
THE DISAM JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE MANAGEMENT

Security cooperation continues to play a key role in the successes that we are achieving around the world. This Journal's feature articles focus on the nation of Croatia with an overview of the country in general as well as a discussion of the various facets of U.S. security cooperation programs benefiting us as partners. Force modernization is preeminent and the year-old program at their Armed Forces Leader and Staff Simulation Center is leading the way.

If you are interested in policy issues, this edition has more than enough to whet your appetite. The final allocations for fiscal year 2002 security assistance programs follows excerpts of remarks made by the Secretary of State to a House Appropriations Subcommittee outlining plans for fiscal year 2003. Additional articles spotlight policy issues centrally related to security cooperation such as human rights, economics, export control, and disarmament. Others are more regionally centered in South America and Europe. All are written at the Under Secretary or Assistant Secretary level - and all provide direction as to where our programs are headed in the future.

Tom Keithly's article, "A Planning Guidance for the Security Cooperation Community," ties together the various goals of security cooperation with the tools of security cooperation. This is done under the umbrella of performance based budgeting and in the context of the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993. A results orientation clearly impacts the need for effective planning and programming of resources, and documenting the results of those processes is essential. Although difficult to quantify many of the results of security cooperation efforts, we all need to be taking notes similar to those of Mr. Joel Williamson and Dr. Jennifer Moroney as they view the Central Asian "ring of access."

Education continues its prominence in this issue as the Defense Acquisition University announces a new Online (entry level) International Acquisition Course, which could have implications for security assistance and foreign disclosure personnel. DISAM, like many other schoolhouses, has seen a renewal of MET/MTT commitments over recent months, including the visit to Egypt profiled within this Journal.

DISAM announces its course offerings for fiscal year 2003 (this is also available on our website), as well as the procedures to enroll. The bottom line, DISAM desires to place students in courses at the optimum time for you as the user and within the physical constraints we have. As the article states, please let us know if you have difficulty obtaining a quota through the standard channel. We normally have unused quotas for a number of our classes, and will work with organizations individually to fill each one of them. The military departments and DISAM pledged to work together at our most recent curriculum review (held in February) to facilitate the process for you. So please feel free to let us know when there is a difficulty on your end.

Thank you for your support of DISAM; we hope that this edition of the Journal reinforces the importance of the role you play in security assistance/cooperation. Keep up the great work!



RONALD H. REYNOLDS
Commandant

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FEATURE ARTICLE

Croatia A Small Country But Not a Small People

**By Andrijana Jelic
Office of Defense Cooperation Zagreb, Croatia**

CROATIAN FLAG

The coat-of-arms of the Republic of Croatia is a historical Croatian symbol in the form of a shield decorated with red and white (silver) fields, of which the first field in the upper left-hand corner is red. Above the shield, there is a crown with five smaller shields bearing historical Croatian coats-of-arms representing (from left to right): the oldest known Croatian coat-of-arms, the Dubrovnik Republic, Dalmatia, Istria, and Slavonia. The coat-of-arms of the Republic of Croatia is placed at the center of the flag which has three horizontal stripes: red, white, and blue.

The Republic of Croatia, situated on the crossroads between Central Europe and the Mediterranean, is spread across 56,542 square kilometers of land area. A small but diverse country, Croatia borders with Slovenia to the north, Hungary to the northeast, Bosnia-Herzegovina to the south, and Serbia and Vojvodina to the southeast. The geographic shape of today's Croatia (the shape of an extended horseshoe formed by elongated Adriatic and Pannonian strips with a broader central zone) is the result of the 14-century long history of the Croatian people in this crossroads of different civilizations. According to its relief and geographical position, Croatia can be divided into three main regions: Adriatic, Dinaric, and Pannonian.



The Croatian Adriatic Sea is one of the most beautiful seas in the world, and as such, attracts many tourists, particularly from Central and Western Europe. Croatia's coastline, which is 5,835 kilometers long, has the most hours of sunshine in Europe after Spain. Along the Adriatic coast, which is the second most indented coastline in Europe (second only to the Norwegian coast), there are 1,185 islands out of which 67 or only 6 percent are inhabited. Because of this, Croatia is often referred to as the coast of one thousand islands. Korcula, a southern Dalmatian fortified city. Korcula is the birthplace of Marco Polo. One of Zagreb's greatest assets is its well preserved surroundings.



Korcula, a southern Dalmatian fortified city. The birthplace of Marco Polo.

Forests cover 36 per cent of Croatia's surface area. The most densely forested region is that of Gorski Kotar, located in the Dinaric region, and also that of eastern Croatia. The Pannonian region is mainly characterized by large fertile plains defined by rivers. Among the largest of these rivers are the Sava, Drava, Kupa and Dunav (Danube). The longest river in Croatia is the Sava, measuring 562 kilometers. It flows into the Dunav which in turn flows into the Black Sea.

Population

According to the 2001 census, Croatia has a population of 4,381,352 or 80.5 people per square kilometer. The most densely populated area is central Croatia with the capital Zagreb, the administrative, cultural and academic center of the country, having a population of 770,058 or close to one-fifth of the entire population. The majority of the population (roughly 90 percent) are Croats. National minorities include Serbs, Muslims, Slovenes, Hungarians, Czechs, Slovaks, Italians, and others. It is also important to note that many Croats live outside the borders of Croatia. Approximately 700,000 live in Bosnia-Herzegovina and many live in Serbia, mostly in Vojvodina (today part of Serbia). Several thousand Croats live in Montenegro, and more than 50,000 live in Slovenia. In relation to its population, Croatia has one of the greatest rates of emigration in the world. It has been estimated that about one million Croats and their descendants live in the countries of Western Europe. Today more than two million Croats and their descendants (I being one of them) live scattered around the world, mostly in the Americas and

Australia. The majority of the population is Roman Catholic, and the others are Eastern Orthodox, Muslims, and Christians of other denominations. The official language is Croatian, the alphabet is Latin, and in some areas minority groups are allowed to use their language and alphabet.

Economy and Tourism

In economic terms, Croatia has a Central European tradition, but almost fifty years of Communism, seventy years of Yugoslav exploitation, and five years of aggression against Croatia have caused extensive damage and left far-reaching consequences. The most important industries are agriculture, shipbuilding, metal and lumber processing, the chemical industry, construction, domestic oil pumping and processing, and food production. Other industries include: fishing, fruit-growing, wines and spirits, especially high-quality wines in Dalmatia, Slavonia, and Istria. Among the non-manufacturing industries, the most important is tourism and the shipping industry. In the shipbuilding industry,



Croatia is one of the leading countries in the world regarding the number, size and quality of its ships.



One of Zagreb's greatest assets is its well preserved surroundings.

The walls of Diocletian's palace and the Romanesque-Gothic bell tower of St. Dujice's cathedral give Split a special atmosphere and charm.

Croatia's geographic position makes it very important in this part of the world, but this is also probably one of the reasons why so many foreigners wanted to conquer it throughout history. Despite great hardship throughout its history. Croatia has never lost its national identity and culture. The Croatian people, although not large in number, have managed to remain at this crossroads of natural beauty and treasures for more than a thousand years.

About the Author

Andrijana Jelic is a 1995 honors graduate from Queens College of the City University of New York where she earned her Bachelor of Arts in Political Science. Jelic moved to Zagreb, Croatia

to work as a linguist with the Croatian Information Center. Ms. Jelic translated excerpts of many scholarly works such as *South-Eastern Europe 1918-1995*, which is published by the Croatian Information Center. She produces daily news bulletins in English for the Foreign Press bureau. In 1999, Jelic began her employment with United States European Command as the international military education and training Coordinator/Budget Analyst in the Office of Defense Cooperation in Zagreb, Croatia. Jelic works directly with the Croatian Ministry of Defense and U.S. military services on all matters concerning the international military education and training program. In September 2000, Jelic was presented with the Achievement Medal for Civilian Service and was later selected as the USEUCOM Civilian of the Year.



Pula is the 1st century arena built by Roman Emperor Vespasian.

Security Assistance Programs: The Catalyst for Transition in the Croatian Military

By

**Major Richard B. Liebl, U.S. Army
Marin Braovac,
Andrijana Jelic,
Office of Defense Zagreb, Croatia**

In general terms, the Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) and security assistance programs continue to play a vital role in advising and assisting the Croatian Ministry of Defense in their efforts to become a more professional and modern force. The Office of Defense Cooperation's marching orders are to continue to support U.S. policy objectives in Croatia and the region and vigorously pursue security assistance programs to bring Croatia in line with its stated strategic objective, full North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership. This will be accomplished by the following: enhancing the professionalization and democratization of the Croatian Armed Forces through the international military education and training (IMET) program; assisting Croatia with its modernization effort through foreign military sales (FMS) assisted with funding through foreign military financing (FMF), promoting direct commercial sales (DCS), providing excess defense articles (EDA) and finally by promoting good will through United States European Command (EUCOM) funded humanitarian assistance programs.

Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Program

On April 8, 1999 Croatia was eligible to use the FMS program, Croatia initiated two cases and submitted a letter of request (LOR) for JANUS and SPECTRUM combat simulation software. Letters of offer and acceptance (LOAs) were signed on November 4, 1999 making them the first FMS cases ever established within the Republic of Croatia. Croatia established two more cases, one for Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) logistics publications to assist the ministry of defense (MOD) in the transition to the NATO codification system (NCS), and a second case for aircrew items and equipment for the Croatian Air Force. Using the FMS program all four cases have been financed.

Effective October 1, 1999, Croatia became an eligible user of FMF grant funds. In fiscal year 2000, Croatia received \$ 4.0 million and in fiscal year 2001 Croatia received \$3.9 million in FMF funding. This year Croatia is expected to receive approximately \$5.0 million. Croatia has committed to use fiscal year 2000 FMF funds for a Multi-Integrated Laser Engagement System 2000, combat training simulations equipment, costing approximately 2.6 million and a ITT Mercury Wideband Network Radio (RT-1812) to transmit data from newly acquired radars to recipient platforms, costing approximately \$1.5 million. Being new to the FMS program, Croatia has established a few small FMS cases. The request for the MILES and RT-1812 equipment will be crucial in establishing confidence in the FMS system.

Croatian Armed Forces Modernization Effort

In April 2002, the Croatian government is planning to begin the reorganization process of their armed forces, which should reduce the current active duty force of over 40,000 personnel to 21,000 over the next five years. Simultaneously, the MoD will start a modernization process, which will probably include:

-
- Upgrade of communication systems with high frequency, very high frequency, ultrahigh frequency and single-channel ground air radio system (SINCGARS) tactical radios,
 - Upgrade of helicopter fleet (MI8 and MI24),
 - Upgrade of MIG-21 (contract had already been signed with Romania),
 - Air Sovereignty Operations Center,
 - Night vision devices,
 - Engineer equipment,
 - Nuclear, biological and chemical equipment,
 - Air defense artillery systems, and
 - Ground transportation.

Some of these programs will use the FMS and FMF programs; some will go through direct commercial sales to take advantage of possible offset arrangements. Some of the modernization efforts have already been awarded to non United States government contractors, as is the case with the current MIG-21 modernization program. For more sufficient operational management of FMS, DCS, and EDA programs, the Office of Defense Cooperation Zagreb established a small office adjacent to the Ministry of Defense Department for Acquisition and Procurement. This allows daily communication with the Assistant Minister for Acquisition and Procurement who is responsible for all procurement activities.

Direct Commercial Sales

The Office of Defense Cooperation assists various U.S. defense contractors seeking business opportunities in Croatia. The Office of Defense Cooperation's assistance is basically to establish contact with Ministry of Defense senior officials, organize presentations, and ensure that U.S. defense contractors have equal opportunities to potential markets. It is very important to say that the ODC assists U.S. defense contractors upon contractor request, free of charge and in good will. The table below shows the numbers and types of programs presented by U.S. defense contractors and companies:

<u>Company</u>	<u>Project</u>	<u>Status</u>
Bell	Bell 206 Helicopters	Delivered fiscal year 1998
Lockheed Martin	FPS-117 Radars	On-going project
Metrics System Corporation	Peregrine Radars	On-going project
MPRI	Military training	On-going project
Raytheon	ADA systems/C2	Briefed MoD and Air Force officials
Harris	Tactical radios	Proposed offer on the MoD international tender
ITT	Tactical radios	Proposed offer on the MoD international tender
Telephonic	C2 Systems	Briefed MoD officials
Tradeways	NBC Equipment	Briefed MoD officials
Sikrosky	Helicopters	Briefed MoD and Air Force officials
Cubic	Simulations/training	Briefed MoD and Army officials
MIC Industries		Briefed government officials

*Rockwell Collins	Communication Systems	Established contact with MoD but did not come to Croatia
*EXIM Bank		Discussed possible cooperation with MoD officials
*Established contact with MoD without ODC involvement		

International Military Education and Training

After the Dayton Accords were signed in 1995, Croatia began restructuring its Army, Navy, and Air Force/Air Defense to meet peacetime needs. Croatia has four clearly articulated goals for its foreign training programs. First, Croatia wants to develop a civil-military system that gives the military an appropriate role in a civil society. Second, Croatia wants a professionally trained military capable of sustaining its own training process. Third, Croatia wants to have a resource management system that is efficient and effective. Finally, Croatia wants all systems to be interoperable with NATO systems. To achieve these goals, the Croatians have identified a number of training priorities:

- Senior level schooling,
- Strategic planning and policy,
- Defense systems planning and process, and
- Training and doctrine.

The IMET Program in Croatia is regarded by many as the most significant and successful U.S. and Croatian engagement tool. The value Croatia has put on U.S. training since 1995 should not be underestimated. The Croatians support the IMET program with two dollars of their money for every dollar dedicated to it by Congress, paying for all of the travel and living expenses for their students. This funding policy is the result of a military need to train the largest number of officers possible. This single policy has effectively tripled the size of their program, making it one of the largest in Europe.

Since 1995, Croatia has sent 304 students for training in the U.S. and hundreds more trained in country through Mobile Education/Training Team (MET) visits. Since 1999, every major command, every sector of the general staff and the defense ministry has someone who has attended training abroad. The Navy and Air Force, in particular, use their graduates very well placing them in command, instructor, or senior staff positions.

How has IMET funded training enhanced the professionalism of Croatian soldiers? The Croatian military greatly admires U.S. training. Croatian soldiers focus on their IMET experience as the catalyst for changes made in the Croatian military. How has IMET contributed to defense resource management, civilian control of the military and respect for human rights? Civilian control of the military and defense resource management are two of the primary goals for the Croatian military. Most if not all courses selected by Croatia tend to contribute to these two objectives.

English Language Training

Recognized as a major objective to support Croatia's future in the NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP), English language training (ELT) will continue to take on an increased importance during the Croatian armed forces transition. Through the IMET Program, Defense Language Institute English Language Center (DLIELC) has assisted the Croatian armed forces with its

english language training since 1995. U.S. support to the Croatian School of Foreign Languages has been in three areas:

- Language labs/instruction materials
- Language Instructor Training
- General, Advanced and Specialized English Language Training

Through IMET, three (level II) language labs were delivered to the School of Foreign Languages, two in Zagreb and one in their extension center in Split. Four new (level IV) language labs, valued at close to \$100,000 each were purchased with IMET supplemental monies in fiscal year 2001 and are expected to be delivered this year. Also, \$75,000 worth of instruction materials for the school were purchased in late 2001 through IMET supplemental monies, or “Q-year” money. With reference to support through language training, DLIELC has trained ten language instructors and over sixty military personnel since implementation of the IMET program in 1995.

Humanitarian Assistance

The ODC works closely with U.S. Agency for International Development on all humanitarian assistance projects. The ODC continues to use the humanitarian assistance program to support the country team’s objective of helping to create the conditions supporting the return of refugees to war devastated areas. Humanitarian Assistance Program - Other, Humanitarian Assistance Program - Excess Property, and Humanitarian Civic Action projects support the missions goal of ensuring that all displaced persons and refugees from or currently in Croatia are able to exercise their right to return voluntarily to communities of origin under conditions of security. These programs help provide the infrastructure and supplies needed to effect that goal.

In fiscal year 2000 ODC Zagreb effected delivery of \$108, 000 U.S. dollars of humanitarian assistance excess property (non-pharmaceutical medical supplies and office supplies) to the International Rescue Committee Knin and the General Hospital in Vukovar. Also in fiscal year 2000, five school restoration and renovation projects were initiated in conjunction with U.S. Agency for International Development. Three of the projects have recently been completed. Fiscal year 2001 reconstruction projects have been completed including rebuilding of the fire station in Vukovar and repair to the secondary school in Petrinja. In fiscal year 2001, humanitarian assistance excess property shipment in excess of \$45,000 was delivered to IRC Knin (consisting of medical supplies, and office supplies) and recreation equipment was donated to the Klasje orphanage in Osijek. The ODC delivered an excess U.S. Army ambulance for donation to the hospital in Vukovar and donated \$100,000 dollars worth of demining equipment to the Croatian Mine Action Center.

About the Authors

Major Richard Liebl is the Chief for the Office of Defense Cooperation in Zagreb, Croatia. In 1999 he served as the Commander for Special Operations Command and Control Element-North (SOCCE-N) as part of Operation Joint Forge. Liebl is a graduate of Columbus State University and has earned a Master of Arts degree in West European Studies from Indiana University. He was commissioned as an Infantry Officer and served in the 25th Infantry Division (Light). In 1991 he graduated from Special Forces Detachment Officer Qualification Course and served in the 3d Special Forces Group (Airborne). Major Liebl has conducted Foreign Area Officer training, and attended DLI for Dutch/Flemish and In-Country Training in the Netherlands.

Since October 2000, Marin Braovac has been working for the Office of Defense Cooperation. His current position allows him to coordinate directly with the Croatian Ministry of Defense and

U.S. defense industries on all matters concerning the foreign military sales program and direct commercial sales program. He has worked for USEUCOM and the FMS/DCS/EDA Program Manager in the Office of Defense Cooperation. He graduated from the University of Zagreb, Faculty of Political Science in March 1996 and holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Political Science. In 1991 Braovac served in the 114th Infantry Brigade of the Croatian Army. In 1997 Braovac served as a Lieutenant in the Croatian Army and was assigned to the Military-Technical Council of the Ministry of Defense as a Senior Consultant/IMET Coordinator. In 1998 Braovac was assigned as an Advisor for International Military Education Programs in the Department of Defense Policy, Division of International Military Cooperation, Croatian Ministry of Defense.

The Croatian Armed Forces Training Simulations Program

By

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In February 2001, the Croatian Armed Forces officially opened the Croatian Armed Forces Leader and Staff Simulation Center (CLSSC). Hailed by some as one of the best equipped training simulation centers in the region, the CLSSC marks a dramatic new step in transforming the Croatian Armed Forces from its wartime disposition to one aimed at improving interoperability with Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Through a comprehensive simulations training program, the Croatian Armed Forces are preparing their forces for the future.

A Deposit Paid in Blood

The Croatian Ministry of Defense (MoD) began the conceptualization for a training simulations program three years after the end of Croatia's war for independence from the Republic of Yugoslavia. Early in 1999, the MoD recognized the need to transform its armed forces into a more modern, better-equipped force in line with western compatible doctrine, training and command and control. The conundrum faced by the senior leaders of the Croatian MoD was how to accomplish this goal with limited resources. The answer to part of that problem lay with training simulations. The use of simulations was recognized as a primary means of training staffs and junior leaders in western decision making and staff procedures. As a result, the government of Croatia, through the MoD, set in motion plans to develop a training simulations program and to establish a Croatian Armed Forces Leader and Staff Simulation Center. This vision included integrating simulations training into all facets of the professional training curriculum of the Croatian Armed Forces.

In an armed forces competing for scarce resources, why invest in expensive training simulations? First and foremost was the need for the Croatian Armed Forces to train its leaders to western standards. In May of 2000 Croatia joined the PfP program and articulated as one of its strategic goals, full membership in NATO. To achieve this goal, the need for interoperability was paramount. Secondly, with a hodge-podge of doctrines left over from the former Yugoslavian Army, the Croatian Armed Forces had a bewildering array of tactics, techniques, and doctrinal procedures with little basis for standardization. Training simulations would allow leaders and staff the first real opportunity to acquaint themselves with western doctrine techniques and tactics. The third major factor in choosing to invest in training simulations stemmed from resources. For the Croatian MoD, time, money and training facilities are in short supply. Even though the initial costs for training simulations programs would be expensive, the training costs would be easily recuperated over the long run.

Besides the obvious values of training simulations, a less tangible reason existed for the use of simulations. For many in the Croatian Armed Forces, the value of providing better training for its soldiers was based on bitter lessons learned from wartime experiences. In the early days of Croatia's war for independence, many hastily assembled units were no more than groups of friends from a town organized into makeshift infantry units. These units in turn made up the brigades that fought the major actions of the war. These men, many of whom had no formal military training, learned their trade by trial and error, sometimes with grave consequences. After the war, commanders of the Croatian Armed Forces committed themselves to the belief that

training saves lives. For the Croatian Armed Forces, training simulations would help ensure future generations of Croatian soldiers did not suffer because of inadequate training.

Recognizing that training simulations were a cost-effective means of training the armed forces, the creation of a simulation center became the target goal. The next step was to develop an implementation plan. A timed phased approach was taken to implementing this plan and it was developed with the assistance of retired army officers and non-commissioned officers working for the U.S. defense contractor, Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI).

The Simulation Center Takes Shape

The initial technical proposal for the simulation center began in May 1999 with the development of an implementation plan for the creation of the CLSSC. This was followed by letters of request (LOR) to purchase both JANUS and SPECTRUM simulation software. In December 1999, the MoD established its simulation project team and selected a site for the center on the compound of the Croatian Military Academy Petar Zrinski in Zagreb. Playing a vital role in the development of this simulations training initiative, MPRI began providing advice and assistance for the plan from its inception. By April of 2000 MPRI had a full time project team committed to the simulations training program. The MPRI had been active in Croatia since 1995 and at the time was also providing support to the ministry of defense and general support through two programs, the Croatian Army Readiness Training (CARTS) program and the Long Range Management Program (LRMP). The relationship between MPRI and the Croatian government has been a long-standing one. The zenith of their assistance, some thirty plus personnel worked in both programs. With the assistance of MPRI, the training simulations initiative took off. The MPRI played an instrumental role in the planning, design, fielding and implementation of the CLSSC and today provides a small staff that continues to assist the center with the training, planning, and evaluating of units during rotations. More than just technical support, the MPRI team provides feedback in the form of after action reviews and take-home packages for units similar to those provided at U.S. training centers like the National Training Center (NTC).

The ODC also played a key role in the program and became an active player in the very early stages. The ODC involvement began when the Croatian Ministry of Defense asked for the purchase of the JANUS and SPECTRUM software programs using foreign military sales (FMS). The JANUS software is designed for more conventional military operations and was intended for training the mainstay forces of the Croatian armed forces. SPECTRUM software is a program that can replicate various operations other than war (OOTW) scenarios and was intended as a tool primarily to train forces in preparation for future roles and missions, namely peace support operations.

By late summer of 2000, the final hurdles in establishing the infrastructure for the CLSSC were surmounted. From August of the same year until late fall, work focused on upgrades to the building and acquiring the equipment, computers, and other items needed to establish a fully functioning center. Phase one was complete.

The next phase involved the actual fielding of the training simulations software. This phase was not without some setbacks. The fielding of both JANUS and SPECTRUM was delayed because a pre-existing, bi-lateral, terrain data agreement between the government of Croatia and the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) did not exist. Without this agreement, NIMA could not release the terrain data needed to create the terrain files for the software. After weeks of coordination, the geo-spatial agreement was finally signed, the JANUS and SPECTRUM terrain files were delivered and the JANUS new equipment training team arrived in the late fall to train the CLSSC staff on use of the software.

With SPECTRUM, the fielding of the software was even more complicated. From the beginning of the training simulations plan it was always clear that JANUS was the premier tool for training in the conventional roles that the new Croatian Armed Forces would execute. JANUS was to be fielded exclusively in the CLSSC. With SPECTRUM, the actual intended users of that software were less defined. Different organizations within the MoD felt they had legitimate claims to receive the software and training. With competing interests potentially detracting from the overall benefit, a cooperative solution between the MoD, MPRI, ODC and the team leader conducting the new equipment training was devised. The new equipment training team was able to cut costs and provide the MoD with fifteen laptop computers, configured into three computer suites with the SPECTRUM software loaded on each. Three suites then went to three different training organizations, the Strategic Studies Institute, the CLSSC and the newly developed International Military Operations Center (IMOC). This innovative solution effectively tripled the training value of the software provided.

Finally, with much fanfare, the CLSSC was officially opened. A pilot test was conducted and the first unit rotation began in March 2001. The CLSSC had become the first tangible project in the overall simulations training initiative.

The Croatian Armed Forces Leader and Staff Simulation Center (CLSSC)

The CLSSC Staff is organized into several components, some of which have direct advisory support from MPRI. The commander has an administrative staff that is linked to the exercise director. Under the commander, three main components exist: an exercise branch, responsible for scenario development; a tactical operations branch, which consists of specialists in each of the battlefield operations systems and is responsible for the application of doctrinal principles; and a technical branch responsible for data base management and systems upkeep. The center itself is configured into several component parts. (see Figure 1).

Much has been accomplished by the CLSSC in the year and a half that it has been operational. The CLSSC successfully trained seventeen battalion task force staffs. Each was an opportunity to train the commander and his staff on the latest US/NATO doctrinal principles, to train on the integration of battle operating systems, incorporate NBC, close air support, and other assets. Through one rotation, a unit exercises the full extent of its capabilities, something that could rarely, if ever be incorporated in an actual field training exercise. In addition to its battalion task force rotations, four brigade task force rotations are also planned for next year.


The Way Ahead: New initiatives

In keeping with its training simulations plan, the MoD is working to develop a combat training center in Slunj, Croatia. This facility will be modeled after U.S. combat training centers and will give units the ability to train in the field against dedicated opposing forces. Croatia has established an FMS case to purchase Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System simulation equipment for use in the combat training centers. Plans are also being developed to link the CLSSC with the combat training centers providing a greater capability to exercise both staffs and units in the field.

As stated, the International Military Operations Center (IMOC) has one suite of SPECTRUM and is planning to use it to develop various training scenarios to better prepare forces designated for participation in peace support operations. The International Military Operations Center is responsible for training and development of programs to prepare Croatian forces for participation in international military operations. Accordingly, the International Military Operations Center has prepared the Croatian contingents for their military observer missions in Ethiopia-Eritrea (UNMEE) and two medical support teams to UNMEE. They also trained the military observer

teams that are deployed to Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). Use of the CLSSC and its own suite of SPECTRUM will give the International Military Operations Center the capability to assist in preparing forces for even more complex missions. Future planned activities include training additional units for participation in NATO, Partnership for Peace exercises and peace support operations including a light infantry, engineer and medical evacuation units.

Figure 1. Configuration of CLSSC



At the Croatian Ministry of Defense Strategic Studies Institute, SPECTRUM software is being utilized in various model and simulation programs but also to develop strategic decision making scenarios for senior government and military officials. Croatia is scheduled to participate in the South Eastern Europe Simulation Network exercise taking place next December. The CLSSC will serve as the national simulation support cell to that exercise. The focus of the South Eastern Europe Simulation Network exercise will be on civil emergency, peace support operations and out of area assistance type operations. In addition to those stated training simulation initiatives, both the Croatian Navy and Croatian Air Force are also working on developing their own training simulation requirements.

Conclusion

The Croatian Armed Forces simulation program was envisioned to assist primarily in training commanders and staffs at battalion and brigade level and to support institutional, general staff and Ministry of Defense training and planning requirements. However, simulations training and the simulations center play a broader role in assisting the Croatian Armed Forces in transitioning to a modern force in tune with the latest western operational techniques and doctrine. The training goals and objectives of the simulations training program ensure the synchronization and integration of all battlefield operations systems, assist the planning of combat support and combat service support operations and support understanding the use of terrain and intelligence. The training simulations program also is helping prepare forces for new roles and missions. In conclusion, the value of training simulations to the Croatian Armed Forces cannot be over

emphasized. Through effective use of simulations, the Croatian armed forces are better able to train their forces for their primary missions, but also prepare at all levels, strategic, operational, and tactical for the new roles and missions of the Croatian Armed Forces in the 21st century.

Figure 2. Battalion Task Force Staff inside the Tactical Operations Center at the CLSSC



Figure 3: Operator work stations at the CLSSC



About the Author

Major Richard Liebl is the Chief for the Office of Defense Cooperation in Zagreb, Croatia. In 1999, he served as the Commander for Special Operations Command and Control Element-North (SOCCE-N) as part of Operation Joint Forge. Liebl is a graduate of Columbus State University and has earned a Master of Arts degree in West European Studies from Indiana University. He was commissioned as an Infantry Officer and served in the 25th Infantry Division (Light). In 1991 he graduated from Special Forces Detachment Officer Qualification Course and served in the 3d Special Forces Group (Airborne). Major Liebl has conducted Foreign Area Officer training, and attended DLI for Dutch/Flemish and In-Country Training in the Netherlands.

LEGISLATION AND POLICY

President Bush's Budget Request for Fiscal Year 2003

By

**Colin L. Powell
Secretary of State**

[Excerpts Secretary of State presented to the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State and the Judiciary, Washington, D.C., March 6, 2002.

Let me say at the outset, Mr. Chairman, before I go into the specifics of the budget request for the State Department and related agencies, that President Bush has two overriding objectives that our foreign policy must serve before all else. These two objectives are to win the war on terrorism and to protect Americans at home and abroad. This Administration will not be deterred from accomplishing these objectives. I have no doubt that this subcommittee and the Congress feel the same way. As you will see when I address the details of the budget request, a sizeable part is related to accomplishing these two objectives.

As many of you will recall, at my first budget testimony to this committee last April, I told you that what we were requesting for fiscal year 2002 represented a significant increase in the Department's resources for that fiscal year. I told you also that such an increase was a good start, that it was the first fiscal step in our efforts to align both the organization for and the conduct of America's foreign policy with the dictates of the 21st Century. And you heard my testimony and you responded, and we are grateful. Because of your understanding and generosity, we have made significant progress. We will make even more in fiscal year 2003.

The President's discretionary request for the Department of State and related agencies for fiscal year 2003 international affairs is \$8.1 billion. These dollars will allow us to:

- Continue initiatives to recruit, hire, train, and deploy the right work force. The budget request includes \$100 million for the next step in the hiring process we began last year. With these dollars, we will be able to bring on board 399 more foreign affairs professionals and be well on our way to repairing the large gap created in our personnel structure and, thus, the strain put on our people by almost a decade of too few hires, an inability to train properly, and hundreds of unfilled positions. By fiscal year 2004, we hope to have completed our multi-year hiring effort with respect to overseas staffing - to include establishing the training pool I described to you last year that is so important if we are to allow our people to complete the training we feel is needed for them to do their jobs. Next March, I will be back up here briefing you on the results of our domestic staffing review.
- Continue to upgrade and enhance our worldwide security readiness - even more important in light of our success in disrupting and damaging the al-Qaida terrorist network. The budget request includes \$553 million that builds on the funding provided from the emergency response fund for the increased hiring of security agents and for counterterrorism programs.
- Continue to upgrade the security of our overseas facilities. The budget request includes over \$1.3 billion to improve physical security, correct serious deficiencies that still exist, and provide for security-driven construction of new facilities at high-risk posts around the world. Mr.

Chairman, we are right-sizing, shaping up and bringing smarter management practices to our overseas buildings program, as I told you we would do last year. The first change we made was to put retired General Chuck Williams in charge and give him assistant secretary equivalent rank. Now, his overseas building operations (OBO) has developed the Department of Defense's first long-range plan, which projects our major facility requirements over a five-year period.

- The overseas building operations is using best practices from industry, new embassy templates, and strong leadership to lower costs, increase quality, and decrease construction time.

As I told you last year, one of our goals is to reduce the average cost to build an embassy. I believe we are well on the way to doing that.

General Williams is making all of our facilities, overseas and stateside, more secure. By the end of fiscal year 2002, over two-thirds of our overseas posts should reach minimal security standards, meaning secure doors, windows, and perimeters.

We are also making progress in efforts to provide new facilities that are fully secure, with thirteen major capital projects in design or construction, another eight expected to begin this fiscal year, and nine more in fiscal year 2003.

- Continue our program to provide state-of-the-art information technology to our people everywhere. Because of your support in fiscal year 2002, we are well on the way to doing this. We have an aggressive deployment schedule for our unclassified system, which will provide desktop internet access to over 30,000 users worldwide in fiscal year 2003 using fiscal year 2002 funds. We are deploying our classified connectivity program over the next two years. We have included \$177 million in the Capital Investment Fund for information technology requirements. Combined with \$86 million in estimated Expedited Passport Fees, a total of \$263 million will be available for our information technology and communications systems initiatives. Our goal is to put the internet in the service of diplomacy and we are well on the way to accomplishing it.

- Continue to meet our obligations to international organizations also important as we pursue the war on terrorism to its end. The budget request includes \$891.4 million to fund U.S. assessments to 43 international organizations, active membership of which furthers U.S. economic, political, security, social, and cultural interests.

- Continue to meet our obligations to international peacekeeping activities. The budget request includes \$726 million to pay our projected United Nations (U.N.) peacekeeping assessments all the more important as we seek to avoid increasing even further our U.N. arrearages. And, Mr. Chairman, I ask for your help in getting the cap lifted so that we can eventually eliminate all our arrearages. These peacekeeping activities allow us to leverage our political, military, and financial assets through the authority of the United Nations Security Council and the participation of other countries in providing funds and peacekeepers for conflicts worldwide.

- Continue and also enhance an aggressive effort to eliminate support for terrorists and thus deny them safe haven through our ongoing public diplomacy activities, our educational and cultural exchange programs, and international broadcasting. The budget request includes \$287 million for public diplomacy, including information and cultural programs carried out by overseas missions and supported by public diplomacy personnel in our regional and functional bureaus. These resources help to educate the international public on the war against terrorism and America's commitment to peace and prosperity for all nations. The budget request also includes \$247 million for educational and cultural exchange programs that build mutual understanding and develop friendly relations between America and the peoples of the world. These activities help

build the trust, confidence, and international cooperation necessary to sustain and advance the full range of our interests. Such activities have gained a new sense of urgency and importance since the brutal attacks of September. We need to teach more about America to the world. We need to show people who we are and what we stand for, and these programs do just that. Moreover, the budget request includes almost \$518 million for international broadcasting, of which \$60 million is for the war on terrorism to continue increased media broadcasts to Afghanistan and the surrounding countries and throughout the Middle East. These international broadcasts help inform local public opinion about the true nature of al-Qaida and the purposes of the war on terrorism, building support for the coalition's global campaign.

Public Diplomacy

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 underscored the urgency of implementing an effective public diplomacy campaign. Those who abet terror by spreading distortion and hate and inciting others, take full advantage of the global news cycle. We must also use that cycle. Since September 11, 2001 there have been over 2,000 media appearances by Department of State officials. Our continuous presence in Arabic and regional media by officials with language and media skills, has been unprecedented. Our international information web site on terror is now online in seven languages. internet search engines show it is the hottest page on the topic. Our twenty-five page color publication, *The Network of Terrorism*, is now available in thirty languages with many different adaptations, including a full insert in the Arabic edition of *Newsweek*. "Right content, right format, right audience, right now" describes our strategic aim in seeing that U.S. policies are explained and placed in the proper context in the minds of foreign audiences. I also serve, ex officio, as a member of the Broadcasting Board of Governors, the agency that oversees the efforts of Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty to broadcast our message into South Central Asia and the Middle East. With the support of the Congress, our broadcasting has increased dramatically since September 11, 2001. We have almost doubled the number of broadcast hours to areas that have been the breeding grounds of terrorists. The dollars we have requested for international broadcasting will help sustain these key efforts through the next fiscal year.

We are working closely right now with Office of Management and Budget to examine our overall requirements. We believe that there are valid fiscal year 2002 needs that cannot wait until fiscal year 2003. The Administration will bring the specific details of this supplemental request to the Congress in the near future. We have not quite finished our review at this point, but it should not take much longer.

All of these Department of State and related agencies programs and initiatives are critical to the conduct of America's foreign policy. Some of you know my feelings about the importance to the success of any enterprise of having the right people in the right places. If I had to put one of these priorities at the pinnacle of our efforts, it would be our hiring efforts. We must sustain the strong recruiting program we began last year with your support and the support of the Congress as a whole. Last year, in new hires for the foreign service, we made great strides. We doubled the number of candidates for the foreign service written examination and this year we will give the exam twice instead of just once. Moreover, our new recruits better reflect the diversity of our country with nearly 17 per cent of those who passed last September's written exam being members of minority groups. For example, we tripled the number of African-Americans and doubled the number of Latino-Americans.

We have also improved civil service recruitment by creating new web-based recruiting tools and by vigorously asserting the truth. We are a team at Department of State and that the foreign service and the civil service are each very important team members. Both are vital to our mission. And now both know it.

Another improvement is that once we identify the best people we bring them on more quickly, a great boon to hiring the best. For foreign service recruits, for instance, we have reduced the time from written exam to entry into service from 27 months to less than a year. We are going to reduce it even further.

We are also working with Office of Budget and Management to create extensive new performance measures to ensure that the people we hire remain the best throughout their careers. All of the above mentioned activities have improved morale at the Department of State. Our people see things happening, things that enhance their quality of life, their security, their ability to do their jobs. Things like our interim childcare center at the National Foreign Affairs Training Center. It opened on September 4, 2001 and can handle a full complement of thirty infants and toddlers. This idea of teamwork, this idea of family and the quality of life that must always nourish it even in the remotest station, is uppermost in our minds at the Department of State. While we concentrate on the nation's foreign affairs we must also focus on taking care of those Americans who conduct it, as well as the many thousands of foreign service nationals who help us across the globe.

These are an extraordinary group of people, Mr. Chairman. For example, our sixty Afghan employees in Kabul worked diligently to maintain and protect our facilities throughout the thirteen years the embassy was closed. They worked at considerable personal risk and often went months without getting paid. They even repaired the chancery roof when it was damaged by a rocket attack. This is the sort of diligence and loyalty that is typical of our outstanding foreign service nationals. Our whole team at the Department of State is vital to mission accomplishment foreign service, civil service, and foreign service nationals. The dollars you helped to provide us last year allowed us to make our team more cohesive and more effective. We want to continue that process.

One message that the tragic events of September 11th and the days that followed have made very clear is that American leadership in international affairs is critical. Out on the front lines of diplomacy, we want a first-class offense for America. As a soldier, I can tell you that quality people with high morale, combined with superb training and adequate resources, are the key to a first-class offense.

So as the Department of State CEO, let me thank you again for what you have done to help us create such a first-class offense and I want to ask you to continue your excellent support so we can finish the job of bringing the Department of State and the conduct of America's foreign policy into the 21st century. I ask for your important support in full committee and in the House as a whole, both for the \$8.1 billion we are requesting for the Department of State and related agencies and for the \$16.1 billion we are requesting for foreign operations. In addition, I ask for your help with whatever supplemental request we present in the near future. With your help, and the help of the whole Congress, we will continue the progress we have already begun.

Fiscal Year 2002 Security Assistance Funding Allocations

By

Kenneth W. Martin
Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

Introduction

The last *DISAM Journal*, Winter 2001/2002 Edition, provided an extensive description and analysis of the numerous pieces of security assistance-related legislation recently enacted for fiscal year (FY) 2002. While funding for the fiscal year was appropriated by the *Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Appropriations Act, 2002*, P.L. 107-115, 10 January 2002, the allocation of funding for specific countries and programs was not completed and provided by the Department of State to Congress until 4 February 2002. It should be noted, though, that the allocations figures for the FY2002 were provided to Congress within the legislated “thirty days after enactment,” as required by Section 521, P.L. 107-115, and Section 653 (a), *Foreign Assistance Act*. The document provided to Congress is entitled *Summary and Highlights International Affairs Function 150, Fiscal Year 2003*, which can be viewed on the State Department web site at <http://www.state.gov/m/rm/rls/iab/2003/>. It contains foreign operations program funding figures for FY2001 (actual), FY2002 (estimated), and FY2003 (requested). This same document has been linked for viewing from the DISAM web site at <http://disam.osd.mil/publications/>.

The subsequent, more detailed publication, *Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2003*, 15 April 2002, [in the past, referred to as the *Congressional Presentation Document (CPD)*] can be viewed also on the State Department web site at <http://www.state.gov/m/rm/rls/cbj/2003/>. This large, useful publication will also be viewable from the DISAM web site under “Publications.”

The allocated funding within both State Department publications reflect appropriations from both the annual *Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Appropriations Act, 2002*, P.L. 107-115, 10 January 2002, and the September 11th terrorist attack legislation, *2001 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States*, P.L. 107-38, 18 September 2001. Any security assistance funding from P.L. 107-38, referred to as “Emergency Response Funding (ERF),” within the following program tables are cleared noted as such.

FY2002 Security Assistance Funding

Table 1 is an overall presentation of the entire funding security program for FY2002 as provided by P.L. 107-115. Displayed in the table for comparison are the program funding levels from FY2001, the Administration’s request for FY2002 funding, and the proposals from both the Senate and the House of Representatives prior to the conference held to iron out the differences. Overall, a comparison of total security assistance funding between last fiscal year and this fiscal year shows a slight decrease of \$21.732 million. But this small difference is further reduced when the FY2001 rescission of \$13.377 million is considered. It also must be noted that, of the four funding programs, only the Economic Support Fund (ESF) experienced a reduction from FY2001 to FY2002. Though small budget-wise in comparison to the other three programs, the International Military Training and Education (IMET) program experienced a growth of \$12.125 million (before rescission) or nearly 21 percent.

When comparing what the Administration requested for FY2002 and what was finally appropriated, only the IMET program received more than what was requested. While matching the Administration's IMET request, the House of Representatives' proposal for the other three programs was less than requested. The Senate's proposal matched the Administration's request for Foreign Military Financing Program (FMFP) funding, increased the IMET request by \$10 million, and provided reduced funding for economic support fund (ESF) and peacekeeping operations (PKO). For all four programs, the Senate's proposals were greater than the House's proposals.

Table 1
Security Assistance Program Appropriations
Fiscal Years 2001 and 2002 Funding Levels
(Dollars in Millions)

	FY2001 Actual Funding [1]	FY2002 Budget Proposal [2]	HRpt 107-345 Senate Proposal	HRpt 107-345 House Proposal	P.L. 107-115 10 Jan 02 FY2002 Funding
FMFP	\$3,576.240	\$3,674.000	\$3,674.000	\$3,627.000	\$3,650.000
IMET	57.875	65.000	75.000	65.000	70.000
ESF	2,314.896	2,289.000	2,239.500	2,199.000	2,224.000 [3]
PKO	<u>126.721</u>	<u>150.000</u>	<u>140.000</u>	<u>135.000</u>	<u>135.000</u>
TOTAL	\$6,075.732	\$6,178.000	\$6,128.500	\$6,026.000	\$6,054.000 [4]

[1] Includes the overall .22 percent rescission of \$13.377M mandated by Section 1(a)(4), P.L. 106-522. FMFP, IMET, ESF, and PKO were reduced by \$7.867M, \$0.127M, \$5.104M, and \$0.279M respectively. Also includes the Southeast Europe Initiative (SEI) funding augmentation of \$31M for FMFP and \$2.875M for IMET appropriated by Title VI, P.L. 106-429, *Emergency Supplemental Appropriation, Military Assistance*.

[2] The budget proposal figures are from the FY2002 *Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations*.

[3] Includes \$25.000M appropriated under a separate ESF authority as the U.S. contribution to the International Fund for Ireland to remain available until 30 September 2003.

[4] Does not include \$645M in Emergency Response Funding (ERF) appropriated by the P.L. 107-38 emergency supplemental. This includes an additional \$45M for FMFP and \$600M for ESF.

FY2002 Foreign Military Financing Program

Table 2 provides the FY2002 Foreign Military Financing Program (FMFP) funding allocated by country or program displayed by region. This grant funding program is for carrying out the provisions of Section 23 of the *Arms Export Control Act* (AECA). FMFP is administered by the DoD Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) at the overall direction of the Department of State.

An analysis of the funding by region shows that the Near East received over 93 percent of the FMFP initially appropriated with bulk going to Israel and Egypt. Israel experienced the \$60 million in annual FMFP growth as was negotiated four years ago to take place over a ten-year period beginning in FY1999. The Europe and Eurasia region and Africa region experienced a reduction in funding for FY2002 while the Western Hemisphere region and East Asia and the

Pacific region realized a growth in FY2002 FMFP. The Western Hemisphere growth was only \$3.71 million. The Philippines FMFP funding of \$19 million accounted for most of the growth for the East Asia and Pacific region.

The Emergency Response Fund (ERF) from P.L. 107-38, 18 September 2001, provided \$45 million additional funding for FY2002 FMFP in response to the war on international terrorism. \$20 million and \$25 million were allocated to Turkey and Uzbekistan, respectively. This brought the FMFP funding total for FY2002 to \$3,695 million. Perhaps obviously related to the war on terrorism is that the Southwest Asia countries of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Tajikistan are to be allocated FMFP funds under Partnership for Peace (PfP) though they, like Pakistan, were not included in the *Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, FY2002*, published by State Department in early CY2001 to receive FMFP.

Table 2
FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING PROGRAM (FMFP) FUNDING
FY2002 Allocation
(Dollars in Millions)

<u>Country/Program by Geographical Region</u>	<u>FY2001 FMFP Funding</u>	<u>FY2002 Budget Request</u>	<u>FY2002 FMFP Funding</u>
<u>NEAR EAST</u>			
Egypt	\$1,297.140	\$1,300.000	\$1,300.000
Israel	1,975.644	2,040.000	2,040.000
Jordan	74.835	75.000	75.000
Morocco	2.495	3.500	3.500
Tunisia	<u>3.493</u>	<u>3.500</u>	<u>3.500</u>
Subtotal, Near East	3,353.607	3,422.000	3,422.000
<u>EUROPE AND EURASIA</u>			
Partnership for Peace (PfP)	[107.661]		[97.750]
Albania	8.631	4.650	4.000
Armenia	0.000	0.000	4.000
Azerbaijan	0.000	0.000	4.000
Bulgaria	13.470	10.000	8.500
Croatia	3.991	6.200	5.000
Estonia	6.186	6.500	6.250
Georgia	4.490	5.650	11.000
Kazakhstan	1.896	2.750	2.750
Kyrgyzstan	1.846	2.000	2.000
Latvia	5.188	7.000	6.250
Lithuania	6.486	7.500	6.593
Macedonia	13.619	10.500	10.500
Moldova	1.497	1.800	1.250
Romania	16.962	11.500	9.000
Slovakia	10.777	8.500	7.750
Slovenia	5.487	4.500	4.000
Tajikistan	0.000	0.000	0.700
Turkmenistan	0.699	0.700	0.000
Ukraine	3.991	4.800	4.000
Uzbekistan	2.445	2.950	0.207
Bosnia-Herzegovina	5.986	2.500	2.250
Czech Republic	8.981	12.000	10.000
Hungary	8.981	12.000	10.000

Table 2 (Continued)
FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING PROGRAM (FMFP) FUNDING
FY2002 Allocation
(Dollars in Millions)

<u>Country/Program by Geographical Region</u>	<u>FY2001 FMFP Funding</u>	<u>FY2002 Budget Request</u>	<u>FY2002 FMFP Funding</u>
Malta	2.993	1.000	0.000
Poland	<u>12.274</u>	<u>15.000</u>	<u>12.000</u>
Subtotal, Europe and Eurasia	146.876	140.000	132.000
<u>WESTERN HEMISPHERE</u>			
Argentina	0.998	0.000	0.000
El Salvador	0.000	3.500	1.000
Nicaragua	0.000	0.000	0.500
Caribbean Regional	[3.992]		[4.200]
Bahamas	0.139	0.100	0.100
Belize	0.200	0.300	0.200
Dominican Republic	0.649	0.220	0.350
Guyana	0.124	0.600	0.200
Haiti	0.449	0.600	0.300
Jamaica	0.584	0.900	0.600
Suriname	0.000	0.250	0.150
Trinidad and Tobago	0.300	0.400	0.300
Eastern Caribbean	1.547	2.130	2.000
WHA Regional Stability [1]	[0.000]	[4.000]	[0.000]
Bolivia			1.000
Ecuador			1.000
Panama			1.000
Peru			1.000
WHA Conflict Prevention/Response	[0.000]	[5.000]	[3.000]
Argentina		2.000	1.000
Bolivia		1.000	0.500
Chile		1.000	0.500
Uruguay		<u>1.000</u>	<u>1.000</u>
Subtotal, Western Hemisphere	4.990	18.000	8.700
<u>AFRICA</u>			
Africa Regional Stability	[8.200]	3.000	[3.000]
Botswana	1.000		1.000
Djibouti	0.100		0.000
Eritrea	0.000		0.250
Ethiopia	0.000		0.250
Ghana	0.500		0.400
Guinea	3.000		0.000
Kenya	1.000		0.000
Mali	0.200		0.000
OAU [2]	0.100		0.000
Senegal	0.800		0.400
South Africa	1.000		0.700

Table 2 (Continued)
FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING PROGRAM (FMFP) FUNDING
FY2002 Allocation
(Dollars in Millions)

<u>Country/Program by Geographical Region</u>	<u>FY2001 FMFP Funding</u>	<u>FY2002 Budget Request</u>	<u>FY2002 FMFP Funding</u>
Zambia	0.500		0.000
Nigeria	10.000	10.000	6.000
South Africa	<u>0.000</u>	<u>6.000</u>	<u>6.000</u>
Subtotal, Africa	18.200	19.000	15.000
<u>EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC</u>			
East Timor	1.796	1.000	1.000
Mongolia	1.995	2.000	2.000
Philippines	1.995	19.000	19.000
Thailand	<u>0.000</u>	<u>0.000</u>	<u>1.300</u>
Subtotal, East Asia and the Pacific	5.786	22.000	23.300
<u>OTHER</u>			
Policy Initiatives	0.000	10.000	8.000
FMFP Admin Costs	32.928	35.000	35.000
Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities (EIPC)	<u>5.986</u>	<u>8.000</u>	<u>4.000</u>
Subtotal, Other	38.914	53.000	47.000
Subtotal FMFP	\$3,568.373 [3]	\$3,674.000	\$3,650.000
<u>RESCISSION</u>	<u>7.867</u>	<u>0.000</u>	<u>0.000</u>
Total FMFP	\$3,576.240	\$3,674.000	\$3,650.000
<u>EMERGENCY RESPONSE FUND (ERF)</u>			
Turkey	0.000	0.000	20.000
Uzbekistan	<u>0.000</u>	<u>0.000</u>	<u>25.000</u>
Subtotal ERF	0.000	0.000	45.000
TOTAL FMFP	\$3,576.240	\$3,674.000	\$3,695.000

[1] WHA - Western Hemisphere Affairs

[2] OAU - Organization of a Foreign Unity.

[3] Includes \$0.240M in MAP receipts.

International Military and Education Training

Table 3 provides the FY2002 funding allocations for international military and education training (IMET), again, by region, country, and program. This grant funding program is authorized by Section 541 of the *Foreign Assistance Act* (FAA) to be administered by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) at the overall direction of the Department of State (DoS).

Because of the large overall increase in IMET funding, an analysis by region shows significant funding growth in all of the regions when comparing FY2001 and FY2002. When comparing by region the Administration's request (the middle column) to what is being allocated (the right column) only Africa failed to show an increase and the difference is only \$210,000.

The larger IMET recipient countries include Turkey with \$2.7 million, Jordan and Philippines with \$2 million each, Poland with \$1.9 million, and Czech Republic and Hungary with \$1.8 million each. In contrast, the country receiving the smallest amount and for the first time any IMET is Saudi Arabia with \$25,000. This causes Saudi Arabia to be eligible for FMS Incremental pricing authorized by Section 21(a)(1)(C), AECA, when purchasing DoD training via FMS. This amounts to "only those additional costs that are incurred by the U.S. government in furnishing such assistance."

The FY2002 IMET Program did not receive any supplemental funding from the Emergency Response Fund (ERF).

Table 3
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY AND EDUCATION TRAINING (IMET) FUNDING
FY2002 Funding Allocation
(Dollars in Thousands)

Country/Program by Geographical Region	FY2001 IMET Funding	FY2002 Budget Request	FY2002 IMET Funding
AFRICA			
Angola	00	100	100
Benin	384	400	400
Botswana	663	580	580
Burkina Faso	00	50	00
Burundi	00	50	00
Cameroon	223	190	190
Cape Verde	126	120	120
Central African Republic	116	110	110
Chad	173	130	130
Comoros	00	50	00
Congo (Brazzaville)	86	110	110
Congo (Kinshasa)	00	50	00
Cote d'Ivoire	00	50	00
Djibouti	132	160	160
Equatorial Guinea	00	50	50
Eritrea	155	375	375
Ethiopia	00	475	475
Gabon	131	160	160
Gambia	00	50	00
Ghana	338	470	470
Guinea	254	250	250
Guinea-Bissau	55	50	50
Kenya	443	460	600
Lesotho	78	100	100
Madagascar	158	170	170
Malawi	388	360	360
Mali	355	325	325
Mauritania	83	100	100
Mauritius	86	100	100
Mozambique	200	215	215

Table 3 (Continued)
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY AND EDUCATION TRAINING (IMET) FUNDING
FY2002 Funding Allocation
(Dollars in Thousands)

Country/Program by Geographical Region	FY2001 IMET Funding	FY2002 Budget Request	FY2002 IMET Funding
Namibia	193	200	200
Niger	102	110	110
Nigeria	663	750	750
Rwanda	00	100	100
Sao Tome	101	85	85
Senegal	912	850	850
Seychelles	60	75	75
Sierra Leone	130	200	200
South Africa	1,200	1,450	1,450
Swaziland	98	100	100
Tanzania	214	200	200
Togo	52	75	75
Uganda	00	100	100
Zambia	181	190	190
Zimbabwe	00	50	00
Subtotal, Africa	8,533	10,395	10,185
<u>EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC</u>			
Cambodia	00	250	00
East Timor	00	50	50
Indonesia	00	400	400
Laos	00	50	50
Malaysia	757	700	700
Mongolia	750	650	650
Papua New Guinea	160	200	200
Philippines	1,436	1,710	2,000
Samoa	88	120	120
Solomon Islands	62	150	150
Thailand	1,852	1,650	1,650
Tonga	100	115	115
Vanuatu	64	100	100
Vietnam	00	50	50
Subtotal, East Asia and the Pacific	5,269	6,195	6,235
<u>EUROPE AND EURASIA</u>			
Albania	1,200	800	800
Armenia	00	00	400
Azerbaijan	00	00	400
Bosnian and Herzegovina	1,109	800	800
Bulgaria	1,599	1,200	1,200
Croatia	1,032	600	600
Czech Republic [1]	1,370	1,800	1,800
Estonia	750	1,000	1,000
Georgia	481	850	850
Greece	25	500	500
Hungary [1]	1,394	1,800	1,800
Kazakhstan	583	650	800

Table 3 (Continued)
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY AND EDUCATION TRAINING (IMET) FUNDING
FY2002 Funding Allocation
(Dollars in Thousands)

Country/Program by Geographical Region	FY2001 IMET Funding	FY2002 Budget Request	FY2002 IMET Funding
Kyrgyzstan	380	475	600
Latvia	815	1,000	1,000
Lithuania	797	1,000	1,000
Macedonia	741	550	550
Malta	136	300	300
Moldova	630	850	850
Poland [1]	1,318	1,900	1,900
Portugal	594	750	750
Romania	1,544	1,400	1,400
Russian Federation	156	800	800
Slovakia	992	850	850
Slovenia	1,022	800	800
Tajikistan	00	75	250
Turkey	1,689	1,800	2,700
Turkmenistan	258	300	450
Ukraine	1,443	1,700	1,700
Uzbekistan	494	800	1,000
Subtotal, Europe and Eurasia	22,552	25,350	27,850
<u>WESTERN HEMISPHERE</u>			
Argentina	846	850	1,000
Bahamas	110	140	140
Belize	223	275	275
Bolivia	665	700	700
Brazil	241	440	440
Chile	550	570	570
Colombia	1,040	1,180	1,180
Costa Rica	297	350	350
Dominican Republic	513	500	500
Eastern Caribbean	448	675	675
Ecuador	550	625	625
El Salvador	653	800	800
Guatemala	291	350	350
Guyana	192	275	275
Honduras	546	625	625
Jamaica	465	600	600
Mexico	1,000	1,150	1,150
Nicaragua	222	375	375
Panama	131	170	170
Paraguay	238	300	300
Peru	509	500	500
Suriname	107	110	110
Trinidad and Tobago	122	135	135
Uruguay	398	415	450
Venezuela	485	500	500
Subtotal, Western Hemisphere	10,842	12,610	12,760

Table 3 (Continued)
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY AND EDUCATION TRAINING (IMET) FUNDING
FY2002 Funding Allocation
(Dollars in Thousands)

<u>Country/Program by Geographical Region</u>	<u>FY2001 IMET Funding</u>	<u>FY2002 Budget Request</u>	<u>FY2002 IMET Funding</u>
<u>NEAR EAST</u>			
Algeria	121	200	200
Bahrain	249	250	400
Egypt	1,119	1,200	1,200
Jordan	1,700	1,800	2,000
Lebanon	546	600	600
Morocco	999	1,000	1,000
Oman	250	275	500
Saudi Arabia	00	25	25
Tunisia	968	1,000	1,000
Yemen	198	250	450
Subtotal, Near East	6,150	6,600	7,375
<u>SOUTH ASIA</u>			
Bangladesh	507	525	600
India	498	650	1,000
Maldives	110	125	125
Nepal	237	225	400
Pakistan	00	00	1,000
Sri Lanka	252	275	275
Subtotal, South Asia	1,604	1,800	3,400
<u>NON-REGIONAL</u>			
General Costs	998	250	395
E-IMET schools	1,800	1,800	1,800
Subtotal, Non-regional	2,798	2,050	2,195
Subtotal IMET	\$57,748	\$65,000	\$70,000
<u>RESCISSION</u>	127	00	00
TOTAL IMET	\$57,875	\$65,000	\$70,000

[1] The Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland also received \$300K, \$300K, and \$400K respectively from prior year "no-year funding" so each country receives \$1.7M in IMET funding during FY2001 as authorized by Section 511, P.L. 106-280. This "no-year" funding is the result of \$1 million in annual IMET since FY1999 remaining available until expended.

Economic Support Fund

Table 4 provides the FY2002 Economic Support Fund (ESF) allocations also by regions, countries, and programs authorized by Chapter 4, Part II of the *Foreign Assistance Act*. This grant funding program is administered by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).

A regional analysis of ESF allocations shows Europe, Africa, South Asia, and the Western Hemisphere experiencing overall growth in FY2002 ESF compared to FY2001 funding levels. In contrast, the Near East and East Asia and Pacific regions experienced a decline. The Near East decline was a significant \$224.723 million while the decline for the East Asia and Pacific region was a much smaller \$2.627 million.

As indicated earlier in the FMFP section, Israel is in its fourth year of agreed upon reductions in ESF support but to be accompanied with an increase in FMFP support. With an annual ESF reduction of \$120 million, Israel is to be removed from the ESF in ten years. This year, Israel received \$720 million in ESF funding. However, the agreement also requires that Israeli's FMFP funding is to increase annually by \$60 million during the same ten-year period. Egypt is to receive a similar annual reduction in ESF but without affecting FMFP. The ESF reduction for Egypt is about \$40 million annually. Prior to implementing this ESF reduction program, Israel and Egypt each were annually receiving \$1,200 million and \$815 million, respectively. This year, Israel and Egypt together still receive nearly 62 percent of the total ESF appropriation.

The Emergency Response Fund (ERF) provides an additional \$600 million in ESF for only one country – Turkey. This increases the total ESF for this fiscal year to \$2,824 million.

Table 4
ECONOMIC SUPPORT FUND (ESF)
FY2002 Funding
(Dollars in Millions)

Country/Program by Geographical Region	FY2001 ESF Funding	FY2002 Budget Request	FY2002 ESF Funding
<u>NEAR EAST</u>			
Egypt	693.471	655.000	655.000
Israel	838.152	720.000	720.000
Jordan	149.670	150.000	150.000
Lebanon	34.923	32.000	35.000
Yemen	3.991	5.000	5.000
Middle East Fact Finding	2.793	0.000	0.000
Middle East Democracy	3.991	7.000	5.000
Middle East Multilaterals	2.994	3.000	3.000
Middle East Regional Coop	4.989	5.000	5.000
Iraq Opposition	24.945	25.000	25.000
West Bank-Gaza	84.813	75.000	72.000
U.S.-North Africa Partner	<u>3.991</u>	<u>5.000</u>	<u>4.000</u>
Subtotal, Near East	1,848.723	1,682.000	1,679.000
<u>EUROPE</u>			
Cyprus	14.967	15.000	15.000
Ireland	24.945	19.600	25.000
Irish Visa Program	<u>4.989</u>	<u>5.000</u>	<u>4.000</u>
Subtotal, Europe	44.901	39.600	45.000
<u>AFRICA</u>			
Angola	2.491	2.000	0.000
Ethiopia/Eritrea	0.000	2.500	0.000
Ghana	4.500	0.000	0.000

Table 4 (Continued)
ECONOMIC SUPPORT FUND (ESF)
FY2002 Funding
(Dollars in Millions)

Country/Program by Geographical Region	FY2001 ESF Funding	FY2002 Budget Request	FY2002 ESF Funding
Nigeria	21.608	25.000	0.000
Sierra Leone	1.900	9.000	9.000
SADC Initiative [1]	0.998	0.000	0.000
Safe Skies	4.995	3.000	3.000
Regional Organizations	0.998	4.000	4.000
Countries in Transition	11.350	20.000	40.000
Education for Development and Democracy	12.466	15.000	15.000
Great Lakes Justice Initiative	10.978	10.000	0.000
Presidential Economic Growth Opportunity	1.995	0.000	0.000
Africa Regional Democracy Fund	<u>11.519</u>	<u>15.000</u>	<u>29.000</u>
Subtotal, Africa	85.798	105.500	100.000
<u>SOUTH ASIA</u>			
Afghanistan	0.000	0.000	17.250
Bangladesh	0.000	3.000	3.000
India	4.989	7.000	7.000
Nepal	0.000	3.000	3.000
Pakistan	0.000	7.000	9.500
Sri Lanka	0.000	3.000	3.000
South Asia Democracy	4.989	0.000	0.000
South Asia Regional	0.000	7.000	3.500
South Asia Energy and Environment	3.492	0.000	0.000
South Asia Regional Stability	0.998	0.000	0.000
Women and Children Support Fund	<u>4.490</u>	<u>0.000</u>	<u>0.000</u>
Subtotal, South Asia	18.958	30.000	46.250
<u>WESTERN HEMISPHERE</u>			
Bolivia	1.995	10.000	10.000
Cuba	4.989	5.000	5.000
Dominican Republic	3.492	2.000	2.000
Eastern Caribbean	6.985	11.000	11.000
Ecuador	5.491	30.000	15.000
El Salvador	4.989	21.000	25.000
Guatemala	13.969	10.000	10.000
Haiti	46.894	35.000	30.000
Honduras	0.998	1.000	1.000
Jamaica	1.497	1.000	1.000
Mexico	6.178	10.000	10.000
Nicaragua	1.499	1.500	1.500
Panama	0.998	4.000	4.000
Paraguay	3.492	3.500	3.500
Peru	2.203	10.000	15.000
Peru/Ecuador Peace	6.985	5.000	5.000
Venezuela	0.000	0.500	0.500
AOJ/ICITAP [2]	6.985	10.000	10.000

Table 4 (Continued)
ECONOMIC SUPPORT FUND (ESF)
FY2002 Funding
(Dollars in Millions)

Country/Program by Geographical Region	FY2001 ESF Funding	FY2002 Budget Request	FY2002 ESF Funding
Centers for Education Excellence Western Hemisphere Regional Democracy	0.000 <u>0.599</u>	7.000 <u>0.000</u>	7.000 <u>0.000</u>
Subtotal, Western Hemisphere	120.238	177.500	166.500
<u>EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC</u>			
Burma	3.492	3.500	6.500
Cambodia	14.967	25.000	20.000
East Timor	24.945	25.000	25.000
Indonesia	49.890	50.000	50.000
Mongolia	11.974	12.000	12.000
Philippines	7.202	15.000	21.000
Accelerating Economic Recovery	4.325	5.000	0.000
Chinese Compensation	28.000	0.000	0.000
China (Rule of Law)	0.000	5.000	5.000
EAP Environmental Initiative [3]	3.492	4.000	3.500
Regional Democracy	3.347	6.000	5.000
Regional Security	0.249	0.250	0.250
Regional Women's Issues	2.994	5.000	4.000
South Pacific Fisheries Treaty	<u>14.000</u>	<u>14.000</u>	<u>14.000</u>
Subtotal, East Asia and the Pacific	168.877	169.750	166.250
<u>GLOBAL</u>			
Human Rights and Demo. Fund [4] Partnerships to Eliminate Sweatshops	13.421 <u>3.991</u>	13.500 <u>5.000</u>	13.000 <u>4.000</u>
OES Initiatives [5]	4.989	4.000	4.000
Policy Initiatives	<u>5.000</u>	<u>62.150</u>	<u>0.000</u>
Subtotal, Global	27.401	84.650	21.000
Subtotal ESF	\$2,314.896	\$2,289.000	\$2,224.000
<u>RESCISSION</u>	5.104	0.000	0.000
Total ESF	\$2,320.000	\$2,289.000	\$2,224.000
<u>EMERGENCY RESPONSE FUND (ERF)</u>			
Pakistan	<u>0.000</u>	<u>0.000</u>	<u>600.000</u>
Subtotal ERF	0.000	0.000	600.000
TOTAL ESF	\$2,320.000	\$2,289.000	\$2,824.000

[1] SADC - Southern African Development Community.

[2] AOJ/ICITAP - Administration of Justice/International Criminal Investigation Training Assistance Program of the U.S. Department of Justice.

[3] EAP Environmental Initiative - East Asia and Pacific Environmental Initiative

[4] FY2002 HRDF allocation assumes \$5M in funding for China (Rule of Law).

[5] OES Initiatives - Oceans, Environment and Science Initiatives

FY2002 Peacekeeping Operations

Table 5 presents the FY2001 funding allocations for International Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) authorized by Section 551, *Foreign Assistance Act*. This funding program is administered directly by the Department of State.

The FY2002 Peacekeeping Program (PKO) is \$8.279 million or just over 6 percent larger than last year. However, the program is \$15 million smaller than the amount requested by the Administration. The regions of the world affected by this year's allocation of funding basically remain unchanged. This would include Africa, East Timor, Southeastern Europe, and the Sinai Multinational Force and Observers (MFO).

The Emergency Response Fund (ERF) does not provide any additional funding to this year's PKO Program.

Table 5
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS (PKO) FUNDING
FY2002 Funding
(Dollars in Millions)

Program	FY2001 PKO Funding	FY2002 Budget Request	FY2002 PKO Funding
Africa Regional	\$30.882	\$51.000	\$41.000
African Crisis Response Initiative	15.618	20.000	15.000
Bulgaria/SEEBRIG [1]	2.500	0.000	0.000
East Timor (UNTAET)[2]	8.500	8.000	8.000
Macedonia	4.100	0.000	0.000
Multinational Force and Observers	16.000	16.400	16.400
Ukraine KFOR [3]	1.200	0.000	0.000
OSCE (Europe Regional) [4]	14.221	16.300	16.300
OSCE (Bosnia)	19.800	20.500	20.500
OSCE (Croatia)	2.900	3.300	3.300
OSCE (Kosovo)	<u>11.000</u>	<u>14.500</u>	<u>14.500</u>
Subtotal PKO	\$126.721	\$150.000	\$135.000
RECESSION	0.279	0.000	0.000
TOTAL PKO	\$127.000	\$150.000	\$135.000

[1] SEEBRIG - South-Eastern Europe Brigade

[2] UNTAET - U.N. Transitional Administration in East Timor.

[3] KFOR - [NATO] Kosovo Force

[4] OSCE - Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

Conclusion

Overall security assistance funding from the annual *Foreign Operations Appropriations Act* did not significantly change from FY2001 to FY2002. The notable difference is the 21 percent increase in IMET funding with \$70 million being available for FY2002. The emergency

supplemental appropriations act, P.L. 107-38, provided an additional \$45 million in FMFP and \$600 million in ESF as Emergency Response Funding (ERF). Turkey received the vast majority of this supplemental with Uzbekistan receiving the balance as \$25 million in FMFP funding.

A new supplemental appropriations act is presently being negotiated between the Administration and Congress primarily for continued recovery from the 11 September terrorist attacks and conducting the subsequent war on international terrorism. The latest total funding being considered is in excess of \$20 billion with more than \$1 billion for foreign operations to include FMFP and probable ESF funding along with other foreign assistance programs. Once the legislation is enacted and becomes available, the follow-on *DISAM Journal* will provide the resulting effect on security assistance and related programs.

About the Author

Mr. Martin is an associate professor with almost fourteen years of service on the DISAM faculty. His duties include Legislation and Foreign Policy functional manager and editor of the annually republished DISAM "Green Textbook", *The Management of Security Assistance*. Mr. Martin retired from the U.S. Navy in 1991 after over twenty-four years of active duty as a surface warfare officer. He received his undergraduate degree in Economics from the Illinois Institute of Technology and his masters in Administration from Central Michigan University.

U.S. Assistance to Colombia and the Andean Region

By

**Ambassador Marc Grossman
Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs**

[The following testimony was presented before the House Appropriations Committee's Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Washington D.C., April 10, 2000.]

Colombia matters to the United States. Congress has been a key partner in our efforts to help Colombia defend its democracy from the demons of narcotrafficking, underdevelopment, human rights abuses, and terrorism.

Many of you have traveled to Colombia. I thank you for your engagement. For those who are considering travel to Colombia, I urge you to go. There is no better way to understand the commitment of the Colombian people to defending their democracy. Your visits make clear everything America stands for democracy, security, and prosperity, in the U.S. and in Colombia.

I also thank you for the bipartisan consensus shown in House resolution 358, passed after President Pastrana's February 20 decision to end the former demilitarized zone; your appropriation last January of funds to carry out the *Andean Counterdrug Initiative*; and your approval of the *Plan Colombia Supplemental* in July 2000. We support your action on the *Andean Trade Preferences Act*, and hope that the Senate will soon enact it into law.

On March 21, 2002 the Administration asked the Congress for new authorities. The terrorist and narcotics problems in Colombia are intertwined. These new authorities would allow us to:

- Address the problem of terrorism in Colombia as vigorously as we currently address narcotics;
- Help the Government of Colombia address the heightened terrorist risk that has resulted from the end of the demilitarized zone.

New authorities would not mean that we would stop our human rights vetting of all Colombian military units receiving U.S. assistance or that we would exceed the 400 person cap on U.S. military personnel providing training in Colombia, nor the 400 person cap on U.S. civilian contractors. The U.S. believes that these new authorities will give us the ability to help the Government of Colombia address the multi-faceted threats to its security, democracy and prosperity. I look forward to discussing this proposal with you.

Hemispheric Vision: Democracy, Prosperity and Security

The United States can be proud of the hemispheric consensus in favor of democracy, rule of law and human rights, open markets and social progress. Our leadership has been essential to creating and promoting this consensus, which was ratified at the Quebec City Summit of the Americas last April. At that Summit President Bush said:

“We have a great vision before us: a fully democratic hemisphere, bound together by good will and free trade. That is a tall order. It

is also the chance of a lifetime and it is the responsibility we all share.”

At Quebec, thirty-four democratically-elected heads of state and government agreed on:

- A democracy clause which makes democratic government a requirement for participation in the summit process;
- A 2005 deadline for the Free Trade Area of the Americas;
- An approved action plan to promote economic prosperity, protect human rights, and fight drug trafficking and organized crime.

There is no more important, or more challenging task than building responsive democratic institutions, competitive markets, effective legal systems and sound educational and social systems throughout the hemisphere. In many countries it will take years to overcome decades of protectionist economic policies, military misrule and lack of social investment. However, as President Bush recently said,

“A dream of free markets and free people, in a hemisphere free from war and tyranny. That dream has sometimes been frustrated - but it must never be abandoned.”

This hemispheric dream of democracy, prosperity and security for every citizen, presented by President Bush, faces its most difficult challenge in the hemisphere’s second oldest democracy, Colombia. What good will these principles be if they are trampled in Colombia?

Colombia: Assault on Democracy

Colombia’s forty million inhabitants and its democracy are under assault by three narcoterrorist groups; the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), National Liberation Army (ELN) and the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC). The three groups with a combined force of over 25,000 combatants, regularly engage in massacres, kidnappings, and attacks on key infrastructure. The United Nations believes that as many as 6,000 of the FARC’s combatants are under 18 years of age. The FARC and AUC are involved in every facet of narcotics trafficking, including cultivation, processing, and transportation. The income they derive from narcotics is estimated at over \$300 million a year and has been key to their expansion, both in numbers and armament over the last ten years. All three groups seek a lawless, anarchic environment in which they can prey on innocent civilians and legitimate business activities.

The terrorist assault on Colombia’s democracy saw the AUC kill two Colombian legislators over the last twelve months, while the FARC kidnapped six Colombian legislators, including presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt. The three terrorist groups assassinated twelve mayors in 2001. FARC efforts to disrupt the March 10 legislative elections failed, but the terrorist group will undoubtedly try to interfere with the May 26 presidential elections as well.

Colombia: Assault on Prosperity

The National Liberation Army and FARC bombings of the key Caño Limó oil pipeline cost the Government of Colombia almost \$500 million in lost revenue last year, equal to almost one-third of Bogota’s spending on health for its citizens. FARC strikes against the country’s power grid in February left forty-five towns, including two departmental capitals, without electricity for days. The FARC also attempted twice to blow up a dam near Bogota, actions which, if successful,

could have killed thousands of civilians. Fortunately, Colombian security forces thwarted both attempts.

The FARC and ELN also represent a danger to the \$4.3 billion in direct U.S. investment in Colombia. They regularly attack U.S. interests, including the railway used by the Drummond Coal Mining facility and Occidental Petroleum's stake in the Caño Limó oil pipeline. Terrorist attacks on the Caño Limó pipeline also pose a threat to U.S. energy security. Colombia supplied 3 percent of U.S. oil imports in 2001, and possesses substantial potential oil and natural gas reserves.

Colombia: Assault on Security

Terrorist attacks on Colombia's security have resulted in saw over 3,000 Colombians killed in 2001. Another 2,856 were kidnapped, with the ELN, FARC and AUC responsible for almost 2,000 victims. Among the kidnapped victims were 289 children, the youngest of whom was only three years old.

The Colombian authorities' arrest of Brazilian narcotrafficker Luis Fernando da Costa in April 2001 at a FARC military camp confirmed extensive FARC involvement in the drug trade, and led to the recent U.S. indictment of the Commander of the FARC's 16th front on drug-related charges.

In the former demilitarized zone, the Colombian military recently found two large FARC-run cocaine laboratories and 7.4 metric tons of cocaine. Similarly, AUC Commander Carlos Castaño has publicly admitted that the AUC obtains 70 percent of its income from narcotics. FARC and AUC activities in southern Colombia have been a major obstacle to our aerial eradication and alternative development programs, especially in Putumayo and Caqueta.

The FARC, ELN, and AUC also threaten regional stability. The FARC regularly uses border regions in Panamá, Ecuador, Brazil and Venezuela for arms and narcotics trafficking, resupply operations, and rest and recreation. Conflicts between the FARC and AUC in northwest Colombia have led to limited refugee inflows into Panamá's Darien region. Venezuela and Ecuador have experienced similar problems. The insecurity created by the FARC, AUC, and ELN creates a haven for criminal activity that affects Colombia's neighbors.

Since 1992, the FARC and ELN have kidnapped 51 United States citizens and murdered ten. The threat also carries into the United States. Illegal drugs caused 50,000 drug-related deaths and \$160 billion in economic losses in the United States in 2000. Colombia supplies 90 percent of the cocaine consumed in the U.S., and it is estimated that approximately 60 percent of the heroin entering the U.S. is of South American origin, which is primarily Colombia. It is also a significant source of heroin.

Colombian: Response to Growth in Terrorist Violence

In 1999, President Pastrana took the initiative in responding to the crisis undermining Colombia's democracy, prosperity and security with the launch of the six-year, \$7.5 billion Plan Colombia. This plan recognized that Colombia's narcotics, political, terrorist and economic problems are interrelated, creating a vicious downward cycle. To break these links, it called for substantial social investment, judicial, political and economic reforms, modernization of the Colombian armed forces, and renewed efforts to combat narcotrafficking. Pastrana also began peace talks with the FARC, providing the group with a 16,000 square mile demilitarized zone to facilitate negotiations. At the same time, he sought to improve ties with the U.S.

U.S. Support for Plan Colombia

The United States shares Plan Colombia's vision of a democratic Colombia free from the scourges of narcotics and terrorism. Support has been a key component of the plan. With your support, since July 2000, the U.S. has provided Colombia with \$1.7 billion to combat narcotics trafficking and terrorism, strengthen democratic institutions and human rights, foster socio-economic development, and mitigate the impact of the violence on Colombian civilians. Our assistance to Colombia using Plan Colombia funds is limited to support of counternarcotics activities.

Take our focus on counternarcotics activities aimed at breaking the financial support of the narcoterrorist groups. The Government of Colombia extradited twenty-three Colombian nationals to the U.S. in 2001, an unprecedented level of cooperation. We trained, equipped, and deployed the Colombian Army's counternarcotics brigade, which destroyed 818 base laboratories and 21 HCL laboratories, and provided security for our aerial eradication operations in Southern Colombia. Operating as part of a Colombian Joint Task Force (JTF-South), we judge it the best brigade-sized unit in the Colombian military. It has served as a brigade operations model with respect to joint operations, proper use of helicopters, intelligence-driven missions, and respect for human rights. Moreover, we dispensed enough herbicide to spray a record potential 84,000 hectares of cocaine cultivation last year, up from 58,000 in 2000, and have set a goal of 150,000 hectares in 2002.

I know there is an on-going debate about the impact of our eradication efforts on total cocaine cultivation in Colombia. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA's) Crime and Narcotics Center and ONDCP say total cocaine cultivation in Colombia increased from 136,000 to 170,000 hectares in 2001. In contrast, the Government of Colombia estimates that cocaine cultivation fell 27,000 hectares during the same period, dropping from 163,000 hectares to 136,000 hectares.. The conflicting numbers reflect the differing methodologies used. The ONDCP has asked an independent team of experts to analyze the two approaches. The U.S. is awaiting for the findings and recommendations of this panel that will determine how cocaine estimates will be done in the future.

The U.S. has also engaged in efforts to ensure the security of Colombians. Since May 2001, the U.S. has funded through Colombia's Ministry of Interior, a program that has provides protection to 1,676 Colombians whose lives were threatened, including human rights workers, labor activists, and journalists. The U.S. government-funded Early Warning System (EWS) helps alert Colombian authorities to threats of potential massacres or other human rights abuses, enabling them act to avert such incidents. To date, the EWS has issued 106 alerts and the U.S. working with non-governmental organizations and international agencies, has provided assistance to 330,000 Colombians displaced by violence since mid-2001. Our program to demobilize child soldiers has helped 272 children to re-integrate into society.

To strengthen Colombia's democracy, we have implemented programs to help the Government of Colombia reform its administration of justice and strengthen local government. We have opened eighteen Casas de Justicia, which provide cost-effective legal services to Colombians who have not previously enjoyed access to the country's judicial system. The U.S. is currently working to set up a Casa de Justicia in San Vicente de Caguan, the main urban area in the former demilitarized zone. Similarly, our program to help municipalities improve their financial management, fight corruption, and boost community participation has completed six Social Investment Fund projects in southern Colombia. The U.S. is also helping the Colombia Prosecutor General's Office set up human rights units throughout the country to facilitate the investigation and prosecution of human rights abuses.

Our alternative development program in southern Colombia has encountered difficulties but we are making adjustments to overcome the security and other constraints we face. We remain committed to alternative development.

Human Rights

Human rights concerns are a central element in our Colombia policy. In meetings with senior Colombian civilian and military officials, U.S. officials regularly stress the need for Colombia to improve its human rights performance. During my visit to Bogota last February, I emphasized to President Pastrana that the Colombian military must take additional actions to sever any links between military personnel and paramilitary forces. I also met with the leading presidential candidates and made clear our expectation that they too be fully committed to improving human rights. In late March, Curt Struble, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, and Scott Carpenter, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, traveled to Bogota to underscore the importance we attach to human rights. Chief of Staff of the Army General Eric Shinseki and Acting CINCSOUTH Major General Gary Speer have also traveled to Colombia and delivered string human rights messages to their counterparts in the Colombian Armed Forces.

Human rights are an essential element in most of our training programs in Colombia. The counternarcotics brigade that we trained and equipped has compiled an excellent human rights record to date. These programs are an integral part of the Government of Colombia's efforts to professionalize the Colombian military and to develop a new human rights culture within the Armed Forces. They deserve our continued support.

Our human rights message is making a difference. President Pastrana and Armed Forces Commander Tapias have repeatedly denounced collusion between elements of the Colombian military and the paramilitaries. The Colombian military captured 590 paramilitaries and killed 92 in combat last year. Eight military personnel, including two colonels and a lieutenant colonel, were charged in civilian courts with collaborating with paramilitaries or with committing gross human rights violations in 2001. A senior Colombian naval official's career has effectively ended because of allegations that he collaborated with paramilitaries.

Still, too many Colombians continue to suffer abuses by state security forces or by terrorist groups acting in collusion with state security units. Those responsible for such actions must be punished. The establishment of the rule of law and personal security for all Colombians cannot happen if human rights abuses and impunity for the perpetrators of such crimes continue to occur.

New Situation Requires New Authorities Adjustments

On February 20, President Pastrana ended the demilitarized zone and the Government of Colombia's peace talks with the FARC. The immediate catalyst for Pastrana's action was the FARC's hijacking of a civilian aircraft and its subsequent kidnapping of the President of the Peace Commission in the Colombian Senate. Pastrana's decision also reflected the FARC's stepped up attacks on military and police targets, its bombings of key economic infrastructure and its refusal to participate in good faith in peace talks after Pastrana had renewed the zone on January 20.

Since February 20, the Colombian military has reoccupied the main urban areas in the former zone, while the FARC has continued its terrorist violence. President Pastrana has announced plans to increase Colombia's defense budget to cover the cost of heightened military operations, and to add 10,000 soldiers to the army. He also requested additional military aid from the U.S. to help cope with the increased terrorist threat. This request includes the removal of the restrictions on the use of military assets provided by the U.S. for counternarcotics purposes.

Just as we supported President Pastrana's management of the peace process with the FARC, we believe it is critical that the U.S. help Colombia deal with the surge in violence that has followed the end of the demilitarized zone. We answered Pastrana's immediate request for help by providing increased intelligence support on terrorist actions, expediting the delivery of helicopter spare parts already paid for by the Government of Colombia, and assisting the Colombians with eradication activities in the former zone.

The U.S. is also acting to address the Colombian people's broader needs as they defend their democracy from terrorist violence. In the counterterrorism supplemental submitted on March 21, we are seeking new, explicit, legal authorities that would allow our assistance to Colombia, including assistance previously provided, to be used "to support a unified campaign against narcotics trafficking, terrorist activities, and other threats to its national security." These new authorities recognize that the terrorist and narcotics problems in Colombia are inextricably intertwined in their threat to Colombia's security, prosperity and democracy. If authorized, we will continue to assist Colombia's counternarcotics activities while also being able to aid their counterterrorism effort.

The new authorities will not resolve all the difficulties that Colombia faces. The military assistance we have provided to Colombia is geared toward a limited, counternarcotics mission. Expanding the authorities for the use of aircraft and other assets to cover terrorist and other threats to Colombia's democracy does not ensure that Colombia will be able to address these multiple threats in the short-term. However, if approved, they will give us the flexibility we need to help the Government of Colombia attack this hydra-headed threat more efficiently and more effectively, in the shortest possible time, with resources already in Colombia.

Our request for new authorities does not signify a retreat from our concern about human rights nor signal an ill-guided U.S. commitment in Colombia. Our proposal expressly states that we will continue to do human rights vetting of all Colombian military units receiving U.S. training or equipment and will maintain the 800 person cap on U.S. military personnel and contractors providing training and other services in Colombia.

In addition to new legal authorities, we are also seeking \$35 million in the counterterrorism supplemental to help the Colombian Government protect its citizens from kidnapping, infrastructure attacks and other terrorist actions. Our \$35 million request is broken down as follows:

- \$25 million in Non-proliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR) funding for anti-kidnapping training and equipment for the Colombian police and military;
- \$6 million in Foreign Military Funds (FMF) funding for training for Colombian military units protecting the key Caño Limón oil pipeline.
- \$4 million in International Narcotics Control Law Enforcement (INCLE) funding to help organize, train, equip and deploy Colombian National Police units that will provide security for the construction of reinforced police stations to enable the police to reestablish a presence in conflicted areas.

In the longer-term, we are asking for \$439 million in INCLE funds in our fiscal year 2003 budget request to sustain our Plan Colombia programs, as well as \$98 million in foreign military financing funds to train and equip Colombian military units protecting the Caño Limón oil pipeline. The \$439 million request includes \$275 million for the Colombian military and police, and \$164 million for democracy programs, alternative development, assistance to vulnerable

groups, and promotion of the rule of law. These funds, together with the terrorism supplemental, will be crucial as the next Colombian government works to improve security, build effective democratic institutions and foster economic growth.

Peace Process

As I mentioned earlier, the U.S. government supported President Pastrana's peace efforts with the FARC. We made clear to the Government of Colombia our concerns about FARC abuse of the demilitarized zone, but maintained that management of the process was the Pastrana Administration's responsibility. I want to reiterate that despite the breakdown of the FARC process due to the FARC's bad faith, the U.S. government remains supportive of peace processes aimed at halting terrorist violence and reincorporating irregular combatants into Colombia's political, economic and social fabric. In this context, we are encouraged by the current talks between the ELN and the Government of Colombia, and hope that they will soon produce a viable, lasting peace accord.

Colombian Commitment

The U.S. is committed to helping Colombia in its fight against terrorism's assault on its democracy, prosperity and security, but Colombians must take the lead in this struggle. U.S. support will be contingent on the Government of Colombia taking the steps needed to mount an effective campaign against terror. These will include Colombian commitments to develop a national political-military strategy, boost the resources devoted to security, implement economic reforms, improve human rights protection, and sustain vigorous and effective counternarcotics programs. We have already engaged the leading Colombian presidential candidates on these issues, and will hold more intensive talks with the president-elect after Colombia's presidential elections.

Conclusion

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, your support will be crucial in the days ahead as you discuss our proposal for new and supplemental funding request for our assistance to Colombia, as well as our fiscal year 2003 budget request. I look forward to maintaining a dialogue with you as we work together to help provide Colombia's democracy the tools it needs to build a secure, prosperous and democratic life for its citizens. The people of Colombia must not be denied the opportunity to enjoy the benefits of a hemisphere united by open markets, democratic governments, respect for human rights, and the rule of law.

Europe and America: A New Strategic Partnership

By

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Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs

[The following is excerpts from the speech given to the Royal Institute of International Affairs 2002 Defense Conference, Chatham House, London, United Kingdom, February 20, 2002.]

The United States: Preparing for Global Operations

Like so many in the U.S. administration, I appreciate Lord Robertson for reminding all of us how unique, vital, and indispensable is our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance. And as one American whose loved ones back home are safer because European pilots and crews are patrolling the skies above the United States. I have come to Europe with a renewed sense of connection to our allies, and gratitude for this Trans-Atlantic bond, carried through the generations. For all the powerful history that underpins the security partnership of Europe and America, we require no such legacy to find common cause today.

And I know that by the time all the speakers on the program have said their piece, a full spectrum of concerns and insights will have been aired. But I have no doubt that the end result will be a convergence of views on the necessity of robust, effective international security cooperation, some of it taking forms that have yet to be conceived. Today, the Royal Institute has asked me to speak about how the U.S. is preparing for global operations. Had I been invited to speak on this subject a year ago, as a private citizen and an ex-government official, I probably would have focused on a vision of alliance operations well into the future, considering how technology and military transformation in the U.S. might have progressed, what modernization might have been achieved by the other NATO militaries, and how the defense sectors of the United States and Europe would have supported that transformation. I would have discussed the nature of the threat and the corresponding evolution in the 21st Century tools of war and rules of war. Above all, I would have ruminated about the future political character of the United States alliance with Europe in the context of an expanded NATO as well as an expanded, empowered European Union. All of these remain hugely consequential topics, and I commend them to the Conference's consideration. But I am not an ex-official at least not as I begin my remarks this morning. And as such, I suppose I am now afflicted with the malady common to government bureaucrats: namely, I cannot see much beyond the in-basket on my desk. And so, when asked the question, "How is the U.S. preparing for global operations?" I find that there is but one vision that fills my head, and that is not some theoretical construct, but rather the global operation taking place today, right now, involving almost every country on the planet.

The United States has been warned repeatedly since September 11, 2001 about possible further terrorist threats. And so in Washington we have thrown out the old play book and waged instead a new kind of international campaign featuring financial, law enforcement, and intelligence cooperation. President Bush has created and empowered a Homeland Security organization and mustered whatever capabilities we presently have for this task, all the while maintaining a high alert at home and abroad. Asymmetric threats, to us, are today's threats.

Similarly, in the area of humanitarian operations, current events demand action. The nations of the world have recently met in Tokyo and pledged major assistance to help restore Afghanistan. The U.S., along with many other governments, has made a commitment to remain engaged in

Afghanistan's future in order that the Afghan people do not fall prey once again to extremists. Program managers and field workers from international organizations, governmental agencies, and non-government organizations are now surging into Afghanistan, because they know that time will not wait for the Afghan people. And so it is with a concern much discussed among European and American security experts, namely, the perceived disparity between U.S. capabilities and those of its allies. The discussion often turns to resources, and appropriately so. Lord Robertson, among others, has criticized levels of European defense spending as too low. President Bush, meanwhile, has just proposed a \$48 billion increase in U.S. defense spending. Recently, he said, "The price of freedom is high; the price of security is high. But the United States will pay it." So, when we think about the future of the trans-Atlantic alliance, we should talk about current defense spending.

In the realm of defense trade licensing, I support NATO's Defense Capabilities Initiative and recognize that there are some critical priorities for military modernization and interoperability that merit a coordinated effort among the allied governments. I will support my colleagues in the Pentagon as they encourage defense industrial cooperation with Europe on key weapons programs for future use by alliance forces.

European defense industry executives often ask whether the U.S. is prepared to open its market further to European defense products. It is a reasonable question, and I believe U.S. defense officials are attentive to workshare and employment issues in these matters; I have to let them speak for themselves. Yet, regardless of how open the Pentagon's acquisition process might be to European products, the inescapable reality is that the U.S. has been outspending Europe on defense research and development by as much as twenty to one.

Obviously, the largest proposed U.S. defense spending increase in twenty years will only accelerate this disparity. The Department of Defense's missile defense and military transformation initiatives will push the U.S. technology baseline further still as they advance from the conceptual to the programmatic stage. So we have to think through the budgetary and defense industrial aspect of our plans for the future.

But debating future spending levels, while necessary, is not at all a sufficient basis to frame the issue of strategic partnership. Once again, the in-basket pervades my own thinking. We must come to terms with the real-world crisis that is right in front of us.

A few weeks ago, I visited eight Arab states, including all of the Gulf Cooperation Council states, and saw U.S. military forces operating in several locations. In some of them, American forces were sharing ramp and hangar space and cooperating closely with soldiers or sailors of other countries engaged in the ongoing campaign to end the threat posed by Al-Qaida and the Taliban in Afghanistan. The many Arab governments hosting these multinational forces are themselves demonstrating solidarity with the international community against the threat of transnational terrorism. I encountered the same spirit of commitment and engagement in a meeting with NATO Ambassadors in Brussels on my way back to Washington.

Indeed, as an American I cannot overstate how important it is to the U.S. and the American people to know that so many countries, starting with our closest allies, have joined with the United States to share the military risks, or to cooperate on many other levels in this endeavor. The swift invocation of *Article 5* by NATO on September 12, 2001 and the endorsement of over 150 governments for the military campaign of the past five months were, to my mind, indications that the international environment was transformed by the attacks of September 11, 2001.

In waging war together on terrorism, our partnership has grown stronger. NATO invoked *Article 5* for the first time ever on September 12. Since then, the European Union has moved

swiftly to round up terrorists, close down terrorist financing networks, and improve law enforcement and aviation security cooperation.

Moreover, it is abundantly clear that even as we fight the war on terrorism, we will not be deterred from achieving the goal we share of a Europe whole, free, and at peace. While in the Balkans there remain several challenges to our achieving this goal, we are meeting those challenges. We have seized war criminals, helped bring about significant changes in governments in Croatia and Yugoslavia, and our military forces are in Kosovo and Bosnia to help bring stability and self-governance, while European-led action fosters a settlement in Macedonia. We need to finish the job in the Balkans and we will. We went in together with you and we will come out together with you. To draw attention to all this solidarity is not to overlook the pervasive international press commentary, and yes, official commentary, one hears today about the particular stance of the United States regarding the threat of terror. I am mindful of the contrast some have drawn between the U.S. and virtually the rest of the international community on this and other issues.

But let us be candid about what has happened. The U.S. you see today is a country whose declaratory policy, military posture, and resource commitments are fully harmonized in support of national security, reflecting the fact that it has been attacked and faces the threat of further attack. This is not a Washington D.C. that people below a certain age will have any reason to understand from personal experience. The U.S. is a country "at war," for lack of a better term. The U.S. military operations are being carried out as legitimate acts of self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Our allies and other nations are in a condition of solidarity, support, and in some cases, joint combat operations with the Americans. For the most part, these allied and coalition forces are operating under the rubric of the many multilateral and treaty obligations invoked since September 11, 2001.

President Bush is pointing very directly at sources of threat, tension, and instability. Other countries, to varying degrees, appear to be measuring their own political appetite for whatever may come next in the war on terrorism. There appears to be some concern internationally about how U.S. leadership in the anti-terror campaign, backed by increased Pentagon spending, may translate into greater influence over the day-to-day affairs of nations once this campaign has succeeded. Notwithstanding some of the rhetoric of late with regard to President Bush's characterization of the threat we face as an axis of evil, I cannot believe that we do not see eye to eye and will not be able to cooperate on the further prosecution of the war on international terrorism. The U.S. faith in the trans-Atlantic bond is unshaken. Indeed, it is strengthened by what we have done together and what we are doing together still.

My own answer to the perceived international concern about United States centralism, as one NATO permanent representative delicately phrased it, is this: the U.S. interests cannot gain and our partnership can hardly remain strategic if some of the partners begin to view our most important shared endeavors in zero sum terms.

Certainly I am pleased that U.S. military forces today are gaining operational proficiency on a large scale, and refining methods and doctrine every day, driven by necessity. But permit me to mention the cost: the U.S. today has tens of thousands of forces forward deployed in the Gulf and Central Asia. Nearly 70,000 reserves have been called up to active duty. We have pulled air, naval and ground assets into and near the theater of operations from all over the world. When one adds the expense of U.S. military operations with its bilateral assistance to countries facilitating the campaign, as well as the commitment made to Afghanistan's reconstruction, the U.S. is incurring a very substantial share of the expense in the global campaign against terrorism. President Bush has accepted this burden, as noted; but that is because virtually all American

citizens feel that our security demands it, not because we seek an exclusive international status either in political or military terms.

There is a message here for U.S. allies in Europe. Let us not talk about new strategic cooperation among allies only in terms of future scenarios, capabilities, and spending. That would be like a sports team biding its time in the locker room, redesigning its uniforms and sketching new plays on the chalkboard while the contest transpires out on the field. The contest today is the crisis that produced more than forty multilateral declarations of support and commitment. The playing field right at this moment is Afghanistan, whether for military missions dealing with the residual al-Qaida and Taliban threat, participation in the International Security Assistance Force, training for Afghan security forces, or support to humanitarian operations. There may well be other geographic venues as this campaign pursues global terrorist operatives who may be in hiding or on the run. What I am saying is that instead of lamenting military disparities in the alliance, and drawing negative contrasts between American policy pronouncements and those of other governments, we need to seize upon, and build on, the overwhelming commonality of interest we all have in prevailing against these threats. That means acknowledging the challenge posed by sophisticated global terrorism and potential weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threats, and putting the horse of national political commitment in front of the cart of investment in military capabilities. The U.S. did not have a Homeland Security office on September 11, 2001; we had not perfected or even tried joint unconventional warfare operations in any recent combat engagement before going into Afghanistan last fall. But we went anyway, because the nation was committed to the mission.

And that is my message to U.S. allies in Europe. Make the political commitment to acknowledge the threat and to face it. Identify the missions that your militaries have a reasonable expectation of being able to execute be they combat, peacekeeping or humanitarian. And let the stimulus be your political debate over defense spending and modernization priorities. Some, like the United Kingdom, have clearly made these calculations and commitments. Others have not.

The foundation of our new strategic partnership is political, not military. It is the moral certainty among leaders and citizens alike that our futures and our fates are bound together, and it is the commitment that we will proceed as partners. I hope this message will find favor at a moment in history when the path toward a more stable and secure world is right beneath our feet.

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2001

By

Lorne W. Craner
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Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor

Overview and Acknowledgments

Why the Reports Are Prepared

This report is submitted to the Congress by the Department of State in compliance with Sections 116(d) and 502(b) of the *Foreign Assistance Act of 1961* (FAA), as amended, and Section 504 of the *Trade Assistance Act of 1974*, as amended. The law provides that the Secretary of State shall transmit the report to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, by February 25, 2002.

“A full and complete report regarding the status of internationally recognized human rights, within the meaning of subsection (A) in countries that receive assistance under this part, and (B) in all other foreign countries which are members of the United Nations and which are not otherwise the subject of a human rights report under this Act.”

We have also included reports on several countries that do not fall into the categories established by these statutes and that thus are not covered by the congressional requirement.

The responsibility of the United States to speak out on behalf of international human rights standards was formalized in the early 1970's. In 1976 Congress enacted legislation creating a Coordinator of Human Rights in the Department of State, a position later upgraded to assistant secretary. In 1994 the Congress created a position of Senior Advisor for Women's Rights. Congress has also written into law formal requirements that U.S. foreign and trade policy take into account countries' human rights and worker rights performance and that country reports be submitted to the Congress on an annual basis. The first reports, in 1977, covered only the 82 countries receiving U.S. aid; this year 195 reports are submitted.

How the Reports Are Prepared

In August 1993, the Secretary of State moved to strengthen further the human rights efforts of our embassies. All sections in each embassy were asked to contribute information and to corroborate reports of human rights violations, and new efforts were made to link mission programming to the advancement of human rights and democracy. In 1994 the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs was reorganized and renamed as the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, reflecting both a broader sweep and a more focused approach to the interlocking issues of human rights, worker rights, and democracy. The 2001 human rights reports reflect a year of dedicated effort by hundreds of State Department, foreign service, and other U.S. government employees.

Our embassies, which prepared the initial drafts of the reports, gathered information throughout the year from a variety of sources across the political spectrum, including government officials, jurists, armed forces sources, journalists, human rights monitors, academics, and labor activists. This information-gathering can be hazardous, and U.S. foreign service officers regularly go to great lengths, under trying and sometimes dangerous conditions, to investigate

reports of human rights abuse, monitor elections, and come to the aid of individuals at risk, such as political dissidents and human rights defenders whose rights are threatened by their governments.

After the embassies completed their drafts, the texts were sent to Washington for careful review by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, in cooperation with other State Department offices. As they worked to corroborate, analyze, and edit the reports, the Department of State officers drew on their own sources of information. These included reports provided by U.S. and other human rights groups, foreign government officials, representatives from the United Nations and other international and regional organizations and institutions, experts from academia, and the media. Officers also consulted with experts on worker rights issues, refugee issues, military and police topics, women's issues, and legal matters. The guiding principle was to ensure that all relevant information was assessed as objectively, thoroughly, and fairly as possible.

The reports in this volume will be used as a resource for shaping policy, conducting diplomacy, and making assistance, training, and other resource allocations. They also will serve as a basis for the U.S. government's cooperation with private groups to promote the observance of internationally recognized human rights.

The Country Reports on Human Rights Practices cover internationally recognized individual, civil, political, and worker rights, as set forth in the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*. There rights include freedom from torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; from prolonged detention without charges; from disappearance or clandestine detention; and from other flagrant violations of the right to life, liberty, and the security of the person.

Universal human rights seek to incorporate respect for human dignity into the processes of government and law. All persons have the inalienable right to change their government by peaceful means and to enjoy basic freedoms, such as freedom of expression, association, assembly, movement, and religion, without discrimination on the basis of race, religion, national origin, or sex. The right to join a free trade union is a necessary condition of a free society and economy. Thus, the reports assess key internationally recognized worker rights, including the right of association; the right to organize and bargain collectively; prohibition of forced or compulsory labor; the status of child labor practices and the minimum age for employment of children; and acceptable work conditions.

Introduction

Human Rights and National Security

For the United States, indeed for the whole world, 2001 was a year in which the importance of universal human rights was brought sharply into focus by global terrorism. On September 11, 2001, the world changed. As President Bush declared in his State of the Union Address,

“In a single instant, we realized that this will be a decisive decade in the history of liberty, that we’ve been called to a unique role in human events. Rarely has the world faced a choice more clear or consequential. . . . We choose freedom and the dignity of every life.”

This choice reflects both U.S. values and the universality of human rights that steadily have gained international acceptance over the past fifty years.

As the United States and our international partners commit resources to the fight against terrorism, we do so for all those who respect and yearn for human rights and democracy. Our fight against terrorism is part of a larger fight for democracy. In the words of President Bush,

“America will lead by defending liberty and justice because they are right and true and unchanging for all people everywhere. No nation owns these aspirations, and no nation is exempt from them. We have no intention of imposing our culture. But America will always stand firm for the non-negotiable demands of human dignity. The rule of law, limits on the power of the state, respect for women, private property, free speech, equal justice and religious tolerance.”

This world of democracy, opportunity, and stability is a world in which terrorism cannot thrive. While the battle only has begun, we already have achieved significant objectives. Afghan citizens have been released from the brutal and oppressive rule of the Taliban. Afghan women, who suffered violence and repression, are now beginning to resume their roles in society. Indeed Afghanistan is a triumph for human rights in 2001.

There is, however, much more work still to be done. The *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2001* captures a world still reeling and reacting to the events of last September. Yet the Reports’ central mission remains the same, to give voice to those who have been denied the freedoms and rights provided for in the *Universal Declaration on Human Rights*. The Report confirm that the battle of ideas between those who suppress democracy and human rights and those who would see them flourish remains far from over. Only through the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms can the international community be secure from the scourge of terrorism.

The Year in Review

Developments in Human Rights, Democracy, and Labor

The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon and the subsequent launch of the international war on terrorism were the defining events of 2001. Assembling a disparate group of nations into an international coalition, the United States led the way into a campaign to defend peace, security, and freedom. In addition to bringing the world together in a common cause, this effort has provided an opportunity to expand the dialog on human rights and fundamental freedoms with a broad spectrum of countries.

Institutional Changes

Perhaps nowhere was institutional change more significant than in Afghanistan, where five years of repressive Taliban rule came to an end. While all Afghans suffered under the cruel and arbitrary rule of the Taliban, women were particularly affected since they were denied their rights and civil liberties and effectively relegated to a state of nonexistence in society. By year’s end, members of the international community were committing themselves to the rebuilding of Afghanistan, including the formation of a broad-based, pluralistic government. Among the new ministers appointed to the interim Afghanistan government were two women. In addition three women were appointed to the *loya jirga*, a consultative council of elders.

In Peru presidential and legislative elections generally met international standards for free and fair elections and demonstrated momentum toward democratic reform in the region. Both transitional President Valentin Paniagua, who took the reins following President Fujimori’s departure, and President Alejandro Toledo took significant steps during the year to address past

abuses, combat corruption, and establish the Truth and Reconciliation Commission to investigate human rights abuses that occurred under the Fujimori Administration.

The Organization of American States adopted a landmark *Inter-American Democratic Charter*, which clearly states that “the peoples of the Americas have a right to democracy and that their governments have an obligation to promote and defend it.” The date of the charter’s adoption was, significantly, September 11, 2001, just hours after the terrorist attacks. In the Middle East, a number of countries initiated steps toward increased democratic practices and pluralism in public life. For example, in Bahrain the Amir annulled the *State Security Act*, which permitted arbitrary arrest, prolonged detention, and forced exile, and conducted a national referendum in which male and female voters endorsed a plan to restore constitutional rule. The Bahrain government also released all political prisoners, took steps to encourage the development of non-governmental organizations and engender an environment supportive of open political discourse, and registered the Bahrain Human Rights Society, the country’s first human rights organization. Events in Qatar and Oman also provided encouragement in 2001.

Political Rights

Open and transparent elections and the peaceful transfer of power marked the coming of age of several democratically elected governments. Thailand held the first elections for its house of representatives under the 1997 constitution, following the election in 2000 of senate members, who previously were appointed by the King. East Timor continued on its path toward independence with its first election since the 1999 independence referendum. The people of East Timor voted for a constituent assembly that then began talks on how the new state would be structured. In Kosovo well-organized elections attracted participation by all ethnic communities. Bangladesh further consolidated its democracy by successfully holding its third parliamentary election on October 1, 2001. The election marked the third democratic exchange of power between national governments since 1991.

In contrast harassment, intimidation, violence, death threats, and fraud marred elections and the political process in several countries. Belarusian leader Aleksandr Lukashenko extended his term of office in September 2001 through a process that failed to meet commitments for democratic elections made by the Belarusian government to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Allegations of irregularities in the election process in Madagascar caused massive demonstrations in that country. The lead-up to 2002 elections in Zimbabwe was marred by a campaign of violence and intimidation of the opposition, a breakdown in the rule of law, and the undermining of democratic institutions, such as the judiciary and independent media, which put the fairness and transparency of the elections in serious doubt. In the preparation for Cambodian elections in 2002, the number of apparently politically motivated killings rose sharply. Reports of vote buying already had surfaced several months before the elections.

The Cuban government continued to deny its citizens basic civil and political rights. Political expression remained prohibited, and the Cuban government continued to imprison people for political reasons, including for simply criticizing the government. The government continued to refuse to allow international organizations to inspect prisons. In Turkmenistan the government continued to deny its citizens many fundamental political rights. Political parties and independent non-government organizations were not allowed.

Internal and Other Conflicts

While persistent strife in many countries continued to challenge efforts to protect the rights of the individual, there were indications in some countries that efforts to secure greater peace and stability were bearing fruit. The United Nations (U.N.) observer mission to the Democratic

Republic of the Congo began to move forward with its plans for assisting in the voluntary disarmament and demobilization of nonsignatory armed groups in the Congo, as called for in the *Lusaka Cease Fire Agreement*. Burundi negotiated an intermediate administrative structure and inaugurated a transitional government on November 1, 2001. International facilitators were able to defuse internal conflict in Macedonia when they mediated the negotiation of a peace agreement that guaranteed ethnic Albanians more rights.

Palestinian terrorist groups, including some members of the security forces and Fatah's Tanzim, killed 208 Israeli soldiers and civilians in the violence that began in September 2000. Violence intensified in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza. Terrorist attacks on Israeli civilians increased, including numerous suicide bombings and shootings. Israeli security forces sometimes used excessive force in contravention of their own rules of engagement, killing 501 Palestinians and injuring thousands in response to terrorist attacks, violent demonstrations, and other clashes in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza.

The fear of spillover from the antiterrorist campaign in Afghanistan and a perceived opportunity to legitimize measures against Muslim Uighur activists under the antiterrorism umbrella led to an intensification of a crackdown in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region of China late in the year. The Chinese government officials asserted that some persons engaged in legitimate political or religious activities were, in fact, involved in terrorist activities or had ties to al-Qaida. Russian forces in Chechnya continued to root out separatist fighters during the year. These sweeps often were accompanied by credible reports of disappearances, extrajudicial killing, extortion, torture, and arbitrary detention. In Colombia longstanding and widespread internal conflict and rampant violence, both criminal and political, persisted. An estimated 3,000 to 3,500 Colombians died during the year as a result of the conflict, which involved state forces, paramilitary groups, and guerrillas. The Colombia government continued to work to end collaboration between security forces and paramilitary groups, who were responsible for the majority of the killings. Colombia guerrilla groups continued to kidnap large numbers of citizens for ransom. Journalists, judicial employees, human rights workers, and trade unionists were among those targeted by various groups. In addition the population of internally displaced persons continued to increase.

Integrity of the Person

Arbitrary detention, torture, and extrajudicial killings remained common tools of political and religious repression. Public security forces all too frequently tortured detainees in China, Indonesia, Kenya, Burma, Uzbekistan, Mexico, and many other countries. In Turkey torture remained a serious problem, although the number of reported cases declined. In Burma arbitrary detention remained a constant threat to civil liberty. Although Burma released approximately 200 political prisoners during the year, hundreds more remained in prison. Similarly, while Uzbekistan released approximately 800 prisoners accused of crimes against their constitution, thousands more remained in prison.

The protections of due process and of timely and fair public trials continued to be unavailable in many countries. During the year Russia raised concerns regarding a series of so-called espionage cases that lacked due process and the influence of the federal security service in court cases. The Zimbabwe government undermined the independence of the judiciary by pressuring justices to resign and replacing them with those deemed to be more sympathetic to the ruling party's policies.

The Mexican National Commission on Human Rights released a report on disappearances dating to the 1970's. Of the 532 disappearances documented in the report, 275 allegedly involved

public authorities. President Fox took an important first step towards addressing these past abuses by appointing a special prosecutor to investigate the cases outlined in the report.

The Lukashenko regime in Belarus undertook no serious measures to determine who was responsible for politically motivated disappearances dating from 1999. Credible reports emerged of a regime death squad operating out of the Belarus Ministry of the Interior that was responsible for the disappearances of prominent opposition figures and an independent journalist. An individual accused of ordering the disappearances was placed in charge of the investigations. Allegations made by investigators, who subsequently sought asylum abroad, indicated that the regime was blocking a thorough investigation.

Although prison conditions remained harsh in Kazakhstan, the Kazakhstan government took some measures to improve conditions and the treatment of prisoners.

Press Freedom

Governments losing popular support again targeted journalists and the independent media. In Zimbabwe President Mugabe expelled foreign journalists and proposed measures to rein in the free press at home. The government of Liberia continued to repress and intimidate the free media. Similar incidents of politically motivated attacks on the free press occurred in the post-Soviet states and Russia, where there was apparent government manipulation of the legal system to gain control over the independent nationwide television broadcaster NTV. When NTV was taken over by the state-controlled gas company, Gazprom, TV-6 became Russia's last independent station. Late in the year, TV-6 also came under fire from shareholder Lukoil-Garant, a company partly owned by the Russian government. The absence of a prompt and transparent investigation into the 2000 killing of Ukrainian independent journalist Heorhiy Gongadze remained of great concern to observers.

Azerbaijan began a new crackdown on the independent media during midyear, intimidating and imprisoning journalists for remarks critical of government officials. However, late in the year, the Azerbaijan president called for an end to the harassment of journalists, and after many years of attempting to obtain licenses, several television stations throughout the country were granted licenses at year's end. In Kazakhstan the Parliament passed a media law that, among other things, holds local media outlets criminally responsible for content when reprinting articles published in the foreign media, limits the retransmission of foreign broadcasting, and places restrictions on the internet. While the government of Kyrgyzstan did reregister sixteen media outlets after months of bureaucratic delay, it continued to pressure the independent media by using lawsuits and other harassing tactics. An independent media was virtually nonexistent in Turkmenistan.

Religious Freedom

Religious freedom remained elusive in many parts of the world. Based on the U.S. Department's *Annual Report on International Religious Freedom 2001* (issued in October 2001 and covering the period July 2000 through June 2001) [See the complete report at <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/irf/>], Burma, China, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and Sudan were designated *countries of particular concern* by the Secretary of State. The Chinese government's respect for freedom of religion and of conscience worsened. Various sources reported that thousands of adherents of the Falun Gong spiritual movement were arrested, detained, and imprisoned, and that 200 or more had died in detention since 1999. Some unregistered religious groups were subjected to increased restrictions, intimidation, harassment, and detention. Many leaders of unregistered religious groups remained in prison. In Tibet the government promptly and forcibly suppressed any activities perceived as advocating Tibetan independence or

separatism. In practice Tibetan Buddhists were prohibited from expressing their reverence for the Dalai Lama as a religious leader. Incidents of arbitrary detention of Vietnamese citizens for the peaceful expression of political and religious views continued. Leaders of unregistered religious organizations suffered special harassment, detention, and imprisonment. In October a Catholic priest, Father Nguyen Van Ly, was sentenced to fifteen years in prison, apparently for calling for respect for religious freedom and human rights. Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam leaders Thich Huyen Quang (the Supreme Patriarch) and Thich Quang Do continued to be held under house arrest.

Obtaining reliable information about the situation in North Korea remained difficult given the regime's rigid control of information. However, reports continued to surface of executions of Christian believers. The North Korean government's human rights record remained poor, and it continued to commit numerous serious abuses. The regime continued to crack down on unauthorized religious groups and tightly control official groups. In Uzbekistan security forces continued to arrest and detain persons arbitrarily on false charges, particularly Muslims suspected of extremist sympathies. The Uzbekistan government continued to view those who practiced an unauthorized version of Islam as enemies of the state and indiscriminately treated them as potential terrorists. Although some unauthorized versions of Islam advocate the overthrow of secular governments, in some cases by violent means, Uzbekistan government often arrested those who do not advocate violence and are only guilty of possessing pamphlets from these groups. In Sudan the government's insistence on Shari'a law made religious freedom a critical issue in the peace process. The Sudan government continued to restrict the activities of non-Muslims, including Christians and followers of traditional indigenous religions, as well as some Islamic groups. Reports of forced conversions to Islam of orphans, abductees, and army recruits remained a matter of concern. Although the government of Saudi Arabia has stated publicly that it will protect the right of non-Muslims to worship privately, the distinction between public and private worship remained unclear. This lack of clarity, combined with instances of arbitrary enforcement, has meant that most non-Muslims worship clandestinely. When discovered some worshippers have been detained and deported.

Women Rights

The plight of Afghan women, who suffered under one of the most repressive regimes in the world, further raised awareness about the continued oppression of women throughout the world and prompted a radio address by U.S. First Lady Laura Bush on the Taliban's brutality toward women and children. The U.S. President signed the *Afghan Women and Children Relief Act of 2001* in December, and the State Department's Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Bureau published *The Taliban's War Against Women*, describing some of the abuses. Soon after the Taliban regime fell, Afghan women began to reassert their rights to basic human dignities. Some enthusiastically took on leadership roles in the Afghan Interim Authority or the Loya Jirga; others returned to work in different areas. As women returned to work, and young women and girls prepared to return to school, it became clear that women were eager to return to active participation in Afghan society. [See the special report at <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/c4804.htm>]

There was other notable progress in human rights for women. In February the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia issued a landmark verdict that found that the enslavement of women and girls in the Bosnian town of Foca for the purpose of continuous rape rose to the level of crimes against humanity. Sixteen women and girls testified that they had been held as slaves and raped multiple times.

In April 2001, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights issued its first report on the issue of violence against women, observing that Brazil had violated the rights of a female

petitioner because the country had failed to act and had tolerated the violence inflicted. The commission recommended that the perpetrator be prosecuted, the victim compensated, and that the Brazilian government continue and expand its reform process to end the problem of state tolerance of domestic violence against women.

In Yemen, the government and a national women's association began a dialog to consider changes to laws that discriminate against women. The women's group provided the Yemen government with legal and religious justifications for the changes. The Yemen government also created a Minister of State for Human Rights and appointed a woman to the position, marking the first time that a woman has held a ministerial position in Yemen. In Turkey substantial reform of the country's Civil Code strengthened gender equality in civil matters. Non-government organizations actively participated in the process and contributed meaningfully to the results. Despite this progress, so-called honor killings and dowry deaths continued to be major problems in certain parts of the Middle East and South Asia. In many parts of Africa, female genital mutilation continued to damage the physical and psychological health of women and girls and to hinder the economic development of the continent. Millions of women are subjected to this practice each year. In March 2001 the U.S. State Department released a *Report on Female Genital Mutilation*.

The international community strongly protested a Nigerian court's decision to sentence a woman to be stoned to death for adultery. The sentence was under appeal at year's end. The incidence of violence, including domestic violence, discriminatory marriage and family laws, as well as unequal access to education, employment, and health care were still significant problems for women in many parts of the world.

The Rights of Children

By the end of the year, eighty nations, including the United States, had signed the optional protocol to the *Convention on the Rights of the Child* on the involvement of children in armed conflict. Still, the rights of children in areas of conflict and in impoverished countries continued to be a major concern. Wars deprived many children of food, shelter, medical care, and mental well-being. Children displaced by conflict were deprived of their education. In many areas of the globe, street children faced similar problems. In addition these children remained especially vulnerable to sexual exploitation and abuse by some police and local officials. Many children have become addicted to drugs. Some young boys in wealthy Persian Gulf states are exposed to great danger when used as jockeys in camel races.

Children made up the largest proportion of internally displaced populations in many countries racked by internal conflicts such as Afghanistan, Angola, and Liberia. In Sri Lanka, Rwanda, Burundi, and Sudan many children were forcibly recruited to engage in combat; however, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Sierra Leone, the governments began demobilizing child soldiers as part of the process of conflict resolution in those countries. Governments continued to ratify *International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 182 on the Worst Forms of Child Labor* faster than any convention in the ILO's history. By year's end, 133 nations had deposited instruments of ratification. The convention was adopted by the United States in 1999 and ratified in 2000. Among the countries that have yet to ratify the convention, Sudan continued to use forced child labor.

Worker Rights

Trade union leaders continued to be targeted for killing and threats in Colombia, where 171 trade union leaders were killed, more than in the rest of the world combined. The United Nations reported that 73 percent of these trade union killings were committed by paramilitary groups. In

Burma forced labor remained a widespread problem, although under international pressure the Burma government promulgated new regulations to curb the practice. China experienced increased labor unrest as frustrated factory workers seized factories and at times managers demanding back wages and fair play from management. A new law on trade unions directed the official All-China Federation of Trade Unions to shift its attention to collective bargaining and to represent workers' interests to management. Russia promulgated a new labor code that appeared to weaken the role of independent unions and leave all unions vulnerable to management domination. In Guatemala several killings of trade union leaders remained unsolved, and workers attempting to organize a union were physically intimidated. However, the Guatemalan government enacted labor code reforms that brought the country a step closer to compliance with international standards. In Vietnam apparel factories experimented with a voluntary private code of labor standards designed to improve working conditions and certify the results to buyers in the United States and Europe.

Trafficking in Persons

The abhorrent practice of trafficking of more than 700,000 men, women, and children each year affected almost every country and remained one of the most serious human rights problems facing the world. Women and children from Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and Southeast Asia have become the primary targets of transnational criminal elements, including traffickers. Abducted by force or ensnared through misrepresentation, fraud, or coercion, trafficking victims are transported throughout the world, where they are forced to work in substandard conditions in factories, as domestic or farm laborers, or are exploited sexually. The abductions of men, women, and children from minority southern tribes in Sudan for forced labor and ransom remained a matter of grave concern.

A number of governments took steps to combat trafficking in persons, although much remains to be done. In South Korea, for example, over fifty district public prosecutor's offices designated special prosecutors for trafficking and have been operating joint crackdown teams for trafficking-related crimes. Several countries in southeastern Europe have focused efforts to deal with the problem, despite significant resource constraints. For example, Albania created and passed a comprehensive *National Strategy on Anti-Trafficking*, which charts its course for dealing with trafficking, and Romania enacted a law that prohibits trafficking in persons. The Economic Community of West African States adopted a *Political Declaration and Action Plan* with achievable goals and objectives. The Philippines also drew up an action plan to combat this growing transnational crime and violation of human rights.

Signaling the U.S. government's commitment, the State Department released its first *Trafficking in Persons Report* in July and formally opened the Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons in November. [See the report at <http://www.state.gov/g/inl/rls/tiprpt/>.] By the end of the year, there were over 100 signatories to the *U.N. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons*, and especially women and children, and 80 signatories to the *Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child* on the sale of children, child prostitution, and child pornography. Both agreements offer multilateral frameworks for addressing these horrific practices.

Corporate Social Responsibility

Partnerships among governments, business, labor unions, and civil society to promote human rights and address corporate responsibility grew during the year and gained new adherents. The U.N. global compact combined the resources of the private sector, working in conjunction with labor, civil society, and governments, toward corporate responsibility in the area of human rights.

Multilateral financial institutions began to address more consistently the issues surrounding corporate responsibility.

During the year, positive examples of partnerships between the private and public sectors emerged. Chevron-Texaco, Conoco, Freeport MacMoRan, British-Petroleum, Shell, and Rio Tinto together with human rights and corporate responsibility groups and the U.S. and British governments worked to integrate and implement the *Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights*. The government of the Netherlands joined this effort in December 2001. Responding to media and other reports of forced child labor in West African cocoa plantations, companies and associations in the chocolate industry lent support to government and non-government organization initiatives to address child trafficking and child labor. Other efforts to improve labor conditions and worker rights also continued as various industries worked with non-government organizations and governments to implement voluntary codes of conduct and factory monitoring systems.

Human Rights in the 21st Century

The pervasiveness of global terrorism became shockingly apparent with the events of September 11, 2001. The events strengthened the argument made by the United States and our international partners that we were engaged in a struggle to defend our freedoms and values. Moreover along with the need to defend ourselves came the growing awareness that terrorism has been gaining adherents for some time in countries where human rights are denied and civil liberties are repressed. The citizens in many of these countries also lack economic opportunity.

Extending the benefits of globalization, therefore, has added a new dimension to the challenge that we face in defending our values. The benefits of taking part in the global economy the exchange of goods and technology, the creation of jobs and an educated workforce are apparent. Stable, democratic governments offer the clearest path to the economic growth and prosperity that nations and their people seek. Ending corruption, assuring the observance of the rule of law, and providing fair judicial recourse are central to economic development and contribute to good corporate governance.

The U.S. government's steadfast commitment to human rights and democracy was left unshaken by September 11, 2001. Indeed these events further strengthened our resolve to help ensure these rights for people everywhere. We will continue to press for human rights, democratic processes, and civil liberties in all countries using the range of tools available to us. The U.S. government will continue to monitor and report accurately and comprehensively on human rights around the globe. The U.S. will continue to work to integrate human rights concerns such as religious freedom, press freedom, good governance, worker rights, respect for women, and combating trafficking in persons, into our foreign policy and programs. And we will accelerate our programming work to assist other countries in improving human rights infrastructure and policies.

To accomplish these goals and achieve sustainable results, we will need partners. The emergence of a vibrant, global civil society over the past three decades has contributed to our efforts, as have our traditional partners governments. The private sector also has an important role to play. They appreciate, as we do, that countries that respect democracy and human rights are stable and secure, and thus good investment environments. As the events of the past year illustrate, the protection and promotion of human rights can no longer be considered the purview of governments and non-government organizations alone. A partnership of governments, non-government organizations, and the private sector will be necessary to win the fight to ensure the observance of universal human rights in the 21st century.

Country-specific reports can viewed at <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/hr/c1470.htm>.

U.S. Foreign Policy: The Growing Role of Economics

By

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First, a Personal Note

This is an exciting time to be working in foreign affairs. We are in an era when foreign policy issues are very much in public focus. As Secretary Powell says, the Department of State is “the first line of offense” in promoting American interests around the world. People care about what the Department of State does, and it is due in no small part to the work of you here in the Baltimore Council and the active participation of U.S. citizens in foreign affairs through similar organizations around the country. Thanks to your lively, informed interest in international affairs, we are able to keep alive the public debate that ensures our foreign policy reflects the best interests and the will of the American people.

I want to talk with you tonight about the role of economics in our foreign policy, and especially what we’re doing in the Department of State’s Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs. I would like to begin with some general observations about the rich mixture of issues we are involved in, and then hone in on a couple of specific topics that are very much in the news today.

The War on Terrorism

One of our highest priorities is combating terrorist financing choking off the resources that make horrific events like those of September 11, 2001 possible. Working closely with the Department of the Treasury, we have designated and blocked the assets of 192 organizations and individuals because of evidence linking them to international terrorism, the Secretary of State placed one organization on this list just last week. This has been an intense diplomatic effort, and as of now I can report to you that 150 nations are also taking action to prevent money from reaching terrorists. The U.S. has frozen some \$34 million in terrorists’ assets, and the rest of the world has blocked an additional \$70 million.

While we are engaged in the effort to stifle terrorist funding, we are at the same time working with the Afghan Interim Authority and the international community to help Afghanistan rebuild its shattered economy. The United States has pledged nearly \$300 million in this fiscal year alone to help Afghans with relief and reconstruction, focusing on health, education, food and agriculture, water and sanitation, refugee relief, transportation and other vital areas. It is important to remember that this official assistance, of course, is in addition to the humanitarian assistance that we have provided the Afghan people for decades over \$1 billion since 1979, more than any other single donor and which we continue to provide. And of course there are the private donations and other expressions of support by Americans our country’s typical response to a people in need.

Let me switch to a broader focus. A strong economy is the foundation of our national security. When we promote free trade and foster global growth, our economy grows and we prosper. Along with that, we have seen that countries which enjoy healthy, growing economies tend to be the

stable ones, contributing to regional peace. And, it will come as no surprise that these are also the countries that enjoy rules-based economic and social systems, because these promote opportunity and jobs and give hope for the future. As Secretary Powell is fond of saying, "Money is a coward it will not go where it does not feel safe" that is, it shies away from places where contracts are not enforced or where the rules are not transparent and well understood.

That is why, in Afghanistan's South Asian neighbor Pakistan, we are fortunate to be working with President Musharraf, a leader who is dedicated to a modern and moderate Islamic state. Because of that commitment, the Administration is helping find ways to promote trade and provide debt relief to Pakistan to recognize its efforts in the war against terrorism as well as its commitment to solid economic fundamentals.

Now that I have mentioned trade, let me spend a few minutes talking about it, because trade is something that really matters here in Baltimore and in the rest of the country. The following are some U.S. economic statistics.

- U.S. exports of goods and services last year accounted for eleven percent of our gross domestic product. The jobs of one of every five U.S. manufacturing workers rely on exports.
- The production of one out of every three acres farmed in this country is exported. Exports account for 25 percent of American farmers' and ranchers' gross cash sales.
- In 2000, sales of high-tech goods abroad accounted for 29 percent of America's merchandise exports.

According to Commerce Department figures, Maryland exported five billion dollars in merchandise in 2000, including about half from the Baltimore metropolitan area alone to 198 foreign destinations. About one-and-a-half billion dollars of that, or nearly one-third, were computers and electronic products. My figures on jobs are not as up-to-date as the trade data, but in 1997, 58,900 Maryland jobs depended on manufactured exports over 3 percent of the state's total private sector employment.

Trade is so important to Americans that the State Department, and the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs especially, puts so much emphasis on negotiating the best trade agreements we can in order to open markets, reduce or eliminate trade barriers, and provide a level playing field that allows American exporters and service providers to compete fairly.

Under World Trade Organization and the *Singapore and Chile Free Trade Agreement*, we are helping pave the way for U.S. companies to invest abroad, bringing critically-needed services, including telecom and information technology, to developing countries. This facilitates other economic development by encouraging the construction of reliable communications networks. Our trade policy is based on a coordinated effort to engage with trading partners around the world bilaterally, regionally and multilaterally.

Bilaterally, together with the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative we are negotiating free trade agreements with Chile and Singapore which we hope to conclude this year. These agreements will dramatically improve opportunities for exporters to these countries and spur others to move ahead with liberalization. We are also exploring the possibility of free trade agreements with a growing number of other countries. Last year we were pleased that Congress approved a groundbreaking bilateral trade agreement with Vietnam, which not only strengthens the economic relationship between our two countries but takes a major step toward healing the social and cultural wounds that have existed for decades.

The U.S. is also active in forging regional trade initiatives. The Department of State was a principal architect of the *2001 African Growth and Opportunity Act*, which allows the duty-free export of some 6,000 products to the U.S. from eligible African countries. President Bush has described *2001 African Growth and Opportunity Act* as “a road map for how the United States and Africa can tap the power of markets to improve the lives of our citizens.” In just one year, *2001 African Growth and Opportunity Act* has dramatically increased African exports to the United States, generated nearly one billion dollars in investment, and created thousands of jobs.

In our own hemisphere, we are forging ahead with the other democracies of the region to develop a free trade area of the Americas, which would create an open market from Alaska to Argentina no later than January 2005. *Free Trade Area of the Americas* will be the logical next step after the highly successful *North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)* which has created jobs and boosted the economies of the U.S., Canada and Mexico. And, for those who are not aware of it, Canada and Mexico represent the leading export markets for Maryland exporting 11 and 17 percent, of the state’s exports, or over \$1.3 billion the fastest-growing markets as well.

The U.S. is following up energetically on existing trade agreements. The U.S. government has developed an extensive system to ensure China’s compliance with the very significant commitments it made to liberalize its economy when it joined the World Trade Organization last December. The U.S. has broad and deep dialogue with the government of Japan and with the European Union on economic, trade and regulatory issues of great importance to U.S. exporters and investors. The U.S. is working toward Russia’s accession to the World Trade Organization to bring it into the world trading system.

Globally, the U.S. is very pleased at the successful launch of the *Doha Development Round* at the World Trade Organization ministerial meeting last November. As a World Trade Organization member nations are now hard at work on turning the Doha consensus into concrete results for example, in opening agricultural markets, maintaining protection for intellectual property while enabling access to drugs for public health emergencies, and promoting capacity building in developing countries. As President Bush pointed out recently, “By one estimate, a new global trade pact could lift 300 million lives out of poverty. When trade advances, there is no question but poverty retreats.”

As with the *Free Trade Area of the Americas*, trade officials from the 144 World Trade Organization member countries have set January 2005 as the target date for concluding the negotiations for the Doha Round. It is fair to say and I am proud to say it, that the Doha Development Agenda represents a tangible example of the success that can be achieved through activist American diplomacy. So, as I said earlier, trade matters and it means jobs for Americans, we can continue to enjoy the benefits of a strong economy.

It matters for another reason, too. According to the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, trade is the single most important channel affecting growth for developing countries. The bank estimates that increasing poor countries’ access to world export markets could generate an additional \$1.5 trillion in income over ten years, and raise their annual domestic product growth rates by half a percentage point.

It is because trade is so important that President Bush has put Congressional approval of *Trade Promotion Authority (TPA)*, at the top of his economic legislative agenda. The TPA has been passed by the House several months ago and is now awaiting action in the Senate; would require Congress to vote up or down on important trade legislation, without tying it up in debates over amendments. This is terribly important to our trading partners because it means the bilateral and multilateral trade agreements they negotiate with our diplomats are the ones Congress will be asked to ratify.

I would now like to address another issue of great importance to the U.S. Department of State and to my Bureau in particular that of international development. In truth, it is not such a large step, however, because this Administration believes trade can play a very important role in helping poorer countries escape from poverty. The international coalition the Administration so successfully built to help fight the war against terrorism will be complemented by an international coalition to fight for economic growth. The U.S. has a distinct national security interest in a strong development assistance policy. As the President said,

“Poverty does not cause terrorism. Being poor does not make you a murderer . . . Yet persistent poverty and oppression can lead to hopelessness and despair. And when governments fail to meet the most basic needs of their people, these failed states can become havens for terror.”

It is time, the President has noted, to close the divide between wealth and poverty, opportunity and misery. It is time for governments to make the right choices for their own people.

At the United Nations Financing for Development Conference in Monterrey, Mexico two weeks ago, President Bush and other world leaders gave their stamp of approval to a document which recognizes the importance of trade, investment, good governance and other factors in helping the world's poorer countries escape from poverty. A quick look at the numbers helps explain why that is important. All told, developing countries receive approximately fifty billion a year in direct assistance from the so-called donor governments. Fifty billion sounds like a lot of money, and it is, of course. But foreign investment flows from developed to developing countries total almost \$200 billion a year. Export earnings of developing countries approach \$2 trillion a year. That is where the real development money is found in trade and investment. And consider this: remittances from workers in the United States alone back to developing countries run about \$30 billion a year.

That is not to say that direct assistance does not have a role in our vision for international development, far from it. In fact, just before the Monterrey Conference, President Bush announced his intention to seek from Congress an additional \$5 billion per year over current projected levels in direct assistance to the poorest countries by fiscal year 2006 (ramping up in 2004 and 2005). Developing countries eligible for this assistance would be those, as President Bush put it, “that govern justly, invest in their people and encourage economic freedom.” The President has directed Secretary Powell and Treasury Secretary O’Neill to come up with clear and concrete objective criteria to see that these funds are used effectively. The U.S. intent is simple: the U.S. responsibility as donors is linked to developing nations’ responsibility for embracing policies of good governance, investment in human capital, and creating an enabling environment for economic growth. This is a results-oriented Administration, and President Bush has made it clear the U.S. will not provide assistance to countries that do not accept the challenge to enact sound policies, build sound institutions, and take advantage of the entrepreneurial spirit in their own societies.

One concrete outcome of the Monterrey Conference was an agreement by the U.S. and China to sponsor jointly a conference on foreign direct investment and development next December. This conference will follow up on the themes of the Monterrey meeting, and you will be hearing more about this as planning progresses.

I believe we are at a turning point in the way we view development. The kickoff was last year’s launch of the *Doha Development Round*. Doha engages developing countries more directly as negotiating partners in the World Trade Organization and will help liberalize trade not just between developing countries and developed country markets, but among developing countries, where we anticipate strong growth. The successful Monterrey conference was the next

in a series of important events. That will be followed by the World Food Summit next June, in Rome. There, we will be working to come up with programs to raise agricultural productivity and reduce poverty programs that will feed the 800 million people in the world who remain poorly nourished and whose lives are cut short by poverty. We will be looking at ways that better define property rights; create conditions for improvements in infrastructure, electricity and communications; and provide information about science and new technology especially agricultural biotechnology that can help increase productivity.

A few weeks after the World Food Summit, the G-8 Summit in Canada will address global economic growth and try to agree on an action plan on Africa to boost African agricultural productivity and capacity building. And then, in August and September, we will strengthen further this results-oriented vision for poverty reduction at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, South Africa. There we will work to develop partnerships among nations to balance social and economic growth with environmental stewardship.

The private sector of the U.S. provides the capital that fuels economic development and helps create the conditions that improve the quality of life. In the process, American companies have become the models of good governance for many foreign businesses that want to succeed in the global marketplace as well as in their own local marketplaces.

Of course, the first responsibility of any corporate executive is to the shareholder. But American companies also recognize that, to be successful, they must do more than simply sell a product. They have to become part of the community as well. U.S. firms have this kind of commitment. Each year, the Department of State presents awards for good corporate leadership and involvement in local communities. This past year, awards went to Ford Motor Company in South Africa for its HIV/AIDS program and to a small energy company in Ho Chi Minh city, which is bringing low-cost solar electricity to the countryside.

The Secretary of State reminds new ambassadors before they go overseas that their main tasks include assisting American business. We work to ensure that American companies are judged fairly on their merits in the competition with companies from other countries. And where there are problems, we work to help them redress their grievances.

To level the playing field for U.S. firms and to combat the scourge of corruption, we strongly support the *Anti-Bribery Convention of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development* which embodies the commitment of Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development member countries, and several others as well, to eliminate bribery of public officials by companies based in signatory nations. In addition, we back regional initiatives to combat corruption, such as the *Inter-American Convention Against Corruption* developed by the Organization of American States. These initiatives are part of our larger goal of development, which calls for countries and companies to institute good governance, transparency and rules-based trade play to promote prosperity at home and expand economic opportunities abroad.

Conclusion

Today, perhaps more than at any other time in history, economics is inextricably part of U.S. foreign policy. Trade and investment directly affect U.S. economic well-being; they have a direct impact on U.S. national security.

There are many other ways this manifests itself in the work of the Department of State; for example, the dozens of Open Skies agreements that have been negotiated or are in process to make air travel safer and easier; agreements to broaden the reach of the internet and facilitate

international telecommunications; diplomacy designed to ensure the reliability of America's energy supply and to protect intellectual property.

Export Control

By

**Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Jr.,
Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs**

[The following are excerpts from the remarks presented to the AIAA Conference held in Washington, D.C., February 20, 2002.]

“What reforms to the U.S. export processes are needed and how can improvements be accelerated?”

This is a question with which I have been wrestling since just after the Secretary of State asked me to be part of his team at the Department of State. September 11, 2001 shifted my focus as it did much of the government, and we lost some time in taking a serious look at how we can make the U.S. Department of State portion of the export control system more responsive to the rest of the agency and the needs of industry, while still ensuring that U.S. security interests are properly served. Finally, I can tell you that I have carefully reviewed every and I mean every report and proposal dealing with the defense export control system that has crossed my desk in the last year. I am happy to take the opportunity today to talk about a number of steps we are taking that should markedly improve and enhance the Department of State’s ability to license the export of defense articles, services, and information.

Let me start off with a snapshot of where the U.S. is now. First of all, of the 47,000 license applications or cases it receives each year, Defense Trade Control handles approximately 70 percent internally; that is, they do not have to be staffed to other offices for review. That is just under 33,000 cases a year. The median processing time for these cases has been reduced from fifteen days in 1999 to eight days. So once again, today the U.S. is turning around 70 percent of the license applications in eight days. The median processing time for the other 14,000 cases, those that must be staffed to other offices within Department of State and/or outside agencies has now been reduced to 58 days, down from 76 in 1999. This progress has been made possible by providing greater resources to Defense Trade Control in a number of functional areas; for starters, we have just about doubled the licensing staff in two years.

We are now benefiting from resource decisions made by Congress in 1999. My goal is to build on that progress and re-engineer the licensing process in a comprehensive manner, to capture any and all efficiencies we can and achieve maximum accountability to management. By doing that, I believe the U.S. will see still further progress on turn-around times, both in terms of shorter duration and more predictability for industry. To accomplish that goal, my staff and I are examining a large and growing list of specific ideas relating to our export licensing procedures: we are also moving swiftly to upgrade defense trade control’s information technology infrastructure, and we are developing further recommendations in the policy area to make the export control system a more effective regulatory and policy instrument.

Re-engineering the Licensing Process

This is the foundation of our efforts in program management. We have to validate our processes before enabling them with information technology systems. And by the way, in this view I have strong encouragement from the Government Accounting Office and U.S. Inspector General behind me. In that context, we are looking at interagency functioning in support of the

licensing function, end-use monitoring of exported defense items and technology, the policy referral process within the Department of State for license applications, the commodity jurisdiction process involving commerce and many issues of timeliness as they relate to industrial competitiveness including the note and effect of congressional notification procedures. We will be looking at our compliance and enforcement functions involving the customs service. And we will be drawing up goals for defense trade advisory relating to training, career development, and customer relations with industry, as well as potential management tools that might be candidates for future resource investment. At an appropriate time, I plan to draw on the expertise of industry via the defense trade advisory group, and I am happy to receive specific ideas and recommendations from members of this organization. Just send them to me at the Program Management Bureau, the sooner the better.

Defense Trade Advisory Group - Defense Trade Control Information Technology Upgrade

Many of you may be aware that we are upgrading defense trade control's information technology infrastructure. We have entered into an intensive dialogue of experts with the Department of Defense, to include several meetings with USXPORTS technical experts. We have expanded the use of the T-1 line to transmit to DoD both structured data and unstructured backup material for cases in support of *Operation Enduring Freedom*, which have been turned around in 24-48 hours on average.

The Department of State's CIO has personnel from his staff working with us on this upgrade effort. And I have received strong encouragement from my bosses to push hard on the information technology front, consistent with Secretary of State Powell's interest in modernizing the U.S. Department of State operations. We hope to use standardized processes and an information technology infrastructure to eliminate delays and bottlenecks that have slowed our responsiveness to industry particularly when staffing cases to other agencies and to policy offices within the Department of State. Our plan is to initiate a six-month beta test of a fully electronic licensing program in the coming weeks, with the participation of some large and small companies alike.

Policy Implementation and Revision

The final area in which we are taking a hard look is the defense export system involving larger policy issues that determine what we are trying to accomplish. As you know, this Administration has sought to continue implementation of the previous Administration's initiative in this area, the *Defense Trade Security Initiative*, which began in May of 2000. To be honest, we have seen mixed results. North Atlantic Treaty Organization Secretary General Lord Robertson has proposed narrowing and concentrating the focus of the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI), which seeks to facilitate the transfer to North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies of equipment identified as key to wartime interoperability. I support Lord Robertson in this endeavor and will work with Department of Defense to that end.

The defense trade security initiative project and program licensing arrangements have not been widely used for a host of reasons. But now that the Joint Strike Fighter is moving forward, the program management will work with Department of Defense to ensure that our licensing process serves national security priorities such as Joint Strike Fighter.

On the Munitions List review, we are close to the Executive Branch agreement on some categories and expect to move the whole process more expeditiously from here on. Industry and Congress will have their say as we go forward.

Finally, we are working with various congressional committee staff members to raise the current thresholds for congressional notification of defense sales. I believe significant changes are warranted and hope Congress will be persuaded.

Conference on Disarmament

By

John R. Bolton
Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security

[The following are excerpts from the speech given before the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, Switzerland, January 24, 2002.]

It is a particular honor for me today to be able to introduce the new U.S. ambassador to the Conference, Eric Javits, who comes to you after a long career specializing in what he characterizes as difficult negotiations. He clearly has the proper background for the Conference on Disarmament and has the full support of the Bush Administration as he strives in this distinguished conference to advance international peace and security.

Permit me to outline to this body, the world's oldest multilateral arms control negotiating forum, the fundamental elements of the Bush Administration's security policy. Our timing is particularly opportune. The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks have made all too clear the grave threats to civilized nations that come from terrorists who strike without warning, their state sponsors, and rogue states that seek weapons of mass destruction. The U.S. must defend our homelands, our forces, our friends and allies against these threats. And the U.S. must insist on holding accountable states that violate their nonproliferation commitments.

The fight against terrorism will remain a top international security priority. As President Bush said:

“Our lives, our way of life, and our every hope for the world depend on a single commitment: The authors of mass murder must be defeated, and never allowed to gain or use the weapons of mass destruction.”

The United States and its partners in this fight will meet this threat with every method at our disposal.

Above all, the U.S. is acting to end state sponsorship of terror. The U.S. believes that with very few exceptions, terrorist groups have not acquired and cannot acquire weapons of mass destruction without the support of nation-states. This support might be technical assistance. It might be funding. Perhaps such assistance has taken the form of simply turning a blind eye to terrorist camps within one's borders. But the fact that governments which sponsor terrorist groups also are pursuing chemical, biological, nuclear, and missile programs is alarming, and cannot be ignored. Nations that assist terror are playing a dangerous game. President Bush stated the following to a joint session of the U.S. Congress last fall:

“We will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.”

If the September 11 terrorist attacks taught the United States nothing else, it taught us not to underestimate the intentions and capabilities of rogue states and terrorist groups. The U.S. will not be complacent to the threat of any kind of attack on the United States, especially from weapons of mass destruction, whether chemical, biological, nuclear, or from missiles.

Chemical Weapons

The U.S. is alarmed by the continuing spread of dangerous technology to countries pursuing illegal programs. The U.S. is a strong proponent of the *Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)*, which provides several useful tools to combat chemical warfare programs. The U.S. has made effective use of the consultation provision of Article IX of the convention to address our questions and compliance concerns. To date, the U.S. has conducted several visits at the invitation of other States parties in a cooperative effort to resolve these questions and compliance concerns. In many cases, this has proven to be highly successful.

The U.S. will continue to use such consultation mechanisms to enhance verification and promote full compliance with the provisions of the convention. Although bilateral consultations are not a prerequisite for launching a challenge inspection, the U.S. believes that challenge inspections may in some cases be the most appropriate mechanism for resolving compliance concerns. Some state parties have sought erroneously to characterize the challenge inspection process as tantamount to an abuse of political power. On the contrary, challenge inspections were included as a fundamental component of the Chemical Weapons Convention verification regime that benefits all state parties, both as a deterrent to would-be violators and as a fact-finding tool to address compliance concerns. They are a flexible and indispensable tool that, if viewed realistically and used judiciously, can be instrumental in achieving the goals of the Chemical Weapons Convention. The nations that are violating the Chemical Weapons Convention should not be smug in the assumption that your chemical warfare program will never be uncovered and exposed to the international community.

Biological Weapons

On biological weapons, the U.S. made its position crystal clear at the Fifth Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention late last year – the U.S. will not condone violation of the Biological Weapons Convention. We flatly oppose flawed diplomatic arrangements that purport to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention but actually increase the specter of biological warfare by not effectively confronting the serious problem of Biological Weapons Convention noncompliance. It is for this reason that the U.S. rejected the draft protocol to the *Biological Weapons Convention* and the continuance of the Biological Weapons Convention ad hoc group and its mandate, and offered an alternate way ahead.

The Biological Weapons Convention protocol, the U.S. government was urged to go along with this proposal because it was “flawed, but better than nothing.” After an exhaustive evaluation within the U.S. government, the government decided that the protocol was actually counterproductive. New approaches and new ways of thinking are needed to prevent the proliferation of biological weapons.

The U.S. presented a number of new proposals to do just this, including tightened national export controls, fully implementing the Biological Weapons Convention by nationally criminalizing activity that violates it, intensified non-proliferation activities, increased domestic preparedness and controls, enhanced biodefense and counter-bioterrorism capabilities, and innovative measures against disease outbreaks. Many, if not all of these measures can begin to be implemented now. The U.S. looks forward to discussing and refining them with all of you and hope that you will join us in endorsing and beginning to implement them as we prepare for the resumption of the Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference next November.

Nuclear Weapons

Nuclear weapons, the United States recently completed a *Nuclear Posture Review*, the basic conclusions of which have recently been made public. Fundamental to this review is the assumption that the U.S. and Russia are no longer adversaries, and, therefore, that such Cold War notions as mutual assured destruction are no longer appropriate as the defining characteristic of our strategic relationship. Accordingly, President Bush has announced that the U.S. will reduce its strategic nuclear force to a total of between 1,700 and 2,200 operationally deployed strategic warheads over the next ten years. President Putin has made a similarly bold and historic decision with respect to Russian strategic nuclear forces. Given the new relationship between Moscow and Washington, the specter of nuclear war between the United States and the Russian Federation is now a comfortably remote possibility. More likely is the possibility of the use of nuclear or radiological weapons by rogue states or terrorist groups. The U.S. is also currently faced with dangerously-high tensions in South Asia between India and Pakistan, both of which have nuclear explosive devices. The proliferation of nuclear materials and technology is a serious threat to international security. The International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) nuclear inspection system must be reinforced, as we press others to adopt strengthened IAEA safeguards designed to detect clandestine nuclear activities. The United States continues to emphasize the importance of universal adherence to, as well as full compliance with and implementation of, the Non-Proliferation Treaty and comprehensive safeguards. Countries such as North Korea and Iraq must cease their violations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and allow the IAEA to do its work. Further, I caution those who think that they can pursue nuclear weapons without detection: the United States and its allies will prove you wrong.

And let me reiterate U.S. policy on nuclear weapons proliferation: the United States regards the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology as a direct threat to international security, and will treat it accordingly. The same holds true for nations that traffic in deadly chemical and biological weapons technology, and missile systems.

Missiles

Almost every state that actively sponsors terror is known to be seeking weapons of mass destruction and the missiles to deliver them at longer and longer ranges. Their hope is to blackmail the civilized world into abandoning the war on terror. They want the United States and others to forsake their friends and allies and security commitments around the world. September 11, 2001 reinforced our resolve to build a limited missile defense shield to defend our nation, friends, forces and interests against missile attacks from rogue states and terrorist organizations who wish to destroy civilized society. It is an undeniable fact that the United States simply has no defense against a missile attack on our homeland. While we do have defenses against shorter-range missiles, we have none against even a single missile launched against our cities. The U.S. must fill this void in our defenses. As a result, the U.S. announced last month our decision to withdraw from the *Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty*. This was an important decision for the Bush Administration and was made in close consultations with Moscow. Although our Russian friends did not agree with our withdrawal decision, the world is aware of the close and growing relationship between our two nations. Our new strategic relationship is much broader than the *Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty*, as evidenced by the announcement by both the United States and Russia that we will reduce our offensive nuclear arsenals to the lowest levels in decades.

The United States is concerned about the spread of missile technology that may not threaten the United States at this time, but poses serious threats to our friends and allies, as well as to deployed U.S. forces. Too many nations are remiss in not controlling their involvement in the proliferation of missile technology. The U.S. is aware of a long list of missile proliferation activities by enterprises from at least a dozen nations. Most of these transactions are serious, and

could result in U.S. sanctions, as has been done several times over the past year. The United States calls on all countries to control missile-related transfers and ensure that private companies operating within their borders cease illegal missile transactions. President Bush has made clear the imperative of restructuring deterrence and defense capabilities to formulate a comprehensive strategy to enhance our security. This strategy must include strengthening nonproliferation measures (prevention), more robust counterproliferation capabilities (protection), and a new concept of deterrence, relying more on missile defense and less on offensive nuclear forces. In this context, the security and well being of the United States and its allies depend on the ability to operate in space. The United States is committed to the exploration and use of outer space by all nations for peaceful purposes for the benefit of humanity purposes that allow defense and intelligence-related activities in pursuit of national security goals. The U.S. remains firmly committed to the *Outer Space Treaty*, and we believe that the current international regime regulating the use of space meets all our purposes. The U.S. see no need for new agreements.

Future of the Conference on Disarmament

This point leads me to touch briefly on the future of this body, the Conference on Disarmament. If it remains deadlocked in futility, it will continue to lose credibility and the attention of the world. To be productive and contribute to international security, the Conference on Disarmament must change the way it does business. It must focus on new threats, such as efforts by terrorist groups to acquire weapons of mass destruction. It must squarely face the serious problem of violations of weapons of mass destruction nonproliferation regimes and treaties. Finally, in order to perform a useful function, the Conference on Disarmament must put aside irreconcilable differences and work on issues that are ready for negotiation, such as a *Missile Material Cutoff Treaty*. I know of no one more qualified to help lead a new approach here in the Conference on Disarmament than Eric Javits, who has already begun working with delegates to find ways to move this body forward in 2002. I have one personal favor to ask the distinguished delegates in this room. It has become fashionable to characterize my country as unilateralist and against all arms control agreements. Nonetheless, our commitment to multilateral regimes to promote nonproliferation and international security never has been as strong as it is today, through numerous arms control treaties and nonproliferation arrangements, including the *Non-Proflieration Treaty*, CFE, CWC, BWC, LTBT, PNET, and the TTBT, as well as to nonproliferation regimes like the Zangger Committee, the NSG, MTCR, the *Wassenaar Arrangement and the Australia Group*. In fact, trying to characterize our policy as “unilateralist” or “multilateralist” is a futile exercise. Our policy is, quite simply, pro-American, as you would expect. The main emphasis of the Bush Administration's arms control policy is the determination to enforce existing treaties, and to seek treaties and arrangements that meet today's threats to peace and stability, not yesterdays. Fundamental to the Bush Administration's policy is the commitment to honor our arms control agreements, and to insist that other nations live up to them as well. Now is the time for the Conference on Disarmament to build on its achievements to forge additional restraints against the spread of weapons of mass destruction. This is Ambassador Javits' mission here, for which he has my full support and that of the U.S. government.

A Planning Guidance for the Security Cooperation Community

By

Thomas M. Keithly
Defense Security Cooperation Agency

Introduction

The key word in today's business and policy environment is performance. Performance-based logistics and performance-based contracting are just a couple of new approaches you may have heard about where the focus is on results. In the Department of Defense, the security cooperation community is establishing a reputation as leaders in the area of performance. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) and its partners within the military departments have tied performance to the budget process with the initiative known as performance based budgeting (PBB). PBB represents an exciting means of transformation for the entire community. It gives us the tools to achieve transformation by focusing on results, and helps gain the insight necessary to connect the budget process to strategy, planning and performance.

In the last edition of the *DISAM Journal*, 24:2, pp 57-64, Lieutenant General Walters, USAF, Director of Defense Security Cooperation Agency, wrote that his agency was dedicated to the development of performance based budgeting and performance based costing (PBC) as tools to improve the resource allocation process. You can get an appreciation for his commitment to PBB and PBC by a glance the DSCA web site, <http://www.dsc.osd.mil/> and link to DSCA *Performance Based Budgeting*. This article introduces a complementary effort to apply the rigors of planning and programming via the publication of a *Defense Planning Guidance* for the security cooperation community.

Performance is a significant part of the U.S. government's recent efforts to adapt e-business solutions to streamline government and make it more responsive to its citizens. General Walters mentioned the *Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993* that encouraged and in some ways mandated a results-oriented culture of performance. This theme was updated last year in an Office of Management and Budget (OMB) circular called *The President's Management Agenda*. The President's introduction announces his "bold strategy for improving the management and performance of the federal government."¹ The document states that success depends not on declaring new programs, but on completion, performance, and results. It gives fourteen areas of improvement, five government-wide and nine agency-specific program initiatives. It emphasizes the vital importance of an empowered workforce, making the most of the knowledge, skills, and abilities of our people. Expected results include: "Standard, integrated budgeting, performance, and accounting information systems at the program level that would provide timely feedback for management . . . to improve financial performance."² In short, PBB and a clear picture of our programs are the way to go.

The Need For Planning And Programming

Translating resources into actions requires, first of all, a clear statement of what the we want to achieve. As one observer wrote: "If you don't know where you're heading, any road will get

1 Office of Management and Budget Circular A-11. *The Executive Office of the President*, Office of Management and Budget, August 2001:p:1

2 Ibid, p:30

you there.” We know where we are heading. Our budget process uses planning and programming to lay out a road map to connect our mission and vision, strategy, and priorities and turn them into goals. This permits us to develop not just a budget, but also a performance-based management approach that makes sure our resources are aligned to accomplish those goals.

In January 2002, Lieutenant General Walters approved the *Defense Security Cooperation Agency Defense Planning Guidance*, for fiscal years 2003-2007. This document kicked off the annual planning and programming cycle. It emulates the approach taken by the Secretary of Defense, articulated in his *Defense Planning Guidance*. This is a key part of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System, commonly known as PPBS. By taking the best aspects of both PPBS and PBB and applying them to the business of foreign military sales (FMS), the DSCA planning guidance sets a common direction for the entire security cooperation community.

The DSCA planning guidance incorporates broad direction from the Secretary of Defense’s own *August 31, 2001 Defense Planning Guidance* and the *Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)* released in September 2001. It discusses our strategic vision, sets out principles to guide our activities, and presents specific goals for the business side of the security assistance program. It concludes with programmatic priorities and a detailed guidance on constructing budgets for fiscal years 2003 and 2004. The following is an overview of the main elements.

Vision - the Strategic Context

The goals of security cooperation are set against a backdrop of an evolving, yet still dangerous, global security environment. From the QDR, the Department of Defense strategic framework is built around four policy goals:

- Assuring allies and friends
- Dissuading future military competition
- Deterring threats and coercion against U.S. interests
- If deterrence fails, decisively defeating any adversary.³

Security cooperation should build those capabilities and cooperative relationships that support U.S. defense policy goals and, in the more immediate term, enable a sustained, multilateral campaign against international terrorism. Our environment is characterized by the following:

- **Global Context - A Changing World**

America’s goals are to promote peace, sustain freedom, and encourage prosperity. This includes sustaining an international system that is respectful of the rule of law and contributes to peace through a network of alliances and friendships. Our changing world involves new military and geopolitical trends: a diminished protection afforded by geographic distance, the volatile mix of rising and declining regional powers, the threat of weapons of mass destruction, the vast distances involved in key regions, access to key resources around the world such as Middle East oil, increasing challenges and threats emanating from the territories of weak and failing states, states with ungoverned space, and a diffusion of power and military capabilities to non-state actors. Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, threats of international terrorism have taken on special significance.

3 *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, 30 September 2001, p:11.

- **Globalization**

We are witness to an acceleration and increased interconnectedness of the economies of the world, with implications for global stability. The resulting acceleration and shrinking of the globe mean that events around the world do not happen in isolation anymore. It is difficult to decouple economic interests from security issues. The fast pace of events demand our knowledge, understanding and prompt response, in this closely linked security environment.

- **An Overseas, Forward Presence**

United States defense strategy calls for sustaining regionally-tailored, forward stationed and deployed forces to assure allies and friends, to deter aggression and coercion, to dissuade adversaries from pursuing threatening ambitions or military programs and, if necessary, to defeat any adversary decisively. Security cooperation should seek to influence the behaviors of a wide array of potential adversaries and develop the capacity of allies and friends to ensure regional stability.

- **Strengthening Alliances and Partnerships**

Often the elements of security cooperation are among the most practical and visible signs of our support for, and involvement with, other nations and their military services and decision makers. In time of peace especially, it is through activities such as site surveys, the development of new systems, reviews of on-going programs, mobile training teams, or the day-to-day contacts of the security assistance officers in-country that positive interactions take place. This interaction leads to improved understanding between nations, support for emerging democracies, effective military-to-military contacts, improved defense capabilities for our allies and friends, and the ability to train and operate together when necessary.

Figure 1
The Goals of Security Cooperation

- **Assure dominant coalitions**
- **Achieve and enhance influence**
- **Contribute to the execution of U.S. policy**
- **Gain regional access and access to decision makers**
- **Build relationships and military-to-military contacts**
- **Acquire the right systems for allies and friends**
- **Develop a broad portfolio of coalition military capabilities**
- **Capitalize on rapid technological developments**
- **Prevent proliferation of technologies and weapons into the wrong hands**
- **Align goals and resources to carry out the job efficiently**
- **Use a performance-based management system to make resource decisions**

Figure 2
The Tools of Security Cooperation

- **Security assistance, including foreign military sales and foreign military finance**
- **Support for direct commercial sales**
- **High level visits**
- **International military education and training, to include rule of law**
- **Support for cooperative agreements**
- **Excess defense articles**
- **Drawdowns**
- **Humanitarian civic assistance and demining**
- **Coordinate issues pertaining to disclosure and licensing**
- **Enhanced international peacekeeping capabilities**
- **Waiver authorities**
- **Financial options**

- **Overarching Goals**

The broad goals of security cooperation are shown in Figure 1. As we work to achieve these goals, security cooperation offers policymakers and the combatant commanders a very useful tool kit made up of a full range of programs and procedures shown in Figure 2.

Call for Action

The DSCA planning guidance lists a range of principles to guide our activities and contribute to establishing a common direction. Two themes are key here. First, we assist allies and friends in obtaining defense goods and services to bolster their own military capabilities. Second, we work toward identifying and building those capabilities that current and future coalitions require.

In our support for U.S. policy, it is important to recall that there is a national security aspect to all that we do. It is necessary first of all to understand the what and the why of our business. The first step is to establish why foreign procurement of a U.S. system or service is needed. With that in mind, including concerns for protection of sensitive technologies and information, we can address what needs to be done, and do it right.

We can support U.S. policy and achieve coalition capabilities in a variety of ways:

- **Support Combatant Commander Theater Security Cooperation Strategies.** Under the guidance of a Secretary of Defense Security Cooperation Guidance, the Combatant Commanders will be developing Theater Security Strategies for their theaters. DSCA and the military departments can engage with the combatant commanders and the Joint Staff to understand and support those country and regional priorities.

- **Identify and Deliver the Right Goods and Services.** Certainly we rely on close liaison with our international partners. Contacts in-country via our security assistance officers (SAO),

and here in the U.S. with their national representatives help contribute to meeting their needs and enhance coalition-building, as well as assure compliance with U.S. regulations. Depending on the nature of the alliance in each region of the world and what mechanisms or institutions are set up to deal with these issues, we must consider how security cooperation can support regional goals. Good communications are essential between region and policy offices, desk officers, weapon/platform experts, as well as the security assistance officer's. Good interagency coordination helps achieve the right balance and provides good advice in both a military and policy sense.

- **Support Cooperative Programs.** The goals of security cooperation are greatly enhanced by programs involving cooperative research, development, production and support. These efforts contribute to the harmonization of requirements between the United States and its allies and friends. Our staffs, at DSCA and the military departments, need to support DoD's Office of International Cooperation and other organizations to identify cooperative solutions.

- **Engage in Releasability and Licensing Issues.** Releasability and licensing decisions can be vital aspects of any sale or transfer of defense equipment or services. First of all, we must ensure that our personnel are familiar with licensing and the various releasability processes, e.g., National Disclosure Policy, Low Observable Vetting, etc. Second, our personnel should establish and maintain close relationships with organizations such as the Defense Technology Security Administration, National Disclosure Policy Committee, and others. Third, DSCA should take a proactive role, when appropriate, in the development of releasability and licensing decisions. To further security cooperation objectives, releasability questions should be addressed early to minimize any negative impacts on security cooperation programs.

Other technology control programs require our attention, such as the Missile Technology Control Regime and End-Use Monitoring (EUM). End-use monitoring covers government-to-government transfers of defense articles, defense services, and related technologies. End-use monitoring is implemented via DoD's Golden Sentry program. This program helps ensure that U.S.-origin defense exports are sent only to the country of ultimate destination for the authorized official end-use, by that government recipient end-user, and that they continue to be used for the approved end-use.

- **Responsive in Time of Crisis.** The effectiveness of coalitions depends upon timely resupply, especially in munitions. In time of crisis, the services will stand up a rapid response cell to take quick action to procure needed ammunition and other key supplies. Shortages, especially in precision-guided munitions, must be resolved to achieve the right balance between U.S. requirements and the needs of allies.

- **Achieve Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C4I⁴) Interoperability.** Successful coalitions demand effective command and control. Communication and good "situational awareness" are essential, in conflict or peacetime. Without interoperable systems or common standards for command, control and communication (C3), the success of any coalition operation is in jeopardy. Further, recent operations prove once again that battlespace management, reconnaissance, intelligence, and electronic warfare are keys to victory.

We should see that our people understand the unique rules regarding releasability of C4I⁴ systems and components. We should ensure that commercial options offered to allies and friends do, in fact, achieve the proper C4I⁴ interoperability. Although direct commercial sales (DCS) may be the vehicle for the sale of command and control equipment, our offices need to take steps to ensure that industry provides fully operable, secure systems. The goal is end-to-end interoperable communications for coalition forces.

- **Train the Security Cooperation Workforce.** A competent and professional workforce is vital to our success. We must pursue initiatives that contribute to a workforce composed of high-quality and dedicated people who possess the right combinations of knowledge and skills. Workforce training needs to keep pace with innovations in security cooperation. In the area of automation, for example, as we develop and field information technology and information management systems, the right kind of training must be made available so that our people understand and embrace these tools, not just to make data entry easier, but to provide better customer service and better program management.

- **Support Foreign Military Sales and DCS.** The two vehicles for the sale of defense articles and services to foreign countries and international organizations are foreign military sales and direct commercial sales. Each has its advantages for the customer. Combinations of FMS and DCS can also lead to success. There are many examples of programs in the past that have met the host country's requirements through a combination of contractual and government-to-government agreements. Such hybrid solutions may also involve the use of cooperative memorandums of understanding to foster research, development, production and life cycle support. A hybrid approach expands our ability to meet the country's needs, while allowing better flexibility yet assuring U.S. involvement and project oversight, where warranted.

- **Consider International Aspects in U.S. Acquisition.** We need a clear and coordinated message of advocacy for U.S. acquisition programs. There needs to be a connection, where appropriate, between domestic programs intended for U.S. forces, and the possibility of foreign participation and purchase, where that is in consonance with U.S. policy. This type of advocacy is a complex balance of U.S. policy in the region, U.S. and coalition warfighting capabilities, control of advanced technologies, cost of acquisition, support for the U.S. industrial base, and benefit to the U.S. economy. Certainly U.S. policy and regional stability remain paramount. The objective is to be forward leaning in the search for options for possible U.S. solutions to the requirements of other nations.

As far as foreign participation, not only are international programs a good idea, they are mandated by DoD. The DoD 5000 series acquisition regulations place emphasis on the use of allied systems and equipment, the interoperability of equipment with allied governments and coalition partners, and on allied participation in DoD acquisition programs through cooperative development and production, and through sales of U.S. equipment. Also, we must lend support to service acquisition priorities, including those of the U.S. Coast Guard within the Department of Transportation. The military departments have their own goods and services to offer, as they represent service-unique strengths and capabilities for which they are the experts; or as they see opportunities for new programs to fulfill foreign requirements.

- **Work with Industry.** Close liaison with the U.S. defense industry helps support U.S. objectives and is of mutual benefit. A teaming relationship helps gain insight into the procurement or logistical needs of allies and friends. Moreover, it helps us understand the full range of defense articles and services that are available, supports the U.S. industrial base, and achieves the acquisition goals discussed above. The restructure of the U.S. defense industry over the last decade has resulted in the consolidation of most major systems into a single source. Foreign defense industries have become major competitors for foreign military sales and often enjoy quasi-governmental support. Multinational identities such as within the European Union lend a regional identity and advocacy to systems. Issues like offsets, the desire for local employment, national pride, or the skills, talents and innovation of each national partner are all at stake. The security cooperation community can work closely with U.S. industry to understand the current environment. In coordination with the regional commander in chief and other U.S. agencies, foreign military sales and direct commercial sales can respond to foreign requirements and support U.S. policy.

- Provide for System Life Cycle Support. The complete life cycle of systems must be taken into consideration. We should apply technological improvements and the application of commercial best practices to modernize our advocacy of the total package approach to the sale and transfer of systems. Sustainability and maintainability are important aspects to the successful sale or procurement of systems by our foreign customers. Related aspects such as logistics, repair, training, software upgrades, modifications and other services must be considered in the early phases of any program.

- Maintain a Strong Customer Focus. As we transform the business of FMS and related processes, we must retain a strong customer focus. In our work supporting the international customer, four themes should be kept in mind:

- Responsiveness. Respond promptly and professionally to our customers and their needs and requests. Help our international customers break the code on what is done and who does it. DSCA's new *Electronic Customer Guide*, located on the DSCA web site, www.dsca.osd.mil, goes a long way in this regard.

- Participation. Where possible, encourage foreign customer participation in the definition of requirements, letter of offer and acceptance development, contracting, program management, etc.

- Visibility and Transparency. Visibility and transparency can lead to the elimination of unnecessary steps and reduced frustration on the part of the customer. Our foreign military sales customers desire increased process transparency, especially in financial matters, to assure their own government that they are getting value for money.

- Standardization. Concurrent with efforts to streamline and simplify our processes, pursue changes that make things easier for others: common terms, common steps, consistent charges, clear and common regulations, etc.


- Streamline Business Processes. Although national security and foreign policy motivate our activities, security cooperation, foreign military sales especially is a large business. We can apply the best of commercial and information technology innovations to improve the business aspects of FMS and other activities. We continue to streamline our business processes to lower total effort and raise productivity. And, initiatives such as the Case Execution Management Information System are underway to put more information in the hands of our foreign military sales customers quicker and expand the use of web-based technology. In short, as Lieutenant General Walters stated clearly at the September 2001 Security Cooperation Conference, we need to go all electronic.

Sharpening the Tools of Security Cooperation

In his article on PBB, Lieutenant General Walters used the construct of core functions, which, as he said, parallel our foreign military sales business life cycle. The diagram at Figure 3 is another way to look at these core functions. The planning guidance relies heavily on this same construct. As with the budget process, the functions are a useful way to think about our business processes and our programming goals. It allows us to assess discrete areas of activity, as we examine the steps of our production line and work to streamline and achieve greater effectiveness. The DSCA planning guidance basic document assigns specific goals for fiscal year 2003 and for planning and programming over the future years defense plan, arranged by core function.

Figure 3

Foreign Military Sales



Foreign Military Sales Transformation

Anyone listening at all to priorities for the Department of Defense in recent months understands the emphasis on transformation. The Secretary of Defense has said that the Department of Defense must transform its business processes and infrastructure to both enhance the capabilities and creativity of its employees and free up resources, as well as support the transformation of military capabilities. This includes streamlining the organization and modernizing our approach to business information.

Transformation means the transition from legacy to new information management systems, using information technology to implement innovative approaches to how business is done. We are able to not just automate outdated paper processes as one government spokesman put it, but can rethink the process as it can be done better electronically. The elements of foreign military sales transformation include:

- Performance-Based Management (PBM). The overall objective of PBM is to align our activity and resources to support our guiding principles. PBM is a broad tool to evaluate resource allocation during the planning, programming and budget process. PBM combines the tools of the following:
 - Performance Based Costing (our term for Activity Based Costing with performance objectives).
 - The application of programming to assess individual activities.
 - The use of performance measures to assess our efforts and improve them.
- Business Process Reengineering (BPR). The objective of BPR is to foster innovation and transformation through a structured approach. BPR within security cooperation follows the example of the DoD Business Initiatives Council, which was established in July 2001 to improve the business operations for DoD through a wide array of short quick hit and long-term initiatives, and reallocate savings yielded by such initiatives to higher priority efforts. Drawing upon all the

good work done to date, this is not reinvention or a general call for ideas. The goal of BPR is to foster innovation and facilitate change to make our business processes better, faster, cheaper, and/or more responsive to the customer(s).

Conclusion

Lieutenant General Walters used the following memorandum to forward the Planning Guidance. It is a clear statement of his intentions for security cooperation:

“I am forwarding the DSCA Planning Guidance for your information and action. This document begins the performance-based budget cycle for fiscal years 2003 and 2004. In addition, it sets out overall guidance and principles for our community. It constitutes, in the terms of the Secretary of Defense’s own Defense Planning Guidance, the security cooperation ‘transformation road map.’

My goal is to strengthen the linkage between the goals of our community and the alignment of our resources. I am committed to:

- Supporting the policy objectives of the United States and the Combatant Commanders by deliberately engaging in export sales (both direct commercial and FMS), releasability and licensing issues, cooperative programs, and life-cycle support.
- Developing a competent, professional, and high-quality workforce through our workforce initiatives.
- Combining the tools of programming, performance-based costing, and performance measures to give us the means for performance-based management.”

General Walters’ words can help all of us see our jobs within the broader strategic context and determine how our daily efforts can best contribute. We can expect to hear more about the use of PBB and PBC, along with planning and programming, as we develop innovative ways to improve the management of security cooperation.

About the Author

Thomas Keithly is a member of the new Programs Division at the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, working to develop a planning and programming approach to foreign military sales and related resources. Previously he worked in security assistance at the Navy International Programs Office where he completed his naval career. His specialties were surface warfare and nuclear propulsion. He is a 1972 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy and recently completed a Masters of International Service at the American University.

PERSPECTIVES

Security Cooperation Pays Off: A Lesson from the Afghan War

By

**Joel E. Williamson
and
Dr. Jennifer D. P. Moroney**

[The following is a reprint from the *DFI Government Practice, Inc.*, publication, web site [publications @dfi-intl.com](http://publications@dfi-intl.com). We wish to thank DFI for allowing us to reprint this article.]

One of the essential lessons of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan is the importance of regional access for U.S. military forces. To the surprise of many around the world, the U.S. was able to gain a ring of access for its forces in countries either not regarded as openly friendly or where relations with the U.S. had been strained.

What is not as well known is that the Department of Defense (DoD) already had a foot in the door to most of these countries in Central and South Asia. The U.S. defense officials had developed special relationships and U.S. forces were eminently familiar with both the personnel and facilities in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan due to a series of bilateral and multilateral exercises and consultative talks held every year in the region since 1996. These security engagement activities laid the groundwork for prompt access to key local political and military leaders for temporary bases in the region necessary to support Enduring Freedom. In fact, U.S. security cooperation programs in Central Asia have not only facilitated the alignment of these countries with the U.S. war against terrorism, but have also contributed to the probable establishment of a longer-term U.S. military presence whether permanent or rotational on their territories.

A significant lesson from Afghanistan is that the U.S. cannot necessarily identify where it will be engaged militarily in the future. A year ago, few officials and analysts would have predicted that the U.S. would intervene on a large scale in a country that previously ranked far down the list of U.S. national interests. Although U.S. security engagement programs were not motivated by preparations for Enduring Freedom, they nevertheless proved to be invaluable.

The success of the Central Asian ring of access argues that the Department of Defense should continue to employ and expand its subtle and inexpensive peacetime security cooperation programs on a global scale. Since we cannot accurately guess which failed or failing state will be the next Afghanistan, a global approach is needed that hedges America's bets by preparing for access potentially anywhere. Costing relatively little, security cooperation activities can have a huge impact. In addition to facilitating U.S. operational access to personnel, facilities, and intelligence in these countries, security cooperation activities contribute to building coalitions, augmenting U.S. warfighting effectiveness, promoting military capabilities in partner countries, encouraging adoption of Western international norms, and generating sustained interaction between U.S. and partner country forces.

U.S. Security Engagement's Contribution to Operation Enduring Freedom

U.S. security cooperation programs such as the *Warsaw Initiative* and the defense and military contacts of the cooperative threat reduction program have played a vital role in securing U.S. operational access for operation Enduring Freedom.

The cooperative threat reduction which funds many of DoD's peacetime military activities with the countries of the former Soviet Union has provided DoD with direct access to various levels of military and political decision-makers in Central Asia. It has also facilitated the building of strong professional and personal relationships between U.S. officials and their counterparts in these countries, in some cases for little more than the cost of travel.

Similarly, the Warsaw Initiative program for Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union has assisted in the training and development of military capabilities in Central Asian states. Warsaw Initiative activities include English language training funded through the international military education and training (IMET) program, as well as non-lethal training and equipment transfers through foreign military financing (FMF).

Because the militaries of Central Asia are predominantly composed of ground troops, the focus of cooperative threat reduction and the Warsaw Initiative in this region have been on land forces, with the U.S. Army and special forces taking the lead. In recent years, an active exercise schedule has been completed with the bilateral Balance exercise series, which rotates between Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan two to four times per year. A multilateral exercise series, Centrasbat/Regional Cooperation, involves these same three countries. Particularly in Uzbekistan, these exercises have proven invaluable for helping the Tashkent government to counter security threats such as the terrorist Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), as well as establishing and fostering close working relationships between the U.S. and Uzbek militaries. In addition, Kyrgyzstan, which shares a strategically important border with China, has given the U.S. a green light to build a new air force base on its territory at Manas.

Although Tajikistan did not participate in formal security cooperation prior to the conflict, consultative talks between the Department of Defense and the Tajik Ministry of Defense in early 2001 explored possible ways to develop bilateral security cooperation and arguably eased subsequent U.S. efforts to use Tajikistan for overflights and basing.

The story of Pakistan is far more complicated. Most U.S. military assistance activities were terminated in 1998 under the *Foreign Assistance Act* after the South Asian nuclear tests. Yet, long standing military-to-military ties developed prior to this time through activities such as joint combined exchange training (JCET) exercises helped the U.S. to renew operational relationships quickly. Moreover, pre 1998 exercises familiarized U.S. forces with Pakistan's terrain and infrastructure in ways that enabled prompt and effective operations when Enduring Freedom commenced.

Uzbekistan, Kyrgystan, and Tajikistan, coupled with Pakistan, essentially solidified the critical ring of access to support Enduring Freedom. Regardless of the approach and the nature of the activities, a steady campaign of security cooperation activities with these countries has resulted in a relatively high level of access and openness between the U.S. and Central asian political and military leaders.

Operationalizing Future Rings of Access

Uncertainty as to where and when U.S. forces will be called upon to intervene in regional conflicts or to support the war on terrorism demands an active and diversified approach on the

part of U.S. Department of Defense decision-makers. As a matter of top priority, the U.S. most pursue security cooperation programs most intensively with those countries that rank highest among U.S. interests. For example Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, because of their possession of significant petroleum reserves and their likely roles as staging areas for any operation against Iraq, necessarily should benefit from a more expansive U.S. security relationship than Ecuador. Yet, because of the unpredictability of global events, countries such as Ecuador should be engaged as well even if at only modest levels. While large-scale joint exercises might be appropriate for allies such as Kuwait, low-cost defense and military contacts should be applied as widely as possible, laying the groundwork for future rings of access wherever they may be needed.

Tailored security cooperation programs can serve as an effective means of building critical relationships with state political and military leaders and subsequently providing access. To assist in building effective security cooperation programs, the Department of Defense has a number of different tools of engagement available in its toolbox. These tools can be used to implement a security engagement strategy based on a regional or country-specific approach. Since choices must be made and priorities must be established, the U.S. should prioritize its security engagement strategy around U.S. national security interests and likely hot spots, in that order. Beyond that, the U.S. should be building relationships as widely as resources will allow.

Laying the groundwork for future rings of access around the globe will provide an important foundation for the Department of Defense's capacity to deter, defend against, and decisively defeat potential threats to U.S. national security.

Building "Rings of Access" Around Potential Conflict-Prone Regional Hot Spots

- DoD should focus on securing initial access to countries with potential to serve as forward bases from which to support and sustain operations.
- Thus, as a matter of priority, DoD should employ its security cooperation programs to promote access and influence in "Front Line" states, i.e., key states within close proximity to regional hot spots, that can provide a "ring of access" during a crisis.



DoD Tools of Engagement

Security Assistance

- International Military Education and Training (IMET/E-IMET)
- Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
- Foreign Military Sales (FMS)
- Excess Defense Articles (EDA)

Defense and Military Contacts

- Counterpart Visits
- General Officer/Flag Officer (GO/FO) Visits
- Ship Port Visits
- Bilateral and Multilateral Staff Talks

Combined Training Exercises

- Joint Combined Exchange Training (JECT) Exercises
- Bilateral and Multilateral Exercises
- MEDFLAG medical Exercises

Combined Education

- DoD Regional Security Centers
- George C. Marshall Center
- Africa Center for Strategic Studies
- Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies
- Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies

About the Authors

Joel E. Williamson is a retired U.S. Army colonel and a Senior Associate at DFI International. He specializes in defense policy, force structure, and readiness issues.

Dr. Jennifer D. P. Moroney is an Associate at DFI International and an adjunct professor of the International Affairs at George Washington University. Widely published on European security issues, she is co-editor of *Ukrainian Foreign and Security Policy: Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives* (Praeger/Greenwood: May 2002).

The DFI International is the parent company of DFI Government Practice, Incorporated. DFI International was founded in 1984 by Dr. Barry Blechman and is headquartered in Washington, D.C. DFI Government practice, Incorporated provides objective and through empirical analysis and timely, pragmatic solutions to U.S. government clients. For more information of DFI contact publications@dfi-intl.com.

EDUCATION AND TRAINING

Defense Acquisition University/Defense Systems Management College Introduces Online International Acquisition Course

By

**Richard Kwatnoski
Defense Systems Management College**

For over five years, the Defense Acquisition University, Defense Systems Management College, has offered a full program of international acquisition training and education at the intermediate level and beyond. It has been comprised of a family of international acquisition courses and continuous learning opportunities to prepare the acquisition workforce for the many challenges of international acquisition programs. Recently, an online training opportunity was added for the entry level. This course is primarily intended for acquisition workforce personnel, but Security Assistance and Foreign Disclosure personnel who play some role in international cooperative programs could benefit as well. The following is a brief description of the entire program.

Courses

There are three international acquisition courses in the program. They are designated as Assignment Specific Mandatory for the acquisition workforce. The courses also are designated as desired and required formal training under the new Department of Defense International Affairs Certification and Career Development Guidelines.

Multinational Program Management Course (PMT 202). This course emphasizes the National Security policy of engagement by encouraging armaments cooperation and interoperability with our allies. Students develop an understanding of how to be effective in an international defense acquisition program. Key national, DoD, and Service policies on international cooperative development, production, and support are explored.

International Security and Technology Transfer/Control Course (PMT 203). This course is a comprehensive review of security and technology transfer/control issues found in international acquisition programs.

Advanced International Management Workshop (PMT 304). This workshop explores issues associated with international negotiation of cooperative acquisition project agreements. Specific topics include negotiation preparation, authority to negotiate and conclude, DoD policies and experiences, and the role of executive departments and the Congress. Upon course completion, students are able to prepare and negotiate an international acquisition project agreement.

Continuous Learning

The DAU/DSMC international acquisition continuous learning program consists primarily of two annual international seminars and a biannual forum.

International Seminars

DAU/DSMC has formed strategic arrangements with Atlantic and Pacific partners. With Atlantic partners, we have been conducting an annual international acquisition/procurement seminar with defense acquisition educational institutions in the United Kingdom, Germany and France for fourteen years on a rotational basis. The fourteenth Atlantic Seminar is scheduled for July 2002 in Paris, France. In the Pacific we have a similar arrangement with defense institutions and Ministries in Australia, South Korea and Singapore. The fourth annual seminar is scheduled for September 2002 at DAU/DSMC, Fort Belvoir, Virginia.

International Acquisition Forum

At DAU/DSMC we host a biannual International Acquisition Forum for OSD and the Services to present and exchange views on contemporary, and sometimes contentious, international acquisition topics. DAU/DSMC has hosted all twelve of these Forums since 1996, which are chaired by the OSD Director, International Cooperation. These forums receive high-level attention from OSD. The USD (AT&L) and the PDUSD (AT&L) have occasionally presided.

New Online International Course

International acquisition training historically began at the intermediate level of acquisition courses. While entry level acquisition workforce personnel would rarely be involved in an international program, there existed a need to provide some basic level training opportunities, especially for those unable to attend the classroom courses. Recognizing this, the OSD Acquisition Initiatives Office sponsored the development of an online course for acquisition workforce personnel new to the international arena. A team was formed chaired by a representative from the OSD Office of the Director, International Cooperation, and comprised of subject matter experts from the services' international program offices, OSD (Policy) International Security Programs, and DAU/DSMC - International Department. The contractor building the online training was Meridian Knowledge Solutions, Inc., Chantilly, Virginia.

The course is divided into three, two-hour parts, and was based upon the OSD Armaments Cooperation Handbook. While the last official version of the Handbook was released in 1996, a completely updated draft version was used to build the course, thus making it even more current than the available Handbook. The International Armaments Cooperation online course prepares learners to for instructor-led, classroom-based courses held at DAU/DSMC, Ft. Belvoir, Virginia. A certificate of completion is available at the successful conclusion of the course and post-test.

Readers are encouraged to visit our international website and take the new International Armaments Cooperation online course, <http://www.dsmc.dau.mil/international/international.htm>

About the Author

Professor Richard Kwatnoski is a Course Manager for International Acquisition Courses at the Defense Systems Management College, Defense Acquisition University, Fort Belvoir, VA. He is also in charge of the annual Pacific Seminar. He may be reached by e-mail: Richard.Kwatnoski@dau.mil

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management Mobile Education Team Returns to Egypt

By

**John C. Clelan
Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management**

Over the years, several Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM) mobile education teams (MET) have gone to Egypt. DISAM teams visited Egypt in 1991, 1998, and 2001. This year from February 26 to March 7, DISAM returned to Egypt once again to provide both a Foreign Purchaser Course (SAM-F) and a Foreign Executive Seminar (SAM-FE). The enthusiasm of the DISAM team consisting of Mr. Frank Campanell (Team Chief), Mr. Forrest Smith, Mr. John Clelan, and Navy Lieutenant Dana Clay was heightened by the exceptionally great weather in Cairo during their stay. The 2001 DISAM visit had met with both student and instructor uncomfortableness due to the high June 2001 temperatures.

Both courses were conducted at the Egyptian Armaments Authority Headquarters in Cairo, Egypt. Although the courses were primarily for Egyptian Armaments Authority officers involved in foreign military sales (FMS) programs, officers from other Army units as well as representatives from the Egyptian Air Force and Navy involved in FMS attended the courses. The participants for the courses ranged in grade from First Lieutenant to Major General and all grades in between with thirty-six students in the Foreign Purchaser Course and fifteen students in the Foreign Executive Seminar.

Major General Khaled Metwally of the Egyptian Armaments Authority opened the courses by stressing the importance of FMS to the Egyptian military and the need for continued cooperation between the U.S. and Egyptian military forces. General Metwally also participated in the course closing ceremonies congratulating the students on their accomplishments. He and Air Force Major General Moussa presented the outstanding graduate award to Air Force Brigadier General Mohamed Reda Rashed. Unlike most DISAM MET courses, the Egyptian Foreign Purchaser Course students were required to take and pass a final course exam, which all students passed with high marks. During the closing ceremonies, the students were awarded their graduation certificates and the DISAM badge.

General Metwally and the entire administrative staff of the Armaments Authority went out of their way to insure that the DISAM team was well cared for during our visit. In the preparations before the course, MAJ Patrick Walsh, Office of Military Cooperation (OMC) Cairo Training Section worked with DISAM and the Armaments Authority to iron out all of the difficulties in presenting the class. The outstanding support from Ms. Megan Kennett and MAJ Patrick Walsh, of the OMC Cairo Training Office was very much appreciated. These individuals were responsible for preparing the diplomas, collecting and delivering the training materials and coordinating the training. Hotel accommodations were excellent, and daily transportation to and from the training location was also excellent. Special thanks to MAJ Patrick Walsh, OMC Cairo Training Section, for presenting a lesson on OMC Cairo's role and responsibilities to both classes on the first day and participating in the opening and closing ceremonies. The DISAM team appreciated OMC support of this event.

Based on DISAM observation and student feedback, the course satisfied the educational objectives of providing students with an overview of the Security Assistance program. The Egyptian Armaments Authority Training coordinator, Brigadier General Abdel Mohsen, requested DISAM conduct an annual MET from now on preferably during the January to March time frame.

The OMC Cairo has already received a formal request for another MET. OMC Cairo requested that future teams include at least two days of advanced meetings with OMC personnel to brief OMC on current FMS issues/procedures and for the team to become familiar with current EG program problems and issues.



Air Force Brigadier General Mohamed Reda Rashed receiving the honor graduate award from Air Force Major General Moussa and Major General Khaled Metwally.



Major Walsh (OMC Cario) and Egyptian students at the course graduation.



DISAM Team Chief Frank Campanell presents DISAM mementos to Major General Khaled Metwally.

About the Author

John C. Clelan has been an assistant professor at the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management for ten years. He also serves as the Financial Functional Coordinator. Prior to coming to DISAM he served as a program manager in the European Division at AFSAC. He holds a B.S. in Business and Management from the University of Maryland, and an MBA in Logistics Management from Wright-State University.



A U.S. Department of State Memorandum Regarding Issuance of U.S. Passports

**U.S. Department of State Office of the Spokesman
Statement By Philip T. Reeker, Deputy Spokesman
For Immediate Release**

April 2, 2002

SUBJECT: U.S. Passports Will No Longer Be Issue ABroad

Effective April 8, 2002, American citizens who require issuance of a U.S. passport while residing overseas will be issued the latest, state-of-the-art passport. It incorporates a digitized image with other enhanced security features. Because this technology is not available at U.S. embassies and consulates, overseas passport issuance is being transferred to the National Passport Processing Center in Portsmouth, New Hampshire.

The security of travel documents in the post-September 11, 2001 world has become even more important. The new passport has many features that make it one of the most secure travel documents produced anywhere in the world. Getting these more secure passports into circulation will help minimize the misuse of American passports by criminals, terrorists, and others.

This new procedure will increase processing time at U.S. embassies and consulates, but the Department of Defense is committed to ensuring that American citizens receive secure documents in a timely manner. American citizens overseas are encouraged to apply early for renewal of expiring passports.

U.S. embassies and consulates will continue to issue passports that are needed for urgent travel. However, such passports will be limited in validity, and cannot be extended. Bearers will be required to exchange, at no additional cost, their limited validity passports for a full-validity digitized passport upon completion of their urgent travel.

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management Application Procedures for Fiscal Year 2003

Prospective military and civilian students within the Department of Defense should contact their education and training officers for cooperation in applying for DISAM attendance. The Defense Management Education and Training Catalog, DoD 5010.16-C, procedures apply. Personnel from other federal governmental organizations should coordinate their applications through their respective agencies. Working through your education and training officers, the following Service Representatives allocate all quotas for DISAM attendance.

DISAM wants to do what we can to assist you in obtaining a quota for the appropriate DISAM course.

Application Procedures and General Information

Any applicant for International Program Security Courses:

- 1 Go to the DISAM web page at <http://disam.osd.mil>.
- 2 Review and choose which course and training location you'd like to attend.
- 3 Submit on-line registration form to DISAM.

Any applicant for Missile Technology Control Regime Courses:

- 1 Go to the DISAM web page at <http://disam.osd.mil>.
- 2 Review and choose which course and training location you'd like to attend.
- 3 Submit on-line registration form to DISAM.

Industry Personnel (SAM-E, Executive Course and SAM-CS Logistics Customer Support Course only)

- 1 Go to the DISAM web page at <http://disam.osd.mil>.
- 2 Click on Student Info, then scroll down to on-line registration.
- 3 Submit on-line registration form for 1st and 2nd choice SAM-E or SAM-CS course.

Non-U.S. Government International Personnel (SAM-F, Foreign Purchaser, SAM-IT, International Training Management and SAM-CS, Logistics Customer Support Course only):

- 1 In country security assistance office requests training to the appropriate country manager at AFSAT, Randolph AFB, TX.
- 2 AFSAT authorizes funding and training.

Non-U.S. Government Department of Defense Personnel (Foreign Service Nationals):

- 1 Coordinate your application through your respective agencies.
- 2 Submit completed DD form 1556 for requested class to DISAM/DAS and if applicable, complete the student eligibility questionnaire available at DISAM web site: <http://disam.osd.mil/images/PDF/questionnaire.pdf>

U.S. Government Department of Defense (military and civilian) Personnel:

- 1 Contact your education and training officers for cooperation in applying for DISAM attendance. The Defense Management Education and Training Catalog, DoD 5010.16-C, procedures apply.
- 2 Working through your education and training officers, the following agencies allocate all quotas for DISAM attendance.

Air Force. All courses except SAM-TO: HQ AFMC/DPEE, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio 45433-5000, (937) 656-0194/DSN 986-0194.

SAM-TO course only. AFSAT/SDS, 315 J Street West, Randolph Air Force Base, TX 78150-4354, (210) 652-4574/ DSN 487-4574.

Army. Civilians (AMC Commands only): HQ USAMC, ATTN: AMCPE-T, 5001 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria VA 22333-0001, (703) 617-8501/DSN 767-8501.

Civilians (all other commands). HQ TRADOC/ODCST-ATOM-O, Bldg 10, Ft Monroe, VA 23651, (757) 788-3001/DSN 680-3001.

Military (AMC Commands only). HQ USAMC, ATTN: AMCPE-AM, 5001 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria VA 22333-0001, (703) 617-9328/ DSN 767-9328.

Military (all other commands - Officers). PERSCOM/TAPC-OPB-D, 200 Stovall St, Alexandria, VA 22332, (703) 325-3159/DSN 221-3159.

Military (all other commands - Enlisted). PERSCOM/TAPC-EPT-F, 2461 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria, VA 22331-0450, (703) 325-4596/DSN 221-4596.

All civilians and military (SAM-TO course only). SATFA/ATFA-RW, 173 Bernard Rd, Ft Monroe, VA 23651-1003, (757) 788-3257/DSN 680-3257.

Coast Guard. COMDT COGARD/G-CI, 2100 2nd Street SW, Washington DC 20593-1000, (202) 267-2628.

Defense Finance and Accounting Services. DFAS-DE, 6760 East Irvington Place, Denver CO 80279, (303) 676-7075/DSN 926-7075.

Defense Logistics Agency. DLA Training Center, Bldg 11, Section 5, 3990 E. Broad St, Columbus Ohio 43216, (614) 692-5955/DSN 850-5955.

Marine Corps. CG TECOM, 3094 Upshur Ave, Quantico VA 22134, (703) 784-1102/ DSN 278-1102.

Navy. NAVIPO/02C10, 4255 Mt Vernon Dr, Suite 17100, Washington DC 20393-5445, (202)764-2461/DSN 764-2461.

Military department education and training offices must send to the DISAM registrar's office at DISAM/DAS (Student Operations), Building 52, 2475 K Street, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio 45433-7641, or e-mail to registrars@disam.dsca.osd.mil. Each potential student is required to fill out the DD Form 1556. Contractor applicants for SAM-C, SAM-CO, SAM-CF, or SAM-CM are accepted on a space-available basis and should send their requests directly to their respective sponsor service.

Requests must arrive at DISAM not earlier than 90 days and not later than 30 days before the course start date. DISAM accepts or rejects a nominee based on information contained on the enrollment request. DISAM notifies the respective service representative of an applicant's acceptance or rejection. If there is doubt as to whether a prospective student meets the course prerequisites, the nominating office is asked to send a request for waiver. Each waiver request is judged on its own merits.

DISAM wants to help the potential student in obtaining a quota for the appropriate DISAM course. If a student has applied for a DISAM course utilizing the approved procedures listed above and has been told the class is full or there are no available quotas remaining for your service, please contact the DISAM registrar's office at DSN 785-4144 or commercial (937) 255-4144 or use our e-mail registrars@disam.dsca.osd.mil. The registrar's office will take your information and provide it via e-mail to your appropriate service representative for possible scheduling. You will be instructed to provide all the required paperwork to your service representative and to the DISAM registrar. If you have not received a quota within 30 days prior to the course start date, contact the DISAM registrar's office again. The registrar will fill all unused quotas on a first-come first-serve basis to qualified candidates.

DISAM Resident Fiscal Year 2003 Schedule

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM)
 Building 52, 2475 K Street
 Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio 45433-7641

Telephone Numbers for Registrar's Office

DSN: 785-4144
 Commercial: (937) 255-4144
 Data Fax: DSN 785-3441
 Data Fax: Commercial (937) 255-3441
 E-mail: registrars@disam.dsca.osd.mil

1st Quarter

<u>Course</u>	<u>Start Date</u>	<u>End Date</u>
SAM TO-1-03	7 Oct	11 Oct 2002
SAM C-1-03	21 Oct	1 Nov 2002
SAM O-1-03	21 Oct	7 Nov 2002
SAM F-1-03	28 Oct	8 Nov 2002
SAM IT-1-03	12 Nov	14 Nov 2002
IPSR(2) 1-03	13 Nov	14 Nov 2002
SAM CS-1-03	18 Nov	22 Nov 2002
SAM E-1-03	18 Nov	22 Nov 2002
SAM C-2-03	2 Dec	13 Dec 2002
SAM CM-1-03	2 Dec	6 Dec 2002
SAM O-2-03	2 Dec	19 Dec 2002
SAM CF-1-03	9 Dec	13 Dec 2002

2nd Quarter

<u>Course</u>	<u>Start Date</u>	<u>End Date</u>
SAM CO-1-03	13 Jan	17 Jan 2003
MTCR 1-03	22 Jan	23 Jan 2003
SAM C-3-03	27 Jan	7 Feb 2003
SAM TO-2-03	27 Jan	31 Jan 2003
SAM CS-2-03	10 Feb	14 Feb 2003
SAM CM-2-03	24 Feb	28 Feb 2003
SAM O-3-03	24 Feb	13 Mar 2003
SAM F-2-03	3 Mar	14 Mar 2003
SAM C-4-03	17 Mar	28 Mar 2003
SAM IT-2-03	17 Mar	19 Mar 2003
SAM O-4-03	31 Mar	17 Apr 2003

3rd Quarter

<u>Course</u>	<u>Start Date</u>	<u>End Date</u>
MTCR 2-03	2 Apr	3 Apr 2003
SAM C-5-03	7 Apr	18 Apr 2003
SAM E-2-03	7 Apr	11 Apr 2003
SAM TO-3-03	14 Apr	18 Apr 2003
SAM C-6-03	5 May	16 May 2003
SAM O-5-03	5 May	22 May 2003
SAM F-3-03	12 May	23 May 2003
SAM CO-2-03	19 May	23 May 2003
SAM IT-3-03	27 May	29 May 2003
SAM AR-1-03	2 Jun	6 Jun 2003
SAM TA-1-03	2 Jun	6 Jun 2003
IPSR(2) 2-03	4 Jun	5 Jun 2003
SAM O-6-03	9 Jun	26 Jun 2003
MTCR 3-03	11 Jun	12 Jun 2003
SAM CM-3-03	16 Jun	20 Jun 2003
SAM E-3-03	23 Jun	27 Jun 2003

4th Quarter

<u>Course</u>	<u>Start Date</u>	<u>End Date</u>
SAM AT-1-03	7 Jul	11 Jul 2003
SAM CF-2-03	14 Jul	18 Jul 2003
IPSR(5) 1-03	14 Jul	18 Jul 2003
SAM CS-3-03	21 Jul	25 Jul 2003
SAM O-7-03	21 Jul	7 Aug 2003
SAM F-4-03	28 Jul	8 Aug 2003
IPSR(2) 3-03	30 Jul	31 Jul 2003
SAM CF-3-03	4 Aug	8 Aug 2003
SAM C-7-03	11 Aug	22 Aug 2003
SAM IT-4-03	11 Aug	13 Aug 2003
SAM TO-4-03	18 Aug	22 Aug 2003
IPSR(2) 4-03	3 Sep	4 Sep 2003
SAM C-8-03	8 Sep	19 Sep 2003
SAM O-8-03	8 Sep	25 Sep 2003
SAM E-4-03	22 Sep	26 Sep 2003
MTCR 4-03	24 Sep	25 Sep 2003

DISAM Non-Resident Fiscal Year 2003 Schedule

Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM)
Building 52, 2475 K Street
Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio 45433-7641

Telephone Numbers for Registrar's Office

DSN: 785-4144
Commercial: (937) 255-4144
Data Fax: DSN 785-3441
Data Fax: Commercial (937) 255-3441
E-mail: registrars@disam.dsca.osd.mil

1st Quarter

<u>Course</u>	<u>Start Date</u>	<u>End Date</u>
SAM MET-1-03	3 Oct	18 Oct 2002
SAM OS-1-03	7 Oct	18 Oct 2002
IPSR(2) (OS)-1-03	16 Oct	17 Oct 2002
SAM OS-2-03	22 Oct	24 Oct 2002
SAM CR(OS)-1-03	4 Nov	8 Nov 2002
SAM OS-3-03	19 Nov	21 Nov 2002

2nd Quarter

<u>Course</u>	<u>Start Date</u>	<u>End Date</u>
SAM OS-4-03	7 Jan	9 Jan 2003
IPSR(2) (OS)-2-03	8 Jan	9 Jan 2003
SAM OS-5-03	14 Jan	16 Jan 2003
SAM MET-2-03	22 Jan	7 Feb 2003
SAM OS-6-03	4 Feb	6 Feb 2003
SAM OS-7-03	11 Feb	13 Feb 2003
SAM OS-8-03	11 Mar	13 Mar 2003
SAM MET-3-03	19 Mar	4 Apr 2003
SAM OS-9-03	25 Mar	27 Mar 2003
IPSR(2) (OS)-3-03	5 Mar	6 Mar 2003

3rd Quarter

<u>Course</u>	<u>Start Date</u>	<u>End Date</u>
SAM MET-4-03	23 Apr	9 May 2003
SAM OS-10-03	29 Apr	1 May 2003
SAM MET-5-03	28 May	13 Jun 2003

4rd Quarter

<u>Course</u>	<u>Start Date</u>	<u>End Date</u>
SAM CR(OS)-2-03	7 Jul	11 Jul 2003
SAM OS-11-03	8 Jul	10 Jul 2003
SAM MET-6-03	9 Jul	25 Jul 2003
IPSR(2) (OS)-4-03	13 Aug	14 Aug 2003
SAM MET-7-03	13 Aug	29 Aug 2003
SAM CR(OS)-3-03	25 Aug	29 Aug 2003
SAM OS-12-03	26 Aug	28 Aug 2003
SAM MET-8-03	3 Sep	19 Sep 2003

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