CIVIL AFFAIRS - BUILDING THE FORCE TO MEET ITS FUTURE CHALLENGES

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL MIGUEL A. CASTELLANOS
United States Army Reserve

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for Public Release.
Distribution is Unlimited.

USAWC CLASS OF 2009

This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle State Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.
Civil Affairs - Building the Force to Meet Its Future Challenges

Civil Affairs (CA) forces and the capabilities they provide to commanders on the battlefield are critical enablers to winning the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Since the beginning of the wars, Army Reserve CA Soldiers assigned to the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC), the Army's conventional CA force provider, have mobilized continuously in support of these operations. Unable to sustain theater force requirements, other Army Reserve forces and personnel from the Navy and Air Force were cross-trained to perform this mission. Future indications posit an increase in destabilizing factors such as ungoverned spaces and failing states. U.S. policy and doctrine see the Army mitigating these threats through shaping the global environment to reduce instability across the international system. Civil Affairs Operations (CAO), throughout the entire spectrum of conflict, are at the forefront of this doctrine and policy. This paper examines how CA forces have evolved since September 11, 2001, discusses their roles in Afghanistan and Iraq, and provides recommendations for the force to meet its future challenges.
USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

CIVIL AFFAIRS - BUILDING THE FORCE TO MEET ITS FUTURE CHALLENGES

by

Lieutenant Colonel Miguel A. Castellanos
United States Army Reserve

Colonel R. Christion Brewer
Project Adviser

This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013
ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Lieutenant Colonel Miguel A. Castellanos
TITLE: Civil Affairs - Building the Force to Meet Its Future Challenges
FORMAT: Strategy Research Project
DATE: 20 March 2009  WORD COUNT: 5,239  PAGES: 26
KEY TERMS: Stability Operations, Transformation, Post Conflict
CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

Civil Affairs (CA) forces and the capabilities they provide to commanders on the battlefield are critical enablers to winning the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Since the beginning of the wars, Army Reserve CA Soldiers assigned to the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC), the Army’s conventional CA force provider, have mobilized continuously in support of these operations. Unable to sustain theater force requirements, other Army Reserve forces and personnel from the Navy and Air Force were cross-trained to perform this mission. Future indications posit an increase in destabilizing factors such as ungoverned spaces and failing states. U.S. policy and doctrine see the Army mitigating these threats through shaping the global environment to reduce instability across the international system. Civil Affairs Operations (CAO), throughout the entire spectrum of conflict, are at the forefront of this doctrine and policy. This paper examines how CA forces have evolved since September 11, 2001, discusses their roles in Afghanistan and Iraq, and provides recommendations for the force to meet its future challenges.
Civil affairs (CA) forces have witnessed a sharp increase in their use and the operations they perform since the beginning of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. These implications have surfaced many concerns over readiness, manning, sustainment, and resetting the force. Theater requirements for CA forces have remained relatively consistent since the beginning of the wars. However, with a force predominantly comprised of U.S. Army Reserve Soldiers (approximately 96% of the Army’s CA structure), the force is showing signs of wear and has resorted to joint and in lieu of (ILO) sourcing options to fill its requirements in theater. Is the Army doing enough to sustain the force today and prepare the force for tomorrow’s conflicts?

This paper examines how CA has evolved, transformed and managed to meet the sourcing requirements in Afghanistan and Iraq. Next, it examines the causes of instability, its affects on U.S. national security, and its destabilizing effects it has on the international community. It then discusses the roles of CA in Afghanistan and Iraq and provides recommendations for the force to meet its future challenges.

Not since the end of World War II have Army Civil Affairs (CA) forces deployed in vast numbers and for such long periods as they are today. During WW II, Civil Affairs and Military Government (CAMG) units conducted postwar activities in Germany and Japan.¹ A similarity in the conduct of these operations then and now is the use of Reserve forces to perform the civil affairs mission. In WWII, the Army recruited and commissioned officers directly from the civilian sector primarily for their expertise within a specific CAMG function. Officers on active duty with similar CAMG functional backgrounds were transferred to these units or the Civil Affairs Division (CAD) at the
War Department.² Today, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are entering their eighth and sixth year respectively. Each faced with dwindling public support and a smaller all-volunteer force to perform the mission.

Unlike the CAMG units of WWII, comprised of both active and reserve component (RC) Soldiers, today’s CA units supporting Army conventional combat forces come exclusively from the Army Reserve. In October 2006, Headquarters Department of the Army issued General Order Number 12 directing reassignment of the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC) from the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) to the U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC). This order additionally re-designated the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) CA force as a conventional force from a Special Operation Force (SOF).³ Previously, active component (AC) and RC CA forces were assigned to USACAPOC and supported SOF and General Purpose Forces (GPF).

In the 1990’s, Civil Affairs Operations (CAO) increased as military operations shifted from traditional state on state conflicts to that of asymmetric or irregular warfare. The end of the Cold War witnessed a surge of stability operations for the U.S. bringing CAO to the forefront in support of nation-building efforts in Kuwait in 1991, Somalia in 1992, Haiti in 1994, Bosnia in 1995, Kosovo in 1999, Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003.⁴ It was becoming apparent that CAO were essential to the successes in every environment across the spectrum of conflict, from peace to general war. When not deployed, CA forces respond to natural disasters providing humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) and provide expertise and training to Geographic Combatant Commanders’ (GCC) Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP).
Since September 11, 2001 (9/11), the operational tempo (OPTEMPO) for CA forces has remained unbelievably high. CA forces have supported war on terror (WOT) requirements in the Philippines, the Horn of Africa, Afghanistan, and Iraq. In 2005, USACAPOC underwent a Force Design Update (FDU) to modularize its structure to meet Army transformation requirements. The FDU was timely, increasing the number of battalions from 24 to 28, and its structure from 146 to 196 personnel. In all, USACAPOC will have gained an additional 1164 positions once the transformation is complete in FY11. The FDU also increased tactical CA companies from one to four per battalion each configured to “plug and play” into an Army Brigade Combat Team (BCT) structure.

Although the FDU redesign is starting to materialize as units increase structure and gain equipment, the task of acquiring Soldiers to fill the positions is taking time. Most units have yet to achieve 85% of their required strength while numbers of those qualified are far less. This coupled with an intense OPTEMPO prevents units’ from properly resetting and stabilizing before mobilizing again. The Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model developed in 2002, was intended to provide predictability for units scheduled to mobilize and determine the associated train-up requirements needed before a unit can deploy. For reserve components, a one-year mobilization is required during a six-year period (1:6 ratio). Currently, USACAPOC CA units are executing less than a 1:3 ratio and receiving dwell periods (the time a unit is not mobilized) of only 20 months before the unit mobilizes again.

The reduced timeline for CA units to reset is having a significant impact on filling the requirements in theater and causing adverse effects on Soldiers, their employers,
and Families. Although enough force structure was in place to sustain the demands for the WOT (assuming units were at 100% strength), requirements for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) 1 required nearly 40% (2400 Soldiers) of USACAPOC’s CA force to mobilize. This large force request significantly reduced the pool of available follow-on forces as many units faced personnel shortages and lacked qualified Soldiers early during the war. The ability to provide the same number of CA personnel was not sustainable and subsequent rotations became increasingly difficult to fill. Since, requests for CA forces have fluctuated from 1000 to 1400 Soldiers per rotation.\(^6\)

With the continued demand for CA forces, USACAPOC filled subsequent rotation requirements from the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), from USARC units that had yet to deploy, and cross-leveled teams and individuals throughout USACAPOC to fill shortages. The use of IRR and USARC Soldiers started in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)/OIF 04-06 (3rd rotation) and peaked in OEF/OIF 07-09 (6th rotation) providing nearly 60% of the CA force requirement for that rotation. To date, both IRR and USARC Soldiers continue to provide approximately 25% of the CA force required in theater. Cross-leveling still occurs to a lesser degree and will undoubtedly continue until units are well enough to provide the entire capability (unit sets) requested.\(^9\)

As a means to sustain force requirements in theater, in 2006, joint sourcing options authorized personnel from the active components of the Air Force and Navy to fill the continuing shortage of CA personnel. Figure 1 shows the various CA sourcing requirements by Army and “joint solution” since the start of the WOT. Although the Air Force and Navy still provide personnel to fill USACAPOC battle rosters, their requirements dropped from 20% in OEF/OIF 06-08 to just over 5% for OEF/OIF 07-09.
The 2009 rotation is utilizing ILO forces from the USAR to fill CA unit shortages. Providing this requirement are three chemical companies that will mobilize, undergo CA training, and deploy as CA companies to perform civil affairs operations. Presently, the 2010 rotation requires more USAR chemical companies to assist USACAPOC meet its manning requirements in theater. The goal, provided new requirements do not emerge, is to allow time for units to reset properly.

**Background: CA Sourcing for GWOT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>GPF Civil Affairs (USAR)</th>
<th>USARC (USAR other than CA)</th>
<th>Unfilled</th>
<th>IRR</th>
<th>USN</th>
<th>USAF</th>
<th>Unfilled</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>04-06</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05-07</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06-08</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07-09</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08-09</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09-10</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-11</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Key Points:**
- Force levels required at start of OIF were not sustainable
- Surge sourcing (addition to 07-09) employed SOF CA "bridge" mission
- FY08 mission requirements increase (Global Requirements and PRTs)
- Impact: Current dwell ratio for GPF CA is approximately 1:3 or home-20-months

**Figure 1. CA Sourcing for the Global War on Terror.**

To reduce the consistent shortfalls of CA forces required in theater, recent policy from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Army provided for the USAR to grow an additional 20 companies with requisite battalion and brigade headquarters elements starting in FY10. Likewise, the AC structure is growing an additional 30 companies with requisite command structure starting in FY11. This increase, intended to support GPF and not SOF, would provide the AC with its own conventional CA
capability. However, a source from U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) stated any CA force added to the AC structure would not be GPF, but SOF, since proponency of AC CA forces resides with USSOCOM. Regardless, both increases in structure will take years to man, equip, and train before deemed fully mission capable.

**Future Challenges**

The future indicates no decline in crises or events that cause instability. Instead, one may best anticipate the future as volatile and complex. An increasingly unpredictable environment characterized by unstable and failing states, increases in population, shortages of basic survival needs such as food and water, lack of security and governance, and a myriad of other factors are burgeoning in many parts of the world. The Seven Revolutions, a project led by the Global Strategy Institute for the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), suggests that by 2025: population, resource management, technology, information flows, economic integration, conflict and governance will have “revolutionary” effects on the international system.

Some of the noteworthy predictions posited from The Seven Revolutions project are:

- Between 2007 and 2025, the population of the developed world is expected to grow 3%, while the population of the developing world is expected to grow 49%.¹²
- By 2020, India’s demand for water will exceed all sources of supply.¹³
- Nine countries—India, Pakistan, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Bangladesh, Uganda, the United States, Ethiopia, and China—will account for one-half of all world population growth through 2050.¹⁴

Some noteworthy conclusions posited from The Seven Revolutions project are:
• Nearly 500 million people live in states considered to be fragile—in other words, states unable or unwilling to assure the provision of security and basic services to significant portions of their populations.¹⁵

• Twenty-two of the world’s 34 poorest countries are engaged in or emerging from armed conflict.¹⁶

• A survey by the UN’s Food & Agriculture Organization shows that armed conflicts are the largest single cause of world hunger; conflicts were the main cause of 35 percent of the food emergencies occurring from 1992 to 2003.¹⁷

These revolutionary effects clearly present the volatile challenges and the destabilizing impacts that will affect societies and the way they cooperate with each other.

The U.S. Government has assessed many of these causes of instability as threats to our national security. U.S. policy is evolving and relying heavily on the military instrument of national power to develop strategies that shape environments, prevent the deterioration of a state, and provide the means that enable states to manage their own problems effectively. The National Security Strategy (NSS) postulates, “Because democracies are the most responsible members of the international system, promoting democracy is the most effective long-term measure for strengthening international stability, reducing regional conflicts, countering terrorism and terror-supporting extremism, and extending peace and prosperity.”¹⁸ The National Defense Strategy (NDS) views the strategic environment as volatile, faced with a variety of irregular challenges, with states unable to effectively police themselves and provide for their own people.¹⁹ The NDS further posits, “Ungoverned, under governed, misgoverned, and contested areas offer fertile ground for such groups (armed su-
national and violent extremism groups) to exploit the gaps in the governance capacity of local regimes to undermine local stability and regional security.”

National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44, Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization, codifies the implementation for an extensive military development of plans, policies, and strategies to address these problems. It specifically states,

The U.S. has a significant stake in enhancing the capacity to assist in stabilizing and reconstructing countries or regions, especially those at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife, and to help them establish a sustainable path toward peaceful societies, democracies, and market economies. The United States should work with other countries and organizations to anticipate state failure, avoid it whenever possible, and respond quickly and effectively when necessary and appropriate to promote peace, security, development, democratic practices, market economies, and the rule of law. Such work should aim to enable governments abroad to exercise sovereignty over their own territories and to prevent those territories from being used as a base of operations or safe haven for extremists, terrorists, organized crime groups, or others who pose a threat to U.S. foreign policy, security, or economic interests.

Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations, establishes stability operations as a core military mission and assigns it the same level of priority as combat operations. Key policy points and themes throughout the directive are:

- Rebuild indigenous institutions including various types of security forces, correctional facilities, and judicial systems necessary to secure and stabilize the environment.
- Revive or build the private sector, including encouraging citizen-driven, bottom-up economic activity and constructing necessary infrastructure.
- Develop representative governmental institutions.
- Ensure Foreign Area Office, Enlisted Regional Specialists, Civil Affairs, Military Police, Engineer and Psychological Operations programs develop the quantity and quality of personnel needed for stability operations.  

Summarizing, the future global environment presents challenges to the interests and security of the United States. The NSS and NDS clearly layout the need for the military to implement strategies that prevent instability and are designed to shape the environment through cooperation and partnerships. These strategies ultimately incorporate the use of civil affairs operations and rely on its force to accomplish these goals.

Civil Affairs in Operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom

This is an assessment compiled from discussions with Army War College students. The intent of these discussions was to gain a perspective from former Battalion Commanders and staff officers who commanded or worked alongside CA forces in OEF and OIF. I sought combat arms officers who deployed at least once. Some had deployed multiple times to Afghanistan, Iraq or both. Each of the officers had over 20 years of service and an accomplished career. A few were selected for brigade command.

During these discussions, my intent was first to understand the subject’s perspective, the lens through which he developed his perspective. Each discussion was unique; no two were alike. Where and when they served in Iraq or Afghanistan had implications on how CAO was conducted. Whether their area of operation (AO) was permissive or hostile, their Civil Affairs Team (CAT) experienced (one comprised of veteran USACAPOC Soldiers) or a composite from the IRR, USARC, and “joint
solution,” would influence their view. My approach was simply to identify recurring themes and salient points that shared a level of consistency throughout the discussions. The discussions focused on three areas: the subject’s level of knowledge of civil affairs and their operations; the attached CA force(s) ability to plan CAO; and the attached CA forces ability to execute CAO. Since many of the subjects interviewed worked at the BCT level and below, our discussions focused on tactical level CAT functions. However, some subjects worked as staff officers at the BCT level and higher and shared experiences about planning teams or CA Headquarters elements with whom they worked.

**Knowledge of Civil Affairs Operations.** Determining the subject’s level of knowledge about CA and their operations was the start point of every discussion. With all conventional CA forces residing in the Army Reserves, how often were active component maneuver forces actually working with them? In general, 70% of the subjects had limited previous experience with CA forces and their mission. They observed CATs at Combat Training Centers (CTC) or other similar exercise venues, but had no direct involvement with leading, planning or employing CATs. Many subjects deployed without understanding how to employ CA forces effectively and did not understand their functions and capabilities. All desired the opportunity to work with their CA element during their units’ Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRE) to develop a better understanding of their abilities, and to establish a relationship. All of the subjects met their CA force for the first time in theater. All subjects conceded greater effort needs to be made to establish a relationship (habitual if possible) prior to deploying into theater, if not with the entire CA element, at least with its key leaders.
A concern amongst all subjects was the disruption caused to CAO as Civil Affairs forces transitioned in and out of theater at different times than the combat units they supported. Depending on the experience of the incoming team, the disruption could jeopardize the progress made of the previous team(s). This degraded some commanders’ ability to manage the flow of money for project continuation and implementation. In only one instance, the transition of CA forces did not disrupt CAO. In this case, the unit trained enough of its Soldiers to manage their Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) responsibilities. Additionally, units required their Company Commanders and Liaison Officers (LNO) to develop and maintain relationships with local leaders to negate the effects of a CA unit in transition.

To increase the understanding of the civil implications in theater, some Army Divisions conducted workshops to train their Soldiers on CA operations and Civil Military Operations staff officer/planner (S9) responsibilities. Commanders that had their staff participate in this training fared better than those who did not. Proactive commanders redesignated three to four officers from their organizations to serve as the Battalion S9 and CA LNOs since this capability was not organic to their structure. This paid dividends for both the maneuver unit and the CA element(s) assigned. For the maneuver commander, assigning his own officers to the position gave the battalion a dedicated staff officer to work and manage Civil Military Operations (CMO) plans and projects. Liaison Officers met with their teams daily providing guidance from the commander and assisted with coordinating requirements for future missions (in most cases, battalion organizations had one CA team assigned with the occasional attachment of one or two more for a specific mission or time).
Planning Civil Affairs Operations. Doctrinally, CATs are required to provide: CMO staff augmentation, CA planning and assessment support to tactical maneuver commanders, cross-cultural communication and limited linguistic support, liaison with civilian authorities and key leaders, area studies and assessments, and assist the Intelligence Officer/Assistant Chief of Staff (S2/G2) and other staff members with CMO preparation of the operational environment.24

Approximately, 70% of the commanders believed their attached CA forces were able to develop plans adequately. Of these commanders, 40% believed their CA forces assessed the environment effectively and developed plans that met their intent. In such cases, previous mobilization experience was perceived to be the primary reason for those teams’ ability to produce the desired results. The remaining 60% attained this capability only after spending time in theater gaining situational awareness, developing an appreciation of the environment, and after training with the supported commander’s staff. Although 30% of commanders thought their CA forces were unable to adequately plan initially, those forces provided a capability that enabled commanders to perform other civil military operations.

All subjects stated their CATs could conduct structural assessments and effectively manage projects. The problem was the process became stove-piped. Assessments stated the obvious and projects were performed simply because money was available. Projects were conducted for the sake of conducting them, neglecting to analyze their relevance to the community or their significance to military objectives. What failed to occur, or lacked substance, were assessments of the population’s culture and social structure, political geography, public administration, cultural relations, legal
structure and economic development; the functional specialty areas of CAO. This inability delayed commanders and staffs from understanding the root causes of the problem, resulting in units searching for solutions. Thus, improvements were happenstance, without synchronizing effects or leveraging gains with future operations.

Maneuver units that succeeded in identifying the root causes of a problem had a better understanding of the civil considerations and dynamics that shaped their battlespace. These units developed methods of action from established lines of operations to achieve the desired effects within the social and political networks and understood who had authority to make decisions within the local government. Leveraging projects (one the community required) and money (a source of income for the community to build the project) enabled commanders to influence the environment and exploit new opportunities to further their objectives. Subsequent CAO enabled commanders to expand their operational reach into areas not yet influenced and further understand the social and political dynamics of an area. Units achieved more success by adding the CA Team Leader to the targeting cell (non-lethal) where he/she worked alongside Information Operations (IO), Psychological Operations (PSYOP), and the Human Terrain Team (HTT), to develop plans.

In all cases, the subjects stated none of their CATs had linguist capabilities. They believed CATs maintained a slightly higher, if not equal, level of cross-cultural communication ability than of their own forces. Increased training to strengthen this attribute plus recurring deployments helped close this ability gap for the AC. The requirement to coordinate effectively with interagency representatives such as the Department of State (DoS), U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), or a
Non-Government Organizations (NGO) was not normally performed by CATs. In many cases, the S9, Chief of Staff, or Deputy Commander of the BCT interacted with these representatives. At the battalion level, CATs worked directly with the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) embedded CATs, to coordinate interagency requirements. Although PRTs worked at the BCT level and higher, all subjects agreed effective interagency coordination is a critical capability CA forces must foster and maintain.

**Executing Civil Affairs Operations.** Civil Affairs Teams are capable of performing four functions: conduct civil reconnaissance; conduct key leader engagement; plan, coordinate, and enable CAO and project management; and provide civil information to the supported commander’s common operating picture (COP).25

Of the four functions, planning and coordinating project management was vital from the perspective of commanders. In all cases, CATs performed an intricate role in managing unit CERP activities. These activities included identifying projects, developing requirements, and conducting frequent inspections ensuring projects were completed in accordance with CERP guidance. Subjects noted sufficient numbers of CATs were trained as CERP Pay Agents (PA) and / or Project Purchasing Officers (PPO) prior to deploying. This negated the need for the commander to use one of his own officers as a PA or PPO. As projects increased in numbers, CATs resorted to training maneuver unit Soldiers to perform basic project assessments. Soldiers learned the scope of projects well enough to communicate its progress and articulate issues reducing the number of sites CATs needed to visit. This increased the overall efficiency of CAO in an area of operation when only one CAT supported the battalion.
Approximately 20% of the subjects with whom I spoke with had CATs comprised of Soldiers from the Army Reserve (IRR and USARC) or joint sourcing. In those few instances, recently trained and inexperienced Soldiers had a learning curve to work through until a level of proficiency was achieved. In each discussion, it was obvious which commanders had experienced teams and which did not. Inexperienced Soldiers were unable to articulate effectively the capabilities the team was able to provide and required a longer time to achieve the desired results. Civil Affairs Teams sourced from USACAPOC were normally more effective. Regardless, team composition should carefully consider the knowledge base and experience level of a Soldier, ensuring equal distribution of capability exists across the force. If the CATs are inexperienced, the CA battalion or brigade headquarters should take a greater role in developing and assisting the teams in the early months of its deployment.

Another shortfall noted was the inability for CATs to provide functional specialty capabilities, specifically in governance, rule of law, economic stability (agriculture) and infrastructure (water and electricity). Conditions in Afghanistan and Iraq both exuded vast societal and infrastructure challenges which fostered instability and security concerns. Subject Matter Expert(s) (SME) adequately capable of responding to problems, develop solutions, and commit resources were far and few between. The non-permissive environment further delayed responses from the interagency, NGOs, and international community from providing expertise in these civil areas. As PRTs emerged and developed capability, efforts from their actions started achieving positive results. However, prior to the establishment of PRTs in Iraq, commanders looked to their CATs to provide this expertise, but it was limited or non-existent. Doctrinally, CATs
do not perform these functions. These functions reside in the Functional Specialty Cells of the CA battalion, brigade and CACOM headquarters (each level of command increasing in subject matter expertise). The functional specialty cell from the battalion could have assisted in providing direction; however, it is common for this cell to go unfilled due to personnel shortages or identifying qualified SMEs. In other instances, these cells have disbanded to augment the understaffed S9/G9 sections of the division.

The Way Ahead

To meet the demands of the future, the CA community has to remain adaptive to structural changes and hone its capabilities to mitigate causes of instability. First, a concerted effort to fill every available position with a qualified Soldier within USACAPOC is paramount. Until the organization is at 100% strength, it will remain difficult to reset the force and determine if the additional structure added in FY11-FY14 will provide enough structure to meet future requirements. A potential start to mitigate this problem is to reassign as many IRR and USARC Soldiers, who mobilized as CA Soldiers, to USACAPOC units. USACAPOC could potentially gain hundreds of school-trained, operationally experienced Soldiers to fill these shortages. This increase of qualified Soldiers is the first step to providing a viable option for increasing unit dwell time for those returning from deployment.

Second, implementing incentives to recruit the right skill sets and retaining experienced Soldiers can provide increased gains for USACAPOC. With the marked demand of increasing CAO in the future, the critical requirement to maintain the MOS at appropriate strength levels could be difficult to achieve. Use of incentives could reduce the likelihood of Soldiers leaving Civil Affairs due to the high OPTEMPO. Whether
awarded once, yearly, or in conjunction with reenlistment, an incentive greatly increases the likelihood of retaining more Soldiers. An increased incentive for those who exercise a functional specialty capability in their civilian occupation greatly increases the likelihood of gaining and retaining SMEs who perform these duties.

Third, both AC and RC CA forces would be better off under a branch proponent instead of a specified proponent. Currently, Special Forces, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations are under the specified proponent of the U.S. John F. Kennedy Special War Center and School (USJFKSWCS), the proponent for Special Operation Forces. Specified Proponents are the commander or chief of any agency responsible for a designated area that does not fall within the purview of a branch proponent. With the increasing demand for CA forces, a branch proponent is best suited to manage the growth of its structure, doctrine and transformational requirements. The Branch Proponent is the commandant or director of the respective school or institution that develops concepts, doctrine, tactics, techniques, procedures, organization designs, material requirements, training requirements, training support requirements, manpower requirements, and education requirements in accordance with the Army Proponent System. A branch proponent would facilitate the establishment of a Basic Officers Leadership Course and Captains Career Course ultimately providing the commissioning sources (academies, Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) and Officer Candidate School (OCS)) opportunities to access into the officer corps as a CA officer. Without a dedicated doctrinal advocate for civil affairs, it is unlikely the force can maintain its preparedness to meet the volatile and complex environment of the future.
Establishing CA under a branch proponent should help repair the seam created when AC and RC CA forces separated in 2006. The CA force of the future needs to be intertwined as one force, each complementing each other’s capabilities. Future TSCP engagements should consist of a mix of both AC and RC forces to create synergy and further enhance the overall capability of the force. Unit structures should accommodate Soldiers from the other’s component for permanent assignment or temporary tours of duty. This will further enhance interoperability, cohesion, and provide for the growth of CA colonels in the AC by providing positions at the CACOM Headquarters (currently residing only in the RC) for continued service.

Likewise, proponency needs to address the inadequate capabilities the force has in performing its functional specialty requirements. Many of these challenges: security, governance, economic growth, and infrastructure are at the root of failed and failing states. The RC’s capability to perform these functions is mediocre at best. It is difficult to develop adequate training and equally hard to staff the cell with capable Soldiers. To fix this problem, the Army needs to develop an institutional training program, perhaps using a civilian university, to teach its Soldiers functional specialty skills. Once complete, the Army needs to maintain these specialized Soldiers in their functional skill and promote them at the same rate of those Soldiers with a successful career. Doing otherwise will greatly reduce the likelihood of the USAR ever increasing this capability to the required level needed for future CAO. Established institutional training programs can provide opportunities for AC Soldiers to undergo this training; ultimately producing a limited number of SMEs instead of providing no capability at all, (Functional Specialty skills are organic only in the USAR).
Fourth, reestablish habitual relationships between RC CA forces and AC GPF. The Army WARTRACE Program deliberately aligns Army forces (AC and RC) under specified wartime commanders to conduct wartime operations and to maintain training and planning associations between AC and RC units. Since 9/11, the WOT and modular transformation have all but dissolved the training and planning associations that once existed between CA units and their WARTRACE units. In my discussions with Commanders’ it was evident from their views the need for AC units to train more often with CA forces in order to gain a greater understanding of their capabilities and organizations. With these relationships dissolved, maneuver units are losing opportunities to effectively integrate and employ CA forces in their operations. Reestablishing these habitual relationships could generate the desire of BCT Commanders to develop an interest with the readiness of their dedicated RC Civil Affairs unit.

Conclusion

Both policy and doctrine are evolving to counter the threats U.S. forces are facing today and in the future. Increasing numbers of states are competing for critical resources, unable to provide security for their people, and unable to govern their territories effectively, causing destabilizing effects on their neighbors and region. These environments spawn the conditions for violent extremist organizations to flourish and threaten the security of the international system and interests of the United States.

A critical enabler in current and future stability operations are the Civil Affairs forces and the operations they perform across the entire spectrum of operations. These operations continue to play an ever-increasing role in shaping environments to deter
and mitigate the causes of instability. The United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command is the main provider of CA forces for the Army’s GPF. Army Reserve Soldiers, providing 96% of the Army’s Civil Affairs force structure, have been mobilizing since the beginning of the WOT, exhausting its force to meet the demands in theater. To sustain this OPTEMPO and improve its capabilities, CA forces need to remain agile and adaptive to new concepts and doctrine to maintain its effectiveness on the battlefield.

Reestablishing habitual relationships with conventional forces, providing incentives to build and retain the force, and providing a branch proponent to champion the causes for CA forces and its operations are the first steps in ensuring units can reset and rebuild themselves to meet future demands. Absent such progress, the Army may find itself ill prepared and rushing at the last moment to conduct operations which could have been avoided in the first place.

Endnotes


2 Ibid., 399.


Medina.

Ibid.

Ibid.


Ibid., 3.


23 Ibid., 10. This point further emphasizes the importance of Civil Affairs in stability operations and the requirement to ensure enough structure and sufficient training is established.


25 Ibid., 2-23.

26 Ibid., 2-19.
