
THE DISAM JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE MANAGEMENT

We are featuring the 162nd Fighter Wing Arizona Air National Guard in its international training of F-16 pilot throughout the world. They have trained pilots from 23 of the 24 countries that operate that aircraft and they continue to do it very well in terms of both the flying mission and taking care of the international students that they train. They are a premier United States Air National Guard organization and play a key role in our interoperability with many countries throughout the world.

Issues addressed in this edition include the following:

- *Preparation for the years ahead within the Pentagon (by Secretary Gates)*
- *Immigration particularly within West Africa*
- *C4ISR*
- *Munitions storage safety concerns worldwide*
- *Hazardous materials issues within the realm of foreign military sales*

Also, in this issue is the annual report by Congress regarding “Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations,” done annually by Richard Grimmett of the Congressional Research Service.

Countries and regions drawing attention in this Journal include the United Arab Emirates, Italy, Seoul Korea, Afghanistan, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s Accession in Protocols for Albania and Croatia.

The Security Assistance Management Manual Tips has become a regular feature from our headquarters at Defense Security Cooperation Agency. We are using the Journal to include frequently asked security cooperation questions from DISAM’s “Ask An Instructor” web site. It is a great feature of the DISAM web site and provides answers to questions and contacts for further discussion to all comers. Take a look as the 2-3 pages of frequently asked questions and answers which serve as a representative sample of what comes in at a rate of 16-20 monthly.

We congratulate the most recent DSCA sponsored graduates from Tufts University, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Global Master of Arts (GMAPII) program. The next class (2009-2010) has begun their first residency the week of 29 March 2009.

DISAM is continuously looking for ways to best meet the education needs, the information dissemination venues that create productive dialogue for the security cooperation community. We are looking at the viability of web accessible “front page” in addition to the printed version of the Journal. We want to be cost effective in our efforts, but do not want to sacrifice the usefulness of a product sent to you. Please respond by 15 June 2009 to our inquiry included in the perforated pages vi-ix of this Journal or simply go directly to our web site located at: http://www.disam.dsca.mil/pubs/journal_survey.htm or e-mail the questionnaire to: webmaster@disam.dsca.mil and provide us your feedback on line.

There is a lot of activity going on within all security cooperation organizations that are a part of our business – and lots of innovation to do it better. Best wishes for continuing successes as we deal with so many security cooperation partners in such a variety of activities worldwide.



RONALD H. REYNOLDS
Commandant

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THE DISAM JOURNAL

of International Security Assistance Management

Volume 31 No. 1

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DISAM Journal Online Concept “Voice of the Customer” Questionnaire

[Background: DISAM is considering adding online delivery of the *DISAM Journal*, in a manner similar to web-based magazines such as *Government Executive*. To complete this questionnaire electronically go to our web site at: http://www.disam.dsca.mil/pubs/journal_survey.htm or e-mail webmaster@disam.dsca.mil. If you wish to complete this survey on paper please remove the following 3 pages, answer the questions, and send to the following address: DISAM Journal Questionnaire, Attn: Lt Lonnie M. Prater, 2475 K Street Bldg 52, WPAFB, Ohio 45433. June 5, 2009 will be the last day we accept questionnaires.]

How can you help?

Please take the following questionnaire based on your own needs as a customer of the *DISAM Journal*.

1. Does your activity receive a copy of the *DISAM Journal*?

_____ Yes

_____ No

2. What happens to the print edition of the *DISAM Journal* upon arrival at your activity?

_____ It gets passed along a “read list”

_____ Placed on shelf or table in common area; eventually replaced or disposed of

_____ One person gets the copy and hides/hoards it

_____ Do not know what happens to the *DISAM Journal*, if we get it at all.

_____ Other - (Please describe.) _____

3. The *DISAM Journal* is published four times a year. Over the 2008 print run, how many printed issues did you read at least one article from?

_____ All 4 issues

_____ 3 issues

_____ 2 issues

_____ 1 issue

_____ Did not read any issues from last year's print run

4. How many online issues did you read at least one article from?

_____ 4 issues

_____ 3 issues

_____ 2 issues

_____ 1 issue

_____ Did not read any online issues last year.

5. In general are you more likely to read:

_____ The print edition of the *DISAM Journal*

_____ The online edition of the *DISAM Journal*

6. Of the print issues that you read in 2008, about what percentage of each issue did you read, on average?

- ☐ Did not read the *DISAM Journal* in 2008
- ☐ Read only 25% or less
- ☐ Read about 50%
- ☐ Read about 75%
- ☐ Read the whole Journal

7. Is there a particular section you regularly read/enjoy? Mark all that apply.

- ☐ Commandant's Introduction
- ☐ Feature Articles on Countries/Regions of the World
- ☐ Feature Articles on Security Cooperation/Security Assistance Organizations
- ☐ Other Feature Articles
- ☐ Legislation & Policy
- ☐ Security Assistance Community
- ☐ Perspectives
- ☐ Education & Training

Please add any amplifying comments here: _____

8. Is there a particular section you regularly avoid or do not enjoy? Mark all that apply.

- ☐ Commandant's Introduction
- ☐ Feature Articles on Countries/Regions of the World
- ☐ Feature Articles on Security Cooperation/Security Assistance Organizations
- ☐ Other Feature Articles
- ☐ Legislation & Policy
- ☐ Security Assistance Community
- ☐ Perspectives
- ☐ Education & Training

Please add any amplifying comments here: _____

9. If the *DISAM Journal* could improve only three of the ways below, which would be most important to you? (You may choose up to 3 answers.)

- ☐ Would like the content to be more current
- ☐ Would like there to be more content in each issue
- ☐ Would like the issues to be more frequent
- ☐ Would like the content to be easier to share
- ☐ Would like to be able to find past articles more easily
- ☐ Would like a wider range of content
- ☐ Would like the *DISAM Journal* to include responses to articles and create a dialogue such as is found in other magazines and journals.
- ☐ Would like the page layout of the paper edition to be more like other magazines
- ☐ Would like my command to get more paper copies of the *DISAM Journal*

10. If the *DISAM Journal* migrated to an online edition similar to that of other news magazines, (Choose the best response.)

- ☐ I would check the site frequently for updates on the world of Security Cooperation and Security Assistance.
- ☐ I would probably need an e-mail reminder to check the site when new issues or articles are posted.
- ☐ I would rarely or never read the *DISAM Journal* online.

11. If e-mail updates were provided, I would most prefer... (Choose up to 3.)

- ☐ A brief e-mail with a link to the new issue
- ☐ An e-mail with the new issue's Table of Contents
- ☐ An e-mail with the new issue's Table of Contents and a brief excerpt of each article
- ☐ A monthly e-mail listing all the new content posted over the last 30 days
- ☐ To receive e-mails whenever a new article is posted in my favorite category
- ☐ To receive e-mails whenever articles are posted which include keywords I have selected (examples "Lebanon" or "NETSAFA" or "End-Use Monitoring")
- ☐ I would like to be able to hand-select entire articles to be sent to my blackberry or other e-mail address.
- ☐ Nothing. I do not want to receive any e-mail updates

12. If the *Journal* migrated online, I would like to be able to post comments on the articles, blog-style.

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No

13. Please use the space below to provide any additional comments regarding the present or future *DISAM Journal*. _____

14. Please use the space below to provide any additional comments regarding this questionnaire.

FEATURE ARTICLES

162ND Fighter Wing Tucson International Airport

The Tucson International Airport, located in Tucson, Arizona, is home to the Air National Guard's (ANG) premier F-16 fighter pilot training unit, the 162nd Fighter Wing. It is the largest ANG fighter wing in the country and resides on 92 acres next to the Tucson International Airport. The wing shares use of the runway, security and fire control with the airport. Approximately 1,700 people work at the base. About 1,100 are full-time employees and the balance are drill status Guardsmen providing forces in support of wartime operations.



Dual Missions

Since its activation in 1956, the 162nd Fighter Wing has fulfilled a federal and state mission. The dual mission, a provision of the United States (U.S.) Constitution, results in each Guardsman holding membership in the National Guard of Arizona and in the National Guard of the U.S. Specifically, the

wing serves the U.S. and allied nations by providing the finest fighter training programs in the world while partnering with the U.S. Air Force in the Global War on Terror and air sovereignty alert.

Federal

The wing's federal mission is to maintain well-trained, well-equipped units available for prompt mobilization during war and provide assistance during national emergencies (such as natural disasters or civil disturbances). Currently, the 162nd deploys its members as part of the Air and Space Expeditionary Force to provide combat forces in support of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.

State

When 162nd Fighter Wing Guardsmen are not mobilized or under federal control, they report to the governor of Arizona and are led by the adjutant general of the state. Under state law, the wing provides protection of life, property and preserves peace, order and public safety. These missions are accomplished through emergency relief support during natural disasters such as:

- Floods, earthquakes and forest fires
- Search and rescue operations
- Support to civil defense authorities
- Maintenance of vital public services and counterdrug operations

Mission Elements

F-16 Fighter Training

The 162nd is the “face of the United States Air Force (USAF) to the world” providing the best-trained coalition war-fighting partners for the USAF. The wing has trained pilots from 23 of 24 countries that fly the F-16 today while developing strategic partnerships and building strong international relationships based on performance, friendship and trust.

Homeland Defense

From Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, located in Tucson, Arizona, the wing operates a 24/7, 365-days-per-year alert detachment to provide a rapid reaction force ensuring air sovereignty over the Southwest.

Operation Snowbird

Also located at Davis-Monthan, this 162nd detachment provides support for visiting flying units from around the world looking to train in the optimal weather conditions and ample ranges of Southern Arizona.

Predator, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

The 214th Reconnaissance Group located at Davis Monthan flies the MQ-1B Predator over Iraq and Afghanistan via satellite from ground control stations in Tucson. Arizona Air Guardsmen fly 24/7 operations saving American lives through the vital information they provide to troops on the ground.

Organization

The wing manages a fleet of more than 70 F-16 C/D/E/F Fighting Falcons. There are three flying squadrons and numerous maintenance squadrons and flights assigned to the wing. Under the 162nd Operations Group are the 152nd, 195th, and 148th Fighter Squadrons. Supporting these units are the Mission Support Group, the Maintenance Group, the Medical Group and Headquarters Squadron.

Community

Guardsmen assigned to the 162nd Fighter Wing often serve their entire military careers in Tucson and enjoy close community ties in southern Arizona. Their vital service to country and state is not possible without tremendous support from various civic organizations listed below.

- 162nd Fighter Wing Minuteman Committee: A non-profit civic group that supports the members and the families of National Guard in Southern Arizona.
- Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve (ESGR): Local volunteers working to gain and maintain active support from all public and private employers for members of the National Guard and Reserve.
- Metropolitan Chamber of Commerce Military Affairs Committee: Volunteer business leaders working to maintain and continually improve the relationship between the military and civilian communities.
- Tucson Council for International Visitors: A non-profit group that designs and implements professional programs and provides cultural activities and home hospitality opportunities for foreign leaders, specialists and international scholars.

The Future

The wing will continue to modernize fighter training operations for the USAF total force and international air forces, defend the homeland, provide trained personnel for the Air and Space Expeditionary Force and fulfill its state mission.

The ultramodern Air Guard Base at Tucson International Airport is very different from the adobe farmhouse and dirt-floor hangar of fifty years ago. What remains unchanged is the outstanding dedication of the men and women working to make the 162nd Fighter Wing one of the finest fighter training wings in the world.

Wing Facts

- The 162nd has more than 37 years experience in fighter training, and more than seventeen years experience in international military training.
- The wing graduated more than 6,800 fighter pilots since 1970.
- Instructor pilots average more than 3,000 fighter hours.
- Aircraft maintainers average eighteen years of experience in fighter aircraft.
- The 162nd Fighter Wing is one of southern Arizona's largest employers bringing more than \$270 million into the local economy.

Building Capable Allies, Strong Bonds the Arizona Air Guard Teaches United States Allies to Fly, Fight, and Win

**By
162nd Fighter Wing Office of Public Affairs**

Over European castles, Middle Eastern deserts, and Pacific islands, F-16 fighter pilots are soaring in ever-increasing numbers.



Their landscapes, nationalities, and cultures are different, but they share several common bonds. They are allies and they are friends. They learned to fly their F-16s at an Air National Guard base in Arizona.

With more nations adding the F-16 to their fighter inventories, the need for pilot training increases; and air force pilots from all over the world are traveling to the 162nd Fighter Wing at Tucson International Airport to learn how to fly the multipurpose fighter.

Our primary goal for international pilot training is to build a foundation that will enable us all to carry out operations as coalition partners, said Brig. Gen. Rick Moisio, Wing Commander. And this wing has the people, equipment, and experience to do just that.

Roughly 1,700 Arizona Air Guardsmen at Tucson International Airport maintain and operate 70 F-16s for the purpose of training aspiring fighter pilots from current partners Poland, Singapore, Norway, Denmark, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.).

Over the last 19 years, the wing has trained more than 750 pilots from 23 of the 24 nations that fly the F-16. It's a mission we know very well, said General Moisio. Enhancing the air capabilities of other nations is what we do; and as senior leaders often point out, it's an undertaking of the utmost significance in our post Cold War environment.

From the highest levels of the DoD, leaders are directing efforts to develop the air forces of partner nations. Defense Secretary Robert Gates emphasized the importance of international training to Air Force leaders April 21st during a speech he gave to the Air War College at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.

What the last 25 years have shown is that the threats can emerge almost anywhere in the world, but our own forces and resources will remain finite, said the Secretary. To fill this gap, we must help our allies and partners to confront extremists and other potential sources of global instability within their borders.

To advance the initiative, the 162nd Fighter Wing trains more than 70 international student pilots per year offering several training programs that range from initial F-16 training to qualify new pilots, to an advanced weapons course.

The initial training course, for example, is six-to-eight months in duration and carries the largest number of students.



Three student pilots from the United Arab Emirates practice emergency egress procedures as part of their F-16 flight training at the 162nd Fighter Wing in Tucson, Arizona. (Air National Guard Photo by Master Sergeant Dave Neve)

By the time an initial student pilot arrives in Tucson, he already has his pilot wings; and he has graduated from the Defense Language Institute. So we can be sure he knows how to fly and how to communicate in English, said Colonel Randy Straka, an instructor pilot and the unit's Operations Group Commander. "Our job is to start the student out in the F-16 from square one.

Colonel Straka has thirteen years of experience training foreign military students and attributes the wing's training success to several factors.

First and foremost, the 162nd has a tremendous safety record because our maintenance personnel here average eighteen years of experience specializing on the F-16, said the Colonel. That instills confidence in the nations we train.

Adding to the secure feeling of flying aircraft from one of the safest F-16 fleets in the world is the freedom afforded by Arizona's plentiful ranges.

We consider our ranges to be national treasures. There are very few places in the world with this kind of airspace for military training, he said.

The Barry Goldwater Range in southwest Arizona, the state's largest, consists of 2.7 million acres of relatively undisturbed Sonoran Desert. Overhead are 57,000 cubic miles of airspace where fighter pilots can practice air-to-air maneuvers and engage simulated battlefield targets on the ground.

Finally, we average 17,000 flying hours per year; and we are able to do that because of Arizona's year-round good weather. Less than 3 percent of scheduled sorties here are

canceled due to weather . . . that is practically unheard of in other parts of the world, said the Colonel.

All of these elements add up to optimal flight-training conditions which allow the wing's cadre of 72 instructor pilots to execute an aggressive training schedule.

The students get the best possible flight education when they come here, said General Moio. Our pilots average ten years of instructor time and 2,300 flying hours in the F-16. The U.S. will always have the world's best fighter pilots, said the General; but it is the 162nd's duty to strengthen the capabilities of our nation's allies.

On its most basic level, it is about flying together, operating together, and training together; so, if we have to, we can fight together. On a deeper level, it is about friendships. With more than 4,000 F-16s in operation around the world, creating the foundation of a relationship is absolutely invaluable, he said.

For more information about the 162nd Fighter Wing, visit our web site: www.162fw.ang.af.mil or contact the unit public affairs office at (520) 295-6192.

Poland's "Peace Sky" at Home in Arizona

By
162nd Fighter Wing Office of Public Affairs

In the transition from Soviet-built MiG-29s and Su-22s to American-built F-16s, Poland takes on one of North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO's) most aggressive fighter up-starts known as "Peace Sky."

A new generation of Polish Air Force pilots are learning how to fly their country's most advanced fighter, the F-16C/D "Jastrząb" or "Hawk" as it is called, from the Arizona Air National Guard. To date, the central European country has received 41 of the 48 F-16s it has on order and is rapidly increasing its number of qualified pilots with help from seasoned instructors at the 162nd Fighter Wing based at Tucson International Airport.

When the program started here in 2004, we were training Poland's senior pilots and Squadron Commanders. These days we are training their junior pilots, said Lieutenant Colonel Will Johnson, an instructor pilot in charge of the wing's Polish program. We have graduated about 34 Polish pilots so far, and we anticipate that there will be more to come.

Polish fighter pilots undergo a rigorous selection process at home to fly the F-16, the future of their country's Air Force. The Su-22 Fitter, for example, is scheduled for retirement in 2012 prompting more pilots to apply for the Peace Sky program.

First Lieutenant Adam Jantas is one of seven Polish Air Force pilots currently half-way through the initial F-16 course. He is a graduate of Poland's Air Force Academy and has eight years of fighter pilot experience in the Su-22.



It was my goal to train in the U.S., said the Lieutenant. I have been here for two years. I started at language school at Lackland Air Force Base in Texas, and then I went to T-38 training at Columbus Air Force Base in Mississippi. My final phase is here.

Jantas flies an average of two or three times per week; but in the first months, he flew as much as five times per week.

In the beginning it was good to fly often, so I could practice. Sometimes long breaks are not good when you are learning something difficult, and repetition is very important, he said.

Jantas and his countrymen are not only learning a new aircraft, but also a new way to fly. "Take offs and landings I can do, but all the other stuff in the F-16 is very difficult," he said.

With 40 F-16 hours under his belt, Jantas observed that the F-16 inflicts more G forces and requires more aggressive flying.

The airplane's fly-by-wire system and computer keeps us from exceeding the limitations of the fighter, he said. Before, I had to be more careful not to exceed [the Su-22's] limitations."

According to Colonel Johnson, the goal is to get the Polish Air Force to fly like the U.S. Air Force.

We teach Polish students that fighters can be flexible, said Johnson. We teach them that when you make a flight plan, that is a good starting point, that is where we are going to deviate from. We teach them to adapt, and they like it. They like to have the ability to take off and make decisions.

Since Poland adopted the F-16, it is changing its ways. Pilots are learning to plan the mission prior to take off, which gives their sorties added flexibility.

At home I would spend two or three days planning sorties and then go fly several in a day, said Jantas. I knew exactly what I was going to do in those sorties, but here it changes everyday. Just when you think you have learned something, you will also be introduced to something new at the same time.

The real learning begins at debrief when student and instructor review video from the flight and all questions are answered.

Our instructors are like mothers who love you and are eager to correct you when you do something wrong, but they do it because they care about you and they want to help you, he said. They know what they are doing, and I see that they have a lot of experience and a lot of patience. They just calmly say, Ok, do not do that again.

When Jantas and his compatriots graduate this winter, they will return to flying squadrons in Poland. Their instructors know they will see them again.

We have been sending our members to a base in Poznan for the last two years as mobile training teams, said Colonel Johnson. The teams consist of three pilots; and they spend three months at a time assisting Polish F-16 pilots, keeping them current on their training.

Johnson himself has visited the country nine times to assist former students. Colonel Johnson stated the following:

It is a great country. The people are nice, and the food is great. As a former Soviet republic, they have really adopted capitalism. They have joined the West from a free market standpoint, and they are good allies for our country.

The unofficial motto of the Peace Sky program is "We are more than allies; we are friends." Everywhere U.S. troops are deployed in the War on Terror, Polish troops are there also.

Seeing them succeed gives me a sense of accomplishment and satisfaction, said Johnson. We will continue to build our alliance with them, and it is a great feeling knowing that the work we do here in Tucson is translating into a safer environment in other parts of the world.

International Military Student Office Best in the Air Force

By
Captain Gabe Johnson
162nd Fighter Wing Public Affairs

They come from Europe, Asia, and the Middle East to learn to fly the F-16 Fighting Falcon from the Arizona Air National Guard, and Guardsmen here serve as their wingmen in more ways than one. When flying over the military training ranges of southern Arizona, international student pilots have experienced instructors to guide them; but back on the ground they need help with housing, transportation, documentation, and adapting to American culture. That is where the 162nd Fighter Wing's award-winning international military student office (IMSO) takes charge.

The wing's seven-member IMSO staff recently took home the 2007 IMSO Team of the Year award in the small activities category for their superior service out of 24 IMSOs Air Force-wide.

The Air Force Security Assistance Training Squadron (AFSAT) presented the award to Major Donna Wolslagel, the wing IMSO officer, August 5th during the annual IMSO conference held at Randolph Air Force Base, Texas. The small activities category includes all offices supporting less than 200 international students annually.



We have never won this award before, said Major Wolslagel, a nine-year IMSO veteran. So to us it is a wonderful recognition of all that has gone into building this program over the years and ultimately the service we have provided to our international students.

The 162nd Fighter Wing International Military Student Office brings home the 2007 IMSO Team of the Year trophy. The office staff, Lieutenant Colonel Donna Rinehart, Major Donna Wolslagel, Senior Master Sargent Teresa Campbell, Master Sargent Deb Alegria, Master Sergeant Marnie Neve, Tech. Sargent Amie Howell, and Airman First Class Jonathan Jackson, worked around the clock to ensure a smooth training experience for international student pilots last year.

IMSO supports about 100 student pilots per year ensuring on-time and complete training. The staff oversees the wing's compliance with all international training requirements. They provide cultural education to wing members before they come into contact with foreign students. They coordinate official visits from international leaders. They are on call 24/7 for any emergency situations involving their students.

Without a solid IMSO program, our students would not be able to focus on their primary mission . . . learning to fly the F-16, said Colonel Randy Straka, 162nd Operations Group Commander. They need a focal point where they can go to get help with family problems, buying a car, finding a place to live, health care, and so on. Those things are not easy to do when you are in a foreign country. When their personal issues are taken care of, they can get to work with their instructors.

At the end of training when students are surveyed about the most memorable part of their experience, they always mention the IMSO office, said Major Wolslagel.

We are the ones who meet them at the airport. We are the ones who take care of them. We are the ones who help them handle family issues. And we are the last ones they see when we drop them off at the airport at the end of training. From start to finish, they are in our care; and it is extremely rewarding to have a hand in showing them the American way of life, said the Major.

Prior to being named the top IMSO in the Air Force, AFSAT singled out the wing's office as a flagship program for others to follow. The staff members are designated subject matter experts and are often asked to assist other IMSOs across the country.

About the Author

Captain Gabriel D. Johnson is a Public Affairs Officer assigned to the 162nd Fighter Wing as Chief of Public Affairs, Tucson International Airport, Arizona. He graduated from the University of Nevada, Reno, in 2000 with a bachelor's degree in journalism and Spanish. He soon joined the active duty Air Force earning a commission as a second lieutenant on 5 April 2001 via Officer Training School, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. His earlier assignments were in public affairs for Air Force Special Operations units. He served at Air Force Special Operations Command and the 16th Special Operations Wing at Hurlburt Field, Florida, generating positive coverage for units supporting both OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM and OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM. Later he served as the Chief of Public Affairs for the Air Force Inspection Agency, Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico. He was responsible for one of the Agency's five primary missions, and publication of *The Inspector General* (TIG) Brief magazine. The Air Force's longest running publication updates active, Guard and Reserve units with the most current guidance and inspection information. In 2006 he completed a voluntary deployment to Baghdad, Iraq, for a six-month joint tour as a public affairs officer for Multi National Force – Iraq (MNF-I). Within MNF-I, he ensured the security, air and ground transportation of international media throughout the country for the purpose of strategically dominating the information battle space with coalition key messages. In March, 2007, he joined the 162nd Fighter Wing of the Arizona Air National Guard as Chief of Public Affairs. Since his arrival, he has worked to enhance the unit's internal information, media relations, and community relations programs.

LEGISLATION AND POLICY

A Balanced Strategy Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age

**By
Robert M. Gates
Secretary of Defense**

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The defining principle of the Pentagon's new *National Defense Strategy* is balance. The United States (U.S.) cannot expect to eliminate national security risks through higher defense budgets, to do everything and buy everything. The Department of Defense (DoD) must set priorities and consider inescapable tradeoffs and opportunity costs.

The strategy strives for balance in three areas:

- Between trying to prevail in current conflicts and preparing for other contingencies
- Between institutionalizing capabilities such as counterinsurgency and foreign military assistance and maintaining the United States existing conventional and strategic technological edge against other military forces
- Between retaining those cultural traits that have made the U.S. armed forces successful and shedding those that hamper their ability to do what needs to be done.

Unconventional Thinking

The United States' ability to deal with future threats will depend on its performance in current conflicts. To be blunt, to fail — or to be seen to fail — in either Iraq or Afghanistan would be a disastrous blow to U.S. credibility, both among friends and allies and among potential adversaries.

In Iraq, the number of U.S. combat units there will decline over time — as it was going to do no matter who was elected President in November of 2008. Still, there will continue to be some kind of U.S. advisory and counterterrorism effort in Iraq for years to come.

In Afghanistan, as (former) President George W. Bush announced last September (2008), U.S. troop levels are rising, with the likelihood of more increases in the year ahead. Given its terrain, poverty, neighborhood, and tragic history, Afghanistan in many ways poses an even more complex and difficult long-term challenge than Iraq — one that, despite a large international effort, will require a significant U.S. military and economic commitment for some time.

It would be irresponsible not to think about and prepare for the future; and the overwhelming majority of people in the Pentagon, the services, and the defense industry do just that. But we must not be so preoccupied with preparing for future conventional and strategic conflicts that we neglect to provide all the capabilities necessary to fight and win conflicts such as those the U.S. is in today.

Support for conventional modernization programs is deeply embedded in the DoD's budget, in its bureaucracy, in the defense industry, and in Congress. My fundamental concern is that there is not commensurate institutional support — including in the Pentagon — for the capabilities needed to win today's wars and some of their likely successors.

What is dubbed the War on Terror is, in grim reality, a prolonged, worldwide irregular campaign — a struggle between the forces of violent extremism and those of moderation. Direct military force will continue to play a role in the long-term effort against terrorists and other extremists. But over the long term, the U.S. cannot kill or capture its way to victory. Where possible, what the military calls kinetic operations should be subordinated to measures aimed at promoting better governance, economic programs that spur development, and efforts to address the grievances among the discontented, from whom the terrorists recruit. It will take the patient accumulation of quiet successes over a long time to discredit and defeat extremist movements and their ideologies.

The U.S. is unlikely to repeat another Iraq or Afghanistan that is, forced regime change followed by nation building under fire anytime soon. But that does not mean it may not face similar challenges in a variety of locales. Where possible, U.S. strategy is to employ indirect approaches, primarily through building the capacity of partner governments and their security forces to prevent festering problems from turning into crises that require costly and controversial direct military intervention. In this kind of effort, the capabilities of the United States' allies and partners may be as important as its own; and building their capacity is arguably as important as, if not more so than, the fighting the U.S. does itself.

The recent past vividly demonstrated the consequences of failing to address adequately the dangers posed by insurgencies and failing states. Terrorist networks can find sanctuary within the borders of a weak nation and strength within the chaos of social breakdown. A nuclear-armed state could collapse into chaos and criminality. The most likely catastrophic threats to the U.S. homeland for example, that of a U.S. city being poisoned or reduced to rubble by a terrorist attack are more likely to emanate from failing states than from aggressor states.

The kinds of capabilities needed to deal with these scenarios cannot be considered exotic distractions or temporary diversions. The U.S. does not have the luxury of opting out because these scenarios do not conform to preferred notions of the American way of war.

Furthermore, even the biggest of wars will require "small wars" capabilities. Ever since General Winfield Scott led his army into Mexico in the 1840s, nearly every major deployment of U.S. forces has led to a longer subsequent military presence to maintain stability. Whether in the midst of or in the aftermath of any major conflict, the requirement for the U.S. military to maintain security, provide aid and comfort, begin reconstruction, and prop up local governments and public services will not go away.

The military and civilian elements of the United States' national security apparatus have responded unevenly and have grown increasingly out of balance. The problem is not will; it is capacity. In many ways, the country's national security capabilities are still coping with the consequences of the 1990s, when, with the complicity of both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue, key instruments of U.S. power abroad were reduced or allowed to wither on the bureaucratic vine. The Department of State (DoS) froze the hiring of new Foreign Service Officers. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) dropped from a high of having 15,000 permanent staff members during the Vietnam War to having less than 3,000 today. And then there was the U.S. Information Agency, whose directors once included the likes of Edward R. Murrow. It was split into pieces and folded into a corner of the DoS. Since September 11, 2001, and through the efforts first of former Secretary of State Colin Powell and now of former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, the DoS has made a comeback.

Foreign Service Officers are being hired again, and foreign affairs spending has about doubled since former President Bush.

Yet even with a better-funded DoS and USAID, future military commanders will not be able to rid themselves of the tasks of maintaining security and stability. To truly achieve victory as Clausewitz defined it to attain a political objective, the U.S. needs a military whose ability to kick down the door is matched by its ability to clean up the mess and even rebuild the house afterward.

Given these realities, the military has made some impressive strides in recent years. Special operations have received steep increases in funding and personnel. The Air Force has created a new air advisory program and a new career track for unmanned aerial operations. The Navy has set up a new expeditionary combat command and brought back its riverine units. New counterinsurgency and Army operations manuals, plus a new maritime strategy, have incorporated the lessons of recent years in service doctrine. “Train and Equip” programs allow for quicker improvements in the security capacity of partner nations. And various initiatives are under way that will better integrate and coordinate U.S. military efforts with civilian agencies as well as engage the expertise of the private sector, including nongovernmental organizations and academia.

Conventional Threats in Perspective

Even as its military hones and institutionalizes new and unconventional skills, the U.S. still has to contend with the security challenges posed by the military forces of other countries. The images of Russian tanks rolling into Georgia last August [2008] were a reminder that nation-states and their militaries do still matter. Both Russia and China have increased their defense spending and modernization programs to include air defense and fighter capabilities that in some cases approach the United States’ own. In addition, there is the potentially toxic mix of rogue nations, terrorist groups, nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. North Korea has built several bombs, and Iran seeks to join the nuclear club.

What all these potential adversaries from terrorist cells to rogue nations to rising powers have in common is that they have learned that it is unwise to confront the U.S. directly on conventional military terms. The U.S. cannot take its current dominance for granted and needs to invest in the programs, platforms, and personnel that will ensure that dominance’s persistence.

But it is also important to keep some perspective. As much as the U.S. Navy has shrunk since the end of the Cold War, for example, in terms of tonnage, its battle fleet is still larger than the next thirteen navies combined — and eleven of those thirteen navies are U.S. allies or partners. Russian tanks and artillery may have crushed Georgia’s tiny military. But before the U.S. begins rearming for another Cold War, it must remember that what is driving Russia is a desire to exorcise past humiliation and dominate its “near abroad”, not an ideologically driven campaign to dominate the globe. As someone who used to prepare estimates of Soviet military strength for several Presidents, I can say that Russia’s conventional military, although vastly improved since its nadir in the late 1990s, remains a shadow of its Soviet predecessor. And adverse demographic trends in Russia will likely keep those conventional forces in check.

All told, the 2008 *National Defense Strategy* concludes that although U.S. predominance in conventional warfare is not unchallenged, it is sustainable for the medium term given current trends. It is true that the U.S. would be hard-pressed to fight a major conventional ground war elsewhere on short notice; but as I have asked before, where on earth would we do that? U.S. air and sea forces have ample untapped striking power should the need arise to deter or punish aggression, whether on the Korean Peninsula, in the Persian Gulf, or across the Taiwan Strait. So although current strategy knowingly assumes some additional risk in this area, that risk is a prudent and manageable one.

Other nations may be unwilling to challenge the U.S. fighter to fighter, ship to ship, and tank to tank. But they are developing the disruptive means to blunt the impact of U.S. power, narrow the United States' military options, and deny the U.S. military freedom of movement and action.

In the case of China, Beijing's investments in cyber warfare, anti-satellite warfare, anti-aircraft and anti-ship weaponry, submarines, and ballistic missiles could threaten the United States' primary means to project its power and help its allies in the Pacific: bases, air and sea assets, and the networks that support them. This will put a premium on the United States' ability to strike from over the horizon and employ missile defenses and will require shifts from short-range to longer-range systems, such as the next-generation bomber.

And even though the days of hair-trigger superpower confrontation are over, as long as other nations possess the bomb and the means to deliver it, the U.S. must maintain a credible strategic deterrent. Toward this end, the DoD and the Air Force have taken firm steps to return excellence and accountability to nuclear stewardship. Congress needs to do its part by funding the Reliable Replacement Warhead Program for safety, for security, and for a more reliable deterrent.

When thinking about the range of threats, it is common to divide the "high end" from the "low end," the conventional from the irregular, armored divisions on one side, guerrillas toting AK-47s on the other. In reality, as the political scientist Colin Gray has noted, the categories of warfare are blurring and no longer fit into neat, tidy boxes. One can expect to see more tools and tactics of destruction — from the sophisticated to the simple being employed simultaneously in hybrid and more complex forms of warfare.

Russia's relatively crude, although brutally effective, conventional offensive in Georgia was augmented with a sophisticated cyber attack and a well-coordinated propaganda campaign. The U.S. saw a different combination of tools during the invasion of Iraq, when Saddam Hussein dispatched his swarming Fedayeen paramilitary fighters along with the T-72 tanks of the Republican Guard.

Conversely, militias, insurgent groups, other non-state actors, and developing-world militaries are increasingly acquiring more technology, lethality, and sophistication as illustrated by the losses and propaganda victory that Hezbollah was able to inflict on Israel in 2006. Hezbollah's restocked arsenal of rockets and missiles now dwarfs the inventory of many nation-states. Furthermore, Chinese and Russian arms sales are putting advanced capabilities, both offensive and defensive, in the hands of more countries and groups. As the defense scholar Frank Hoffman has noted, these hybrid scenarios combine "the lethality of state conflict with the fanatical and protracted fervor of irregular warfare," what another defense scholar, Michael Evans, has described as "wars . . . in which Microsoft coexists with machetes and stealth technology is met by suicide bombers."

Just as one can expect a blended high-low mix of adversaries and types of conflict, so, too, should the U.S. seek a better balance in the portfolio of capabilities it has the types of units fielded, the weapons bought, the training done.

When it comes to procurement, for the better part of five decades, the trend has gone toward lower numbers as technology gains have made each system more capable. In recent years, these platforms have grown ever more baroque, have become ever more costly, are taking longer to build, and are being fielded in ever-dwindling quantities. Given that resources are not unlimited, the dynamic of exchanging numbers for capability is perhaps reaching a point of diminishing returns. A given ship or aircraft, no matter how capable or well equipped, can be in only one place at one time.

For decades, meanwhile, the prevailing view has been that weapons and units designed for the so-called high end could also be used for the low end. And to some extent that has been true: strategic bombers designed to obliterate cities have been used as close air support for riflemen on horseback.

M-1 tanks originally designed to plug the Fulda Gap during a Soviet attack on Western Europe routed Iraqi insurgents in Fallujah and Najaf. Billion-dollar ships are employed to track pirates and deliver humanitarian aid. And the U.S. Army is spinning out parts of the Future Combat Systems program, as they move from the drawing board to reality, so that they can be available and usable for troops in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Nevertheless, given the types of situations the U.S. is likely to face for example, the struggles to field up-armored Humvees; Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles (MRAPs); and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) programs in Iraq, the time has come to consider whether the specialized, often relatively low-tech equipment well suited for stability and counterinsurgency missions is also needed. It is time to think hard about how to institutionalize the procurement of such capabilities and get them fielded quickly. Why was it necessary to go outside the normal bureaucratic process to develop technologies to counter improvised explosive devices, to build MRAPs, and to quickly expand the United States' ISR capability? In short, why was it necessary to bypass existing institutions and procedures to get the capabilities needed to protect U.S. troops and fight ongoing wars?

The DoD's conventional modernization programs seek a 99 percent solution over a period of years. Stability and counterinsurgency missions require 75 percent solutions over a period of months. The challenge is whether these two different paradigms can be made to coexist in the U.S. military's mindset and bureaucracy.

The DoD has to consider whether in situations in which the U.S. has total air dominance, it makes sense to employ lower-cost, lower-tech aircraft that can be employed in large quantities and used by U.S. partners. This is already happening now in the field with Task Force Observe, Detect, Identify, and Neutralize (ODIN) in Iraq, which has mated advanced sensors with turboprop aircraft to produce a massive increase in the amount of surveillance and reconnaissance coverage. The issue then becomes how to build this kind of innovative thinking and flexibility into the rigid procurement processes at home. The key is to make sure that the strategy and risk assessment drive the procurement, rather than the other way around.

Sustaining the Institution

The ability to fight and adapt to a diverse range of conflicts, sometimes simultaneously, fits squarely within the long history and the finest traditions of the American practice of arms. In the Revolutionary War, tight formations drilled by Baron Friedrich von Steuben fought redcoats in the North while guerrillas led by Francis Marion harassed them in the South. During the 1920s and 1930s, the Marine Corps conducted what would now be called stability operations in the Caribbean, wrote *The Small Wars Manual*, and at the same time developed the amphibious landing techniques that would help liberate Europe and the Pacific in the following decade. And consider General John "Black Jack" Pershing: before commanding the American Expeditionary Forces in Europe in World War I, Pershing led a platoon of Sioux scouts, rode with buffalo soldiers up San Juan Hill, won the respect of the Moro in the Philippines, and chased Pancho Villa in Mexico.

In Iraq, an army that was basically a smaller version of the United States' Cold War force over time became an effective instrument of counterinsurgency. But that transition came at a frightful human, financial, and political cost. For every heroic and resourceful innovation by troops and commanders on the battlefield, there was some institutional shortcoming at the Pentagon they had to overcome. There have to be institutional changes so that the next set of colonels, captains, and sergeants will not have to be quite so heroic or quite so resourceful.

One of the enduring issues the military struggles with is whether personnel and promotions systems designed to reward the command of American troops will be able to reflect the importance

of advising, training, and equipping foreign troops, something still not considered a career-enhancing path for the best and brightest officers. Another is whether formations and units organized, trained, and equipped to destroy enemies can be adapted well enough and fast enough to dissuade or co-opt them or, more significantly, to build the capacity of local security forces to do the dissuading and destroying.

As Secretary of Defense, I have repeatedly made the argument in favor of institutionalizing counterinsurgency skills and the ability to conduct stability and support operations. I have done so not because I fail to appreciate the importance of maintaining the United States' current advantage in conventional war fighting but rather because conventional and strategic force modernization programs are already strongly supported in the services, in Congress, and by the defense industry. The base budget for fiscal year 2009, for example, contains more than \$180 billion for procurement, research, and development; the overwhelming preponderance of which is for conventional systems.

Apart from the Special Forces community and some dissident Colonels, however, for decades there has been no strong, deeply rooted constituency inside the Pentagon or elsewhere for institutionalizing the capabilities necessary to wage asymmetric or irregular conflict — and to quickly meet the ever-changing needs of forces engaged in these conflicts.

Think of where U.S. forces have been sent and have been engaged over the last 40-plus years: Vietnam, Lebanon, Grenada, Panama, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, the Horn of Africa, and more. In fact, the first Gulf War stands alone in over two generations of constant military engagement as a more or less traditional conventional conflict from beginning to end. As General Charles Krulak, then the Marine Corps Commandant, predicted a decade ago, instead of the beloved “Son of Desert Storm,” Western militaries are confronted with the unwanted “Stepchild of Chechnya.”

There is no doubt in my mind that conventional modernization programs will continue to have, and deserve, strong institutional and congressional support. I just want to make sure that the capabilities needed for the complex conflicts the U.S. is actually in and most likely to face in the foreseeable future also have strong and sustained institutional support over the long term. And I want to see a defense establishment that can make and implement decisions quickly in support of those on the battlefield.

In the end, the military capabilities needed cannot be separated from the cultural traits and the reward structure of the institutions the U.S. has: the signals sent by what gets funded, who gets promoted, what is taught in the academies and staff colleges, and how personnel are trained.

Thirty-six years ago, my old Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) colleague Robert Komer, who led the pacification campaign in Vietnam, published his classic study of organizational behavior, *Bureaucracy Does Its Thing*. Looking at the performance of the U.S. national security apparatus during the conflict in Vietnam, both military and civilian, he identified a number of tendencies that prevented institutions from adapting long after problems had been identified and solutions proposed:

- A reluctance to change preferred ways of functioning
- The attempt to run a war with a peacetime management structure and peacetime practices
- A belief that the current set of problems either was an aberration or would soon be over
- The tendency for problems that did not fit organizations' inherited structures and preferences to fall through the cracks

I mention this study not to relitigate that war or slight the enormous strides the institutional military has made in recent years but simply as a reminder that these tendencies are always present in any large, hierarchical organization and that everyone must consistently strive to overcome them.

I have learned many things in my 42 years of service in the national security arena. Two of the most important are an appreciation of limits and a sense of humility. The U.S. is the strongest and greatest nation on earth, but there are still limits on what it can do. The power and global reach of its military have been an indispensable contributor to world peace and must remain so. But not every outrage, every act of aggression, or every crisis can or should elicit a U.S. military response.

We should be modest about what military force can accomplish and what technology can accomplish. The advances in precision, sensor, information, and satellite technologies have led to extraordinary gains in what the U.S. military can do. The Taliban were dispatched within three months and Saddam's regime was toppled in three weeks. A button can be pushed in Nevada and seconds later a pickup truck will explode in Mosul. A bomb dropped from the sky can destroy a targeted house while leaving the one next to it intact.

But no one should ever neglect the psychological, cultural, political, and human dimensions of warfare. War is inevitably tragic, inefficient, and uncertain; and it is important to be skeptical of systems analyses, computer models, game theories, or doctrines that suggest otherwise. We should look askance at idealistic, triumphalist, or ethnocentric notions of future conflict that aspire to transcend the immutable principles and ugly realities of war, that imagine it is possible to cow, shock, or awe an enemy into submission, instead of tracking enemies down hilltop by hilltop, house by house, block by bloody block.

As General William Tecumseh Sherman said, Every attempt to make war easy and safe will result in humiliation and disaster.

Repeatedly over the last century, Americans averted their eyes in the belief that events in remote places around the world need not engage the U.S. How could the assassination of an Austrian archduke in the unknown Bosnia and Herzegovina affect Americans, or the annexation of a little patch of ground called Sudetenland, or a French defeat in a place called Dien Bien Phu, or the return of an obscure cleric to Tehran, or the radicalization of a Saudi construction tycoon's son?

In world affairs, what seems to work best, the historian Donald Kagan wrote in his book. *On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace*, . . . is the possession by those states who wish to preserve the peace of the preponderant power and of the will to accept the burdens and responsibilities required to achieve that purpose.

I believe the *United States' National Defense Strategy* provides a balanced approach to meeting those responsibilities and preserving the United States' freedom, prosperity, and security in the years ahead.

Address to the First Annual International Conference on Africa: Africa Initiative Project

By
Phillip Carter III
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs

[The following are excerpts of the address given at Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona, November 21, 2008.]

This conference is very important. It not only allows for a deeper understanding of African history, but contemporary United States and Africa Affairs. Combining a rich historical perspective with an interdisciplinary vision and awareness for the future, provides a great means to address challenges on the African continent.

We at the Department of State's (DoS) Bureau of African Affairs are also celebrating an important milestone this year — our 50th Anniversary. Building upon a half century of accomplishment, the Bureau looks to the next fifty years with great hope and excitement.

United States Policy in Africa

Over the past eight years, the United States (U.S.) has made an unprecedented commitment to Africa. [The former Bush's] Administration has gone further than any previously in engaging and assisting the continent. We are working with our sub-Saharan partners to pioneer a new era of development in Africa. This afternoon, I would like to highlight our policy priorities on the continent.

Democratic Institution Building

The first defining priority is "Democratic Institution Building." We are engaged in supporting the rise of freedom and democracy throughout sub-Saharan Africa. During the past two decades, progressive democratic reform has adapted to local values, customs, and practices. Outgrowths of democratic, well-governed states that adhere to the rule of law, support the will of their people, and contribute responsibly to the international system are developing.

We have partnered with these nations to build democratic institutions, conduct free and fair elections, and govern justly. These outcomes mark an important historical shift. In the past four years alone, there have been more than fifty democratic elections throughout Africa. Almost three-quarters of sub-Saharan nations are now classified by Freedom House as "Free" or "Partly Free" — up from less than half in 1990.

Despite significant progress, recent elections in Kenya and Zimbabwe have hindered these advances. These elections, marked by voting irregularities, contestable results, and post election violence, demonstrate that the path to democracy is often challenging.

Notwithstanding these impediments, the U.S. will continue to work with our international partners to support democratic institutions, promote free and fair elections, and expand freedom and prosperity for the benefit of all. For example, we will continue to strongly support the democratic transition in Liberia — and to strengthen democratic institutions in post-conflict countries, such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Burundi.

Although conflict resolution is an essential part of our foreign policy objectives, we believe that to sustain long term peace and stability on the continent, it is not enough to just end wars but we must move beyond post-conflict transformation to consolidate democracies.

Economic Growth and Development

Our second foreign policy priority is the expansion of “Economic Growth and Development.”

At the 2005 Gleneagles G8 [Group of Eight Top Economic World Powers] Summit, the United States committed to doubling its assistance (bilateral and multilateral) to sub-Saharan Africa from a base of \$4.4 billion in 2004 to \$8.7 billion by 2010. We are on track to meet that pledge.

To accelerate growth in Africa, the U.S. implemented the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), a revolutionary foreign assistance program that seeks to reduce poverty through sustainable economic growth by awarding sizeable grants not loans to countries that practice good governance, seek to take responsibility for their own development, and are committed to achieving results. Of the eighteen compacts signed to date since the program’s inception in 2004, eleven totaling over \$4.8 billion have been signed with sub-Saharan African countries. Senegal and Malawi are in the process of developing compacts, and another eight African nations have Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) threshold programs to help them qualify for full compact.

The U.S. government has enacted the *African Growth and Opportunity Act* (AGOA), a program that rewards reforming African countries with U.S. trade preferences. This initiative has helped to reduce barriers to trade, increase exports, create jobs, and expand business opportunities for African and U.S. entrepreneurs. With 41 countries presently qualified, AGOA has become a cornerstone of our trade and investment policy in Africa. It has helped increase two-way trade between the U.S. and eligible African economies to over \$50 billion more than six times the level in 2001, the first full year of AGOA.

Programs such as MCC and AGOA are strengthening African economic health and underscore our cardinal interest in the continent’s economic affairs. Not surprisingly, in 2007, sub-Saharan Africa experienced a growth rate of 6.5 percent one of its highest in decades.

Disease

The third U.S. foreign policy priority in Africa is the fight against “Disease.” As the leading cause of death on the continent, disease is one of the greatest challenges to Africa’s future. Rising to meet this challenge, the U.S. is partnering with sub-Saharan nations to target the prevention, care, and treatment of disease . . . especially human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immune deficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS), malaria, and neglected tropical diseases.

To address the severe and urgent human immuno deficiency virus/acquired immune deficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS) crisis, former President Bush led the world into action with the U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). PEPFAR is the largest commitment ever by a single nation toward an international health initiative. Through PEPFAR, the U.S. government has already provided \$18.8 billion in HIV/AIDS funding, with a reauthorization of up to \$48 billion for HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria over the next five years.

When former President Bush launched PEPFAR, approximately 50,000 people in sub-Saharan Africa were receiving antiretroviral treatment. Today, PEPFAR supports lifesaving treatment for over 1.7 million people worldwide, care for 6.6 million people living with HIV/AIDS, and prevention of mother-to-child HIV transmission during nearly 12.7 million pregnancies, allowing nearly 200,000 children to be born HIV free.

Responding to the malaria crisis, the President launched the President's Malaria Initiative (PMI) in 2005. The U.S. has committed \$1.2 billion in new malaria funding to reduce malaria-related deaths by 50 percent in fifteen African countries. In 2007, the Malaria Initiative reached more than 25 million people with effective prevention and treatment interventions.

In the fight against what we call "neglected tropical diseases," the President, in February 2008, announced a five year, \$350 million initiative to eliminate the burden of neglected tropical diseases (NTDs) as a major threat to health and economic growth in the developing world. Focusing on seven major diseases, from snail fever to hookworm, this initiative aims to provide integrated treatment for more than 300 million people in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

Through the prevention and treatment of disease, programs such as PEPFAR and PMI are touching the lives of millions. In collaboration with our regional partners, we will continue to develop sustainable healthcare infrastructure; so African nations can address these challenges through their own national institutions.

Conflict Resolution

Conflict Resolution represents our final foreign policy priority on the continent. In the past seven years, we have seen the end of major conflicts in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire, North-South Sudan, Ethiopia-Eritrea, and Angola. Although the current peace is fragile in several of these countries — and challenges persist in Darfur, Eastern Congo, and Somalia — Africa has demonstrated a trend toward conflict resolution and stability. I would like to highlight three distinctive areas demonstrating this trend:

- Peacekeeping
- Counterterrorism
- Maritime safety

Through our participation in the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), the U.S., along with our G8 partners [Canada, United Kingdom, France, Russia, Japan, Germany, Italy, and the United States] are committed to building global peace and security by training and equipping 75,000 peacekeepers worldwide by 2010. The U.S. has been the most important contributor to African force generation efforts through our Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program and large scale provision of peacekeeping equipment. Since 2005, the U.S. has directly trained nearly 60,000 African peacekeepers in twenty-two countries. Of these troops, over 82 percent have deployed to African Union and United Nations peacekeeping missions.

Second, to combat terrorism, the U.S. is pursuing a multidisciplinary regional approach in the trans-Sahara region, as well as the Horn of Africa. The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership is a multi-year effort, funded at about \$150 million per year, to leverage and coordinate military, law enforcement, development, and public diplomacy elements to enhance the capacity of the trans-Sahara region to deter and defeat terrorism and counter extremist ideology. We are seeking to build on the success of this program with a parallel East Africa Regional Strategic Initiative to counter the terrorist elements that destroyed our Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam ten years ago and continue to threaten regional stability.

Last, the U.S. is also partnering with African nations to support progress in strengthening maritime security, particularly anti-piracy measures in sub-Saharan Africa. The ability of African nations to control their coastal waters is critical to regional trade and economic growth; control of sovereign natural resources, including fisheries; the delivery of critical humanitarian assistance to Somalia; and efforts to stem the trafficking of drugs, weapons, and humans on the continent.

Conclusion

In closing, the U.S. government is committed to work with our African partners to promote democratic institution building; conflict resolution; economic growth and development; and the prevention, care, and treatment of disease throughout the African continent.

When African nations cultivate freedom, prosperity, and justice, their populations are more likely to reject extremist ideology, build strong economies that benefit all people, and replace disease and despair with healing and hope. These are unwavering priorities of the U.S. government today, tomorrow, and in the months and years ahead.

Address to the Overseas Security Advisory Council 23rd Annual Conference

**By
Condoleezza Rice
Former Secretary of State**

[The following is an excerpt of the keynote address by former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, given at the Dean Acheson Auditorium, Washington, D.C., November 19, 2008.]

I am delighted that you are here to discuss the security challenges that we face as we pursue our work abroad. The Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC) is an extraordinary partnership, and I want to thank you for your support and for your ideas. You play an important role in helping to shape the world's view of America and how we maintain our security and how we engage with our neighbors in their countries. And you do so reflecting both our values and our goals.

As many of you know, in 1985, then Secretary of State George Shultz, my good friend and my mentor, recognized the growing threat posed by international terrorism to Americans living and working abroad. Secretary Shultz believed that we needed a dynamic forum for sharing ideas and information on security between our public and private sectors. To achieve that end, he created the Overseas Security Advisory Council, or OSAC, which initially comprised fifteen American companies and the Department of State (DoS) and the Department of Commerce (DoC).

Today, the wisdom of that decision 23 years later has never been clearer. OSAC has grown into a partnership encompassing twelve federal agencies and over 5,600 private groups, from business to academia and nongovernmental and faith-based communities. OSAC is a model of a public-private partnership working cooperatively to achieve the shared aim of keeping Americans overseas safe as they pursue their professional and personal goals around the world. Americans live and work and travel abroad more securely because of the success of this OSAC partnership.

The importance of your work is seen again and again. One milestone this year was OSAC's coordination during the Beijing Olympics, which provided in-depth consultation and assistance to hundreds of companies involved in the Games. OSAC has also played a crucial role in helping Americans and American institutions respond to terrorist attacks. In the face of the bombing at the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad and the armed attack against our embassy in Sanaa, OSAC quickly gathered security information and shared that information; and that was used, in turn, to brief senior Department officials and private security chief security officers. OSAC has always used its newly formed institutions well. And the latest, its hotel sector institution to disseminate information and keep other hotels in the region informed about the security situation, is going to be a very important innovation.

Perhaps the best example of OSAC's ability to provide an information-sharing platform for the private sector is the Country Council Program, which is designed to help U.S. businesses and organizations maintain effective security procedures tailored to the specific countries where they operate. Today, there are over 100 Country Councils attached to U.S. embassies and consulates around the world. I am particularly pleased that OSAC officials visited Baghdad in June to help establish a Country Council Program there. A robust and active Country Council Program in Iraq will be critical to American interests as the security situation there continues to improve and as the U.S. private sector returns to Iraq.

I am impressed too with OSAC's efforts to attract new partners. OSAC's outreach to colleges and universities has caused this sector to grow to more than 300 educational institutions. As a

diplomat, I know the benefits derived by American students studying abroad. Often, after living in a new culture and struggling with a new language, our students return home with a concept of themselves and their country that is renewed by the experience. They too are often our greatest ambassadors, not just telling but living the American story of opportunity and freedom. But as a university provost, I also know that the benefits of study abroad will be diminished or even disappear if we do not confront the security challenges facing American students abroad. In this regard, OSAC is playing an important role; and the recent OSAC conference at Texas Tech on security and foreign studies exemplifies the collaboration that is essential to safe and secure travel for American students around the world.

So, today, the mission of OSAC is more critical than ever. We are in a world, post-September 11, 2001, in which we are safer, but not yet safe. Therefore, continued and evolving threats throughout the world place at risk our ability to showcase American innovation, education, and humanitarian efforts. OSAC remains a relevant and vital public-private partnership to safeguard American lives and interests overseas. I want to thank you for your commitment to our diplomatic mission. I want to thank you for our security. And I want to thank you for your dedication to the essential work that must be done abroad. And on a personal note, I want to thank each and every one of you for what you do every day toward this mission [and] what you will continue to do. And you can be certain that I will be very proud and pleased to pass on to my successor the great story of OSAC, the great work of OSAC, and the great partnership that we have developed.

Mixed Migratory Flows - Immigration

By

Kelly Ryan

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Population, Refugees, and Migration

[The following is an excerpt from remarks to the Plenary Session: Regional Conference on Refugee Protection and International Migration in West Africa Dakar, Senegal, November 13, 2008.]

It is an honor for me to speak to you today as a representative of the United States Government, one of the co-sponsors of this conference. Last year, President Wade spoke of the important role of migrants: “L’émigration est une donnée permanente dans l’histoire des peuples et les migrants contribuent aussi bien à la prospérité de leur pays d’origine qu’à celle de leur pays d’accueil.”

Since time immemorial, people have left their countries in search of a better life for themselves and their families. They leave for many reasons, including the desire for economic improvement and family reunification and to escape war, civil conflict, and environmental degradation. According to the United Nations (U.N.), there are more than 190 million migrants in the world today, constituting approximately 3 percent of the world’s population. One does not have to search far in the news to find tragic examples of instances in which vulnerable migrants or refugees have died or been put in grave danger because of their attempts to leave their home countries. The subject of mixed migration flows deserves the attention of the international community. The United States (U.S.) is committed to the idea that mixed migration flows must be addressed in a collaborative and effective manner. We have learned through our own experience that partnerships must be nurtured amongst and within states and include international organizations and civil society.

What is fascinating to me about migration is its protean quality: sometimes migration is forced and sometimes it is voluntary. In fact, as Ambassador Swing noted, the International Labour Organization (ILO) (U.N.) has found that irregular migration accounts for a mere 10-15 percent of all migration. Sometimes it occupies an uneasy zone between the two. Millions of migrants are documented, many are not. In some countries documentation entitles migrants to generous benefits, in other places it does not.

This conference is an important one, and the issue is not new. In fact, my government has been supporting joint International Organization on Migration—United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (IOM-UNHCR) activities on mixed migratory flows in the Caribbean for over five years. We have seen first hand cooperation on intra-regional returns of trafficking victims as well as multi-lateral efforts amongst governments, UNHCR, and IOM to address the protection needs of asylum seekers.

I believe that there is a unique opportunity—created through this conference—for Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) countries to develop genuine partnerships permitting better treatment of migrants. If the partnership evolves, which I hope it will, it can improve the lives of those migrants living abroad and make migration policies more humane and better enforced. I have seen a regional cooperation occur in Europe, the Americas, Africa, and Asia.

The U.S. believes the most practical way to advance effective, humane migration policies is to support regional migration dialogues. Regional dialogues promote open, informal discussion and information exchange on shared migration concerns. In these fora, member states identify areas for cooperation and develop migration strategies that are humane and stress orderly, authorized movements of individuals. The congenial, informal nature of these regional approaches allows

governments to discuss migration issues of common interest, build consensus, and undertake joint initiatives to improve migration management and the situation of migrants in their regions.

I would like to offer an example for your consideration, a possible model for ECOWAS: the Regional Conference on Migration, one of the older consultative processes, in which North and Central American countries along with the Dominican Republic dialogue in an informal but serious manner about migration challenges and protection needs.

Turning again to this region, migration in West Africa is something of a bright spot. The end of civil strife in Sierra Leone and Liberia, thanks in part to the constructive role played by ECOWAS forces, has allowed . . . millions of voluntary returns of those who fled persecution and civil strife. The prevailing peace, however fragile, allows greater trust to emerge among governments in the region. This trust encourages governments to observe the provisions of the 1979 ECOWAS Protocol Relating to the Free Movement of Persons, Residence and Establishment, a ground breaking important initiative for ECOWAS countries.

Yet, the reverse of the medal is much more somber: we know that dozens of Africans have died in the past few months trying to take advantage of the calmer summer weather to make the journey to the Canary Islands and Spanish mainland to find jobs in Europe. At the end of October [2008], two African migrants were found dead after their wooden fishing boat packed with 125 migrants landed in Spain's Canary Islands. They had reportedly left Guinea and had been at sea for eight to ten days suffering from thirst, hunger, and exposure. The challenge for countries in the region is complex.

- How to effectively identify, protect, assist, process, and return each one of these individuals traveling in mixed flows
- How to identify the smuggler, the trafficker, from the unaccompanied child or the trafficking victim
- The economic migrant from the asylum seeker
- The stateless person when all are undocumented

The challenge for all of our countries is also about helping to prevent irregular flows, which can have such tragic consequences and pose a threat to national security.

The attacks in South Africa earlier this year show us that no country is immune from the fact that migrants can be vulnerable to mob violence during periods of economic hardship. What measures can governments introduce to make sure the human rights of migrants are respected?

Next, what are some trends we can see in migration among countries in the region? One trend we see in West Africa is the displacement of farmers and their families because of decertification and erosion. This phenomenon often gets lumped into urbanization and often involves people staying in the same country, but it is also a facet of the migration issue. In the same vein, how will climate change affect migration flows in the region?

It is with these questions and challenges in mind that my government strongly supports UNHCR and IOM in their mandated activities conducted to provide assistance and protection to those in need. More specifically, we work with UNHCR to promote the Agenda on Protection and support its activities around the world. Through IOM, we support the Migration Dialogue for West Africa, where ECOWAS countries come together to discuss migration-related issues of interest and best practices as well as regional anti-trafficking efforts and a fund to provide assistance to children trafficked in West Africa, which has assisted several hundred children over the past few years. It is our hope that both the 10-Point Plan and the Migration Dialogue can be further operationalized through a regional specific collaborative approach.

Finally, it is my hope that this conference and the follow-on activities of UNHCR, IOM, and ECOWAS member states will make migration safer, more orderly, and more humane. The time is right for partnership and enhanced cooperation within existing mandates to advance this effort. I look forward to learning from you during the next two days especially as to how ECOWAS countries choose to pursue this important, often life-saving work.

Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2000 - 2007

By

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October 23, 2008**

[The following is an excerpt from the full report for *Congress Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2000-2007*, October 23, 2008. The full report can be viewed at: <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/112020.pdf>.]

Introduction and Overview

This report provides Congress with official, unclassified, background data from U.S. government sources on transfers of conventional arms to developing nations by major suppliers for the period 2000 through 2007. It also includes some data on worldwide supplier transactions. It updates and revises Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report RL34187, *Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1999-2006*.

The data in this report provide a means for Congress to identify existing supplier-purchaser relationships in conventional weapons acquisitions. Use of these data can assist Congress in its oversight role of assessing whether the current nature of the international weapons trade affects U.S. national interests. For most of recent American history, maintaining regional stability and ensuring the security of U.S. allies and friendly nations throughout the world have been important elements of U.S. foreign policy. Knowing the degree to which individual arms suppliers are making arms transfers to individual nations or regions provides Congress with a context for evaluating policy questions it may confront. Such policy questions may include, for example, whether or not to support specific U.S. arms sales to given countries or regions or to support or oppose such arms transfers by other nations. The data in this report may also assist Congress in evaluating whether multilateral arms control arrangements or other U.S. foreign policy initiatives are being supported or undermined by the actions of arms suppliers.

The principal focus of this report is the level of arms transfers by major weapons suppliers to nations in the developing world — where most of the potential for the outbreak of regional military conflicts currently exists. For decades, during the height of the Cold War, providing conventional weapons to friendly states was an instrument of foreign policy utilized by the United States and its allies. This was equally true for the Soviet Union and its allies. The underlying rationale for U.S. arms transfer policy then was to help ensure that friendly states were not placed at risk through a military disadvantage created by arms transfers by the Soviet Union or its allies. Following the Cold War's end, U.S. arms transfer policy has been based on assisting friendly and allied nations in developing and maintaining their ability to deal with regional security threats and concerns.

The data in this report illustrate how global patterns of conventional arms transfers have changed in the post-Cold War and post-Persian Gulf War years. Relationships between arms suppliers and recipients continue to evolve in response to changing political, military, and economic circumstances. Where before the principal motivation for arms sales by foreign suppliers might have been to support a foreign policy objective, today that motivation may be based as much on economic considerations as those of foreign or national security policy.

The developing world continues to be the primary focus of foreign arms sales activity by conventional weapons suppliers. During the period of this report, 2000-2007, conventional arms transfer agreements (which represent orders for future delivery) to developing nations comprised 66.6 percent of the value of all international arms transfer agreements. The portion of agreements with developing countries constituted 67.7 percent of all agreements globally from 2004-2007. In 2007, arms transfer agreements with developing countries accounted for 70.5 percent of the value of all such agreements globally. Deliveries of conventional arms to developing nations, from 2004-2007, constituted 64.7 percent of all international arms deliveries. In 2007, arms deliveries to developing nations constituted 55.6 percent of the value of all such arms deliveries worldwide.

The data in this new report supersede all data published in previous editions. Since these new data for 2000-2007 reflect potentially significant updates to and revisions in the underlying databases utilized for this report, only the data in this most recent edition should be used. The data are expressed in U.S. dollars for the calendar years indicated and adjusted for inflation (see the next few sub-titled sections of this article for more detail). U.S. commercially licensed arms export delivery values are excluded (see the section of this article sub-titled “United States Commercial Arms Exports”). Also excluded are arms transfers by any supplier to sub-national groups. The definition of developing nations, as used in this report, and the specific classes of items included in its values totals are found in the section of this article sub-titled “Definition of Developing Nations and Regions.”

Calendar Year Data Used

All arms transfer and arms delivery data in this report are for the calendar year or calendar year period given. This applies to U.S. and foreign data alike. The U.S. government departments and agencies publish data on U.S. arms transfers and deliveries but generally use the U.S. fiscal year as the computational time period for these data. As a consequence, there are likely to be distinct differences noted in those published totals using a fiscal year basis and those provided in this report which use a calendar year basis.

Arms Transfer Values

The values of arms transfer agreements (or deliveries) in this report refer to the total values of conventional arms orders (or deliveries as the case may be) which include all categories of weapons and ammunition, military spare parts, military construction, military assistance and training programs, and all associated services.

Definition of Developing Nations Regions

As used in this report, the developing nation’s category includes all countries except the

- United States
- Russia
- European nations
- Canada
- Japan, Australia
- New Zealand

A listing of countries located in the regions defined for the purpose of this analysis, Asia, Near East, Latin America, and Africa is provided in the full report (available at <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/112020.pdf>.)

Constant 2007 Dollars

Throughout this report values of arms transfer agreements and values of arms deliveries for all suppliers are expressed in U.S. dollars. Values for any given year generally reflect the exchange rates that prevailed during that specific year. The report converts these dollar amounts (current dollars) into constant 2007 dollars. Although this helps to eliminate the distorting effects of U.S. inflation to permit a more accurate comparison of various dollar levels over time, the effects of fluctuating exchange rates are not neutralized. The deflators used for the constant dollar calculations in this report are those provided by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). Unless otherwise noted in the report, all dollar values are stated in constant terms.

Major Findings

General Trends in Arms Transfers Worldwide

The value of all arms transfer agreements worldwide (to both developed and developing nations) in 2007 was nearly \$60 billion. This was an increase in arms agreements values over 2006 of 9.2 percent.

In 2007, the U.S. led in arms transfer agreements worldwide, making agreements valued at over \$24.8 billion (41.5 percent of all such agreements), up significantly from \$16.7 billion in 2006. Russia ranked second with \$10.4 billion in agreements (17.3 percent of these agreements globally), down from \$14.3 billion in 2006. The United Kingdom ranked third; its arms transfer agreements worldwide were \$9.8 billion in 2007, up from \$4.1 billion in 2006. The U.S., Russia, and the United Kingdom collectively made agreements in 2007 valued at over \$45 billion, 75.2 percent of all international arms transfer agreements made by all suppliers.

For the period 2004-2007, the total value of all international arms transfer agreements (\$208.3 billion) was substantially higher than the worldwide value during 2000-2003 (\$147.6 billion), an increase of 29.2 percent. During the period 2000-2003, developing world nations accounted for 67.7 percent of the value of all arms transfer agreements made worldwide. During 2004-2007, developing world nations accounted for 67.7 percent of all arms transfer agreements made globally. In 2007, developing nations accounted for 70.5 percent of all arms transfer agreements made worldwide.

In 2007, the U.S. ranked first in the value of all arms deliveries worldwide, making nearly \$12.8 billion in such deliveries or 41.3 percent. This is the eighth year in a row that the U.S. has led in global arms deliveries. Russia ranked second in worldwide arms deliveries in 2007, making \$4.7 billion in such deliveries. The United Kingdom ranked third in 2007, making \$2.6 billion in such deliveries. These top three suppliers of arms in 2007 collectively delivered nearly \$20.1 billion, 64.8 percent of all arms delivered worldwide by all suppliers in that year. The value of all international arms deliveries in 2007 was \$31 billion. This is a decrease in the total value of arms deliveries from the previous year (a decline from \$33.6 billion). The total value of such arms deliveries worldwide in 2004-2007 (\$134.9 billion) was lower than the deliveries worldwide from 2000-2003 (\$143.6 billion), a decline of nearly \$10 billion.

Developing nations from 2004-2007 accounted for 64.7 percent of the value of all international arms deliveries. In the earlier period, 2000-2003, developing nations accounted for 65.1 percent of the value of all arms deliveries worldwide. In 2007, developing nations collectively accounted for 55.6 percent of the value of all international arms deliveries.

Worldwide weapons orders increased in 2007. The total of nearly \$60 billion was an increase from \$54.9 billion in 2006, or 9.2 percent. Global arms agreement values for the other years covered here ranged from \$48.7 billion in 2005 to \$32.6 billion in 2003. Of the major arms orders secured in 2007, most were made by the traditional major suppliers. In some instances these orders represented

significant new acquisitions by the purchasing country. In others they reflected the continuation or acceleration of a longer-term weapons-acquisition program.

The increase in new weapons sales can also be explained, in part, by the decision of some purchasing nations to acquire major systems they had deferred buying due to budgetary considerations. Some nations were completing the integration of major weapons systems they had already purchased into their force structures. Some of the growth in arms transfer agreements more recently also reflects contracts related to training and support services, as well as upgrades of existing weapons systems. Individual orders such as these can be expensive and, in given instances, prove to be nearly as costly as orders for new units of military equipment.

Because the international arms market continues to be intensely competitive, several producing countries have focused sales efforts on prospective clients in nations and regions where individual suppliers have had competitive advantages resulting from well-established military-support relationships. Arms sales to new North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member nations in Europe to support their military modernization programs have created new business for arms suppliers, while allowing these NATO states to sell some of their older generation military equipment, in refurbished form, to other less-developed countries.

There are inherent limitations on these European sales due to the smaller defense budgets of many of the purchasing countries. Yet creative seller financing options, as well as the use of co-assembly, co-production, and counter-trade agreements to offset costs to the buyers, continue to facilitate new arms agreements. It seems likely that the U.S. and European countries or consortia will compete vigorously for prospective arms contracts within the European region in the foreseeable future. Such sales seem particularly important to European suppliers, as they can potentially compensate, in part, for lost weapons deals elsewhere in the developing world that result from reduced demand for new weapons.

Developed nations continue their efforts to protect important elements of their national military industrial bases by limiting arms purchases from other developed nations. However, several key arms suppliers have placed additional emphasis on joint production of various weapons systems with other developed nations as a more effective way to preserve a domestic weapons production capability, while sharing the costs of new weapons development. The consolidation of certain sectors of the domestic defense industries of key weapons-producing nations continues in the face of intense foreign competition. Some supplying nations, meanwhile, have chosen to manufacture items for niche weapons categories where their specialized production capabilities give them important advantages in the international arms marketplace.

Despite the recent upward trend in weapons purchases with the developed world, some developing nations have limited their weapons purchases primarily due to their limited financial resources to pay for such equipment. Other prospective arms purchasers in the developing world with significant financial assets have been cautious in launching new and costly weapons-procurement programs. Increases in the price of oil, while an advantage for major oil producing states in funding their arms purchases, has, simultaneously, caused economic difficulties for many oil consuming states, contributing to their decisions to curtail or defer new weapons acquisitions. A number of less affluent developing nations have chosen to upgrade existing weapons systems in their inventories, while reducing their purchases of new ones. This circumstance may curtail sales of some new weapons systems. Yet the weapons upgrade market can be very lucrative for some arms producers and partially mitigate the effect of fewer opportunities for the sale of major items of military equipment.

Most recently, the nations in the Near East and Asia regions have resumed large weapons purchases in contrast with arms sales activity in the earliest years of this report. These major orders continue to be made by a select few developing nations in these regions. They have been made principally by

India and China in Asia and Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) in the Near East. These purchasing tendencies are subject to abrupt change based on the strength of either the threat assessments of individual states or the strength of their individual economies. For the larger group of nations in these regions, the strength of the economies of a wide range of nations in the developing world continues to be the most significant factor in the timing of many of their arms purchasing decisions.

Latin America and, to a much lesser extent, Africa are regions where some nations wish to modernize important sectors of their military forces. Some large arms orders (by regional standards) have been placed by a few states in these two regions within the last decade. Yet in Latin America and Africa, many countries are constrained in their weapons purchases by their financial resources. So long as there is limited availability of seller-supplied credit and financing for weapons purchases and national budgets for military purchases remain relatively low, it seems likely that major arms sales to these two regions of the developing world will be limited to a small number of nations there.

General Trends in Arms Transfers to Developing Nations

The value of all arms transfer agreements with developing nations in 2007 was nearly \$42.3 billion, an increase from the \$38.1 billion total in 2006. In 2007, the value of all arms deliveries to developing nations (\$17.2 billion) was lower than the value of 2006 deliveries (over \$21.4 billion) and the lowest total for the 2000-2007 periods. Recently, from 2004-2007, the U.S. and Russia have dominated the arms market in the developing world, with both nations either ranking first or second for three out of these four years in the value of arms transfer agreements. From 2004-2007, Russia made nearly \$39.3 billion, 27.9 percent of all such agreements, expressed in constant 2007 dollars. During this same period, the U.S. made \$34.7 billion in such agreements, 24.6 percent of all such agreements. Collectively, the U.S. and Russia made 52.5 percent of all arms transfer agreements with developing nations during this four year period. The United Kingdom, the third leading supplier, from 2004-2007, made \$21.3 billion or 15.1 percent of all such agreements with developing nations during these years. In the earlier period (2000-2003), the U.S. ranked first with \$46.4 billion in arms transfer agreements with developing nations or 48.3 percent. Russia made \$25.6 billion in arms transfer agreements during this period or 26.6 percent. France made nearly \$5 billion in agreements or 5.2 percent.

From 2000-2007, most arms transfers to developing nations were made by two major suppliers in any given year. The U.S. ranked first among these suppliers for five of the last eight years during this period, falling to third place in 2005. Russia has been a strong competitor for the lead in arms transfer agreements with developing nations, ranking second every year from 2000 through 2003, and first from 2004-2006. Although Russia has lacked the larger traditional client base for armaments held by the U.S. and the major West European suppliers, its recent successes in concluding new arms orders suggest that Russia is likely to continue to be, for some time, a significant leader in arms agreements with developing nations. Russia's most significant high value arms transfer agreements continue to be with India and China. Russia has also had some success in concluding arms agreements with clients beyond its principal two. Russia continues to seek to expand its prospects in North Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia.

Most recently Russia has increased sales efforts in Latin America, despite having essentially abandoned major arms sales efforts there after the end of the Cold War. Venezuela has become a significant new arms client gained by Russia in this region. The Russian government has adopted more flexible payment arrangements for its prospective customers in the developing world, including a willingness in specific cases to forgive outstanding debts owed to it by a prospective client in order to secure new arms purchases. Additionally, Russia continues to seek to enhance the quality of its follow-on support services to make Russian products more attractive and competitive and to assure its

potential clients that it can effectively provide timely service and spare parts for the weapons systems it exports.

Major West European arms suppliers, particularly France and the United Kingdom, have concluded large orders with developing countries over the last eight years based on either long-term supply relationships or their having specialized weapons systems readily available. Germany has been a key source of naval systems for developing nations. Although it faces increased competition from these other major arms suppliers, the U.S. appears likely to hold its position as the principal supplier to key developing world nations, especially those able to afford major new weapons. The U.S. has developed for decades such a wide base of arms equipment clients globally that it is able to conclude a notable number of agreements annually to provide upgrades, ordnance, and support services for the large variety of weapons systems it has previously sold to its clients. Thus, even when the U.S. does not conclude major new arms agreements in a given year, it can still register significant arms agreement values based on transactions in these other categories.

The principal arms-supplying nations continue to focus their sales efforts on the wealthier developing countries. Arms transfers to the less affluent developing nations are still constrained by the scarcity of funds in their defense budgets and the unsettled state of the international economy. The overall decline in the level of arms agreements with developing nations that began after 2001 and continued through 2003 has halted. Arms transfer agreements with developing countries reached their highest total value in 2007 at nearly \$43.3 billion. From 2004 through 2007, there has been a steady increase in arms transfer agreements with developing countries [and], to an important degree, by sales to the more affluent nations in this group. Those developing nations with notably increased oil revenues have been particularly active in seeking new weaponry most recently.

China, as well as other European and non-European suppliers, appears to have increased their participation in the arms trade with the developing world in recent years, albeit at lower levels and with more uneven results than those of the major suppliers. Nevertheless, these non-major arms suppliers have proven capable, on occasion, of making arms deals of consequence. Most of their annual arms transfer agreement values during 2000-2007 have been comparatively low, although the values are larger when they are aggregated together as a group. In individual cases they have been successful in selling older generation equipment, while they procure newer weapons to upgrade their own military forces. These arms suppliers also are more likely to be sources of small arms and light weapons and associated ordnance, rather than routine sellers of major military equipment. Most of these arms suppliers have not consistently ranked with the traditional major suppliers of advanced weaponry in the value of their arms agreements and deliveries.

United States

The total value in real terms of U.S. arms transfer agreements with developing nations rose from \$9.1 billion in 2006 to \$12.2 billion in 2007. The U.S. share of the value of all such agreements was 28.8 percent in 2007, up from a 24 percent share in 2006.

In 2007, the total value of U.S. arms transfer agreements with developing nations was attributable to a few major deals with clients in the Near East and in Asia. A substantial number of smaller valued purchases by a wide number of traditional U.S. arms clients throughout the Near East and Asia contributed notably to the overall U.S. agreements total. The arms agreements total of the U.S. in 2007 illustrates the continuing U.S. advantage of having well-established defense support arrangements with weapons purchasers worldwide, based upon the existing variety of U.S. weapons systems their militaries utilize. The U.S. agreements with all of its clients in 2007 include not only sales of major weapons systems, but also the upgrading of systems previously provided. The U.S. totals also include agreements for a wide variety of spare parts, ammunition, ordnance, training, and support services which, in the aggregate, have significant value.

Among the larger valued arms transfer agreements the United States concluded in 2007 with developing nations were: with the U.A.E. for 26 UH- 60M Black Hawk helicopters for over \$800 million and for 20 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) launchers and rockets for \$595 million. Other U.S. arms agreements in 2007 were with the following:

- Egypt for co-production of 125 M1A1 Abrams tanks for \$771 million
- Saudi Arabia for 152 GE/Pratt and Whitney jet engines for \$386 million and for F-15 aircraft follow-on services for \$319 million
- South Korea for 58 AN/VRC-90E SINCGAR radio systems for \$427 million and for 210 SM-2 STANDARD Block III missiles for \$210 million,
- Colombia for 15 UH-60L Black Hawk helicopters for \$217 million
- Jordan for a C4SIR system for \$208 million.

Russia

The total value of Russia's arms transfer agreements with developing nations in 2007 was \$9.7 billion, a decrease from \$14.4 billion in 2006, placing Russia third in such agreements with the developing world. Russia's share of all developing world arms transfer agreements increased then fell from 37.9 percent in 2006 to 23 percent in 2007.

Russian arms transfer agreement totals with developing nations have been notable during the last four years. During the 2004-2007 periods, Russia ranked first among all suppliers to developing countries, making \$37.9 billion in agreements (in current 2007 dollars). Russia's status as a leading supplier of arms to developing nations stems from a successful effort to overcome the significant economic and political problems associated with the dissolution of the former Soviet Union. Traditional arms clients of the former Soviet Union were generally less wealthy developing countries valued as much for their political support during the Cold War as for their desire for Soviet weaponry. Several of these Soviet-era client states received substantial military aid grants and significant discounts on their arms purchases. After 1991 Russia consistently placed a premium on obtaining hard currency for the weapons it sold. Faced with stiff competition from Western arms suppliers in the post-Cold War period, Russia modified and adapted its selling practices in an effort to regain and sustain an important share of the developing-world arms market.

In recent years, Russian leaders have made significant efforts to provide more creative financing and payment options for prospective arms clients. They have agreed to the following:

- To engage in counter-trade
- Offsets
- Debt-swapping
- In key cases, to make significant licensed production agreements in order to sell Russia's weapons.

The willingness to license production has been a central element in several cases involving Russia's principal arms clients, India and China. Russia's efforts to expand its arms customer base have met with mixed results. Russia's arms sales efforts, apart from those with China and India, have been focused on Southeast Asia. Here Russia has secured arms agreements with Malaysia, Vietnam, and Indonesia. Most recently Russia has concluded major arms deals with Venezuela and with Algeria. Elsewhere in the developing world, Russian military equipment can be competitive

because it ranges from the most basic to the highly advanced. For less affluent developing nations, Russia's less expensive armaments are particularly attractive.

The sale of military aircraft and missiles continues to be a significant portion of Russia's arms exports. But the absence of major new research and development efforts in this and other military equipment areas can jeopardize long-term Russian foreign arms sales prospects. Although military weapons research and development (R&D) programs exist in Russia, other major arms suppliers are currently more advanced in the process of developing and producing weaponry than in existing Russian R&D programs.

Despite these potential difficulties, Russia continues to have important arms development and sales programs involving India and China, which should provide it with sustained business throughout this decade. Through agreements concluded in the mid-1990s, Russia has sold major combat fighter aircraft and main battle tanks to India and has provided other major weapons systems through lease or licensed production. It continues to provide support services and items for these various weapons systems. Sales of advanced weaponry in South Asia by Russia have been a matter of ongoing concern to the U.S. because of long-standing tensions between India and Pakistan. When India acquires a new weapon system, this typically leads Pakistan to seek comparable weapons or those with offsetting capabilities. A key U.S. policy objective is keeping a potentially destabilizing arms race in this region within check.¹

China has been Russia's other key arms client in Asia, especially for advanced aircraft and naval systems. Since 1996, Russia has sold China Su-27 fighter aircraft and agreed to licensed production of them. It has sold the Chinese quantities of Su-30 multi-role fighter aircraft, Sovremenny-class destroyers equipped with Sunburn anti-ship missiles, and Kilo-class Project 636 submarines. Russia has also sold the Chinese a variety of other weapons systems and missiles. In 2005, Russia agreed to sell China 30 IL-76TD military transport aircraft and 8 IL-78M aerial refueling tanker aircraft for more than \$1 billion. Russia also signed new arms transfer agreements with China for a number of AL-31F military aircraft engines for \$1 billion and agreed to sell jet engines for China's FC-1 fighter aircraft at a cost in excess of \$250 million. Chinese arms acquisitions are apparently aimed at enhancing its military projection capabilities in Asia and its ability to influence events throughout the region. These acquisitions continue to be monitored by U.S. policymakers. The U.S. policy interest is, among other things, ensuring that it provides appropriate military equipment to U.S. allies and friendly states in Asia to help offset any prospective threat China may pose to such nations, while keeping the U.S. military aware of any threat it may face in any confrontation with China.² In 2007 there were no especially large Chinese arms agreements with Russia, possibly because the Chinese military is focused on absorbing and integrating previous arms purchases from Russia into its force structure.

Among the most significant arms transfer deals Russia made in 2007 were [those made] with India. These agreements included the sale of 347 T-90 main battle tanks, 40 Su-30MKI combat fighter aircraft, and a number of MiG-29 fighter aircraft. Also concluded was an agreement for the production of jet aircraft engines and one for long term defense production cooperation. An important portion of Russia's \$9.7 billion arms agreement total for 2007 was with India.

1. For detailed background see CRS Report RL33515, *Combat Aircraft Sales to South Asia: Potential Implications*, by Christopher Bolkcom, Richard F. Grimmer, and K. Alan Kronstadt; CRS Report RL32115, *Missile Proliferation and the Strategic Balance in South Asia*, by Andrew Feickert and K. Alan Kronstadt; and CRS Report RL30427, *Missile Survey: Ballistic and Cruise Missiles of Selected Foreign Countries*, by Andrew Feickert.

2. For detailed background see CRS Report RL30700, *China's Foreign Conventional Arms Acquisitions: Background and Analysis*, by Shirley Kan, Christopher Bolkcom, and Ronald O'Rourke and CRS Report RL33153, *China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities — Background and Issues for Congress*, by Ronald O'Rourke.

In 2007, Russia also made new arms sales with Indonesia for three Su-27SKM and three Su-30MK2 fighter aircraft for \$355 million and for Mi-17 and Mi35M helicopters for over \$100 million. Iran contracted with Russia for five batteries of the S-300PMU1 air defense system, and Syria purchased the Buk-M1-2 air defense system.

China

The Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s provided China with the opportunity to become an important supplier of less expensive weapons to certain developing nations. During that conflict China demonstrated that it was willing to provide arms to both combatants in the war, in quantity and without conditions. Since that time China's arms sales have been more regional and targeted. From 2004-2007, the value of China's arms transfer agreements with developing nations averaged about \$2.3 billion annually. During the period of this report, the value of China's arms transfer agreements with developing nations was highest in 2007 at \$3.8 billion. A significant portion of that total can be attributed to a significant contract with Pakistan associated with the production of the J-17 fighter aircraft. Generally, China's sales figures reflect several smaller valued weapons deals in Asia, Africa, and the Near East, rather than one or two especially large agreements for major weapons systems.

There have been few developing nations with significant financial resources that have sought to purchase Chinese military equipment during the eight-year period of this report, because most Chinese weapons for export are less advanced and sophisticated than weaponry available from Western suppliers or Russia. China, consequently, does not appear likely to be a key supplier of major conventional weapons in the international arms market for the foreseeable future. China's likely client base could be states in Asia and Africa seeking quantities of small arms and light weapons, rather than major combat systems. At the same time, China has been an important source of missiles in the developing world arms market. China supplied Silkworm anti-ship missiles to Iran. Credible reports persist in various publications that China has sold surface-to-surface missiles to Pakistan, a long standing and important client. Iran and North Korea have also reportedly received Chinese missile technology, which may have increased their capabilities to threaten other countries in their respective neighborhoods. The continued reporting of such activities by credible sources raises important questions about China's stated commitment to the restrictions on missile transfers set out in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), including its pledge not to assist others in building missiles that could deliver nuclear weapons. Since China has some military products, particularly missiles that some developing countries would like to acquire, it can present an obstacle to efforts to stem proliferation of advanced missile systems to some areas of the developing world where political and military tensions are significant and where some nations are seeking to develop asymmetric military capabilities.³

China, among others, has been a key source of a variety of small arms and light weapons transferred to African states. Although the prospects for significant revenue earnings from these arms sales are limited, China may view such sales as one means of enhancing its status as an international political power and increasing its ability to obtain access to significant natural resources, especially oil. Controlling the sales of small arms and light weapons to regions of conflict, in particular to

3. For detailed background on the MTCR and proliferation control regimes and related policy issues, see CRS Report RL31559, *Proliferation Control Regimes: Background and Status*, by Mary Beth Nikitin, Paul Kerr, Steve Bowman, and Steven A. Hildreth and CRS Report RL31848, *Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (ICOC): Background and Issues for Congress*, by Andrew Feickert.

some African nations, has been a matter of concern to the U.S. The U.N. also has undertaken an examination of this issue in an effort to achieve consensus on a path to address it.⁴

Major West European Suppliers

Beyond the U.S. and Russia, the four major West European arms suppliers are:

- France
- The United Kingdom
- Germany
- Italy

The four are the nations that can supply a wide variety of more highly sophisticated weapons to would-be purchasers. They can serve as alternative sources of armaments that the U.S. chooses not to supply for policy reasons. The United Kingdom sold major combat fighter aircraft to Saudi Arabia in the mid-1980s, when the U.S. chose not to sell a comparable aircraft for policy reasons. These four NATO nations have been allies of the U.S. and generally have supported the U.S. position in restricting arms sales to certain nations during the Cold War era. In the post-Cold War era, their national defense export policies have not been fully coordinated with the U.S. as likely would have been the case at the Cold War's height.

These leading European arms supplying states, particularly France, view arms sales foremost as a matter for national decision. France has also frequently used foreign military sales (FMS) as an important means for underwriting development and procurement of weapons systems for its own military forces. So the potential exists for policy differences between the U.S. and major West European supplying states over conventional weapons transfers to specific countries. Such a conflict resulted from an effort led by France and Germany to lift the arms embargo on arms sales to China currently adhered to by members of the European Union (E.U.). The U.S. viewed this as a misguided effort and vigorously opposed it. The proposal to lift the embargo was ultimately not adopted, but it proved to be a source of significant tension between the U.S. and the E.U. Thus, arms sales activities of major European suppliers continue to be of interest to U.S. policymakers, given their capability to make sales of advanced military equipment to countries of concern to U.S. national security policy.⁵

The four major West European suppliers, France, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy, as a group, registered a significant increase in their collective share of all arms transfer agreements with developing nations between 2006 and 2007. This group's share rose from 18.5 percent in 2006 to 32.2 percent in 2007. The collective value of this group's arms transfer agreements with developing nations in 2007 was \$13.6 billion compared with a total of \$7.1 billion in 2006. Of these four nations, the United Kingdom was the leading supplier with \$9.8 billion in agreements in 2007, a dramatic increase from \$4.1 billion in agreements in 2006. A substantial portion of the United

4. For background on China's actions and motivations for increased activities in Africa, see CRS Report RL33055, *China and Sub-Saharan Africa*, by Raymond W. Copson, Kerry Dumbaugh, and Michelle Lau. For background on U.S. policy concerns regarding small arms and light weapons transfers, see CRS Report RS20958, *International Small Arms and Light Weapons Transfers: U.S. Policy*, by Richard F. Grimmett.

5. For detailed background see CRS Report RL32870, *European Union's Arms Embargo on China: Implications and Options for U.S. Policy*, by Kristin Archick, Richard F. Grimmett, and Shirley Kan. It should be noted that members of the European Union, and others, have agreed to a common effort to attempt some degree of control on the transfer of certain weapons systems; but the principal vehicle for this cooperation — the Wassenaar Arrangement — lacks a mechanism to enforce its rules. For detailed background see CRS Report RS20517, *Military Technology and Conventional Weapons Exports Controls: The Wassenaar Arrangement*, by Richard F. Grimmett.

Kingdom's \$9.8 billion agreement total in 2007 is attributable to an order valued in excess of \$9 billion from Saudi Arabia for 72 Typhoon Eurofighter aircraft. Germany's \$1.5 billion in arms agreements in 2007 resulted primarily from an agreement with South Korea for the purchase of an existing Patriot PAC-2 air defense system for \$1.2 billion.

Collectively, the four major West European suppliers held a 32.2 percent share of all arms transfer agreements with developing nations during 2007. In the period from 2004-2007, they have generally been important participants in the developing world arms market. Individual suppliers within the major West European group have had notable years for arms agreements, especially France in 2000 and 2005 (\$2.2 billion and \$6.8 billion, respectively). The United Kingdom also had large agreement years in 2004 (\$4.5 billion), in 2006 (\$4.1 billion), and \$9.8 billion in 2007. Germany concluded arms agreements totaling nearly \$2 billion in 2006 and \$1.5 billion in 2007. In the case of each of these three European nations, large agreement totals in one year have usually reflected the conclusion of very large arms contracts with one or more major purchasers in that particular year.

The major West European suppliers have had their competitive position in weapons exports strengthened over the years through strong government marketing support for their foreign arms sales. As they all can produce both advanced and basic air, ground, and naval weapons systems, the four major West European suppliers have competed successfully for arms sales contracts with developing nations against both the U.S., which has tended to sell to several of the same clients, and with Russia, which has sold to nations [who are] not traditional customers of either the West Europeans or the U.S. But the demand for U.S. weapons in the global arms marketplace, from a large established client base, has created a more difficult environment for individual West European suppliers to secure, on a sustained basis, large new contracts with developing nations.

A few European arms suppliers have begun to phase out production of certain types of weapons systems. Such suppliers have increasingly engaged in joint production ventures with other key European weapons suppliers or even client countries in an effort to sustain major sectors of their individual defense industrial base, even if a substantial portion of the weapons produced are for their own armed forces. The Eurofighter project is one example; the Eurocopter is another. Other European suppliers have also adopted the strategy of cooperating in defense production ventures with the U.S. such as the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), rather than attempting to compete directly, thereby meeting their own requirements for advanced combat aircraft, while positioning themselves to share in profits resulting from future sales of this new fighter aircraft.⁶

Continuing strong demand for U.S. defense equipment as well as concern for maintaining their market share of the arms trade has led E.U. member states to adopt a new code of conduct for defense procurement practices. This code was agreed to on November 21, 2005 at the European Defense Agency's (EDA) steering board meeting. Currently voluntary, the E.U. hopes it will become mandatory and through its mechanisms foster greater competition within the European defense equipment sector in the awarding of contracts for defense items. The larger hope is that by fostering greater intra-European cooperation and collaboration in defense contracting and the resulting programs . . . the defense industrial bases of individual E.U. states will be preserved and the ability of European defense firms to compete for arms sales in the international arms marketplace will be substantially enhanced.

Regional Arms Transfer Agreements

The markets for arms in regions of the developing world have traditionally been dominated by the Near East and by Asia. Nations in the Latin America and Africa regions, by contrast, have not

6. For detailed background on issues relating to the Joint Strike Fighter program, see CRS Report RL30563, *F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program: Background, Status, and Issues*, by Christopher Bolkcom.

been major purchasers of weapons, except on rare occasions. The U.S. policymakers have placed emphasis on helping to maintain stability throughout the regions of the developing world. Thus, the U.S. has made and supported arms sales and transfers it has believed would advance that goal, while discouraging significant sales by other suppliers to states and regions where military threats to nations in the area are minimal. Other arms suppliers do not necessarily share the U.S. perspective on what constitutes an appropriate arms sale. For in some instances, the financial benefit of the sale to the supplier trumps other considerations. The regional and country specific arms-transfer data in this report provide an indication of where various arms suppliers are focusing their attention and who their principal clients are. By reviewing these data, policymakers can identify potential developments which may be of concern and use this information to assist their review of options they may choose to consider given the circumstances. What follows below is a review of data on arms-transfer agreement activities in the two regions that lead in arms acquisitions, the Near East and Asia. This is followed, in turn, by a review of data regarding the leading arms purchasers in the developing world.

Near East⁷

The primary catalyst for new weapons procurements in the Near East region in the last decade was the Persian Gulf crisis of August 1990-February 1991. This crisis, culminating in a U.S.-led war to expel Iraq from Kuwait, created new demands by key purchasers such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the U.A.E., and other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) for a variety of advanced weapons systems. Subsequently, major concerns over the growing strategic threat from Iran have become the principal driver of GCC states' arms purchases. Because GCC states do not share a land border with Iran, their weapons purchases have focused primarily on air, naval, and missile defense systems. Egypt and Israel, meanwhile, have continued their military modernization programs, increasing their arms purchases from the U.S.⁸

Most recently, the position of Saudi Arabia as principal arms purchaser in the Persian Gulf region has been re-established. In the period from 2000-2003, Saudi Arabia's total arms agreements were valued at \$3.2 billion (in current dollars), less than the levels of the U.A.E., Egypt, and Israel. For the period from 2004-2007, Saudi Arabia's total arms agreements were \$23.2 billion (in current dollars), making it the leading Near East purchaser once again.

The Near East has generally been the largest arms market in the developing world. However, in 2000-2003, it accounted for 42.3 percent of the total value of all developing nations arms transfer agreements (\$33.3 billion in current dollars), ranking it second behind Asia which was first with 46.9 percent of these agreements (\$35.2 billion in current dollars). During 2004-2007, the Near East region accounted for 46.3 percent of all such agreements (\$63.1 billion in current dollars), again placing it first in arms agreements with the developing world. The Asia region ranked second in 2004-2007 with \$57.6 billion in agreements or 42.3 percent.

The U.S. dominated arms transfer agreements with the Near East during the 2000-2003 period with 73.6 percent of their total value (\$24.5 billion in current dollars). Russia was second during these years with 9.3 percent (\$3.1 billion in current dollars). Recently, from 2004-2007, the United States accounted for 32.8 percent of arms agreements with this region (\$20.7 billion in current dollars). The United Kingdom accounted for 27.9 percent of the region's agreements (\$17.6 billion in current

7. In this report the Near East region includes the following nations: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, U.A.E., and Yemen. The countries included in the other geographic regions are listed at the end of the full report (<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/112020.pdf>).

8. For detailed background see CRS Report RL31533, *The Persian Gulf States: Issues for U.S. Policy*, 2006, by Kenneth Katzman.

dollars). Russia accounted for 20.8 percent of the region's agreements in the most recent period (\$13.1 billion in current dollars).

Asia

Efforts in several developing nations in Asia have been focused on upgrading and modernizing defense forces, and this has led to new conventional weapons sales in that region. Since the mid-1990s, Russia has become the principal supplier of advanced conventional weaponry to China, selling fighters, submarines, destroyers, and missiles, while maintaining its position as principal arms supplier to India. Russian arms sales to these two countries have been primarily responsible for the increase in Asia's overall share of the arms market in the developing world. Russia has expanded its client base in Asia, receiving aircraft orders from Malaysia, Vietnam, and Indonesia. India has also expanded its weapons supplier base, purchasing the Phalcon early warning defense system aircraft in 2004 from Israel for \$1.1 billion and numerous items from France in 2005, in particular 6 Scorpene diesel attack submarines for \$3.5 billion. In 2007, India made major purchases from Russia of T-90 main battle tanks, Su-30 MKI fighter aircraft, and MiG-29 fighter aircraft. The U.S. made a multi-billion dollar sale to Pakistan in 2006 of new F-16 fighter aircraft, weapons, and aircraft upgrades, while Sweden sold it a SAAB-2000 based AWACS airborne radar system for over a billion dollars. In 2007, Pakistan contracted with China for production of J-17 fighter aircraft. These transactions have placed Pakistan among the leading major Asian arms buyers of recent years. The data on regional arms-transfer agreements from 2000-2007 continue to reflect that Near East and Asian nations are the primary sources of orders for conventional weaponry in the developing world.

Asia has traditionally been the second largest developing-world arms market. In 2004-2007, Asia ranked second, accounting for 42.3 percent of the total value of all arms transfer agreements with developing nations (\$57.6 billion in current dollars). Yet in the earlier period, 2000-2003, the region ranked first, accounting for 46.9 percent of all such agreements (\$35.2 billion in current dollars).

In the earlier period (2000-2003), Russia ranked first in the value of arms transfer agreements with Asia with 49.8 percent (\$17.5 billion in current dollars). The U.S. ranked second with 19.8 percent (\$7 billion in current dollars). The major West European suppliers, as a group, made 12.5 percent of this region's agreements in 2000-2003. In the later period (2004-2007), Russia ranked first in Asian agreements with 35.9 percent (\$20.7 billion in current dollars), primarily due to major combat aircraft and naval system sales to India and China. The U.S. ranked second with 19.3 percent (\$11.1 billion in current dollars). The major West European suppliers, as a group, made 17.4 percent of this region's agreements in 2004-2007.

Leading Developing Nations Arms Purchasers

India was the leading developing world arms purchaser from 2000-2007, making arms transfer agreements totaling \$31.9 billion during these years (in current dollars). In the 2000-2003 period, China ranked first in arms transfer agreements at \$10.1 billion (in current dollars). In 2004-2007 India ranked first in arms transfer agreements, with a large increase to \$24.2 billion from \$7.7 billion in the earlier 2000-2003 period (in current dollars). This increase reflects the continuation of a military modernization effort by India, underway since the 1990s, based primarily on major arms agreements with Russia. The total value of all arms transfer agreements with developing nations from 2000-2007 was \$217.6 billion in current dollars. Thus India alone accounted for 14.7 percent of all developing world arms transfer agreements during these eight years. In the most recent period, 2004-2007, India made \$24.2 billion in arms transfer agreements (in current dollars). This total constituted 17.8 percent of all arms transfer agreements with developing nations during these four years (\$136 billion in current dollars). Saudi Arabia ranked second in arms transfer agreements during 2004-2007 with \$23.2 billion (in current dollars) or 17.1 percent of the value of all developing world arms transfer agreements. During 2000-2003, the top ten recipients collectively accounted for 66.9

percent of all developing world arms transfer agreements. During 2004-2007, the top ten recipients collectively accounted for 61.6 percent of all such agreements. Arms transfer agreements with the top ten developing world recipients, as a group, totaled \$34.1 billion in 2007 or 80.6 percent of all arms transfer agreements with developing nations in that year. These percentages reflect the continued concentration of major arms purchases by developing nations among a few countries. Saudi Arabia ranked first among all developing world recipients in the value of arms transfer agreements in 2007, concluding \$10.6 billion in such agreements.

India ranked second in agreements at \$5 billion. Pakistan ranked third with \$4.2 billion in agreements. Seven of the top ten recipients were in the Near East region; three were in the Asian region.⁹ India was the leading recipient of arms deliveries among developing world recipients in 2007, receiving \$1.6 billion in such deliveries. Israel ranked second in arms deliveries in 2007 with \$1.5 billion. Egypt ranked third with \$1.5 billion. Arms deliveries to the top ten developing nation recipients, as a group, were valued at \$11.1 billion or 64.5 percent of all arms deliveries to developing nations in 2007. Five of these top ten recipients were in Asia; three were in the Near East. One was in Latin America and one was in Africa.

Weapons Types Recently Delivered to Near East Nations

Regional weapons delivery data reflect the diverse sources of supply and type of conventional weaponry actually transferred to developing nations. Even though the U.S., Russia, and the four major West European suppliers dominate in the delivery of the fourteen classes of weapons examined, it is also evident that the other European suppliers and some non-European suppliers, including China, are capable of being leading suppliers of selected types of conventional armaments to developing nations. Weapons deliveries to the Near East, historically the largest purchasing region in the developing world, reflect the quantities and types delivered by both major and lesser suppliers. On the next page is an illustrative summary of weapons deliveries to this region for the period 2004-2007.

Large numbers of major combat systems were delivered to the Near East region from 2004-2007, specifically,

- Tanks and self-propelled guns
- Armored vehicles
- Major and minor surface combatants
- Supersonic combat aircraft
- Helicopter
- Air defense
- Anti-ship missiles

The United States and Russia made deliveries of supersonic combat aircraft to the region. The United States, China, and the European suppliers delivered many anti-ship missiles. The United States, Russia, and European suppliers in general were principal suppliers of tanks and self-propelled guns, APCs and armored cars, surface-to-air missiles, as well as helicopters. Three of these weapons categories, supersonic combat aircraft, helicopters, tanks, and self-propelled guns are especially costly and are a large portion of the dollar values of arms deliveries by the U.S. Russia, and European suppliers to the Near East region during the 2004-2007 period.

The cost of naval combatants is also generally high, and the suppliers of such systems during this period had their delivery value totals notably increased due to these transfers. Some of the less expensive weapons systems delivered to the Near East are, nonetheless, deadly and can create important security threats within the region. In particular, from 2004-2007, the U.S. delivered 77 anti-ship missiles to the Near East region. China delivered 80, and the four major West European suppliers delivered 80. The U.S. delivered six minor surface combatants to the Near East, while the major West European suppliers collectively delivered three major surface combatants, twenty-seven minor surface combatants, and six guided missile boats. The non-major West European suppliers collectively delivered 70 anti-ship missiles. Other non-European suppliers collectively delivered 560 APCs and armored cars, 88 minor surface combatants, as well as 30 surface-to-surface missiles, a weapons category not delivered by any of the other major weapons suppliers during this period to any region.

United States Commercial Arms Exports

United States commercially licensed arms deliveries data are not included in this report. The United States is the only major arms supplier that has two distinct systems for the export of weapons: the government-to-government FMS system and the licensed commercial export system. It should be noted that data maintained on U.S. commercial sales agreements and deliveries are incomplete and are not collected or revised on an on-going basis, making them significantly less precise than those for the U.S. FMS program which accounts for the overwhelming portion of U.S. conventional arms transfer agreements and deliveries involving weapons systems. There are no official compilations of commercial agreement data comparable to that for the FMS program maintained on an annual basis. Once an exporter receives from the State Department a commercial license authorization to sell valid for four years there is no current requirement that the exporter provide to the Department of State, on a systematic and on-going basis, comprehensive details regarding any sales contract that results from the license authorization, including if any such contract is reduced in scope or cancelled. Nor is the exporter required to report that no contract with the prospective buyer resulted.

Annual commercially licensed arms deliveries data are obtained from shipper's export documents and completed licenses from ports of exit by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection Agency which are then provided to the U.S. Census Bureau. The Census Bureau takes these arms export data and, following a minimal review of them, submits them to the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls in the Political-Military Bureau (PM/DDTC) of the DoS, which makes the final compilation of such data details of which are not publicly available. Once compiled by the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls at the DoS, these commercially licensed arms deliveries data are not revised. By contrast, the U.S. FMS program data, for both agreements and deliveries, maintained by the DoD, are systematically collected, reviewed for accuracy on an on-going basis, and are revised from year-to-year as needed to reflect any changes or to correct any errors in the information. This report includes all FMS deliveries data. By excluding U.S. commercial licensed arms deliveries data, the U.S. arms delivery totals will be understated.

Some have suggested that a systematic data collection and reporting system for commercial licensed exports, comparable to the one which exists now in the Department of Defense, should be established by the Department of State. Having current and comprehensive agreement and delivery data on commercially licensed exports would provide a more complete picture of the U.S. arms export trade, in this view, and thus facilitate Congressional oversight of this sector of U.S. exports.

United States

- 557 tanks and self-propelled guns
- 587 Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs) and armored cars
- 6 minor surface combatants
- 94 supersonic combat aircraft
- 29 helicopters
- 748 surface-to-air missiles
- 77 anti-ship missiles

Russia

- 230 tanks and self-propelled guns
- 260 APCs and armored cars
- 30 supersonic combat aircraft
- 30 helicopters
- 1,640 surface-to-air missiles

China

- 60 other aircraft
- 80 anti-ship missiles

Major West European Suppliers

- 20 tanks and self-propelled guns
- 60 APCs and armored cars
- 3 major surface combatants
- 27 minor surface combatants
- 6 guided missile boats
- 20 supersonic combat aircraft
- 10 helicopters
- 80 anti-ship missiles

All Other European Suppliers

- 130 tanks and self-propelled guns
- 1,280 APCs and armored cars
- 10 minor surface combatants
- 9 guided missile boats
- 320 surface-to-air missiles
- 70 anti-ship missiles

All Other Suppliers

- 560 APCs and armored cars
- 88 minor surface combatants
- 20 helicopters
- 30 surface-to-surface missiles
- 20 anti-ship missiles

United States and the United Arab Emirates Joint Statement

By
Office of the Spokesman
Department of State, Washington, D.C.,
November 17, 2008

The United States (U.S.) and the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) have an enduring partnership and share a common vision for a secure, stable, and prosperous Middle East. They share a belief in peace, respect for the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of all states and a belief that religious tolerance and moderation will prevail over violence and extremism. It is these commonly held tenets that have brought the United States and the U.A.E. to a new level of friendship and cooperation.

Our two nations have enjoyed close relations since the U.A.E.'s federation that have grown stronger in recent times. The United States and the U.A.E. collaborate as like-minded partners on regional issues such as the Arab-Israeli peace process, ensuring peace and stability in Lebanon, and supporting Iraq's increasing engagement with its neighbors. The U.S. and U.A.E. also work closely to bring peace and stability to Afghanistan and to strengthen the economy of Pakistan.

The U.S. and U.A.E. are allies and partners in the continuing struggle against terror and extremism. The U.A.E. provides the U.S. and coalition forces access to its ports and territory and other critical and important logistical assistance. The U.A.E. and the U.S. continue to work together to undercut the violent ideology used to justify extremism and prevent terrorist attacks against our people and common interests and the terrorist financing that supports terrorist organizations. The U.A.E. also enhances global security by actively participating in various initiatives to counter illicit shipments of dangerous goods and materials. The U.S. and the U.A.E. share a deep concern over the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery systems, and related materials, as well as WMD financing, and reaffirm the importance for all nations to comply with United Nations (U.N.) Security Council Resolutions and cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

The U.A.E. has played a positive role in advancing democratic reforms in the region and has helped lead the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative, including hosting the *Forum for the Future* in 2008. Ongoing efforts to increase cooperation in the fields of education and cultural exchange will not only deepen our bilateral relationship, but also promote shared values of tolerance and moderation throughout our societies.

In the area of human rights, the U.S. and U.A.E. share a common purpose in the fight against human trafficking, in expanding opportunities for women, and in improving standards for workers. The U.S. continues to work with the U.A.E. as it reforms its education system so that U.A.E. students can lead lives as life-long learners and responsible citizens in a global society.

The U.A.E. and the U.S. continue to work closely together in assuring the stability and security of energy supplies and their unhindered transit through international waterways. The U.S. recognizes that the U.A.E. has been a responsible and reliable supplier of energy to world markets, with the sustained involvement of U.S. companies in the U.A.E. oil and gas industry for more than forty years. This cooperation has increased transparency in the energy sector and promoted investment and exploration. The U.A.E. also welcomes greater U.S. participation in its significant efforts to become a leader in alternative energy research and development.

The U.S. welcomes the U.A.E.'s decision to pursue the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The U.A.E. has committed to complete operational transparency and to pursuing the highest

standards of non-proliferation safety and security. The U.S. and the U.A.E. have recognized their partnership in this important effort through the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding on April 21, 2008 and the pursuit of an Agreement Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy.

The U.S. and the U.A.E. reaffirm the importance of collaboration on international financial, trade, and investment issues. With the U.A.E. having been the top Arab destination for U.S. exports in 2007, the U.S. and U.A.E. commercial ties represent a key component of the bilateral relationship which we hope to strengthen further. Investors from the U.A.E. have been responsible and reliable investors in the U.S. for more than thirty years. Investors from the U.S. have been welcome in the U.A.E. for as long. Both countries reaffirm our common interest in an open and stable international financial system and to maintaining the free flow of cross-border investment. Investments should be made on the basis of economic and financial risk and return-related considerations. Recipient countries should ensure predictable investment frameworks. Both countries welcome the work of the International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds and the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) to establish multilateral frameworks for positive interaction between Sovereign Wealth Funds and recipient countries.

The U.S. and U.A.E. also wish to highlight the close and expanding cultural and educational ties between the two countries. The U.S. Department of Education and the U.A.E. Ministry of Education have formally established a direct relationship. The U.A.E. participates in International Visitor Programs, and the U.S. and the U.A.E. exchange Fulbright scholars. Major U.S. higher education, health care and arts institutions are involved in initiatives in the U.A.E. The U.A.E. student enrollment in U.S. universities continues to grow. The U.A.E. looks forward to opportunities [in] joint research and development (R&D) in the area of education.

The U.S. and the U.A.E. continue to explore the benefits of increased engagement by regular meetings at the Ministerial-level, chaired by the Foreign Minister and the Secretary of State. These meetings would provide an opportunity to exchange views on security cooperation, regional political issues, and the common interests they increasingly share.

PERSPECTIVES

Italy to Host Africa Command Headquarters

By

Lisa M. Novak

Mideast Stars and Stripes Contributor

[The following originally appeared in *Mideast Stars and Stripes*, December 5, 2008. The article in its original format is available at: <http://www.stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=59224>.]

Italy has agreed to host the Army and Navy headquarters units of the recently created U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM). The official announcement was made Wednesday evening in a joint statement at the U.S. Embassy in Rome by the U.S. Ambassador to Italy Ronald P. Spogli and the Italian Foreign Minister Franco Frattini.

The headquarters units might see slight personnel increases over the next few years. The Army's Southern European Task Force (SETAF), located in Vicenza could increase by about fifty active-duty personnel, bringing the active-duty staff to about 300 soldiers, according to Colonel Marcus De Oliveira, SETAF Chief of Staff.

In Naples, Naval Forces Europe was expanded to include the Africa Command component. The new Navy designation is Naval Forces Europe-Africa (NAVEUR NAVAF). With a staff of about 500, that number could increase over the next few years by about 140, according to Navy officials.

Officially established October 1, 2008, the Africa Command "was created to provide a strategic, holistic DoD approach to security on the African continent," according to Africa Command Commander Gen. William Ward, in his first posture statement to the House Armed Services Committee this past March. To that end, much of the Navy's engagement in Africa has focused on building regional cooperation on the continent. Combating piracy is a continuing focus for the Navy and for Africa Command.

The model you want to see is the regional states band together. And that is what we are trying to do in the Gulf of Guinea: set up regional partnerships down there so we can get them to work together, said Admiral Mark Fitzgerald, Commander of NAVEUR NAVAF.

The Navy's Africa Partnership Station (APS) helps train African navies to combat regional problems such as drug smuggling, piracy, illegal immigration, and human trafficking. While Fitzgerald does not see APS being absorbed by Africa Command, the new Command may provide strategic direction. For example, it could request medical training in one area or security training in another.

We . . . have always supported both Africa and Europe in our missions and goals, Fitzgerald said. With the stand-up of AFRICOM, what changed was our administrative aligning, but not really the way we do business.

I think Italy recognizes and certainly appreciates the complexities of Africa, Fitzgerald said regarding the location for the Navy component. The bottom line is that Italy is as concerned about Africa as the U.S. is.

Seoul's Defense Exports Exceed \$1 Billion

By
Jung Sung-Ki
Defense News Contributor

[The following article originally appeared on the *Defense News* website, 2 January 2009. We would like to thank *Defense News* for allowing us to reprint this article.]

South Korea sold more than \$1 billion worth of weapons and defense goods overseas in 2008, the largest amount since it began exporting defense articles in 1975, according to the Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) [in Seoul, Korea].

The \$1.03 billion in exports, a 22 percent increase from the previous year's \$844 million, is the second consecutive sharp rise following DAPA's creation.

This is very meaningful given the increase in defense exports comes amid a worldwide economic downturn, a DAPA spokesman said December 31. Through active efforts to promote the nation's defense exports since our agency's inauguration in 2006, we were able to increase the amount of the country's defense exports to some \$844 million in 2007, up from an annual average of \$250 million in previous years, and finally achieve the goal of \$1 billion.

South Korea expanded its arms trading partners last year by 12 to 58 nations, including African and South American countries such as Egypt and Peru, the spokesman said. The sale of world-class advanced weapon systems, such as self-propelled howitzers, aircraft, and ships, is a dramatic departure from the rifle ammunition and spare parts that were more common in the past, he said.

Last year's exports were boosted by a contract with Turkey over the transfer of tank development technology, he added. Under the deal, valued at \$400 million, South Korea is to help Turkey develop a main battle tank by 2015 through the transfer of technology related to the design and development of K1A1 and K2 tanks.

South Korea will transfer key technologies regarding engine, guns, and snorkeling systems to Turkey, which initially wants to build about 250 advanced main battle tanks, DAPA officials said. Seoul will provide more than 60 percent of the technology required.

The K2 Black Panther tank, built by the state-funded Agency for Defense Development and Hyundai Rotem, is armed with an indigenous 120mm/50-caliber smoothbore gun. It can reach speeds of up to 70 kilometers per hour on paved roads with gun stabilization and can cross [a] river as deep as 4.1 meters using a snorkel.

Other major contracts in 2008 include Korea Aerospace Industries' \$170 million contract with the U.S. Air Force for A-10 wing structure and ones for exporting spare parts of the K-9 self-propelled howitzer to the United States, Turkey, and others, they said.

South Korea aims to reach \$3 billion in exports by 2012 amid high expectations of the KT tank and the T-50 Golden Eagle supersonic trainer.

The country is making all-out efforts to sell the T-50 trainer overseas. Potential consumers include the United Arab Emirates, Singapore, the United States, and Greece, officials said.

In a 2009 policy briefing to President Lee Myung-bak December 31, the Ministry of National Defense pledged full-fledged efforts to support defense exports to help revive the economy, setting a goal of \$1.2 billion this year.

The Ministry will launch a pan-governmental council to support defense exports, it said in a news release. To improve cooperation with private firms and institutes, the Ministry will raise the ratio of private firm participation in defense research and development programs by 10 percent to 60 percent, it said.

Chairman Says He is Ready to Execute New President's Military Decisions

By
Samantha L. Quigley
American Forces Press Service Contributor

[The below article originally appeared in the *American Forces Press Service*, News Articles, January 12, 2009. We would like to thank *American Forces Press Service* for giving us permission to reprint the following article.]

Whatever decisions President-elect Barack Obama makes regarding Iraq and Afghanistan, the military is prepared to carry them out, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said in an interview last night on the CBS TV show "60 Minutes."

When President-elect Obama gets in and says, Here is the decision, the United States military, led by me, is going to march off and execute that decision, Navy Admiral Mike Mullen told correspondent David Martin.

Should that decision be to withdraw troops from Iraq, as Obama stated he would in campaign addresses, it is up to Mullen to tell the new President what it will take. Before Christmas, the Chairman visited the front lines in Iraq to determine for himself what it will take to get 140,000 troops out of the country gracefully. "I don't think it's 'Mission Impossible,'" Mullen said, noting that the President-elect has said consistently that he wants to withdraw troops responsibly. "Certainly, a responsible withdrawal is, I think, a very, very possible outcome here, given what I have seen transpire over the last couple of years and literally what I saw walking the streets of Samarra," the Chairman said.

Samarra is home to the al-Askari Mosque, a Shia Muslim shrine also known as "the Golden Mosque." The February 2006 bombing of the mosque sparked sectarian violence that nearly tore Iraq apart. The structure is now being rebuilt.

Mullen also made his way to Afghanistan during his pre-holiday trip, and he said he stands by his earlier assessment that "we are not winning" the war there. "I said it because I believed it, and I still believe it," he said. "I think the level of violence in 2008 surprised us all. The sophistication of the tactics of the insurgency surprised us all. A possible answer to the upswing in violence in Afghanistan includes more troops on the ground," he said. "The exact number isn't known," he acknowledged. "I talked . . . about a range between 20,000 and 30,000."

That would nearly double the number of troops fighting the insurgency in Afghanistan. But even increased troop numbers won't do any good unless the insurgent safe haven in Pakistan is mitigated, the Admiral said. Pakistan shares a border with Afghanistan, and Taliban extremists have been using safe havens within Pakistan to plan and train for attacks inside Afghanistan.

That safe haven has got to be shut down to a level where it does not have the effect that it is having now, Mullen said. In the long run, if that is not done, then additional troops are not going to have that big an impact.

Mullen said he makes a point of meeting with his Pakistani counterpart whenever he is in the area, including this past trip. This visit marked his seventh visit to the country since he took office in October 2007. "It's a critical relationship," Mullen said, adding that relations with the country are equal to, if not more important than, those with any other country right now.

“The relationship between the new President and the military he will command also is critical,” Mullen said. The Chairman met with Obama in Chicago shortly after the election at the President-elect’s request.

As Commander in Chief, the connection with the military is absolutely vital, he said. So making that connection as early as possible and as solid as possible is a huge deal.

Mullen said he does not sense any hesitancy from the military over the incoming President. “What is really important about us in the military is that we stay neutral and remain apolitical,” he said. “We work for whoever the President is. All of us in the military will do that faithfully to support President [George W.] Bush until the 20th of January, and we will do the same thing for President-elect Obama once he gets into the position.”

Assessment of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives Accountability and Control, Security Assistance, and Sustainment for the Afghan National Security Forces

[The following are excerpts from the *Executive Summary* of the Department of Defense (DoD) Office of Inspector General Report No. SPO-2009-001, Project No. D2008-D000IG-0141.001, October 24, 2008.]

Who Should Read This Report?

Personnel within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) and its subordinate Commands in Afghanistan, the Military Departments, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization-International Security Assistance Force (NATO-ISAF) who are responsible for property accountability and control, the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program supporting Afghanistan, and the development of the logistics and medical sustainment bases within the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) should read this report.

Background

The DoD Office of Inspector General (DoD IG) performed an assessment of the control and accountability of arms, ammunition, and explosives (we did not include an evaluation of explosives in our assessment) in Iraq in September and October 2007. The results of that assessment and recommendations for corrective actions were published in DoD IG Report No. SPO-2008-001, *Assessment of the Accountability of Arms and Ammunition Provided to the Security Forces of Iraq*, July 3, 2008.

The IG assembled an assessment team in February 2008 to determine the status of the corrective actions being implemented for the accountability and control of arms, ammunition, and explosives being transferred to the Iraq Security Forces. Before returning to Iraq, the assessment team visited Afghanistan in April 2008 to assess issues involving the accountability and control of arms, ammunition, and explosives; the responsiveness of U.S. FMS processes supporting ANSF; and the development of logistics sustainment capability for ANSF, to include a related issue on building the Afghan military health care system and its sustainment base.

Results

The report's results are separated into four parts:

Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives

The mission of the arms, ammunition, and explosives logistics supply chain is to provide an effective end-to-end system that delivers materiel to the warfighter, while maintaining the security and safety of the materiel and the public. Inherent in this mission is the requirement to implement procedures and mechanisms throughout the supply chain that ensure accountability and control of arms, ammunition, and explosives while enabling mission execution. However, the assessment team found that the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) had not issued implementing instructions or procedures governing the accountability, control, and physical security of arms, ammunition, and explosives the U.S. is supplying to ANSF. Further, CSTC-A had not clearly defined the missions, roles, and responsibilities of U.S. training teams and senior mentors involved in advising ANSF and the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior on the accountability, control, and physical security of U.S.-supplied arms, ammunition, and explosives. Moreover, the CSTC-A had not accurately recorded the serial numbers of weapons that were to be issued to ANSF and did not report these serial numbers to the DoD Small Arms Serialization Program.

While the CSTC-A continued to make progress on weapons accountability, they need to issue command policy guidance and implementing instructions or procedures for the accountability, control, and physical security of arms, ammunition, and explosives. Further, it is critical that the CSTC-A develop a formal mentoring strategy with detailed implementing guidance for mentoring ANSF and the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior on the accountability, control, and physical security of U.S. supplied arms, ammunition, and explosives. In addition, the CSTC-A needs to ensure that serial numbers and associated information in its data systems used to track the weapons are accurate and report the serial number information to the DoD Small Arms Serialization Program.

Foreign Military Sales

The FMS program has historically functioned primarily as a peacetime security assistance program. However, the U.S. is using the FMS program as the principal means to equip, expand, and modernize ANSF during wartime conditions. To be successful in executing this strategic decision, the \$7.4 billion FMS program in Afghanistan needs to be fully supportive of the wartime equipping requirements of the CSTC-A and ANSF. Responsive support beyond the norm is essential for rapid ANSF force generation, replacement of combat losses, and force modernization.

Commanders noted that progress has been made in improving the FMS program responsiveness. However, FMS case processing time standards were developed in peacetime and were still inadequate for meeting the wartime train-and-equip requirements of the CSTC-A and ANSF. Further, the CSTC-A security assistance office was not adequately staffed with sufficient numbers of personnel and those personnel that were assigned did not possess the requisite rank, security assistance skills, and experience required to successfully execute the mission. As a result, the ability of the FMS program and the CSTC-A security assistance office to responsively and effectively accomplish the mission may have been impaired.

A wartime standard for FMS case processing times should be established to support U.S. strategic objectives in Afghanistan. In addition, the number of personnel in the CSTC-A security assistance office and the rank level of its leadership should be increased to be commensurate with the mission, size, and scope of the FMS program in Afghanistan.

Logistics Sustainability

The ability of ANSF to operate independently relies on developing adequate logistical support for fielded military and police units. This support includes standardized logistics policies and processes that include:

- A logistics organization that is able to procure, receive, store, distribute, maintain, and re-supply its forces
- Maintenance of a sufficient logistical infrastructure
- Support of professional logistics training and mentoring activities

The CSTC-A has responsibility for helping ANSF build these capabilities and develop logistics sustainability.

However, the various U.S. plans for development of ANSF logistics sustainment were not clearly linked in a single integrated plan; did not provide a time-phased, conditions-based approach for accomplishing end state objectives; and generally did not identify a specific person or office responsible for the execution of specific tasks. Moreover, it was not clear the extent to which the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior and ANSF were directly engaged in the process of planning the establishment of their own logistics sustainment base.

There were insufficient numbers of logistics mentors assigned to ANSF. The CSTC-A had not prepared or issued a strategy to its mentors advising the Ministry of Defense, General Staff, and Ministry of Interior logistics organizations for achieving a sustainable logistics capability.

A single, integrated logistics sustainment plan should be developed in coordination with the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior and ANSF that links tasks, milestones, metrics, and identifies specific accountable offices of primary responsibility for each action. Further, it is critical that a formal mentoring strategy with detailed implementing guidance for achieving ANSF logistics sustainability also be developed. Moreover, logistics mentors need to receive the requisite training to successfully execute their mission.

Medical Sustainability

Independent, effective ANSF operations depended on an ANSF health care delivery system that provides acceptable field-level combat casualty care, evacuation of casualties, restorative surgery and rehabilitation, and long-term care for disabled ANSF personnel. A sustainable ANSF health care system depended on an integrated Afghan civil-military-police health care system, where civilian clinical services, medical education, and medical logistics supported ANSF needs. The complexity of medical stabilization and reconstruction challenges in Afghanistan called for a robust U.S. interagency and international effort to assist deployed medical personnel in developing and implementing a detailed, multi-year strategy and reconstruction plan. However, lack of coordinated long-term planning and engagement by the CENTCOM, the CSTC-A, the NATO-ISAF, and the U.S. Mission-Afghanistan limited the development of key Afghan civilian health care system capabilities needed to support ANSF. Further, there was confusion among the ANSF medical leadership as to the policy and strategy on integration of Afghan military and police medical functions into a common ANSF medical corps, or even whether this was a desirable goal.

Moreover, many U.S. and NATO-ISAF medical mentoring teams were not fully manned, particularly those assigned to work with the Afghan police; and the development of ANSF medical personnel was seriously hampered by the mentors' inadequate training. Comprehensive pre-deployment training and in-country orientation programs would significantly boost the effectiveness of medical mentoring personnel. Moreover, restrictive personnel practices for U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force medical personnel assigned to the CSTC-A reduced its ability to relocate them to meet changing work requirements in Afghanistan. In addition, specific, prioritized medical objectives that had been synchronized with the appropriate levels of ANSF medical leadership had not been developed for providing mentoring support to ANSF.

An integrated Afghan civil-military-police health care system [upon which a sustainable ANSF health care system must depend] may not develop. The lack of an effective ANSF health care system would require prolonged combat casualty care assistance by the U.S. and other NATO-ISAF member countries to ANSF, as well as delay its ability to operate independently.

The CENTCOM in coordination with U.S. Mission-Afghanistan, Afghan medical leadership, NATO-ISAF, and multiple interagency and international partners need to develop a comprehensive, integrated, multi-year plan to build a sustainable ANSF health care system. DoD and NATO-ISAF medical mentoring teams need to be fully resourced with adequately trained personnel and supported by an interagency "reach back" capability that coordinates all U.S. government health sector reconstruction activities in Afghanistan.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE COMMUNITY

Surface Deployment and Distribution Command Global Surface Transportation Experts

[Editor's Note: With the recent transportation challenges in supporting non-North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) foreign military sales (FMS) customers in Eastern Europe and the coalition partners in both Afghanistan and Iraq, we believe a brief history of one of the key organizations in the worldwide transportation network would benefit the *DISAM Journal* readership. The below history is courtesy of the Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC) web site: <http://www.sddc.army.mil/Public/Home.>]

A Brief History of the Surface Deployment and Distribution Command

Organizational Development

The Military SDDC traces its organizational lineage to the Army's former Office of the Chief of Transportation, established 31 July 1942. Fourteen years later, the Department of Defense (DoD) established a separate agency to carry out traffic management functions. On 1 May 1956, SDDC's original mandate began when the Secretary of Defense designated the Secretary of the Army as the single manager for military traffic within the United States (U.S.).

1 July 1956, the Army established the Military Traffic Management Agency (MTMA) to carry out those single-manager functions. Originally, MTMA did not operate military ocean terminals, a function held by the U.S. Army Transportation Terminal Command (a Transportation Corps component).

The original MTMA did not feature port commands but did include five regional offices:

- Eastern (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania)
- Western (Oakland, California)
- Central (St. Louis, Missouri)
- Southwestern (Dallas, Texas)
- Southeastern (Atlanta, Georgia)

This arrangement essentially lasted until 1965. Only the Oakland headquarters remained the same after that time. MTMA and then Defense Traffic Management System (DTMS) called the field offices "traffic regions."

MTMA lasted only five and a half years. Then, as part of his overall DoD restructuring, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara transferred the organization to the newly established Defense Supply Agency (DSA). On 1 January 1962, he re-designated MTMA as the Defense Traffic Management Service. The Army Materiel Command (AMC) then took over the military ocean terminals. However, DoD and congressional concerns over duplication in military logistics soon led to further reorganizations. After a detailed reexamination of the Defense

Transportation System, McNamara designated the Secretary of the Army as the single manager for military traffic, land transportation, and common-user ocean terminals on 19 November 1964.

To execute this centralized management concept, a joint service planning staff formed to establish an agency, the Military Traffic Management and Terminal Service (MTMTS). DoD then formally activated MTMTS as a jointly staffed Army major command on 15 February 1965. MTMTS assumed all responsibilities assigned to the DTMS and the terminal operations functions of the U.S. Army Supply and Maintenance Command (a component of the AMC). With the approval and publication of its single-manager charter on 24 June 1965, MTMTS joined the Military Air Transport Service (now Air Mobility Command) and the Military Sea Transport Service (now Military Sealift Command) in providing complete transportation services to the DoD.

The formation of the MTMTS resulted in tremendous change in the Command's organization. Since MTMTS now operated military ocean terminals, it focused its area command structure on ports. Upon the Command's formation, the former eastern traffic region headquarters moved to Brooklyn, New York and became Eastern Area. Western Area (formerly a traffic region) headquarters remained at Oakland, California. MTMTS abolished the southwestern and southeastern field offices. For two years, however, MTMTS retained its Central Area command in St. Louis, Missouri.

In 1966 the Transportation Engineering Agency, Fort Eustis, Virginia, the Army's only activity with traffic and transportability engineering expertise, became a major component of MTMTS. To streamline operations further, the Command then disestablished that headquarters in early 1967 and transferred its functions to Eastern Area. MTMTS maintained its Eastern Area Headquarters in Brooklyn, New York until September 1975 when it moved Bayonne, New Jersey.

MTMTS provided support for the Vietnam War through cargo operations at its military ocean terminals at Oakland, California (MOTBA), Bayonne, New Jersey (MOTBY), and Sunny Point, North Carolina (MOTSU) as well as commercial ports. In the earlier years of the war, MTMTS shipped soldiers by surface from its Western Area (primarily Oakland). By 1967, as troops rotated to Vietnam in small groups or individually, fewer soldiers went by surface; most were airlifted to the theater.

As a means of easing serious congestion and ship delay, MTMTS in 1966 initiated a practice of sending full shiploads to single ports of debarkation in theater whenever possible. It continued this practice throughout the war. Between 1965 and 1969, MTMTS in conjunction with the Military Sealift Command, transported over 22 million short tons of dry cargo and over 14 million short tons of bulk petroleum to Vietnam.

On 31 July 1974, MTMTS was re-designated as the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) to make its title more readily identifiable with its mission.

On 1 October 1988, MTMC, along with the Military Sealift Command (MSC) and the Military Airlift Command, officially became a component of the United States Transportation Command (TRANSCOM). Created on 18 April 1987, TRANSCOM began official operations on 1 October 1987 as DoD's single unified transportation command.

TRANSCOM's mission was to integrate global air, land, and sea transportation in support of national security objectives. MTMC, MSC, and AMC remained as major commands of their parent services and have continued to perform service-unique missions under the direction of their military departments (MILDEPs). On February 14, 1992, DoD gave TRANSCOM control of service-operated transportation in both peace and war.

The First Gulf War

The millions of tons of cargo and thousands of troops moved to support Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm marked the largest test of the military's logistical capability since the World War II Normandy invasion. During the Gulf War, MTMC personnel successfully managed the movement of 85 percent of the unit equipment shipped to Saudi Arabia. They operated out of 33 ports worldwide and loaded more than 945,000 pieces of equipment equaling 6.5 million measurement-tons onto 564 ships bound for Saudi Arabia. At the peak of operations, MTMC activated 12 transportation units, 225 volunteers, and 73 Individual Mobilization Augmentees from the Reserve components to support Desert Shield missions. Under the Special Middle East Shipping Agreements, MTMC booked 37,000 forty-foot commercial containers with sustainment supplies aboard commercial liners bound for Southwest Asia.

After the Gulf War: Organizational Changes

The Gulf War resulted in changes for MTMC. In 1991, MTMC re-designated its Transportation Terminal Command Far East as MTMC Pacific and moved it from Korea to Hawaii. Headquarters then assigned MTMC Europe as a subordinate command of MTMC Eastern Area in July 1992. This arrangement meshed with Military Traffic Management Command Headquarters' (HQMTMCs') relationships with Western Area and MTMC Pacific. The Command's February 1993 reorganization created an organization that provided improved quality service and optimum strategic deployability of America's forces in support of national defense.

The Command's directorates of international traffic, inland traffic, passenger traffic, personal property and safety, and security were centralized into a single Operations Directorate. The reorganization also combined personnel and logistics into a single directorate.

MTMC supported several contingency operations in the 1990s. Among them were the following:

- Operation Restore Hope, Somalia in 1993
- Operation Support Hope, Rwanda in 1994
- Operation Uphold Democracy, Haiti in 1994
- Operation Vigilant Warrior in Damman, Saudi Arabia, 1994-95
- Operation Joint Endeavor, Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1996

In general, the Cold War's end meant continuous change for MTMC. Even before the Berlin Wall fell, Congress had established the Base Realignment and Closing Commission (BRAC). Throughout the 1990s, this group shuttered growing numbers of well-established but less-used bases around the country. MTMC survived the first few BRAC cycles (1988, 1991, 1993), but not the 1995 round of proposals. At that time the DoD recommended closing the Oakland and Bayonne military ocean terminals. BRAC accepted its recommendations, which meant abolishing MTMC's Eastern and Western Area Commands. According to plan, MTMC would close down those ocean terminals by 2001.

To replace its two area headquarters, HQMTMC planned to establish a single Continental United States (CONUS) Command. HQMTMC formed a selection team, which evaluated a large variety of sites. In early 1997, Secretary of the Army Togo D. West reviewed the site team recommendations and decided on Fort Eustis, Virginia as the single area command's headquarters.

The loss of the area commands meant gain in other areas. As a result of the recommendations by its Organizational Excellence team, HQMTMC made MTMC Europe (since 1992 a component of Eastern Area) and MTMC Pacific (a component of Western Area) separate commands in late 1996.

In an effort to make its organizations more recognizable as regular Army units, MTMC redesignated its port units on 1 October 1997. The previous four-digit designations changed to three digits, and the major and medium port commands changed to groups, battalions, and companies. For example, MTMC Europe became the 598th Transportation Group (Terminal); and MTMC Pacific became the 599th Transportation Group (Terminal).

Relocations & Reorganizations

On 15 October 1997, MTMC established the Deployment Support Command (DSC) at Fort Eustis. Its Eastern and Western Area Commands were consolidated into the DSC. On 30 September 1999, MTMC closed its military ocean terminals at Bayonne and Oakland.

The Command's headquarters moved the following year. For 35 years MTMC headquarters operated out of the Nassif Building in Falls Church, Virginia. From May through October 2000, the Headquarters relocated to the Hoffman II Building in Alexandria, Virginia.

Continuing with its streamlining operations, MTMC began in 2000 to standardize the size and organization of its groups, battalions, and companies worldwide. Prior to these changes, MTMC's transportation battalions varied in strength from 19 to 84 persons.

During the following year, MTMC reorganized into a single operating headquarters, split-based in Alexandria, Virginia and Fort Eustis, Virginia. The Command concurrently deactivated its DSC and stood up its Operations Center in November 2001.

During 2001 and throughout 2002, MTMC mobilized Reserve Transportation units and organized Deployment Support Teams as part of its support for the Global War on Terrorism. From October 2002 through May 2003, the Command supported Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, moving over 15,000,000 square feet of cargo, operating from 16 seaports and power projection platforms worldwide.

Throughout the 1990s the Command worked continuously to reengineer its Household Goods Moving Program. In November 2002 it began developing a new program titled "Families First" to be the revised DoD Household Goods Program. Families First's objective is three-fold:

- To improve the liability/claims process
- To improve carrier performance through performance-based acquisitions
- To implement an integrated move management system

SDDC continues to work with the Household Goods Moving Industry to provide best quality moves for service members, DoD civilians, and their families.

With TRANSCOM's designation as the DoD's Joint Distribution Process Owner in the fall of 2003, and as a result of MTMC's changed missions to meet the demands of the Global War on Terror, the Command changed its name officially on 1 January 2004 to the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command. The name change better reflects its increased emphasis on deployment operations and end-to-end distribution of surface cargoes from depots to the war fighters.

Since the Command's establishment on February 15, 1965, there has hardly been a transportation or logistics issue within DoD that SDDC's actions have not influenced positively. It is proud to have a motivated, competent, well-trained work force within its corporate structure that is dedicated to

providing responsive transportation support to American forces in peace and war. SDDC stands ready to meet future challenges with the same professionalism and dedication demonstrated throughout its proud history.

Surface Deployment and Distribution Command Operations Center Customer Advisory, December 18, 2008 CA-08-12/18-0303

Subject: Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Pseudo FMS, and Iraqi Security Forces Fund (ISFF) Funded Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) Shipments to Iraq

Purpose: To update the shipping community on a new requirement for additional documentation when submitting Levy Exemption Waivers (LEWs)

Be Advised: For further shipping guidelines, see Customer Advisory (CA) CA-08-01/29-0020. The information provided herein supersedes the guidance provided in previous FMS CAs to Iraq (CA-08-03/26-0056, CA-07-08/24-0172, and CA-08-10/23-0271)

Booking Terms

All FMS cargo booked through the Integrated Booking System (IBS) has the following additional mandatory items on the Export Traffic Release Request (ETRR). Blocks 1 through 9 must be included when processing the ETRR.

1. Document Identifier: The full FMS Case Designator (E.G., IQ-B-AAA or E4-B-XXX) or the Direct Commercial Sales Contract Number

2. FMS Delivery Term Code (DTC): DTC 7 FMS cargo will be shipped in accordance with the *Defense Transportation Regulation* (DTR) 4500.9-R-Part II, Appendix E, for DTC 7 (delivery to an inland point in the recipient country). The Department of Defense (DoD) is responsible for transportation, including over ocean and inland overseas movement, from point of origin to a specified inland point overseas. Purchasing country is responsible for unloading overseas inland carrier's equipment at the inland named point and any subsequent movement, if required. Ocean-lifted FMS and Pseudo FMS cargo destined for Iraq **will not** be booked to Kuwait.

Pseudo FMS will be booked door-to-door through the Umm Qasr, Northport (PL2) to the Commercial Logistics Distribution Agency Warehouse, DoD Activity Address Code (DODAAC) W90SVS. They will execute onward movement to its final destination. Pseudo FMS is funded under the ISFF program and is identified by a country code and congressional appropriation year of E4, B3, B7, Y6, Y7 or Y9 or appearing in the second and third positions of a shipment unit's transportation control number (TCN) (TE4, BB3, DB7 or PY9) and the *Military Standard Requisitioning & Issue Procedures* (MILSTRIP) document number or numbers assigned to the materiel packed in the shipment unit. **Do not use shipper DODAA when creating the TCN.**

Iraqi FMS-funded cargo will be booked into Umm Qasr, Southport (PL4) for onward movement to its final destination by USC05 contractors. Iraq FMS-funded cargo is identified by country code IQ appearing in the second and third position of a shipment unit's TCN (BIQ, DIQ, PIQ, and TIQ) and the MILSTRIP document number or numbers assigned to the materiel packed in the shipment unit. **Do not use Shipper DODAAC when creating the TCN.**

*** For directions on constructing FMS TCNs see DTR Part II Appendix L
<http://www.transcom.mil>**

3. FMS SUPPAD: Supplemental Address — Record Positions (R.P.) 45 – 50 of the MILSTRIP document. R.P. 45 is the FMS purchasers' procuring agency Military Services Code. R.P. 46 is the offer/release option code. R.P. 47 is the Freight Forwarder Code. R.P. 48 – 50 is the FMS Case Designator.

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- 4. Project Code:** The CJCS Project Code “9GV” will be used to identify FMS shipments.
- 5. Point of Contact (POC):** Final Destination point of contact (POC) Name, Commercial Phone Number, E-mail (Consignee) / MAPAC TAC “M” MARK FOR ADDRESSEE (if available)
- Origin POC Name, Commercial Phone Number, E-mail — Vendor / Releasing Depot or Administering Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) Transportation Office
- 6. Delivery Information to the Carrier:** Multi-National Security Transition Command – Iraq (MNSTC-I) Contract Number, Security Convoy Service, Final Destination POC Name / Commercial Phone / e-mail
- 7. Remarks to the Booker:** Required SPOD, Consignee POC Name, Commercial Phone / E-mail. If container purchased by consignee, “Container title passed to consignee”
- 8. Transportation Related Services / Accessories:** The following accessorial services must be ordered at the time of the original request:

- Government Owned Containers Only
- Cargo Clearance Service
- Carrier Provided Flatracks & Breakbulk Cargo
- Cargo Clearance Service
 - Tarping Service
- Carrier Provided Containers
 - Cargo Clearance Service
 - Tarping Service
 - Transloading

If a service is needed that is not ordered in the original cargo booking, then the shipper/consignee will be required to request the service from the origin Ocean Cargo Clearing Authority (OCCA) Booking Office. Approval for additional transportation services will depend on availability of rates within the applicable SDDC contract.

9. ETR Delivery E-mail / Fax: E-mail address must be entered in the ETR delivery method when processing the ETR. -E-mail: 595thcustomersupport@kuwait.swa.army.mil.

General Information

Cargo Placards: Cargo placards are recommended to be applied to each piece of FMS cargo in order to easily identify the equipment, its final destination, and POC at arrival.

Custom Procedures: Shipper is required to complete an Levy Exemption Waiver (LEW) (instructions and process are also included in this advisory).

Required Shipping Information (Documentation): The shipper (acting as the technical order (TO) is required to provide the Advanced Transportation Control & Movement Document (ATCMD) data — Worldwide Port System / Global Air Transportation Execution System (WPS/GATES) entry — prior to the shipment departing the shipping activity’s location: http://www.transcom.mil/j5/pt/dtrpart2/dtr_part_ii_202.pdf with the RFID number in the remarks field. The National Stock Number (NSN) should be annotated in the six trailer data of the Transportation Control and Movement

Document (TCMD) (DTR Part II). The FMS Case Number and Port Call File Number (PCFN) should be annotated in the nine trailer data. The TO will furnish the SDDC Operations Center with all information in connection with negotiations with commercial carriers as far in advance as possible (DTR Part II APP E FMS, p. II-E-2, II-E-3)

Request for Implementation Date (RFID): The project code “9GV” should be included in the operations field when burning the tag in order to easily identify FMS shipments. Each shipment unit must be tagged, labeled, and marked according to DoD and Central Command (CENTCOM) policy, Chapter 208 in the DTR, PART II, and the current MIL-STD-129. This includes the need for a shipment unit’s clear text and bar-coded TCN to appear in the shipment unit’s Military Shipping Label (MSL).

Note: Tracking queries can be referred to MNSTC-IJ4Tracking@Iraq.centcom.mil.

Transportation Discrepancy Reports: For DTR Part II, Appendix I - Transportation Discrepancy Report (TDR) Instructions visit http://www.transcom.mil/j5/pt/dtrpart2/dtr_part_ii_app_i.pdf.

Non Defense Transportation System (DTS) Shipments of FMS: It is command guidance that almost all of FMS and Pseudo FMS shipments be moved within the DTS. SDDC will **not** be responsible for coordination, tracking, custom clearance, or any transportation related services if cargo is not booked through the DTS.

Levy Exemption Waiver Process Custom Procedures

Shippers are required to complete an LEW and e-mail a copy of the carrier’s award page (if shipping a vehicle, include the certificate of origin from the manufacturer) to Project and Contracting Office/Gulf Region Division (PCO/GRD) Levy Exemption Section at: pcocustoms@pco-iraq.net. They will forward to the Iraqi Customs for exemption and clearance.

Each levy request now requires the FMS or Pseudo FMS Case Identifier to be listed on the Levy Exemption Form or, for ISFF DCS, the contract number or Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) number (if used in place of a contract). Additionally, a copy of the purchase order for DCS or the LOA for FMS and Pseudo FMS cases must be provided with the levy request, in addition to the prime contract. The purpose is to verify that cargo on the levy waiver form is in support of an FMS case, Pseudo FMS case, or DCS contract. Purchase orders, which include the contract number or the address of the sponsor organization, are very effective for this purpose.

Note: In some cases, the purchase order might not provide this information. The required information could be listed within the prime contract (verbiage which details the equipment required or services to be performed) or on an air bill which may offer proof that the cargo listed is in support of one of the three procurement vehicles listed above. However, if it is not possible to submit a purchase order, please obtain another method of verification. Iraqi Customs will make the final determination if the documentation provided is sufficient to provide the proof required to process the LEW.

Upon approval, a scanned copy of the exemption form along with the Iraqi Customs approval stamp will be forwarded back to the originator of the e-mail. It is recommended that a copy of the scanned exemption form accompany the cargo to the Custom point of entry. This process takes approximately 24-48 hours excluding Fridays and Saturdays. The Iraqi Customs Liaison Official clearing your shipment is Mr. Jaafar at Mobile 0790-190-8030 or DSN number 318-239-4331.

Approved Levy Exemption Waivers must be forwarded to:

- 595TH Transportation Terminal Group (TTG) - 595thcustomersupport@spod.arfor.army.mil
- OCCA Southwest Asia - occaswa@bahrain.swa.army.mil
- OCCA Europe - occaeaur@sddc598th.army.mil
- OCCA Pacific- albert.s.sannicolas@us.army.mil use occapacific@sddc.army.mil

The carrier's agent/subcontractor must present this document to the Border Customs Agent along with other shipping paperwork such as airway bills or packing lists. This LEW must match the cargo manifest.

Levy Exemption Waiver Special Instructions

- Containerized cargo must include the container numbers (in the "line number" field).
- The "Sponsor Organization" block must be completed with the carrier's contract sponsor (i.e. SDDC).
- The "Point of Entry" must specify either Trebil (for Aqaba cargo) or Umm Qasr.
- The USC commercial carrier's contract number (as shown on the carrier award page) must appear in the "Unique Contract Number" block.
- All vehicles imported to Iraq must be model year 2006 or newer (or refurbished in or later than 2006). Construction equipment (cranes, forklifts, etc.) must be model year 1992 or newer (or refurbished later than 1992). All exemption requests for vehicles being imported under the Iraqi Levy Exemption (Iraq and Jordan) process must include the manufacturer's certificate of origin; the export certificate of origin will not be considered when requesting exemption. If a vehicle is refurbished, a letter from the refurbishing company containing the year, make, model, vehicle identification number (VIN), and date of refurbishment must accompany the request for exemption.

Procedures for Completing and Utilizing the Cargo Placard

- The information on the cargo placard will help identify the shipment and will allow cargo handlers to identify the final destination. This will assist in sorting inbound cargo as well as provide contact information for any unclaimed or misplaced shipments.
- If assistance is needed or contractually required to move shipments from point of entry to the end user via an identified staging area or warehouse, please utilize the information on the second page of the cargo placard. Once the cargo placard has been completed, it must be attached to all sides of each part of the shipment (i.e. each pallet, container, box, etc).
- The following instructions will assist in completing the form:
 - **Foreign Military Sales Case Number:** If shipping is subcontracted, the shipper must be provided with the primary contract number that comes from the contract generated from the Program and Contracting Office.
 - **Delivery Order/Shipment Number:** Task order or delivery order number if more than one order for this contract (i.e. 001 or 002) and shipment number for this order.

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- **Point of Contact for Arrival:** Already identified for our three current locations
 - **Final Destination:** This is the final delivery point or location of the end user.
 - **Address:** Provide as much descriptive detail as possible
 - **Grid Coordinate:** If available
 - **Primary and Alternate POC at Final Destination:** (Self-Explanatory)
 - **Name:** (Self-Explanatory)
 - **Phone:** (Self-Explanatory)
 - **E-mail:** (Self-Explanatory)
 - **Requiring Activity:** The customer (i.e., Ministry of Transportation)
 - **Point of Entry into Iraq:** Point the shipment will arrive in Iraq (i.e. Umm Qasr South Port).
 - **Delivery Info:** Any specific instructions the vendor or end-user may have

Note: All POCs must be identified by name and not solely by organization. Failure to do so will result in delay in delivery. Failure to utilize this form will affect any required transportation that may be contractually required. In addition, failure to utilize the cargo placard may result in cargo being lost, unaccounted for at the point of entry into Iraq, or potentially delayed in delivery to final destination.

Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance and The United States Army Communications and Electronics Command

[The following information was provided via the U.S. Army Communications and Electronics Command (CECOM) web site at: www.monmouth.army.mil/CELCMC/.]

About the United States Army Communications and Electronics Command

The CECOM Life Cycle Management Command (LCMC) develops, acquires, fields, supports, and sustains superior Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance, (C4ISR) and Information Systems for the Joint Warfighter.

An Interdependent Life Cycle Management Team

The CECOM LCMC and Army Team C4ISR are comprised of independent and interdependent organizations that are collectively responsible for the life cycle of C4ISR systems. These organizations include the

- Communications-Electronics Command;
- The Program Executive Office (PEO) for Command, Control, and Communications Tactical;
- The PEO for Intelligence, Electronic Warfare, and Sensors;
- The PEO for Enterprise Information Systems; and
- The Communications Electronics Research, Development, and Engineering Center.

The systems our team manages are found throughout Army (and allied) units, Army platforms, and across the spectrum of Army operations, as is evident from our business statistics for fiscal year (FY) 2007:

- We intensively managed 128 major defense programs, amounting to over \$10 billion in total obligation authority to acquire, field, and provide new equipment training on C4ISR systems.
- We are responsible for almost 56,000 inventoried items (almost half the Army's inventory), including over 6,600 major end items. We have reset (repaired, recapitalized, or replaced) 127,000 C4ISR systems since FY04.
- We provide and sustain software for most of the Army's deployed systems. We fielded 250 software releases, incorporating over 4,000 requirements.
- We produced 130 test reports in support of intra-Army interoperability certification, ensuring system software operates as expected on the battlefield.
- We completed 11 Installation Information Infrastructure Modernization Program build-outs, resulting in upgraded and modernized infrastructure for key Army installations.

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- Our depot accomplished over \$700 million a year in maintenance, fabrication, and system integration for Army, Navy, and Air Force C4ISR systems.
 - We initiated over \$1 billion in new foreign military sales cases.
 - Our contract awards totaled \$14.5 billion, of which \$2.75 billion was to small businesses.

A LandWarNet Center of Excellence

Our strategic priorities for the future:

- C4ISR and Information Systems Development, Acquisition, Fielding, and Sustainment to Ensure Cyberspace Dominance
- C4ISR Readiness
- Industrial Base Health
- Transformation and Innovation

We are rapidly fielding the best new C4ISR equipment to soldiers fighting every day, upgrading and modernizing existing systems, incorporating new technologies, and ensuring the operational readiness of these systems that both protect our Warfighters and give them a technological advantage over the enemy.

**We know why we are here:
“One Mission, One Vision — the Warfighter.”**

Dangerous Depots: The Growing Humanitarian Problem Posed by Aging and Poorly Maintained Munitions Storage Sites Around the World

Fact Sheet

By

**Bureau of Political-Military Affairs
Washington, D.C., August 4, 2008**

[Some information in the historical timeline in this fact sheet was drawn from a list entitled “Major Ammunition Accidents — 1916 to 2008” compiled by Colonel George Zahaczewsky, U.S. Army (Retired). Colonel Zahaczewsky was formerly the Director of the United States (U.S.) Department of Defense’s Humanitarian Demining Research and Development Program. Information was also drawn from “Recent Explosive Events in Ammunition Storage Areas,” a report of 137 incidents released in June 2007 by the South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (www.seesac.org)].

On March 15, 2008, a series of massive and deadly explosions ripped through an Albanian government munitions depot in the village of Gërdec near Tirana, resulting in 24 deaths, injuries to over 300 more people, and catastrophic damage to hundreds of homes and other civilian structures within a 2.5 kilometer (1.5 mile) radius. Contributing factors to the initial explosion, which triggered a cascade of further explosions, involved old, unstable ammunition, improper storage, and unsafe handling. Sadly, this was not a unique incident.

Catastrophic explosions at other munitions storage depots in populated areas in Uzbekistan and Bulgaria have since occurred. They are the latest in a series of incidents spanning many years and among the most recent manifestations of an international problem that has worsened since the end of the Cold War — government arms depots filled with ageing, unstable, poorly maintained, improperly stored, and weakly guarded munitions. These “dangerous depots” have the potential to create even more casualties on an annual basis than landmines and explosive remnants of war.

The Landmine Monitor recorded a total of 5,751 known casualties in 2006 from landmines and explosive remnants of war worldwide. Yet in one afternoon alone in 2007, a catastrophic explosion at a munitions depot outside of Maputo, the capital of Mozambique, killed and injured over 600 people, far more than the 35 people reportedly killed by landmines and explosive remnants of war in Mozambique the previous year.

Years ago the U.S. recognized this growing humanitarian threat to innocent civilians around the world whose homes, schools, markets, and places of worship are in close proximity to munitions depots filled with ageing artillery shells, bombs, and other munitions, even sea mines, and that are prone to spontaneous explosions due to improper storage and unsafe handling. The Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (www.state.gov/t/pm/wra) in the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs offers Physical Security and Stockpile Management assistance to other countries to help them deal with their dangerous depots. This office, in concert with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (www.dtra.mil/oe/osi/programs/smarms/index.cfm?More), has already been invited by several countries around the world to provide such assistance. In fact, the largest arms and munitions destruction project in history is being undertaken in Ukraine through a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Partnership for Peace Trust Fund project, in which this Office is serving as the focal point for the U.S., which is the lead donor. Unfortunately, the U.S. has received

fewer requests for help than is commensurate with the problem of dangerous munitions depots around the world.

The historic timeline of selected incidents [that follow indicate] the humanitarian impact posed by dangerous depots is widespread and worsening.

Examples of Major Accidents at Munitions Depots

2008 July 10, Uzbekistan

An explosion at a military depot in Kagan, southeast of Bukhara, killed at least three persons and injured twenty-one, according to the host government. There have been unconfirmed reports of even more casualties.

July 3, Bulgaria

A series of explosions at the Chelopchene munitions depot in Sofia, capital of Bulgaria, rocked the city and forced the evacuation of residents within a 6 kilometer (3.7 mile) radius. Tons of ammunition and explosives blew up immediately. More munitions and explosives are believed to be damaged, constituting a danger. The U.S. immediately offered to help remediate this hazardous explosive site and Bulgaria accepted. The Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement is preparing to render assistance.

March 15, Albania

A massive explosion at a munitions depot in Gërdec, northwest of the capital Tirana, killed some 24 people, injured over 300, destroyed over 400 homes, and resulted in the evacuation of over 4,000 nearby residents. The depot was being used as a munitions demilitarization facility. The precise cause of the explosion is still being investigated. Preliminary findings point to unsafe procedures that triggered a spontaneous explosion which created numerous secondary explosions. The U.S. Embassy, Department of State (DoS), and Department of Defense (DoD) immediately provided assistance. Subsequently, the Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement has committed \$2 million to help Albanian authorities thoroughly and safely clean up all of the highly dangerous unexploded ordnance that still litters the site and environs. See statements related to this tragedy on the U.S. Embassy website is found at: http://tirana.usembassy.gov/2008_releases.html.

2007 - December 29, Colombia

A series of about six explosions at an army base in Medellin killed two people, injured seven, and caused neighboring civilian residents to flee. The first explosion was reportedly caused by a grenade that detonated inside a weapons storage area.

July 26, Syria

An explosion at a munitions depot at a military complex approximately 6 miles north of Aleppo killed fifteen soldiers and wounded fifty. Officials blamed the explosion on a heat wave.

June 17, Democratic Republic of Congo

A Congolese Army munitions depot near Mbandaka in Equateur Province was destroyed in an explosion, which killed three people and injured 52.

April 7, Sudan

The international airport in Khartoum was closed temporarily due to an explosion in an adjacent munitions depot. Fortunately, there were no reported casualties.

March 22, Mozambique

Over 100 people were killed and more than 500 injured when the Malhazine Ammunition Depot exploded in a densely populated neighborhood 10 kilometers (6.2 miles) from the center of downtown Maputo, the capital. Unexploded ordnance from that explosion continued to injure people for several days afterwards. Hot weather and negligence were cited as the cause. The depot was constructed in 1984 by the Soviet Union and stockpiled with obsolete Soviet-era weapons and munitions. It had already experienced an explosion in January 2007, which injured three people.

2006 - October 19, Serbia

An explosion in a munitions depot injured approximately twenty people in the town of Paracin and caused damage, some of it significant, in that town and in the villages of Cuprija and Jagodina. The United Kingdom and United Nations Development Program (UNDP) provided assistance.

March 23, Afghanistan

Two civilians were killed and almost 60 were injured, along with eighteen Afghan Army soldiers, when a fire and explosion occurred in a storage area for confiscated weapons and ammunition in Jabal Saraj, northeast of Kabul. The munitions had been collected as part of the Disarmament of Illegal Armed Groups Program sponsored by the UNDP. Leaking white phosphorus munitions may have caused the accident. The site was eventually cleared by a DynCorp International explosive ordnance disposal team funded by the Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement.

2005 - October 1, Russia

A fire in a Russian Pacific Fleet ammunition storage depot on the Kamchatka Peninsula forced the evacuation of five local towns. Although subsequent explosions in the depot scattered flying ordnance over an 8 kilometer (nearly 5 mile) area, there were no reported casualties.

May 2, Afghanistan

An illicit collection of munitions in Bajgah, north of Kabul, exploded, killing 28 people, injuring 13, and leveling 25 houses in the village. The munitions had been stockpiled by a local militia commander.

2004 - May 6, Ukraine

Five people were killed and over 300 wounded in explosions in ammunition-loaded railroad cars at a munitions storage site near Melitopol (Novo-Bogdanovka) in the Zaporozhye region of Ukraine. The explosions also forced the evacuation of over 5,000 people living within a 15 kilometer (9.3 mile) radius of the disaster site. Over 300 buildings were destroyed; and six villages — Novobohdanovka, Vorozhdeniye, Privolnoye, Spaskoye, Oriovo, and Vysokoye — within 40 kilometers (nearly 25 miles) of the depot were reported to be partially or totally destroyed. Some reports attributed the accident to cigarette smoking within the depot.

February 19, India

Thirty persons were injured due to an explosion at a munitions depot in Amritsar, India.

2003 - October 11, Ukraine

Several thousand people were evacuated from their homes after a series of explosions ripped through a munitions depot at Artemovsk (Artyomovsky) in the eastern Donetsk region. The explosions, caused by a fire, shattered the windows of several apartment blocks.

June 28, Iraq

Approximately 30 Iraqis were killed, and scores injured, when an artillery ammunition dump they were looting north of Haditha blew up.

March 23, Ecuador

An explosion at a navy base in Guayaquil killed one, injured 22, and damaged at least 360 homes. A second explosion occurred on March 30 but reportedly caused no new casualties.

January 23, Peru

An explosion killed seven Peruvian military personnel who were inspecting ammunition at a base depot and injured fifteen other military personnel and 80 civilians on the base, which is located about half a mile from the city of Tumbes.

2002 - November 21, Ecuador

Two explosions in the munitions depot of Ecuador's largest military installation near the city of Riobamba killed seven people and injured 274. The incident was attributed to the accidental detonation of a grenade during a munitions handling operation.

October 30, Mozambique

The explosion of a munitions depot in Beira reportedly killed six people, injured fifty others, and affected approximately 900 more. Three more people who lived in the area were killed in November 2006 after encountering an item of unexploded ordnance that had been projected from this 2002 explosion.

June 28, Afghanistan

Nineteen people (some reports state 32) were killed and as many as 70 injured when a munitions depot blew up in Spin Boldak. The explosion (cause unknown, although there was one report of a rocket attack) scattered rocket-propelled grenades, anti-aircraft rounds, and small arms ammunition over a wide area.

January 29, Thailand

[Damaged munitions from an incident that occurred in 2001 caused] a second, smaller explosion in a munitions depot in Pak Chong and resulted in eleven casualties.

January 27, Nigeria

Catastrophic explosions at the Ikeja ammunition depot in the center of Lagos and the resulting panic, which caused as many as 600 people to drown in a canal as they fled, resulted in more than 1,100 deaths and 5,000 injured. The accident displaced 20,000 people and destroyed much of the northern part of Lagos. A fire near the depot reportedly initiated the explosion. However, other reports blamed the accident on the deteriorated condition of much of the old munitions stored there. The U.S. Department of State's former Office of Humanitarian Demining Programs (a precursor to the Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement) provided clean up assistance through a contract with RONCO Consulting Corporation.

January 11, India

An explosion at a munitions depot in Bikaner killed two persons and injured 12.

The preceding list of incidents is merely a sampling. There have been many more accidents at munitions depots around the world over the years. The phenomenon of catastrophic explosions at munitions depots is not new, nor is it simply a post-Cold War development. For example, on August 18, 1946 the sudden detonation of 28 sea mines, containing approximately 9 tons of explosives, killed 70 personnel and injured 100 others in Vergarolla, Croatia. However, since the end of the Cold War, the frequency of such incidents has increased as has the expansion of civilian dwellings towards what were once isolated depots in some cases. As munitions deteriorate further, new tragedies will follow unless this problem is more widely acknowledged and addressed. The Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency remain committed to helping confront it.

Combating the Threat of Small Arms and Light Weapons: Planning and Coordination Information for Host Nations

[The following article originally appeared on the Defense Threat Reduction Agency's web site: www.dtra.mil.]

Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) Program

The objective of DTRA's SALW Program is to reduce proliferation by assisting foreign governments with improving the security, safety, and management of state-controlled stockpiles of man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), other small arms and light weapons, and conventional ammunition.

By securing and managing these assets, DTRA's efforts decrease the availability of weapons and ammunition to terrorists and insurgents, minimize regional exposure to the destabilizing effects of cross-border weapons transfers, and reduce the risk of catastrophic ammunition accidents.

Assessments

A key component of DTRA's cooperative program is to evaluate the safety and security of state-controlled weapons and ammunition stockpiles in the host country. Upon arrival, DTRA team members will provide an initial in-briefing for host country representatives. Next, the team will begin conducting assessment activities accompanied by host nation escorts.

An assessment normally requires one day per site, depending on the size of the facility. For example, a two-person DTRA team can usually survey 15-20 ammunition magazines or 8-12 weapons storage areas per day. The DTRA team will also require one full day to prepare the technical report and the risk assessment. It is essential that DTRA team members have permission to take photographs of current storage conditions for inclusion in these reports.

On the last day of the assessment, DTRA team members will out-brief appropriate host country representatives on their findings and recommendations. All photographs and other information collected during the assessment will be protected from disclosure to outside parties.

During the out-briefing, the team usually recommends follow-on seminars focusing on improving physical security and stockpile management (PSSM).

Physical Security and Stockpile Management Seminars

PSSM seminars are normally conducted over a four-day period. The first three days consist of briefings and other classroom activities designed to acquaint participants with international standards and best practices for the storage, transportation, security, and stockpile management of ammunition and weapons. On the fourth day, a practical exercise allows participants to evaluate an ammunition storage area and a military unit's arms room.

DTRA's SALW Program offers two PSSM seminars. The PSSM Technical Seminar is designed for individuals who work directly with arms, ammunition, and explosives (AA&E) as part of their job. The PSSM Executive-Management Seminar is tailored to senior-level officials who have decision-making authority concerning the acquisition, storage, security, and disposal of AA&E. Many of the subject areas covered in each seminar are the same, but the modules in the executive-management seminar are presented at a managerial level rather than at a detailed technical level.

DTRA Roles and Responsibilities

DTRA funds its own transportation to and from the host country. In addition, the DTRA team will bring all necessary equipment, such as computers and projectors, at no cost to the host country. DTRA will also provide seminar participants with seminar booklets and reference materials written in their native language.

Questions?

For more information about DTRA's SALW Program, please visit: www.dtra.mil/oe/osi/programs/smarms/index.cfm?More

For questions about SALW assessments or PSSM seminars or about the process for requesting this assistance, please contact the U.S. Embassy in your country.

You may also contact SALW Program representatives by e-mail at salw@dtra.mil or phone at 1-800-334-2517 or 1-703-767-2739.

Agenda for PSSM Technical Seminar

Day 1
Introduction
Ammunition Basics
Ammunition Painting and Marking
Explosives Compatibility

Day 2
Net Explosive Weight Hazards
Ammunition Storage
United Nations Hazard Classification
Physical Security Measures

Day 3
Stockpile Surveillance
Risk Assessment
Arms Security
Transportation of Arms and Ammunition

Day 4
Practical Exercise Preparation/Field Trip
Participant Briefings on Findings
Seminar Summary

Agenda for PSSM Executive-Management Seminar

Day 1
Introduction
SALW Proliferation Threat
International Agreements
Policies and Procedures
Program Management

Day 2
Explosives Compatibility
Net Explosive Weight Hazards
Ammunition Storage
United Nations Hazard Classification
Physical Security Measures

Day 3
Stockpile Surveillance
Risk Assessment
Risk Assessment Practical Exercise
Arms Security
SALW Elimination

Day 4
Practical Exercise Preparation/Field Trip
Participant Briefing on Findings
Seminar Summary

Host Nation Responsibilities: Assessments Invitation

The host nation is responsible for requesting DTRA assistance through their U.S. Embassy, usually in the form of a Diplomatic Note to the Defense Attaché Office. Preferred dates and alternative dates for the assessment should be included in the request.

Identifying Sites

The host country is responsible for identifying the ammunition and weapons storage facilities to be assessed and for obtaining permission for the DTRA team to access these sites. Host countries are asked to submit a list of proposed sites to their U.S. Embassy at least two weeks prior to the DTRA team's arrival.

Scheduling Briefings

The host nation is responsible for working with their U.S. Embassy to schedule the DTRA briefings provided to host country representatives at the beginning and end of the visit.

Host Nation Responsibilities: Seminars Invitation

The host nation is responsible for requesting DTRA assistance through their U.S. Embassy, usually in the form of a Diplomatic Note to the Defense Attaché Office. Preferred dates and alternative dates for the seminar(s) should be included in the request. DTRA cannot sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) or any other type of contract with the host nation because this program is purely cooperative in nature.

Identifying Participants

The host country is responsible for identifying 20-40 qualified individuals to attend each seminar and for providing a list of participants' names to their U.S. Embassy. Since DTRA will use this list to prepare a certificate for each participant, accuracy is very important.

Transporting Participants

The host country is responsible for transporting participants to and from the seminar location and the sites selected for the practical exercise.

Identifying Sites

The host country is responsible for identifying classroom facilities and the ammunition and weapons storage facilities for the practical exercises. The host country is also responsible for obtaining permission for the DTRA team and course participants to have access to these sites.

Providing Meals and Drinks

The host nation is responsible for providing the participants with lunches, coffee, tea, etc., if desired. DTRA cannot fund these items.

Small Arms and Light Weapons Missions-to-Date As of December 2008

Assessments and/or Seminars

1. Afghanistan (02/07, 05/07)
2. Albania (05/01, 05/05, 10/07, 07/08, 10/08)
3. Angola (09/03)
4. Antigua (09/08)
5. Aruba (09/08)
6. Barbados (09/08)
7. Belarus (04/04)
8. Belgium (02/06, 03/06, 10/07)
9. Bosnia (05/03, 12/04, 12/05, 05/07, 04/08)
10. Bulgaria (10/00)
11. Burundi (08/06, 08/06, 07/07)
12. Cambodia (12/03, 03/04)
13. Congo, Republic of (01/07, 04/07, 04/07)
14. Czech Republic (11/06)
15. Ecuador (01/03, 03/03, 03/05, 04/08, 10/08, 11/08)
16. El Salvador (04/03, 07/03, 09/03)
17. Georgia (10/06, 10/06)
18. Guatemala (10/08)
19. Guyana (12/01)
20. Haiti (12/04)
21. Honduras (08/05, 10/05, 09/06, 01/07)
22. Hungary (04/05)
23. Kazakhstan (05/05)
24. Kenya (12/08)
25. Macedonia (10/00, 10/06, 04/07, 02/08, 09/08)
26. Moldova (05/07, 10/07, 11/08)
27. Montenegro (04/07)
28. Mozambique (08/07, 03/08)
29. Nicaragua (04/03, 01/04)
30. Nigeria (02/06 - incomplete)
31. Panama (05/08, 05/08)
32. Paraguay (06/07, 09/07, 03/08)
33. Peru (03/07)
34. Romania (02/02)
35. SAO Tome (10/04)
36. Serbia & Montenegro (05/05, 07/05, 09/05)
37. St. Kitts and Nevis (09/08)
38. Suriname (04/05, 11/05, 03/07)
39. Tajikistan (11/04, 04/05, 07/06, 04/07, 01/08, 10/08)
40. Togo (04/06, 08/06)
41. Uganda (08/08 - incomplete)
42. Ukraine (11/04)
43. Uruguay (02/08, 03/08)

Combatant Command Visits

1. European Command (EUCOM) (10/03, 09/05, 09/06, 10/06, 06/07, 10/07, 09/08)
2. Pacific Command (PACOM) (12/03, 01/04, 08/06, 10/07)
3. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) (12/02, 07/03, 07/06, 10/06, 02/07, 05/07, 10/07, 04/08, 09/08)
4. Central Command (CENTCOM) (03/07, 07/07, 08/07)
5. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) (06/07)
6. Africa Command (AFRICOM) (10/07, 03/08, 09/08)

Conferences and/or Consultations

1. Angola (04/07)
2. Argentina (06/04, 10/07)
3. Australia (01/08)
4. Austria — Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE) (06/03, 03/05, 11/07, 02/08, 06/08, 10/08)
5. Bahamas (12/07)
6. Belgium (12/03, 03/05, 06/07, 10/07) — North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), VCC, OSCE
7. Bosnia (12/02)
8. Burkina Faso (12/06)
9. Cambodia (12/07)
10. Cameroon (09/03)
11. Chile (11/06)
12. France (11/08)
13. Germany (02/06, 04/07, 11/07)
14. Israel (04/06)
15. Kenya (08/05, 07/08)
16. Mexico (02/08)
17. Nicaragua (04/03)
18. Norway (11/07)
19. Panama (01/08)
20. Russia (12/05, 01/07, 07/08)
21. Spain (06/07)
22. St. Kitts and Nevis (11/08)
23. Switzerland — United Nations (UN) (05/06, 10/06, 12/07)
24. Tanzania (02/07)
25. Thailand (10/06)
26. Turkmenistan (11/06)
27. Uganda (10/04, 06/08, 08/08)
28. United Kingdom — Joint Arms Control Implementation Group (JACIG) (09/04, 04/05, 09/05, 09/06)
29. United States (NY, NCR, FL, OH, AL)
30. Uruguay (10/07)

Destruction Verification

1. Bulgaria (08/05, 11/05)
2. Hungary (12/05, 02/06)

Other

1. Germany — NATO Small Arms and Light Weapons SALW Course (07/07, 06/08, 10/08)
2. Switzerland — Verification Training Course (09/06, 02/07)
3. NATO — International Verification Training Course (10/07)

Grand Total: 63 Countries (including USA)

PERSPECTIVES

History Made as Guard Chief Gets 4th Star

By
William H. McMichael
Staff Writer for the *ArmyTimes*

[The following article originally appeared on *ArmyTimes.com* November 17, 2008. The *DISAM Journal* would like to thank the *ArmyTimes* for allowing us to reprint the following article. The article can be read in its entirety at the following web site: <http://www.armytimes.com/>.]

Hearty cheers filled the Pentagon auditorium Monday [November 2008] afternoon as history was made when a fourth star was pinned on the shoulders of the new Chief of the National Guard Bureau for the first time in its almost four centuries of existence.

Just as important to the hundreds of Guardsmen in attendance, Air Force Lieutenant General Craig McKinley also will serve as principal adviser to the Defense Secretary through the Joint Chiefs Chairman on all National Guard matters. No such position previously existed.

McKinley will also continue as principal adviser to the Army and Air Force Secretaries and Staff Chiefs on matters related to the Army and Air National Guards.

This elevation of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to four stars underscores the critical importance of the Guard to America's overall national defense, Defense Secretary Robert Gates told the gathering. It also signifies the vital role the Chief has in bridging the state and federal components of our government and the active and reserve components of our military.

McKinley's promotion "is recognition of his outstanding leadership abilities and shows the confidence the President and I have in him to be the nation's senior Guard officer at such a critical time," Gates said.

Several of the roughly 30 states' Adjutants General in attendance said the move is long overdue.

The awareness will be much increased about the critical role that the National Guard plays for our nation, both at home and in combat operations around the world, said Army Maj. Gen. Bob Lee, Hawaii's Adjutant General. When you add the Army and the Air Guard together, it is just short of a half-million folks. So it is about time we got a four-star General that controls so many resources.

The fourth star and new advisory role follow recommendations by the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves and last year's *Defense Authorization Act*, in which Congress also established the Guard as a joint activity of the Department of Defense.

McKinley succeeds Lieutenant General Stephen Blum, who in January [2009] will become the first National Guard Deputy Commander of U.S. Northern Command—another commission recommendation.

The commission based its recommendation to make the National Guard Bureau Chief a four-star on several findings:

- That a formal relationship should be established between the Guard and the Defense Secretary, the Joint Chiefs, the Unified Commands, and other federal agencies on non-federalized National Guard matters such as operations and exercises.
- That the Chief performs simultaneous service chief-like duties for the Guard components of both the Army and Air Force, which the commission called a “complex task”.
- Two federal studies on General officer responsibilities from which the commission concluded that the Guard Chief’s duties rate four stars.

The commission also pointed out that making the Guard Chief a senior adviser to the Defense Secretary would “expand access” to the Chief’s expertise, particularly with regard to response to domestic emergencies, and would “mitigate the difficulties inherent in the current structure” in which the Guard had to work through Army and Air Force channels to interact with other Pentagon organizations, such as NORTHCOM and Joint Forces Command.

At the same time, the commission argued against making the Guard Chief a full member of the Joint Chiefs, concluding that the duties of each of the Joint Chiefs are greater than those of the Guard Chief. Doing so could also create the sense that the Guard is a separate service when, the commission agreed, it is not.

In his remarks, McKinley noted that he is meeting Tuesday with Gates to discuss the commission’s recommendations, issued in January [2009].

According to a defense official, Gates is being briefed on where the Pentagon stands on all the 95 recommendations made by the commission, eighteen of which have already been implemented.

The official said that if Gates is satisfied with what he hears, he may sign out an action memo on the remaining recommendations.

Iraqi General Visits Luke Air Force Base Flies in F-16

By
Second Lieutenant Bryan Bouchard, USAF
56th Fighter Wing Public Affairs

[This article originally appeared in *Air Force Print News Today*, December 17, 2008.]



Iraqi air force Brigadier General enters a 63rd Fighter Squadron F-16 Fighting Falcon before a flight at Luke Air Force Base, Arizona, December 15, 2008. (U.S. Air Force photo/Staff Sgt Richard Rose).

Ten years ago, Iraqi air force Brigadier General Ali Al-Aaragy was flying Mirage fighters for his country's air force. This week, he was flying in a 63rd Fighter Squadron F-16 Fighting Falcon.

"It was a dream come true to fly in the F-16," the General said after his flight piloted by Lieutenant Colonel Jack Maixner, 63rd Fighter Squadron (FS) Commander, December 15, 2008.

The General, who works as his country's air force advisor to the Minister of Defense, said the purpose of his visit to Luke Air Force Base was to enhance the relationship and partnership between the Iraqi air force and the U.S. Air Force, as well as to see the current developments in training and fighter aircraft for possible procurement by his country's government.

The General spent about ten days in the United States, first visiting Randolph Air Force Base, Texas, where he flew in the T-6 Texan and T-38 Talon, two aircraft he hopes will soon be entering the Iraqi air force's inventory.

Aside from the F-16 flight which he described as "amazing," the Iraqi leader spoke with Brigadier General Kurt Neubauer, 56th Fighter Wing Commander, who explained how Luke is organized, managed, and operates. This, General Ali said, was one of the most impressive aspects of the U.S. Air Force he learned about during his trip.

I like how each air base is different and was surprised to see how they are managed, he said. I would like to copy these air bases and place them in Iraq.

Not only was the General impressed with the way Air Force bases are managed, but partnership with local communities was another factor which he said was an impressive aspect of the U.S. Air Force.

General Ali, who himself has 2,000 hours in the French-made Mirage F-1 fighter, praised the Air Force and what it has done for his country and air force in Iraq.

Our cooperation with the Coalition Air Force Training Teams has led Iraq to be able to protect the infrastructure, fight terrorists and insurgents, and protect Iraq's sovereignty, he said. The Iraqi people know that terrorism is a threat to Iraq, and right now the Iraqi army and air force enjoy good cooperation with the people in regard to reporting suspicious activities.

After his visit to Luke, the General was scheduled to return to Iraq, bringing photos and videos of his trip to not only show his government, but also the Iraqi people, the capabilities, partnership, and friendship the U.S. Air Force is giving Iraq.

I want to thank the U.S. Air Force for how they are helping us and trying to push the Iraqi air force forward, General Ali said. We are working together as one team to rebuild the Iraqi air force.

The photos and videos shot by Airmen from the 1st Combat Camera Squadron at Charleston Air Force Base, South Carolina are to be aired on Iraqi national television January 6, 2009 for the Iraqi Armed Forces Day.

Through our television channels, we will be able to show the people how the U.S. Air Force is working with us to build a new Iraqi air force, the General said.

Diplomacy in a New Age: How the National Guard Builds International Partnerships through Local Communities

By
Tim Hoyle, Major, Air National Guard
Headquarters Denver Air National Guard
State Partnership Program Director

[The following article is solely the product of the author (as footnoted); and any opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of DISAM, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, DoD, the Air Force, or Air National Guard.]

Giving Power to Gain Security — Détente

Under the Nixon Administration, the President looked for a way to extract the United States (U.S.) from Vietnam. Containment of communism was not working. Henry Kissinger proposed a new security arrangement. He was the chief architect of détente. Kissinger championed détente as a new system that promoted stability and equilibrium. To do this, “major powers had to renounce the use of nuclear weapons.” [Jones 2001]. During the 1970s and 1980s, there was an unprecedented movement towards nuclear disarmament and control under the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) I and II treaties. During this transition period, states began to work in a cooperative fashion to defuse tensions between the East and the West. Significant draw-downs of strategic nuclear weapons made the world a much safer place from atomic holocaust. Détente was an early signal that the world was prepared to march into a new era. Cooperation through equilibrium of power changed how modern nation states interacted. Absolute security was not the goal, as seen earlier in the 20th century. Under détente, the U.S. and the USSR recognized that no single nation could have absolute security.

This new security arrangement required that nation states yield some of their sovereignty. Nations would now allow their potential enemies access to their most closely guarded secrets. Transparency was essential to ensure compliance with the SALT treaties. This is a dramatic departure from traditional security systems. During the age of détente, nuclear-armed states agreed to destroy weapons, decommission missile sites, and allow for weapons inspections. Since the end of the Cold War, the nature of bi-polar strategic threats has evaporated. With the re-balancing of power, the Soviet Union began to dismantle. The U.S. became even more concerned about the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In addition, the U.S. did not have political or diplomatic relations with these newly emerging countries.

Preventative Defense and Global Engagement

During the Clinton Administration, the *National Security Strategy* highlighted the policy of engagement. Known as “Shape, Respond, and Prepare,” the *National Security Strategy* emphasized the need to achieve global and regional integration through Theater Engagement Plans (TEPs). TEPs would “shape” the battle-space by building alliances and partnerships through the use of all instruments of U.S. power, diplomatic, military, and economic. Then Secretary of Defense, William J. Perry outlined his view of Preventive Defense, “actions we can take to prevent the conditions of conflict and create the conditions of peace.” [Perry 1996] Perry voiced his opinion that democracy was the key to ensuring U.S. security interests. Democratic states were important in advancing stability and reducing violence. Perry called for U.S. foreign policy to be engaged throughout the globe to promote democracy, with particular emphasis aimed toward Eastern Europe. Perry likened Preventive Defense to the aims of the Marshall Plan. He observed that the Marshall Plan provided

stability to Europe immediately after World War II. This helped nation-states rebuild their capability to support the regional defense system as east-west tensions grew. As the world was changing, the role of the military has transformed dramatically. Perry looked for alternative means to protect U.S. national interests. To do all of this, he advocated alternative and non-coercive methods to shape international behavior. To make his point about paving the way towards peace, he highlighted the impact of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). He held this program up as an important diplomatic tool that was integrating former Soviet Bloc nations into the new security architecture, promoting democratic regimes, and spreading free-market reforms.

NATO established the PfP program in 1994. Individual states were partnered with central European nations. Partnerships were founded with former Soviet Bloc nations such as Poland and Hungary, who expressed interest in joining NATO. This program brought together military units from the United States and its former adversaries and provided a venue where former Warsaw Pact nations could engage with western countries. The PfP program was successful at building a bridge to the east through non-confrontational engagements and stimulated more broad-based initiatives. The role of the National Guard became important when Latvia was looking to model their reserve forces on the Guard. The Guard's contribution was particularly helpful because it was viewed as less threatening than using active duty forces in eastern Europe. Early partners in the newly formed State Partnership Program (SPP) were Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia. Success in this program gave momentum for the SPP to grow. In addition to former Soviet States requesting assistance, DoD was expanding the strategic role that the military was playing. In Bosnia, U.S. forces were playing an important peace-keeping role. Throughout this period, the U.S. military was increasingly being used to implement peacetime operations under the National Security Strategy.

Multilateralism

The influence of the 1990s can be felt today, as current national policy continues a strategy of global engagement. The *National Defense Strategy*, 2005, calls for "strengthen[ing] alliances and partnerships. The Security Cooperation Program is one of the principal vehicles for strengthening alliances and partnerships." [*National Defense Strategy*, March, 2005]. Security cooperation and the Theater Security Cooperation program outline regional plans that promote military and humanitarian assistance objectives in each Combatant Command (COCOM). Traditional Commander's Activities (TCA) is one program that supports and promotes theater objectives of each COCOM. The TCA works closely with the SPP to coordinate events that support each country and regional security objective. The State Partnership Program was a child of the PfP project, and today is found in nearly every state. The SPP is one tool that can provide diplomats another avenue to build connections between the U.S. and their partners. The SPP engages with partner nations both militarily and through civilian agencies.

Many political pundits and elected officials expressed concerns that the U.S. military was neither trained nor equipped to accomplish nation-building. Some argued that soldiers are ill-prepared to solve civilian issues. "Nation-building by military force is not a coherent, defensible policy. It is based on no theory; it has no proven technique or methodology. And there are no experts who know how to do it." [Payne 2005] However, the U.S. military has been involved in stabilization operations almost every year since the end of the Cold War. The U.S. is engaged throughout the world in supporting allies and promoting democracy to emerging nations. The reality is that the vast majority of available resources in any particular region are found within the COCOM. Military budgets are measured in the billions. The military is the major player in supporting nations in an area of responsibility (AOR) and the primary source for funding. However, American intervention and stabilization efforts following major combat have had mixed results. In the last century, the U.S. has toppled eighteen regimes, yet less than a third have become democracies. [Jennings 2003] Exporting democracy may

not be easy or feasible in all cases. One only has to examine recent statements by General Petraeus to see that the U.S. is struggling to find a political solution in Iraq. Military success does not guarantee political results. General Petraeus believes that military force is one part of a total effort for political reform in Iraq. "Military action is necessary but not sufficient..." [DoD Briefing, www.defenselink.mil, 26 April 2007].

State Partnership Program: Building Stability Through the State Partnership Program

The State Partnership Program is an international partnership between individual states and foreign nations. It works closely with the DoD and host nation embassies to sponsor events that support U.S. national security objectives. The goals of the program are to promote military, governmental, cultural, and economic exchanges with partner countries. The SPP, administered by the National Guard, is an alternative diplomatic tool that establishes close ties between partner nations and individual states. Through the SPP, states create lasting and enduring friendships with their partner nations in real and substantial ways. The National Guard's close relationships with the state's militia, local government, and community-based organizations make it the ideal organization to lead the SPP. Throughout the world, there are over fifty partnerships between states and nations in Europe, Asia, South America, and Africa. The SPP is an effective tool that engages nations and promotes democratic ideals throughout the globe.

The SPP provides for and supports our allies by enhancing military capabilities and economic freedom, promoting good governance, and fostering economic performance. It connects partner nations with National Guard units around the nation. These partnerships help to coordinate the participation in large scale regional exercises, such as New Horizons in the Caribbean and South America. Partner states exercise their military operations in support of a humanitarian disaster. Rapid recovery after a major storm instills trust and confidence in the local citizenry and promotes stability. Through this program, National Guard units coordinate with state and local governments and provide technical expertise, guidance, and even mentoring to their partners. In Delaware, the Governor and her senior staff visited Trinidad and Tobago to discuss good governance and best practices in education, disaster management, and prison systems. State Partnerships also promote economic development and international partnerships. In Rhode Island, the SPP established a student exchange program.

Unique Diplomatic Tool

The National Guard is an important part of providing security through international engagement. The Guard's SPP is a unique diplomatic tool that leverages both military and civilian agencies to support and enhance national security objectives in a region. The SPP is unique from other DoD programs because of the nature of the reserve component. The National Guard provides additional focus and energy to its state partners. The Guard promotes readiness and inter-operability with partner states through cooperation and coordination. As a separate service component, the National Guard has the flexibility to support national security objectives. The National Guard promotes national and regional security objectives in support of the COCOM through its close partnership with the major command, the U.S. embassy, and foreign military officials. The Guard is ideally positioned to promote long lasting military-to-military relationships that bring a multitude of skills which transcend traditional military capabilities. The Guard is uniquely suited to build democratic values with partner countries. The Guard's close association with state government provides access to civilian and business leaders. Consequently, the Guard promotes two important ingredients to successful foreign relations: military readiness and civilian support.

Promoting Security Through Readiness

National Guard soldiers and airmen provide continuity and longevity to enduring relations. Unlike their active component counterparts, the Guard's typical tour is closer to twenty years, not twenty

months. Stability of personnel promotes trust and predictability between the partners. In addition, long term relationships encourage long term planning and training opportunities. This adds stability and predictability to international relations.

The National Guard is efficient, costing only 6 cents for every dollar spent on defense budget. Consequently, the Guard is an efficient and inexpensive program to administer the SPP. The Guard brings modest but additional resources to partner nations that provide real tangible military exchanges as well as economic benefits.

The National Guard is singularly focused on one partnership and one mission. The SPP is a mechanism to catalyze broad and expanding support of mutual goals for the U.S. and host nations. Each partnership is tailored to meet the host nation's needs. This individualized attention promotes confidence and trust between partners.

Through continuity, efficiency, and energy, the Guard provides tremendous capabilities to enhance and strengthen military capabilities with a partner or ally.

Promoting Security through Democracy and Nation-Building

The National Guard provides high-level access to state institutions. The Guard is headed by the Adjutant General, usually a cabinet level official in each state. In addition, the Guard is part of the community and has close contacts with public and private agencies and institutions. Through working with the local/state government, the citizen soldier promotes democratic values and institutions through engagements with other nations.

Guardsmen and women are both military professionals and civilians. Their civilian experience, knowledge, and abilities greatly enhance their value and contribution towards enhancing international ties. They bring varied backgrounds when participating in an SPP foreign exchange. In Delaware, the SPP hosted an event with their partner country, Trinidad and Tobago, on disaster management. The Director of Joint Plans for the Delaware National Guard is a senior official in county government. His civilian relationships were critical in coordinating a visit to the New Castle County Joint Operations Center. In addition, in his civilian capacity, he oversaw storm-water management, a critical issue for Trinidad and Tobago.

The SPP can provide flexible and responsive engagements. The National Guard provides funding in addition to the COCOM. Through the Minute Man Fellow (MMF) funding, the Guard can host civilian-to-civilian events.

The Guard promotes the values of democracy through its close relationship with the state and community. Through access to civilian leaders, core of citizen-soldiers, and unique funding programs, the Guard promotes and enhances military subordination of civilian authority.

To understand the SPP is to grasp what it is not. It is not a foreign aid program or military assistance initiative, such as International Military Education and Training (IMET). The SPP does not replace what the COCOM is working on, rather it augments current engagements. In addition, the SPP works closely with the U.S. embassy in the host nation to promote civilian and economic objectives. It supports national security objectives in the partner nation by building long-term and enduring relationships with partner states. Essentially, the SPP is a microcosm of all the instruments of national powers at the local level. SPP provides events that focus on national security issues at the grass roots level. The National Guard is uniquely positioned to promote the values of American freedoms and democracy by engaging in events that touch the very social fabric of U.S. society. In addition, the SPP works closely with their state governments to support other important objectives, such as promoting health, education, or local law enforcement.

The SPP supports national security objectives by doing three things very well:

- It works closely with major COCOMs to ensure proper coordination of plans and programs to enhance readiness and security.
- It works with the embassy, the host nation, and state governments to support civilian, economic, and cultural goals and exchanges to expand and enrich the partnership.
- Finally, the SPP brings a holistic approach to the partnership, taking full advantage of synergies that are created, adding value to the partnership.

Supporting the Combatant Commander's Vision

Each subject matter expert exchange (SMEE) is approved and vetted by the host nation and the partner unit. Once the concept is written, it is sent to the country's U.S. embassy, as well as to the COCOM. Finally, the event is approved by the National Guard Bureau. All stake-holders weigh-in to ensure that mutual goals and objectives are being met. The host nation and the SPP coordinator work closely together to ensure that their events are relevant and important to a critical national goal. The SPP coordinator ensures that events are closely aligned with the regional and country plans. U.S. embassy personnel provide guidance and support to ensure that both the COCOM and the Ambassador's goals are met. The approval process for an event is important because it shows how the SPP advances national objectives by prioritizing events and ensuring they are supporting the vision of the theater. In the Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) AOR, the COCOM's theater objectives include: fighting terrorism, counter-drug operations, humanitarian aid and assistance, as well as promoting readiness and inter-operability. These objectives are critical components and essential when requesting justification and approval for a SMEE. In addition, the country plan is consulted to provide further direction and refinement on a mission tasking.

Supporting Civilian Authority and Key Stakeholders' Goals and Objectives

In addition to supporting the COCOM, the SPP works with all sectors of society to promote and enhance the relationship that transcends traditional military exchanges. The Guard's access to civilian leadership gives it leverage with civilian agencies to promote program goals. The active duty component is less able to support non-military objectives. However, the Guard, with its outside resources and experience, can readily support schools, public health clinics, or local police. The SPP is funded by the National Guard Bureau (NGB) through the MMF fund to promote civilian-to-civilian exchanges. In fiscal year 2006, there were fifteen MMF and Latin American Cooperation funded events. In Delaware, MMF funds supported a senior civic leader exchange, several cultural events, and a disaster management and preparation exercise. These exchanges led to additional partnership opportunities that had little or no cost. During the State of the Union Address, Trinidadian officials working in Washington, D.C. toured the district's disaster management agency and learned about large event protection and security. The only cost associated with this event was time. However, key planning personnel from Trinidad and Tobago were able to observe how Washington, D.C. works with many local and federal agencies to coordinate appropriate security. The SPP event showcased how interagency coordination enhances effectiveness and promotes security; the National Capital Region (NCR), National Park Police, and the National Guard all work in concert to ensure a blanket of security. During a cultural exchange funded by the Pentagon, the Trinidad and Tobago Steel Orchestra was performing throughout the beltway at several music events. While in Washington, D.C., the SPP transported the band to Delaware. The expense to bus the orchestra was only a fraction of the real cost, but Delaware was able to take full advantage of Trinidad's visit to Washington, D.C. In addition, the Chief Warrant Officer of the Band visited the Warrant Officer School house. This two day event enhanced Trinidad's awareness of professional military education but cost less than a

hundred dollars. Most events cost about \$10,000, and that is a very small price to pay to enhance and promote international relations. The bilateral relationship adds a great deal of leverage to the existing relationship and adds real value for little cost. The SPP provides a tremendous “bang for the buck.” However, the SPP could lose its effectiveness if it is not properly funded or if bureaucratic roadblocks stifle engagement. Furthermore, some state programs lose support by leadership as priorities shift over time. In addition, when there are tensions between the U.S. and partner countries, the SPP activities slow down precipitously. When this occurs, programs wither on the vine. Ultimately, the SPP is another tool to support foreign policy objectives. When used as designed, it is highly efficient and effective.

Connecting the Dots – Bringing It All Together

The SPP leverages a small presence into a blossoming partnership to enhance national capabilities in the region. Through the SPP, SMEEs are coordinated with host nations to promote engagements in many focus areas, including:

- Emergency Response and Consequence Management
- Senior Leadership Exchanges
- Professional Development
- Counter-Drug Operations
- Counter-Terrorism
- Humanitarian Operations
- Logistics
- Communications
- Military Law
- Multilateral Exercises
- Engineering Exercises
- Small Unit Exchanges
- Community Relations
- Medicine
- Media and Public Affairs
- Policy and Economic Development
- Peace-Keeping Operations

The SPP adds value and resources to engagements occurring in every Command of the DoD. The program has seen significant growth in the past few years. Between 1998 and 2004, 198 Traditional Commander’s Activities events were funded for approximately 1.7 million dollars. In 2006 alone, there were 132 events funded at over 1.5 million dollars. There has been a dramatic increase in activities led by the SPP. This is particularly true for smaller states, such as Trinidad and Tobago. In fiscal year 2006, nearly half of all TCA engagements were funded by the NGB through the MMF program.

Source: Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) (Colonel Jorge Matos)

An important part of any program is its ability to measure its effectiveness. The SPP has shown significant success at increasing resources and working towards expanding partnerships throughout the globe. However, it will need to develop quantifiable measures of success to ensure it is an enduring program. The SPP can point to many antidotal measures of accomplishments. In Guatemala, the Arkansas National Guard conducted a damage assessment in the aftermath of Hurricane Stan in October of 2005. The Guatemalan military benefited from techniques learned by Arkansas emergency response personnel in the years prior to the storm. Wisconsin's SPP facilitated the transfer of a surplus emergency response vehicle. The U.S. also benefits from SPP partnerships. During Hurricane Katrina, Mississippi's partner country, Bolivia, sent troops to assist in the recovery efforts.

Future of the State Partnership Program

The SPP has been an important part of U.S. foreign policy, supporting national goals and objectives in every region. On the horizon, state-to-nation bi-lateral relations will expand to include events with regional focus. Partner states in the Caribbean are working together to find common areas of interest to leverage resources and increase the participation and efficiency of each SMEE. Delaware, Washington, D.C., Rhode Island, South Dakota, and the Virgin Islands are working with their Caribbean partners to collaborate on regional conferences and leverage state resources, such as higher education to promote a regional student exchange program. This is only the beginning of new and exciting opportunities for the SPP and their foreign partners. In addition to regional efforts, the SPP will be supporting efforts by SOUTHCOM to promote new engagement strategies that leverage interagency relationships and promote political and economic growth through partnerships with non-governmental organizations. SOUTHCOM has outlined their plan in "Partnership for the America Command Strategy 2016." SOUTHCOM will use non-profits and other organizations to help support stabilization goals and objectives in their AOR. "SOUTHCOM will actively support interagency, non-governmental entities and public private institutions to enhance regional stability." SOUTHCOM has created two new Directorates to support their nation-building efforts, to include J9-Interagency Cooperation and J10-Public Private Partnerships. There is a trend towards using the military to support traditionally civil agency responsibilities. In particular, the SPP supports both classic military support as well as working with the government and private sector to support country goals and regional objectives.

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The North Atlantic Treaty Organization Accession Protocols for Albania and Croatia

[The following are excerpts from speeches delivered at the White House East Room as released by the Office of the Press Secretary, October 24, 2008.]

Former President Bush

The ambassador of Croatia and Albania are here for a special reason. Deputy Secretary England, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mullen, thank you for coming. Ambassadors, members of the administration, members of the Diplomatic Corps, friends of freedom: Welcome, we are glad you are here. This is a special moment in the hopeful story of human liberty, as America formally declares its support for Albania and Croatia's entry into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

With today's ceremony, we celebrate two young and vigorous democracies seeking to assume new responsibilities in a time of terrorism and a time of war. We strengthen America's partnership with nations that once found themselves in the shackles of communism. We rejoice in taking a major step toward welcoming the people of Albania and Croatia into the greatest alliance for freedom the world has ever known.

The U.S. is proud to have supported the NATO aspirations of these nations from the beginning. Laura and I fondly remember our visits to Tirana and Zagreb, where we met people who are showing the world the potential and the promise of human freedom. The citizens of Albania and Croatia have overcome war and hardship, built peaceful relations with their neighbors, and helped other young democracies build and strengthen free societies. The people of Albania and Croatia are helping move the world closer to a great triumph of history: a Europe that is whole, a Europe that is free, and a Europe that is at peace.

The invitation to join NATO is recognition of the difficult reforms these countries have undertaken on the path to prosperity and peace. In return, NATO membership offers the promise of security and stability. The U.S. and our NATO Allies will stand united in defense of our fellow members. Once Albania and Croatia formally join NATO, their people can know: if any nation threatens their security, every member of our Alliance will be at their side.

The road of reform does not end with acceptance into NATO. Every member of the Alliance has a responsibility to enhance, promote, and defend the cause of democracy. I am confident that Albania and Croatia will deliver on their commitments to strengthen their democratic institutions and free market systems.

Albania and Croatia's entry into NATO is [a] historic step for the Balkans. In the space of a single decade, this region has transformed itself from a land consumed by war to a contributor to international peace and stability. America looks forward to the day when the ranks of NATO include all the nations in the Balkans—including Macedonia. I thank Macedonia's ambassador for joining us today. We are proud of the steps you are taking to strengthen your democracy. The great NATO Alliance is holding a place for you at our table. And we look forward to your admission as a full NATO member as soon as possible.

Our nations seek a path to NATO—other nations seek a path to NATO membership, and they have the full support of the United States government. Today I reiterate America's commitment to the NATO aspirations of Ukraine, Georgia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Montenegro. The door to NATO membership also remains open to the people of Serbia, should they choose that path. All these

nations treasure the blessings of liberty because they remember the pain of tyranny. And they share NATO's solemn commitment to defend the free against the unfree, and the weak against the strong.

The lasting strength of the NATO Alliance is a testament to the enduring power of freedom. And the expansion of this Alliance will lead the way to a safer and more hopeful world. On behalf of my fellow Americans, I offer congratulations to the people of Albania and Croatia on this historic achievement. May your children always honor the struggles you endured. May the stories of Albania and Croatia be a light to those who remain in the darkness of tyranny. And may your example help guide them to a brighter day.

It is now my honor to welcome the Secretary General to the podium, Mr. Secretary General.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization Secretary General De Hoop Scheffer

Credit where credit is due, Mr. President, Madam Ambassador, Mr. Ambassadors, Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen: almost sixty years ago now, when NATO's founding treaty was signed right here in this city, one delegate expressed the hope that it would prove to be a continuous creation. Today's ceremony is ample proof that this hope has been realized.

With Albania and Croatia, two more proud democracies will soon enter our transatlantic family. What started with twelve nations will soon comprise twenty-eight. There is no stronger vindication of the enduring nature of the *Washington Treaty* and of the values that it enshrines. Our Atlantic Alliance was born in the Cold War, but it has long outlasted the circumstances that brought it into being. NATO today is an active Alliance and actively working to defend its values against threats from wherever they may come, an Alliance whose members are committed to developing the instruments and the capabilities that are needed to fulfill their demanding missions, and an Alliance determined to work with other nations and organizations to deal with the many challenges before us.

Today we will be witnessing the United States of America ratification of the Protocols of Accession. Given the indispensable political and military role of this nation in our Alliance, this is a most significant moment. We are now one major step nearer to welcoming into the Alliance Albania and Croatia, two more countries who have demonstrated, by word and by deed, that they are willing and able to shoulder the responsibilities of NATO membership.

Their accession will be a boon for NATO, as it will strengthen our common effort to safeguard and promote security and stability. But—and you, Mr. President, said it already—it will also be a boon for southeast Europe and a vivid demonstration that southeast Europe can shed its tragic past. Both countries have set an example for others to follow, and we will encourage and support all those who aspire [to] that same goal—for the Europe we are seeking to build should be a continent where nations are free to determine their own future and not have their future decided by others.

Mr. President, Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen: even after almost sixty years, the *Washington Treaty* indeed remains a continuous creation. This treaty has not only sparked a unique Alliance; it has also helped to create a unique transatlantic community, a strong community of shared values and interests, a community which shall be strengthened further with the joining of Albania and Croatia.

And let me end, Mr. President, by crediting you for your relentless investment and your relentless energy of making NATO a larger and more successful Alliance. I think we have seen in your eight years the energy this Alliance deserves, but without your personal commitment, I think this would not have been possible. Let me add that finally, on a personal note. Thank you very much.

United States Must Take Long View, and Forge Security Partnerships, Mullen Says

**By
John J. Kruzel
*American Forces Press Service***

[This article contains excerpts from an article from the *American Forces Press Service*, News Articles, 26 October 08. The full text is available at: <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=47952>. Navy Admiral Michael G. Mullen's top priority as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is to widen the scope of United States (U.S.) military strategy to look beyond the borders of Iraq and Afghanistan and strengthen security partnerships, the Admiral told an audience [in Washington on 25 October 2007]. The *DISAM Journal* would like to thank the American Forces Press Service for allowing us to reprint the following article.]

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Navy Admiral Mike Mullen gives his first public speech since becoming Chairman at the Mayflower Hotel in Washington, October 25, 2007. The event was hosted by the Center for a New American Security which develops strong national security and defense policies promoting and safeguarding American interests and values.

"We are in a generational war, and we need to take a long view and think strategically about how we manage our risks globally," Mullen said at the Center for a New American Security in his first public address since assuming office as Chairman [1 October 2007].

The Chairman said military leaders responsible for strategic thinking and planning should look "through a long lens."

I am concerned that we focus too much on the here and now, he said. The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan weigh heavily on the minds of the American people as they do on mine, but we must not be myopic in our view. There is more to the Middle East than those two countries, he added.

Achieving a stable and prosperous Middle East requires more than just a military effort, Mullen said. He noted that participation from non-military elements is vital to gaining the widest breadth of ideas and the broadest range of possible outcomes and alternative futures.

Security is necessary, but it is not sufficient, he said. We must integrate our capabilities with all instruments of national power, and that starts with a better and stronger interagency and the relationships therein.

Mullen said current security challenges present the U.S. with an opportunity "to go beyond the interagency" and forge ties with international partners, nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations, and private sector entities. Regional instability in the Middle East or elsewhere has an impact worldwide, Mullen said, which is why the Chairman's top priority is to develop a comprehensive global military strategy. "It is tied to a larger global view and one that is sustainable over time," he said.

In the current conflict against radical jihadists, and in the long war in general, Mullen said he encourages "debate and persistent intellectual rigor" as military planners formulate sound strategy for the 21st century.

We are part of a new world order; and, as the recently departed Adm. William J. Crowe once said, It is long on new, and it is short on order, the Chairman said. Crowe, who served as Chairman in the late 1980s and early 1990s, died [in October 2007]. This new era demands we ask hard questions, seek new answers, engage in new debates, explore new military strategic thinking, develop alternative options, come up with new solutions to longstanding problems, and dream up innovative ideas to address these challenges.

To address emerging challenges to the interdependent global system, the U.S. must cast a wider net, Mullen said, increasing cooperation with international partners.

That system has many stakeholders; and we need to work with them as we think about things like global order, stability, and economic prosperity, he said. But we will be hard pressed to help a global community safeguard that global system, and by extension our own well being, without the people and the tools to do the job.

Chairman Identifies “Tough Questions” Facing United States

The Admiral identified pressing questions the U.S. faces as it attempts to counter emerging threats while maintaining a position of leadership. Speaking to an audience at the Center for a New American Security [in Washington], Mullen said the U.S. today is confronted by threats from transnational terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The country also must preserve the “freedom of action” to contend with regional instability, deter aggressive action by potentially hostile state actors, help manage the growing competition for natural resources, and mitigate the effects of natural disasters and pandemics, he said.

The nation will need to maintain a posture that takes advantage of all the opportunities for international cooperation and progress the globalized world has to offer, he added.

So tonight, I invite you to consider some tough questions and help your military help me rigorously analyze the major strategic challenges we face as we develop a dynamic military strategy of cooperation for the 21st century, Mullen said.

The questions the Chairman posed are:

- How can a violent extremist movement that increasingly targets the integrated nature of the largely globalized world be effectively eliminated in both the short and the long term?
- How can the development of weapons of mass destruction by or the transfer of associated technologies to aggressive regimes and radical extremists like al Qaeda be prevented?
- How can regional instability stemming from accelerating global integration, intense nationalist and religious movements, and the spread of technology throughout the world be mitigated and localized?
- How can the United States military remain sufficiently capable to deter aggressive actions by nations like Iran, North Korea, and others who seek to expand their military capability?
- How can countries like China and Russia be effectively engaged to ensure that their growing regional influence translates to cooperative participation in the global economic system?

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- How will global industrialization, world population expansion, and migration affect the consumption rates, the distribution, and the long term availability of vital resources such as water and energy?
 - How will competition for those resources affect global stability, and what role will the military play in managing these risks?
 - How can the local, regional, and potentially global effects of another tsunami like the one that hit in the Indian Ocean Basin [several] years ago or another earthquake like the one that devastated parts of Pakistan in 2005 or another Hurricane Katrina or even the California wildfires that [dominated the news] be mitigated?
 - What impact will a massive natural disaster or a global pandemic have throughout the world, and how can militaries work together to alleviate the shock to the global system?
 - How can we do all that is required of us and still remain good stewards of our nation's resources?

Mullen described such queries as “tough questions with no easy answers.” He encouraged Americans to consider the questions and use them to stimulate debate.

I am eager to engage your diverse intellectual resources and thoughtful debate, he said, and welcome your contributions in identifying potential answers to these and other critical questions.

EDUCATION AND TRAINING

A Foreign Military Sales Primer on Hazardous Materials: What Are Competent Authority Approvals? and Why Are They Required for Foreign Military Sales Shipments?

By
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Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management
Joseph Dugan
Military Surface Deployment Distribution Command
and
Orris Groenenboom
United States Army Security Assistance Command

The Military Surface Deployment Distribution Command (SDDC), U.S. Department of Transportation (DoT), Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), foreign military sales (FMS) transportation community, and Department of Defense (DoD) Material Manager Safety Offices seek to clarify and update existing procedures for the shipment of hazardous materials (HAZMAT) to FMS customers – especially explosive HAZMAT. All HAZMAT must be properly packed, labeled, and documented before shipment. However, the most important task of the FMS community at-large is to ensure that FMS customers have proper documentation for shipping HAZMAT Class 1 explosives, and that FMS customers know how Competent Authority Approval (CAA) requirements apply to them. This article provides a brief overview on how to identify and process HAZMAT shipments and discusses the more urgent topic of problems concerning CAA requirements. This paper addresses topics lacking in current guidance, difficulties associated with fixing the problems, and procedures that are being considered to fix these problems. A frequently asked questions (FAQ) section is provided at the end of this article.

What are Hazardous Materials?

HAZMAT items are materials that are dangerous in and of themselves, usually for chemical reasons. HAZMAT can damage or destroy property and cause health problems, and sometimes even death, if they leak, break, evaporate, or react when improperly stored or packed. Transportation hazard communication requirements are fulfilled by assuring that proper marking, labeling, and documentation standards are in full compliance. These standards help ensure that transportation workers and the general public are cautious of HAZMAT and know what to do in the event of an in-transit accident or other incident. The DoT and international HAZMAT regulatory organizations segregate dangerous goods – or HAZMAT – into nine (9) classes. The listing below is from the DoT HAZMAT regulation published in 49 CFR 173.2, Hazardous Materials Classes and Index to Hazard Class Divisions. The purpose of segregating HAZMAT into classes is to identify the hazard risk to health, safety, and property when transported. An item falls into Class 1 when the predominant hazard is an explosive reaction. Gases fall into Hazard Class 2, and so forth.

Hazard Classes (HC) Class Category	
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1	Explosives
2	Gases
3	Flammable Liquids
4	Flammable Solids
5	Oxidizing Substances & Organic Peroxide
6	Toxic & Infectious Substances
7	Radioactive Materials
8	Corrosives
9	Miscellaneous Dangerous Goods

Shipping Hazardous materials

HAZMAT moves everywhere. HAZMAT is transported within, through, and between countries. National and international agencies monitor and regulate HAZMAT to make sure that it moves safely. Any country that moves HAZMAT has a competent authority (CA). The CA controls and regulates the movement of HAZMAT within its own country by researching and classifying new HAZMAT items and publishing HAZMAT regulations.

National CAs meet, confer, and work with each other to produce international rules and regulations to ensure the safe movement of HAZMAT worldwide. The two primary international organizations that regulate worldwide HAZMAT deliveries are the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the International Maritime Organization (IMO). The ICAO publishes technical instructions for international air shipments, which are assimilated for easier use in the *International Air Transportation Association's (IATA's) Dangerous Goods Regulation*. The IMO publishes the *International Maritime Dangerous Goods (IMDG) Code* for ocean HAZMAT shipments. The *Dangerous Goods Regulation* and *IMDG* address all classes of hazardous material.

The DoT is the only recognized CA for the United States Government (USG). The DoT publishes HAZMAT rules and regulations under Title 49, Parts 100-199, of the *Code of Federal Regulations* (49 CFR 100-199). The CFR outlines the legal requirements for preparing hazardous material for transportation by rail, air, vessel, and motor vehicles within the Continental United States (CONUS). ICAO, IATA, and IMO regulations apply to HAZMAT shipments that exit the U.S. All shippers of dangerous goods must follow these regulations. For DoD shipments, the following DoD regulations apply:

- DoD 4500.9-R: *Defense Transportation Regulation (DTR)*
- *Air Force Interservice Manual (AFMAN) 24-204(I)*
- *Army Technical Manual (TM) 38-250*
- Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) Publication 505
- *Defense Logistics Agency Instruction (DLAI) 4145.3: "Preparing Hazardous Materials for Military Air Shipment"*

The DoD or USG shipping activity preparing a HAZMAT shipment is responsible for ensuring that the shipment is properly packaged, marked, labeled, and placarded. Each shipment must be 'certified' by the origin shipping activity (e.g. a DoD/USG vendor in coordination with a DoD/USG Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) transportation officer, or a DoD/USG depot or storage site) using a properly executed *Shipper's Declaration for Dangerous Goods*. This declaration certifies that the item has been properly identified, classified, and packaged in compliance with the applicable

HAZMAT regulations. The declaration should include the following: item's proper shipping name, hazard class/division, compatibility group, United Nations Identification Number (UN#), packing group, point of contact information in event of emergency, and the name of the HAZMAT official who prepared the certification. The source data for these requirements can be found in the dangerous goods list located within the HAZMAT regulation used for the certification. U.S. and international HAZMAT certification is required for all FMS shipments of HAZMAT. The certification must cover movement from point of origin to final destination in the purchaser's country. This is required by the DTR and it applies whether the export is via the Defense Transportation System (DTS) or through a purchaser's freight forwarder. FMS freight forwarders, just like carriers, cannot violate the integrity of a shipment unit. If a shipper certifies an FMS shipment in accordance with 49 CFR instead of international regulations, the FMS purchaser and its freight forwarder must hire a commercial packaging service to open, repack, re-label, and recertify the shipment before it can be exported. The FMS purchaser may submit a *Supply Discrepancy Report* (SDR) to DoD to reclaim the money spent on recertification.

Class 1 Explosives

Items that fall into Class 1 are classified as high or low explosives according to rates of decomposition: low explosives burn rapidly and high explosives detonate. Properties of the explosive indicate the division into which it falls. Shipping papers, labels, and other markings include both the hazard class and division (HC/Division). "Divisions" break classes down even further. For example, a HC/Division 1.1 explosive is the most dangerous explosive because it can explode or detonate in one massive explosion. HC/Division 1.2 explosives can throw projectiles but should not detonate en masse.

HAZMAT Class 1 Explosives

HC/Division	Definition
1.1	Mass Explosive Hazard
1.2	Non-mass explosive, fragment producing
1.3	Mass fire, minor blast or fragment hazard
1.4	Moderate fire, no blast or fragment.
1.5	Explosive substance, very insensitive
1.6	Explosive article, extremely insensitive

1. HC/Division 1.1, 1.2, 1.3 shipments to the FMS customer must move via the DTS at no less than through DoD-controlled ports of embarkation. They may not be handled by a commercial freight forwarder.

2. The only time a freight forwarder can receive Class 1 explosives is when the HC/Division is 1.4, 1.5 or 1.6 and only when the Controlled Inventory Item Code (CIIC) = 7, P, or U. (Ref: DTR, Part II, Tables 205-15 & 205-17). Examples are cartridge activated devices (CADs), HC/Division 1.4, in federal stock class (FSC) 1377. Care must also be taken to ensure the freight forwarder is capable of receiving 1.4 through 1.6 explosives due to local fire ordinances that apply.

Note: If you have access to FEDLOG, you can research the national stock number (NSN) or part number to determine if the item is a Class 1 explosive and the Controlled Inventory Item Code (CIIC).

Start

https://www.webflis.dlis.dla.mil/

Defense Logistics Information Service
A Defense Logistics Agency Activity

DLIS Home | Products | Services | Programs | Cataloging | Log Tools | Supplier | Training | Library

WebFLIS Home

WebFLIS Public Inquiry Selection Menu

Instructions for performing searches:

For a **NIIN** or **NSN** search, enter a full nine position NIIN or a thirteen position NSN in the NIIN or NSN field and then click on the Go button.

For Warfighter searches, enter a **NIIN** or **NSN** and then click on **Warfighter Search** button. Warfighter is Clothing & Textile's online information and ordering system. It is a component of the Defense Supply Center Philadelphia (DSCP).

Enter Search Criteria

Enter NIIN or NSN

Go

Warfighter Search

Enter Item Name Keyword(s)

Enter Part Number

Enter CAGE Code

Company only

Enter Manufacturer's Name

& Enter Part Number

Reset all fields

WebFLIS Output Selection Views

☒ Identification Data

☐ MDE Rule Coded Data

☒ Ref/PN Data

☒ Management Data

☐ Phrase Data

☒ Freight Data

☐ Decoded Characteristics Data

Clear all Select all

Enter the NSN or part number and press Go.

Check the following boxes including Freight Data.

WebFLIS
Federal Logistics Information System

WebFLIS Home

1/12/2009 2:14:15 PM

WebFLIS National Stock Number (NSN) Output Data
Search again?

NSN: 1377011381551
(Warfighter Search)

Item Name: EJECTOR, PARACHUTE, CARTRIDGE ACTUATED

Query Type: PUBLIC

Date of query: 1/12/2009 2:14:15 PM

Identification Back to Top

FIG	INC	CRIT CD	II	RPD MRC	DMIL INT CD	DMIL ASGMT	NIIN	PMIC ADP	ESD EMI	HMIC	HCC
A23900	61837	Y	M	2							Y

SCHEDULE B: 8804000000

ENAC:

Reference/Part Number Back to Top

REF/PN	CAGE-CD	STAT	RNCC	RNYC	DAC	RNAAL	FC	RNSC	RNJC	SADC	HCC	MSDS
1377-ZY89	99999	A	6	9	9	ZZ						
1018-502	51998	A	3	2	2	SB						

Management Back to Top

EFF-DT	MODE	AAC	SOS	UI	UI PRICE	QU	CLIC	SLC	REP	USC
2008336	DF	P	FGZ	EA	\$1,601.00	1	7		I	L

Freight Back to Top

ACTY-CD	NMFC	SUB ITM	UFC-CD-MODF	HMC-CODE	CLASS-RTG	LS-CRLD	RAIL-VARI	WTR-COM	TYP-F	SPC-HAND	AIR-DIM
SU	064300	B	05980		M			680	F	M	A

AIR-CMDTY INTGTY-CD FR-DESC

4M EXPLOSIVES-AMMO OR CARTRIDGES SUBJ

Controlled Inventory Item Code (CLIC) Ref: DoD 4100.39-M Vol 10

Click on Type Cargo Code "F" to determine if item is a Class 1 explosive.

Help

Name: TYPE OF CARGO CODE

Definition
A CODE USED FOR ALL SHIPMENTS VIA WATER TO IDENTIFY THE TYPE OF CARGO INCLUDED WITHIN THE SHIPMENT UNIT. E.G., A-RADIOACTIVE, B-SUBJECT TO DAMAGE FROM HEAT, P-POISON, ETC. SEE VOLUME 10, TABLE B2 AND QUANT. INFO ON-LINE.

Code Definition
F EXPLOSIVES, CLASS C, UN CLASS 1 (EXPLOSIVE C LABEL)

Defense Logistics Information Service 24 Washington Ave. N STE 9 Seattle, WA 98107-2004 Rev 3.0.3

(Note: if the Type Cargo Code is not displayed, then contact the Item Manager for assistance in determining the Hazard Class.)

What is Competent Authority Approval and when is it required?

Regardless of the division of explosives involved, explosive items cannot be shipped unless the owner or exporter has a CAA from the controlling CA. Because ownership of FMS shipments passes from the DoD/USG to the FMS purchaser at shipment point of origin, and control passes at some point in between (except for Delivery Term Code (DTC) 7 shipments), the procedures discussed below must be followed very carefully to ensure that the correct entity has a CAA in place.

CAAs are issued by national CAs. The CA is a national agency that has the authority to classify hazardous items and establish hazardous materials packaging and transportation regulations that apply to shipments originating in the CA's country. A CA is internationally recognized for being able to harmonize its country's HAZMAT policies and procedures with those of other countries and authoritative international HAZMAT organizations (e.g., ICAO and the IMO). When any explosive is involved, a CA must issue a CAA that certifies the following:

- The CA has reviewed the Class 1 Explosives (EX) hazard classification and packaging for a specific item
- The item meets U.N. standards
- The item is approved for transportation

The DoT (the USG's CA) has authorized the DoD to self-classify its own explosives, i.e. military explosives and in some cases other Hazard Classifications which may contain explosive properties (ref: 49 CFR 173.56b). When a Service Hazard Classifier (focal point within the DoD Material Manager Safety Office) requires a hazard classification for a new item, complete details (shipping description, division, etc.) are sent to the Department of Defense Explosive Safety Board (DDESB) for final approval. This procedure is commonly referred to as the Final Hazard Classification (FHC) process (see *DoD Joint Technical Bulletin* (TB) 700-2 (in draft) for FHC procedure details). These requests are routed through the Military Surface Deployment Distribution Command (SDDC) Safety Office. The application is then transmitted to the DoT Associate Administrator for Hazardous Materials Safety who functions within the DoT Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration. DoT responds with a CAA that assigns an EX-Number to each submitted item. The EX-Number is constructed in a 10-digit format. For example, EX2009010032 is broken down by the following data elements:

- Positions 1-4 equal the four digit year (2009)
- Positions 5-6 equal the two digit month (01)
- Positions 7-10 equal a four digit serial number (0032)

Foreign CAs may employ an equivalent arrangement.

CAAs can also be issued as Packaging CAAs, meaning that alternate HAZMAT packaging is approved for transportation and meets U.N. standards. Packaging CAAs are required when the packaging note indicates that a Packaging CAA is required per the applicable HAZMAT regulation. Packaging CAAs are predominately used for non-DoT specification packaging, and provide additional instructions that apply specifically to the NSN/part number of the item being shipped.

In addition to the required HAZMAT certification for shipments of Class 1 items (explosives), a CAA must be on record and attached to the shipping papers. Before explosives can be shipped, the applicable CAA/EX-Number must be cited on both the Bill of Lading and CAA attached to the international shipping papers. This requirement pertains to DoD and FMS shipments.

Complete Approval Authority Impact to Foreign Military Sales

International HAZMAT rules honor CAAs issued by each participating country's authorized national CA. However, CAs will often disapprove transportation of an explosive to be transported within their territory unless they issue their own CAA for the same item. This is the case with the USG's CA. A DoD CAA/EX-Number can only be used to move an explosive item while it is still owned by DoD or still in physical custody of DoD in the DTS. Custody of Class 1 explosives purchased on FMS cases cannot be exported, imported, or moved within CONUS by the FMS purchaser or its agent (freight forwarder) until the DoT issues a CAA/EX-Number in the FMS purchaser's name. The item is no longer a U.S. DoD asset because title transfers to the FMS purchaser at the point of origin; i.e., at the loading dock of the vendor/contractor or DoD depot. Once the FMS purchaser takes physical possession of Class 1 explosives in the U.S., the DoD's CAA/EX-Number is no longer valid. If the FMS purchaser wants to ship or return Class 1 explosives via pilot or vessel pick-up from/to a U.S. port, the FMS purchaser must have a DoT-issued CAA/EX-Number in its name.

The CAA/EX-Number issued to the DoD can be used to move FMS-purchased Class 1 items (explosives) only when the DoD retains custody of the shipment (DTS). Class 1 explosives must remain in DoD custody under the following circumstances:

- Movements within CONUS (air, land, sea, and rivers)
- Export/import movements on a DoD-owned asset (Air Mobility Command aircraft or Military Sealift Command vessel)
- Export/import movements on a DoD-procured commercial ship or aircraft
- Physically located at an DoD installation OCONUS
- Physically located at the OCONUS port of debarkation (POD) prior to pickup by the purchaser (DTC 9). Once the material is offloaded at the OCONUS POD, onward inland transportation must be under the purchaser's own national CAA. If the materiel is moving through a third country, the FMS purchaser may have to obtain a CAA from the third country's CA.
- Delivery to a final inland destination in the purchaser's country (DTC 7)

For shipments of Class 1 explosives returning to the U.S. for repair or other reasons, the FMS customer must provide the country-specific CAA/EX-Number issued by the DoT, along with the CAA issued by its own national CA (see 49 CFR 173.56(f) for reference).

It is highly recommended that the FMS purchaser submit all CAA requests immediately upon acceptance of the applicable FMS Letter of Offer & Acceptance (LOA) to provide the DoT with sufficient CAA processing time (~6 months). The country-specific DoT CAA/EX-Number must be in the possession of the FMS purchaser's freight forwarder prior to the first shipment of an item against the LOA (unless 100 percent DTS is used).

The Way Ahead

The country-specific CAA/EX-Number issued by DoT is not a new requirement. Recent incidents involving FMS explosive shipments have brought increased attention to this subject. CAAs/EX-Numbers are a major part of the worldwide HAZMAT program that uses very specific packaging, labeling, documentation, and transport rules to ensure safe movement, delivery, and storage. Explosives are considered the most volatile and dangerous of all HAZMAT (except perhaps radioactive material)

and thus require special attention and procedures. Unfortunately, FMS customer countries are not being informed about CAA/EX-Number requirements and procedures.

The DoD/FMS transportation community is working to develop mandatory FMS LOA notes to inform FMS purchasers of these requirements. Additionally, there are ongoing problems that subject matter experts continue to sort out. For example, DoT's database does not currently have the ability to distinguish between a CAA issued to DoD and one issued to an FMS customer. A range of alternatives is being evaluated with solutions ranging from adding a country-specific suffix on each part number sold via FMS to assigning a new NSN or part number.

There are also questions regarding the best procedures to ensure accurate and timely processing of country-specific CAA requests. What will be the responsibilities of each party involved, the FMS customer, the case manager, AMC, SDDC, and others? DoD transportation experts, including DSCA and the MILDEPs, in conjunction with SDDC and DoT, are actively engaged in identifying problems, developing solutions, and recommending 'best practices'. Watch for 'best practices', policy memos, and updated regulatory guidance to be released as problem areas are addressed and resolved.

Frequently Asked Questions and Answers

Question: Does every foreign country have a national CA?

Answer: If a prospective FMS purchaser does not have a CA, one should be established if the FMS purchaser intends to order Class 1 explosives from the DoD (the alternative 100 percent DTS, DTC 7). IATA, ICAO, and IMDG Code contain contact information for national CAs.

Question: What steps should be taken if system component items have not received a FHC by the DoD before transferring the asset to the FMS purchaser?

Answer: Following TB 700-2, IHCs and FHCs can only be used internally by DoD for applicable items being shipped. For this reason, IHCs and FHCs would not apply to foreign items or assets entering the DTS. Therefore, it is incumbent upon DoD to have in place a DoT-issued CAA/EX-number before an item can be sold via FMS. The FMS purchaser's CA needs to issue its own CAA for any previously purchased items. Then the FMS purchaser must obtain a DoT CAA/EX-number in order to return the item(s) to the U.S. for repair, modification, or rework.

Question: Do DoT CAA/EX-numbers issued to foreign purchasers have expiration dates?

Answer: Yes. DoT CAA/EX-Numbers are typically valid for one (1) year. However, the purchaser's CA can request a CAA/EX-Number be valid for up to five years, and the DoT will normally honor this request. A 5-year window enables the NSN/part number to be returned multiple times using the same CAA/EX-Number. If the NSN or part number changes (e.g. new model), or the country alters the packaging, a new CAA/EX-number would have to be requested.

Question: As the FMS Case Manager, what can I do to help educate my FMS customer regarding Class 1 (explosive) shipping requirements?

Answer: It is the FMS Case Manager's duty to keep their foreign customers abreast of new developments on transportation and documentation requirements. FMS case managers should provide their foreign customers with adequate educational materials well in advance of a CAA request to ensure successful shipment of materiel. The first step would be to provide foreign customers with a copy of this article!

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Foreign Military Sales Interservice Transportation Working Group (ISTWG) members:

Mr. Todd Hughes, DSCA Strategy Directorate

Ms. Tamara Dresbach, AFSAC

Mr. Richard A. Berry, USASAC-NC

Mr. Mohan (George) Verghis, NAVICP-OF

The Department of Transportation Office of Hazardous Materials Special Permits and Approvals:

Mr. Delmer F. Billings

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Mr. Joseph P. Dugan is employed by the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC-SA) as an Occupational & Health Specialist. He is designated as the DoD liaison for HAZMAT safety issues and responsible for the processing of Competent Authority Approvals, Special Permits, and Special Approvals. He has currently worked in this capacity for six years. Prior to this, he worked as a DoD rail car inspector with over twenty years experience. He was HAZMAT certified at Fort Eustis, Virginia.

Mr. Orris Groenenboom has been a transportation management specialist with the U.S. Army Security Assistance Command (USASAC) in New Cumberland, Pennsylvania since October 1980. He started his U.S. Army civilian career as a supply management intern at Red River Army (now Defense Logistics Agency) Depot in Texarkana, Texas. After assignments in Germany and Rock Island, Illinois, he transitioned from supply to transportation management because it is a far more exciting career field. He served in Vietnam in a Landing Ship Tank delivering, among other things, explosives! He moved to USASAC in 1980.

Ask an Instructor Questions and Answers

By the Defense Institute of Security Assistance
Management Directorate of Research

[The following is a new feature added to the Journal “Education and Training” section which provides our readership insight into some of the more globally applicable questions and answers we have received through our web site (www.disam.dsca.mil/Research/Ask_Instructor/askinstructor.asp). We hope you find it useful and solicit your feedback on both this article and the utility of DISAM’s “Ask an Instructor” program. Questions and answers may be changed or edited to suit the Journal and its readership.]

Question:

There is a guide that provides points of contact information for Security Assistance Organizations (SAOs) (e.g. names, telephone numbers, mailing addresses); and I have a copy of this guide. Is there a comparable guide that provides point of contact information for Foreign Embassies located in the Washington, D.C. area? If yes, what is this resource and where can it be found (e.g. website)?

Answer:

Yes, there is such a guide. It is available on the Department of State web site. At the bottom left side of this page, there is a link entitled “Foreign Embassy Personnel in the United States (Diplomatic List).” This site provides current and archival information regarding foreign diplomats in the U.S. by name and position and also usually furnishes a mailing address or other contact information for their Consulate or Embassy.

Question:

How do I find an on-site class (DISAM non-resident course) that is being held near my location?

Answer:

Please contact the DISAM on-site coordinator. Currently the telephone number is DSN 784-8457 and Commercial (937)904-8457. Also, the email can be found on the DISAM webpage: <http://www.disam.dsca.mil/catalog1/SAM-os.asp> linked as “On-Site Coordinator” under the section titled “Requesting SAM-OS Course”. The appropriate person will be forwarded the email from that location. Classes are requested by an organization for that organization. Not all organizations will allow others to attend their on-site classes; but in unique cases, you may be able to attend an on-site for another organization at a nearby location. You can also get a good Security Assistance and Security Cooperation overview from the Security Assistance Management Orientation Course (SAM-OC) online at: <http://www.disam.dsca.mil/catalog1/sam-oc.asp>.

Question:

My country has asked for a printout of available excess defense articles. Is there a link that is accessible on a non .mil or .gov network that allows my country to peruse the list of available excess defense articles?

Answer:

Sorry, but there is no such list. Major end items are declared Excess Defense Articles (EDA) by each service Secretary as they become available and are generally advertised by the Military Department International Logistics Control Organization (ILCO) — for the Air Force, Air Force Security Assistance Center; for the Army, United States Army Security Assistance Center-New

Cumberland; for the Navy, Navy Inventory Control Point Philadelphia/OF (International programs) — on a when available, one-time basis. They generally do not maintain a list. You can contact each implementing agency to find out if they have anything excess to offer at a specific time. If anything matching your list is available, then your country may be considered along with all other applicants who have indicated an interest in that EDA. For EDA that are secondary, consumable, and non-lethal and demilitarized major assets (which generally require major repairs), you may consult the Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service (DRMS). Their website is: www.drms.dla.mil. Their site allows viewers to see a list of available assets; but unless you have a foreign military sales (FMS) case in place with DRMS, you cannot purchase or freeze those assets.

Question:

Given that funds collected from foreign governments for foreign military sales (FMS) purposes are not appropriated by Congress, are these FMS funds subject to the same legal restrictions regarding how they may be spent as funds that have been appropriated by Congress? Do we tend to apply the rules for appropriated funds to FMS funds as a matter of policy rather than law?

Answer:

Funds are treated as though they were appropriated funds with the exception that once they are deposited in the Security Assistance Trust Fund they are no year funds and can be used until they are all obligated.

Question:

If an FMS case is a “sole source” contract case (sole source vice single source), whose responsibility is case management and under what regulation?

Answer:

The fact that an FMS case is sole source does not change the organization that performs the case management. Sole source procedures are outlined in the *Security Assistance Management Manual* (SAMM) section C6.3.4. The SAMM is the official policy for conducting FMS. You will note that the SAMM does not address any change in case management responsibilities as a result of the Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) being sole source. Sole source does require the case manager to review the Letter of Request (LOR) sole source justification against the SAMM criteria for approval/disapproval. Additionally, the case manager is encouraged to coordinate the sole source request with the contracting organization that will eventually place the FMS requirement on contract in order to obtain information/advice from the contracting officer perspective. Implementation of a sole source LOA would be in accordance with the SAMM C6.1 but would include direction that the respective procurement by the applicable program office or inventory control point be on a non-competitive procurement per the approved LOA sole source note.

Question:

When a case is in closure and the “Below the Line” (BTL) transportation expenditures are less than the amount of the BTL transportation costs on the LOA, does the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) return the unused transportation costs back to the country?

Answer:

Yes, the LOA is a cost estimate. The country will be billed based on actual costs. LOA standard term and condition 4.2 specifically states, “The USG will refund any payments received for this LOA which prove to be in excess of the final total cost of delivery and performance and which are not required to cover arrearages on other LOAs of the Purchaser.”

Question:

Do all Night Vision Goggles (NVGs) require End Use Monitoring (EUM)? Could we go with a lesser generation of Night Vision Goggle (over the counter) and not have the enhanced EUM requirements?

Answer:

All NVGs purchased by foreign military end users require some degree of end use monitoring. If purchased via FMS, Enhanced End Use Monitoring is the normal method. See the *Security Assistance Management Manual* (SAMM) policy memo: “Guidance for the Transfer of Night Vision Devices (NVDs) (DSCA 04-25)” (http://www.dsca.mil/samm/policy_memos/2004/DSCA%2004-25.pdf). If purchased via a direct commercial sale, the Department of State will verify the end use via the Blue Lantern system of checks. If purchased as an “over the counter” commercial item, the Commerce Department verifies the export license of “Dual Use” items such as Gen II and III NVGs via their monitoring program, EXTRAN. It is illegal to ship or transport any Night Vision Device (NVD)/ NVG overseas without written approval from one of the three USG agencies above.

Security Assistance Management Manual Tips

[Editor's Note: The following *Security Assistance Management Manual* (SAMM) Tips are a compilation of the same tips appearing in the Defense Security Cooperation Newsletter. We gratefully acknowledge DSCA's contributions and if you want to read more please go to the following web site: <http://www.dsca.mil>.]

Case Cancellations

Foreign military sales (FMS) cases may be cancelled either by the purchaser or by the United States government (USG). After a case has been implemented, cancellations are processed as a closure of the case, with the purchaser being responsible for any termination costs as well as any estimated administrative costs associated with the case. Per the letter of offer and acceptance (LOR) standard terms and conditions, the USG may cancel a case (or any part of a case) based on U.S. national interests. See SAMM Chapter 6, paragraphs C6.9.1 and C6.9.2. For additional details or for questions or further information on this topic, please contact Policy Division, Strategy Directorate at (703) 601-4368.

Blanket Order Cases and Lines

Per the SAMM C5.4.3.2, blanket order cases and/or lines are used to provide categories of items or services with no definitive listing of items or quantities. Scope is limited to the described item and/or service categories and the purchaser-furnished as line dollar value. Types of items provided on blanket order cases and/or lines are non-significant military equipment (SME) items and/or services that lend themselves to blanket order cases, and/or lines that include spare and repair parts, publications, support equipment, supplies, maintenance, technical assistance, training, and training aids (further definition is available in SAMM C5.4.3.2.1.) Items not provided on blanket order cases and/or lines include classified material, SME including major defense equipment (MDE) and the related initial support item package. For questions or further information on this topic, please contact Policy Division, Strategy Directorate, at (703) 601-3843.

Administrative Expenses for Foreign Government Representatives

The USG does not serve as the disbursing agent for funds received under LOAs unless those funds are required for materiel or services provided by the DoD, another federal agency, or through a DoD procurement contract. LOAs shall not include transportation, lodging, per diem, or other administrative expenses of foreign government representatives, even though such expenses may be related to the procured materiel and services. In exceptional situations, DSCA may specifically authorize an LOA to include the payment of travel and living allowances for international students. Foreign purchasers may not use LOAs to lease commercial or general service administration (GSA) vehicles. Foreign purchasers are responsible for making and paying for these arrangements outside of the FMS process. See SAMM Chapter 4, Section C4.4. For more information or questions on this topic, please contact Policy Division, Strategy Directorate.

Diversion of Material

Implementing agencies (IAs) normally fill security assistance requirements from production on a first-in, first-out basis. National security considerations and foreign policy objectives may require that materiel procured or stocked for FMS be diverted to meet higher priority requirements for other FMS customers with the prior concurrence of the Director, DSCA. In extreme cases, items may also be diverted from production or from U.S. Forces to meet high priority FMS requirements. DoD policy requires a determination that the sale of a defense item shall not degrade U.S. defense efforts by taking needed equipment from U.S. stocks (withdrawals) or disrupting deliveries of critical items

from production for U.S. forces (diversions), unless the sale of the item is in the overall U.S. national interest. For information regarding diversions see SAMM Chapter 6, paragraph C6.4.7. For questions or further information on this topic, please contact Policy Division, Strategy Directorate, at (703) 601-3842.

Direct Exchange

Direct exchange is a type of repair program executed under an LOA document. Under a direct exchange, a repairable item is exchanged for the same type of serviceable item from DoD stock. To qualify for the Direct Exchange program, the repairable item must have been obtained under the *Arms Export Control Act*, and the DoD (including FMS) must have a requirement for the item. The Direct Exchange program has a quick turnaround time since replacement items are issued from DoD stock. For more information about Direct Exchange program see SAMM Chapter 6, Section C6.4.9. For more information on this topic, please contact Policy Division, Strategy Directorate, at (703) 604-6612.

White Phosphorous Munitions

Requests for white phosphorus munitions should be submitted in accordance with the procedures established for SME. Requests should indicate type of ammunition, the quantity, and intended use. Requests should be accompanied by a Country Team Assessment indicating whether the amount requested is reasonable in relation to the intended use, current on-hand inventories, and predictable usage rates of such items. Requests must also contain assurance from the host government that white phosphorus munitions are used only for purposes such as signaling and smoke screening. DSCA/OPS shall coordinate the request and upon approval, advise the DoD component and provide the special conditions that must be included in the LOA. For more information regarding this issue see SAMM Chapter 4, paragraph C4.3.7. For questions or further information on this topic, please contact Policy Division, Strategy Directorate, at (703) 601-3842.

Letters of Request for Price and Availability Data

Foreign countries and international organizations request price and availability (P&A) data when preliminary data are required for planning purposes or in anticipation of an FMS purchase. P&A data are rough order of magnitude estimates of cost and availability of defense articles and/or services, which are sufficiently accurate for planning purposes but may not be used for budgetary purposes nor may be considered as USG commitments. P&A data are prepared in the Defense Security Assistance Management System, but are not valid for use in preparing a LOA due to the preliminary nature of the data. IAs must ensure the following:

- DoD component can recommend release of the articles and/or services to the purchaser
- If the purchaser were to request an LOA, it could be provided, considering clearances such as Congressional Notification or disclosure approval
- The purchaser knows to submit an LOR for an LOA if it chooses to pursue the purchase.

For additional details see SAMM Chapter 5, paragraph C5.3. For questions or further information on this topic, please contact Policy Division, Strategy Directorate, at (703) 601-4368.

Military Articles and Services List

The *Military Articles and Services List* (MASL) identifies defense articles and services and is a required entry on each LOA line item. Defense articles that are SME require enhanced end-use monitoring (EUM), and are restricted under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)

restrictions, or are classified items must be identified clearly on the LOA using defined order MASLs. Such items cannot be listed on a blanket order line or a defined order line coded as non-SME, routine EUM, or non-MTCR. Nor can they be added in the Line Item Description or in a Line Item Note under such a blanket or defined order line. For more details on MASLs see SAMM Chapter 13, Section C13.6., and the *MASL Handbook*. For questions or further information on this topic, please contact Financial Policy and Internal Operations, at (703) 604-6576 or the Policy Division, Strategy Directorate, at (703) 601-3842.

21 March 2009 the Global Master of Arts Program II Graduates a Class

Twelve students sponsored by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) received certificates marking their completion of the Global Master of Arts Program (GMAP II) 21 March 2009.

GMAP II is a twelve month course of study in international affairs leading to a Global Master of Arts degree from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University located in Medford, Massachusetts. The program is specifically designed for mid-career level professionals and is intended to enhance the skills of selected civilian and military personnel working in international affairs positions.

DSCA's deputy director Beth McCormick attended the graduation ceremony and gave a few remarks. She joined Deborah Winslow Nutter, PhD, senior associate dean, professor and director of GMAP II and other faculty members in congratulating the students as they received their certificates.

The twelve students and their fellow classmates who have completed all the requirements will be granted degrees in May 2009 upon approval of the Board of Trustees of Tufts University. The DSCA sponsored graduates are listed below.

- Kenneth Becker, country program director, Navy International Programs Office
- Alula Berhaane, command country managers, Air Force Security Assistance Center
- Rita Chico, security assistance analyst, Defense Security Cooperation Agency
- Terrence Dudley, navy section chief, U.S. Military Liaison Office, Brazil
- James Dywan, field studies program manager, U.S. Army
- Andrew Heppelmann, foreign area officer, U.S. Army European Command
- Scott Mackenzie, deputy chief, Pacific Branch, Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force for International Affairs
- Greg Marme, chief, Security Cooperation Budget, U.S. Central Command
- Christian Paasch, foreign affairs specialist, Air Force, Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force for International Affairs
- John Reed, country program director, Sub-Sahara Africa, Defense Security Cooperation Agency
- David Rye, deputy chief, Combat Power Projection Branch, Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force for International Affairs
- Nathan Whitaker, foreign military sales case manager, Naval Air Warfare Center Training Systems Division Orlando, Florida
