, government and international institution officials, academics, and anyone else interested in gaining an insightful perspective on the subject.

**David A. Anderson,
Ph.D., LTC, USMC, Retired,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

WARLORD: A Life of Winston Churchill at War, 1874-1945, Carlo D’Este, HarperCollins Publishers, New York, 864 pages, 2008, \$39.95.

Carlo D’Este’s outstanding biography is a vivid profile of Winston Churchill, warts and all, a great man seemingly born and bred for

war. Churchill was fascinated by all things military from his early years and invigorated by military training (Sandhurst), by combat experiences as a young man in India and Sudan, and exposure to combat as a war correspondent in the Boer War. He was also First Lord of the Admiralty prior to and during the first part of World War I, and after political disgrace resulting from the Dardanelles failure, was a fully engaged regimental commander in Belgium in 1916. He returned as First Lord of the Admiralty in 1939 and became prime minister of England in May 1940.

In February 1915, just prior to the Dardanelles and Gallipoli, Churchill said to Violet Asquith, “I think a curse should rest on me—because I love this war. I know it’s smashing and shattering the lives of thousands every moment—and yet—I can’t help it—I enjoy every second of it.”

D’Este describes a war leader who, if he could have done so, would have fought in the trenches, led soldiers in combat, commanded a theater of war, planned strategy and disposition of forces, and led the nation, all at once. Churchill’s desire to fill every military role and to experience every adventure of war was as far from ordinary egoism as the spirit of self-sacrifice is from mystical intuition. Churchill’s instinct was toward total identification and absorption in all aspects of the conduct of the war.

D’Este’s Churchill is a difficult, not very likeable child and youth, emotionally neglected by his mercurial father and beautiful mother. Churchill’s father had a low opinion of his son’s abilities, believed he lacked the intellectual capacity for law, and was exasperated by his son’s refusal to apply himself to his studies or stay out of scrapes with other boys and school authorities.

Churchill left his adolescence with narcissistic wounds; from an early age he craved honor, glory, position, and influence, as well as riches. He lived well beyond his means throughout his life. He found acceptance at Sandhurst and applied himself to learning his profession. He was a superb and fearless

horseman and an outstanding polo player. In addition, at Sandhurst he was in his element. Nevertheless, Churchill was always a difficult person who acted as if rules were made for other people: in his 20s he was ambitious, opportunistic, and self-serving. When he became an author and war correspondent, Churchill infuriated military leaders with his critical judgments of British ineptitude in the Sudan and Boer Wars. "Infuriating" is a term that appears frequently in authorities' reactions to Churchill's behaviors as a youth and young man.

Churchill's ability to infuriate others did not subside as he rose to political prominence in the Liberal party. He came to be viewed as an opportunist and adventurer because of his switches of political parties, his frequent changes of opinion on key issues, and his failures with the Dardanelles and Gallipoli fiascos during World War I, which he never lived down.

D'Estes' portrait of Churchill as war leader is that of an inspired, creative, brilliant, and nearly intolerable micromanager. Churchill interfered with his generals anywhere and everywhere. He never lost his penchant for military end runs, ancillary operations, and daring initiatives. Churchill's conduct as military strategist in World War II made it crystal clear that the Dardanelles was not an aberration; it was a reflection of his deepest tendencies. Churchill was a great leader but he was not, in this portrait, a great or even sound strategist. He was physically brave to the point of recklessness. During the Blitz, he liked to walk in St. James Park or watch the bombing of London from the rooftops of ministries. He never missed an opportunity in either World War I or World War II to approach the front whenever possible. "Real danger nerved him," an associate accurately said of him.

Churchill was a trial to his generals who rarely displayed the fighting spirit and initiative he admired. His style was to aggressively challenge his military leaders in direct conversations; and if they allowed themselves

to be bullied, he lost respect for them. If, on the other hand, they resisted him too adamantly or unreasonably, he replaced them. D'Estes' account of Churchill's conflicted relationships with his chief of staff, Alan Brooke, and with General Eisenhower are among the strengths of the book.

Possibly the biggest surprise in the book is D'Estes' description of how close the British political establishment came to appointing Halifax instead of Churchill as prime minister in May 1940. Churchill became prime minister only because Halifax declined the position, either in an act of supreme self-abnegation, failure of nerve, or a political calculation that Churchill would quickly self-destruct.

D'Estes view is that, despite Churchill's faults and infuriating traits, England would not have survived 1940 and 1941 without his leadership. "It took Armageddon to make me PM," Churchill once said. If, when England faced destruction the British political establishment had not overcome its intense distrust of Churchill, England might well have entered into a negotiated settlement with the Nazis prior to Pearl Harbor, with historical consequences impossible to imagine.

Dee Wilson,
Washington State

THE AIRMEN AND THE HEAD-HUNTERS: A True Story of Lost Soldiers, Heroic Tribesmen and the Unlikeliest Rescue of World War II, Judith M. Heimann, Harcourt, New York, 2007, 304 pages, \$26.00

Does an almost forgotten chapter of World War II history involving a little known military rescue deep in the jungles of Japanese occupied Borneo offer any relevance or interest to the average reader of today? This is the question that is both asked and answered affirmatively by *The Airmen and the Headhunters: A True Story of Lost Soldiers, Heroic Tribesmen and the Unlikeliest Rescue of World War II*. The book chronicles the adventures of eight army airmen shot down over Japanese-occupied Borneo in 1944.

The airmen are discovered by the Dayaks, an unknown tribe of head hunters from the interior of Borneo. Interwoven in this story is the saga of British Major Tom Harrison and a group of seven other Australian special soldiers conducting operations in Borneo during this time. The actions of these special operations soldiers were linked closely to the successful rescue of the airmen.

On 16 November 1944, Japanese forces shot down a B-24 from the 23d Bomb Squadron, 307th Bomb Group, carrying a crew of 11 personnel over the interior of Borneo. The world of a remote jungle people soon engulfed these eight survivors. The Dayak tribe, having sworn off head-hunting as late as 1930, was a mystery to the airmen. However, several of the Dayak group were Christians due to their exposure to missionaries and considered it against their faith to turn the airmen over to the Japanese. The eight airmen survived for over seven months by being shuttled between different Dayak villages. The appearance of British and Australian special forces soldiers provided the final impetus for the safe return of the airmen.

Judith M. Heimann, the wife of an American diplomat stationed in Indonesia and Borneo, began researching the rumors of this story in 1992. She spent several years interviewing the surviving airmen and their families as well as several of the surviving Dayak tribesmen who were involved in the events. Heimann traveled extensively in Borneo and interviewed key participants. She traveled to several of the locations in this book, and obtained firsthand interviews with key participants and their family members. Mrs. Heimann discusses the cultural adjustment of the airmen to the Dayak tribe and demystifies these tribesmen. She provides a direct example of how the airmen's pre-conceived notions about the Dayaks are altered favorably through exposure to these people and their culture. The author also provides a glimpse into the unique special forces operations taking place in Borneo between 1944 and 1945.

The Airmen and the Headhunters takes an obscure area of operation

and brings to light a unique struggle that took place. Heimann illustrates how a remote jungle tribe, combined with a group of special forces operatives and downed airmen, created havoc behind the Japanese lines in 1944 and 1945. I highly recommend this selection for all readers with an interest in military history as well as those who might enjoy a glimpse into an otherwise unknown culture.

MAJ Benjamin K. Dennard
Schofield Barracks, Hawaii

PARADISE LOST: Smyrna, 1922: The Destruction of Islam's City of Tolerance, Giles Milton, Basic Books, New York, 2008, 432 pages, \$27.95.

Giles Milton, one of the more entertaining writers of popular history, has written a book that is both gripping and a good read. *Paradise Lost: Smyrna, 1922: The Destruction of Islam's City of Tolerance* discusses the destruction of the cosmopolitan city of Smyrna (Izmir) and the ethnic and religious purges that accompanied it. The period following World War I was full of turmoil that could not be calmed by the host of international solutions and the mandates that accompanied it. The German, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman Empires were dismembered and the minority nationalities were given great autonomy and, often, independence. President Woodrow Wilson's well-meaning Fourteen Points were part of this effort. Britain, France, and the United States were not only proponents but also "neutrals" in this effort. The result was trauma, deep trauma that is still apparent in the Middle East and the Balkans.

Smyrna was a truly cosmopolitan city that was peopled by Turks, Greeks, Armenians, Jews, Arabs, and Europeans. It was the richest city in Anatolia. However, large parts of Anatolia were occupied by Greece with British connivance. When Mustafa Kemal launched his successful counteroffensive against the Greek Army, Smyrna fell under Turkish control. The old city was torched and Turkish irregulars fell upon

the Greek, Armenian, and Jewish populace. It was bloody repayment with a vengeance for earlier Greek atrocities against the Turks. Allied warships were too frequently neutral observers in the midst of open carnage. Well over 100,000 people perished and the end result was the forced deportation of Greeks and Armenians from Turkey and of Turks from Greece. Massive ethnic and religious cleansing was performed by both sides. This was the birth of modern Turkey. Revolutions are seldom pretty and the events in Smyrna made this one even less so.

Milton sees the events through the eyes of the Levantine elite—the key merchants and upper class of Smyrna who left diaries and detailed accounts of the time. They had the time and social "duty" to maintain these records, and interviews with surviving family provided a good deal of information to the author. The book is well-researched, but the author's evidence trail is hard to follow. His endnotes are skimpy, the bibliography rambles, and there is no index. There are no maps or photographs—and the book screams for both. The book will do nothing to heal the divide between either the Greeks and the Turks or the Armenians and the Turks, but it does point out the difficulties when great powers make sweeping mandates without establishing a comprehensive plan with a rigorous enforcement regime.

The book is recommended for military professionals, those who are concerned with peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions, and those who are interested in an area of history that this country tends to neglect.

LTC Lester W. Grau,
USA, Retired,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

TRENCH WARFARE UNDER GRANT AND LEE: Field Fortifications in the Overland Campaign, Earl J. Hess, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 2007, 336 pages, \$39.95.

Earl Hess has contributed yet another credible scholarly work to

his already impressive list of titles, all of which continue to deepen the overall understanding of the experience of Civil War combat. Like his much-celebrated earlier works, the *Union Soldier in Battle: Enduring the Ordeal of Combat* (University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, 1997) and *Banners to the Breeze: The Kentucky Campaign, Corinth, and Stones River* (University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, NE, 2000), *Trench Warfare under Grant and Lee: Field Fortifications in the Overland Campaign* uses extensive primary sources and even meticulous battlefield research to bring to light an often misunderstood or little-studied aspect of the War Between the States.

Trench Warfare under Grant and Lee represents the middle book of a trilogy on the use of fortifications in the Civil War—the first being *Field Armies and Fortifications in the Civil War the Eastern Campaigns, 1861-1864* (University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 2005)—and presages the yet-to-be-written final volume, which will cover the campaign around Petersburg to the war's conclusion in 1865. Hess uses this second work on trench warfare to underscore the central theme of his trilogy, that field fortifications were not, as commonly held, the result of the widespread use of rifled muskets and their attendant casualties. Instead, the reliance on trenches was the result of Grant's repeated and incessant assaults on Lee in his contrived war of attrition against the vaunted Army of Northern Virginia. For the Confederates, the trench and other man-made obstacles offered a way to redress the overwhelming Northern battlefield advantages of manpower and materiel while the Federals sought to use them as a means of holding ground in close proximity to the Southern lines or to conserve strength on one part of the battlefield while massing for a decisive attack on another.

Picking up where his previous study left off, Hess begins his second study by first examining the engineer components of both Lee's Army of Northern Virginia and

Grant/Meade's Army of the Potomac and then embarks upon a series of chronological case studies that examines each of the battles—Wilderness, Spotsylvania, the North Anna, and Cold Harbor—of the Overland Campaign which cost Grant approximately 60,000 men in barely six weeks.

Where other authors limit their studies of the Overland Campaign to only Richmond's northern approaches, Hess includes the additional case study of Butler's Army of the James and its operations from the southeast. Hess includes the abortive attack on Bermuda Hundred within the overall framework of the Overland Campaign because it not only included the extensive use of field fortifications, but also fit unwittingly into Grant's overall strategy of holding Confederate forces and wearing them down through attrition.

While Hess' study is limited overall in its utility for the modern practitioner of operational art, it is still noteworthy for its ultimate attention to detail and from the overall expertise that the author brings to his study. Not only did Hess glean valuable information from the armies' operational reports, he also relied heavily on firsthand accounts of trench action by both engineer officers and common soldiers to give a precise view of what life and combat in the trenches entailed. Furthermore, the author also pored over the battle sites and personally examined and, in some cases, measured the remnants of still-existing trenches to confirm or deny the written historical sources. Hess has contributed another fine work to the existing body of historical scholarship on the Civil War. *Trench Warfare under Grant and Lee* will make a fine addition to any Civil War historian's library.

Dan C. Fullerton, PhD.
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

BORROWED SOLDIERS: Americans Under British Command, 1918, Mitchell A. Yockelson, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, 2008, 256 pages, \$29.95.

In 1917, when President Woodrow Wilson led the United States into the First World War, he sought to keep his country above what he viewed as the sordid entanglements of European power politics. Thus, he had America fighting alongside Britain, France, and Italy as an "associated power" rather than an "ally." To that same end, Wilson admonished General John Pershing to use the newly-created divisions of the American Expeditionary Force to create an independent field army, an army capable of winning discretely American victories.

With this guidance, Pershing stubbornly resisted British and French efforts to "amalgamate" small U.S. units into the allied armies. However, Pershing badly needed allied help in organizing and training an effective, modern force. As a result, once U.S. divisions had finished training with the Allies, Pershing pulled most of them back under his control to create the First U.S. Army. What few Americans remember is that Pershing allowed two National Guard divisions—the 27th from New York and the 30th from the Carolinas and Tennessee—to remain under the control of the Sir Douglas Haig's British Expeditionary Force. Together, these two divisions formed the II U.S. Corps, which fought on the British front from the summer of 1918 until the end of the war.

In *Borrowed Soldiers*, Mitch Yockelson revisits the story of this often forgotten American corps and, in doing so, offers us a fascinating case study in coalition warfare. In many ways, the II Corps was an orphan unit. The Americans relied on the British for food, weapons, and, eventually, even clothing. What is more, Pershing never sent the divisions their organic artillery and denied them replacements until after the Armistice. Nevertheless, at the end of September 1918, the British gave the two divisions of doughboys one of the most difficult assignments of the war: breaching of the Hindenburg Line. Over a three-day period, the inexperienced American divisions took heavy casualties and struggled to reach their objectives.

In doing so, they demonstrated the same problem of inexperienced leadership endured by the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) units in the Argonne Forest. To their credit, the 27th and 30th later showed a steep learning curve in fighting through German rear guards along the Selle River in mid-October.

In their brief time at the British front, the U.S. II Corps lost almost a third of its strength in killed and wounded and earned mixed reviews from their British and Australian comrades-in-arms. Nevertheless, the author argues that the assignment of the American troops to the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) was a successful experiment in coalition warfighting. With this book, Yockelson has done a good job of illuminating a little-known aspect of America's military past.

LTC Scott Stephenson,
USA, Retired, Ph.D.,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

THE FAR REACHES OF EMPIRE: War in Nova Scotia 1710-1760, John Grenier, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, 2008, 288 pages, \$34.95.

John Grenier's *The Far Reaches of Empire* provides a well-researched account of a little known theater of colonial conquest in the early American epoch. He covers a 50-year period in the 18th century when Anglo-American soldiers and colonists attempted to exert dominion over the French Acadian settlers and indigenous Indian tribes living in Nova Scotia. This long-term conflict took place against the background of the greater Anglo-French struggle for power in the New World.

In today's terminology the campaign for domination in Nova Scotia would be classified as a counterinsurgency. Conflict in Nova Scotia between 1749 and 1755 possessed the worst characteristics of modern warfare: indiscriminate violence against noncombatants, the creation of refugee populations, guerrilla operations, and a touch of ethnic cleansing. Both sides were equally ruthless in the pursuit of their goals.

The book struggles to tie the different strands of this Nova Scotian counterinsurgency into a coherent, understandable framework. The strategic goals of the insurgents, particularly their French sponsors were unclear, and the overall British strategy of pacification were never fully articulated in the text. That said, the author does show how the Nova Scotia experience contributed to the development of an American

approach to war characterized by the desire for total victory and unconditional outcomes.

Grenier is an active duty Air Force colonel with a Ph.D. in history who has established himself as an expert in early American military history. The strengths of his second book represent excellent archival research. He used extensive primary and secondary sources and writes with an easy-to-read style.

He generously provides maps for the reader, with references to both the English and French language place-names. I often consulted these maps during the course of reading the book.

I recommend this book to Soldiers and historians with a strong interest in the military history of North America in the 18th century.

Kevin D. Stringer, Ph.D.,
Zurich, Switzerland

MR Letters

Tell Me How This Ends

John Stettler, *Dallas, Texas*—Much of Linda Robinson's *Tell Me How This Ends: General David Petraeus and the Search for a Way Out of Iraq* (reviewed by Colonel Gregory Fontenot in the November-December 2008 *Military Review*) examines the "surge" in Iraq, but doesn't mention the U.S. making any headway until it discusses the actions of the Iraqi volunteers known as the "Sons of Iraq." We read of continued problems even with the influx of surge troops. The real turning point in the conflict comes in Ameriyah—with the help of the Sons of Iraq.

General Petraeus was of obvious importance in restoring order in Iraq. The book indicates that one of General Petraeus's greatest strengths is knowing when to encourage officers to use their own good judgment, but it does not answer the big question,

Was the troop surge into Iraq the best strategy?

The book mentions other strategies that would not have required a surge in troop levels. However, much to my dismay, it never mentions General Peter Chiarelli's noteworthy statement: "*I don't need more troops, I need more jobs.*"

The Sons of Iraq were being fostered well before the "surge strategy" was announced. *Was General Chiarelli encouraging this as part of his desire to pay Iraqis to do something productive?* Was he muzzled by an administration that might not have liked his call for "economic pluralism"? Did the administration not like his idea of paying money to men who once attacked our Soldiers? Did ideology compel the administration to describe the strategy as a "surge" strategy rather than a "jobs for former insurgents" strategy? Was sending more troops the only way to stabilize Iraq? Why wasn't

there a debate on whether "more jobs" could have done the trick? I am just a civilian, but as a civilian, I can raise such issues. The military needs to debate the merits of "a surge strategy" versus a "jobs strategy."

This is important because of something else not mentioned in the book: while Iraq was being stabilized, Afghanistan was going to hell. Was Afghanistan starving for more troops? The nice thing about a "more jobs" strategy is that we could have easily used it in Afghanistan as well as in Iraq. Due to the lack of troops, the "surge strategy" was limited to Iraq. Unfortunately, the "jobs" idea was forgotten, but for the Sons of Iraq.

I have great respect for the wide range of talent in the Army. Our Soldiers should be the most precious commodity in our military arsenal, especially in times like these when they are in short supply. Thanks to all of you.



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