

Bridge Over Troubled Waters: How Armed Nation-Building Spans The Gap Between Victory  
And Stability

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**BRIDGE OVER TROUBLED WATERS: HOW ARMED NATION-BUILDING  
SPANS THE GAP BETWEEN VICTORY AND STABILITY**

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## Executive Summary

**Title:** Bridge Over Troubled Waters: How Armed Nation Building Spans The Gap Between Victory And Stability

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**Thesis:** The military should be more responsible for nation-building activities until the time when the post-hostility environment allows for the secure and timely transition of authority to the proper civilian components. Accordingly, this paper aims to identify how the military can shape the operational environment prior to and shortly after major combat operations end in order to limit chances for a power vacuum.

**Discussion:** The first few months of post-war Iraq clearly indicates the complexity and challenges of stability operations and reconstruction. The post-hostility environment defined the climate for transition of authority and set the conditions for the nation-building process to commence early. In Iraq, the Coalition had to defeat insurgents at the same time they set up Iraqi institutions, repaired vital infrastructure, and of critical importance, maintained a sufficient level of popularity among the majority of the Iraqis.

Nation-building is advanced political engineering by use of all elements of national power. The intricate problem though, is that use of military force and nation-building as such seem to have a mutual exclusive effect. Irrespective of the methods, the result is likely to be armed nation-building. Presence and number of forces are obviously important factors to decrease chances of creating a power vacuum. A secure environment, however, cannot be attained through security operations alone. Even if combat operations are still in progress, some essential governmental and administrative functions may still be carried out. Moreover, results from reconstruction and humanitarian assistance will positively influence the occupied population, earning their trust and confidence while also persuading them from supporting insurgents. Absence of other organizations is likely to occur in an early post-hostility phase. Military forces must be prepared performing non-traditional military tasks.

Although the level of security may be far from perfect, of vital importance is the ability to set the stage for a seamless transition of authority to the subsequent civilian administration. As major combat operations slow down, nation-building activities planned for stability operations and reconstructions must gradually increase toward the point of transition.

**Conclusion:** The most significant post-hostility feature is the way security influences the other tenets of nation-building and vice versa. They are not only interlinked, they have a mutual amplifying effect, and should take place concurrently. The single most important lesson from OIF is likely to be that the military commander has to define the set of conditions for transition of authority to the civilian component. Unity of command throughout the transition phase is extremely important to gain and maintain unity of effort. This requires close coordination of all elements of national power. Enhanced inter-agency training and cooperation will significantly impact the outcome of future conflicts. Moreover, dedicated units specially prepared and trained to start rebuilding institutions and infrastructure may be far more effective than the elements that invaded a country, because they might be perceived more positively.

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## Preface

"Peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers, but only soldiers can do it," said the second Secretary of the United Nations, Dag Hammarskjöld. I think he perfectly captured the complexity of peacekeeping in this statement. Slightly paraphrased, I think his quote also captures the complexity and challenging nature of post-conflict nation-building; it is not a job for soldiers, but soldiers are decisive for a viable outcome. In both cases key themes are force credibility and legitimacy, because it is the military force that moves the processes forward and sets the conditions for success. I have chosen to study immediate post-conflict periods because I think it is vital to understand the possibilities and limitations for use of military power in the first few decades of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Moreover, the complexity of post-conflict operations will significantly influence the transformation of military capabilities to fit the security threats of our time.

I want to acknowledge a few people that have supported me during the research and writing. First, I want to thank my two faculty advisors, Dr. John "Black Jack" Matthews and Commander Warren D. Lewis because they in an admiring way have encouraged and inspired me to raise and discuss ideas in my conference group that at times have been somewhat controversial although of great importance for developing my thesis. My two mentors Dr. Gordon Rudd and Lieutenant Colonel Henry W. Bennet, USA have been a tremendous good support throughout this period. In their capacity of having served in Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance and as battalion commander in 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne Division in OIF 1, they have equipped me with an invaluable perspective and insight on the nature of the Iraqi post-hostility environment. I also owe my wife Ingrid a special thank for her insightful comments and substantial contribution to align my thoughts and ideas through numerous discussions. Finally, but not least I want to thank my sponsor and good friend, Major Paul Cucinotta, who has dedicated much time and efforts to expand and excel my language proficiency. He has also in an admiring way patiently listened to and responded to my ideas, and carefully answered my numerous questions throughout the year about English terms, acronyms, and the American way of war.

## Introduction

*“You [President George W. Bush] are going to be the proud owner of 25 million people. You will own all their hopes, aspirations and problems. You’ll own it all.”<sup>1</sup>*

--Secretary of State Colin Powell

Prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), several scholars warned about a possible power vacuum in the wake of a war. The key question was how to organize the nation-building process in order to prevent a gap as major combat operations evolved into *stability operations and reconstruction*<sup>2</sup>. A solution is to make the military more responsible for nation-building activities until the time when the post-hostility environment allows for the secure and timely transition of authority to the proper civilian components. Accordingly, this paper aims to identify how the military can shape the operational environment prior to and shortly after major combat operations end in order to limit chances for a power vacuum.

Nation-building is highly controversial because of its political connotation. It suggests intervention in another country, either to change a regime or to support its survivability. For this paper, *nation-building* is defined as a process of transforming or constructing a nation in order to create a state that is secure, politically stable, and viable in the long run by using the full spectrum of national power. Consequently, nation-building activities normally include establishing internal and external security, political and administrative bodies, and social and economic reconstruction.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> As quoted in Bob Woodward, *Plan of Attack* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), 150.

<sup>2</sup> There is a range of terms associated with post-conflict operations. In U.S. Army FM 3-07, *Stability Operations and Support Operations*, the term stability and support operations (SASO) is used for post-conflict operations. However, support operations suggest dealing with domestic operations such as natural crises and not operations tied to foreign interventions and in this case, post-war Iraq. Since there is no approved U.S. joint definition, the term used in this paper is *stability operations and reconstruction*. This term, however, is closely associated with terms as Military Operations Other than War (MOOTW), Phase IV Operations, Post-Hostility Operations and Small Wars.

<sup>3</sup> For the further discussion of nation-building activities in Iraq, these will be categorized into security, civil administration, reconstruction, and humanitarian assistance. This classification was also used by Commander U.S. Central Command General Franks in his discussion of nation-building challenges prior to OIF. See Tommy R. Franks, *American Soldier* (New York: HarperCollins Publishers Inc, 2004), 419-420.



One of Iraqi Freedom's main objectives was to enable Iraq's rapid transition to a representative government.<sup>4</sup> Winning the Iraqi war was important for the United States; although of equal importance is also success in crafting a viable and stable Iraqi state. Larry Diamond, a senior Fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution and a former Senior Adviser to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, commented that the lack of security and lack of progress in post-conflict reconstruction during the first few months of OIF undermined the Coalition, and contributed to a serious legitimacy deficit.<sup>5</sup> In a broader perspective, failure in nation-building can easily create failed states rather than get the target states on track, which without doubt can serve as breeding ground for insurgency and an amplifying source of regional anxiety and instability.

This is a qualitative study on the military's role in the transition phase between major combat operations and subsequent stability operations and reconstruction. It will focus primarily on Operation Iraqi Freedom as a single case study. The United States' experiences in Iraq, however, will be compared and contrasted with similar experiences where the U.S. military has been successfully engaged. In particular, the occupation of post-war Germany and Japan and the stabilization operations in Bosnia and Kosovo.

First I will consider some characteristics of the Iraqi *post-hostility environment* in order to identify particular challenges for a nation-building process. Second, the process of nation-building is discussed as well as how the military's involvement in nation-building has evolved since World War II. Third, some of the tenets of nation-building are addressed to identify exactly why and how the military can contribute to the smoothest possible transition to the lead civilian body. Then, the process of transition of authority will be briefly addressed with an emphasis at the inter-agency

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<sup>4</sup> Jim Garmone, *Rumsfeld Lists Operation Iraqi Freedom Aims, Objectives*, 21 March 2003. *U.S. Department of Defense*, URL: <[http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2003/n03212003\\_200303219.html](http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2003/n03212003_200303219.html)>. Accessed 5 January 2005.

<sup>5</sup> Larry, Diamond, U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations. *The "Post-conflict" Lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan*, Hearings, 19 May 2004.

level. Finally, in the perspective of future conflict patterns, there are introduced some possible developmental trends for nation-building underlining the military's role.

### **The Post-hostility Environment in Iraq**

The post-hostility environment is determined by the nature of the conflict, the perception of the intervener, and the state of the defeated civil administration. The first period after OIF's major combat operation was over can be characterized as a power vacuum. For several weeks there was lawlessness with thousands of people stealing from shops and governmental buildings.<sup>6</sup> The unlawfulness exploited an environment completely void of public authority, and a coalition unable to counter criminality in addition to battling the commencing insurgency. The forces on the ground were not prepared to deal with this unlawfulness.<sup>7</sup> Moreover, in addition to the fact that the looting started before the troops even arrived in Baghdad, the first units on scene, "...first needed to win the battle by quickly taking out all the resistance, then focus on suppressing the looters", remarked Colonel Christopher C. Conlin, one of the first battalion commanders to arrive Baghdad.<sup>8</sup>

Simultaneously, the Iraqis were complaining about the lack of security and stability, which they claimed the Americans promised them.<sup>9</sup> Although Saddam Hussein had disappeared, a number of his strongest supporters were yet to be defeated.<sup>10</sup> Military historians Murray and Scales suggest that remnants of the Baathist Party that survived the fall of Baghdad were able to adapt to

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<sup>6</sup> Barton Gellman, "Looting Is a Double Loss for U.S. Forces," *Washington Post*, 28 April 2003, A12.

<sup>7</sup> Colonel John A. Toolan, USMC, Director U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Quantico, VA. and former Operations Officer of 2<sup>nd</sup> Marine Division and Commander Regimental Combat Team 4 in Iraq during March and April 2003, interview by author, 13 April 2005.

<sup>8</sup> Colonel Christopher C. Conlin, USMC, Director multinational/inter-agency experimentation USJFCOM, J9 Norfolk, VA, former battalion commander Regimental Combat Team 7 in Iraq during March and April 2003, e-mail interview by author, 17 April 2005.

<sup>9</sup> Rajiv Chandrasekaran, "U.S. Military Slow to Fill Leadership Vacuum Left by War," *Washington Post*, 5 May 2003, A01.

<sup>10</sup> Williamson Murray and Robert H. Scales Jr., *The Iraq War: A Military History* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 240.

carry out “an unconventional war focused on dueling civilizations.”<sup>11</sup> Instead of the quick defeat of Saddam Hussein and his regime, the Coalition seemed to be involved in what became a religious fundamentalist conflict with insurgents in particular areas of Iraq. Evidently, the United States led Coalition failed to account for the residual effects of the defeated regime.

The way an adversary experiences defeat further influences the complexity of post-conflict operations. This is illustrated by the differences between post-war occupations of Japan and Germany, and the current occupation of Iraq. Germany and Japan were undoubtedly thoroughly defeated, and moreover, their governments agreed to unconditional surrender.<sup>12</sup> In contrast, in Iraq there was no formal governmental surrender, and a great number of the Iraqi soldiers surrendered or deserted without being engaged during the major combat operation.<sup>13</sup> Former Iraqi soldiers and members of the irregular and fanatical Fedayeen were able to go home, and apparently became a recruiting source for insurgency. This was further exacerbated by Coalition Provincial Authority decisions in May 2005 about de-baathification and to disband the Iraqi military.<sup>14</sup>

President Bush said on 7 September 2003 that the “...coalition came to Iraq as liberators and we will depart as liberators.”<sup>15</sup> One of the U.S. planning assumptions was that Coalition forces would be perceived as liberators rather than occupiers. Although there are huge differences among the Iraqi regions, the continuous instability and ferocious attacks on Coalition troops suggest that the term liberator is arguable at best. Dr. Hugo Slim, a British scholar notes that, “Whoever wins

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<sup>11</sup> Ibid., 236.

<sup>12</sup> James Dobbins and others, *America's Role in Nation-building: From Germany to Iraq* (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 2003), 153.

<sup>13</sup> Murray and Scales Jr., 100.

<sup>14</sup> Intra., 14.

<sup>15</sup> George W. Bush, President of the United States, *Address of the President to the Nation*, 7 September 2003, *The White House*. URL: <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/09/20030907-1.html>>. Accessed 4 January 2005.

the people will win the war and win the state.”<sup>16</sup> This seems valid for the situation in Iraq. The Iraqi insurgents try by all means to convince the Iraqi people and the Islamic world that the U.S. Coalition is an occupying infidel.<sup>17</sup> Many Iraqis have a predisposed attitude towards Americans and the Western culture. They are extraordinarily sensitive and distrustful because of painful memories of Western imperialism through French and British occupation, the Gulf War in 1991, and the strong ties between the United States and Israel.<sup>18</sup>

Both the insurgents and the Coalition have competing interests for the support or control of the Iraqi people. The point about “whoever wins the people” is important because an occupier may only have a short window before the goodwill generated by liberation turns into anger and frustration if people cannot see progress in improving the quality of life.<sup>19</sup> Accordingly, the Coalition forces do not only have to defeat insurgents, rather they have to prevent the insurgents from gaining ground. This is challenging since insurgents do not necessarily play by the same rules as Western forces. Colonel Ralph Peters, USA (Ret.) includes insurgents in what he calls *the new warrior class*, which “do not play by our rules, do not respect treaties, and do not obey orders they do not like.”<sup>20</sup> This is the true face of irregular warfare.

The state of the civil administration also significantly affects the post-hostility environment. Moreover, the degree of institutionalized democratic traditions will also determine the depth of political engineering and the efforts needed. Research by the RAND Corporation claims that post-

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<sup>16</sup> Hugo Slim, “With or Against? Humanitarian Agencies and Coalition Counter-Insurgency,” *Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue*, “<http://www.hdcentre.org/>” URL:

<<http://www.hdcentre.org/datastore/shaping%20opinion/With%20or%20Against%20.pdf>>. Accessed 6 March 2005.

<sup>17</sup> Murray and Scales Jr., 236.

<sup>18</sup> Toby Dodge, *Inventing Iraq: the failure of nation-building and a history denied* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2003), 157-163.

<sup>19</sup> Peter W. Galbraith, U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations. *United States Post-war Policies in Iraq*, Hearings, 12 June 2003.

<sup>20</sup> Ralph Peters, *The New Warrior Class, Fighting for the Future: Will America Triumph?* (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1999), 32-33.

war Germany and Japan had an exceptionally favorable basis for successful nation-building.<sup>21</sup> Although their civil administrations were influenced by the ideology of their old regimes, these administrations were able to build on and function from previous capabilities shortly after combat ended.

In post-war Iraq the foundation for nation-building is far from ideal compared to that of Germany and Japan. After the fall of the Baathist regime there was no functional administration left. Another element of uncertainty is how rapidly Iraqi central and local authorities can be established. Even though the Iraqi people are not ignorant of democracy, there was a democracy deficit during Saddam Hussein's autocratic dictatorship. Everything was centralized around Saddam Hussein, his two sons and the most loyal of the Baath Party.<sup>22</sup> Additionally, some have questioned whether a country as diverse as Iraq can function as a nation-state.<sup>23</sup> The various groups that make up Iraq can hardly survive as individual polities. Their disparities may also bond them together. Unlike the war in Bosnia where the Bosnian Serbs were drawn towards Serbia and the Bosnian Croats were drawn towards Croatia, the Sunnis and the Kurds have limited possibilities without being a part of Iraq.

The Iraqi post-hostility environment did not form any favorable conditions for the nation-building process to commence early. In an environment absent of war, yet far from peace, the Coalition had to defeat insurgents at the same time they set up Iraqi institutions, repaired vital infrastructure, while also maintaining a sufficient level of popularity among the majority of the Iraqis. Figure 1 depicts a period of uncertainty between the end of major combat operations and subsequent stability operations and reconstruction begin where the benchmark to start transition (T)

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<sup>21</sup> Dobbins and others, *America's Role in Nation-building*, xix-xxvi.

<sup>22</sup> Murray and Scales Jr., 31.

<sup>23</sup> Dobbins and others, *America's Role in Nation-building*, xxvi.

of authority from the military is hard to identify.




Figure 1: A period of uncertainty between the end of major combat operations and when stability operations and reconstruction begin

The extent and complexity of this grey area are difficult to determine because of variables like level of security, usefulness of former governmental institutions, and the state of infrastructure. This is increasingly complex because of the difficulties assessing these variables in an uncertain and changing environment. Even though it is impossible to predict the timing of a transition in advance, historic and cultural studies coupled with observations on actual enemy patterns will make the military more pro-active and prepared for the unexpected.

## Nation-Building

The U.S. military's engagement in nation-building has changed several times since its first major nation-building experience in the aftermath of World War II. The U.S. military played a very important role in the reconstruction of a devastated post-war Germany. The military had to assume all the functions necessary to run a modern society.<sup>24</sup> This post-war operation was a huge success for what became West Germany.

The Cold War changed the employment of U.S. forces. In a bipolar world, the Cold War concept of security was a balance of power between the superpowers with few possibilities for major interventions from any state or the United Nations (UN). Military means were used to

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<sup>24</sup> Earl F. Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany 1944-1946* (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History United States Army, 1975), 396-397.

maintain a status quo rather than engage in fundamental societal transformations.<sup>25</sup> However, the end of the Cold War period led to a new security challenges. According to David Lightburn, the Director Special Projects at the Pearson Peacekeeping Center in Canada, “the demand for peacekeeping grew as the Cold War ended and a number of latent and internal, and ethnic, territorial and religious tensions boiled over into conflict.”<sup>26</sup> The implementation of the Dayton Agreement in Bosnia in 1995 demonstrates employment of military forces more like post-war Germany than during the entire Cold War era.

One of the key lessons for the *Implementation Force* (IFOR) in Bosnia was that the fulfillment of the military mission was only possible through the implementation of the civilian aspects of the Dayton Agreement.<sup>27</sup> There was a need for unity of effort between the military component and the civilian agencies. IFOR had to adopt close cooperation with civilian organizations, such as Office of the High Representative, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the UN.<sup>28</sup> U.S. military leaders in Bosnia recognized they had to involve themselves in nation-building; they saw no alternative if the NATO-force was ever going to be able to reduce its commitment without risking the peace.<sup>29</sup> IFOR expanded the scope of a military mandate.<sup>30</sup>

The Kosovo operation shows a further expansion of the military’s involvement in nation-building activities. The strong interaction between the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) and the civilian components from the UN and other international organizations made this operation the

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<sup>25</sup> Dobbins and others, *America’s Role in Nation-building*, xiv.

<sup>26</sup> David Lightburn, “Lessons learned,” *NATO Review*, Summer 2001, 12-16.

<sup>27</sup> James J. Landon, “Civil Military Cooperation,” *Lessons From Bosnia: The IFOR Experience*. Federation of American Scientists, “<http://www.fas.org/main/home.jsp>.” URL: <<http://www.fas.org/irp/ops/smo/docs/ifor/bosch05.htm>>. Accessed 5 January 2005.

<sup>28</sup> Lightburn, *Lessons*.

<sup>29</sup> Conrad C. Crane, and W. Andrew Terrill, *Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges, and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario* (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, Feb 2003), 9.

<sup>30</sup> Espen Barth Eide, “Peacekeeping past and present,” *NATO Review* 49, no. 2 (Summer 2001): 7.

most successful post-Cold War operation.<sup>31</sup> Even though there were a very broad variety of civilian and military participants, this was still compatible with extensive burden-sharing and unity of command. Although the U.S. Military played a successful and important role in Bosnia and Kosovo, there were domestic disagreements between the Clinton administration and the military on the use of military forces in peacekeeping and nation-building.<sup>32</sup>

Traditionally, there has been an American aversion to nation-building, which was strengthened after the Vietnam War.<sup>33</sup> Furthermore, this aversion increased noticeably after the American failure in Somalia in 1993. In 2000, President George W. Bush argued that U.S. troops were not to be used for nation-building.<sup>34</sup> The aftermath of 11 September 2001 and the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq have changed this view. However, there will always be a discussion on the level of direct intervention by the military in affairs commonly perceived as under civilian control. In the United States, this tradition traces back to a fear of foreign entanglements in the affairs of Europe described by President George Washington in his Farwell address of 1796. He wrote, "...they [the states within the Union] will avoid the necessity of those overgrown military establishments which, under any form of government, are inauspicious to liberty, and which are to be regarded as particularly hostile to republican liberty."<sup>35</sup>

As mentioned, the military took a major role in the nation-building of Germany and Japan. However, the guidance from President Truman was to shift the control from the military to the State Department as soon as possible. "He believed it was in the American tradition that the military should not have governmental responsibilities beyond the requirements of military

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<sup>31</sup> Dobbins and others, *America's Role in Nation-building*, 128.

<sup>32</sup> Dana Priest, *The Mission*, (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Co., 2003), 42.

<sup>33</sup> Crane and Terrill, *Reconstructing Iraq*, 17.

<sup>34</sup> Wayne Washington, "Once against nation-building, Bush now involved," *The Boston Globe* (Boston) 2 March 2004.

<sup>35</sup> George Washington, "Farwell Address (1796)," *U.S. Department of State*, <http://usinfo.state.gov/>. URL: <<http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/facts/democrac/49.htm>>. Accessed 26 March 2005.



operations.”<sup>36</sup> The success achieved in post-war Germany and Japan were the result of direct military involvement in governance and administration. According to the *New York Times* in October 2002, the U.S. Administration planned to install an American-led military government of Iraq for the initial post-war period.<sup>37</sup> This is a delicate issue that is best summarized by the question Secretary Powell asked the President in August 2002 when they discussed the consequences of a war, “What of the image of an American general running an Arab country, a General MacArthur in Baghdad?”<sup>38</sup> In his book *American Soldier*, General Tommy R. Franks discusses the pros and cons of civilian control of a Provisional Authority in Iraq.<sup>39</sup> He concludes that the post-hostility phase would require civilian leadership assisted by a great number of civilians from the U.S. as well as from the international community. General Franks recognizes the interdependence between security and societal reconstruction.<sup>40</sup> Although security is key, “...security would not be possible in Iraq without immediate reconstruction and civic action.”<sup>41</sup>

Nation-building is certainly not a short-term undertaking, nor should we expect it to be. The record of U.S. nation-building suggests that, “while staying long does not guarantee success, leaving early ensures failure.”<sup>42</sup> Figure 2 depicts the ideal vision of the transition of responsibilities from the military to the major civilian components. Ideally, the military aims to end combat operations as quickly as possible and hand over post-conflict tasks to civilian agencies.

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<sup>36</sup> As quoted in Ziemke, 401.

<sup>37</sup> David E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt, “THREATS AND RESPONSES: A PLAN FOR IRAQ; U.S. Has a Plan To Occupy Iraq, Officials Report,” *New York Times*, 11 October 2002, A1.


<sup>38</sup> Woodward, 150.

<sup>39</sup> Franks, 422.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, 424.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, 422.


<sup>42</sup> Dobbins and others, *America’s Role in Nation-building*, 164.



**Figure 2: The Ideal Vision of Transition**

Source: Conrad A. Crane and Andrew W. Terrill, *Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges, and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario*, (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, Feb 2003), 45

The security level is likely to set the premises for the thoroughness and speed of the nation-building process. The level of security will influence on the point of transition. Figure 3 depicts a more realistic vision of transition.



**Figure 3: The Realistic Vision of Transition**

Source: Conrad A. Crane and Andrew W. Terrill, *Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges, and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario*, (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, Feb 2003), 45.

During the planning for OIF, one of General Franks’ key questions was “How long would it be necessary to maintain military rule in Iraq?”<sup>43</sup> Military rule in Iraq did not last very long before transfer of authority to the Coalition Provincial Authority.<sup>44</sup> Maybe more relevant questions to ask are whether it is feasible to hand-over the authority to a civilian body, or what resources the

<sup>43</sup> Franks, 420.

<sup>44</sup> Department of Defense, *Pre-war Planning for Post-war Iraq*, U.S. Department of Defense, <http://www.defenselink.mil>. URL: <[http://www.defenselink.mil/policy/isa/nesa/post-war\\_iraq.html](http://www.defenselink.mil/policy/isa/nesa/post-war_iraq.html)>. Accessed 9 January 2005.

military organization should bring with them in order to span the gap between major combat operations and stability operations and reconstruction. Nation-building seems rather complex and requires substantial planning and coordination. In addition to its political sensitivity, it appears very fluctuating depending on the specific post-hostility environment. However, one thing all the post-conflict cases studied in this paper have in common is the reciprocity between the civilian parts of nation-building and strong military presence.

### **Creating Security**

The military is the key player when establishing a secure post-hostility environment because of its knowledge, distributed presence, resources, and superior capabilities. While testifying before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom, Colonel Scott R. Feil, USA (Ret.) warned that, “the most dangerous time for the establishment of precedent counter to coalition overall goals for the people of Iraq will come if a security vacuum exists between the time Saddam’s forces withdrew, or cease activity, and the arrival of American and coalition forces.”<sup>45</sup> Therefore, the military has to set the right conditions for the transition from major combat operations into stability operations. Moreover, they must determine if and when to declare a war as over. This decision is crucial to the success of subsequent stability operations.

Two likely explanations of why the power vacuum occurred in Iraq may be that the major combat operation was declared over too early, and that the number of troops available was insufficient to stabilize Iraq. On 1 May 2003, when President Bush announced the major combat operation was over, the recommendation for this announcement came from General Franks.<sup>46</sup> His motivation was to attract new countries to assume peacekeeping in Iraq, because several

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<sup>45</sup> Scott R. Feil, U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations. *Security in a Post-conflict Situation in Iraq*, Hearings, 11 February 2003.

<sup>46</sup> Michael DeLong and Noah Lukeman, *Inside CentCom* (Washington, D.C.: Regenary Publishing, 2004), 121.

governments did not allow their forces to contribute as long as the war was in progress. Another alternative may have been to continue major combat operations and concentrate more forces in the provinces with the toughest resistance to ensure a level of security that would facilitate a timely transition.

The required numbers of troops were heavily debated long before the war commenced. Former Army Chief of Staff and former Commander of the NATO Stabilization Force in Bosnia, General Eric Shinseki, was one of the first to raise his voice. General Shinseki told the Senate Armed Services Committee that, “it takes a significant ground force presence to maintain a safe and secure environment, to ensure that people are fed, that water is disturbed, all the normal responsibilities that go along with administering a situation like this.”<sup>47</sup> After the war, the former administrator of the Coalition Provincial Authority (CPA), Ambassador L. Paul Bremer supported General Shinseki’s view. Ambassador Bremer claims that there were too few troops at the beginning as well as throughout the occupation.<sup>48</sup>

When discussing troop strength it is interesting to compare the war-winning strategies for Germany and Iraq to see how they affected post-war operations. The U.S. occupation force in Germany resulted directly from troops needed to win the war. Mass was a premium in order to defeat German forces. This resulted in large formations of U.S. troops spread out all over the U.S. occupation zone in order to control the population and secure vital infrastructure.<sup>49</sup> During OIF’s combat operations, the emphasis was speed and precision over mass.<sup>50</sup> In both cases, the war-winning strategy drove the post-war plan; moreover, the war requirements drove the post-war troop numbers.

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<sup>47</sup> Eric Schmitt, “Army Chief Raises Estimate of G.I.’s Needed in Postwar Iraq,” *The New York Times*, 25 February 2003 and Woodward, 207-208.

<sup>48</sup> Thomas E. Ricks and Robin Wright, “Bremer Criticizes Troop Levels” *Washington Post*, 5 October 2004, A01.

<sup>49</sup> Ziemke, 320.

<sup>50</sup> Franks, 416.

The significant number of American troops in Germany was advantageous when the U.S. Army demobilized the German armed forces. Within three months after the surrender, the German forces were disarmed and demobilized, and about four million of prisoners of war and refugees were repatriated.<sup>51</sup> Before the war in Iraq commenced, a report from the U.S. Army War College warned that dissolution of the Iraqi Army could have disastrous societal consequences.<sup>52</sup> Moreover, this report suggested using the Iraqi Army as an instrument in the nation-building process since they represented one of the few Iraqi institutions that encompassed a strong sense of national unity. Unfortunately, in May 2003 Ambassador Bremer's CPA had to disband the Iraqi Army and the Baathist security structure, resulting in hundreds of thousands of men melting into society with their weapons, and without anyone to control them.<sup>53</sup>

Another approach that may have enhanced the security situation in the long term was to handle the different provinces in separate ways. More military effort could possibly have been tailored to the most challenging provinces before the major combat ended. For instance, the Al-Anbar province in western Iraq, which consists of 95 percent Sunni Muslims, was never properly secured before major combat operations ended. When the Marines came back to Al-Anbar after securing Baghdad, no significant forces had been there for a long time.<sup>54</sup> Even today a good deal of the insurgency operates from this province.

Preventing a power vacuum, however, is not only about the number of troops. In an environment in-between war and a secure society there is also a great demand for police forces. In Kosovo for instance, there was a huge unfilled need for a civilian policing capability. Former Commander Kosovo Force (KFOR), the German General Klaus Reinhardt said they had to use

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<sup>51</sup> Crane and Terrill, *Reconstructing Iraq*, 2.

<sup>52</sup> Crane and Terrill, *Reconstructing Iraq*, 32.

<sup>53</sup> James Fallows, "Blind into Baghdad," *The Atlantic Monthly*, January/February 2004, 73.

<sup>54</sup> Toolan interview.

KFOR troops to prevent criminals from filling the initial power vacuum until the international community provided the resources needed.<sup>55</sup> Former Deputy Commander CENTCOM, Lieutenant General Michael DeLong, USMC (Ret.) said, “there was not a lot we could do [about the extensive looting]. The relatively small number of troops we had in Baghdad had to be reserved for fighting, patrolling, and maybe guarding a few of the major facilities.”<sup>56</sup> When the power vacuum first occurred alternative courses of action were limited. One of the Marine regimental commanders that entered Baghdad early on, Colonel John A. Toolan, said it was extremely difficult to discriminate between the looters, of which some were armed, and the Fedayeen.<sup>57</sup> Moreover he added, “When fighting is still going on, looting is a secondary considerations.”<sup>58</sup>

During the combat operation there were indications that the subsequent post-hostility phase could be affected severely by insurgents adopting irregular warfare. As Lieutenant General William Wallace, USA Commander V Corps said, “The enemy we’re fighting is a bit different than the one we wargamed against, because of these paramilitary forces.”<sup>59</sup> Although this took place in late March 2003, far too late to change troops available for May post-war operations, it foreshadowed the challenges the Coalition would be faced with, and it validated Shinseki’s pre-war troop estimate.

Use of force is inevitable in counter-insurgency; however, extensive use of force and nation-building seem contradictory. To a great extent, nation-building is about motivating a nation’s people to progress forward from a failed state to a new and presumably lasting one. It seems quite obvious that the stronger support the nation-builder gets from the target population, the faster the nation-building process will proceed. An Iraqi member of the Iraqi Governing Council is critical to

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<sup>55</sup> Klaus Reinhardt, “Commanding KFOR,” *NATO Review* 48, no. 2/3 (Summer 2000): 17.

<sup>56</sup> DeLong and Lukeman, 116.

<sup>57</sup> Toolan interview.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*,

<sup>59</sup> Franks, 508.

the way U.S. troops handle counterinsurgency.<sup>60</sup> He claimed that U.S. troops use excessive power in a humiliating and unnecessary way when they round up people and even demolish their houses. He said, “You cannot win the hearts and minds of the people by using force.”<sup>61</sup> His point is valid. Extensive use of force will contribute to a prolonged nation-building process. On the other hand, some units took decisive actions to improve the relationship with local populations even though they still were in the midst of combat operations. Col Toolan said that when his regiment stopped or during operational pauses they immediately defaulted to stability operations and reconstruction, collected information from local population, and took interest in their needs.<sup>62</sup> “It was a natural task to identify local leadership and investigate needs, and when the attack continued, Civil Affairs hung back to continue their assessments.”<sup>63</sup>

Hostile post-war environments seem unavoidable unless the numbers of troops and police forces allow real control, and moreover, constitute a capability that is able to deal with unexpected enemy actions. Undoubtedly, another choice would be to continue the combat operations until the sufficient level of security is reached. The key question regarding the security situation is when to declare the end of a war. There is certainly no standard reply to that question. Irrespective of the methods, the result is likely to be armed nation-building<sup>64</sup>. Nation-building as such and use of force seem to have a mutual exclusive effect.

### **The Issue of Post-War Administration and Governance**

Disintegration of a defeated regime may cause an immediate power vacuum, and the military is usually the only capable instrument to prevent such a vacuum by maintaining the most important

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<sup>60</sup> Peter Maass, “Professor Nag’s War,” *New York Times*, 11 January 2004.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid.

<sup>62</sup> Toolan interview.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid.,

<sup>64</sup> Anthony H. Cordesman, U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations. “*The “Post-conflict” Lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan*, Hearings, 19 May 2004.

responsibilities and public services of a society. The transition of responsibilities between military rule and a subsequent civilian administration may take some time. In Iraq, where the level of security is still far from sufficient, the organizational challenges of nation-building were tremendous.<sup>65</sup> Some critics say the transfer of authority to the first civilian U.S. administrator in Iraq took too long, was too inefficient, and ill-defined. During testimony before the Senate on 12 June 2003, Ambassador Peter W. Galbraith stated that retired Lieutenant General Jay Garner, head of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), arrived in Baghdad 13 days after the Marines entered the city.<sup>66</sup> He also said it took days before Garner's operation was effectively set up and he suggested that lack of planning resulted in multiple missteps. According to the *Washington Post*, during the first couple of weeks Garner and his staff stayed out of public view instead of engaging more closely with the authority vacuum.<sup>67</sup>

Although ORHA comprised of personnel from nearly all of the governmental agencies,<sup>68</sup> it was not set up for success right from the beginning. Specifically, ORHA was established late in January 2003, far too late to get any ownership in the post-conflict plan. Furthermore, the fact that ORHA was stood up by the Department of Defense and under direct control of Secretary Rumsfeld calls to question, whether it was truly an interagency effort. Neither ORHA nor Bremer's CPA consisted of adequate staff. In contrast, General Anthony Zinni, USMC (Ret.) in capacity of former Commander CENTCOM, maintains that the size of CPA was about the same size as his planners had thought of for each of the Iraqi provinces.<sup>69</sup>

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<sup>65</sup> Rajiv Chandrasekaran and Peter Slevin, *Iraq's Ragged Reconstruction A Month After Baghdad's Fall*, *U.S. Efforts Founder*, *Washington Post*, 9 May 2003, A01.

<sup>66</sup> Galbraith, U.S. Congress.

<sup>67</sup> Rajiv Chandrasekaran, "U.S. Military," A01.

<sup>68</sup> Gordon Rudd, Professor of Strategic Studies at U.S. Marine Corps School of Advanced Warfare, and former staff of ORHA Iraq 2003. Interview by author, 30 March 2005.

<sup>69</sup> Anthony Zinni, "Ten Mistakes History Will Record About War in Iraq," *The Defense Monitor*, May/June 2004, 2.



Experience from the NATO deployment in Kosovo demonstrated the immediate need for military support of the civilian aspects of post-war operations. The first commander for the KFOR, General Sir Michael Jackson pointed out the lack of political and administrative bodies in Kosovo when KFOR was employed in the summer of 1999. He said KFOR, in addition to its security tasks, had to support the civilian society with various utilities and humanitarian assistance as well as acting as a complete administration.<sup>70</sup> Jackson emphasized that most of these civil related tasks were later transferred to civilian organizations. The first troops to arrive Baghdad early April 2003 had a similar experience. According to Colonel Conlin, he and his battalion had to start working rule of law about 30 minutes after they arrived Baghdad on 9 April.<sup>71</sup> Conlin says they “Had a car stop with the rapidly expiring body of a local who had just been in a traffic accident unrelated to the combat. The driver said that since there were no police or hospitals, we must be in charge, so he left the body with us. [This was the] First time we realized that we were effectively the newly responsible government for everything in our AOR.”<sup>72</sup>

Thorough planning and preparation are of great importance to facilitate a timely transition from combat to stabilization. Again, the occupation of post-war Germany offers valid experience. Post World War II Operation Eclipse and its more than two-year long planning prepared U.S. military forces to immediately fill the power vacuum after the German collapse.<sup>73</sup> During OIF, the Department of Defense set up a Post-war Planning Office to prepare for problems and to coordinate efforts of coalition countries and U.S. government agencies.<sup>74</sup> The plan for the reconstruction of Iraq was named Eclipse 2. This reconstruction plan has been described as insufficient to meet the

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<sup>70</sup> Zoran Kusovac, “Interview General Sir Mikhael Jackson,” *Jane’s Defence Weekly* 32, no. 15 (13 October 1999): 40.

<sup>71</sup> Conlin, e-mail interview.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*,

<sup>73</sup> Ziemke, 163-164.

<sup>74</sup> Donald H. Rumsfeld, Remarks as delivered by Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, 11<sup>th</sup> Annual Salute to Freedom, Intrepid Sea-Air-Space Museum, New York City 14 February 2003.

challenges of post-war Iraq. Regardless of the Eclipse 2 plan, according to Colonel Stephen Kidder, USA, "the units did not know this plan when they crossed the line of departure on 19 March 2003; and they first got the plan after they came to Baghdad, and then they had to improvise as best as they could."<sup>75</sup>

This situation may have been aggravated through confusion about who was in charge during the transition period. The initial command relationship between Franks and Garner could easily be misunderstood. Secretary Rumsfeld told Franks "He'll [Garner] be your subordinate ... but he'll be my man in Iraq."<sup>76</sup> Additionally, when Franks placed Garner subordinate to the overall ground commander in Iraq, U.S. Army Lieutenant General David D. McKiernan from late March through early May, this increased the friction between the military and civilian component.<sup>77</sup> In early May, Garner's authority was further questioned as the White House intended to appoint Ambassador Bremer as Iraq's top civil administrator.<sup>78</sup> The unclear command relationship obviously caused a lot of uncertainty in Iraq. In the post-war occupation of Germany, there was some friction between the more than four-year military government and the governmental agencies in America, although General Lucius D. Clay as a proconsul secured unity of command within the American occupation zone.<sup>79</sup> Although unity of command at the top level in Iraq proved extremely difficult to achieve, at the regional level Major General David H. Petraeus, commander of 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne Division, effectively acted as military governor in northern Iraq.<sup>80</sup>

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<sup>75</sup> Colonel Stephen Kidder, USA, lecture in Campaign Planning presented in OLOW class at U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Quantico, VA, 2 December 2004.

<sup>76</sup> Franks, 423.

<sup>77</sup> Rudd interview.

<sup>78</sup> Rajiv Chandrasekaran, "U.S. Military," A01.

<sup>79</sup> Ziemke, 444-449 and Dobbins and others, 13-15.

<sup>80</sup> Henry W. Bennet, Lieutenant Colonel, USA, Faculty Advisor U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College, and former battalion commander 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne Division in Iraq 2003. Interview by author, 25 March 2005.

Transition of responsibilities from the military before the security situation is sufficient is inadvisable. The danger of creating a power vacuum is obvious. On the other hand, even if war fighting is still in progress, some essential governmental and administrative functions may still be carried out. Even though military governance after a war has ended is politically sensitive, if the level of security is likely to hamper the start of nation-building, the alternative of having a military proconsul for a certain period of time is probably better than risking a power vacuum.

### **Reconstruction**

The military needs to be involved in planning and coordinating reconstruction because of its expertise, capabilities, and because how reconstruction affects the overall efforts on societal transformation. The extent of damage to civilian infrastructure and public utilities will set the requirements for reconstruction. Despite the Coalition's success avoiding serious collateral damage, the Iraqi economy, infrastructure and public utilities suffered from severe degeneration following the previous Gulf War, the result of the ban on Iraqi oil export by the International Community. To a great extent, the Hussein regime also ignored preventive maintenance on infrastructure and public utilities over years throughout the country. The effect of Operation Iraqi Freedom exacerbated Iraq's economic woes.

In World War II Germany the economy collapsed before the war ended. The war damages were gigantic, and by the end of the war their industrial capabilities were at an all-time low. The U.S. military with its vast resources played a key role in planning and rebuilding the German economy and ensuring its continued growth. For instance, the military governor of the U.S. sector, General Clay, contributed substantial efforts and resources to restart German industry.<sup>81</sup>

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<sup>81</sup> Dobbins, and others, 17-18.

Similarly, Iraqi reconstruction faces multiple challenges which are exacerbated by a volatile level of security and stability. Reconstruction during major combat operations can be very difficult, or even impossible in most cases. If the level of security allows any reconstruction activities, an early start in liberated areas might yield good results. However, the military has traditionally been reluctant to use their assets for civilian purposes. *Mission creep*<sup>82</sup> is a term that was frequently used during NATO's operations in Bosnia because military assets were utilized in ways far different than they were originally designed.

Use of military assets, however, may be the only solution to kick-start reconstruction as well as to sustain it immediately following hostilities. Combat Support and Combat Service Support units have a variety of resources that are well suited for civilian reconstruction including: combat and construction engineers, maintenance personnel, medical experts, communicators and transportation units. Building dedicated units for stability operations and reconstruction is one likely option that has been discussed to enhance the U.S. Army's means to operate in a post-hostility environment.<sup>83</sup> In most post-conflict environments, tailored specialized military and civilian resources in dedicated units would be far more effective in reconstruction efforts than combat units. Moreover, dedicated units for stability operations and reconstruction will allow combat units to focus most of their resources on security operations and counter-insurgency.

Civilian contractors offer alternate ways to commence post-war reconstruction. In Iraq, the civilian contractors were used on a much larger scale compared to previous post-conflict areas. Contractors have a great variety of services to offer, ranging from catering and advanced

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<sup>82</sup> The term mission creep actually stems from Somalia where the mission grows/changes without growing/changing the force. In Bosnia the military adapted to peace enforcement.

<sup>83</sup> See, for example, Michael O'Hanlon, "The Need to Increase the Size of the Deployable Army," *Parameters*, Carlisle, PA, Autumn 2004, 11-13.

engineering to providing security.<sup>84</sup> While most military engineer capabilities are too inadequate to deal with complex subjects like electricity supply, water supply and sewage, contractors can be hired to quickly restore such public services. By directing contractors to hire a certain number of local employees there is also a possibility to strengthen local businesses and consequently the prosperity of the local community.

Although civilian contractors are not subject to the same restrictions as governmental employees, and some of them even bring their own security, the level of security limits what they can accomplish. Contractors are undoubtedly useful in long-term reconstruction, but their efficiency as a quick fix of post-war damages can be questioned because it usually takes some time before the ground forces have established the necessary control and situational awareness in an area. The effect of contractors, however, requires thorough planning, issuing them clearly defined tasks, and most importantly, seamless coordination with the military.

Even if the level of security is insufficient for regular reconstruction, combat troops can use the so-called Commander's Emergency Response Fund (CERF) as an improvised solution. CERF equips local commanders with money to quickly deal with short-term needs of the Iraqi populace.<sup>85</sup> The problem with this type of funding was the bureaucratic hurdles to put these dollars in the hands of commanders; moreover, the amount of money was tied to the rank of a commander and not the event that drove the need for funding.<sup>86</sup>

When a major combat operation is over, the only substantial organization present may be the military. A secure environment, however, cannot be attained through security operations alone.

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<sup>84</sup> For examples of civilian contractors, see companies as: Halliburton; <http://www.halliburton.com/kbr/index.jsp> or; Blackwater USA; <http://www.blackwaterusa.com/> or Custer Battles; <http://www.custerbattles.com/>

<sup>85</sup> Gerry J. Gilmore, *Reconstruction Fund Helps Provide Better Life for Iraqis*, House Armed Services Committee, <http://www.house.gov/hasc/>. URL: <<http://www.house.gov/hasc/GoodNews/IraqreconstructionJan14.html>>. Accessed 4 April 2005.

<sup>86</sup> Bennet interview.

Results from reconstruction will positively influence the occupied population earning their trust and confidence, and persuading them from supporting insurgents. Combat troops working alongside dedicated reconstruction units will create a combined effect, not unlike traditional combined arms, although optimized to fit a post-hostility environment.

### **Humanitarian Assistance**

Military involvement in humanitarian assistance depends largely on whether there is an immediate humanitarian need and to what extent various governmental and non-governmental organizations contribute to humanitarian efforts. For Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Coalition anticipated that there would be an enormous need for humanitarian assistance. One of the planning concerns was the danger of having millions of Iraqis as refugees. This was not the case. However, there was still need for humanitarian assistance, but not to the degree as anticipated.

Post-war Kosovo serves as an example where there was great need for humanitarian assistance. Almost one million Kosovo Albanians were displaced, and about two-thirds of all homes in Kosovo were uninhabitable.<sup>87</sup> KFOR provided humanitarian assistance as they were deployed into Kosovo; however, this was handed over to international organizations and non-governmental organizations as soon as they became operational.<sup>88</sup> In Kosovo, the quickly improving security situation enabled the relatively quick handover of humanitarian responsibilities to civilian organizations.

In contrast, the threat level for civilian organizations in Iraq has increased rather than decreased following major combat operations. This is problematic as most international- and non-governmental organizations are generally not organized or equipped to operate in an unsecured

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<sup>87</sup> Dobbins and others, 113.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, 121.

environment.<sup>89</sup> In a post-hostility environment the humanitarian community<sup>90</sup> holds important capabilities that will be sought after to quickly stabilize a society after a conflict. An inhospitable environment for civilian organizations may increase the pressure on the military to bring humanitarian assistance. Since many humanitarian organizations may hesitate accepting military support, the military should develop methods that are less intrusive in order to establish conditions for these organizations to operate securely while also integrating their principles.

Military forces delivering humanitarian assistance is an issue with several constraints. Most humanitarian organization will object that military forces should be involved in deliverance of humanitarian assistance.<sup>91</sup> The bulk of humanitarian organizations maintain that the principles of impartiality and neutrality are crucial for their ability to operate and keep their personnel safe. More often than not they not only hesitate to engage closely with the military, many of them avoid any contact all together. In general, the humanitarian community is more cautious of possible mix-up of roles than the military because they have to maintain their impartiality.

The humanitarian assistance community has a variety of occupational qualifications that are different from the military's. However, these qualifications are somewhat complementary to the ones the military traditionally has in its inventory. Even more important, the inhabitants in an area of conflict or disaster will perceive the vast majority of humanitarian organizations differently than military forces. In most cases, their degree of legitimacy and impartiality will be rated higher than for the military. This will equip these organizations with tools to provide a helping hand at places or in circumstances that most military organizations are incapable.

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<sup>89</sup> Anthony H. Cordesman, U.S. Congress.

<sup>90</sup> I broadly define the term humanitarian community to include International, Governmental and non-governmental organizations, which have pronounced that their goals are to mitigate human sufferings after wars, disasters etc.

<sup>91</sup> Slim, "With or Against?"

The military, however, has often regarded humanitarian organizations as beneficial contributors in order to reach the military end state, which is normally associated with withdrawal of military forces. Currently, military forces are dependant on the humanitarian community's contribution in a post conflict environment. The military simply does not possess enough resources, and in some cases sufficient legitimacy, to deliver humanitarian assistance all by itself. A good start for broader cooperation, or even collaboration between the military and humanitarian organizations would be to interact more closely during peacetime. Joint training and exercises may help harmonize the two parties; although the initiative has to come from the military.

Medical support to civilians is another difficult issue to balance. Medical formations and facilities can form the core of units dedicated for immediate humanitarian assistance as well as for long-term reconstruction effort by establishing hospitals. One obvious reason for not involving in medical support is the danger of creating dependency upon the military. For example, an immunization program initiated by the military in a post-conflict area may do more harm than good because of the uncertainty connected to sustaining such an initiative.

Although the military in most cases has substantial recourses that can be utilized for humanitarian assistance, such involvement can reduce the presence of humanitarian organization and create desperate dependency of military assets. On the other hand, these negative effects have to be balanced with available capacities and the military need for increased popular support. Societies badly affected by war or devastation will most certainly appreciate life-support, regardless of whether the provider is in uniform. Improved cooperation through workshops and exercises is likely to reduce friction in operations.

### **Enabling the transition of Authority**

The military has an indisputable role in shaping the post-hostility environment in order to get a nation-building process on track. However, it is difficult to disagree with retired Colonel Feil who

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*Bridge Over Troubled Waters: How Armed Nation Building Spans The Gap Between Victory And Stability*



told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that, “it is imperative that any approach to Iraq in a post-conflict situation begins with a presumption that only a comprehensive, holistic plan executed through integrated, yet decentralized actions will be successful.”<sup>92</sup>

The immediate post-hostility period will benefit from unity of effort and unity of command in order to utilize all available military and civilian resources necessary to quickly secure and stabilize the situation. Key to successful transition is integrated planning and interagency coordination. Anthony H. Cordesman claims that “...security and nation-building missions must begin as combat operations proceed, there must be no pause that creates a power vacuum, and the U.S. must act from the start to ensure that the necessary resources for nation-building are present.”<sup>93</sup>

This description seems quite similar to the U.S. military’s course of action for rebuilding post-war Germany. When the U.S. forces advanced into Germany, civil affairs units followed right behind them. This was not coincidental; it had been pre-planned through more than two years of post-war planning. In contrast, the revealed results of the post-war planning for Iraq do not coincide with the expectations. According to the *Washington Post* 16 October 2002, the State Department expected that nation-building in Iraq could take from six to nine months.<sup>94</sup> Most people were surprised by the speed with which major combat operations in Iraq were accomplished. CENTCOM assumed that Baghdad would fall after just 60 days of fighting; moreover, they assumed the fall of Baghdad would mean victory.<sup>95</sup> In fact, the major battles of Operation Iraqi Freedom were over after only 21 days of fighting.<sup>96</sup> Arguably, the planning of OIF presumed that the outcome of the coalition's attack on Iraq would result in virtually an automatic nation-building

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<sup>92</sup> Scott R. Feil, U.S. Congress.

<sup>93</sup> Anthony H. Cordesman, U.S. Congress.

<sup>94</sup> Christopher Buckley, “Iraq: The Q and A; [FINAL Edition],” *Washington Post*, 16 October 2002, A25.

<sup>95</sup> DeLong and Lukeman, 83.

<sup>96</sup> Franks, 523.

process, almost as if nation building would be self-starting. A lesson from this is that the campaign planning process as well as interagency planning must be prepared for an early transition.

Colonel Feil stated that, "...the United States must articulate its transition strategy."<sup>97</sup> He further exemplified his remarks stating, "The criteria that will govern the transition from military agency to civilian agency, and from outsider to insider in the execution of all the post-conflict reconstruction tasks must be developed, promulgated, and integrated into the [campaign] plan."<sup>98</sup> There is reason to examine the relationship between the Department of Defense and State Department and to determine whether it hampered the transition preparations. The strenuous atmosphere between those departments is likely to have complicated their collaboration.<sup>99</sup> More than a year after OIF commenced, General Franks said he wished "Donald Rumsfeld and Colin Powell had forced the Defense and State Departments to work more closely together."<sup>100</sup> On the other hand, the responsibility to ensure no stovepipe planning of the different phases of a campaign is undoubtedly vested with the Combatant Commander.

There will always be different opinions on when it is the best time for transition. General, Joseph P. Hoar, USMC (Ret.) argues that there should have been a shift from the Department of Defense to the State Department as the lead agency when the combat operation was over.<sup>101</sup> From a unity of effort perspective, this could have offered clearer guidance and an improved transition process. On the other hand, this could prove difficult because of limited availability of resources, not to mention the implications of the level of security. Currently, the State Department possess

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<sup>97</sup> Scott R. Feil, U.S. Congress.

<sup>98</sup> Ibid.


<sup>99</sup> Franks, 375.

<sup>100</sup> Ibid., 544.

<sup>101</sup> Joseph P. Hoar, U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations. *Iraq Transition – The Way Ahead*, Hearings, 19 May 2004.

neither trained personnel nor an organizational structure to support stability operations and reconstruction.

As seen in Iraq, the transition of authority can take place even if the level of security is insufficient. However, the risk of having a poorly executed transition between the military and the subsequent civilian administration is quite clear. Moreover, lack of unity of command throughout the transition phase is likely to have a devastating effect on unity of effort. As major combat operations slow down, nation-building activities planned for stability operations and reconstruction must gradually be stepped up toward the point of transition (figure 4).



**Figure 4: A more seamless and gradual transition of authority towards the end of major combat operations**

The goal must be to enable seamless transition of authority throughout the period of uncertainty. This requires that the military commander defines and sets the conditions for the transition. Moreover, that the military component and the civilian component must agree on which conditions set the stage for a successful transition.

### **Further Evolution of Nation-building**

Post-war Iraq may not set the standard for future post-hostility operations, but it is a useful study of key themes. Post-war Germany was different from post-war Bosnia, and post-war Bosnia differed from what happened in Kosovo. While all four post-war scenarios are different they have one element in common, they all required extensive nation-building and a considerable military presence.

Robert Leonhard, an American military theorist, claims that early 21st-century conflicts, with a few exceptions, will be prolonged, although of low intensity, while high intensity conflicts will be rarely seen.<sup>102</sup> The chief reason for this, he says, is the American dominance in conventional fighting, which makes potential adversaries inclined to make use of unconventional warfare over long periods of time. When Dr. Thomas P. M. Barnett, a senior strategic researcher and professor at the U.S. Naval War College, describes war in the twenty-first century, he emphasizes the connectivity between war and peace as the key to understanding and fighting contemporary and future threats.<sup>103</sup> He advocates that the spread of political and economical globalization throughout the parts of the world where democracy has not yet rooted will bring greater stability for most of the world.

Today's security challenges have a great number of facets, and most of them are inextricably interlinked. During the last four years we have experienced devastating results from terrorism and natural disasters that previously would have been considered sheer imagination. The imminent danger of other failed states is present. Factors that one-way or another will affect the most imminent security threats include: growing poverty, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, lack of non-renewable resources, and global warming. These threats by their very nature are existential and cannot be met with military means alone. There are several indications suggesting U.S. adaptations to such scenarios.

Based on lessons from four years as U.S. secretary of state Colin Powell argues strongly for U.S. engagement with failed states.<sup>104</sup> In his article, *No Country left behind*, Powell claims there is a clear link between the war on terrorism and the U.S. ability to prevent states from becoming

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<sup>102</sup> Robert Leonhard, "Factors of Conflict in the Early 21st Century," *Army* 53, no. 1 (January 2003): 32.

<sup>103</sup> Thomas P. M. Barnett, *The Pentagon's new map: war and peace in the twenty-first century* (New York, NY: 2004), 7-8.

<sup>104</sup> Colin Powell, "No Country Left Behind," *Foreign Policy*, Washington D.C. (January/February 2005): 29-31.

failed. The on-going transformation of the U.S. military seems to follow the same tendency. Department of Defense Director of Force Transformation, Vice Admiral Cebrowski (Ret.) says the U.S. military has to shift its focus to meet the current security threats. To engage with threats like rogue states and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the U.S. must "...shift from defence to offence, from reaction and response to pro-action and prevention."<sup>105</sup> In response to such threats, the U.S. military and coalition forces, in concert with other elements of national power, may have to defeat some adversaries militarily while other should be subject to nation-building.<sup>106</sup>

Tied to the security situation after September 11, along with costly lessons from the Iraq war, the Department of Defense has for more than a year considered dedicating military forces to stability and reconstruction operations.<sup>107</sup> Moreover, there have been suggestions on creating something similar to the Goldwater-Nichols Act to strongly enhance interagency cooperation.<sup>108</sup> Increased interagency cooperation will most certainly result in a far more efficient utilization of the elements of national power during a nation-building process.

Evidently, security challenges and military transformational trends indicate that the U.S. Military has to be mentally prepared for a much broader spectrum of tasks in the future than they are today. Not only will nation-building be considered a normal military task, the likelihood of military forces finding themselves in charge of armed nation-building is significant. Given such a perspective, creative and non-traditional military solutions are required to find the right balance between the need for military forces to conduct combat operations and to support reconstruction. One solution for the U.S. might be to look to other countries for units dedicated to undertake

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<sup>105</sup> Arthur Cebrowski, "Transforming America's Military," *London Financial Times*, London, 5 January 2005.

<sup>106</sup> Barnett, 379-383.

<sup>107</sup> Paul Stone, DoD Considers Creating Stability and Reconstruction Force. 30 December 2003. URL: [http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Dec2003/n12302003\\_200312301.html](http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Dec2003/n12302003_200312301.html) Accessed 15 January 2005.

<sup>108</sup> General Peter Pace, USMC, Extemporaneous Remarks as delivered to the Marine Corps Association/Naval Institute's Forum 2004, 7 September 2004. URL: [http://www.dtic.mil/jcs/vice\\_chairman/MCANavalInstituteFORUM2004.html](http://www.dtic.mil/jcs/vice_chairman/MCANavalInstituteFORUM2004.html)>. Accessed 15 January 2005.

nation-building activities. As smaller European nation's warfighting capabilities deteriorate, a viable niche for some of them may be to establish units specialized for solving post-hostility challenges in the wake of war. In the same way as NATO has created NATO Response Force for initial entry operations where different countries are assigned specific roles and responsibilities, NATO could call upon its members to institute something similar for post-conflict activities. However, the individual member country's political will and restrictions must be considered.

### **Conclusion**

Experiences from previous post-hostility operations indicate several challenges when a major combat operation evolves into a stability operation. Operation Iraqi Freedom has certainly amplified these challenges. In Iraq, the transition of authority from the military to civilian authority took place in an environment that was neither war nor peace. The lack of adequate security significantly affected the nation-building process. On the other hand, a lack of noticeable results from early reconstruction and humanitarian assistance made the security environment even more volatile. The most significant post-hostility feature is the way security influences the other tenets of nation-building and vice versa. They are not only interlinked, they have a mutual amplifying effect, and should take place concurrently.

Nation-building should be thoroughly planned and those plans have to be promulgated to the war fighters. The nation-building process cannot commence after the war is over. It has to be a parallel process. This requires close coordination of all elements of national power. The single most important lesson from OIF is likely to be that the military commander has to define the set of conditions for transition of authority to the civilian component. Loosing popular support from the target population in the immediate post-hostility period may be more serious than loosing an important battle during the major combat operation. The occupier has to use extensive means not

only battling insurgency, but also addressing intangible reasons for the insurgents' support. Sometimes the ideal solution is to continue the combat operations until a sufficient level of security is reached, another time it may only cause more popular support for insurgents. It is difficult to balance the visual results for the population and the use of force against them.

If possible, the ideal solution is not to let the units or command elements that invaded a country start rebuilding institutions and infrastructure. Units dedicated to reconstruction may be far more effective; moreover, they might be perceived more positively than those within the first echelon. More resources should be set aside to enhance inter-agency training and cooperation. There is a great need for doctrinal standards that allow efficient use of both military and civilian assets. Future conflict patterns will require more dual purpose forces at the sacrifice of multipurpose forces designed for both high-intensity warfare and stability operations and reconstruction.

The potential for military confrontations, either conventional or unconventional, is just as possible as using nation-building to prevent failed-states from becoming rouge states. In an operation area there will neither be combat troops nor units specialized in stability and reconstruction; there will be both. While one force is literally specialized in defeating an enemy, the other should specialize in limiting the number of enemies. Even though armed nation-building appears to be a contradiction in terms, it is likely to be the norm and not the exception. Accordingly, Collin Powell's Pottery Barn rule should not be forgotten: "You break it, you own it."<sup>109</sup>

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<sup>109</sup> Woodward, 150.

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