

Strategy Research Project

A FULL-TIME WORKFORCE FOR AN OPERATIONAL ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

BY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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ABSTRACT

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The events of 9/11 accelerated the transformation of the Army National Guard from a strategic reserve to what many now call an operational reserve; yet a corresponding change to the full-time workforce has not been realized. It remains a workforce comprised largely of dual status military technicians and Active Guard and Reserve soldiers, augmented by a small non-dual status civilian sector that has not changed in numbers these past 40 years. It is a workforce that is sufficient for one sector of the Army National Guard – the Modified Table of Organization and Equipment units or deployable organizations, but is wholly inadequate for another sector – the larger headquarters and other non-deployable organizations. This project looks at the history of the full-time workforce in the Army National Guard, its current mix of civilian and military technicians and Active Guard and Reserve soldiers, and the difficulties that composition poses for the large, non-deployable organizations. Finally, this paper makes a recommendation as to how best to base the arrangement of technicians in the full-time workforce to meet the needs of today's operational Army National Guard.

A FULL-TIMEWORKFORCE FOR AN OPERATIONAL NATIONAL GUARD

The readiness of reservists to fulfill their wartime mission depends heavily on full-time support.

—Final Report of the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves¹

Conventional thinking in terms of how the Army National Guard has transformed since 9/11 can be summed up by saying the Guard is no longer a woefully underfunded and undermanned strategic reserve of the Cold War-era Army; rather it has become a healthier resourced operational force, successfully fighting side-by-side with its active duty partners in the struggle some call the “long war” or the Global War on Terror.² Testament to just how far the Army National Guard has come since 9/11 can be seen in the numbers; through Fiscal Year 2007, the Army National Guard has mobilized more than 388,000 soldiers in support of the Global War on Terror and many domestic operations.³

Indeed, the successes enjoyed by the National Guard may be attributed in part to the efforts of a now varied and robust full-time workforce which keeps the Guard relevant and ready on a day to day basis.⁴ It is a workforce comprised primarily of civil servants (excepted and competitive technicians) and Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) soldiers.⁵ It is also a workforce that, because of the exigency of war and its depleting affect on full-time manning, is heavily and necessarily augmented by others -- traditional soldiers on temporary full-time National Guard duty orders. Quite often, contractor personnel may be often found seamlessly working side-by-side with the remaining full-time unit support personnel. These temporary or fixes are costly in terms of train up costs for replacements and overall personnel procurement costs. These fixes also do

not compensate for the institutional and operational knowledge dissipates when our full-time workforce deploys and can be costly in time lost to train-up and job learning.

Can the Guard continue to operate with the full-time workforce as it is currently configured, or do we need to change the mix for an operational Army National Guard to meet the needs of the job at hand and whatever conflicts the future may bring? This paper explores the background and composition of the full-time workforce for the Army National Guard and some of the issues encountered in managing such a dissimilar force, especially at the organizations most adversely affected by the current operation tempo (OPTEMPO). Additionally, this paper looks at the effects of mobilizations on this segment of the workforce and finally, makes a recommendation as to how the workforce may best be configured to support the Army Guard as an operational reserve force now and in the years to come.

Workforce Background

Full-time support personnel serve in more than 2900 units and elements across the Army National Guard.⁶ Full-time support packages vary by the level of command at which they are emplaced. For example, an infantry detachment, company, or battalion at a hometown armory will be primarily staffed with AGR soldiers and augmented by the full-time National Guard duty soldiers or soldiers working in an Inactive Duty Training or Annual Training status. At a major subordinate command headquarters – normally a brigade sized element – it is common to find this same package, but augmented by a few excepted military technicians as well. However, at the state joint force headquarters, the United States Property and Fiscal Office and state level maintenance

facilities, one will find AGR soldiers, full-time National Guard duty soldiers, excepted military technicians, competitive technicians, and contractors.

AGR soldiers focus on “organizing, administering, recruiting, instructing and training within the Army National Guard” units and share the same pay and benefits as their active duty brethren.⁷ Military Technicians focus primarily on training management, maintenance of equipment and vehicles, and administration functions and fall into several pay and benefits systems, including the long established General Schedule (GS) and Wage Grade (WG) systems and the National Security Personnel System, currently under implementation Department of Defense wide.⁸ Non-dual status technicians, functioning within the pay and benefits systems of their excepted counterparts, serve primarily in administrative roles, but may serve in roles traditionally reserved for dual-status technicians.⁹ All of these full-time support positions are augmented to varying degrees by full-time National Guard duty soldiers and contractor personnel.

AGR soldiers serve in different categories or statuses. One category of AGR soldiers are those residing on a state’s manning document in a Title 10 status.¹⁰ The population of these soldiers performing duty in a state will typically be extremely small. For example, the Wisconsin Army National Guard, a mid-sized Army Guard state with approximately 7700 soldiers, has a compliment of three: the United States Property and Fiscal Officer representing the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, the Inspector General, and the Senior Army Advisor. These Title 10 soldiers serve in the Army National Guard under several authorities found in the U.S. Code.¹¹ For example, the United States Property and Fiscal Officer serves under the authorities of Title 10 USC

12301(d) and Title 32 USC 708.¹² Other soldiers serving on Title 10 are doing so on long term tours of 180 days or more, for example, at the National Guard Bureau, on individual augmentee missions in support of Operation Enduring Freedom or Operation Iraqi Freedom and other combatant commanders, or as liaisons at other service component headquarters.

Another category of AGR soldiers are those ordered to perform full-time military duty under the provisions of Title 32 USC 502(f).¹³ Title 32 AGR soldiers comprise the largest part of the state AGR population and are most prevalent in the units dotted about the state or territory and at the joint force headquarters. Many of these soldiers fill a critical role in their unit of assignment. Most unit commanders are traditional Guard men and women who conduct their National Guard duties on weekends, some week nights and during annual training. These AGR soldiers are their commander's conduit to the full-time Guard leadership and are responsible for fulfilling a variety of requirements. They maintain the unit's readiness in areas of personnel, equipment, maintenance, training, and day-to-day administrative functions, ensuring a smooth transition for the unit from a peacetime training organization to a war time fighting organization.

At the state or territorial joint force headquarters, Title 32 AGR soldiers fill positions within the traditional G-staff or J-staff structures. These soldiers also fill positions at the Recruiting Command and its operational nodes in armory communities throughout the state. The duties and responsibilities of AGR soldiers at the joint force headquarters and the Recruiting Command are much the same of the tactical oriented unit AGR soldiers, but more so at the operational level.

Military technicians form the next largest slice of the full-time workforce. The military technician program in use by the Army National Guard of the various states, territories and the District of Columbia was enacted by Congress with the passing of the Technician Act of 1968 or Public Law 90-486. With its passing came the establishment of the use of military technicians, providing a means for the Adjutant Generals - the commanders of the states' National Guard forces - to ensure the day-to-day operations, training and administration of the Guard was completed. Military technicians are also referred to as dual status or excepted technicians; they have the additional requirement to be an active member of the State National Guard in which they are employed and are excepted from the rules governing a typical civil service employee "in the areas of tenure and competitive requirements for employment."¹⁴

The National Guard also employs another category of technicians who do not have the military membership requirement and is the least populated segment of the full-time workforce; these technicians are referred to as non-dual status or competitive technicians. The authority for their employment is derived from Title 10 of the USC Code which says a non-dual status technician "is a civilian employee of the Department of Defense serving in a military technician position who...is employed under section 709 of Title 32 in a position designated under subsection (c) of that section and when hired was not required to maintain membership in the Selected Reserve."¹⁵ Also by statute, the U.S. Congress has set the permanent number of non-dual status, or competitive technicians that may be employed by the National Guard, at 1950.¹⁶ This number is based on the Act's provision that 95% of the full-time workforce (a combined Army and Air 40,000 strong in 1968) must be military technicians, inferring the remaining 5% could

be non-dual status technicians. In all subsequent National Defense Authorization Acts, the majority of these authorizations (1600) belong to the Army National Guard; the remainder belongs to the Air National Guard. While the full-time workforce authorizations grew significantly over the years, Fiscal Year 2000 National Defense Authorization Act limitations on non-dual status technicians in the Guard has not changed and subsequently, non-dual status authorizations have remained stagnant.¹⁷

Nationwide, in Fiscal Year 2008, there were approximately 29,200 AGR soldiers (short of the validated requirement of 42,533 soldiers), 26,500 military technicians (short of the 40,729 validated requirement), and 1600 civilian technicians (100% of the congressionally mandated requirement), totaling an NDAA authorized requirement of 57,300.¹⁸ This 68% fill rate of required positions, matched with a very robust end strength of over 360,000 equates to an approximate 1:6 ratio of full-time support personnel versus the total Guard force. By comparison, the Active Army with a Fiscal Year 2008 end strength of approximately 536,000 soldiers had approximately 243,000 Department of the Army civilians supporting their effort; this equates to an approximate ratio of just over one Department of the Army civilian for every two active duty soldiers, a marked contrast to an equally busy and now operational Army National Guard.^{19 20}

Both categories of technicians (dual-status *or* military and non-dual status *or* civilian), though working for a State or territorial Adjutant General (most often a Federally recognized General Officer working for and paid by the state, commonwealth or territory), are in fact Federal employees of the Department of the Army and are controlled by the provisions of Title 32 of the U.S. Code.²¹ Military and civilian technicians are found primarily at the United States Property and Fiscal Offices, the joint

force headquarters and all levels of organizational maintenance facilities. The price tag for this workforce is large. In Fiscal Year 07, the Army Guard budget devoted 32% each of its operations and maintenance appropriation (OMNG 2065) and its pay and allowances appropriation (NGPA 2060) in support of the technician and AGR programs, respectively. In money terms, that's approximately \$4.2 billion of an over \$13 billion budget, when augmented by the Global War on Terror supplemental funding bill.²²

Difficulties with the Mix

Historically, there have been problems with a mixed workforce (technicians and AGRs) in the reserve components to which we have evolved today. These problems are based in the inequities of using two employment systems, with different pay and benefits systems, simultaneously to fill positions in one organization and are further magnified with the transformation of the Army National Guard to an operational reserve.

As early as 1985, a General Accounting Office report to the Secretary of the Army indicated there were many issues when technicians and AGRs were working side by side at the unit level.²³ Findings indicated supervisory lines were vague, job duties and responsibilities for AGRs were ill defined (compared to the standards in place for technicians), and there was much friction between AGR soldiers and technician personnel because of inequalities in pay, leave, and benefits, AGR faring much better than technicians in all three instances. The National Guard Bureau had a plan for integrating AGRs into the workforce while addressing the technician workforce and the many issues caused by a mixed workforce (technicians and AGRs working side by side in units). That plan called for converting those technicians to AGR who were in a position and eligible to do so. The remaining technicians would be transferred to support

positions outside deployable units, like state joint force headquarters, the United States Property and Fiscal Offices, and maintenance facilities. Once completed, the effect would be only AGR soldiers would comprise the full-time workforce in deployable organizations. This indeed has come to pass.

The 1985 General Accounting Office report also made note that hiring AGR soldiers at the units had a positive effect on the turnover rate for the full-time workforce.²⁴ The lower-graded General Schedule positions which previously were hard to fill, or keep filled, because of low wages, were now stabilized when filled with a better compensated AGR soldier. This worked for deployable organizations populated with lower graded full-time supply or administrative clerk positions. However, this practice of hiring AGR soldiers at the lower graded positions was not carried out at the larger non-deployable organizations; its effects are felt most at the United States Property and Fiscal Office with a large population of lower graded (GS-05 to GS-07) positions.

Today, a military technician-heavy, large, and non-deployable organization located near a smaller and deployable organization comes out on the losing end in many of its hiring processes. Many of the lower General Schedule and Wage Grade positions in these large organizations can be very hard to fill when they compete with the smaller organizations vying for the same pool of traditional soldiers drawn to the more lucrative AGR positions. To illustrate, an entry level GS-05 at the United States Property and Fiscal Office for Wisconsin in Camp Douglas will begin with an annual wage of \$29,726 or \$14.24 per hour; starting a bit higher at the nearby Combined Support Maintenance Shop is the WG-05 at a rate of \$15.52 hour or a bit more than \$32,000 per year.²⁵

By comparison, an AGR E5 soldier hired for a comparably classified position at the close by 32d Brigade Combat Team headquarters will start at \$35,364 (of which over \$12,000 is not taxable income). And maybe more importantly, the AGR position comes with the active duty built-in health care plan and much better leave program than the entry level technician position. The entry level technician earns the equivalent of 13 days vacation per year (30 days for their AGR counterpart) and must pay a hefty premium if they choose a health care plan. Many times, a military technician hired at a lower grade will use their hiring only as an initial entry position. Once they gain exposure in the organization, at the earliest opportunity they will abandon any plans for a long-term civil service career in favor of the more profitable AGR career.

The full-time workforce is the glue that keeps the component together, be it the Active Army or the Army National Guard. Both components are busy fighting the long war as one team, deploying equipment and personnel to the theaters of operations, and defending the homeland. Both components continue to recruit new soldiers into their service who must be cared for, trained, and equipped. And both components continue to procure equipment that must be accounted for and maintained. The business of the Army and the Army National Guard units remaining on home soil goes on. Army National Guard units must continue to recruit, administer, and train new soldiers for their units (be they deployed or not) in preparation of future deployments or meeting the homeland defense and security needs of their respective state or territorial citizenry under the leadership of their Commander-in-Chief. The Army too must continue to recruit, administer, and train soldiers for their units to meet future deployment needs

and assigned tasks in support of the U.S. Northern Command homeland defense mission.²⁶

It falls largely upon the full-time workforce to ensure their respective service component is mission ready. For that purpose, it is important for each to retain a robust workforce that is properly funded and organized in such a manner that they can support the home front and war zone efforts. However, the Army National Guard is hindered in its ability to maintain a robust workforce by the current federal law under which they must operate. The Title 32 technician workforce of the Army National Guard has the requirement to maintain military membership as a condition of employment and as a result, is subject to being deployed. The Title 5 Department of the Army civilian workforce of the Army is not subject to such conditions. While the Army indeed deploys a portion of its civilian workforce in support of the war (approximately 3800 Department of Defense civilians were deployed as late as November 2008), the Army National Guard asks the majority of its civilian workforce to regularly deploy as a condition of their employment.²⁷

Under the current structure of the Army National Guard, unit full-time support personnel deploy with their unit – save an occasional soldier who may stay behind to support rear detachment operations (supply operations, personnel management, facility security, etc.). However, because of the dual status requirement for most of the technician workforce, when a unit deploys they take with them soldiers who are dual hatted as military technicians and are employed full-time at the joint force headquarters, the United States Property and Fiscal Office, or a combined maintenance facility. These deployments can have a potentially devastating and costly effect on the operation of

those respective organizations and second and third order effects on non-deployed units. Even the Department of Defense in 1999 recognized this in a report to Congress stating “The National Guard cannot operate without a workforce that includes some employees who do not have to mobilize with the units they support.”²⁸ Many of the positions military technicians occupy are considered inherently governmental in nature, but not exclusively military and could be filled by non-dual status technicians.²⁹ An example would be the United States Property and Fiscal Office logistics operation. The operation, responsible for equipping, clothing, and supplying the soldiers of the state or territory with what they need to maintain mission readiness, can be adversely affected when a majority of its employees are military technicians and are members of a deploying truck, quartermaster, or maintenance unit. Even with long lead-times from unit alert to mobilization, it can be difficult to secure qualified replacement personnel given current backfill rules or resource constraints on hiring contractors.

Backfilling deploying technicians is subject to stringent rules, based on budgetary constraints. For each technician deployed, the National Guard Bureau Human Resource directorate has established a 1:5 backfill ratio (for comparison, the backfill ratio for AGR soldiers is 1:3); that is for every five technicians who deploy, the organization may hire one temporary backfill. The problem arises as the hiring manager must redistribute workloads to other employees until relief can be gained with a new hire. This causes much stress in the workplace and reduced efficiency on the part of remaining employees. And because overtime pay is not authorized for Title 32 technicians, employees are rewarded with compensatory time-off. Often, an employee relinquishes this compensatory time because they do not have the opportunity to use it *and* their

earned annual leave each year because of the heavy workload. This backfill ratio is wholly inadequate, and the ability of the organization to maintain its operational capability is hindered to the point other remedies must be pursued.

One common remedy, albeit a temporary fix, includes the hiring of contractors to complete tasks that normally would be accomplished by the deploying technician. While National Guard Bureau at times centrally funds and provides some emergency hire technicians and contractors, states normally must fund the extra help out of their own funds, that is with appropriated funds provided to the state in a compatible program, and that can be costly. Often this practice leads to hiring retired Guardsmen (typically senior non-commissioned officers or commissioned officers) who, because of their institutional knowledge of the organization and specific capabilities for a given position, will command a higher rate of pay in order to be drawn back to the workplace. Other pay inequity issues arise causing negative feelings in the work environment. A contractor with no prior military background processing payroll actions may get paid considerably more than the GS-05 military pay clerk sitting in the next cubicle doing the same work.

Another remedy calls for organizations to shift resources. In a budget world skewed by supplemental funding and seemingly endless pools of cash, it is common for larger National Guard organizations to shift the costs of finding a replacement for a deployed technician to a Global War on Terror funding line and hire traditional soldiers on long term orders - Full-time National Guard Duty - Operational Support. With its active duty pay structure and benefits, the use of Full-time National Guard Duty - Operational Support soldiers can have the same negative impact as hiring a contractor; the soldier often is much better compensated than their technician counterpart.

However, this option is hampered as well by congressional ceilings (17,000 nationwide per the National Defense Authorization Act) and mobilizations.³⁰ The available pool from which to obtain qualified replacements is greatly reduced with some states experiencing mobilizations rates of 50% to 80% of their traditional guardsmen.³¹

The net effect of these problems is detrimental to the large organizations that rely heavily on military technicians in order to carry out their missions in support of the now operational Army National Guard. Increasingly they find it more difficult to carry out their missions with such a diminished capacity in their full-time workforce. They must compete with the smaller deployable organizations that offer more attractive employment packages and more significantly, they operate in the confines of a military technician system that is inequitable when compared to the AGR system and constrained by law and regulations with an inflexible management capability. Clearly, the way to minimizing the shortcomings is to give these organizations the ability and flexibility to hire technicians who are not subject to deployment; increasing the number of non-dual status authorizations is the key to their viability and future success.

Many understand these shortcomings of the current end strength authorizations and are calling for a change in the structure and or manning levels of the full-time Army National Guard workforce. The Army Guard leadership in its Annual Financial Report for Fiscal Year 2007 maintains that Army National Guard readiness correlates directly to the level of authorized full-time manning and the Guard's ability to meet its mission requirements in the states as well as its operational requirement overseas. The end result of not being resourced at adequate levels in support of full-time manning will be

reduced ability to meet the needs of the Army Force Generation model as well as the requirements of the Army Guard as it relates to the Army Campaign Plan.³²

Indeed, the National Guard Association of the United States, a powerful lobbying organization, calls for increasing the overall fulltime workforce numbers ahead of the Fiscal Year 2009 budget to levels projected for Fiscal Year 2013, or 73% of those requirements validated in Fiscal Year 1999 and based on the Army Guard being a strategic reserve. The Association calls the Army's plan for staffing the Army National Guard full-time force "wholly inadequate to produce the level of readiness needed in today's security environment," and advocates for the accelerated growth of the full-time support workforce from the 57,306 authorized in Fiscal Year 2008 to the Fiscal Year 2013 level of 62,040.³³ These numbers represent a mix of AGR, dual status and non-dual status technicians. And while the Association does not address a specific need for raising the limitation on civilian technicians, it recognizes that the National Guard is now operating in "an operational environment of persistent conflict" much different from that of 1999 and subsequently has developed "significantly higher full-time manning needs."³⁴

The National Guard Bureau J1 directorate has also been active in pursuing a positive change to the numbers of non-dual status technicians in support of the full-time workforce. A J1 working group concluded there was a need to increase the overall numbers of civilian employees as mission readiness was being adversely impacted. The J1 recommended a change in the United States Code to delete the reference to a specific number (1600) and instead, use a percentage of 5%.³⁵ Applying this percentage to current full-time workforce figures (includes AGR and technicians) would provide the

Army National Guard 4,691 civilian technician authorizations. It is important to note this would not be an increase to existing authorizations, rather replacing on-board military technicians through conversion or attrition. The working group cited cost savings from a military leave standpoint (the Guard would not have to pay civilian technicians the 15 days of military leave now required for military technicians) and determined there would be no overall cost increases because total technician authorizations would not rise.³⁶

It is important to note the J1 working group does not advocate filling all available non-dual status positions as they recognize the Army National Guard is still a military-centric organization. Certain full-time positions in the state level workforce (in particular the joint force headquarters and the United States Property and Fiscal Office) should and must remain military in nature be they filled with an AGR or a military technician. Senior leadership positions such as, primary G and J staff directors and certain subordinates and the United States Property and Fiscal Officer and selected subordinates are some examples of positions that should remain filled with uniform personnel.

The Way Ahead

Maintaining the status quo or transitioning to a pure AGR or pure military technician force are not practicable alternatives and should not be considered. The former is proving not to be acceptable and would further exacerbate the current conditions experienced at the large, non-deployable type headquarters. The latter two options would certainly level the playing field in terms of pay and benefits, but given the deployability of its population, a pure uniformed workforce would not alleviate the

problems associated with the high operation tempo of the Guard. How then should the Army National Guard proceed?

A movement is already underway to take a hard look at how the Army structures its full-time workforce for its reserve components. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates directed the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel to form and convene a working group which includes the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, to review the laws and policies in effect as they relate to the makeup of the full-time support program for the Reserve Components, including the National Guard.

This senior level working group is charged with evaluating: (1) all current laws and policies relating to full-time support management; (2) the various categories of full-time support, developing advantages and disadvantages of each; and (3) what changes, if any, need to be made in the makeup (purpose, composition, and size) of the full-time support force and the management of same. Additionally, the group is to provide an individual assessment of the full-time support manning and military technician programs of the Army reserve components. Secretary Gates directed these actions in response to the committee's recommendations that "Congress, with input from the Department of Defense, should adopt a new model to provide full-time support to the Army Reserve Components as part of a program to improve their overall military effectiveness and to more fully integrate the Army and its components into a total force."³⁷

It is important for the Army National Guard to *attain* a workforce that will be little affected by the idiosyncrasies, constraints, and inequities contained in the current full-time force models and by the high rates of unit mobilizations. As the National Guard

Bureau moves forward and completes their evaluations, assessments, and recommendations and considers how a new full-time support model for the National Guard should look, high on their list of viable alternatives should be an emphasis on gaining the ability to emplace more non deployable civilian technicians in their workforce. The new model must be geared towards alleviating the strain on the workforce at the large, headquarters type organizations that the impact of mobilizations and current manning documents impose. The success of any recommendation the National Guard Bureau makes will of course be subject to securing a change to verbiage as contained in current law or policy and should have little impact on funding.

The National Guard Bureau, the Army National Guard, and its supporters in Congress and organizations like the National Guard Association of the United States should continue to put forth the effort to compel lawmakers to reconsider the mix of employees that best supports the Guard in the operational environment in which it finds itself. That end can be accomplished by enacting a change in the language in 10 USC 10217 to reflect the number of military technicians that may be non-dual status from a hard number to a percentage, based on the total number of authorized full-time manning (AGR and military technician). This would have the most positive and immediate effect on the full-time manning structure of the Army National Guard in the current and future operating environment. Using current end strength authorizations and applying a 5% multiplier, the Army National Guard could realize the authorization of an additional 3,000 non-dual status technicians nationwide.³⁸ While this would still not put the Army National Guard on par with the Regular Army in terms of soldier-to-civilian ratio, it certainly would be a step in the right direction.

The ability to fill vacancies with stable, long term employees would provide the Army National Guard a high level of certainty in regards to continuity of operations during times of increased OPTEMPO. Continuity of state-level operations (which must continue no matter the number of units deployed from that state or territory), continuity of unit operations (placement of AGRs and military technician full time in units they support), and finally, efficiency of resources (in time and dollars gained by the elimination of military technicians who take military leave for annual training or schools) would all be improved with the ability to hire nonmilitary technicians.

An added benefit to increasing non-dual status authorizations would be the immediate increase of qualified and available personnel in the hiring pool. Many former military technicians, who lost their jobs through retirement or loss of military membership or retired soldiers, are readily available to step in and begin working with little or no lost time to the organization for training or education. This population has a proven track record with the many private sector firms that hire them and offer contract services to the military services; this demography produces ideal candidates for civilian technicians.

The flexibility in personnel position management that comes with this alternative would allow states to simply evaluate their needs based on their past, current, and future operations and adjust the ratio of dual status and non-dual status technicians accordingly, with no increase to total authorizations. States that have experienced a high deployment rate of their military technicians, averaging between 9%-12% nationwide since 9/11, would be able to minimize the risk of failure to their state readiness mission by the change to this more predictable workforce.³⁹ Budgeteers

should have no argument with this alternative either; redesignating existing military technician authorizations to civilian status will not have an effect on the overall technician end-strength and its associated funding.⁴⁰

Finally, changing the basis of authorizations in the language of the law from a hard number to a percentage-based number would allow for more predictability in workforce management for personnel and resource managers. Whether we face upturns or downturns in future defense spending (we can not discount the possibility of what a more stable era of international security, e.g., the Clinton era, could bring), we could be assured that we would have a suitable full-time workforce that would stay commensurate to the size of the traditional force it supports.

A feasible answer, then, lies in adjusting the overall Army National Guard civilian and military technician population to a mix that provides predictability and long-term stability in the workforce. This adjustment is especially important to those organizations in the Guard which rely heavily on the technician workforce to accomplish their readiness missions. Moving forward and securing a change to the next National Defense Authorization Act is the way ahead. Basing the end strength of the civilian workforce on a percentage of the overall authorized full-time support force will have an immediate and positive impact. Increasing the civilian workforce sets the conditions for the Army National Guard to meet its mission requirements and remain relevant as an operational reserve force, now and in the future.

Endnotes

¹ Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, "Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st Century Operational Force; Final Report to Congress and the Secretary of Defense," January 31, 2008, http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/CNGR_final-report.pdf (accessed October 17, 2008).

² Ibid.

³ The Army National Guard, *Annual Financial Report Fiscal Year 2007*, (Washington, DC: The Army National Guard, 2008) 22.

⁴ Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, "Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st Century Operational Force; Final Report to Congress and the Secretary of Defense."

⁵ The Army National Guard, *Annual Financial Report Fiscal Year 2007*, 91.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ 32 U.S.C §709(c)(1), Technicians: employment, use, status.

¹⁰ A unit manning document (UMD) is similar to the personnel portions of a Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) or a Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE). It illustrates the full-time authorizations available to the various National Guard organizations in a state. It is managed by the Human Resource Officer at each joint force headquarters.

¹¹ U.S. Department of the Army, *The Active Guard Reserve (AGR) Program*, Army Regulation 135-18 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, June 19, 2003), 1.

¹² National Guard Bureau, *United States Property and Fiscal Officer Appointment, Duties, and Responsibilities*, National Guard Regulation 130-6/Air National Guard Instruction 36-2, (Arlington, VA: National Guard Bureau, July 1, 2007), 2.

¹³ U.S. Department of the Army, *The Active Guard Reserve (AGR) Program*, 1.

¹⁴ National Guard Bureau, Office of Technician Personnel, *National Guard Technician Handbook* (Washington, DC: National Guard Bureau, November 10, 2004), Forward and pg 6.

¹⁵ 10 U.S.C. §10217(a)(2), Non-dual status technicians.

¹⁶ 10 U.S.C. §10217(c)(2), Non-dual status technicians, Permanent limitations on numbers.

¹⁷ CRS Report for Congress, *Military Technicians: The Issue of Mandatory Retirement for Non-Dual Status Technicians*, March 28, 2000, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/crs/RL30487_000328.pdf (accessed December 8, 2008).

¹⁸ The National Guard Association of the United States, NGAUS Fact Sheet on the ARNG Full-time Support, <http://www.ngaus.org/content.asp?bid=10898> (accessed September 14, 2008).

¹⁹ "Re-enlistments outpacing fiscal year mission," *The Army Times*, September 29, 2008.

²⁰ The Association of the United States Army, *Profile of the U.S. Army 2008*, Institute of Land Warfare, Arlington, VA, 2008, 37.

²¹ National Guard Bureau, Office of Technician Personnel, *National Guard Technician Handbook*, Forward, 6.

²² The Army National Guard, *Annual Financial Report Fiscal Year 2007*, 39-40.

²³ U.S. General Accounting Office, *Problems in Implementing The Army's Reserve Components Full-time Manning Program, Report to the Secretary of the Army*, (Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, June 4, 1985), 9, 11-12.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ General Schedule Pay Tables, <http://www.opm.gov/oca/08tables/pdf/RUS.pdf> (accessed December 3, 2008); Wage Grade Pay Tables, <http://www.opm.gov/oca/08tables/pdf/RUS.pdf> (accessed December 3, 2008).

²⁶ United States Northern Command, "About USNORTHCOM," <http://www.northcom.mil/About/index.html> (accessed December 6, 2008). Website states mission as: "USNORTHCOM anticipates and conducts Homeland Defense and Civil Support operations within the assigned area of responsibility to defend, protect, and secure the United States and its interests."

²⁷ Stephen Losey, "Next Up To deploy: Civilians", *The Federal Times*, November 3, 2008.

²⁸ CRS Report for Congress, *Military Technicians: The Issue of Mandatory Retirement for Non-Dual Status Technicians*, 2000.

²⁹ National Guard Bureau, Legislative initiative, NGB-J1-TN, *Providing greater flexibility in the Title 32 technician positions that may be filled by Non-Dual Status (NON-DUAL STATUS) technicians*, e-mail attachment to author, December 3, 2008.

³⁰ *National Defense Authorization Act of 2008*, Public Law 110-181, 110th Cong., 2nd sess. (January 28, 2008) <http://www.opencongress.org/bill/110-h4986/text>, (accessed November 12, 2008).

³¹ National Guard Bureau, Legislative initiative, NGB-J1-TN, *Providing greater flexibility in the Title 32 technician positions that may be filled by Non-Dual Status (NON-DUAL STATUS) technicians*.

³² The Army National Guard, *Annual Financial Report Fiscal Year 2007*, p 91.

³³ The National Guard Association of the United States, NGAUS Fact Sheet on the ARNG Full-time Support.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ National Guard Bureau J1 “Functional Advisory Council Issue paper,” June 5, 2008, e-mail attachment to author December 3, 2008.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, “Recommendations of the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves,” memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, Washington, DC, November 24, 2008, p 9-11.

³⁸ National Guard Bureau J1 Legislative Initiative (Unified Legislation and Budgeting), e-mail attachment to the author December 3, 2008.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ National Guard Bureau, Legislative initiative, NGB-J1-TN, *Providing greater flexibility in the Title 32 technician positions that may be filed by Non-Dual Status (NON-DUAL STATUS) technicians.*