

# Homeland Security Institute

## Radicalization: An Overview and Annotated Bibliography of Open-Source Literature

Final Report

15 December 2006



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HSI's mission is to assist the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Under Secretary for Science and Technology, and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) operating elements in addressing national policy and security issues where scientific, technical, and analytical expertise is required. HSI also consults with other government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, institutions of higher education, and nonprofit organizations.

HSI delivers independent and objective analyses and advice to support policy development, decision-making, alternative approaches, and new ideas on significant issues. HSI's research is undertaken by mutual consent with DHS and is organized by Tasks in the annual HIS Research Plan. This report presents the results of research and analysis conducted under

### **Core Task 06-53, Radicalization and Warning Indicators of HSI's Fiscal Year 2006 Research Plan**

The purpose of this task is to conduct a review of available unclassified open-source literature and identify areas for further research. The objectives of the task are to prepare a summary of key findings that will serve as a resource to intelligence analysts, law enforcement personnel, and researchers.

The results presented in this report do not necessarily reflect official DHS opinion or policy.



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# **RADICALIZATION: AN OVERVIEW AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF OPEN-SOURCE LITERATURE**

## **FINAL REPORT**

**15 December 2006**

**Prepared for:**

**Department of Homeland Security  
Science and Technology Directorate**

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## SUMMARY

### Background

Radicalization, broadly defined, is the process whereby an individual or group adopts extremist beliefs and behaviors. It is important to understand and recognize the process by which people become radicalized and the indicators related to radicalization in order to develop effective means of preventing or countering it.

Intelligence analysts, law enforcement, and private sector officials currently gather information on radicalization from a wide variety of independent domestic and international sources. No single library exists that affords access to a variety of studies and analyses on radicalization. The purpose of this report is to provide a bibliography of unclassified radicalization literature. This bibliography is intended to serve as a resource to acquaint intelligence analysts, law enforcement personnel, and researchers with the topic of radicalization, to identify and summarize work that has addressed this topic to-date, and to illustrate gaps that remain and may require further in-depth study.

### Methodology

We identified and reviewed over 250 unclassified sources relating to radicalization. The literature consists of government-sponsored reports, expert testimonies, journal articles, academic research, books, and press reporting. We identified radicalization literature from academic and professional databases (e.g., JSTOR, EBSCO) and books.

Based on our initial search, we selected over 130 sources (spanning from 2001 to the present) to include in the bibliography. Our selections were reviewed by internal and external subject matter experts (SMEs) to ensure that we had a representative sampling of radicalization literature. The SMEs also helped identify articles considered to be most relevant, informative, or that made the greatest contribution to the analysis or discussion of radicalization. No attempt was made to independently validate the analyses presented in the literature.

The literature covers a range of topics: definitions, descriptions of international and domestic experiences with radicalization, models and frameworks, and gaps and recommendations. Each source is categorized in an annotated bibliography according to one or more of these topics (brief overviews of each topic area to be described later).

### Bibliography Format

To facilitate use, the bibliography is presented in three ways:

- An annotated bibliography containing all references divided by topics
- A full reference list, sorted alphabetically by author
- A CD containing an electronic copy of the reference information, sorted in a variety of ways, including: alphabetically by author, by title, by publication date, by topic, and by type of source. This disk will also contain an electronic version in Portable Document Format (PDF)

Each entry in the annotated bibliography contains the following information: citation, source, topic area(s), web link (if applicable), and Key Points.

- The *citation* contains all the information available for the reference, including author, title, source and date.

- The *Source Type* indicates whether the reference comes from congressional testimony; domestic or international government reports; academic research papers, presentations or journals; books; press reports; or domestic or international think tank reports.
- The *Topic Area(s)* lists all relevant subjects that the reference addresses (Definitions, Domestic, International, Models/Frameworks, Gaps/Recommendations).
- The *Web Link* is provided for references that are available online.
- The *Key Points* for each reference were extracted from the original sources and organized by HSI analysts. The Key Points are often direct quotes or paraphrases from the article. They should not be considered a complete summary of the document or a full representation of the authors' views. **The information contained in the Key Points may be copyrighted and may be subject to limitations on further reproduction or dissemination.**

## **Radicalization Topic Areas**

Much of the literature included in the bibliography presents information about the general characteristics of radicalization. While researchers have not found evidence of a standard profile of individuals who become radicalized, several authors suggest common attributes related to the types of individuals who may become radicalized, the factors that influence radicalization, and the pathways to radicalization.

The literature in both the Domestic and International sections, described below, discusses general characteristics of radicalization and addresses what is known about the environments or *nodes* where radicalization may occur. Other topics that appear in the literature include definitions and terminology, theoretical models and frameworks, knowledge gaps, and recommendations for addressing radicalization.

### ***Definitions and Terminology***

While radicalization is not a new phenomenon, the use of this word in relation to Islamic extremism and terrorism began appearing more frequently in the press and popular dialogue around 2004.<sup>1</sup> It has been used increasingly ever since.

The references cited in the bibliography provide various definitions of radicalization and other related terms. The term *radicalization* has been defined and used in a variety of ways in the sources that are referenced, including:

- “The progressive personal development from law-abiding Muslim to Militant Islamist”<sup>2</sup>
- “Growing readiness to pursue and/or support – if necessary by undemocratic means – far-reaching changes in society that conflict with, or pose a threat to, the democratic order”<sup>3</sup>
- “The process of adopting an extremist belief system, including the willingness to use, support, or facilitate violence, as a method to effect societal change”<sup>4</sup>

Additionally, we include references that address the terminology commonly used when framing discussions of radicalization and terrorism. These sources suggest that certain words or phrases not be

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<sup>1</sup> Searched “radicalization” in all news sources available on Nexis.com and found 26 articles from 2004, 872 articles from 2005, and over 1000 articles from 2006.

<sup>2</sup> Taarnby, 2005

<sup>3</sup> AIVD, 2005

<sup>4</sup> DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis

used when describing terrorism because they could either cause offense or lend credence to the terrorists' cause.

### ***Domestic Radicalization Literature***

Our search of the literature revealed that research on radicalization in the U.S. is more limited when compared to Europe. We found significantly fewer studies and reports addressing domestic radicalization than those that address radicalization in other parts of the world.

The literature on domestic radicalization generally focuses on analyses of the threat (e.g., whether a greater threat comes from radicalized individuals entering the U.S. from other countries or from U.S. citizens becoming radicalized overseas and returning home). Behavioral experts, social scientists, and terrorism experts describe and assess those factors that may identify the types of individuals who might be prone to radicalization and the processes by which radicalization may occur.

Much of the U.S.-specific literature compares the nature and extent of radicalization in the U.S. to the international situation, including perceived variances in root causes, trends and places where radicalization occurs or may occur. Efforts that are currently underway to address radicalization and recommendations for future studies on radicalization are also discussed.

### ***International Radicalization Literature***

A significant amount of literature exists on radicalization in countries other than the U.S. The terrorist attacks in Madrid and London, and thwarted terrorist plots and arrests of homegrown extremists throughout Europe have resulted in considerable attention to the problem from European governments and scholars.

We include literature that discusses the initiatives taken by the European Union (EU) and the individual Member States aimed at understanding and preventing radicalization. These initiatives are varied and include engaging the moderate Muslim population to become more vocal and involved, encouraging the hiring of imams who are familiar with the language and culture of the European country they live in, launching public relations and outreach campaigns to promote understanding and tolerance between subcultures, and revamping immigration regulations to foster integration.

We include studies and research from leading European government-sponsored agencies and research institutions, including the General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) of the Netherlands, the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), and the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI). Much of the literature published by these entities focuses on providing a description of the scope and extent of the radicalization problem within their respective countries; identifying key factors that may be related to why radicalization occurs; and proposing recommendations and additional research aimed at responding to and preventing further radicalization.

### ***Models/Frameworks***

A number of studies have been conducted by researchers who apply behavioral and social science models and conceptual frameworks to understand radicalization. Some of the models and frameworks included in this bibliography specifically address terrorism, and may be applicable to the study of radicalization.

### ***Gaps/Recommendations***

Several gaps and recommendations are identified by the sources cited in the bibliography. The gaps primarily highlight what is not known about radicalization and point to areas that have not been addressed

to any great extent. The recommendations emphasize areas that require additional study, suggest ways to address radicalization issues, and propose counter-terrorism strategies.

## **Key Observations**

Research, theory, and data on Islamic radicalization are still beginning to emerge. Considerable research and theoretical development are needed to fill existing gaps in order to provide a better understanding of the radicalization process and other related issues. In the course of compiling this literature review, we were able to identify where radicalization research has been focused to date as well as the areas where critical gaps in our understanding may exist. Below, we briefly describe key gaps that we identified from our review of the radicalization literature.

### ***Who/What/Why – Factors and Influences***

Much of the literature we reviewed points to the social factors contributing to radicalization (e.g., lack of integration, low socio-economic status, lack of education); however, other data indicate that well-educated, affluent individuals, who appear to be well-integrated are also susceptible to radicalization. There is evidence that the social factors that may have been influential in the radicalization of the London bombers were different from those of the perpetrators of the train attacks in Spain.

### ***How – Radicalization Process***

Some researchers suggest that attempts to develop an individual profile of radicalization are misguided and that research should be conducted to understand the “hows”—assessing group behaviors and social contagion processes—versus the “whos” and “whys.” In-depth case studies of identified radical individuals and groups, particularly in the U.S., could be conducted and the data utilized to discern possible patterns, links or common processes. Examination of the processes involved in radicalization may help practitioners to identify early warning indicators.

### ***Muslim Demographics and Radicalization Trends***

Our review of the available data suggests that we know very little about Muslims in the U.S. (e.g., the locations of the largest concentration of Muslims and the growth rates of various Muslim populations). As a result, our knowledge concerning where radical elements are likely to be active is even more limited.

For example, some literature suggests that African-American and Hispanic Muslim converts are the fastest growing segment of the Muslim population in the United States. Literature sources also indicate that these two groups may be more susceptible to, or more involved with, radicalization. This phenomenon is supported by an increase of African-American and Hispanic Muslims participating in terrorist training camps overseas, and the radicalization of this population in U.S. prisons. Yet, very little information has been identified on where these groups are concentrated and at what pace they are growing.

Muslim youths are frequently cited as the most susceptible to radicalization. Much if not all of the available research is based on data and studies on European and Middle Eastern youths. Research and analysis on radicalization of Muslim youths in the U.S. is limited.

### ***Environments or Nodes of Radicalization***

Prisons, mosques, universities, community centers, and the Internet are frequently identified as environments where radicalization occurs. In addition to physical environments, charismatic leaders,

written or recorded material, or shared experiences may also help to foster radicalization.<sup>5</sup> With the exception of prisons, there is limited concrete information about whether or not these environments or *nodes* foster radicalization in the U.S.

### ***Universities***

Since the thwarted liquid explosives airline plot, there has been significant attention paid to radicalization and recruitment occurring on university campuses in the U.K. We did not find similar literature addressing universities in the U.S. as a source of radicalization.

### ***Mosques***

The literature discusses both “garage mosques,” which have been appearing in Europe as a response to the perceived increase of law enforcement surveillance, and informal mosques that have been emerging to accommodate rapid growth of the Muslim population. In addition to getting a better understanding of how to identify mosques that may be radical, it would also be beneficial to identify the types of venues in the U.S. that extremists may frequent to practice their religion when they are concerned that their normal place of worship is under increased scrutiny.

### ***Prisons***

A plethora of literature describing prison radicalization in the U.S. is available. There are efforts in place to try to stem the spread of prison radicalization by conducting screening of religious service providers, training personnel to notice the signs of radicalization, and tracking prisoners and religious providers as they transfer from one prison to another. Radical groups are said to recruit in prisons by offering connections or friendships to inmates both while they are in prison and after their release. At present, no databases or tools exist to track potentially radicalized prisoners after they have exited the correctional system. As a result, we do not know if former prisoners are concentrating in certain locales within the U.S., either within or outside of Muslim communities.

### ***Internet***

The Internet has been identified by many sources as contributing to radicalization, mainly because it is easy to use, is available around the globe, and is relatively inexpensive. The Internet is seen as a great forum for discussion, dissemination of information, virtual community building, training, and inspiration. There is concern among many of the experts who have addressed this topic that susceptible youths are visiting websites that espouse extremist ideology and are being drawn toward radicalized groups or individuals. Although the U.S. government has indicated that there is thus far no direct evidence that the Internet has been a factor in any domestic incidents, it would be beneficial to get a better understanding of how the Internet could contribute to radicalization in the U.S.

### ***Others***

Additional environments may exist or emerge that require study. The *Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005* revealed that informal settings, specifically a local Islamic bookshop and local gyms, contributed to the radicalization of the perpetrators.<sup>6</sup> It is possible that there are

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<sup>5</sup> “Nodes” are defined as conduits that facilitate or support a person or group through the radicalization process. (U.S. Congress. House. Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment of the Homeland Security Committee. Javed Ali statement on Radicalization. 109th Cong., 2d sess., 20 September 2006.)

<sup>6</sup> O'Neill, Brendan. "Killer Workout: Are gyms, not mosques, the main breeding ground for Islamic terrorists?" *Slate* (1 June 2006).

other locations or environments that provide opportunities for young people to bond and potentially be recruited. Information on such environments in the U.S. is limited.

***Information Exchange and Adoption of Tactics***

Other groups in the U.S. express rhetoric similar to that of Islamic extremists. The National Intelligence Estimate, released in April 2006, assessed that “anti-U.S. and anti-globalization sentiment is on the rise and fueling other radical ideologies. This could prompt some leftist, nationalist, or separatist groups to adopt terrorist methods to attack U.S. interests.”<sup>7</sup> Anti-government extremists, anarchists, and extremist Islamic terrorists share some similar elements in their ideologies, including opposition to U.S. government and corporate policies, opposition to the war in Iraq, and hostility toward Israel.

A number of sources describing the situation in U.S. prisons, for instance, indicated that radicalization is not just Islamic in nature. There is concern that domestic extremist groups are using their well-established networks to help provide links and other resources to Islamic radicals in U.S. prisons. The nature and extent of the possible relationships between these groups are unknown and may warrant additional study.

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<sup>7</sup>National Intelligence Estimate. Declassified Key Judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, April 2006.

## DEFINITIONS

**Borum, Randy. “Radicalization in America: What We Are (Slowly) Learning.” PowerPoint presentation provided by author.**

*Source Type:* Other (PowerPoint Presentation)

*Topic Area(s):* Definitions, Domestic

*Key Points:*

Borum suggests that people follow different pathways to radicalization and provides concepts that might be more helpful in understanding the radicalization process.

The article provides definitions for radicalization, including:

- Taarnby, 2005: radicalization is “the progressive personal development from law-abiding Muslim to militant Islamist”
- AIVD, 2005: radicalization is the “growing readiness to pursue and/or support—if necessary by undemocratic means—far-reaching changes in society that conflict with, or pose a threat to, the democratic order.”

Borum states that there is a distinction between radicalization and recruitment; radicalization is the ideological development or alignment, whereas recruitment is mobilizing extremists to engage in terrorism or other violent acts.

Borum suggests that vulnerability may be more of a useful concept than personality when trying to understand radicalization.

He outlines the steps of the recruitment process, including:

- 1) Attract/promote exposure to seminal ideas.
- 2) Invite prospects to smaller, select gathering.
- 3) Develop social bond to small group.
- 4) Gradually introduce political/radical ideas.
- 5) Cultivate extremism, focusing on political/radical ideas (incite hate, erode barriers to violent action).
- 6) Allow social forces to mobilize volunteers for action.

**Council on Foreign Relations. “American Militant Extremists, United States Radicals: Terrorism Q & A.” <http://www.cfr.org/publication/9236/>.**

*Source Type:* Think Tank (Domestic)

*Topic Area(s):* Definitions, Domestic

*Web Link:* <http://www.cfr.org/publication/9236/>

***Key Points:***

This primer from the Council on Foreign Relations discusses American militant extremists and other radical groups in the U.S. It suggests that American right-wing extremists are advocating rhetoric similar to Islamic extremists.

This source presents three types of domestic terrorist groups:

- 1) Left-wing: anticapitalist revolutionary groups
- 2) Right-wing: motivated by opposition to federal taxation and regulation, the UN, other international organizations, the U.S. government, and hatred of racial and religious minorities; estimated 10,000 to 100,000 members, with a smaller extremist core
- 3) Special-interest: focuses on one issue such as abortion, the environment, or animal rights

The report indicates that 3/4 of the 335 suspected or confirmed terrorist incidents that occurred between 1980 and 2000 were carried out by Americans.

It provides the FBI definition of domestic terrorism as: “the unlawful use, or threatened use, of force or violence by a group or individual based and operating entirely within the United States or its territories without foreign direction committed against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.”

The article provides the Patriot Act’s definition of domestic terrorism as “criminal acts that are dangerous to human life and seem to be meant to scare civilians or affect policy.”

The report suggests that leaderless resistance is being used by domestic extremists to avoid detection. Anarchist and left-wing rhetoric has begun to emerge in eco-terrorist propaganda; groups such as ALF/ELF have ties with each other and foreign counterparts.

According to the article, monitoring organizations have indicated that both American right-wing extremists and Islamic militants spread similar theories about Jews, Freemasons, and other groups conspiring to control the world and have shown that some white supremacists applauded the 9/11 attacks.

**European Commission. *Addressing the factors contributing to violent radicalisation Communication*. Brussels, Belgium: Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Counsel, 9 September 2005.**

**Source Type:** Government (International)

**Topic Area(s):** Definitions, International, Gaps/Recommendations

**Web Link:** <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52005DC0313:EN:NOT>

**Key Points:**

This report discusses the factors that contribute to violent radicalization, including a threat from Islam, reasons for radicalization, and where radicalization is occurring.

The European Commission states that the main threat to Europe and the West comes from an abuse of Islam. The Commission believes “there is no such thing as ‘Islamic terrorism,’ nor ‘catholic’ nor ‘red’ terrorism...The fact that some individuals unscrupulously attempt to justify their crimes in the name of a religion or an ideology cannot be allowed in any way and to any extent whatsoever to cast a shadow upon such a religion or ideology.”

Although the threat from an abuse of Islam is relatively recent, Europe has a long history of fighting terrorism (e.g., ETA, IRA). The ideologies range from extreme right or left, anarchist, religious, or nationalist. Terrorist cells have been known to Europe before 11 March 04 bombings in Madrid and the 7 July 05 bombings in London.

The Commission states that today’s threats are small scale organizations and groups across Member States that advocate radical beliefs or encourage young people to take social or political action against Islamophobia or perceived anti-Islamic politics of the West.

According to the Commission, those involved in radicalization may be European citizens whose motivations defy simplistic categorization. Those involved may or may not be socially-excluded, socio-economically disadvantaged, unemployed or living in deprived suburbs of large cities or inner-city housing estates, or from immigrant families.

The Commission discusses factors contributing to radicalization:

- On a broad level, some perceive injustice or exclusion, allowing them to fight under a common political, religious, national, or ethnic banner. With these group affiliations they can carry out acts of violence in the name of a cause.
- On an individual psychological level, some may feel discriminated against or may not feel accepted in society, and therefore are unwilling to identify with the values of the larger society.

The Commission says that people are exposed to new ideas through universities, the Internet, chat rooms, places of worship, political parties and organizations; and the media, including radio and satellite TV. These can help disseminate propaganda that contributes to violent radicalization, facilitates recruitment, and influences the way the public is informed.

The Commission also discusses the root causes of radicalization:

- An individual's negative feelings of exclusion exist alongside positive mobilizing feelings about becoming part of a group and taking action for change.
- Social factors such as exclusion—perceived or real—are often partial reasons given for becoming prone to radical opinion or joining radical movements. Others include feeling discriminated against, threatened identity, immigration, and globalization.
- Identity issues come into play because youth do not feel connected to the linguistic, religious, or political beliefs of their parents' generation or that of the host country.

The Commission also notes that some people, particularly young people from poorer, or excluded backgrounds, may feel a strong attraction for the “certainties” of extreme ideologies, although it is not only individuals in these categories who are found to have turned to violent radicalization.

According to the commission, the development and implementation of a European Strategy on violent radicalization will be a long-term effort. The immediate focus areas are broadcast media, the Internet, education, youth engagement, employment, social exclusion and integration issues, equal opportunities, and nondiscrimination and intercultural dialogue.

Member States have been studying the phenomenon of violent radicalization concentrating on recruitment hotspots like prisons, religious centers, and schools. The Commission believes Europe should draw on available expertise but at the same time not limit itself to it.

**Ford, Peter. “Fighting Terrorism One Word at a Time.” *Christian Science Monitor*, (24 April 2006).**

**Source Type:** Press Report

**Topic Area(s):** Definitions, International

**Web Link:** <http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0424/p04s01-woeu.html>

**Key Points:**

Ford describes the European Union's approach to counter-terrorism as going beyond intelligence and law enforcement to deal with the “wider context” that can breed resentful terrorists.

He indicates that the European Union is attempting to not use words and phrases that could cause offense (e.g., “Islamic terrorism”) in an effort to not “lump all Muslims in the same category.”

**Frattini, Franco. "Responses to the threat of terrorism and effects on communities."  
London: Speech at Conference sponsored by EU JHA Committees, 24 November 2005.**

*Source Type:* Government (International)

*Topic Area(s):* Definitions, International, Gaps/Recommendations

*Web Link:*

[http://europapoort.eerstekamer.nl/9310000/1/j9tvgajcovz8izf\\_j9vvgbwoimqf9iv/vgbwr4k8ocw2/f=/vh67or54zexu.pdf](http://europapoort.eerstekamer.nl/9310000/1/j9tvgajcovz8izf_j9vvgbwoimqf9iv/vgbwr4k8ocw2/f=/vh67or54zexu.pdf)

*Key Points:*

Frattini discusses the action plan developed by the European Union (EU) for mitigating the factors that create fertile ground for radicalization. Involvement and interaction with minority communities is said to be a key part of the EU's plan.

The author defines "European citizenship" as a sense of belonging to European society and sharing its fundamental common values, as opposed to a feeling of separateness based on religion or immigration status. Frattini says that European citizenship can be a confusing term, in that it is not referring to a legal status created to replace national citizenship, but rather a buzzword being used in the EU to describe the concept of common identity.

Frattini explains that the European Commission has adopted a statement called "Terrorist Recruitment: Addressing the Factors Contributing to Violent Radicalization," which outlines initiatives in various areas that have been implemented to date, including:

- Broadcast media/Internet: prohibit programs that can incite hatred; removal of terrorist propaganda from the Internet.
- Education, youth engagement, and European citizenship: develop among youth an understanding of Europe's cultural diversity and common values; promote intercultural dialogue; promote concept of active "European citizenship."
- Integration, inter-cultural dialogue, and dialogue with religions: promote a sense of European identity, not just with immigrants, but also with second and third-generation; support inter-religious dialogue through a network of representatives from different faith groups, as well as conferences and seminars; designate 2008 as the Year of Intercultural Dialogue.
- Law enforcement/security services: engage more at the local level with youth; exchange best practices of minority recruitment in police and security services.
- Expert networks: create a network of European experts to study the root causes and responses to violent radicalization.
- External relations: dialogue with countries that could serve as breeding grounds and training sites for terrorists.

Frattini recommends that additional research is needed that looks into the root causes of violent radicalization.

**Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations / Central Intelligence and Security Service. *From Dawa to Jihad: The Various Threats from Radical Islam to the Democratic Legal Order*. Hague, Netherlands: Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations / Central Intelligence and Security Service, December 2004.**

*Source Type:* Government (International)

*Topic Area(s):* Definitions, International

*Web Link:* <http://www.aivd.nl/contents/pages/42345/fromdawatojihad.pdf>

***Key Points:***

This article discusses the importance of the democratic legal order as a starting point for an AIVD study of radical Islam, and radical Islam as a dynamic phenomenon that involves a variety of threats. It describes counterstrategies and resistance against the various threats from radical Islam.

This report provides definitions for the following terms:

- “Radicalisation is explicitly seen here as a (one-way) process and not as a state. In the description of the components of radicalism there is an obvious relationship with the term 'extremism'.”
- Radicalism: “The (active) pursuit of and/or support to far-reaching changes in society which may constitute a danger to (the continued existence of) the democratic legal order (aim), which may involve the use of undemocratic methods (means) that may harm the functioning of the democratic legal order (effect).”
- Ultra: an extraordinary or exaggerated form of a known, usually political capacity (compare ultra left-wing, ultra right-wing).
- Extreme: going to the limit. Description of groups operating on the fringe of the existing political spectrum.
- Extremism: “going as far as, pushing to the ultimate consequences.” In general political terms, extremism thus is a phenomenon that considers the extreme as acceptable or pursues the extreme in its aims and/or means. Within this context the extreme may mean violence—leading to death.
- Orthodox: strictly upholding a traditional (mostly religious) doctrine, in accordance with all the doctrine's precepts.
- Fundamentalist: orthodox, anti-liberal (usually religious) movement, with an anti-intellectual slant (no freedom of debate, no room for doubt).
- Militant: obviously a term with a military connotation; in general meaning combative and aggressive, within the boundaries of the law.
- Activist: the focus is on action, instead of on words. In principle, actions (campaigns) do not have to cause damage to property, but they may involve disturbance of the public order.
- Violent activist: involving damage to property, see also under *activist*, although this type of activism does not necessarily involve disturbing the public order.
- Terrorist: causing serious damage to property, thus disrupting social processes and/or committing or threatening violence targeted at human lives (from a political or religious objective) aimed at realizing social changes and/or influencing the political decision-making process within the context of the democratic legal order.

Democratic societies have a legal order, which is a system of rules and regulations prescribed and accepted by that society.

The AIVD suggests that three components of radicalization exist:

- 1) The pursuit of far-reaching economic, social, and political reforms of society
- 2) The acceptance of far-reaching personal or social consequences of this pursuit of far-reaching reforms
- 3) The pursuit of far-reaching reforms beyond moderate reformism, involving general uncompromising attitude and tendencies toward confrontation with those standing in the way

The report describes three types of radicalism:

- Antidemocratic, which is a nonacceptance of democratic government, where a different form of government is desired and one will use armed combat or insidious undermining techniques
- Undemocratic, which is a willingness to use undemocratic means to achieve an end (e.g., animal rights activism, political activism)
- Not intentionally antidemocratic or undemocratic, which include isolationism, exclusivism, and parallelism

The article identifies an alarming trend of recruitment for the armed radical Islamic struggle (jihad) among Dutch youth, in particular ethnic minorities in the Netherlands. It notes that “the spread of radical Islam and related terrorism, like the dissemination of Western ideas worldwide, is the expression of a trend towards globalization that has been developing for quite some time.” The common basis for many movements, organizations, and groups stems from the dissatisfaction about and resistance to the political, economic, and cultural dominance of the West which is shared by many Muslims.

The report contends that one may get an overestimation of threat if too much emphasis is placed on the ideological relationship between violent and non-violent forms of Islam. Nonviolent forms can be a breeding ground for further radicalization or shelter for terrorists. Nonviolent forms are also harder to identify than acutely violent groups. However, violent radical Muslims increasingly make use of the rhetoric and means of the asymmetrical war.

The articles discusses three types of Islam: 1) radical political Islam, 2) radical Islamic Puritanism, and 3) radical Muslim nationalism.

Radical Islam is described as the “politico-religious pursuit of establishing—if necessary by extreme means—a society that reflects the perceived values from the original sources of Islam as purely as possible.” “Radical Islam consists of a multitude of movements, organisations and groups which show a certain affinity with one another, but which may also have very different ideological and strategic views.”

Dismantling al Qaeda's infrastructure facilities in Afghanistan as well as the elimination or arrest of several of its foremost leaders has resulted in fragmentation of al Qaeda. As a result, its actual strength and organizational powers have been reduced. This has caused a decentralization of international Islamic terrorism. There are no longer any global networks controlled by a central al Qaeda leadership. Instead, local networks have emerged, which are related on the basis of a common al Qaeda ideology, rather than by organizational ties. Within the local networks, in particular in the Western world (especially in Europe), al Qaeda's ideology is interpreted in an even more extremist way than by al Qaeda's leadership.

The AIVD states that “terrorism is the ultimate consequence of a development starting with radicalization processes.” A number of counterstrategies are highlighted to include:

- Provision of information to government bodies and the public
- Cooperation with moderate forces
- Promotion of competitive views
- Identity development
- Stimulation of positive role models
- Encouragement of the emancipation of women
- Education
- Political-administrative measures
- Media coverage
- Financial investigation
- Continuous testing against the Penal Code of possible cases of discrimination or incitement of hatred and rebellion
- Cooperation with governments of motherland countries
- Socio-economic factors
- Dialogue between the civil society and moderate forces in the Muslim communities
- Cooperation between intelligence and security services, judicial authorities, police, and others
- Arrests
- Infiltration, frustration, obstruction
- Security and protection
- Sensibilisation

**Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations. *Violent Jihad in the Netherlands: Current trends in the Islamic terrorist threat.* General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD), March 2006.**

**Source Type:** Government (International)

**Topic Area(s):** Definitions, International

**Web Link:**

[http://english.nctb.nl/Images/Violent%20jihad%20in%20the%20Netherlands%202006\\_tcm127-112471.pdf](http://english.nctb.nl/Images/Violent%20jihad%20in%20the%20Netherlands%202006_tcm127-112471.pdf)

**Key Points:**

This report discusses the current and increasing threat of homegrown jihadist networks in the Netherlands. It notes that the principal causes of the increase in these types of networks are radicalization and recruitment.

The AIVD provides definitions for the following terms:

- Islamism: radical movement within Islam which pursues the realization of a society that reflects their perception of the original sources of Islam, the Koran and Sunnah
- Jihadist: extremist Islamists who propagate violence against perceived enemies of Islam to effect social and political change that accords with their radical religious ideals
- Radicalization: a growing readiness to pursue and/or support—if necessary by undemocratic means—far-reaching changes in society that conflict with, or pose a threat to, the democratic order
- Mobilization to violence: aka jihadisation. Small numbers leap from radicalism to extremism

The report notes that radicalization can jeopardize social cohesion and solidarity, create polarization, and, in the long term, threaten the democratic order. It finds that some youth perceive violent jihad as positive and “cool.”

It contains information on the Theo van Gogh murder and resultant problems. In the Netherlands “personal struggle against concrete political ‘enemies of Islam’ appears to play a more prominent role in the Netherlands than in Madrid and London, where the attackers hit the West as an abstract symbol of oppression.” The attraction of radical Islam for young Muslims seems to have grown after the van Gogh murder.

The AIVD discusses the role of jihad networks. Specific to the Netherlands is the development of networks in three historical phases—traditional, proliferation and homegrown. Today they are involved in the support, preparation, and commission of terrorist operations. Today they lack the hierarchical structure and have an informal, flexible membership. Personal ties bind networks together and are based on shared political-religious ideology, trust, friendship, ties to country of origin, shared experiences, and a common enemy.

Decentralization has occurred where there has been a shift from central operational control to local autonomy and a further expansion of operating area. Additionally, transnational networks help with coordination, recruitment and dissemination of radical ideology.

The AIVD notes that individuals get extremist ideology through Internet and other local influences and then adapt it to a European context. Mosques, imams, Islamic organizations, and jihad networks also influence and recruit young Muslims. A growing tendency for young Muslims to radicalize on their own initiative has been noted—this is a spontaneous, interactive, and largely autonomous process. The core of radicalized youth is probably small in Netherlands, around several hundred people and 10 to 20 loose-knit jihad networks.

The socio-political context, which is driven by religious, political, and social issues, is discussed. Feelings of discontent and frustration are expressed and people believe that the *umma* is being oppressed and persecuted. This fuels feelings of anger, powerlessness and humiliation. A victim complex develops and conspiratorial thinking blames all problems on external factors and “others,” and thus they turn their back on society.

The article discusses the process of radicalization as beginning with youth taking classes at centers or mosques and then looking for new teachers because the courses are insufficient. Many times they have “living-room meetings” and charismatic leaders as inspiration. Websites enable propagators to spread messages to wide audiences and recruit individuals, which may help form

local networks. Social relations play a large role in formation of local networks, which are made up of friends and family members.

According to the AIVD, certain indicators are seen among young people going through jihadisation. Certain group processes have elements in common with processes with isolated religious sects. These include:

- Increasing isolation
- Loss of independence
- Fixation on cult figures or other heroes or inspirational leaders
- Possible intimidation

“These processes result in a collective ideology of personal violence. Political goals are often vague or absent.”

The report discusses the influence of the Internet. It spreads messages, stimulates and accelerates emergence of real and virtual networks, is cheap, fast, and easily accessible, is an easy place to meet like-minded people and feel accepted into a community. It gives a sense of self: “I chat, therefore I exist.” There is a lack of censorship on the Internet and this means that there is possibly no way for a person to separate facts from fiction, and the line between real and virtual becomes blurred. “The purely virtual world is replacing the real world, as a consequence of which individuals become isolated from the surrounding society and turn against it, initially ideologically, but at a later stage possibly violently. This affects social cohesion and enables radicalised persons to more easily make the leap to the use of violence.”

Before and after 9/11, the threat to Europe came mostly from abroad, but after 9/11, the threat has been fueled mainly by local development and initiatives. Western Europe (and the Netherlands) is confronted with an increasing number of radicalized, potentially violent, homegrown Muslims. Their motives can be explained partly by growing dissatisfaction with the status of Islam and Muslims in Europe among Islamic populations groups and among young Muslims in particular.

Young Muslims believe that “domestic culture in the Netherlands is also negatively disposed towards Islam.” A significant number of young Muslims are dissatisfied with their own positions in society because unemployment and discrimination are problems in Dutch society, especially for those from a Moroccan background. Also, they face low education levels and often live in deprived urban areas. Young Muslims may isolate themselves and/or resort to violence to vent their frustrations. Even young Muslims with average to high educational levels may be discontent and feel “relative deprivation.”

The AIVD relates that several psychosocial factors have been identified. They include “local radical networks in the Netherlands [that] consist mainly of young Dutch Muslims with a Moroccan background who are – often triggered by personal circumstances, thwarted ambitions or peer pressure – in search of identity and status in Dutch society.” Smaller populations of second-generation Turkish, Bosnian and Pakistani immigrant communities go through a similar process, but on smaller scale than Moroccans.

Young Muslims do not feel affiliation with the Islamic culture of their parents or the culture of European society. They feel hurt and resentful and therefore adopt an identity profile by which they react against parents who are considered too passive and submissive as well as against

dominant society. Sometimes this is termed a *deculturalization process* where they feel trapped between two cultures because of a failure to integrate and alienation from traditional culture.

A list of demographics of those radicalizing in the Netherlands is included:

- Young Muslims, 16 to 25 years of age, of Moroccan background but born or raised in the Netherlands
- Younger generations connected to local networks while the first-generation connected to international networks
- Most adhere to nonviolent form of Islam, but some choose violent jihad
- Muslim oppression around the world is an inspiration or source of anger
- A recent development is women joining local jihad networks

The AIVD notes that “how or when this jihadisation is triggered cannot always be detected in time. As a consequence, we are sometimes suddenly confronted by groups and individuals who engage in violence without any visible preceding recruitment process.” Threats can develop in a short period because of the interaction between local and international networks and the intensity of the radicalization process.

The report states that young Dutch Muslims, the children or grandchildren of migrants from Islamic countries, are increasingly susceptible to radicalization and jihadisation. This susceptibility can be explained by a combination of religious, socio-political, cultural and socio-psychological factors such as fixation on puritanical Islam, anger and frustration about status of Muslims and Islam, and an identity crisis.

The AIVD states that “at present we apparently find ourselves at a crucial point in the development of jihadism in Europe. The jihadist threat might diminish considerably if we succeed in reversing the trend of local radicalisation and jihadisation which causes the current growth in jihadist networks in Europe.”

The AIVD questions whether, because of the young age of a substantial number of members of local jihadist networks, their behavior could not be simply explained as “normal” adolescent behavior? Is the threat from adolescents really very high? However, the issue, they also state, with this idea is that generally adolescent behavior does not lead to life-threatening violence or terrorism.

The report discusses what could be done to curb radicalization:

- Stop representing al Qaeda as an omnipresent unassailable adversary
- Pursue an effective national counter-terrorism policy
- Monitor processes of radicalization, recruitment, and network formation on the Internet because it has become an increasingly important medium for terrorists. This should be done to gain insight into new threats and to thwart preparatory activities for possible attacks at the earliest possible stage
- Take a broad approach and have wide-ranging and detailed assessments of threat from Islamic terrorism
- Consider individual and social processes as well as background factors, and pay attention to psychological aspects

**Pluchinsky, Dennis. “The Global Jihad: Leaderless Terrorism?” Presentation, joint meeting sponsored by the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Division of International Security Studies, the RAND corporation, and the U.S. Army’s Eisenhower National Security Series, 20 June 2006.**

*Source Type:* Think Tank (Domestic)

*Topic Area(s):* Definition, Gaps/Recommendations

*Web Link:* [http://www.eisenhowerseries.com/pdfs/terrorism\\_06/final/final\\_2006-06-20.pdf](http://www.eisenhowerseries.com/pdfs/terrorism_06/final/final_2006-06-20.pdf)

***Key Points:***

Pluchinsky suggests that leaderless terrorism, including lone wolves and autonomous terrorist cells, is the new trend. Leaderless terrorism is an “important, growing, and permanent component of the global jihad movement.”

Autonomous terrorist cells (ATC) are defined as a group of people with similar grievances and mindsets who decide to engage in political terrorist activity but do not belong to or operate under the direct command of a larger parent organization; an example is the cell that perpetrated the London attacks in July 2005.

According to Pluchinsky, there is no “jihadist ATC template.” He suggests that each cell is constructed according to local security conditions, the degree of external connections, and the capabilities and personal dedication of cell members, which makes them virtually undetectable by design.

The threat from leaderless terrorism should be addressed by retooling analytic approaches; redirecting counter-terrorism funding; and developing effective community-based counter-extremist programs.

**Raz, Guy. “The War on the Word ‘Jihad.’” *All things Considered*. National Public Radio, 31 October 2006.**

*Source Type:* Press Report

*Topic Area(s):* Definitions

*Web Link:* <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=6392989>

***Key Points:***

Raz discusses that the meaning of “jihad” has changed and evolved over time but also presents information from Mary Habeck (a Johns Hopkins political scientist) who says that today “jihad” has only has one meaning—achieving an end through violence.

The article also presents information from Islamic historian Reza Aslan who says that extremist groups have managed to elevate the importance of jihad as a politicized religious duty.

**Raz, Guy. *Exploring the Language of Post-Sept. 11 U.S. Policy: A Five-Part Series on the Political Lexicon of Our Times*. National Public Radio, 31 October 2006.**

*Source Type:* Press Report

*Topic Area(s):* Definitions

*Web Link:* <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=6406405>

*Key Points:*

This article discusses the use of language in U.S. policy after 9/11.

Raz presents a discussion with Douglas Streusand (an Islamic history teacher at Marine Corps Staff College at Quantico, VA) who says that “describing Islamist militants and insurgents in Iraq as ‘jihadists’ is hurting U.S. policy...for a Muslim jihad is a good thing. It literally means striving in the path of God. By describing insurgents or terrorists as jihadists, we imply we are fighting meritorious Muslims.” He also suggests that the term “hirabah” could be used instead. Hirabah means an unjust form of warfare. “Streusand says that changing the language ever so slightly may have a beneficial impact on public opinion in the Islamic world. Perhaps by understanding the impact of that language, we can begin to repair some of the geopolitical fractures that have come to define the beginning of the 21st century.”

**Streusand, Douglas and LTC Harry D. Tunnell IV. *Choosing Words Carefully: Language to Help Fight Islamic Terrorism*. European Commission for Justice, Freedom and Security, 23 May 06.**

*Source Type:* Government (International)

*Topic Area(s):* Definitions, Domestic

*Key Points:*

Streusand and Tunnell suggest that radicalization needs to be fought on many fronts, one of which is convincing Muslims that terrorists do not represent true Islam. According to them, some of the words that are used by Western leaders to describe terrorists may inadvertently lend credence to the terrorist’s cause.

The authors indicate that Western leaders don’t fully understand the meaning of the words that are used to describe terrorists and their ideology; they list some of these words that should not be used, and provide other Arabic terms that could be useful in swaying the Islamic public.

The authors indicate that the following terms should be avoided when describing terrorists:

- Jihad: this means striving, specifically striving on the path to God. This is an obligation of all Muslims; by referring to the terrorist attacks as part of a jihad, we are legitimizing their actions in the eyes of Muslims.
- Mujahideen: from the same root word as jihad, thus meaning one who is striving; authenticates terrorists as warriors for Islam.

- Caliphate (khlilafa): The original caliphate is seen by Muslims as an era of just rule. By saying terrorists want to establish a worldwide caliphate, we imply that they will bring just rule to the world.
- Allah: this word simply means God, not an Islam-specific God. We should translate this as God, emphasizing that Islam/Judaism/Christianity all recognize the same God of Abraham.

The authors recommend that the following terms should be used both internationally and domestically as part of the information and opinion war that is essential to defeating terrorists:

- Hirabah: sinful warfare, warfare contrary to Islamic law. Use instead of jihad.
- Mufsid: evil or corrupt person. Use instead of mujahideen.
- Fitna: discord or strife among Muslims. Use to identify them with historical figures who were corrosive to Islam.
- Totalitarian: totalitarianism is seen in Islam as a foreign (Western) concept (fascism, Marxism) that is incompatible with their religion.

**Taarnby, Michael. *Recruitment of Islamist Terrorist in Europe: Trends and Perspectives*. Research Report. Danish Ministry of Justice, 14 January 05.**

**Source Type:** Government (International)

**Topic Area(s):** Definitions, International

**Web Link:** <http://www.jm.dk/image.asp?page=image&objno=73027>

**Key Points:**

Taarnby provides definitions for the following terms:

- Cell: A small group of terrorists. A closed unit but with one or more links to a network.
- European: For the purpose of this study, defined as individuals residing in Europe, whether as migrant workers, foreign students, asylum seekers or citizens.
- Gatekeeper: A militant Islamist who is personally connected to a terrorist network.
- Islamist: A Muslim who follows one of the very conservative branches of Islam, often the Salafi or Wahabi creed, and who has turned Islam into a self-contained lifestyle.
- Mujahideen: Literally, Holy Warrior, but most often associated with militant Islamists fighting guerrilla warfare.
- Network: A number of cells interrelated through personal relationships.
- Recruitment: Recruitment for the Jihad is understood as an activity that intends to enlist militant Islamists in an existing terrorist cell. Recruitment is the bridge between a personal belief and violent activism.
- Radicalization: The progressive, personal development from law-abiding Muslim to militant Islamist.

He discusses recruitment in Europe and notes that terrorist recruitment is on the rise, but “militants and terrorists only represent a fraction of a minority.”

There is an absence of top-down recruitment, but rather a bottom-up process through friendships and connections—a self-generating process—is how young people becoming radicalized.

Taarnby states that recruitment is defined by shared ideology and personal interaction; connections between people are crucial. The terrorist presence in Europe is organized by friendships and mutual ideologies. The process from alienated individual to committed activist requires investment and intense personal interaction. He notes that the fear of Internet recruitment may be overblown.

According to Taarnby, the recruitment process may contain these elements:

- Alienation and marginalization
- Spiritual quest
- Process of radicalization
- Meeting like-minded people
- Gradual seclusion and cell formation
- Acceptance of violence as legitimate political means
- Connection with a gatekeeper in the know
- Going operational

Newer generation of Islamist terrorists are less linked to al Qaeda and more to global jihad. Current networks are diffuse cells, which means that if one is taken down the others are not necessarily affected. This is a strength and a weakness.

He describes those who might join radical groups. Second-generation immigrants are susceptible because radical Islam presents a vehicle of protest against problems of access to employment, housing, discrimination and negative public image of Islam. Converts represent a minority of militant Islamists. Often, radicals come from the margins of society or have a history of drug use or petty crime. He states that “social conditions serve as the foundation” for understanding Islamist terrorism. Motivation cannot be reduced to a single factor.

Taarnby describes places where recruitment occurs, such as radical mosques which serve as radicalization agent and provide a social environment that fosters transformation for young and alienated Muslims. The role of clerics has changed; they are not able to recruit openly but instead use massive propaganda effort and underground mosques. Recruitment in mosques has become more difficult because of the scrutiny by security and law enforcement authorities.

He also discusses why and how radicalization occurs. “The militants believe they are fighting a last-ditch battle for the survival of their society, culture, religion and way of life” (Taarnby citing Burke 2004). The ideology feeds off polarization and radicalization in Europe so that even trivial issues like a dress code in French schools can become significant.

This article also provides some information regarding specific countries such as the U.S., Britain, France, the Netherlands and Italy.

**U.S. Congress. House. Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment of the Committee on Homeland Security. Donald Van Duyn statement on Islamic Radicalization. 109<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2d sess., 20 September 2006.**

*Source Type:* Congressional Testimony

*Topic Area(s):* Definitions, Domestic, Gaps/Recommendations

*Web Link:* [http://homeland.house.gov/hearings/109\\_060920\\_Radicalization/details.aspx](http://homeland.house.gov/hearings/109_060920_Radicalization/details.aspx)

***Key Points:***

Van Duyn suggests that the key to successfully stopping the spread of radicalization is identifying patterns and trends in the early stages.

The FBI definition of homegrown Islamic extremists is presented as “U.S. persons who appeared to have assimilated, but reject the cultural values, beliefs, and environment of the U.S. They identify themselves as Muslims and on some level become radicalized in the U.S. They intend to provide support for, or directly commit, a terrorist attack inside the U.S.”

According to Van Duyn, the FBI is approaching radicalization on two levels:

- 1) Attempting to understand the dynamics of individual and organizational radicalization to identify early indicators as to whether individuals or groups are demonstrating the potential for violence
- 2) Engaging in extensive outreach to Muslim communities to dispel misconceptions that may foster extremism

Van Duyn indicates that the threat from homegrown Islamic extremists is smaller in scale than that posed by overseas terrorist groups but is potentially larger in psychological impact.

He points out that the apparent increase of cases involving homegrown Islamic extremists may represent an increased sensitivity of law enforcement to activities not previously regarded as terrorism but recommends that we cannot rule out the possibility that the homegrown phenomenon is growing.

Van Duyn addresses the risks posed by extremist imams, suggesting that they can strongly influence individual belief systems by speaking from a position of authority (especially in the case of Muslim converts); can influence vulnerable followers; can spot and assess individuals who respond to their messages; and can potentially guide them into increasingly extremist circles. He says that extremist imams are active in influential venues such as prisons, publishing, online forums, audio lectures, and at Islamic conferences and institutes.

Prison radicalization is discussed. According to Van Duyn, prison radicalization occurs primarily through anti-U.S. sermons provided by contract, volunteer, or staff imams, radicalized inmates who gain religious influence, and extremist media; ideologies most often embraced by radicalized inmates include the Salafi form of Sunni Islam, sometimes called “prison Islam” and an extremist view of Shi’a Islam similar to that used by government of Iran and Lebanese Hizballah.

Van Duyn indicates that prison radicalization appears to be carried out by domestic Islamic extremist groups with few or no direct foreign connections.

According to Van Duyn, not all prison radicalization is Islamic in nature. He offers white supremacists as another type group that has been radicalizing and recruiting in prisons.

He discusses how the Internet is being used as a venue for radicalization of young Westerners. Van Duyn suggests that increased law enforcement activities following 9/11 migrated radicalization, recruitment, and material support activities online; proposes that the Internet furthers indoctrination, creates links between extremists located around the world, and may serve as a springboard for future terrorist activities.

Van Duyn proposes that overseas travel “can be a significant element in facilitating the transition from one who has the proclivity to be radicalized, and who may espouse radical rhetoric, to one who is willing and ready to act on those radicalized beliefs...foreign travel appears to provide networking that makes it possible for interested individuals to train for and participate in operational activity.” According to him, the overseas experiences of John Walker Lindh played a pivotal role in his involvement with the Taliban.

**U.S. Congress. House. Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment of the Homeland Security Committee. Javed Ali statement on Radicalization. 109<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2d sess., 20 September 2006.**

*Source Type:* Congressional Testimony

*Topic Area(s):* Definitions, Domestic

*Web Link:* [http://homeland.house.gov/hearings/109\\_060920\\_Radicalization/details.aspx](http://homeland.house.gov/hearings/109_060920_Radicalization/details.aspx)

***Key Points:***

Describes a study convened by the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis to develop a broader understanding of why and how radicalizing influences take root and spread in the U.S. The study is focusing on radicalization dynamics in key geographic regions throughout the country, starting with New York, New Jersey, and California, and is attempting to frame an intelligence picture for the state or region from national-level intelligence reporting and open-source info.

Ali explains that they are attempting to identify the critical factors at the “front end” of the radicalization process to help in the development of methods to prevent radicals from “crossing the line.”

He indicates that no universal definition of radicalization exists in the intelligence or academic/social sciences communities.

The Office of Intelligence and Analysis has developed a working definition of radicalization: “entails the process of adopting an extremist belief system, including the willingness to use, support, or facilitate violence, as a method to effect societal change; separates radicalization from terrorism and focuses more on an understanding of behavior and how, why, and where behavior develops over time.”

Radicalization “nodes” are defined as conduits that facilitate or support a person or group through the radicalization process. According to Ali, these may be physical institutions, virtual communities, charismatic individuals, written or recorded material, or even shared experiences.

Ali presents preliminary findings:

- Relationships between radicalization nodes and radical actor/groups vary across ideological and ethno-religious spectrums, different geographic regions, and socio-economic conditions; and
- There are many diverse “pathways” to radicalization in the U.S. based on examination of the nodes
- Radicalization is not a “one-way street”
- Individuals and groups can radicalize or de-radicalize based on a variety of factors

## DOMESTIC

**Borum, Randy. “Radicalization in America: What We Are (Slowly) Learning.” PowerPoint presentation provided by author.**

*Source Type:* Other (Powerpoint Presentation)

*Topic Area(s):* Definitions, Domestic

*Key Points:*

Borum suggests that people follow different pathways to radicalization and provides concepts that might be more helpful in understanding the radicalization process.

The article provides definitions for radicalization, including:

- Taarnby, 2005: radicalization is “the progressive personal development from law-abiding Muslim to militant Islamist”
- AIVD, 2005: radicalization is the “growing readiness to pursue and/or support—if necessary by undemocratic means—far-reaching changes in society that conflict with, or pose a threat to, the democratic order.”

Borum states that there is a distinction between radicalization and recruitment; radicalization is the ideological development or alignment, whereas recruitment is mobilizing extremists to engage in terrorism or other violent acts.

Borum suggests that vulnerability may be more of a useful concept than personality when trying to understand radicalization.

He outlines the steps of the recruitment process, including:

- 1) Attract/promote exposure to seminal ideas.
- 2) Invite prospects to smaller, select gathering.
- 3) Develop social bond to small group.
- 4) Gradually introduce political/radical ideas.
- 5) Cultivate extremism, focusing on political/radical ideas (incite hate, erode barriers to violent action).
- 6) Allow social forces to mobilize volunteers for action.

**Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS). *The Transatlantic Dialogue on Terrorism. Initial Findings.* Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), August 2004.**

**Source Type:** Think Tank (Domestic)

**Topic Area(s):** Domestic, International, Gaps/Recommendations

**Web Link:** [http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/0408\\_transatlanticterrorism.pdf](http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/0408_transatlanticterrorism.pdf)

**Key Points:**

This article summarizes the findings from three high-level meetings held by the Transatlantic Dialogue on Terrorism; the purpose of the meetings was to assess the understanding of terrorism among experts, policymakers, and the public in the U.S. and Europe. Participants included experts from the government, academia, and think tanks.

The first meeting of the Transatlantic Dialogue on Terrorism focused on developing a better understanding of radical Islam's ideology and identity, its organizational advantages, and its spread. Participants discussed the following statements:

- Radical Islamist violence is driven, in part, by a global religious revival, and a key challenge in addressing the ideology of radical Islam is navigating the complex motivations of its adherents.
- The movement continues to gain strength over a broad geographical area, and substantial evidence of ongoing radicalization of Muslim minorities can be seen in Southeast Asia, Europe, South America, North America, and Australia.
- Radicalization is not limited to parts of the world that are economically deprived: the movement spreads easily among those who are privileged.
- Radical Islamists are now willing to partner with groups and individuals even if they are not Muslim, and it is difficult for national governments to undermine the appeal of jihadist groups for a number of reasons including that jihadists are skilled at using their deeds as propaganda, al Qaeda is constantly finding ways to penetrate all social classes, jihadists are becoming more innovative in their use of recruiting tools, and the appeal of the radical ideology is strengthened by the war in Iraq and the lack of a Middle East peace process.

The second and third meetings focused on the U.S. and European perspectives of the factors that contribute to the radicalization of ideology. The four factors that were identified include:

- 1) Poverty: the importance of addressing poverty is commonly recognized as part of a wider strategy to reduce the appeal of radical Islamist violence; however, U.S. and European attitudes on using development assistance as part of the war on terrorism vary; U.S. policymakers see development assistance as playing a supporting role to tactical counter-terrorism operations; Europeans believe that the goal of assistance is to alleviate suffering from poverty and hope that decrease in lure of radicalism will be a byproduct.
- 2) Role of Muslim NGOs: Americans and Europeans agree that reducing the power and influence of Muslim NGOs is essential, although neither has figured out how to do this; one possibility might be supporting work of international NGOs instead of those run by the U.S. or Europe.
- 3) Demographics: evidence suggests that escalations in violence correspond with large youth bulges, most notably during periods of high unemployment rates and scarcity of resources;

Europeans and Americans agree that demographic issues are serious and rarely receive sufficient attention from political leaders.

- 4) Radicalization of education: participants agree that education can be important in both the growth and decline of radicalism.

The report provides the main areas of agreement between American and European participants regarding the radicalization of ideology, including:

- The threat is serious.
- The search by jihadist groups for weapons of mass destruction is a worrying trend.
- Some suggested that the U.S. sees the war on terrorism as ending in victory or defeat and that Europeans see the war on terrorism as a long-term threat to be managed; these differences were not evident in the Dialogue participants, and any differences of opinion on this question were minimal.
- No quick fixes will resolve the problem of terrorism.
- Political leaders in the U.S. and Europe have not bridged the gap and built a common sense of purpose among their people; differences in public opinion reflect less on terrorism and more on varying political and cultural contexts in the U.S. and European societies.
- Intelligence and law enforcement cooperation between the U.S. and Europe is excellent.
- The U.S. and Europe have a limited understanding of the jihadist movement and the ideologies that sustain it.

The report outlines ways of addressing underlying causes of the rise of terrorism, including:

- What is the most effective way to use development assistance to counter terrorism?
- How can the West deal with NGOs that provide social services and contribute to the spread of radical ideologies?
- How can the U.S. and Europe encourage a reform agenda for education in Muslim countries?
- How can American and European policymakers be convinced to deal with long-term demographic challenges?
- How can the U.S. and Europe take steps to make sure that WMD stay out of the hands of radical Islamist groups?
- How can the U.S. and Europe (and others) breathe new life into the Middle East peace process?

**Cilluffo, Frank and Gregory Saathoff. GWU Homeland Security Policy Institute, UVA Critical Incident Analysis Group. *Out of the Shadows: Getting Ahead of Prisoner Radicalization*: 2006.**

**Source Type:** Academic Research/Journal

**Topic Area(s):** Domestic, International, Gaps/Recommendations

**Web Link:** <http://hsgac.senate.gov/files/091906Report.pdf>

**Key Points:**

This report describes research conducted by a task force led by the George Washington University's Homeland Security Policy Institute (HSPI) and the University of Virginia's Critical Incident Analysis Group (CIAG). The task force's purpose was to study the issue of radicalization and recruitment in U.S. prisons.

According to the report, the U.S. has the world's largest prison population (over two million, 93 percent of whom are in state and local prisons and jails) and the highest incarceration rate (701 out of every 100,000). This fact presents the possibility that every radicalized prisoner could become a terrorist recruit. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales recently stated that "[t]he threat of homegrown terrorist cells—radicalized online, in prisons, and in other groups of socially isolated souls—may be as dangerous as groups like al Qaeda, if not more so. They certainly present new challenges to detection." The London transit bombings of 2005 and the Toronto terrorist plot of 2006, for example, illustrate the threat posed by a state's own radicalized citizens. By acting on international lessons learned, the U.S. may operate from a proactive position.

The report presents reasons why prisons can be considered an ideal environment for radicalization, including the high prevalence of individuals with the characteristics of typical terrorist recruits (e.g., young, unemployed, alienated, need for sense of self-importance, need to belong to a group, and need for protection); inmates have anti-social attitudes and need an outlet for their violence impulses; and many inmates have no prior exposure to Islam and therefore are vulnerable to extremist interpretation including the radical literature that is widespread in prisons.

Prison gangs may adopt "Jailhouse Islam" unique to prison that incorporates values of gang loyalty and violence. Other radical groups in prisons that may share some common ideological causes with radical Islam (e.g., hostility towards Israel) include right-wing extremists and cults; terrorists and criminal gangs have occasionally cooperated (e.g., the Madrid train bombings).

The spread of Muslim radicalization in U.S. prisons is linked to the following:

- A shortage of Muslim chaplains is due to a lack of organizations to administer a vetting process, and a reliance on non-vetted contractors and volunteers who are not required to have formal religious training.
- Standard policies for vetting religious providers at state and local levels are lacking.
- Half of prison religious services are unsupervised, run by inmates, and lack audio/video monitoring.
- Arabic language and script is used to communicate secretly and to transmit radical materials; also, extremist versions of the Qur'an are found in prisons.

- Tracking of former inmates and religious provider is lacking; providers dismissed from one facility may simply enter another.
- Radical groups with well-financed backers can offer substantial social and financial support to released prisoners.

The report describes efforts undertaken in California prisons to combat radicalization, including terrorism awareness courses; posting liaison officers at different prisons who meet monthly to share info; and the use of fusion centers to facilitate information sharing across federal, state, and local levels. Also described are efforts by the Federal Bureau of Prisons (FBOP) to address radicalization, including extensive questioning of religious service providers regarding their beliefs on violence, ties to and/or funding from foreign governments, willingness to provide services for all faiths; conducting rigorous background checks; involving Muslim chaplains in the screening process; requiring endorsement from national religious organizations; implementing best practices guidelines for approval of religious materials; mandating constant supervision of inmate-led groups; and requiring that Islamic materials be prepared by chaplains who are full-time FBOP staff. Lessons learned from Europe to control prison radicalization are also presented.

Key findings of the task force include:

- Radicalization is neither a recent phenomenon, nor unique to Islam.
- An inadequate number of Muslim religious service providers increases the risk of radicalization; the lack of social support and the inability to track inmates makes them vulnerable to recruitment.
- Information sharing between federal, state, and local prison systems is key; change has been made at the federal level but most prisoners are at state and local prisons.
- Limited manpower and funding hinder efforts to combat radicalization; the inability to follow up on leads uncovered in investigations is another obstacle.
- Radicalization is a global problem; thus, information sharing with other countries is important.
- Insufficient information about prisoner radicalization is available.
- Prison officials are stretched thin due to prison overcrowding.
- A multi-disciplinary approach to the problem is necessary; perspectives from religion, criminal justice, intelligence, law, and behavioral sciences are needed.
- Awareness, education, and training programs are needed for personnel working in prison, probation, and parole settings.
- A Congressional risk assessment is recommended.

**Coll, Steve. “How Are Young Muslims Radicalized on Domestic Soil?” *The New Yorker*, 5 June 2006.**

*Source Type:* Press Report

*Topic Area(s):* Domestic, International

*Key Points:*

This article presents some of the findings from U.K. reports regarding radicalization, including:

- No consistent profile can be used to help identify who might be vulnerable to radicalization.
- Alienation from citizenship or family and a loss of faith in secular opportunity have created a pool of potential volunteers; preachers, recruiters, and al Qaeda leaders take it from there.

Coll describes Muslim sentiment in the United States through a poll conducted by Zogby International just before the last presidential election. Results showed that more than one third of American Muslims believe that the administration is waging a war on Islam. A similar number believe that “American society overall is disrespectful and intolerant toward Muslims” and more than half said that they knew someone who had suffered discrimination. A large number of America’s Muslim residents think that the United States is not safe for them.

About the international scene, Coll writes, “we remain concerned that across the whole of the counterterrorism community, the development of the home-grown threat and the radicalization of British citizens were not fully understood or applied to strategic thinking.”

Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff is quoted as saying that it is “very, very hard to detect” a jihadi terrorist who is “purely domestic, self-motivated, self-initiating.”

**Coll, Steve. “What Bin Laden Sees in Hiroshima.” *Washington Post*, 6 February 2005.**

*Source Type:* Press Report

*Topic Area(s):* Domestic

*Key Points:*

Coll notes that today al Qaeda is no longer much of an organization, if it can be called one at all. However, bin Laden will continue to inspire others to act on his behalf.

He says that the notion of a semi-independent cell of self-aggrandizing Islamist scientists is, unfortunately, not invented. The movement that bin Laden now seeks to inspire draws from at least two channels. One is the spontaneous identification of individual Muslims with his cause—self-declared affiliations by jihadis acting essentially on their own. The second is jihadis drawn from conventional guerilla movements.

**Coolsaet, Rik. *Between al-Andalus and a failing integration: Europe's pursuit of a long-term counterterrorism strategy in the post-al Qaeda era*. Royal Institute for International Relations (IRRI-KIB). Brussels, Belgium: Academia Press, May 2005.**

*Source Type:* Think Tank (International)

*Topic Area(s):* Domestic, International

*Web Link:* <http://www.irri-kiib.be/paperegm/ep5.pdf>

***Key Points:***

Coolsaet states that radicals today are local, self-sustained, technologically savvy, and generally unaffiliated with al Qaeda. He claims that terrorism and radicalization today are “glocal” phenomena—the core is local but the appearance is global. The root cause is the global environment, which creates a sense of solidarity among Muslim communities. Local root causes vary, depending on the continents and the countries involved, and have nothing to do with 9/11.

Other root causes identified include radicalization, regional conflicts, failed or failing states, globalization, socio-economic factors, alienation, propagation of an extremist world view, and systems of education. Coolsaet describes nodes where radicalization can take place, which include radical mosques, prisons, schools, neglected city districts, and Internet chat rooms. Charismatic leaders also play a role.

Coolsaet notes that youth chose the “easy way out,” projecting themselves as victims and radicalize themselves to be fighting for world-wide jihad. Self-radicalization is on the rise in Europe and is more important than recruiters. Those most susceptible in Europe are second- and third-generation Muslims, young, of north-African decent, and ages 15 to 18.

Coolsaet writes that second- and third-generation youngsters of North African descent are vulnerable because they lack positive identification. They are confronted with job and housing discrimination, despair, and feelings of exclusion. He discusses Tariq Ramadan who says radicals use an “unhealthy victim mentality,” which must be rejected by Muslims and Europeans. They create their own subculture and withdraw from family and friends not linked with their new associates. They embrace Islam as their new identity, not the Islam of their parents, but a more conservative Islam.

Europe finds it important to address the root causes of terrorism in addition to going after known terrorist groups and using military force. Coolsaet notes that European and American perceptions of the root causes are different. Europeans assume root causes are mainly local and have to do with domestic grievances that are main driving force behind their actions; the U.S. considers local groups “to be part of a global Islamist insurgency.” He writes that to be able to create a successful strategy to deal with local dynamics, the perception of a global formidable foe needs to be altered. There needs to be a counter-terrorism strategy that is repressive of terrorism but also promises long-term political involvement.

Coolsaet proposes a three-pronged approach:

- 1) Repress and prevent terrorist acts.
- 2) Tackle local root causes, both within the EU and worldwide.
- 3) Bridge a global perception gap.

So far, the EU and U.S. are focusing on the repression and prevention of terrorist acts.

Coolsaet suggest a number of more specific actions for countering terrorism:

- Provide immigration policies that work .
- Use social engineering to get groups to feel commonalities.
- Enhance education and multicultural awareness.
- De-dramatize the language of authorities and media. “It does make a huge difference if the reaction is a ‘declaration of war against Muslim terrorists’ or a condemnation of these incidents as the unacceptable behaviour of a small group of young thugs, whatever their origin may be.”

**Council on Foreign Relations. “American Militant Extremists, United States Radicals: Terrorism Q & A.” <http://www.cfr.org/publication/9236/>.**

*Source Type:* Think Tank (Domestic)

*Topic Area(s):* Definitions, Domestic

*Web Link:* <http://www.cfr.org/publication/9236/>

**Key Points:**

This primer from the Council on Foreign Relations discusses American militant extremists and other radical groups in the U.S. It suggests that American right-wing extremists are advocating rhetoric similar to Islamic extremists.

This source presents three types of domestic terrorist groups:

- 1) Left-wing: anticapitalist revolutionary groups
- 2) Right-wing: motivated by opposition to federal taxation and regulation, the UN, other international organizations, the U.S. government, and hatred of racial and religious minorities; estimated 10,000 to 100,000 members, with a smaller extremist core
- 3) Special-interest: focuses on one issue such as abortion, the environment, or animal rights

The report indicates that 3/4 of the 335 suspected or confirmed terrorist incidents that occurred between 1980 and 2000 were carried out by Americans.

It provides the FBI definition of domestic terrorism as: “the unlawful use, or threatened use, of force or violence by a group or individual based and operating entirely within the United States or its territories without foreign direction committed against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.”

The article provides the Patriot Act’s definition of domestic terrorism as “criminal acts that are dangerous to human life and seem to be meant to scare civilians or affect policy.”

The report suggests that leaderless resistance is being used by domestic extremists to avoid detection. Anarchist and left-wing rhetoric has begun to emerge in eco-terrorist propaganda; groups such as ALF/ELF have ties with each other and foreign counterparts.

According to the article, monitoring organizations have indicated that both American right-wing extremists and Islamic militants spread similar theories about Jews, Freemasons, and other groups conspiring to control the world and have shown that some white supremacists applauded the 9/11 attacks.

**Cozzens, Jeffrey. “Islamist Groups Develop New Recruiting Strategy.” *Jane's Intelligence Review* (1 February 2005).**

**Source Type:** Press Report

**Topic Area(s):** Domestic, International

**Web Link:** [http://www.janes.com/security/international\\_security/news/jir/jir050121\\_1\\_n.shtml](http://www.janes.com/security/international_security/news/jir/jir050121_1_n.shtml)

**Key Points:**

Cozzens states that the use of passive (websites) and active (aimed at a specific group or individual) propaganda promotes people joining groups on their own volition instead of being recruited. The passive propaganda is targeting second- and third-generation youths in the West.

When recruitment by Islamists is through ideology alone or through networked channels, it is an attempt to coerce individuals to take part in or support violent jihad.

Cozzens notes that the strategic importance Western operatives and female operatives have had on jihadist cells. Conflicts are often framed in religious terms to try and garner support, and radicalization can take place in venues that help legitimize actions, such as prisons, revivalist meetings, or mosque study groups.

He notes a phenomenon termed “Group of Guys.” It describes a small group of disenfranchised male Muslims who emigrate to the West, establish friendships after meeting at a mosque or some other location, and seek to enlist others to jihad.

**Emerson, Steven. *American jihad: The terrorists living among us*. New York: The Free Press, 2002.**

**Source Type:** Book

**Topic Area(s):** Domestic, International

**Key Points:**

Emerson examines the linkages between international terrorist groups and domestic cells/organizations using open source research and anecdotal cases to support his points. He discusses infiltration activities that are said to have occurred in the U.S., including recruitment, fund raising, and money laundering, networking, and direct organizing.

Three types of people who have infiltrated are identified—naturalized U.S. citizens (e.g., Wadih el-Hage who was convicted in the East Africa embassy bombings), illegal entrants (e.g., Abu Mezer who planned to bomb the New York subway), and U.S. residents (e.g., Khalil Ziyad who administered radical websites). Additionally, purported links to international terrorist groups are discussed, including the al-Kifah refugee center and al-Farooq mosque, both in Brooklyn and linked to al Qaeda, and a University of South Florida engineering professor, Sami al-Arian, of Palestinian origins with links to Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

**Hoffman, Jamaluddin B. *Guide to Wahhabi Organizations in North America*. Center for Policing Terrorism.**

**Source Type:** Think Tank (Domestic)

**Topic Area(s):** Domestic

**Web Link:** <http://www.cpt-mi.org/WahabbiOragnziationsNorthAmerica.pdf>

**Key Points:**

Hoffman expresses that Salafi is responsible for many of the negative practices commonly associated with contemporary Islam and responsible for the terrorist violence that has become associated with Islam in the modern era. Salafis believe that violence is an acceptable means for reforming religion, society and the world.

To conduct illegal or subversive activities, they targets mosques, religious schools, and Islamic centers and organizations.

The article contains a list of terrorist organizations in North America that pose the most immediate and credible threat to domestic security to North America and Canada (not in order of threat level):

- al Qaeda (“The Base”) a.k.a.: The World Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders, and the Islamic Army for the Liberation of the Holy Places
- Hizb ut-tahrir (HT) a.k.a.. Hizb-ut-Tahrir al-Islami
- Jemaah Islamiyah (“Islamic Party,” JI)
- Hamas (Arabic acronym for “Islamic Resistance Movement”)
- Islamic Jihad (IJ) a.k.a. Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Jihad Group
- Hezbollah (“Party of God”) a.k.a. Islamic Jihad, Revolutionary Justice Organization, Organization of the Oppressed on Earth, and Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine
- Ikhwan al-muslimin (“Muslim Brotherhood”) a.k.a. Ikwan, the Muslim Brothers, and the Brotherhood
- Al-Gama’a al-islamiyya (“The Islamic Group,” IG)
- Al-Fuqra (“The Poor”) a.k.a. Jamaat al-Fuqra, Jihad Council for North America, Muhammad Commandos, Muslims of the Americas, and Soldiers of Allah

The author lists ways to identify Wahhabis, such as blending into larger immigrant communities in which they operate; law enforcement can glean little from outward appearance. “In North

America, a Muslim wearing a turban and long beard is much more likely to be a traditionalist moderate than a radical extremist. By the same token, it is impossible to distinguish a clean-cut, alcohol-drinking hijacker from any other assimilated immigrant from the Middle East.”

He states that one should examine statements of individuals because they are not good at concealing what they are passionate about and examine their public rhetoric.

**Jimenez, Marina. “The Radicalization of U.S. Muslims.” *National Post* (November, 17, 2001).**

**Source Type:** Press Report

**Topic Area(s):** Domestic

**Web Link:** <http://www.rickross.com/reference/islamic/islamic38.html>

**Key Points:**

Jimenez suggests that the common message being preached in mosques throughout the world—that Muslims are under global attack by the West—is contributing to radicalization.

According to Jimenez, radical imams in Pakistan, North America, and elsewhere are defining the war on terrorism in religious terms, as Christianity (“Christendom”) versus Islam. She suggests that the public and private discourse of many imams is often different and indicates that some who claim to be moderate or mainstream in public sometimes preach more militant ideology in private.

Islam is recognized by Jimenez as the fastest growing religion in the U.S., with 60 percent of the 1200 mosques in the U.S. having been established in the past 20 years. She says that nearly 30 percent of all congregants are converts and that a majority of those are African-American males. She indicates that there is a strong influence in U.S. mosques of Wahabism, the sect that inspired violent extremism in Osama bin Laden.

The article quotes a Muslim leader who suggested in 1998 that 80 percent of American Muslim mosques had been taken over by Islamic extremists; it also cites a Hartford seminary survey that found 2/3 of mosque leaders in the U.S. as believing that America is immoral.

Daniel Pipes, from the Middle Eastern Forum, is quoted as saying that American Muslim institutions and mosques are influenced by radicals because they were established and/or funded by the Saudis. She also indicates that many African-American imams have studied in Saudi Arabia.

Rashied Omar, an imam and scholar at the University of Notre Dame’s Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies says “All religions struggle with their extremist fringes. The difference with Islam, however, is that the fringe exerts a disproportionate influence...attributes this disproportion in part to the media for giving them a platform, and to U.S. support both for Israel and for authoritarian regimes in the Middle East [which] gives them a cause.”

Jimenez concludes that radicalization and Islamist jihad might ultimately be defeated by the “dynamics of the North American melting pot at home” versus by the presence of U.S. forces in the Middle East.

**Leiken, Robert S. “Europe’s Angry Muslims.” *Foreign Affairs* (July/August 2005).**

**Source Type:** Academic Research/Journal

**Topic Area(s):** Domestic, International

**Web Link:** <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20050701faessay84409/robert-s-leiken/europe-s-angry-muslims.html>

**Key Points:**

Leiken describes the spread of Islam across Europe among descendants of Muslim immigrants. He finds that most are disenfranchised and disillusioned by the failure of integration, and therefore some European Muslims have taken up jihad against the West. He discusses the implications for the United States. Leiken discusses the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s fear European or American jihadists coming from Western Europe.

He reports that the situation of Muslims in America is different from that of Muslims in Europe. Most who moved to Western Europe started arriving after WWII and crowding into small, culturally homogenous enclaves. Many are now citizens in name but not culturally or socially. Many young Muslims reject the minority status to which their parents acquiesced. He notes that the isolation of these communities obscures their inner workings, allowing mujahideen to fundraise, prepare, and recruit for jihad with a freedom not widely available in Muslim countries.

In contrast, in the U.S., Muslims are geographically diffuse, ethnically fragmented, and generally well off. He notes that “the footprint of Muslim immigrants in Europe is already more visible than that of the Hispanic population in the United States.”

Leiken states that Europe may be reaching a tipping point. “With the Muslim headscarf controversy raging in France, talk about the connection between asylum abuse and terrorism rising in the U.K., an immigration dispute threatening to tear Belgium apart, and the Dutch outrage over the van Gogh killing, Western Europe may now be reaching a tipping point.” He provides a description of the *van Gogh murder*.

Leiken describes two types of jihadists in Europe:

- Those from outside Europe (aliens, asylum seekers, students who gain refuge in liberal Europe from crackdowns against Islamists in Middle East, radical imams, and first-generation)
- Those from within (alienated citizens, second- or third-generation children of immigrants born in Europe)

The latter group is “the most dangerous incarnation of that staple of immigration literature” and has been termed “the revolt of the second generation.” There are also examples of what has been termed adversarial assimilation—integration into the host country’s adversarial culture.

Leiken notes that “another paradigmatic second-generation recruit” is the upwardly mobile young adult with university education who appears well integrated. Those who are educated provide the leadership, and those who are less educated provide the muscle.

According to this article, Europe has responded to the increasing problem of radicalization:

- The EU Member States have implemented a European arrest warrant allowing police to avoid lengthy extradition procedures.
- Europeans have come to see that permissive policies may be excessive, even dangerous, and are asking Muslims to practice religious tolerance themselves and adjust to the values of their host countries.

Leiken notes that varying policies in different countries have not prevented radicalization from occurring. “So far, it appears that absolute assimilation has failed in France, but so has segregation in Germany and multiculturalism in the Netherlands and United Kingdom...one may wonder whether the mixed U.S. approach—separating religion from politics without placing a wall between them, helping immigrants slowly adapt but allowing them relative cultural autonomy—could inspire Europeans to chart a new course between an increasingly hazardous multiculturalism and a naked secularism that estranges Muslims and other believers.”

**Marks, Alexandra. “Radical Islam finds US ‘sterile ground’: Home-grown terror cells are largely missing in action, a contrast to Europe’s situation.” *Christian Science Monitor* (23 October 2006).**

*Source Type:* Press Report

*Topic Area(s):* Domestic, International

*Web Link:* <http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/1023/p01s04-ussc.html>

*Key Points:*

Marks discusses aspects of the Muslim population and the situation in the United States and presents a picture of young Muslims in America. This picture is that they are young, educated, motivated, and integrated into society.

She finds that homegrown terror cells remain a concern for U.S., but that because planning appears unsophisticated and the numbers of homegrown cells are low, some security analysts have concluded that “America, for all its imperfections, is not fertile ground for producing jihadist terrorists.” The U.S. statistics on Muslims include the following: 95 percent of Muslim Americans are high school graduates, nearly 60 percent are college graduates, and Muslims are thriving economically around the country. (She took her data from a Zogby International survey 2004).

Regarding Europe, Marks notes that “the majority came to work in factory jobs and often from poorer areas at home...European Muslims today live primarily in isolated, low-income enclaves where opportunities for good jobs and a good education are limited.” Specifically, in Britain, two thirds of Muslims live in low-income households; three quarters of households are overcrowded;

and the jobless rate is 15 percent in the overall Muslim community and 17.5 percent for young Muslims.

In contrast to Europe, most Muslim immigrants came to the U.S. for educational or business opportunities. Generally they come from educated, middle-class families in their country of origin. However, the U.S. also has poor neighborhoods with large Muslim populations; they tend to be better assimilated into American society and are also interspersed with other ethnic groups.

According to young Muslims cited in Marks' article, "People come to this country [U.S.] and they like it. They don't view it as the belly of the beast. With very few exceptions, you don't see the bitter enclaves that you have in Europe." A terrorism expert in Washington, D.C. stated that "We don't have large populations of immigrants with a generation sitting around semi-employed and deeply frustrated. That's a gigantic difference." The resentments that can breed extremism, as seen in Europe, do not seem very evident in the Muslim community in the U.S.

Contrary to mosques in Europe, clerics in mosques in America fairly commonly preach assimilation. Marks also presents information on the following groups or individuals: Lackawanna 6; Iyman Farris, Shahawar Matin Siraj; Hamid and Umar Hayat; and the JIS at Folsom prison.

**Marks, Alexandra. "Islamist Radicals in Prison: How Many?" *Christian Science Monitor* (20 September 2006).**

***Source Type:*** Press Report

***Topic Area(s):*** Domestic, Gaps/Recommendations

***Web Link:*** <http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0920/p03s02-ussc.html>

***Key Points:***

This article warns against using isolated cases of prison radicalization to dictate "what could ultimately end up being bad policy" that could play into the hands of terrorist recruiters. Differences between immigrant Muslim prisoners and American-born Muslim prisoners are shown—immigrant Muslim prisoners tend to be more radicalized than American-born Muslim prisoners, according to the article.

The lack of a coherent system for screening out extremist chaplains is discussed, along with the lack of supervision for over half of prison religious services. The article further states that it is critical for authorities to share information, especially because inmates are often moved between prisons and could bring radicalization and recruitment agendas with them.

**Meyer, J. “Amateurs’ May Join in Terrorism: A War with Iraq Could Prompt Attacks by Muslim Sympathizers, U.S. Officials Say.” *Los Angeles Times*, 9 February 2003.**

*Source Type:* Press Report

*Topic Area(s):* Domestic

*Key Points:*

According to this article, “officials in the United States and abroad have picked up increasing signs of agitation within radicalized pockets of Muslim communities. They stressed, however, that the vast majority of Muslims—although they may oppose the U.S. military buildup against Iraq—are peaceable and law abiding. But authorities said radical Muslim leaders in dozens of mosques, cultural centers, and study groups—mostly overseas—are lashing out at the United States, predicting that a war will kill innocent women and children.”

**National Intelligence Estimate. *Declassified Key Judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States*. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, April 2006.**

*Source Type:* Government (Domestic)

*Topic Area(s):* Domestic, Gaps/Recommendations

*Web Link:* <http://www.cnn.com/2006/images/09/26/nie.declass.pdf>

*Key Points:*

The National Intelligence Estimate assesses that “the operational threat from self-radicalized cells will grow in importance to U.S. counterterrorism efforts, particularly abroad but also in the homeland.” Anti-U.S. and anti-globalization sentiment is on the rise and is fueling other radical ideologies. This could prompt some leftist, nationalist, or separatist groups to adopt terrorist methods to attack U.S. interests.

Four underlying factors are presented that are exploited by jihadists to fuel the spread of the jihadist movement, including:

- 1) Entrenched grievances, such as corruption, injustice, and fear of Western domination, leading to anger, humiliation, and a sense of powerlessness
- 2) The Iraq “jihad”
- 3) The slow pace of real and sustained economic, social, and political reforms in many Muslim majority nations
- 4) Pervasive anti-U.S. sentiment among most Muslims

The radicalization process is described as occurring more quickly, more wisely, and more anonymously in the Internet age, raising the likelihood of surprise attacks by unknown groups whose members and supporters may be difficult to pinpoint. The Muslim mainstream has emerged as the most powerful weapon in the war on terror and could help to facilitate the growth of a constructive alternative to jihadist ideology.

**Perl, Raphael. *Trends in Terrorism: 2006*. Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress. The Library of Congress, 21 July 2006.**

*Source Type:* Government (Domestic)

*Topic Area(s):* Domestic, Gaps/Recommendations

*Web Link:* <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/69479.pdf>

***Key Points:***

CRS notes that “a threat from radical jihadists...is becoming more widespread, diffuse, and increasingly homegrown, often with a lack of formal operational connection with al Qaeda ideological leaders”

This report describes three trends in terrorism:

- The emergence of “micro-actors,” small autonomous cells and individuals that are becoming increasingly homegrown, resulting in a diversity in identity profiles, structures, motives, and tactics. These cells are small, decentralized, and do not have regular communication with other groups or cells.
- A trend toward sophistication in which terrorist groups use technology, such as the Internet, for a number of purposes including financing and planning
- An increasing overlap between terrorist activities and criminal activities

The report finds an increase in political influence of radical Islamist fundamentalist political parties throughout the world. The “actions and agendas of such groups could facilitate creation of a political climate in their home countries which views terrorism as a politically acceptable tactic and which might make their home countries appear as an attractive location for active terrorist groups to establish a secure base.”

The report presents a 2005 RAND study that noted the following trends:

- An increased focus on soft-civilian targets
- An ongoing emphasis on economic attacks
- A continued reliance on suicide attacks
- A desire to attack with WMD but little ability to execute these tasks
- An increase in homegrown attacks
- A possibility of future attacks from the far right, anarchists, and radical environmentalists

CRS discusses implications for U.S. policy if the trend of homegrown attacks continues: the immediate future is likely to bring a “larger number of smaller attacks, less meticulously planned, and local rather than transnational in scope.” Additionally, there is growing concern of simultaneous attacks intended to inflict economic damage.

Additionally, if terrorist acts involve local actors, the question of whether the U.S. anti-terrorism strategy and operations should reflect a more international law enforcement-oriented approach.

CRS discusses a number of recommendations for policymakers:

- Expanding programs that support foreign law enforcement training and educational exchanges

- Joint/multilateral training exercises
- The creation of bilateral or multilateral law enforcement task forces
- Exchanges of detailees among foreign and domestic law enforcement agencies
- Expansion of so-called “rule of law” programs

**Reynolds, Michael. “Homegrown Terror.” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 60.6 (26 June 2005): 48-57.**

**Source Type:** Academic Research/Journal

**Topic Area(s):** Domestic

**Web Link:** [http://www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art\\_ofn=nd04reynolds](http://www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art_ofn=nd04reynolds)

**Key Points:**

Reynolds discusses the potential threat posed by non-Islamic homegrown terrorists. He provides examples of non-Islamic homegrown terrorists who have been arrested on various charges, including Joseph “Doc Chaos” Konopka and William Joseph Krar. Both of these extremists were found to have chemical weapons capabilities.

He suggests that antigovernment extremists and Islamic terrorists have a similar ideology, including:

- Violently against “new world order” especially with regard to the U.S. government and corporate policies
- Uniformly anti-Semitic/anti-Israel
- Totally opposed to the war in Iraq

Reynolds indicates that certain literature, including *Hunter* and *The Turner Diaries*, have been found in the possession of several homegrown terrorists. He also points to non-Islamic homegrown terrorists as being “facilitators and providers” and questions whether they would actually take part in attacks or if they only help to facilitate and provide for other terrorist groups.

**Richards, Alan. *Socio-economic roots of radicalism? Towards explaining the appeal of Islamic radicals*. Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) of the U.S. Army War College, July 2003.**

*Source Type:* Government (Domestic)

*Topic Area(s):* Domestic, International, Gaps/Recommendations

*Web Link:* <https://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/PUB105.pdf>

***Key Points:***

This monograph examines links between radicalism and a series of crises associated with modernization in the Islamic World. Richards conducts a demographic analysis of the Middle East and North Africa, finding that high unemployment and increasing poverty, among other forces, have alienated large sectors of the Muslim youth. He argues that “radicalism is a political response to the deepening economic, social, political, and cultural crisis in the Muslim world,” concluding that there are no easy solutions and current U.S. policies do little to ameliorate Mid-East conditions.

**Roy, Olivier. “EuroIslam: The jihad within?” *The National Interest* 71 (Spring 2003).**

*Source Type:* Academic Research/Journal

*Topic Area(s):* Domestic, International

*Web Link:* [http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\\_m2751/is\\_2003\\_Spring/ai\\_99377576](http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2751/is_2003_Spring/ai_99377576)

***Key Points:***

Roy discusses jihadism in Europe: who is affected by radicalization and why radicalization is occurring. He presents the argument that re-Islamization is a necessary condition for radicalization. It can be linked to one’s country of origin or be more ideological. Generally it is young alienated individuals who are affected, and the situation in Europe is that of well-educated youths generally leading westernized lives, who then are “born again” and become radical.

Roy also notes that “radicalization is a peripheral result of the Westernization of Muslims born and living in Europe” and is linked with a generation gap, lower social status, and perpetuates preexisting leftist anti-imperialist protests within these communities.

Roy describes an Algerian group (FIS) that illustrates a general process of radicalization: 1) detachment of Islamic radical European youth from the politics of country of origin, and 2) resulting in a polarization because they are not as attracted to political nationalistic approach to Islam—instead the mother country becomes even more “Islamist-nationalist.”

He writes that lack of assimilation into European society coupled with no connection to country of origin can lead to radicalization. Radical Islam can be appealing to alienated youth because it gives them justification for finding a new Islam. Radicals target people are in doubt about their identity and faith. “To convert to Islam today is a way for a European rebel to find a cause; it has little to do with theology.”

Roy asserts that “a universal form of Islam is also developing in the United States and Canada, but it differs in structure and implication from that in European countries.”

**Roy, Olivier. “Why Do They Hate Us? Not Because of Iraq.” *New York Times*, 22 July 2005.**

***Source Type:*** Press Report

***Topic Area(s):*** Domestic, International

***Key Points:***

Roy notes that “the Western-based Islamic terrorists are not the militant vanguard of the Muslim community; they are a lost generation, unmoored from traditional societies and cultures, frustrated by a Western society that does not meet their expectations. And their vision of a global ummah is both a mirror of and a form of revenge against the globalization that has made them what they are.”

**Schmidt, G. “Islamic Identity Formation among Young Muslims: The Case of Denmark, Sweden and the United States.” *Journal of Muslim Affairs* 24.1 (April 2004): 31-45.**

***Source Type:*** Academic Research/Journal

***Topic Area(s):*** Domestic, International

***Key Points:***

This paper explores transnational identity formation among young Muslims in Denmark, Sweden, and the United States. The focus is on young, well-educated Muslims of immigrant background between 15 and 30 years of age, either born or raised in the West.

The process of transnational identity formation is described according to four overall conditions and themes:

- Visibility and aesthetics
- Choice
- Transnationalism
- Social ethics

The young Muslims interviewed frequently argued that their religious identity is a consequence of individual choice. They stated that the message from the imams and their own generation’s interpretation of Islam was awkward. Young Muslims criticize the imams for lacking knowledge of the country in which they had settled.

One way that young Muslims often find the answers they seek is to participate in discussion groups or the Internet. Young Muslims believe they follow an authentic Islam that is perfectly adaptable to and perfectly fulfilling of the ideal of Western democracies. Islam is used to transcend aspects of identity that otherwise could be problematic.

**Sinai, Joshua. "A Jihad on U.S. Soil?" Washington Times, 23 November 2005.**

*Source Type:* Press Report

*Topic Area(s):* Domestic, International

*Web Link:* <http://www.washingtontimes.com/op-ed/20051122-091752-5605r.htm>

*Key Points:*

This article is a review of "The Next Attack: The Failure of the War on Terror and a Strategy for Getting It Right," by Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon (New York: Times Books, 2005). Sinai notes that increasing numbers of Muslims are joining the radical Islamists in terrorist violence.

He writes that jihadist ideology has become the bloody banner for grievances around the world, merging into a pervasive hatred of the United States, its allies, and the international order they uphold. This hatred has so loosened Muslim religious and social inhibitions on violence that it now justifies an attack on infidels such as the United States using weapons of mass destruction.

Sinai notes that still "in their assessment of potential radicalization among American Muslims that could lead to future violence, the authors [Benjamin and Simon] correctly point out that a greater proportion of American Muslims is more inhospitable to jihadism than their European counterparts."

**Streusand, Douglas and LTC Harry D. Tunnell IV. *Choosing Words Carefully: Language to Help Fight Islamic Terrorism*. European Commission for Justice, Freedom and Security, 23 May 06.**

*Source Type:* Government (International)

*Topic Area(s):* Definitions, Domestic

*Key Points:*

Streusand and Tunnell suggest that radicalization needs to be fought on many fronts, one of which is convincing Muslims that terrorists do not represent true Islam. According to them, some of the words that are used by Western leaders to describe terrorists may inadvertently lend credence to the terrorist's cause.

The authors indicate that Western leaders don't fully understand the meaning of the words that are used to describe terrorists and their ideology; they list some of these words that should not be used, and provide other Arabic terms that could be useful in swaying the Islamic public.

The authors indicate that the following terms should be avoided when describing terrorists:

- Jihad: this means striving, specifically striving on the path to God. This is an obligation of all Muslims; by referring to the terrorist attacks as part of a jihad, we are legitimizing their actions in the eyes of Muslims.
- Mujahideen: from the same root word as jihad, thus meaning one who is striving; authenticates terrorists as warriors for Islam.

- Caliphate (khlilafa): The original caliphate is seen by Muslims as an era of just rule. By saying terrorists want to establish a worldwide caliphate, we imply that they will bring just rule to the world.
- Allah: this word simply means God, not an Islam-specific God. We should translate this as God, emphasizing that Islam/Judaism/Christianity all recognize the same God of Abraham.

The authors recommend that the following terms should be used both internationally and domestically as part of the information and opinion war that is essential to defeating terrorists:

- Hirabah: sinful warfare, warfare contrary to Islamic law. Use instead of jihad.
- Mufsid: evil or corrupt person. Use instead of mujahideen.
- Fitna: discord or strife among Muslims. Use to identify them with historical figures who were corrosive to Islam.
- Totalitarian: totalitarianism is seen in Islam as a foreign (Western) concept (fascism, Marxism) that is incompatible with their religion.

**Sullivan, Eileen. Experts Seeks More Clues About Root Cause of "Homegrown" Terrorist Movement. CQ Homeland Security, 20 September 2006.**

*Source Type:* Academic Research/Journal

*Topic Area(s):* Domestic

***Key Points:***

According to CQ Homeland Security, the phenomenon of homegrown terror movements in the U.S. is spreading, particularly among first- and second-generation Americans who feel marginalized, may have a criminal record, and receive and spread their messages through the Internet, mosques, and charismatic leaders.

Sullivan asserts that the process of radicalization is unclear, but the U.S. intelligence community has identified two pathways:

- Young American Muslims who go overseas and receive education and training
- American Muslims who adopt extremist views and convert to Islam in U.S.

The article suggests that extremists enjoy American freedoms right now and therefore the U.S. must develop laws and policies to combat radicalization and terrorism.

**Taspinar, Omer. *Europe's Muslim Street*. Foreign Policy Studies. The Brookings Institution, March 2003.**

*Source Type:* Think Tank (Domestic)

*Topic Area(s):* Domestic, International

*Web Link:* <http://www.brookings.edu/views/op-ed/fellows/taspinar20030301.htm>

***Key Points:***

According to Taspinar, there are 15 million Muslims in Europe and up to three times as many in the U.S.

He discusses that “although the majority of Muslims living in Europe (or, for that matter, the United States) are peaceful and law abiding, many European governments worry under their breath about the role of some European Muslims in past and future terrorist attacks—a concern stoked by the discovery of al Qaeda cells in Germany, France, Italy, and Britain. Given these not-so-latent suspicions and prejudices, one casualty of a major Islamic terrorist attack on European soil would likely be Europe’s budding multiculturalism.”

He notes that demographic growth and enfranchisement are already integrating European Muslims into the political mainstream and have the potential to produce a moderate type of Euro-Islam.

**Turkish Institute for Police Studies (TIPS). *NATO & TIPS Terrorism Project: Understanding and Responding to Terrorism—A Multi-Dimensional Approach*. Turkish Institute for Police Studies (TIPS), September 2006.**

*Source Type:* Academic Research/Journal

*Topic Area(s):* Domestic, International

***Key Points:***

This report provides a list of sessions that were presented at a workshop, “Understanding and Responding to Terrorism,” that was held on September 8 and 9, 2006. The workshop brought together people from academia and law enforcement to identify terrorism threats, to advance cooperation levels, and to explore ways of countering terrorism.

Over 100 presentations were made during the conference. The presentations were not available. Those that may be potentially related to radicalization include:

- “Social Causes of Terrorism,” by Diab Al-Badayneh, Mutah University, Jordan
- “Does Inequality Trigger Terrorism in the New World Order?” by Mustafa Kayaoglu, University of North Texas
- “The Socio-Economic Sources of Terrorism in the Muslim World,” by Taha Ozkan, Seta Foundation, Turkey

- “Becoming a Terrorist: The Psychology of Recruitment in Terrorist Organizations,” by Mini Mamak, Forensic Service, St. Joseph’s Healthcare, Canada
- “The Role of Religions in Combating Terrorism,” by Zeki Saritoprak, John Carroll University
- “Role of Religion in Social Integration,” Ali Murat Yel, Fatih University, Turkey
- “Global Social Integration as a Solution in the War Against Global Terrorism,” by Kenan Bayhan, University of North Texas
- “The Role of Family in the Fight Against Terrorism,” Ersin Oguz, Ankara Police Department, Turkey

**U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Intelligence. Bruce Hoffman testimony on the Use of Internet by Islamic Extremists. RAND Corporation, 4 May 2006.**

*Source Type:* Congressional Testimony

*Topic Area(s):* Domestic, International

*Web Link:* [http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/2006/RAND\\_CT262-1.pdf](http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/2006/RAND_CT262-1.pdf)

**Key Points:**

In his testimony before the House, Hoffman discusses that Islamic extremists are well-versed in technology, and new forms of media enhance the adversary’s ability to shape and share their messages and bypass traditional forms of media. “Radical Islamist terrorist organizations in particular are seen as being on the ‘cutting edge of organizational networking.’”

They use technology for a variety of purposes including propaganda, education/information, recruitment, coercion, training, instruction, planning, and internal propaganda to strengthen morale and provide inspiration. The Internet provides a way to promote a “global dialectic” from a local base that can be spread throughout the world in a cost effective way.

According to Hoffman, most terrorist and insurgent groups have websites, and Arab and Islamic groups are regarded by knowledgeable observers to have the largest presence on the Internet. According to a Professor at Haifa University, there are about 4,800 terrorist related websites. A problem with Internet information is that it is not monitored and may not be accurate, but people have no way of checking this.

There is no direct link between Internet recruitment and radicalization to mainstream terrorist organizations, but it does provide inspiration and motivation.

**U.S. Congress. House. Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment of the Committee on Homeland Security. Donald Van Duyn statement on Islamic Radicalization. 109<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2d sess., 20 September 2006.**

*Source Type:* Congressional Testimony

*Topic Area(s):* Definitions, Domestic, Gaps/Recommendations

*Web Link:* [http://homeland.house.gov/hearings/109\\_060920\\_Radicalization/details.aspx](http://homeland.house.gov/hearings/109_060920_Radicalization/details.aspx)

***Key Points:***

Van Duyn suggests that the key to successfully stopping the spread of radicalization is identifying patterns and trends in the early stages.

The FBI definition of homegrown Islamic extremists is presented as “U.S. persons who appeared to have assimilated, but reject the cultural values, beliefs, and environment of the U.S. They identify themselves as Muslims and on some level become radicalized in the U.S. They intend to provide support for, or directly commit, a terrorist attack inside the U.S.”

According to Van Duyn, the FBI is approaching radicalization on two levels:

- 1) Attempting to understand the dynamics of individual and organizational radicalization to identify early indicators as to whether individuals or groups are demonstrating the potential for violence
- 2) Engaging in extensive outreach to Muslim communities to dispel misconceptions that may foster extremism

Van Duyn indicates that the threat from homegrown Islamic extremists is smaller in scale than that posed by overseas terrorist groups but is potentially larger in psychological impact.

He points out that the apparent increase of cases involving homegrown Islamic extremists may represent an increased sensitivity of law enforcement to activities not previously regarded as terrorism but recommends that we cannot rule out the possibility that the homegrown phenomenon is growing.

Van Duyn addresses the risks posed by extremist imams, suggesting that they can strongly influence individual belief systems by speaking from a position of authority (especially in the case of Muslim converts); can influence vulnerable followers; can spot and assess individuals who respond to their messages; and can potentially guide them into increasingly extremist circles. He says that extremist imams are active in influential venues such as prisons, publishing, online forums, audio lectures, and at Islamic conferences and institutes.

Prison radicalization is discussed. According to Van Duyn, prison radicalization occurs primarily through anti-U.S. sermons provided by contract, volunteer, or staff imams, radicalized inmates who gain religious influence, and extremist media; ideologies most often embraced by radicalized inmates include the Salafi form of Sunni Islam, sometimes called “prison Islam” and an extremist view of Shi’a Islam similar to that used by government of Iran and Lebanese Hizballah.

Van Duyn indicates that prison radicalization appears to be carried out by domestic Islamic extremist groups with few or no direct foreign connections.

According to Van Duyn, not all prison radicalization is Islamic in nature. He offers white supremacists as another type group that has been radicalizing and recruiting in prisons.

He discusses how the Internet is being used as a venue for radicalization of young Westerners. Van Duyn suggests that increased law enforcement activities following 9/11 migrated radicalization, recruitment, and material support activities online; proposes that the Internet furthers indoctrination, creates links between extremists located around the world, and may serve as a springboard for future terrorist activities.

Van Duyn proposes that overseas travel “can be a significant element in facilitating the transition from one who has the proclivity to be radicalized, and who may espouse radical rhetoric, to one who is willing and ready to act on those radicalized beliefs...foreign travel appears to provide networking that makes it possible for interested individuals to train for and participate in operational activity.” According to him, the overseas experiences of John Walker Lindh played a pivotal role in his involvement with the Taliban.

**U.S. Congress. House. Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment of the Homeland Security Committee. Javed Ali statement on Radicalization. 109<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2d sess., 20 September 2006.**

*Source Type:* Congressional Testimony

*Topic Area(s):* Definitions, Domestic

*Web Link:* [http://homeland.house.gov/hearings/109\\_060920\\_Radicalization/details.aspx](http://homeland.house.gov/hearings/109_060920_Radicalization/details.aspx)

***Key Points:***

Describes a study convened by the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis to develop a broader understanding of why and how radicalizing influences take root and spread in the U.S. The study is focusing on radicalization dynamics in key geographic regions throughout the country, starting with New York, New Jersey, and California, and is attempting to frame an intelligence picture for the state or region from national-level intelligence reporting and open-source info.

Ali explains that they are attempting to identify the critical factors at the “front end” of the radicalization process to help in the development of methods to prevent radicals from “crossing the line.”

He indicates that no universal definition of radicalization exists in the intelligence or academic/social sciences communities.

The Office of Intelligence and Analysis has developed a working definition of radicalization: “entails the process of adopting an extremist belief system, including the willingness to use, support, or facilitate violence, as a method to effect societal change; separates radicalization from terrorism and focuses more on an understanding of behavior and how, why, and where behavior develops over time.”

Radicalization “nodes” are defined as conduits that facilitate or support a person or group through the radicalization process. According to Ali, these may be physical institutions, virtual communities, charismatic individuals, written or recorded material, or even shared experiences.

Ali presents preliminary findings:

- Relationships between radicalization nodes and radical actor/groups vary across ideological and ethno-religious spectrums, different geographic regions, and socio-economic conditions; and
- There are many diverse “pathways” to radicalization in the U.S. based on examination of the nodes
- Radicalization is not a “one-way street”
- Individuals and groups can radicalize or de-radicalize based on a variety of factors

**U.S. Congress. House. Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment of the Committee on Homeland Security. Randall A. Blake, Statement for the Record. 109<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2d sess., 20 September 2006.**

*Source Type:* Congressional Testimony

*Topic Area(s):* Domestic

*Web Link:* [http://homeland.house.gov/hearings/109\\_060920\\_Radicalization/details.aspx](http://homeland.house.gov/hearings/109_060920_Radicalization/details.aspx)

**Key Points:**

Blake suggests that the extent to which the message of violent extremism is reaching and resonating with some young Muslims around the world, including Europe, Canada, and the United States, is disturbing.

He presents two paths to radicalization:

- 1) Young American Muslims (generally male) become radicalized overseas—danger is that young men who have attended extremist madrassas or terrorist training camps or have studied with Imams who condone a violent form of Islamic extremism could return to the homeland and act as agents of radicalization; this form appears to be more common.
- 2) Radicalization process is predominantly homegrown, including individuals who have never been to Afghanistan, Pakistan, or the Middle East or attended an organized terrorist training camp. They have never met a member of al Qaeda or any other foreign terrorist organization, but they have absorbed the message of violent extremism, have incorporated it into their group’s culture, and are using it to justify crime and terrorism.

Gateways to extremism are environments where the atmosphere is ripe for radicalization to occur; the following “gateways” have been identified by the intelligence community:

- Prison system
- University campuses (radical imams or students spot and assess young men/women susceptible to violent extremism)
- Mosques/community centers (extremist leaders encourage overseas travel and to fight for Muslim causes)

- Internet (virtual recruiting station)

Blake provides examples of radicalization from the past year from Europe, the U.K., and Canada to reinforce that we cannot assume that young people who grow up surrounded by Western values, ideals, and culture are immune from messages that translate into violent extremism.

**U.S. Congress. House. Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment of the Committee on Homeland Security. Walid Phares statement on Intercepting Radicalization at the Indoctrination Stage. 109<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2d sess., 20 September 2006.**

*Source Type:* Congressional Testimony

*Topic Area(s):* Domestic

*Web Link:* [http://homeland.house.gov/hearings/109\\_060920\\_Radicalization/details.aspx](http://homeland.house.gov/hearings/109_060920_Radicalization/details.aspx)

**Key Points:**

Phares suggests that the ideology of Jihadism is dangerous and poses a direct threat against homeland security. He claims that this is evident in the fact that the ideology has already been used to recruit and inspire Americans to wage war against their own nation.

Phares indicates that radical ideology has been omnipresent in many cases involving people who have radicalized, including: the Virginia Paintball Gang, Jose Padilla, Richard Reid, John Walker Lindh, Azzam al Amriki (aka: Adam Gadahn), and the Portland 7. He proposes that the terrorism America and its allies are facing in the War on Terror is “a direct product of this radical ideology.”

He states that “jihadism rejects the American way of life, aims at destroying democracies, and installing a totalitarian regime named Caliphate...to do so, Jihadism creates the conviction in the minds of its adherents that war against the Government, people, and Constitution of the United States is the path towards its achieving the universal goal.”

According to Phares, Jihadists in the West, in general, and U.S., in particular, are of two types once formed: 1) either they join an organization and move into a cell, or 2) they form their own cell without connecting to a larger organization.

Phares presents factors that “protect” U.S.-based jihadists, including:

- Little ability exists of the public to identify them because their ideology has not been officially identified by the government.
- Without the public, law enforcement and homeland security cannot mobilize a large-scale effort to identify and isolate jihadist activities; by not identifying the ideology and its strategies, the government cannot direct its agencies/resources against the threat.
- The ideology of Jihadi-terrorism “enjoys the political freedoms of the country” and is “protected” by advocacy groups, legal defense and is funded both domestically and by foreign regimes and organizations.

He provides the following suggestions for establishing a national resistance to radicalization:

- Identify the ideology of Jihadism (government, media, and experts)
- Mobilize against the ideology of Jihadism (the public and educational institutions)
- Ban the ideology (U.S. Congress)
- Educate the public
- Work with domestic Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs), with the general public, and specifically with the Muslim communities
- Work with international NGOs and particularly with liberal, democratic, and humanistic Muslims

Phares points to Jihadism as the main root cause of terrorism and suggests that defending the homeland will require development of policies and laws that identify, ban, isolate, and shrink Jihadism with the help of the American public in general and the Muslim and Middle Eastern communities in particular.

**U.S. Congress. House. Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment of the Homeland Security Committee. Steve Emerson testimony on the Homeland Security Implications of Radicalization. 109<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2d sess., 20 September 2006.**

*Source Type:* Congressional Testimony

*Topic Area(s):* Domestic, Gaps/Recommendations

*Web Link:* [http://homeland.house.gov/hearings/109\\_060920\\_Radicalization/details.aspx](http://homeland.house.gov/hearings/109_060920_Radicalization/details.aspx)

*Key Points:*

Emerson claims the radicalization of Muslim populations in Western societies has “leapt to the forefront of homeland security concerns due to the rise in homegrown terrorist plots in the U.S., Europe, Canada, and Australia.”

He points to some commonalities of radicalization, including:

- A charismatic spiritual leader
- Mosque attendance
- Internet connection
- Overseas travel

Emerson suggests that prior to radicalization, most individuals did not show evidence of extremist views or connection to terrorist activity. He indicates that American citizens who have radicalized are largely first- or second-generation Americans with a Middle Eastern or South Asian ethnic origin. Emerson also suggests that Islamic converts represent a significant portion of those who have become radicalized in the U.S., providing the Virginia Jihad Network, Folsom prison gang, and Portland 7 as examples.

Emerson describes those who have been radicalized in the U.S. as being primarily below the age of 30. He says they are often radicalized in private study circles or by people they meet at their place of worship. He indicates that an older, charismatic imam often plays a role in the radicalization process.

Emerson describes “Agents of Radicalization,” including:

- Religious leaders (e.g., charismatic leaders)
- Internet: “The Internet has become an indispensable multifaceted operational tool for terrorists in terms of psychological warfare, publicity, propaganda, data mining, fundraising, recruitment, mobilization, networking, sharing information, and coordination. Several of these functions can combine to serve the larger function of radicalization, which is crucial to the success of terrorists and extremists who propagate militant Islamism—particularly those who act on behalf of the ideology presented by al Qaeda.”

He points to domestic radical Islamic civil society groups as engendering radicalization, suggesting that they are spreading a false sense of persecution and alienation in the Muslim community in the West by labeling the war on terror as a war on Islam. Emerson indicates nearly all of the post 9/11 terrorist plots have claimed to be “avenging crimes committed by the West against Muslims.”

He suggests that the Internet has helped to spread radicalization and has increased exponentially the formation of homegrown cells. According to Emerson, the Internet “can facilitate the entire process of the development of a plot from initial radicalization to the formulation of a complex and potentially deadly terrorist attack.” He says the Internet is having a radicalizing effect on Western second-generation Muslim youths who find themselves divided between two cultures with contrasting value systems.

Emerson quotes FBI Director Mueller from June 2005, saying that there are between 5,000 and 6,000 extremist websites on the Internet encouraging extremists to initiate their own radicalization and to cultivate relationships with other like-minded persons; some provide instructions on how to contribute to violent jihad while others disseminate the extremist thought that often serves as the central ingredient in the radicalization process.

He recommends that the U.S. be vigilant in combating the ideology at home and abroad with a multi-pronged campaign that addresses root causes but not at the expense of locating and incapacitating terrorist cells, with the result of isolating, retarding, and halting radicalization.

Emerson suggests that the most viable option to prevent the spread of militant ideology is to work to insulate Muslim communities in the West from radicalizing influences through the empowerment of constructive and truly moderate Muslim leaders. “A greater effort on the part of the Muslim community must be undertaken to counter the growing trend that sees jihad as the new counterculture for a generation cause between two cultures that are often at odds.”

He advises the FBI, DHS, and State Department to be careful about the extent to which they are legitimizing radical groups that are posing as moderates and recommends that they seek out dialogue and cooperation with true Muslim moderates who do not support terrorism, justify terrorist actions, and who seek integration into America versus self-isolation.

**U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Bruce Hoffman testimony on Islam and West: Searching for Common Ground: The Terrorism Threat and Counter-Terrorism Effort. 109<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2d sess., 18 July 2006.**

*Source Type:* Congressional Testimony

*Topic Area(s):* Domestic, International, Gaps/Recommendations

*Web Link:* <http://www.senate.gov/~foreign/testimony/2006/HoffmanTestimony060718.pdf>

***Key Points:***

Hoffman notes that the adversary is dynamic, and it evolves and adjusts to our countermeasures. He describes four types of al Qaeda:

- al Qaeda Central
- al Qaeda Affiliates and Associates
- al Qaeda Locals, which consists of those with prior terrorism experience and local recruits in other countries
- al Qaeda Network, which consists mostly of homegrown radicals and local converts

Hoffman states that those who are homegrown are generally from the margins of society, often involved in petty crime, students at universities, and feel a sense of alienation.

He describes a pathway to radicalization which begins by focusing on being a good Muslim where one is then exposed to propaganda about perceived injustices and perception of a war against Islam and forms more radical opinions.

Hoffman purports that success against terrorism will require a strategy that combines tactics and breaking cycle of recruitments. It cannot be a purely militaristic endeavor but must also involve parallel political, social, economic, and ideological activities. Other areas of importance include negotiation, psychology, social and cultural anthropology, foreign area studies, and complexity theory and systems management.

**U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.  
Director Frank J. Cilluffo statement on Prison Radicalization: Are Terrorist Cells Forming  
in U.S. Cell Blocks? 109th Cong., 2d sess., 19 September 2006.**

*Source Type:* Congressional Testimony

*Topic Area(s):* Domestic, International, Models/Frameworks, Gaps/Recommendations

*Web Link:* <http://www.gwu.edu/~newsctr/testimony.pdf>

***Key Points:***

Cilluffo presents findings from a study of prison radicalization that examined the process by which inmates become motivated to listen to or read about radical ideas, enlist in or respond to terrorist recruiting efforts, or undertake terrorist activity. He provides examples of persons who have been radicalized while in prison or spread radical ideology while serving prison sentences.

He also discusses radicalization in European prisons, claiming that European Muslims are more socio-economically marginalized than in the U.S., making them more vulnerable to radical messages. Cilluffo warns that European prison radicalization presents a containment challenge, as radicals from European prisons could travel to the U.S. or participate in U.S.-based terrorist networks.

Considering prisons to be an incubator for radical ideas, he notes several factors as having the potential to impact U.S. prison radicalization, including the following:

- Prison officials lack the manpower to oversee every prayer service or investigate every lead related to radicalization
- A lack of suitably qualified Muslim religious providers results in radical prisoners assuming religious authority
- Inmates leaving prison often have little financial or social support, making them vulnerable to recruitment by radical groups that can offer this support

Violent prison gangs and extremist Christian groups, according to Cilluffo, are compounding the threat from radical Islamic groups. Gangs and extremist Christian groups can share their recruiting approaches with radical Muslim groups; they also may engage in mutually beneficial criminal enterprises to gain funding. Christian extremist groups (which have a history of attacks on U.S. soil) can assist radical Islamic groups in areas where they have a common cause, including hostility towards the U.S. government and Israel. Secret communication practices used by gangs and Christian extremist groups can be adapted for use by radical Muslim groups (e.g., using Arabic language and script to communicate in secret).

Roadblocks to combating radicalization in prisons are discussed by Cilluffo, including:

- Local information on radicalization is easily transferred into regional and national intelligence networks.
- Cultural/bureaucratic obstacles prevent the flow of information.
- Different levels of government have different views on “tradecraft” for countering radicalization. Some agencies want to step in early while others want to let the situation play out in order to learn additional information about the radicalization issue.

- The lack of a database to track inmates after they have served their sentence as well as prisoners or prison religious providers associated with radical groups or espousing radical views.
- The lack of standard policy for vetting religious providers, even for prisons within the same state, and the lack of standards to determine whether reading material is appropriate.

Initiatives for addressing radicalization in prisons are described, including efforts in certain California prisons as well as efforts underway by the Federal Bureau of Prisons (FBOP). Limitations on research on radicalization in prisons are described by Cilluffo, including the lack of data, limited access provided to researchers to enter prison facilities, and lack of information-sharing among authorities due to ongoing investigations.

**U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.  
Gregory B. Saathoff statement on Religious Radicalization Behind Bars. 109<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2d  
sess., 19 September 2006.**

*Source Type:* Congressional Testimony

*Topic Area(s):* Domestic, Models/Frameworks, Gaps/Recommendation

*Web Link:* <http://hsgac.senate.gov/files/091906Saathoff.pdf>

***Key Points:***

Saathoff describes radicalization from a behavioral sciences perspective and presents prisons as a potential source for terrorist recruitment. Psychological traits of prisoners, he states, are similar to those of terrorist recruits, including disillusionment with society, violent impulses, high level of distress, lack of intrinsic religious beliefs or values, dysfunctional family system, and dependent personalities. Prisoners may see themselves as victims of society and radical groups may promise them the opportunity to seek retribution.

According to Saathoff, prior to their prison experience, inmates may have little exposure to organized religion, so they depend on the interpretations of religious officials in the prison or in the religious literature they are given. Prisoners also have indirect access to the Internet, through which they can correspond with “50 to 500” pen pals, who disseminate information to them. Prison officials, he notes, may be unable to recognize jihadist material advocating violence or radicalized inmates taking steps toward becoming terrorists. Prison officials, inmates, and visitors can unwittingly be cajoled or bribed into transmitting radical messages and materials without being aware of their purpose, which Saathoff calls *para-radicalization*.

Obstacles to radicalization prevention include the inability to identify inmates associated with radical groups, track inmates after release, or track religious providers as they move between prisons. The lack of intelligence sharing on emerging threats is another obstacle. Saathoff also notes several limitations for researching prison radicalization—a limited awareness and understanding of the issue at the state and local level, where the vast majority of prisoners are held; and scholars are often constrained or denied permission to do research in prisons due to history of abuse by researchers using human subjects from prisons.

**U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.  
Donald Van Duyn statement on Prison Radicalization: The Environment, the Threat, and  
the Response. 109<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2d sess., 19 September 2006.**

*Source Type:* Congressional Testimony

*Topic Area(s):* Domestic, Gaps/Recommendations

*Web Link:* <http://hsgac.senate.gov/files/091906VanDuyn.pdf>

***Key Points:***

Van Duyn states that prisons continue to present opportunities for the proselytizing of radical Islam. Prison radicalization primarily occurs through three means:

- Anti-U.S. sermons provided by contract, volunteer, or staff Imams
- Radicalized inmates who gain religious influence
- Extremist media

Radicalized inmates, according to Van Duyn, usually adhere to the Salafi form of Sunni Islam or extremist versions of Shi'a Islam similar to those found in Iran or practiced by Hezbollah. Domestic inmates who become radicalized tend not to have been born into the Muslim faith but became converts. They tend to either feel discriminated against or believe that the U.S. oppresses minorities and Muslims overseas. He notes several dangers posed by radicalized inmates, including urging other prisoners to attend certain mosques and urging them to disobey prison authorities and incite violence in the prison; they also could pass acquired terrorism skills on to other inmates.

Van Duyn provides details from cases of prison radicalization. Most radicalized inmates have not become threats to national security, and most cases of radicalization and recruitment originate from domestic extremists with few, if any, foreign connections. There is also an emerging crossover trend of gang members becoming Islamic extremists. Radicalization is most common in high population areas on the West Coast and in the Northeast.

He describes efforts by the FBI and Federal Bureau of Prisons (FBOP) to organize the Correctional Intelligence Initiative (CII). The CII is intended to improve intelligence collection to detect, deter, and disrupt prison radicalization. It also is training and providing materials on prisoner radicalization to state and local correctional institutions.

Van Duyn provides recommendations for preventing prison radicalization, including:

- Establishing vetting protocols for prison contractors and volunteers and creating databases to track them
- Improving monitoring capabilities
- Coordinating inmate transfers
- Improving information-sharing between all levels of law enforcement and prison personnel

**U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.  
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross statement on Prison Radicalization: Are Terrorist Cells Forming  
in U.S. Cell Blocks? 109<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2d sess., 19 September 2006.**

*Source Type:* Congressional Testimony

*Topic Area(s):* Domestic, Gaps/Recommendations

*Web Link:* <http://hsgac.senate.gov/files/091906GartensteinRoss.pdf>

***Key Points:***

Gartenstein-Ross presents a case study of the Al Haramain Islamic Foundation to foster an understanding of how prison access was exploited. Originally formed as a private charity in Saudi Arabia, the foundation is believed to have links to terrorism, including involvement in the East Africa embassy bombings and Bali bombings. Leaders of the foundation's U.S. branch were indicted for a money-laundering scheme that involved smuggling traveler's checks to fund the Chechen mujahideen.

He describes the Prison Dawa Program that the foundation initiated after becoming affiliated with a mosque in Oregon in 1998. The leader of its U.S. congregation recognized the potential for recruitment, referring to inmates as a "captive audience." The Al Haramain foundation forged relationships with Muslim prison chaplains, who agreed to distribute the pamphlets and questionnaires to inmates.

Gartenstein-Ross states that prisoners learned of the foundation from chaplains, word-of-mouth from other inmates, or from seeing contact information on literature sent to prisons. Prisoners initiated contact with the U.S. branch of the foundation by sending written request for Islamic literature. The foundation sent them pamphlets on the Wahhabi/Salafi version of the Qur'an and a questionnaire emphasizing concepts from Wahhabism or Salafism that could be used to gain an understanding of an inmate's theological views. The questionnaire asked for the prisoner's name, prisoner number, release dates, and address outside of prison. The foundation entered all data from questionnaires into a database, giving them the opportunity to follow up with inmates after they were released. The database contained 15,000 names in 1998.

**U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Senator Susan M. Collins statement on Prison Radicalization: Are Terrorist Cells Forming in U.S. Cell Blocks? 109th Cong., 2d sess., 19 September 2006.**

*Source Type:* Congressional Testimony

*Topic Area(s):* Domestic, Gaps/Recommendations

*Web Link:* <http://hsgac.senate.gov/files/091906SMCOpen.pdf>

***Key Points:***

Senator Collins suggests that a rise in domestic terrorist cells is inspired by, but not directly linked to, al Qaeda, representing an emerging threat to national security. She provides examples of this threat, including the Assembly for Authentic Islam (JIS) terrorist cell that formed in the Folsom State Prison in California. She poses the question of what training and skills are needed by corrections officers to be able to recognize radicalization and recruitment efforts in prisons.

**U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Javed Ali statement on Prison Radicalization: Are Terrorist Cells Forming in U.S. Cell Blocks? 109<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2d sess., 19 September 2006.**

*Source Type:* Congressional Testimony

*Topic Area(s):* Domestic, Gaps/Recommendations

*Web Link:* <http://hsgac.senate.gov/files/091906Ali.pdf>

***Key Points:***

Ali describes efforts underway by DHS's Office of Intelligence and Analysis to address how, why, and where radicalized ideas and beliefs develop over time in the U.S. Prisoners have been radicalized through charismatic religious inmates, religious volunteers and chaplains, and extremist propaganda. He summarizes research on radicalization as follows:

- Relationships between radicalization nodes and radical actor/groups vary
- Several diverse pathways exist to radicalization in the U.S.
- Radicalization is not a one-way street; certain factors can cause individuals or groups to de-radicalize, particularly in the case of prison radicalization
- Radicalization in prisons occurs predominantly among African-American inmates

**U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. John M. Vanyur statement on Prison Radicalization: Are Terrorist Cells Forming in U.S. Cell Blocks? 109<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2d sess., 19 September 2006.**

*Source Type:* Congressional Testimony

*Topic Area(s):* Domestic

*Web Link:* <http://hsgac.senate.gov/files/091906Vanyur.pdf>

***Key Points:***

Vanyur describes the Correctional Intelligence Initiative (CII)—a nationwide special project involving correctional agencies at all levels of government—which is designed to detect, deter, and disrupt the radicalization and recruiting of inmates. CII involves local Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) to train correctional administrators; coordinate intelligence sharing and liaison activities between JTTFs and corrections agencies; and communicate best practices.

He explains that information on chaplains and religious contractors and volunteers is checked against FBI-supported databases. Federal Bureau of Prisons (FBOP) civil service chaplains must meet the same requirements for employment as a federal law enforcement officer. Nearly all FBOP staff were trained to recognize the signs of potential radicalization, according to Vanyur.

**U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Steven Simon testimony on Priorities for Homeland Security. 109th Cong., 2d sess., 12 September 2006.**

*Source Type:* Congressional Testimony

*Topic Area(s):* Domestic

*Web Link:* <http://hsgac.senate.gov/files/091206Simon.pdf>

***Key Points:***

In his testimony before the Senate, Simon discusses the importance of the U.S. fostering good relationships with Muslim American communities because of increasing alienation.

He notes that places ripe for recruitment include coffee-houses, mosques, and Islamic Centers, and that Muslims are radicalized by a combination of media imagery, socio-economic exclusion, and a set of simple, but internally consistent religious and ideological concepts.

He says that the U.S. government has not manifested trust in Muslims, there is mutual distrust, and Muslims are not included in policy positions and decision-making. Additionally, American Muslims are choosing not to assimilate, and they may be feeling accelerating alienation, which could produce a “rejectionist generation.” Since 9/11 Muslim Americans are facing higher rates of racism, employment and housing discrimination, and vandalism.

However, Simon also states that “American Muslims do not remotely pose the domestic threat the European Muslims do.” He provides a few suggestions for how to counter radicalization which include increasing community policing efforts, more video surveillance, and better information-sharing capabilities.

**U.S. Congress. Senate. Senate Armed Services Committee. John D. Negroponte statement on the Annual Threat Assessment. 109<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2d sess., 28 February 2006.**

*Source Type:* Congressional Testimony

*Topic Area(s):* Domestic

*Web Link:* <http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2006/February/Negroponte%2002-28-06.pdf>

**Key Points:**

Negroponte makes a distinction between activism and radicalization, claiming that more Muslims are becoming political activists but are rejecting the extremist message and violent agendas of jihadists. According to him, this “does not necessarily signal a trend toward radicalization.”

Negroponte provides an example of a homegrown jihadist cell in Lodi, California that had connections to Pakistani militant groups, recruited U.S. citizens for training at radical madrassas in Karachi, sponsored Pakistani citizens for travel to the U.S. to work at mosques and madrassas, and raised funds for militant groups.

**U.S. Congress. Senate. Senate Committee on Intelligence. Robert S. Mueller III, testimony. 109<sup>th</sup> Cong., 1st sess., 16 February 2005.**

*Source Type:* Congressional Testimony

*Topic Area(s):* Domestic

*Web Link:* <http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress05/mueller021605.htm>

**Key Points:**

According to Mueller, there are three areas of greatest concern:

- The threat from covert operatives who may be inside the United States who have the intention to facilitate or conduct an attack.
- al Qaeda's intention to obtain and ultimately use some form of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-energy explosives (CBRNE) material in its attacks against America.
- The potential for al Qaeda to leverage extremist groups with peripheral or historical connections to al Qaeda, particularly its ability to exploit radical American converts and other indigenous extremists.

**U.S. Congress. Senate. Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations. Dr. Robin Niblett statement on Islamic Extremism in Europe. 109<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2d sess., 5 April 2006.**

*Source Type:* Congressional Testimony

*Topic Area(s):* Domestic, International, Gaps/Recommendations

*Web Link:* <http://www.senate.gov/~foreign/testimony/2006/NiblettTestimony060405.pdf>

***Key Points:***

Niblett discusses current thinking pertaining to the factors that have led to the rise of Islamic extremism in Europe and the connections to violent terrorist action; how European governments perceive the threat and what steps are they taking to address this phenomenon; and the transatlantic dimensions of this danger.

The European experience is described as being different than the United States; in the U.S., the threat posed by Islamic extremism has been kept and addressed primarily off-shore.

He suggests that a combination of external and internal forces is driving Islamic extremism in Europe. Niblett indicates that Islamic extremism is being fed internally by the growing sense of frustration and alienation felt by second- and third-generation children of the Muslim economic immigrants to Europe of the 1950s and 1960s.

Niblett indicates that the concerns of European policymakers include:

- Rioting in Paris last fall, Muslim reactions to the “cartoon” controversy, and a continuing influx of Muslim immigrants will feed an expanding popular backlash in Europe against Muslims which will, in turn, drive new converts into the extremist Islamic camp.
- A larger proportion of Muslim communities might be sufficiently radicalized or isolated to offer a popular base either of support or of acceptance within which extremists can circulate, making the work of law enforcement and intelligence services that much harder.
- Well-educated young Muslims, especially those studying in the areas of information technology, computer sciences, chemistry, and biotechnology might be drawn to the cause of Islamic extremism and put their knowledge to the service of groups wanting to carry out spectacular attacks on European soil.
- There will be a further expansion and deepening of cross-border linkages across Europe among radical Islamist terrorist groups.
- Returnees from Iraq might bring organizational and operational skills to Europe that could further increase the lethality and frequency of attacks.
- European countries offer an infinite number of potential targets for terrorist attack and that no country is immune from being considered a target.
- European police, intelligence, customs, and judicial services are not well enough organized to confront this fluid new threat.

The author presents the four broad strategies that have been undertaken by European governments to combat radicalization and extremism:

- 1) They are taking collective as well as individual steps to lessen their vulnerability to the threat posed by terrorist groups, primarily in the field of asylum law, police and intelligence cooperation, and judicial coordination.

- 2) They are trying to improve the social integration of these communities by offering better economic opportunities to young Muslims living in deprived neighborhoods.
- 3) They are combating the “ghettoization” and separation of their Muslim populations from the rest of society by instituting programs designed to force Muslim communities to integrate better with the rest of domestic society.
- 4) They are trying to break the linkages between Islamic extremist ideology and Muslim youth across Europe, with measures to block entry to or expel radical imams; criminalize incitement to hate and violence; and to encourage the growth of Islamic groups with closer ties to local communities.

Niblett suggests that progress to combat radicalization and extremism has been limited due to the following:

- EU-level cooperation against extremism and terrorism remains very difficult operationally.
- Ability to institute economic reforms that will open new job opportunities in deprived economic areas and reduce high levels of unemployment among immigrant communities are limited.
- European governments are being simultaneously driven to act and constrained by the sorts of steps they can take in promoting social integration due to the growing public hostility toward Islam and Muslim immigration.
- Many of Europe’s new “citizenship” programs seem limited in their potential impact.
- European governments face serious opposition to some of the measures that they are undertaking from domestic human rights groups and the judiciary.
- There appears to be a deeper, structural stand-off between European societies and their Muslim communities.
- Europeans themselves are uncertain about what sort of identity they are trying to promote or protect.

Niblett indicates that the U.S. government and its European counterparts have taken a number of steps to try to confront extremism and other risks posed by international terrorism, including:

- They regularly exchange intelligence information on potential threats
- They enacted Mutual Extradition and Legal Assistance Agreements to help expand law enforcement and judicial cooperation
- They instituted procedures to tackle terrorist group financing
- They have strengthened international standards for the International Port Facility and Vessel Security Codes
- They have established a policy dialogue on border and transportation security
- They have stationed U.S. Customs officials at European ports as part of the U.S. Container Security Initiative

Niblett points to two broader sets of long-term concerns for U.S. interests:

- 1) Islamic extremists based in Europe could increasingly provide the spark that ignites popular revolts against moderate Arab governments in North Africa, the Middle East, and the Gulf region, or against other vulnerable allies of the United States, such as Pakistan.
- 2) European governments faced with large, growing, and restive Muslim populations might tailor or manage some of their foreign policies toward the Arab world in ways that cut across U.S. and transatlantic interests (less well-defined risk for the U.S.).

**U.S. Congress. Senate. Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Daniel Benjamin testimony on Islamic Extremism in Europe. 109<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2d sess., 5 April 2006.**

*Source Type:* Congressional Testimony

*Topic Area(s):* Domestic, International

*Web Link:* <http://www.senate.gov/~foreign/testimony/2006/BenjaminTestimony060405.pdf>

***Key Points:***

Benjamin describes radicalization in Europe. He points to marginality in Europe as helping to explain the appeal of radicalization; Muslims live in ghetto-like segregation, have second-rate schooling, higher levels of unemployment, and are more likely to have either low-wage or dead-end jobs.

He explains that many European Muslims are picking religion as their determining trait; in the U.K., 41 percent of Muslims under 35 years of age described themselves as solely “Muslim” versus “British and Muslim” (from a 2002 survey); in France, preferential identification with Islam among Muslims has increased 25 percent between 1994 and 2001.

Benjamin indicates that although recruitment is taking place at the local level, the motivations that guide the group can be both local (e.g., unemployment, discrimination) and global (Iraq, Afghanistan, Guantanamo). He says that many Muslims in Europe perceive anti-terror laws as being unfairly enforced, believe they are subjected to abuse or hostility, and feel they are politically underrepresented.

He describes the Muslim perception of the West, explaining that they believe the West equates Islam with terrorism and thinks that the West believes Islam is an intolerant religion. Many do not think that Islam fits into Western culture.

Benjamin concludes “the eruption of jihadist violence in Europe must become a major concern for Washington for reasons that transcend concern for the safety of friends across the Atlantic. For one thing, the U.S. and Europe share a security perimeter. Not only are there more Americans and American businesses in Europe than virtually anywhere else, but most Europeans have easy access to the U.S. through the visa waiver program. (It is a disturbing oddity that the U.S. immigration system is now optimized to allow in people from the area of the world where Islamist radicalism may be growing the fastest.) Moreover, the numbers of radicals in Europe and the civil liberties protections means that the continent will remain the most likely launching pad for attacks against Americans.”

**U.S. Congress. Senate. Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Tom C. Korologos testimony on Islamic Extremism in Europe. 109<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2d sess., 5 April 2006.**

*Source Type:* Congressional Testimony

*Topic Area(s):* Domestic, International, Gaps/Recommendations

*Web Link:* <http://www.senate.gov/~foreign/testimony/2006/KorologosTestimony060405.pdf>

***Key Points:***

Korologos describes an approach that was used by the U.S. Embassy in Brussels to engage Muslims there. The approach—public diplomacy based on dialogue, not monologue—supplemented the extensive U.S. financial, intelligence, law enforcement, defense, private diplomatic and other initiatives directed at Islamic extremism in Europe. He suggests this model can generate a movement of mainstream Muslims across Europe to ease Muslim alienation and combat extremism.

Korologos explains that while the U.S. embassy in Belgium was performing Muslim outreach with local and elected officials, they found there was no communication between American Muslims and European Muslims in Belgium to share lessons learned (re: identity), balancing faith and nationality, and integration.

The embassy arranged to bring American Muslims together with Belgium Muslims to discuss issues of Muslim participation in society, including Muslim identity, civic life, economic opportunity, media portrayal, youth development, and women's issues. The discussions were framed around domestic issues of importance to minorities. Both groups shared good practices and success strategies. ("Muslim Communities Participating in Society: A Belgium-U.S. Dialogue" – Nov 2005)

Korologos suggests that the forum resulted in Belgian Muslims seeing the U.S. Government in a more positive light; attempted to empower Muslims to counter the alienation that can spur radicalism and terrorism; encouraged them to define themselves and Islam as peaceful and moderate; helped to enfranchise Muslims with larger society, to move Muslims from margins to the mainstream. "We discovered a new form of U.S.-sponsored Muslim engagement and empowerment—based on dialogue, not monologue among Muslims themselves."

Korologos also mentions a program where the Annenberg School for Communications at the University of Southern California and a Belgium partner are working on a program to engage Belgian and American reporters, editors, anchors, and producers on the challenges of good practices related to covering Muslims and Islam in the media.

**U.S. Congress. Senate. Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland Security of the Committee on the Judiciary. Harley G. Lappin statement on Terrorist Recruitment and Infiltration in the United States: Prisons and Military as Operational Base. 108<sup>th</sup> Cong., 1st sess., 14 October 2003.**

*Source Type:* Congressional Testimony

*Topic Area(s):* Domestic

*Web Link:* [http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=960&wit\\_id=2318](http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=960&wit_id=2318)

***Key Points:***

Lappin discusses the policies put in place by the Federal Bureau of Prisons (FBOP) to prevent recruitment of terrorists and extremists in federal prisons. He discusses efforts to date:

- Eliminating most inmate organizations to control the influence of outside entities on inmates
- Enhancing information and monitoring systems
- Enhancing intelligence gathering and sharing capabilities
- Identifying and managing inmates who could cause “disruption”

The FBOP has a full-time representative on the National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF) to facilitate intelligence exchange. Lappin further states that the FBOP receives NJTTF alerts on individuals who have ties to organizations that are under investigation and enter federal prisons as contractors, volunteers, or visitors. Programs are in place to provide inmates with the knowledge, skills, and ability that they need after their release from prison, including vocational training, education, substance abuse treatment, pro-social values programs, and religious programs. The FBOP also has instituted screening and background checks for staff, volunteers, and contractors. Contractors and volunteers are only authorized to address the specific religious areas of inmates of their own faith.

Lappin discusses the requirements and professional qualifications that have been established for chaplains, including: a degree from a school of theology or seminary; membership in an ecclesiastically-recognized religious institute; a minimum of two years of experience leading a congregation or ministry; endorsement by a recognized endorsing organization; and a demonstration of willingness and ability to provide religious programs for inmates of all faiths. Convicted terrorists who are in custody are confined in secure conditions, their communications are monitored, and they are identified and tracked in FBI information systems.

**U.S. Congress. Senate. Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland Security of the Committee on the Judiciary. John S. Pistole statement on Terrorist Recruitment and Infiltration in the United States: Prisons and Military as Operational Base. 108<sup>th</sup> Cong., 1st sess., 14 October 2003.**

*Source Type:* Congressional Testimony

*Topic Area(s):* Domestic

*Web Link:* [http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=960&wit\\_id=2718](http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=960&wit_id=2718)

*Key Points:*

U.S. prisons are described by Pistole as a viable venue for radicalization and recruitment. He claims that terrorists seek to exploit the freedom to exercise religion by using radical forms of Islam to recruit operatives in prisons. The Federal Bureau of Prisons (FBOP) maintains a presence on the National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF), which allows them to work with the FBI on preventing prison radicalization. Membership in radical groups is described as offering inmates protection, positions of influence, and a network of correspondence in and out of prison.

**U.S. Congress. Senate. Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland Security of the Committee on the Judiciary. Michael Waller statement on Terrorist Recruitment and Infiltration in the United States: Prisons and Military as Operational Base. 108<sup>th</sup> Cong., 1st sess., 14 October 2003.**

*Source Type:* Congressional Testimony

*Topic Area(s):* Domestic, International, Gaps/Recommendations

*Web Link:* [http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=960&wit\\_id=2719](http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=960&wit_id=2719)

*Key Points:*

Waller presents the following information regarding prison recruitment efforts:

- Recruits are mainly black, with a growing Hispanic minority.
- Radical imams in prisons demand and are granted exclusive permission to proselytize for Islam; 80 percent of religious conversions that occur in prisons are to Islam.
- Radicals commonly prey on inmates' disaffection from society, such as by praising 9/11 and al Qaeda.
- There are disproportionate amounts of Muslim literature available in prisons, especially in the U.K.
- Islam is appealing because it "revenge[s] [inmates] upon the whole of society;" inmates believe society has mistreated them and want revenge.

Documentation of Waller's testimony provides appendices that include "Key Organizations Involved in Muslim Prison Recruitment," and several articles reporting on the paths of Europeans who were recruited into radical Islam and became terrorists.

**Zambellis, Chris. “Radical Trends in African-American Islam.” *Terrorism Monitor* 4.16 (10 August 2005): 9-11.**

*Source Type:* Think Tank (Domestic)

*Topic Area(s):* Domestic

*Web Link:* <http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2370101>

***Key Points:***

Zambellis suggests that U.S. law enforcement and intelligence officials are paying closer attention to trends that point to increasing radicalization of African-American Muslim converts and Latino American Muslims—“Fears of the threat of al Qaeda’s influence spreading among African American Muslim converts and underprivileged minorities in impoverished inner cities is in part based on alarming trends in Europe. Evidence of the presence of Black and Latino American-born Muslims in terrorism training camps in the Middle East and South Asia is one point of concern.”

Article suggests that Islam is seen by some African Americans as an opportunity to formally break with injustices of the past. Author provides details on some incidents involving Muslim converts.

**Zambellis, Chris. “Arrest of American Islamist Highlights Homegrown Terrorist Threat.” *Terrorism Focus* 3.25(27 June 2006): 2-3.**

*Source Type:* Think Tank (Domestic)

*Topic Area(s):* Domestic

*Web Link:* <http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2370041>

***Key Points:***

Zambellis provides information on Syed “Fahad” Hashmi, a 26 year old American citizen of Pakistani descent who was arrested at Heathrow airport in London. Hashmi was arrested for his suspected role in providing aid for an al Qaeda plot to attack targets in London and for delivering military equipment and funds to radical Islamists in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Author suggests that Hashmi’s background and turn toward radicalism should raise serious concerns related to the growing threat of homegrown Islamist extremists in the U.S.

**“FBI Will Do ‘Threat Assessment’ of Nation’s Prisons,” *San Francisco Chronicle*, 31 August 2005.**

*Source Type:* Press Report

*Topic Area(s):* Domestic

***Key Points:***

According to this article, FBI agents nationwide have been ordered to conduct “threat assessments” of inmates who might have become radicalized in prison and could commit extremist violence when released.

Since 11 September 2001, a concern has been that terrorist groups with extremist ideologies may be targeting felons as prime candidates for conversion during their time in prison.

The FBI wants to increase its efforts to “identify, report, analyze, and disrupt efforts by extremist persons or groups to radicalize, recruit, or advocate for the purpose of violence within correctional facilities.”

FBI director Robert Mueller warned the U.S. Senate intelligence committee in February that prisons are “fertile ground for extremists.”

**“Islamist Terrorism in London: Unsettling Implications,” *Strategic Comments London: International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)*, 2.5. July 2005.**

*Source Type:* Think Tank (International)

*Topic Area(s):* Domestic, International

***Key Points:***

The IISS notes that the global jihadist network has successfully adapted to the removal of its operating base in Afghanistan, has drawn inspiration and energy from the U.S.-led intervention in Iraq, and seeks to isolate America from its European allies and partners and perhaps establish a strong European network with which to target the United States.

Outrage at the terror attacks in London among moderate Muslims appears likely to make them more cooperative with the government and more proactive in confronting radicalism within the Muslim community. But these effects could also antagonize Muslim radicals, and so the government needs to use discretion in its community outreach and clandestine penetration efforts.

EU partners have a program in place called the Schengen Information System. Each participating country is required to issue alerts on illegal aliens from outside the EU seeking visas, including authorized documentary, photographic, and biometric identification.

According to IISS, the United States remains al Qaeda’s prime enemy and prize target, but it must rely increasingly on local groups that are merely ideologically inspired, rather than operationally controlled, by al Qaeda leadership. Currently, such groups are more likely to coalesce in Europe, where there are more Muslims and a more energized radicalization movement than in the U.S.



## INTERNATIONAL

**Abuza, Zachary. *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003.**

*Source Type:* Book

*Topic Area(s):* International

***Key Points:***

Abuza's book analyzes the political, economic, and social context and trends in Southeast Asia that have fostered Islamic radicalism and encouraged the rise of militant Islamic groups and their willingness to engage in terrorist activities. He gives particular attention to the links between radical Islam in the region and al Qaeda. He also suggests that both socioeconomic and political reasons have contributed to the growth of Islamic grievances within Southeast Asian states since the 1970s.

Abuza indicates that one factor encouraging Islamic radicalism in Southeast Asia is the growth in *madrassas* (Islamic schools) and *pesentren* (boarding schools) that are mostly outside the control of the state educational system; often they include schools that adhere to the rigid Wahhabi version of Islam that encourages radicalism. He points to the general upsurge in Islamic education as attendance at mosques has increased in recent years.

Some of the growth in Islamic fundamentalism in countries such as Indonesia can be attributed to the failure of the domestic political economy and the prolonged suppression by the earlier authoritarian regime of President Suharto. In other countries, such as the Philippines or Malaysia, the Muslim communities have been economically less well off compared with the country's non-Muslim population.

Abuza suggests that, along with the growing Islamic radicalism, two other factors have increased the prospect of Southeast Asia becoming a major center of operations for al Qaeda operatives:

- 1) The Afghan connection to Middle Eastern extremists, when many Muslim radicals from Southeast Asia became involved in fighting with the mujahideen from around the world, including the Middle East, against the Soviets.
- 2) Southeast Asian states had become "countries of convenience" for international terrorists. They used countries, such as Indonesia and the Philippines, for training and terrorist attack operations by taking advantage of their relatively accessible societies and non-threatening security environments.

**Archik, Kristin, John Rollins and Steven Woehrel. *Islamist Extremism in Europe*. Congressional Research Service Report for Congress. The Library of Congress, 29 July 2005.**

**Source Type:** Government (Domestic)

**Topic Area(s):** International

**Web Link:** <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RS22211.pdf>

**Key Points:**

The authors provide an overview of Islamist extremism in Europe, including possible terrorist links, European responses, and implications for the United States. The implications of radicalization are discussed, including how extremism is tied to and supports terrorism, how the Europeans have tried to respond to extremism, and why the situation in Europe impacts U.S. homeland security efforts.

According to the report, between 15 and 20 million Muslims live in Europe today; Muslims are particularly numerous in France, Germany, U.K., Spain, Italy, Netherlands, and Belgium. Islam is said to be the fastest growing religion on the continent.

The report discusses how Muslims initially came to Europe in the 1950s and 1960s to fill labor shortages; these Muslims were mostly from North Africa, Turkey, and Pakistan. Recently, however, Muslims are migrants and refugees from Balkans, Iraq, Somalia, Palestine, and other conflict areas.

The authors explain how the Europeans have struggled with absorbing Muslims, resulting in many who are poor, unemployed, and feel isolated and alienated. Two common approaches common in Europe are described:

- 1) The multicultural approach where Muslims maintain a distinct identity, often leading to separate, parallel societies (e.g., U.K., Netherlands).
- 2) The integration approach, where full acceptance of the host country's values is expected and uniqueness is ignored (e.g., France).

They suggest that although not the majority, radical fringe elements exist in Europe and these groups may provide support and cover for terrorist cells. Europe's open borders enable extremists to move about freely. The U.K. is described as a breeding ground for extremists (e.g., Richard Reid and Zacharias Moussaoui who were both influenced by radical British clerics, and the perpetrators of the 7 July 06 bombings who had ties with Pakistan).

The authors state that many European Muslims may be vulnerable to radicalization because of failed integration. Global issues and foreign policy may also provide fuel for radicalization. The relative proximity to conflict zones, such as the Balkans and the Middle East, translates to easy access for extremist fighters seeking new recruits.

Central and Eastern Europe do not have as many problems with radical Islam. There is, however, concern about radicalization occurring in Southeast Europe due to the large Muslim population, the presence of jihadist fighters who remained behind after Balkans conflicts, and the presence of Islamic charities that are operating as al Qaeda money-laundering fronts.

European responses to extremism include the following:

- Viewing a multicultural approach as a failure and pushing for integration
- Taking steps to aid integration into host nation society
- Encouraging moderate Muslims and supporting moderate political voices
- Encouraging “home grown” imams and cultural education for foreign imams
- Addressing sources of frustration, including jobs, education, and racism

The measures taken by Europe to contain extremists include increasing security measures, including monitoring radical mosques and changing laws, and reforming immigration and asylum laws which make it easier to exclude or deport radicals.

The authors suggest that the U.S. views Europe as a possible launching point for attacks on the homeland, and as a result, Washington has been focusing on increased cooperation with Europe. Particular emphasis has been placed on border control and transportation security, especially container security and exchange of airline passenger information. The Visa Waiver Program is highlighted as a vulnerability that can allow extremists to be granted access to the U.S.

**Atran, Scott. “The Virtual Hand of Jihad.” *Terrorism Monitor* 3.10 (May 19, 2005): 8-11.**

**Source Type:** Think Tank (Domestic)

**Topic Area(s):** International, Gaps/Recommendations

**Web Link:** <http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369701>

**Key Points:**

Atran proposes that current risk management approaches to countering terrorism do not suffice in that they assume that adversaries model the world on the basis of rational choices that are comparable across cultures. When Atran interviewed would-be martyrs he found that “devotional values are not very sensitive to standard calculations of cost and benefit, to quantity or to tradeoffs across different moral and cultural frameworks. This means that traditional calculations of how to defeat or deter an enemy (for example by eliminating top operatives of threatening destruction of supporting populations) may not succeed.”

According to Atran, “arguably the greatest potential terrorist threat in the world today lies with uprooted and egalitarian Muslim young adults in European cities, who provided the manpower for both the 9/11 and Madrid train-bombing attacks. Immigrant integration into European societies has always been more difficult than in America, being more state-driven or ‘top-down’ than community-based or bottom-up. There is no indication that any rival to Jihadism’s uncompromising vision of a fair and just society—which debriefings show clearly motivate these people—is being conveyed to would-be jihadist youth in Europe.”

Atran claims that al Qaeda-Central no longer exists and has been replaced with groups of friends and family who are bonded into action by Jihadist websites; he proposes that radicalization is proceeding apace with the exponential growth in Internet connections and points out that in the past 5 years, active Jihadist websites have increased from 14 to over 4,000.

Atran presents Sageman's research, which studied 500 globally-networked Jihadists and found that social networks of the militant groups were hard-to-penetrate, spontaneously formed, and self-mobilizing with few direct physical contacts with other cells; there is little homogeneity across Jihadist diaspora, which makes profiling "worthless."

He recommends the "deployment of more diverse talent and flexible tools to grapple with the variable and virtual hand of global network jihad," the need to dispel myths, and the need for other approaches to gain a better understanding of radicalization.

**Balzacq, Thierry and Sergio Carrera. *The EU's Fight against International Terrorism: Security Problems, Insecure Solutions*. CEPS Policy Brief, no. 80. Centre for European Policy Studies, July 2005.**

**Source Type:** Think Tank (International)

**Topic Area(s):** International, Gaps/Recommendations

**Web Link:**

[http://www.libertysecurity.org/IMG/pdf/TheEU\\_sFightagainstInternationalTerrorism.pdf](http://www.libertysecurity.org/IMG/pdf/TheEU_sFightagainstInternationalTerrorism.pdf)

**Key Points:**

The Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) suggests that EU policies may be compounding problems of terrorism because policies put in place do not match the diagnosis or fully comply with principles of legitimacy, proportionality and efficiency.

The EU's counter-terrorism policies have two purposes:

- A psychological aspect by which to strengthen bonds between Member States, and promote solidarity and empathy.
- Defensive and proactive political actions such as legislative initiatives.

CEPS notes that skepticism exists over whether these legal instruments are effective in curbing threats of political violence. It suggests that, "The EU needs to rethink its discourse and overall approach towards groups of its citizens (and non-citizens) who are of different racial and religious backgrounds."

**Baran, Zeyno. "Fighting the War of Ideas." *Foreign Affairs* 84.6 (November/ December 2005): 68-78.**

*Source Type:* Academic Research/Journal

*Topic Area(s):* International, Gaps/Recommendations

*Web Link:* [http://www.hizb.org.uk/downloads/pdfs/fighting\\_the\\_war\\_of\\_ideas.pdf](http://www.hizb.org.uk/downloads/pdfs/fighting_the_war_of_ideas.pdf)

***Key Points:***

Baran discusses nonviolent groups that share a similar ideology to al Qaeda but do not carry out terrorist attacks. He indicates that these groups promote radicalization by indoctrinating individuals with the radical ideology in order to prime them for recruitment by more extreme organizations where they can take part in actual operations.

Baran recommends that rehabilitating the U.S.'s image will require an "ideological campaign" that highlights values common to the Western and Muslim world.

**Bell, Stewart and Adrian Humphreys. "Terrorism's 'New Guard,' Secret Reports Warn of Canadian Extremists." *National Post (Canada)*, 4 May 2006.**

*Source Type:* Press Report

*Topic Area(s):* International

*Web Link:* <http://www.canada.com/nationalpost/news/story.html?id=376f0554-386f-4282-a1be-68bb884c02f7>

***Key Points:***

The authors discuss a report from the Integrated Threat Assessment Center (ITAC) that concludes "A small number of extremists in Canada advocate violent jihad in pursuit of their political and religious aims. The reasons for radicalization are varied, and include a general sense of anger at what is seen as oppression of Muslims throughout the world [and] parental influence."

They note that an apparent shift in the focus of Canadian counter-terrorism efforts has been underway; while, in the past, Canada's main concern was "homeland" terrorists, such as the Sikh militants, today's top security concern is the emerging generation of homegrown extremists.

The article describes the "old guard" of terrorists as immigrants and refugees who brought to Canada the conflicts of their homelands, while the new generation consists largely of Canadian-born radical Muslims of various ethnicities as well as converts who have adopted the extremist interpretation of Islam.

The authors point to the U.S. State Department's annual report on global terrorism, released April 2006, which concluded that terrorists have "capitalized on liberal Canadian immigration and asylum policies to enjoy safe haven, raise funds, arrange logistical support, and plan terrorist attacks," and suggest that extremists are operate inside Canada's borders.

**Blair, Tony. Prime Minister's Press Conference, 5 August 2005.**

*Source Type:* Press Report

*Topic Area(s):* International

*Web Link:* <http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page8041.asp>

*Key Points:*

In his press conference, Blair stated: "Coming to Britain is not a right, and even when people have come here, staying carries with it a duty. That duty is to share and support the values that sustain the British way of life. Those who break that duty and try to incite hatred or engage in violence against our country or our people have no place here."

**Bloom, Mia. "Mother. Daughter. Sister. Bomber." *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 61.6 (November/December 2005): 54-62.**

*Source Type:* Academic Research/Journal

*Topic Area(s):* International, Gaps/Recommendations

*Web Link:* [http://www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art\\_ofn=nd05bloom](http://www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art_ofn=nd05bloom)

*Key Points:*

Bloom discusses the phenomenon of females as suicide bombers. Although Islamic leaders were initially opposed to using females as suicide bombers, in recent years, religious terrorist groups have increasingly used women. Bloom claims that among Islamic groups, the trend toward women suicide bombers appears to be "contagious."

She also suggests that terrorist groups will continue to recruit women as long as they can offer the women an escape route from their societies and a chance to participate as a full person in something they find important. Consequently, protecting and promoting the rights of these women, during times of peace and conflict, must be a centerpiece, not an afterthought, of policy.

**Borum, Randy. *Psychology of Terrorism: Reference List*. Tampa, FL: University of South Florida, 2004.**

**Source Type:** Academic Research/Journal

**Topic Area(s):** International, Models/Frameworks

**Web Link:** <http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/208551.pdf>

**Key Points:**

This document contains the bibliography from Borum's, *Psychology of Terrorism* (2004). Three types of annotations are the bibliography's 300 entries: 1) original author's abstract, 2) editor's annotation, and 3) key quote summary. The bibliography was derived from a search of major academic databases focusing on professional social science literature on psychology and terrorism. The entries of most relevance to radicalization include:

- #23: Borum, "Understanding the terrorist mindset," which identifies four observable stages of ideological development and extremist behavior.
- #39: Clark, "Patterns in the lives of ETA members," which describes the radicalization of Basque youth, including recruitment processes and termination of their relationship with Euzkadi ta Askatasuna (ETA), the Basque separatist group. ETA members were not found to be alienated or psychologically distressed but instead to have the support of their families and ethnic community.
- #132: Horgan, "The social and psychological characteristics of terrorism and terrorists," examines social and psychological characteristics of terrorism and terrorists. According to Horgan, numerous pathways exist by which people enter, remain, or leave a terrorist organization.
- #158: Keppel, "Muslim extremism in Egypt," which examines international extremist movements from the 1960s onward from a historical-political perspective.
- #261: Silke, "Becoming a terrorist," which concludes that no evidence of psychopathological, genetic, or biological explanations exist for why individuals become terrorists.
- #293: Taylor & Horgan, "The psychological and behavioral bases of Islamic fundamentalism," which explores the relationship between Islamic fundamentalism and violence to understand the nature of religious and ideological control over behavior.

**Boyle, Jon and Mark Trevelyan. “Al-Qaeda Exploits ‘Blue-Eyed’ Muslim Converts.” *Reuters* (11 October 2005).**

*Source Type:* Press Report

*Topic Area(s):* International

*Key Points:*

The authors write that Jean-Louis Bruguiere, France’s top anti-terrorism judge, told a newspaper “The converts are undeniably the toughest. Nowadays the conversions happen more quickly and the commitment is more radical.”

**Broere, Wendel. “Dutch see home-grown terrorism threat growing.” *Independent Online* (30 March 2006).**

*Source Type:* Press Report

*Topic Area(s):* International

*Web Link:*

[http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set\\_id=1&click\\_id=3&art\\_id=qw1143740162590B226](http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set_id=1&click_id=3&art_id=qw1143740162590B226)

*Key Points:*

Broere discusses the report released in March 2006 from the General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) of the Netherlands, entitled “*Violent Jihad in the Netherlands, Current Trends in the Islamist Terrorist Threat.*”

The report states the following:

- The threat of home-grown jihad is greater in the Netherlands than any other European country.
- Islamophobia is more prevalent after the death of van Gogh and has left the Muslim minority the subject of racist attacks; imams and Muslim leaders are now under the “government microscope.”
- The war in Iraq and the Dutch presence in Afghanistan has motivated a possible attack.
- Recruitment targets mainly Dutch young people of Moroccan origin.
- A key factor in radicalizing young Muslims is the misinterpretation of key verses of the Qur’an, or taking these verses out of context.
- Al Qaeda is being used as a brand name and form of inspiration.
- Violent jihad is seen as “positive and cool” inside certain youth groups.
- The Internet is used as a “virtual training camp” and is providing access to weapons.

**Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS). *The Transatlantic Dialogue on Terrorism. Initial Findings.* Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), August 2004.**

**Source Type:** Think Tank (Domestic)

**Topic Area(s):** Domestic, International, Gaps/Recommendations

**Web Link:** [http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/0408\\_transatlanticterrorism.pdf](http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/0408_transatlanticterrorism.pdf)

**Key Points:**

This article summarizes the findings from three high-level meetings held by the Transatlantic Dialogue on Terrorism; the purpose of the meetings was to assess the understanding of terrorism among experts, policymakers, and the public in the U.S. and Europe. Participants included experts from the government, academia, and think tanks.

The first meeting of the Transatlantic Dialogue on Terrorism focused on developing a better understanding of radical Islam's ideology and identity, its organizational advantages, and its spread. Participants discussed the following statements:

- Radical Islamist violence is driven, in part, by a global religious revival, and a key challenge in addressing the ideology of radical Islam is navigating the complex motivations of its adherents.
- The movement continues to gain strength over a broad geographical area, and substantial evidence of ongoing radicalization of Muslim minorities can be seen in Southeast Asia, Europe, South America, North America, and Australia.
- Radicalization is not limited to parts of the world that are economically deprived: the movement spreads easily among those who are privileged.
- Radical Islamists are now willing to partner with groups and individuals even if they are not Muslim, and it is difficult for national governments to undermine the appeal of jihadist groups for a number of reasons including that jihadists are skilled at using their deeds as propaganda, al Qaeda is constantly finding ways to penetrate all social classes, jihadists are becoming more innovative in their use of recruiting tools, and the appeal of the radical ideology is strengthened by the war in Iraq and the lack of a Middle East peace process.

The second and third meetings focused on the U.S. and European perspectives of the factors that contribute to the radicalization of ideology. The four factors that were identified include:

- 1) Poverty: the importance of addressing poverty is commonly recognized as part of a wider strategy to reduce the appeal of radical Islamist violence; however, U.S. and European attitudes on using development assistance as part of the war on terrorism vary; U.S. policymakers see development assistance as playing a supporting role to tactical counter-terrorism operations; Europeans believe that the goal of assistance is to alleviate suffering from poverty and hope that decrease in lure of radicalism will be a byproduct.
- 2) Role of Muslim NGOs: Americans and Europeans agree that reducing the power and influence of Muslim NGOs is essential, although neither has figured out how to do this; one possibility might be supporting work of international NGOs instead of those run by the U.S. or Europe.
- 3) Demographics: evidence suggests that escalations in violence correspond with large youth bulges, most notably during periods of high unemployment rates and scarcity of resources;

Europeans and Americans agree that demographic issues are serious and rarely receive sufficient attention from political leaders.

- 4) Radicalization of education: participants agree that education can be important in both the growth and decline of radicalism.

The report provides the main areas of agreement between American and European participants regarding the radicalization of ideology, including:

- The threat is serious.
- The search by jihadist groups for weapons of mass destruction is a worrying trend.
- Some suggested that the U.S. sees the war on terrorism as ending in victory or defeat and that Europeans see the war on terrorism as a long-term threat to be managed; these differences were not evident in the Dialogue participants, and any differences of opinion on this question were minimal.
- No quick fixes will resolve the problem of terrorism.
- Political leaders in the U.S. and Europe have not bridged the gap and built a common sense of purpose among their people; differences in public opinion reflect less on terrorism and more on varying political and cultural contexts in the U.S. and European societies.
- Intelligence and law enforcement cooperation between the U.S. and Europe is excellent.
- The U.S. and Europe have a limited understanding of the jihadist movement and the ideologies that sustain it.

The report outlines ways of addressing underlying causes of the rise of terrorism, including:

- What is the most effective way to use development assistance to counter terrorism?
- How can the West deal with NGOs that provide social services and contribute to the spread of radical ideologies?
- How can the U.S. and Europe encourage a reform agenda for education in Muslim countries?
- How can American and European policymakers be convinced to deal with long-term demographic challenges?
- How can the U.S. and Europe take steps to make sure that WMD stay out of the hands of radical Islamist groups?
- How can the U.S. and Europe (and others) breathe new life into the Middle East peace process?

**Chalk, Peter.** “Militant Islamic Extremism in Southeast Asia.” In *Terrorism and Violence in Southeast Asia: Transnational Challenges to States and Regional Stability*, ed. Paul J. Smith, 19-37. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2005.

*Source Type:* Book

*Topic Area(s):* International

***Key Points:***

Chalk focuses on Islamic extremism and terrorist activities occurring among several countries in Southeast Asia. He emphasizes the transnational links between the historical basis of many extremist and separatist groups operating in Southeast Asian countries and the exogenous groups from Central Asia and the Middle East, particularly al-Qaeda.

Chalk describes radicalization trends in specific countries, including:

- Southern Philippines: the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) has evolved from a separatist insurgency in Mindanao, and has had only murky connections with outside Islamist elements, mostly in the form of sharing its training camps with foreign operatives; in comparison, the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), which is also dedicated to establishing an independent Islamic state of Mindanao has shown strong links with outside Islamic extremists from its start, including providing support for terrorist operations outside of the Philippines including the aborted Operation Bojinka to destroy multiple U.S. commercial airlines flying trans-Pacific routes.
- Malaysia: while this country is known to contain Muslim extremist groups, they operate more diffusely than in the Philippines or Indonesia; until 2001, the activities of extremist elements, such as the Kumpulan Mujahideen Malaysia (KMM), a radicalized local movement, were closely linked with the Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS), the harder-line Islamic party within Malaysia.
- Indonesia: Islamic extremism in Indonesia emerged rapidly followed the overthrow of President Suharto in 1998, building on political stability and economic distress at the time; Indonesia has not only become host for jihadist groups (e.g., Laskar Jihad, Laskar Jundullah) that have engaged in anti-Christian violence starting in 2000, but also has given rise to the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) terrorist group.

**Chubin, Shahram. “Islam, Islamic Groupings, and the West.” In *Setting the 21st Century Security Agenda*, 83-86. International Relations and Security Network, 2003.**

**Source Type:** Think Tank (International)

**Topic Area(s):** International

**Web Link:** <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/pubs/ph/details.cfm?v33=60194&size51=10&id=415>

**Key Points:**

Chubin discusses that Islamism may actually be declining as a phenomenon because of its use of violence, failed politics, and lack of economic base. Radical Islam is driven by ideological and sectarian disputes that weaken it. It is very much a case of a clash within rather than between civilizations.

He notes that one of the problems Islam is facing is “its difficult encounter with modernization” and that this has “accentuated the crisis of identity.”

Regarding Islam in the West, Chubin notes writes, “Muslim communities in the West are characterized by a profound ambivalence. They admire the freedom of society, but are challenged by the need to retain or redefine their identity and achieve integration without loss of that identity.”

**Cilluffo, Frank and Gregory Saathoff. GWU Homeland Security Policy Institute, UVA Critical Incident Analysis Group. *Out of the Shadows: Getting Ahead of Prisoner Radicalization*: 2006.**

**Source Type:** Academic Research/Journal

**Topic Area(s):** Domestic, International, Gaps/Recommendations

**Web Link:** [http://hsgac.senate.gov/\\_files/091906Report.pdf](http://hsgac.senate.gov/_files/091906Report.pdf)

**Key Points:**

This report describes research conducted by a task force led by the George Washington University’s Homeland Security Policy Institute (HSPI) and the University of Virginia’s Critical Incident Analysis Group (CIAG). The task force’s purpose was to study the issue of radicalization and recruitment in U.S. prisons.

According to the report, the U.S has the world’s largest prison population (over two million, 93 percent of whom are in state and local prisons and jails) and the highest incarceration rate (701 out of every 100,000). This fact presents the possibility that every radicalized prisoner could become a terrorist recruit. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales recently stated that “[t]he threat of homegrown terrorist cells—radicalized online, in prisons, and in other groups of socially isolated souls—may be as dangerous as groups like al Qaeda, if not more so. They certainly present new challenges to detection.” The London transit bombings of 2005 and the Toronto terrorist plot of

2006, for example, illustrate the threat posed by a state's own radicalized citizens. By acting on international lessons learned, the U.S. may operate from a proactive position.

The report presents reasons why prisons can be considered an ideal environment for radicalization, including the high prevalence of individuals with the characteristics of typical terrorist recruits (e.g., young, unemployed, alienated, need for sense of self-importance, need to belong to a group, and need for protection); inmates have anti-social attitudes and need an outlet for their violence impulses; and many inmates have no prior exposure to Islam and therefore are vulnerable to extremist interpretation including the radical literature that is widespread in prisons.

Prison gangs may adopt "Jailhouse Islam" unique to prison that incorporates values of gang loyalty and violence. Other radical groups in prisons that may share some common ideological causes with radical Islam (e.g., hostility towards Israel) include right-wing extremists and cults; terrorists and criminal gangs have occasionally cooperated (e.g., the Madrid train bombings).

The spread of Muslim radicalization in U.S. prisons is linked to the following:

- A shortage of Muslim chaplains is due to a lack of organizations to administer a vetting process, and a reliance on non-vetted contractors and volunteers who are not required to have formal religious training.
- Standard policies for vetting religious providers at state and local levels are lacking.
- Half of prison religious services are unsupervised, run by inmates, and lack audio/video monitoring.
- Arabic language and script is used to communicate secretly and to transmit radical materials; also, extremist versions of the Qur'an are found in prisons.
- Tracking of former inmates and religious provider is lacking; providers dismissed from one facility may simply enter another.
- Radical groups with well-financed backers can offer substantial social and financial support to released prisoners.

The report describes efforts undertaken in California prisons to combat radicalization, including terrorism awareness courses; posting liaison officers at different prisons who meet monthly to share info; and the use of fusion centers to facilitate information sharing across federal, state, and local levels. Also described are efforts by the Federal Bureau of Prisons (FBOP) to address radicalization, including extensive questioning of religious service providers regarding their beliefs on violence, ties to and/or funding from foreign governments, willingness to provide services for all faiths; conducting rigorous background checks; involving Muslim chaplains in the screening process; requiring endorsement from national religious organizations; implementing best practices guidelines for approval of religious materials; mandating constant supervision of inmate-led groups; and requiring that Islamic materials be prepared by chaplains who are full-time FBOP staff. Lessons learned from Europe to control prison radicalization are also presented.

Key findings of the task force include:

- Radicalization is neither a recent phenomenon, nor unique to Islam.
- An inadequate number of Muslim religious service providers increases the risk of radicalization; the lack of social support and the inability to track inmates makes them vulnerable to recruitment.

- Information sharing between federal, state, and local prison systems is key; change has been made at the federal level but most prisoners are at state and local prisons.
- Limited manpower and funding hinder efforts to combat radicalization; the inability to follow up on leads uncovered in investigations is another obstacle.
- Radicalization is a global problem; thus, information sharing with other countries is important.
- Insufficient information about prisoner radicalization is available.
- Prison officials are stretched thin due to prison overcrowding.
- A multi-disciplinary approach to the problem is necessary; perspectives from religion, criminal justice, intelligence, law, and behavioral sciences are needed.
- Awareness, education, and training programs are needed for personnel working in prison, probation, and parole settings.
- A Congressional risk assessment is recommended.

**Coll, Steve. “How Are Young Muslims Radicalized on Domestic Soil?” *The New Yorker*, 5 June 2006.**

*Source Type:* Press Report

*Topic Areas(s):* Domestic, International

*Key Points:*

This article presents some of the findings from U.K. reports regarding radicalization, including:

- No consistent profile can be used to help identify who might be vulnerable to radicalization.
- Alienation from citizenship or family and a loss of faith in secular opportunity have created a pool of potential volunteers; preachers, recruiters, and al Qaeda leaders take it from there.

Coll describes Muslim sentiment in the United States through a poll conducted by Zogby International just before the last presidential election. Results showed that more than one third of American Muslims believe that the administration is waging a war on Islam. A similar number believe that “American society overall is disrespectful and intolerant toward Muslims” and more than half said that they knew someone who had suffered discrimination. A large number of America’s Muslim residents think that the United States is not safe for them.

About the international scene, Coll writes, “we remain concerned that across the whole of the counterterrorism community, the development of the home-grown threat and the radicalization of British citizens were not fully understood or applied to strategic thinking.”

Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff is quoted as saying that it is “very, very hard to detect” a jihadi terrorist who is “purely domestic, self-motivated, self-initiating.”

**Coolsaet, Rik.** “Radicalization and Europe's counter-terrorism strategy.” *The Transatlantic Dialogue on Terrorism - CSIS/Clingendael - The Hague*, 8-9 December 2005.

**Source Type:** Think Tank (International)

**Topic Area(s):** International

**Web Link:**

<http://pswserv1.ugent.be/rc/Nederlands/Artikels/IP/WatZwaarder/WZIN30%20CSIS%20081205%20Rev.pdf>

**Key Points:**

Coolsaet presents four distinct views of global Islamist insurgency:

- Many groups today are of al Qaeda design.
- Al Qaeda is at the center, with rings of less structured groups around it.
- The terrorist threat in Europe is a patchwork of self-radicalizing cells with international contact, without a central engine and without a central organizational design.
- Lone wolves also represent a threat.

He notes that individuals and groups are largely self-radicalizing and self-recruiting but held together by opportunistic links and casual contacts. The era of vertical and hierarchical terror organizations is largely over. “European security agencies have noted a growing tendency of self-radicalization and self-recruitment of individuals.”

A “glocal” phenomenon is described in which the core is local and but appearances are global.

Coolsaet also presents are common themes of discontent, feelings of injustice, disenchantment, questions of identity, frustration, dissatisfaction, social exclusion, alienation that young Muslims in migrant populations feel in Europe. Specifically, “second and third generation youngsters form the core of radical groups....some rapidly radicalize into self-declared local vanguards of the worldwide jihad, sometimes under the influence of a charismatic individual.” Radicals capitalize on anger and frustration and propose a simple answer—terrorism. Rigid interpretations of Islam provide a strict set of rules in times of rapid change and uncertainty.

The article also states that feeling like one belongs to a group and having symbols to identify with creates a “fertile breeding ground for political radicalization.”

**Coolsaet, Rik. *Between al-Andalus and a failing integration: Europe's pursuit of a long-term counterterrorism strategy in the post-al Qaeda era*. Royal Institute for International Relations (IRRI-KIB). Brussels, Belgium: Academia Press, May 2005.**

*Source Type:* Think Tank (International)

*Topic Area(s):* Domestic, International

*Web Link:* <http://www.irri-kiib.be/paperegm/ep5.pdf>

***Key Points:***

Coolsaet states that radicals today are local, self-sustained, technologically savvy, and generally unaffiliated with al Qaeda. He claims that terrorism and radicalization today are “glocal” phenomena—the core is local but the appearance is global. The root cause is the global environment, which creates a sense of solidarity among Muslim communities. Local root causes vary, depending on the continents and the countries involved, and have nothing to do with 9/11.

Other root causes identified include radicalization, regional conflicts, failed or failing states, globalization, socio-economic factors, alienation, propagation of an extremist world view, and systems of education. Coolsaet describes nodes where radicalization can take place, which include radical mosques, prisons, schools, neglected city districts, and Internet chat rooms. Charismatic leaders also play a role.

Coolsaet notes that youth chose the “easy way out,” projecting themselves as victims and radicalize themselves to be fighting for world-wide jihad. Self-radicalization is on the rise in Europe and is more important than recruiters. Those most susceptible in Europe are second- and third-generation Muslims, young, of north-African decent, and ages 15 to 18.

Coolsaet writes that second- and third-generation youngsters of North African descent are vulnerable because they lack positive identification. They are confronted with job and housing discrimination, despair, and feelings of exclusion. He discusses Tariq Ramadan who says radicals use an “unhealthy victim mentality,” which must be rejected by Muslims and Europeans. They create their own subculture and withdraw from family and friends not linked with their new associates. They embrace Islam as their new identity, not the Islam of their parents, but a more conservative Islam.

Europe finds it important to address the root causes of terrorism in addition to going after known terrorist groups and using military force. Coolsaet notes that European and American perceptions of the root causes are different. Europeans assume root causes are mainly local and have to do with domestic grievances that are main driving force behind their actions; the U.S. considers local groups “to be part of a global Islamist insurgency.” He writes that to be able to create a successful strategy to deal with local dynamics, the perception of a global formidable foe needs to be altered. There needs to be a counter-terrorism strategy that is repressive of terrorism but also promises long-term political involvement.

Coolsaet proposes a three-pronged approach:

- 1) Repress and prevent terrorist acts.
- 2) Tackle local root causes, both within the EU and worldwide.
- 3) Bridge a global perception gap.

So far, the EU and U.S. are focusing on the repression and prevention of terrorist acts.

Coolsaet suggest a number of more specific actions for countering terrorism:

- Provide immigration policies that work .
- Use social engineering to get groups to feel commonalities.
- Enhance education and multicultural awareness.
- De-dramatize the language of authorities and media. “It does make a huge difference if the reaction is a ‘declaration of war against Muslim terrorists’ or a condemnation of these incidents as the unacceptable behaviour of a small group of young thugs, whatever their origin may be.”

**Cozzens, Jeffrey. “Islamist Groups Develop New Recruiting Strategy.” *Jane's Intelligence Review* (1 February 2005).**

***Source Type:*** Press Report

***Topic Area(s):*** Domestic, International

***Web Link:*** [http://www.janes.com/security/international\\_security/news/jir/jir050121\\_1\\_n.shtml](http://www.janes.com/security/international_security/news/jir/jir050121_1_n.shtml)

***Key Points:***

Cozzens states that the use of passive (websites) and active (aimed at a specific group or individual) propaganda promotes people joining groups on their own volition instead of being recruited. The passive propaganda is targeting second- and third-generation youths in the West.

When recruitment by Islamists is through ideology alone or through networked channels, it is an attempt to coerce individuals to take part in or support violent jihad.

Cozzens notes that the strategic importance Western operatives and female operatives have had on jihadist cells. Conflicts are often framed in religious terms to try and garner support, and radicalization can take place in venues that help legitimize actions, such as prisons, revivalist meetings, or mosque study groups.

He notes a phenomenon termed “Group of Guys.” It describes a small group of disenfranchised male Muslims who emigrate to the West, establish friendships after meeting at a mosque or some other location, and seek to enlist others to jihad.

**Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS). *Women and Radicalization*. Working Paper, no. 5. Copenhagen, Denmark: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2006.**

*Source Type:* Think Tank (International)

*Topic Area(s):* International

*Web Link:* <http://www.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/WP2006/DIIS%20WP%202006-5.web.pdf>

***Key Points:***

This paper discusses the radicalization of women in Muslim societies and groups in Asia and Africa. DIIS notes that women who are vulnerable to radicalization include those who are poor, un- or under-educated, socially marginalized, and who have strong political grievances. Also susceptible are those who are related to or have close ties to radicalized men.

Women are brought into contact with transnational, Islamic extremism near home where they can be induced to join extremist circles through local pressures and incentives.

The DIIS suggests that Islamic feminism can inform the development of country-specific initiatives or interventions to prevent women from becoming involved in (or wean them away from) extremism, by:

- Supporting education for girls
- Providing work opportunities
- Providing legal literacy training and arenas for debate of gender and law
- Engaging local Muslim women leaders in education, cultural arenas, religious activities, and the media to promote women's empowerment
- Holding forums for public debate and examination of contentious issues
- Working with women in areas of political or armed conflict, or in zones of natural disasters

**Department of State, Office of Research. *British Muslims Derive Identity from Ethnic Background and Religion: Favorable Opinion of British Government Restored*. Opinion Analysis. Department of State, Office of Research, 15 June 2005.**

*Source Type:* Government (Domestic)

*Topic Area(s):* International

***Key Points:***

The Department of State information is based on data from face-to-face interviews with 500 Muslims above the age of 16 in Britain that were conducted in 2005.

Of the Muslims in Britain 9 out of 10 (89 percent) are citizens, but few feel that being British defines them. According to the 2001 census, more than 1.5 million Muslims live in England and Wales (3 percent of population). One third of British Muslims are born in Britain. The Muslim population consists of a broad mix of ethnic backgrounds, including Pakistani (45 percent), Bangladeshi, British, Indian, Turkish, and Nigerian.

Very few British Muslims obtain their identity from being British. Rather, religion (33 percent) and ethnic background (27 percent) give British Muslims their sense of identity. They are more likely to primarily identify with their ethnic background or religion than are Muslims in France, Germany, or Spain.

Most (84 percent) of British Muslims say it is best for Muslims to maintain a separate identity while integrating into the society in which they live. However, the British public would like to see more integration. Most British Muslims have a favorable overall view of Britain, but they cite discrimination and racism as top concerns. In fact, 6 of 10 say they have been the target of racism at least once.

The report states that “While the young (16 to 34 years of age) are slightly more comfortable than older generations with the idea of living in a multiethnic neighborhood and working with people of diverse backgrounds, they are also more inclined to favor socializing with people of similar backgrounds (65 percent) and to frown on interfaith dating and marriage (56 percent).”

**Department of State, Office of Research. *European Muslims Negative toward U.S.: Mixed Views on Participation in Iraq. Opinion Analysis. Department of State, Office of Research, 7 July 2005.***

**Source Type:** Government (Domestic)

**Topic Area(s):** International

**Key Points:**

This Department of State information is based on data from face-to-face interviews conducted in 2005 with Muslims in Britain, France, Spain, and Germany. An overview is provided of European Muslims’ views of the United States. Specifically, two thirds of British, German, and Spanish Muslims and three quarters of French Muslims hold a negative view of U.S. policies regarding the Middle East.

European Muslims believe that countries must work with other countries to combat terrorism. They are opposed to their countries participating militarily with Coalition forces in Iraq, but this does not indicate support for the insurgency.

**Department of State, Office of Research. *French Muslims Favor Integration into French Society: Two-Thirds Report Racist Experiences*. Opinion Analysis. Washington, DC: Department of State, 24 May 2005.**

*Source Type:* Government (Domestic)

*Topic Area(s):* International

***Key Points:***

The information from the Department of State is based on data from face-to-face interviews with 535 Muslims above the age of 16 in France that were conducted in 2005. According to the data, Muslims make up seven to eight percent (4 to 5 million people) of the population in France.

Results indicate that Muslims in France report that integrating into French society while maintaining a separate identity is best, but many say they have been discriminated against or treated with hostility because of ethnicity or religion. French Muslims have a generally favorable opinion of France and express confidence in public schools; three quarters say that relations between Muslim communities and the French are good, and one quarter say they are bad. The French public generally reports positive feelings toward ethnic minority groups. Most Muslims feel that France does not have equal opportunities in education and jobs, and many report experiencing racism or discrimination.

**Department of State, Office of Research. *German Muslims Feel Strong Ties to Germany and Countries of Origin: Want Greater Understanding and Acceptance*. Opinion Analysis. Washington, DC: Department of State, 24 May 2005.**

*Source Type:* Government (Domestic)

*Topic Area(s):* International

***Key Points:***

This information from the Department of State is based on data from face-to-face interviews with 524 Muslims above the age of 18 in Germany that were conducted in 2005.

According to the data, there are 3.2 million Muslims in Germany. Sizeable percentages feel ties to their countries of origin. Forty percent report holding German citizenship, but 37 percent report also holding another citizenship.

Results indicate that 84 percent of German Muslims have a favorable view of Germany, and 64 percent of German Muslims say that, in general, relations between Muslim communities and majority of Germans are good. However, 70 percent of the German public views ethnic relations as bad. Generally German Muslims favor integrating into German society either fully or while maintaining a separate identity, and majorities support full integration at school with respect to learning and using the German language. Thirty seven percent of German public feels that Muslims should fully integrate, while 54 percent feel they should integrate while maintaining a separate identity. Two thirds of German Muslims report having been object of racist or

discriminatory behavior, but they tend not to link it to 9/11 in the U.S. In fact, only one quarter say they have feel that they have been treated differently since 9/11.

**Department of State, Office of Research. *Spanish Muslims Do Not Feel Deeply Rooted in Spain: Muslims in Madrid More Dissatisfied than Others*. Opinion Analysis. Department of State, Office of Research, 11 October 2005.**

*Source Type:* Government (Domestic)

*Topic Area(s):* International

***Key Points:***

The information presented by the Department of State is based on data from face-to-face interviews with 503 Muslims above the age of 16 in Spain that were conducted in 2005. There are one million Muslims in Spain (1.5 to 2.5 percent of Spain's population) and are predominantly of Moroccan origin (Algerian, Syrian, and others); 22 percent are Spanish citizens and 79 percent are citizens of Morocco. One quarter of Spanish Muslims reside in Madrid.

Most Muslims in Spain support integration, but many more favor integrating while maintaining a separate identity. The Spanish public would like to see more integration of Muslims. Spanish Muslims are divided on whether ethnic relations in Spain are good or bad. In Madrid the ratings are higher for bad relations between Spanish Muslims and the general Spanish population. Racism and discrimination are a widespread concern, especially in Madrid.

Most Spanish Muslims name religion (25 percent) or ethnic background (23 percent) as what gives them a sense of identity, and 42 percent do not feel Spanish at all. These findings contrast with other European countries.

**Dittrich, Mirjam. *Muslims in Europe: Addressing the Challenges of Radicalization*. Working Paper No. 23. Brussels, Belgium: European Policy Centre (EPC), March 2006.**

*Source Type:* Think Tank (International)

*Topic Area(s):* International

*Web Link:* <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/pubs/ph/details.cfm?id=16979>

***Key Points:***

The EPC identifies a number of root causes of Muslim radicalism, including modernization, cultural, social, political dissatisfaction or exclusion, discrimination, bad immigration policies, and alienation of young people.

Dittrich notes that differentiation between causes (external and international), and background factors also can contribute to violent radicalization. External factors could be the issues regarding Iraq, Abu Ghraib, Israel-Palestine, and a variety of domestic topics such as integration policies.

Dittrich states that most Muslims are not radical but that “violent radicals are exploiting and misusing Islam as a framework for recruiting terrorists.” The “international dimension of terrorism has grown significantly, mostly as a consequence of globalization, the increasing use of mass media, the spread of international banking systems, and the cyber revolution.”

The paper describes Muslim population in a number of countries:

- Belgium: Four percent of the population is Muslim. The rate of Muslim unemployment is two times higher than the average Belgian citizen, in part because Muslims face employment discrimination, as well as discrimination in housing, public services, and police contact.
- France: Statistics on race and religion are not collected in France. Among the Muslim population high levels of unemployment, low levels of education, and widespread discrimination exist. Moreover, the Muslim community is not well integrated.
- Germany: Citizenship in Germany is now granted by birth. Approximately 160,000 new Muslims immigrate to or are born in Germany each year. Germany is enacting tough laws regarding immigration.
- Spain: The Muslim population in Spain is growing rapidly.
- The Netherlands: Of the population in the Netherlands, 5.7 percent is Muslim. While the country is usually considered liberal, the increase in Islamophobia and skepticism is blamed partly on failed integration policies.
- U.K.: The majority of Muslims in the U.K. are citizens, but do not feel like they are accepted as part of larger society.

Dittrich discusses a number of places where or ways in which radicalization can take place, including:

- Imams. Because most imams are “imported” from the Muslim world, young people not identify with their traditional teaching. There is a need for “homegrown” imams.
- Internet. The Internet is playing a key role in the radicalization of young Muslims for a variety of reasons. It creates a sense of belonging, the number of extremist websites has increased from 12 to 4,500 over the last eight years, and the sheer amount of web

propaganda and tech savvy of the extremists makes it hard to track websites or implement countermeasures.

- Radical mosques. Radical mosques attract young people from working class backgrounds who feel rejected by Western societies and are looking for a cause. Sometimes extremists withdraw from local mosques due to surveillance—they were expelled for their radical views, or they felt the imam was not radical enough. They choose to move to private meeting places that are harder to monitor. Many Muslims, even those who are moderate, worship in informal prayer rooms—hundreds of such “garage mosques” exist.
- State prisons have been identified as a potential recruiting ground, but the extent of the problem is unknown.

Dittrich proposes solutions to the problem of radicalization and terrorism by:

- Recognizing and discussing differences
- Addressing root causes
- Preventing, protecting, pursuing, and responding to problems
- Improving intelligence sharing and cooperation

The EU provides a framework for strategies, and Member States have to create and implement their own policies.

The author describes how EU measures counter radicalization:

- Disrupt activities of networks and individuals who draw people into terrorism through political dialogue and legal frameworks
- Ensure that voices of the mainstream prevail over extremists by engaging with Muslim organizations
- Encourage European imams
- Promote security, justice, democracy and opportunity for all

Finally, Dittrich describes the many factors to be addressed:

- Broadcast media
- Internet
- Education, youth engagement, citizenship
- Integration and dialogue
- Law enforcement and security authorities
- Expert networks
- External relations

**Emerson, Steven. *American jihad: The terrorists living among us*. New York: The Free Press, 2002.**

*Source Type:* Book

*Topic Area(s):* Domestic, International

*Key Points:*

Emerson examines the linkages between international terrorist groups and domestic cells/organizations using open source research and anecdotal cases to support his points. He discusses infiltration activities that are said to have occurred in the U.S., including recruitment, fund raising, and money laundering, networking, and direct organizing.

Three types of people who have infiltrated are identified—naturalized U.S. citizens (e.g., Wadih el-Hage who was convicted in the East Africa embassy bombings), illegal entrants (e.g., Abu Mezer who planned to bomb the New York subway), and U.S. residents (e.g., Khalil Ziyad who administered radical websites). Additionally, purported links to international terrorist groups are discussed, including the al-Kifah refugee center and al-Farooq mosque, both in Brooklyn and linked to al Qaeda, and a University of South Florida engineering professor, Sami al-Arian, of Palestinian origins with links to Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

**European Commission. *Addressing the factors contributing to violent radicalisation Communication*. Brussels, Belgium: Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Counsel, 9 September 2005.**

*Source Type:* Government (International)

*Topic Area(s):* Definitions, International, Gaps/Recommendations

*Web Link:* <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52005DC0313:EN:NOT>

*Key Points:*

This report discusses the factors that contribute to violent radicalization, including a threat from Islam, reasons for radicalization, and where radicalization is occurring.

The European Commission states that the main threat to Europe and the West comes from an abuse of Islam. The Commission believes “there is no such thing as ‘Islamic terrorism,’ nor ‘catholic’ nor ‘red’ terrorism...The fact that some individuals unscrupulously attempt to justify their crimes in the name of a religion or an ideology cannot be allowed in any way and to any extent whatsoever to cast a shadow upon such a religion or ideology.”

Although the threat from an abuse of Islam is relatively recent, Europe has a long history of fighting terrorism (e.g., ETA, IRA). The ideologies range from extreme right or left, anarchist, religious, or nationalist. Terrorist cells have been known to Europe before 11 March 04 bombings in Madrid and the 7 July 05 bombings in London.

The Commission states that today's threats are small scale organizations and groups across Member States that advocate radical beliefs or encourage young people to take social or political action against Islamophobia or perceived anti-Islamic politics of the West.

According to the Commission, those involved in radicalization may be European citizens whose motivations defy simplistic categorization. Those involved may or may not be socially-excluded, socio-economically disadvantaged, unemployed or living in deprived suburbs of large cities or inner-city housing estates, or from immigrant families.

The Commission discusses factors contributing to radicalization:

- On a broad level, some perceive injustice or exclusion, allowing them to fight under a common political, religious, national, or ethnic banner. With these group affiliations they can carry out acts of violence in the name of a cause.
- On an individual psychological level, some may feel discriminated against or may not feel accepted in society, and therefore are unwilling to identify with the values of the larger society.

The Commission says that people are exposed to new ideas through universities, the Internet, chat rooms, places of worship, political parties and organizations; and the media, including radio and satellite TV. These can help disseminate propaganda that contributes to violent radicalization, facilitates recruitment, and influences the way the public is informed.

The Commission also discusses the root causes of radicalization:

- An individual's negative feelings of exclusion exist alongside positive mobilizing feelings about becoming part of a group and taking action for change.
- Social factors such as exclusion—perceived or real—are often partial reasons given for becoming prone to radical opinion or joining radical movements. Others include feeling discriminated against, threatened identity, immigration, and globalization.
- Identity issues come into play because youth do not feel connected to the linguistic, religious, or political beliefs of their parents' generation or that of the host country.

The Commission also notes that some people, particularly young people from poorer, or excluded backgrounds, may feel a strong attraction for the "certainties" of extreme ideologies, although it is not only individuals in these categories who are found to have turned to violent radicalization.

According to the commission, the development and implementation of a European Strategy on violent radicalization will be a long-term effort. The immediate focus areas are broadcast media, the Internet, education, youth engagement, employment, social exclusion and integration issues, equal opportunities, and nondiscrimination and intercultural dialogue.

Member States have been studying the phenomenon of violent radicalization concentrating on recruitment hotspots like prisons, religious centers, and schools. The Commission believes Europe should draw on available expertise but at the same time not limit itself to it.

**Ford, Peter. "Fighting Terrorism One Word at a Time." *Christian Science Monitor*, (24 April 2006).**

*Source Type:* Press Report

*Topic Area(s):* Definitions, International

*Web Link:* <http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0424/p04s01-woeu.html>

*Key Points:*

Ford describes the European Union's approach to counter-terrorism as going beyond intelligence and law enforcement to deal with the "wider context" that can breed resentful terrorists.

He indicates that the European Union is attempting to not use words and phrases that could cause offense (e.g., "Islamic terrorism") in an effort to not "lump all Muslims in the same category."

**Frattoni, Franco. "Responses to the threat of terrorism and effects on communities." London: Speech at Conference sponsored by EU JHA Committees, 24 November 2005.**

*Source Type:* Government (International)

*Topic Area(s):* Definitions, International, Gaps/Recommendations

*Web Link:*

[http://europapoort.eerstekamer.nl/9310000/1/j9tvgajcovz8izf\\_j9vvgbwoimqf9iv/vgbwr4k8ocw2/f=/vh67or54zexu.pdf](http://europapoort.eerstekamer.nl/9310000/1/j9tvgajcovz8izf_j9vvgbwoimqf9iv/vgbwr4k8ocw2/f=/vh67or54zexu.pdf)

*Key Points:*

Frattoni discusses the action plan developed by the European Union (EU) for mitigating the factors that create fertile ground for radicalization. Involvement and interaction with minority communities is said to be a key part of the EU's plan.

The author defines "European citizenship" as a sense of belonging to European society and sharing its fundamental common values, as opposed to a feeling of separateness based on religion or immigration status. Frattoni says that European citizenship can be a confusing term, in that it is not referring to a legal status created to replace national citizenship, but rather a buzzword being used in the EU to describe the concept of common identity.

Frattoni explains that the European Commission has adopted a statement called "Terrorist Recruitment: Addressing the Factors Contributing to Violent Radicalization," which outlines initiatives in various areas that have been implemented to date, including:

- Broadcast media/Internet: prohibit programs that can incite hatred; removal of terrorist propaganda from the Internet.
- Education, youth engagement, and European citizenship: develop among youth an understanding of Europe's cultural diversity and common values; promote intercultural dialogue; promote concept of active "European citizenship."

- Integration, inter-cultural dialogue, and dialogue with religions: promote a sense of European identity, not just with immigrants, but also with second- and third-generation; support inter-religious dialogue through a network of representatives from different faith groups, as well as conferences and seminars; designate 2008 as the Year of Intercultural Dialogue.
- Law enforcement/security services: engage more at the local level with youth; exchange best practices of minority recruitment in police and security services.
- Expert networks: create a network of European experts to study the root causes and responses to violent radicalization.
- External relations: dialogue with countries that could serve as breeding grounds and training sites for terrorists.

Frattoni recommends that additional research is needed that looks into the root causes of violent radicalization.

**Gallis, Paul, Kristin Archick, Francis Miko and Steven Woehrel. *Muslims in Europe: Integration Policies in Selected Countries*. Congressional Research Service Report for Congress. The Library of Congress, 18 November 2005.**

*Source Type:* Government (Domestic)

*Topic Area(s):* International

*Web Link:* <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33166.pdf>

***Key Points:***

In this report, Gallis, Archick, Miko, and Woehrel describe the situation of Muslims in various European countries and discuss immigration issues and radicalization.

The CRS Report provides demographics for Muslims in Europe. Muslims are the largest minority in Europe. They are a diverse population, and Islam is the fastest growing religion. Part of what has led to a large Muslim population in Europe is immigration patterns, guest worker programs, and high birth rates are among Muslims.

The report cites that a disproportionately large number of Muslims in Europe are poor, unemployed, or imprisoned, and many feel a sense of cultural alienation and discrimination.

It reports that European countries do not feel that large parts of their Muslim populations are radical but that “there is a growing awareness that social deprivation, discrimination, and a sense of cultural alienation may make some European Muslims—especially those of the second and third generation—more vulnerable to extremist ideologies.”

The authors notes that “although the Commission acknowledges that the main terrorist threat stems from ‘an abusive interpretation of Islam,’ it stresses that its proposals also seek to address other extremist threats, such as those posed by right-wing skinheads or indigenous groups.”

The report notes that the EU aims to keep integration policies separate from counter-terrorism and counterradicalization efforts and will keep a balance between democratic ideals such as civil rights and liberties and combating Islamic extremism and recruitment.

The U.K. has traditionally had liberal immigration policies and a “multiculturalism” mindset instead of an assimilation mindset. It favors tolerance and integration while allowing immigrants to keep cultural identities and customs.

Demographics on the U.K. are as follows: It has 1.6 million Muslims mostly from Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India; 46 percent are British-born; Muslims have the youngest age profile of all religious groups; and they have three times more unemployment, lower economic activity rates, more under-qualified workers, higher rates living in deprived neighborhoods, disproportionately larger numbers in prison than the general British population.

The report discusses why young British Muslims may be radicalizing: they feel a sense of cultural alienation, disenfranchisement, and discrimination in a society that does not fully accept them. The recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq may be helping radicalize British Muslims.

Radicalization occurs in many places, including prisons, mosques, and universities. “Many Muslims who turn to extremism or engage in terrorism are well-educated, often with technical or professional qualifications.”

CRS offers that the U.K. is responding by:

- Revamping nationality laws to require citizen applicants to have a good grasp of English, British history, culture, and customs by passing a test or taking a class
- Supporting foreign “ministers of religion” so that imams will have English skills for their religious duties and for their duties as community leaders and counselors
- Improving dialogue with Muslims to aid integration to help them play a vital role in curbing Islamic extremism
- Conducting research through polls and surveys, as well as conducting outreach to mosques, youth and student groups, and community organizations
- Fostering “homegrown” imams who are more in tune with the community
- Addressing socio-economic disadvantages and discrimination to improve integration and decrease disaffection among youths

The U.K. does not have affirmative action but instead has strong anti-discrimination laws. Since 9/11 the U.K. has tightened security measures and is reforming laws regarding immigration and asylum. It is struggling to balance this with civil liberties. Some critics say that Britain’s “watchful tolerance” practices are not allowing deep insight into the problem and instead allowing radicals to incite hatred and violence.

The report provides information specific to France. France accepts multiculturalism but places high importance on public order and assimilation; it rejects quotas and affirmative action so to afford more quality of rights and opportunities; France does not keep stats on race, ethnicity, and religion, and business cannot ask about these areas.

The report also estimates that 10 percent of the population (6 million people) is of Muslim background, and most are from Algeria or Morocco, but many are also from Tunisia and the Middle East. Islam is second to Catholicism. About two million of France’s Muslims are citizens.

The authors discuss the widely held belief that France's Muslim community is not well assimilated. They have low educational rates and face employment discrimination. Muslims in France are not a coherent community but rather divided by traditions, lands of origin, and language.

Racist violence against Muslims has been rising in France, and extreme right-wing groups were responsible for most of these incidents. Anti-Semitic violence has also risen, which has generally been committed by young Muslims. The increase in such violence correlates to violence in the Middle East.

The report describes how France is responding:

- Over the past 25 years, France has been taking a more assertive role in addressing its Muslim population.
- France emphasizes dialogue and law enforcement for public safety.
- In 2003, it created the French Council for the Muslim Religion, a forum for discussion with government officials about building mosques, religious holiday observance, and food in prisons. This council does not represent all streams of Islam, nor is it seen as a vehicle for assimilation or integration because it does not address educational issues or youth group activities. It is a functional apparatus by which to include mainstream Muslims in government.
- France has banned conspicuous religious symbols at public schools.
- France is trying to appoint clerics who had been born or educated in France.

The report provides information specific to Germany. Germany has not been very successful in integrating or assimilating those who wish to stay permanently. In 2000, it changed its laws to allow citizenship by birth, but Germans still have strong national identity and consider those with ancestry more German. There is an annual quota on immigrants and there are mandatory German language, history and culture courses.

According to the report, approximately 7 million foreigners live in Germany, and 3.5 percent (3.3 million) of them are Muslims. Fifteen percent of Muslims in Germany are German citizens.

The report describes Muslim immigration into Germany. In the 1950s and 1960s, Germany brought in guest workers whom they expected to leave, so they did not have integration efforts. Many groups stayed in Germany but maintained their own cultural identity and communities and are today not well-integrated.

Most Muslims in Germany are seen as moderates (Turkish and Yugoslav Muslims have historically not been involved in radicalism), but "support for more radical Islamic views may be on the rise, especially among some younger Muslims." Germany is increasingly concerned about radical clerics who may be preaching in German Mosques. Most imams are "imported" so they are not familiar with the West and may even have hostile views of it.

The report notes a growing concern over the radicalization of many young Muslims who are motivated by pan-Islamic notions of Muslim humiliation around the world. It is within this group that Islamic terrorists are most likely to find sympathy.

As an example, the authors describe that three of the 9/11 hijackers lived in Hamburg and were able to take advantage of Germany's liberal asylum laws, privacy protections, and religious

freedoms. “Germany now sees radical Islamic terrorism as its primary security threat and itself as a potential target of attack.”

The report describes that Germany is responding by:

- Creating initiatives to increase dialogue with Islamic organizations, but differences among Muslim groups have hampered these efforts
- Incorporating religious Islamic courses into some schools’ religious courses
- Taking strides to resolve formal status of Muslims such as the citizenship law of 2000 and other immigration laws

Germany has made much less progress in trying to eliminate the de facto isolation of Muslims. Economic growth would aid progress in these areas by relieving a major source of economic tension.

Another part of the report provides information specific to Spain. The Spanish Prime Minister has increased resources for fighting terrorism but is emphasizing the assimilation of Muslims into Spanish society, rather than viewing them as possible security threats.

The exact number of Muslims in Spain is unknown due partly to substantial illegal immigration and the rapid growth of Muslim population in Spain. Additionally, the Muslim community in Spain is not viewed as a unified whole.

According to the CRS report, not enough mosques exist to accommodate the growing Muslim population and “Many Muslims in Spain worship in informal ‘garage mosques,’ headed by imams whose professional qualifications and political ideologies are unknown.” This makes monitoring of Mosques difficult. “Although it is concerned about the threat from the introduction of ultraconservative forms of Islam to Spain, the government is reluctant to fund mosques itself.”

The report provides a description of the bombers who targeted the rail system in Madrid, Spain on 3/11/04:

- First-generation immigrants
- Members of jihadist groups before coming to Spain
- A few were well-educated, but most were not
- Employed in construction, small business, or other typical immigrant jobs
- Some had no jobs, and used theft or other criminal activities to get money
- Most were 30 years of age and married

The report describes how Spain is responding:

- Pre-3/11 Muslims were seen as a problem having to do with immigration, but now people who have been in the country illegally for 6 months and are employed are eligible to become legalized for one-year residence and work permits.
- The government is working with Spain’s two major Islamic organizations to help foster integration.
- There is an emphasis to improve monitoring of jihadist activity in prisons, which were recruitment centers for Islamic extremists, and the dispersal of such prisoners to prevent them from working together.

- There is a challenge of integrating large numbers of Muslim and other immigrants into the educational system. Immigrant children face language barriers as well as poor education in former homeland. Spain has implemented bridge programs, tutoring, and counseling to better education.

**General Intelligence and Security Service of the Netherlands. *Recruitment for the Jihad in the Netherlands, From Incident to Trend*. Press Release. General Intelligence and Security Service of the Netherlands, 9 December 2002.**

**Source Type:** Government (International)

**Topic Area(s):** International

**Web Link:** <http://www.aivd.nl/contents/pages/2285/recruitmentbw.pdf>

**Key Points:**

The AIVD conducted a study on recruitment and radicalization in the Netherlands and concluded that the incidents of recruitment for the jihad taking place in the Netherlands are not isolated and are indicative of the “entrance of a violent radical Islamic movement in Dutch society.”

The AIVD discusses various stages and aspects of recruitment. They found that teens are the primary targets of recruitment, possibly due to the general interest and sympathy for the Islamist war against Israel and the West being wide spread among Islamic youths.

They suggest that recruitment in the Netherlands is occurring in mosques, through the Internet, and at other “spotting locations” such as coffee houses, prisons, and Islamic centers.

The AIVD identified the types of individuals who are joining radical movements in the Netherlands as:

- So-called converts
- Young immigrants
- Second- or third-generation Muslims with Dutch nationality (this group is most prevalent in the Netherlands)

The AIVD discusses the roles that parents can and cannot play in countering radicalization. They indicate that parents’ roles in countering radicalization might be limited because parents are often perceived by kids as having responded in a passive manner to political-cultural standards that are contrary to Islam.

**Haahr, Kathy. “Emerging Terrorist Trends in Spain’s Moroccan Communities.” *Terrorism Monitor* 4.9 (May 4, 2006): 1-3.**

*Source Type:* Think Tank (International)

*Topic Area(s):* International

*Web Link:* [http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?issue\\_id=3713](http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?issue_id=3713)

***Key Points:***

Haahr describes how the presence of radicals in the Spanish enclaves and in southern Spain could create a foothold for North African extremists to gain entry into Europe and, from there, to launch attacks on the U.S.

The author indicates that recent counter-terrorism operations in Spain have spotlighted an increasing presence of Salafi-Islamists and al Qaeda “loyalists” in Andalucía and, more alarmingly, in the Spanish autonomous communities of Ceuta and Melilla.

She describes Ceuta and Melilla, which are Spanish enclaves on the northern coast of Morocco. Each enclave has a population of approx 65,000, of which about 40 percent are Muslims. Until recently, there has been a relative absence of radical Islamic groups in the enclaves, but the presence of militants sympathetic to al Qaeda or the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) has been increasing. Demographics are in favor of Islamists; Muslims will be majority in both enclaves in 13 to 15 years from now.

Spanish authorities are said to have deployed counter-terrorism agents to the enclaves and cities in southern Spain to try to counter the radical Islamic groups.

**Jones, George. “Blair to curb human rights in war on terror.” U.K.: *Telegraph*, 8 June 2005.**

*Source Type:* Press Report

*Topic Area(s):* International, Gaps/Recommendations

***Web Link:***

<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/core/Content/displayPrintable.jhtml;jsessionid=A4OIN0B3XXXA3QFIQMGSFGGAVCBQWIV0?xml=/news/2005/08/06/nblair06.xml&site=5&page=0>

***Key Points:***

Jones states that Blair is “no longer prepared to allow Britain to be a haven for Muslim extremist whose presence in London has resulted in its being dubbed ‘Londonistan.’”

Blair has outlined 12 far-reaching curbs on civil liberties to tackle the growth of Islamic extremism, which include deportation laws to deport religious fanatics and extremists who abuse the tolerant policies in the U.K., and requirements for people who want to become citizens such as an oath of allegiance to the U.K., a citizenship ceremony, and requiring an adequate grasp of the English language.

**Kruglanski, Arie W. and Shira Fishman. “Terrorism Between ‘Syndrome’ and ‘Tool.’”**  
*Current Directions in Psychological Science* 15 (2006): 45-48.

**Source Type:** Academic Research/Journal

**Topic Area(s):** International, Models/Frameworks

**Web Link:**

<http://www.wam.umd.edu/~hannahk/SHORTENED%20DHS%20BOSTON%20TALK,%20APRIL%202013.doc>

**Key Points:**

Two psychological views of terrorism are described. One approaches it as a “syndrome” and the other views it as a “tool.” Implications of either or both approaches can be used to better understand the psychology of terrorism.

This article presents two major psychological approaches to terrorism including the “syndrome” perspective and the “tool” perspective.

- *A syndrome.* According to this view, a set of identifiable characteristics distinguish terrorists from nonterrorists. Pathological personality traits or motivations distinguish individuals, while a distinct organizational structure and evolutionary trajectory distinguishes terrorist groups from nonterrorist groups.

The article notes, however, that research appears to show little support for this approach. No empirical evidence shows a relationship between terrorism and any of the following: poverty, education, economic conditions, or political repression. Where poverty and oppression could be contributing factors to terrorism, so could a large variety of motivations, such as religious fervor, nationalistic zeal, quest for personal glory, or greed.

- *A tool.* This approach assumes little about the uniform properties of terrorists or terrorist organizations. It suggests that terrorism is an instrument, or immoral means, used by some groups to achieve their goals. As a tool, terrorism is an action available to countries, states, groups, and individuals.

The article suggests that several implications come from the “tool” view of terrorism. One is that a moral argument must be made to convince others to not use terrorism. The ends justifies the means is the basis of this view. Terrorists and their supporters may feel morally justified, and moral relativism is implicit in the “ends justifies the means” argument. One must decide which end is more important—for or against terrorism—which is influenced by psychological factors.

The tool view implies that to discourage terrorism, the perpetrator must be convinced that terrorism as a means is ineffective, that alternative and more effective means will better achieve his goals, and that terrorism hinders attainment of other important goals. One difficulty of discouraging terrorism is that it advances the perpetrator’s goals on many levels—ideological (political, religious, ethno-nationalistic) and emotional (inflicting pain and suffering on the enemy).

**Leiken, Robert S. “Europe’s Angry Muslims.” *Foreign Affairs* (July/August 2005).**

**Source Type:** Academic Research/Journal

**Topic Area(s):** Domestic, International

**Web Link:** <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20050701faessay84409/robert-s-leiken/europe-s-angry-muslims.html>

**Key Points:**

Leiken describes the spread of Islam across Europe among descendants of Muslim immigrants. He finds that most are disenfranchised and disillusioned by the failure of integration, and therefore some European Muslims have taken up jihad against the West. He discusses the implications for the United States. Leiken discusses the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s fear European or American jihadists coming from Western Europe.

He reports that the situation of Muslims in America is different from that of Muslims in Europe. Most who moved to Western Europe started arriving after WWII and crowding into small, culturally homogenous enclaves. Many are now citizens in name but not culturally or socially. Many young Muslims reject the minority status to which their parents acquiesced. He notes that the isolation of these communities obscures their inner workings, allowing mujahideen to fundraise, prepare, and recruit for jihad with a freedom not widely available in Muslim countries.

In contrast, in the U.S., Muslims are geographically diffuse, ethnically fragmented, and generally well off. He notes that “the footprint of Muslim immigrants in Europe is already more visible than that of the Hispanic population in the United States.”

Leiken states that Europe may be reaching a tipping point. “With the Muslim headscarf controversy raging in France, talk about the connection between asylum abuse and terrorism rising in the U.K., an immigration dispute threatening to tear Belgium apart, and the Dutch outrage over the van Gogh killing, Western Europe may now be reaching a tipping point.” He provides a description of the *van Gogh murder*.

Leiken describes two types of jihadists in Europe:

- Those from outside Europe (aliens, asylum seekers, students who gain refuge in liberal Europe from crackdowns against Islamists in Middle East, radical imams, and first-generation)
- Those from within (alienated citizens, second- or third-generation children of immigrants born in Europe)

The latter group is “the most dangerous incarnation of that staple of immigration literature” and has been termed “the revolt of the second generation.” There are also examples of what has been termed adversarial assimilation—integration into the host country’s adversarial culture.

Leiken notes that “another paradigmatic second-generation recruit” is the upwardly mobile young adult with university education who appears well integrated. Those who are educated provide the leadership, and those who are less educated provide the muscle.

According to this article, Europe has responded to the increasing problem of radicalization:

- The EU Member States have implemented a European arrest warrant allowing police to avoid lengthy extradition procedures.
- Europeans have come to see that permissive policies may be excessive, even dangerous, and are asking Muslims to practice religious tolerance themselves and adjust to the values of their host countries.

Leiken notes that varying policies in different countries have not prevented radicalization from occurring. “So far, it appears that absolute assimilation has failed in France, but so has segregation in Germany and multiculturalism in the Netherlands and United Kingdom...one may wonder whether the mixed U.S. approach—separating religion from politics without placing a wall between them, helping immigrants slowly adapt but allowing them relative cultural autonomy—could inspire Europeans to chart a new course between an increasingly hazardous multiculturalism and a naked secularism that estranges Muslims and other believers.”

**Marks, Alexandra. “Radical Islam finds US ‘sterile ground’: Home-grown terror cells are largely missing in action, a contrast to Europe’s situation.” *Christian Science Monitor* (23 October 2006).**

*Source Type:* Press Report

*Topic Area(s):* Domestic, International

*Web Link:* <http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/1023/p01s04-ussc.html>

*Key Points:*

Marks discusses aspects of the Muslim population and the situation in the United States and presents a picture of young Muslims in America. This picture is that they are young, educated, motivated, and integrated into society.

She finds that homegrown terror cells remain a concern for U.S., but that because planning appears unsophisticated and the numbers of homegrown cells are low, some security analysts have concluded that “America, for all its imperfections, is not fertile ground for producing jihadist terrorists.” The U.S. statistics on Muslims include the following: 95 percent of Muslim Americans are high school graduates, nearly 60 percent are college graduates, and Muslims are thriving economically around the country. (She took her data from a Zogby International survey 2004).

Regarding Europe, Marks notes that “the majority came to work in factory jobs and often from poorer areas at home...European Muslims today live primarily in isolated, low-income enclaves where opportunities for good jobs and a good education are limited.” Specifically, in Britain, two thirds of Muslims live in low-income households; three quarters of households are overcrowded; and the jobless rate is 15 percent in the overall Muslim community and 17.5 percent for young Muslims.

In contrast to Europe, most Muslim immigrants came to the U.S. for educational or business opportunities. Generally they come from educated, middle-class families in their country of

origin. However, the U.S. also has poor neighborhoods with large Muslim populations; they tend to be better assimilated into American society and are also interspersed with other ethnic groups.

According to young Muslims cited in Marks' article, "People come to this country [U.S.] and they like it. They don't view it as the belly of the beast. With very few exceptions, you don't see the bitter enclaves that you have in Europe." A terrorism expert in Washington, D.C. stated that "We don't have large populations of immigrants with a generation sitting around semi-employed and deeply frustrated. That's a gigantic difference." The resentments that can breed extremism, as seen in Europe, do not seem very evident in the Muslim community in the U.S.

Contrary to mosques in Europe, clerics in mosques in America fairly commonly preach assimilation. Marks also presents information on the following groups or individuals: Lackawanna 6; Iyman Farris, Shahawar Matin Siraj; Hamid and Umar Hayat; and the JIS at Folsom prison.

**Mili, Haydar. "Securing the Northern Front: Canada and the War on Terror (Part I)." *Terrorism Monitor* (15 July 2005).**

*Source Type:* Think Tank (Domestic)

*Topic Area(s):* International

*Web Link:* <http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369744>

***Key Points:***

In part one of a two-part series on Canada and the war on terror, Mili describes the terrorist threat in Canada, explaining that a network of terrorist cells, mostly with ties to North Africa, has existed in Canada since the late 1990s. He suggests that these cells not only threaten Canada, but the U.S. as well, because the cells can potentially serve as catalysts for radicalization on the northern border.

Article provides a description of existing networks in Canada, including the Kamal Network, the Montreal Cell, and the Second Circle.

Mili cites examples indicating that Canada is a terrorist target, including:

- Ressay admitted to planning a large bomb attack in a Montreal Jewish neighborhood
- An al Qaeda audiotape in November 2002 cited Canada as a target
- An al Qaeda military manual listed Canada as a Christian target

**Mili, Haydar. “Securing the Northern Front: Canada and the War on Terror (Part 2).” *Terrorism Monitor* 3.14 (15 July 2005): 4-6.**

*Source Type:* Think Tank (Domestic)

*Topic Area (s):* International

*Web Link:* <http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369755>

***Key Points:***

In part two of the two-part series on Canada and the war on terror, Mili continues to describe networks, mostly with ties to North Africa, that have existed in Canada and could potentially serve as catalysts for radicalization on the northern border of the United States.

Mili suggests that radicalization of second-generation Muslims is attributable to extremist imams who spread jihadist doctrine and serve as recruiters. He points to a particular mosque in Montreal, the Assuna Mosque, as being especially active in promoting radicalization.

**Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations / Central Intelligence and Security Service. *From Dawa to Jihad: The Various Threats from Radical Islam to the Democratic Legal Order*. Hague, Netherlands: Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations / Central Intelligence and Security Service, December 2004.**

*Source Type:* Government (International)

*Topic Area(s):* Definitions, International

*Web Link:* <http://www.aivd.nl/contents/pages/42345/fromdawatojihad.pdf>

***Key Points:***

This article discusses the importance of the democratic legal order as a starting point for an AIVD study of radical Islam, and radical Islam as a dynamic phenomenon that involves a variety of threats. It describes counterstrategies and resistance against the various threats from radical Islam.

This report provides definitions for the following terms:

- “Radicalisation is explicitly seen here as a (one-way) process and not as a state. In the description of the components of radicalism there is an obvious relationship with the term 'extremism'.”
- Radicalism: “The (active) pursuit of and/or support to far-reaching changes in society which may constitute a danger to (the continued existence of) the democratic legal order (aim), which may involve the use of undemocratic methods (means) that may harm the functioning of the democratic legal order (effect).”
- Ultra: an extraordinary or exaggerated form of a known, usually political capacity (compare ultra left-wing, ultra right-wing).
- Extreme: going to the limit. Description of groups operating on the fringe of the existing political spectrum.

- Extremism: “going as far as, pushing to the ultimate consequences.” In general political terms, extremism thus is a phenomenon that considers the extreme as acceptable or pursues the extreme in its aims and/or means. Within this context the extreme may mean violence—leading to death.
- Orthodox: strictly upholding a traditional (mostly religious) doctrine, in accordance with all the doctrine's precepts.
- Fundamentalist: orthodox, anti-liberal (usually religious) movement, with an anti-intellectual slant (no freedom of debate, no room for doubt).
- Militant: obviously a term with a military connotation; in general meaning combative and aggressive, within the boundaries of the law.
- Activist: the focus is on action, instead of on words. In principle, actions (campaigns) do not have to cause damage to property, but they may involve disturbance of the public order.
- Violent activist: involving damage to property, see also under *activist*, although this type of activism does not necessarily involve disturbing the public order.
- Terrorist: causing serious damage to property, thus disrupting social processes and/or committing or threatening violence targeted at human lives (from a political or religious objective) aimed at realizing social changes and/or influencing the political decision-making process within the context of the democratic legal order.

Democratic societies have a legal order, which is a system of rules and regulations prescribed and accepted by that society.

The AIVD suggests that three components of radicalization exist:

- 1) The pursuit of far-reaching economic, social, and political reforms of society
- 2) The acceptance of far-reaching personal or social consequences of this pursuit of far-reaching reforms
- 3) The pursuit of far-reaching reforms beyond moderate reformism, involving general uncompromising attitude and tendencies toward confrontation with those standing in the way

The report describes three types of radicalism:

- Antidemocratic, which is a nonacceptance of democratic government, where a different form of government is desired and one will use armed combat or insidious undermining techniques
- Undemocratic, which is a willingness to use undemocratic means to achieve an end (e.g., animal rights activism, political activism)
- Not intentionally antidemocratic or undemocratic, which include isolationism, exclusivism, and parallelism

The article identifies an alarming trend of recruitment for the armed radical Islamic struggle (jihad) among Dutch youth, in particular ethnic minorities in the Netherlands. It notes that “the spread of radical Islam and related terrorism, like the dissemination of Western ideas worldwide, is the expression of a trend towards globalization that has been developing for quite some time.” The common basis for many movements, organizations, and groups stems from the dissatisfaction about and resistance to the political, economic, and cultural dominance of the West which is shared by many Muslims.

The report contends that one may get an overestimation of threat if too much emphasis is placed on the ideological relationship between violent and non-violent forms of Islam. Nonviolent forms

can be a breeding ground for further radicalization or shelter for terrorists. Nonviolent forms are also harder to identify than acutely violent groups. However, violent radical Muslims increasingly make use of the rhetoric and means of the asymmetrical war.

The articles discuss three types of Islam: 1) radical political Islam, 2) radical Islamic Puritanism, and 3) radical Muslim nationalism.

Radical Islam is described as the “politico-religious pursuit of establishing—if necessary by extreme means—a society that reflects the perceived values from the original sources of Islam as purely as possible.” “Radical Islam consists of a multitude of movements, organisations and groups which show a certain affinity with one another, but which may also have very different ideological and strategic views.”

Dismantling al Qaeda's infrastructure facilities in Afghanistan as well the elimination or arrest of several of its foremost leaders has resulted in fragmentation of al Qaeda. As a result, its actual strength and organizational powers have been reduced. This has caused a decentralization of international Islamic terrorism. There are no longer any global networks controlled by a central al Qaeda leadership. Instead, local networks have emerged, which are related on the basis of a common al Qaeda ideology, rather than by organizational ties. Within the local networks, in particular in the Western world (especially in Europe), al Qaeda's ideology is interpreted in an even more extremist way than by al Qaeda's leadership.

The AIVD states that “terrorism is the ultimate consequence of a development starting with radicalization processes.” A number of counterstrategies are highlighted to include:

- Provision of information to government bodies and the public
- Cooperation with moderate forces
- Promotion of competitive views
- Identity development
- Stimulation of positive role models
- Encouragement of the emancipation of women
- Education
- Political-administrative measures
- Media coverage
- Financial investigation
- Continuous testing against the Penal Code of possible cases of discrimination or incitement of hatred and rebellion
- Cooperation with governments of motherland countries
- Socio-economic factors
- Dialogue between the civil society and moderate forces in the Muslim communities
- Cooperation between intelligence and security services, judicial authorities, police, and others
- Arrests
- Infiltration, frustration, obstruction
- Security and protection
- Sensibilisation

**Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations. *Violent Jihad in the Netherlands: Current trends in the Islamic terrorist threat.* General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD), March 2006.**

**Source Type:** Government (International)

**Topic Area(s):** Definitions, International

**Web Link:**

[http://english.nctb.nl/Images/Violent%20jihad%20in%20the%20Netherlands%202006\\_tcm127-112471.pdf](http://english.nctb.nl/Images/Violent%20jihad%20in%20the%20Netherlands%202006_tcm127-112471.pdf)

**Key Points:**

This report discusses the current and increasing threat of homegrown jihadist networks in the Netherlands. It notes that the principal causes of the increase in these types of networks are radicalization and recruitment.

The AIVD provides definitions for the following terms:

- Islamism: radical movement within Islam which pursues the realization of a society that reflects their perception of the original sources of Islam, the Koran and Sunnah
- Jihadist: extremist Islamists who propagate violence against perceived enemies of Islam to effect social and political change that accords with their radical religious ideals
- Radicalization: a growing readiness to pursue and/or support—if necessary by undemocratic means—far-reaching changes in society that conflict with, or pose a threat to, the democratic order
- Mobilization to violence: aka jihadisation. Small numbers leap from radicalism to extremism

The report notes that radicalization can jeopardize social cohesion and solidarity, create polarization, and, in the long term, threaten the democratic order. It finds that some youth perceive violent jihad as positive and “cool.”

It contains information on the Theo van Gogh murder and resultant problems. In the Netherlands “personal struggle against concrete political ‘enemies of Islam’ appears to play a more prominent role in the Netherlands than in Madrid and London, where the attackers hit the West as an abstract symbol of oppression.” The attraction of radical Islam for young Muslims seems to have grown after the van Gogh murder.

The AIVD discusses the role of jihad networks. Specific to the Netherlands is the development of networks in three historical phases—traditional, proliferation and homegrown. Today they are involved in the support, preparation, and commission of terrorist operations. Today they lack the hierarchical structure and have an informal, flexible membership. Personal ties bind networks together and are based on shared political-religious ideology, trust, friendship, ties to country of origin, shared experiences, and a common enemy.

Decentralization has occurred where there has been a shift from central operational control to local autonomy and a further expansion of operating area. Additionally, transnational networks help with coordination, recruitment and dissemination of radical ideology.

The AIVD notes that individuals get extremist ideology through Internet and other local influences and then adapt it to a European context. Mosques, imams, Islamic organizations, and jihad networks also influence and recruit young Muslims. A growing tendency for young Muslims to radicalize on their own initiative has been noted—this is a spontaneous, interactive, and largely autonomous process. The core of radicalized youth is probably small in Netherlands, around several hundred people and 10 to 20 loose-knit jihad networks.

The socio-political context, which is driven by religious, political, and social issues, is discussed. Feelings of discontent and frustration are expressed and people believe that the *umma* is being oppressed and persecuted. This fuels feelings of anger, powerlessness and humiliation. A victim complex develops and conspiratorial thinking blames all problems on external factors and “others,” and thus they turn their back on society.

The article discusses the process of radicalization as beginning with youth taking classes at centers or mosques and then looking for new teachers because the courses are insufficient. Many times they have “living-room meetings” and charismatic leaders as inspiration. Websites enable propagators to spread messages to wide audiences and recruit individuals, which may help form local networks. Social relations play a large role in formation of local networks, which are made up of friends and family members.

According to the AIVD, certain indicators are seen among young people going through jihadisation. Certain group processes have elements in common with processes with isolated religious sects. These include:

- Increasing isolation
- Loss of independence
- Fixation on cult figures or other heroes or inspirational leaders
- Possible intimidation

“These processes result in a collective ideology of personal violence. Political goals are often vague or absent.”

The report discusses the influence of the Internet. It spreads messages, stimulates and accelerates emergence of real and virtual networks, is cheap, fast, and easily accessible, is an easy place to meet like-minded people and feel accepted into a community. It gives a sense of self: “I chat, therefore I exist.” There is a lack of censorship on the Internet and this means that there is possibly no way for a person to separate facts from fiction, and the line between real and virtual becomes blurred. “The purely virtual world is replacing the real world, as a consequence of which individuals become isolated from the surrounding society and turn against it, initially ideologically, but at a later stage possibly violently. This affects social cohesion and enables radicalised persons to more easily make the leap to the use of violence.”

Before and after 9/11, the threat to Europe came mostly from abroad, but after 9/11, the threat has been fueled mainly by local development and initiatives. Western Europe (and the Netherlands) is confronted with an increasing number of radicalized, potentially violent, homegrown Muslims. Their motives can be explained partly by growing dissatisfaction with the status of Islam and Muslims in Europe among Islamic populations groups and among young Muslims in particular.

Young Muslims believe that “domestic culture in the Netherlands is also negatively disposed towards Islam.” A significant number of young Muslims are dissatisfied with their own positions in society because unemployment and discrimination are problems in Dutch society, especially for those from a Moroccan background. Also, they face low education levels and often live in deprived urban areas. Young Muslims may isolate themselves and/or resort to violence to vent their frustrations. Even young Muslims with average to high educational levels may be discontent and feel “relative deprivation.”

The AIVD relates that several psychosocial factors have been identified. They include “local radical networks in the Netherlands [that] consist mainly of young Dutch Muslims with a Moroccan background who are – often triggered by personal circumstances, thwarted ambitions or peer pressure – in search of identity and status in Dutch society.” Smaller populations of second-generation Turkish, Bosnian and Pakistani immigrant communities go through a similar process, but on smaller scale than Moroccans.

Young Muslims do not feel affiliation with the Islamic culture of their parents or the culture of European society. They feel hurt and resentful and therefore adopt an identity profile by which they react against parents who are considered too passive and submissive as well as against dominant society. Sometimes this is termed a *deculturalization process* where they feel trapped between two cultures because of a failure to integrate and alienation from traditional culture.

A list of demographics of those radicalizing in the Netherlands is included:

- Young Muslims, 16 to 25 years of age, of Moroccan background but born or raised in the Netherlands
- Younger generations connected to local networks while the first-generation connected to international networks
- Most adhere to nonviolent form of Islam, but some choose violent jihad
- Muslim oppression around the world is an inspiration or source of anger
- A recent development is women joining local jihad networks

The AIVD notes that “how or when this jihadisation is triggered cannot always be detected in time. As a consequence, we are sometimes suddenly confronted by groups and individuals who engage in violence without any visible preceding recruitment process.” Threats can develop in a short period because of the interaction between local and international networks and the intensity of the radicalization process.

The report states that young Dutch Muslims, the children or grandchildren of migrants from Islamic countries, are increasingly susceptible to radicalization and jihadisation. This susceptibility can be explained by a combination of religious, socio-political, cultural and socio-psychological factors such as fixation on puritanical Islam, anger and frustration about status of Muslims and Islam, and an identity crisis.

The AIVD states that “at present we apparently find ourselves at a crucial point in the development of jihadism in Europe. The jihadist threat might diminish considerably if we succeed in reversing the trend of local radicalisation and jihadisation which causes the current growth in jihadist networks in Europe.”

The AIVD questions whether, because of the young age of a substantial number of members of local jihadist networks, their behavior could not be simply explained as “normal” adolescent behavior? Is the threat from adolescents really very high? However, the issue, they also state, with this idea is that generally adolescent behavior does not lead to life-threatening violence or terrorism.

The report discusses what could be done to curb radicalization:

- Stop representing al Qaeda as an omnipresent unassailable adversary
- Pursue an effective national counter-terrorism policy
- Monitor processes of radicalization, recruitment, and network formation on the Internet because it has become an increasingly important medium for terrorists. This should be done to gain insight into new threats and to thwart preparatory activities for possible attacks at the earliest possible stage
- Take a broad approach and have wide-ranging and detailed assessments of threat from Islamic terrorism
- Consider individual and social processes as well as background factors, and pay attention to psychological aspects

**Moore, Cerwyn & al-Shishani, Batal. “The Jihadist Movement After London: Diverse Backgrounds, Common Ideology.” *Terrorism Monitor* 3.15 (28 July 2005): 4-6.**

**Source Type:** Think Tank (Domestic)

**Topic Area(s):** International

**Web Link:** <http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369754>

**Key Points:**

The authors suggest that a “new generation” of terrorists is being bred whose path to radicalization and violence is based more on transnational issues than local conditions. They point to the Casablanca attacks in 2003 as having signified the emergence of a new generation of Salafi-Jihadi cells that draw on different networks from those directly associated with al Qaeda.

Moore and al Shishani point to three factors that they believe are compounding the existing threat, including:

- 1) New tactics, including the failure to immediately claim responsibility, and the use of homegrown terrorists
- 2) The importance of networks in aiding transnational movement and recruiting through appeals to nonterritorial forms of identity
- 3) Connections with North African militants, rather than al Qaeda

They suggest that prior to the 7 July 2005 London bombings, the focus was on Afghan/Taliban veterans with direct links to al Qaeda. According to the authors, since then, there has been a realization that a new threat has emerged, including Salafi-Jihadis who are not members of a recognized network nor tied to a specific country.

Authors indicate that several countries have ties to Salafists from North Africa, including Spain, the U.K. (links with North African Salafists for technical and logistical support), and Iraq (1 in 4 foreign insurgents reportedly from Morocco or other North African country).

They point out two trends in the current jihadist movement, including 1) militants are being produced everywhere there is a conflict between a regime and radicalized Muslims; and 2) attacks are no longer followed by immediate and unequivocal claims of responsibility, probably because perpetrators do not owe allegiance to a single, organized network such as al Qaeda.

**Munthe, Teri. “Terrorism: Not Who But Why?” *RUSI Journal* 150.4 (1 August 2005).**

**Source Type:** Think Tank (International)

**Topic Area(s):** International, Models/Frameworks, Gaps/Recommendations

**Web Link:**

<http://www.opendemocracy.net/debates/article.jsp?id=2&debateId=124&articleId=2692>

**Key Points:**

Munthe suggests that, to understand radicalization, we must understand its terms: “If we can’t ask ‘Who?’ then we must ask ‘Why?’ The way we answer that question will determine our policy approach.”

Munthe presents three frameworks—religious, cultural, and political—that are frequently used to explain radicalization; he suggests the flaws of each and provides a “cocktail” in exchange.

According to Munthe:

- The religious framework suggests that jihadism is the truthful expression of Islam; implicit in this is an “inevitable and perfectly natural conflict between Islam and the West...the evil ‘other’ and clash of the civilizations.” Being modern means one is a bad Muslim; value schemes are different, with the issue of women most often cited.
- The culture framework argues that jihadism expresses a profound cultural malaise in the Muslim world; jihadism is symbolic of a massive identity-breakdown. “Multi-culturalizing” is suggested to encourage dialogues of civilizations, coming up with alternative “universalisms” which establish a core of shared values.
- The political framework argues that jihadism is due to political suffering and injustice; the main culprit is the West, which has exploited the natural resources of the Middle East to further its own growth; the West, particularly the U.S., is ultimately responsible for the continued humiliation of Palestinians and is the “ultimate tormentor” of the region; this framework is most current in Europe and most common in the Middle East and North Africa. Reform is encouraged both within and outside the Muslim world.

Munthe suggests that radicalization, Islamism, and jihadism in the Middle East are responses to three kinds of oppression or occupation, including:

- Occupation of the domestic political sphere (exclusion from the sphere of participatory politics forced ‘perfectly reasonable opposition movements towards violence)
- Occupation of territory

- Occupation of global sphere of dominance (U.S. military bases in Gulf, exploitation of natural resources, Western exploitation vs. partnership)

The author suggests that the radicalization process follows different patterns in different parts of the world and, therefore, source materials should address the areas being studied; for example, French studies have used data from the West and Western Muslim countries, where the radicalization process may be very different.

Munthe proposes that a combination of political, cultural, and doctrinal approaches will work to tackle the radicalization problem: “Start with Politics, then add Culture, and finally—though it sounds dangerously politically incorrect—throw a little Islam into the mix.”

**Novikov, Evgenii. “The World Muslim League: Agent of Wahhabi Propagation in Europe.” *Terrorism Monitor* 3.9 (6 May 2005).**

**Source Type:** Think Tank (Domestic)

**Topic Area(s):** International

**Web Link:** <http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369686>

**Key Points:**

According to Novikov, the website for the Muslim World League (WML), an organization funded by the Saudi government, indicates that Wahhabi clerics are increasingly targeting Europe as an ideological recruiting ground. The WML was created in 1962 in Mecca and in due course became a primary tool for disseminating Wahhabi ideology worldwide.

Novikov notes that between 13 and 20 million Muslims are now living in the European Union and significant portions of this population are alienated and therefore susceptible to radicalization. The WML has been paying special attention to Europe because it is considered a promising area for further Islamization.

The author notes that Wahhabi missionaries and propagandists expend a lot of energy in accessing and indoctrinating young people because youths now make up the majority of the Muslim population of Europe.

Novikov notes that European imams should work and establish links with local organizations, governmental bodies, research centers, and with all segments of the local population in order to promote the Islamic “mission” in Europe.

**Powers, Bill. “Generation Jihad: Rootless and restive young Muslims in Europe are increasingly turning to religious extremism. An inside look at the threat of homegrown militants.” *Time*, (3 October 2005).**

*Source Type:* Press Report

*Topic Area(s):* International

*Web Link:* <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1109334,00.html>

***Key Points:***

Powers discusses a variety of issues related to the radicalization of young Muslims in Europe. He quotes counter-terrorism officials as saying that the number of radicals in Europe is growing.

He describes “Generation Jihad” in Europe as being frustrated with a perceived scarcity of opportunity and disappointment at public policies that they believe target Muslims unfairly; some lack a sense of belonging to European societies; they suffer disproportionately from Europe’s high-unemployment, slow-growth economies; some are outraged over the bloodshed in Iraq and the persistent notion that the West is waging a war on Islam: “rootlessness compounded by economic struggle.”

A French law was instituted in 2004 banning “conspicuous religious symbols” from public schools, including head scarves. He also points to a French police estimate in 2004 that found that 150 of the country’s indexed 1,600 mosques and prayer halls were under the control of extremist elements.

He describes the U.K. as having a zero-tolerance policy toward hateful rhetoric and will deport clerics who are believed to incite violence. He indicates that some moderates fear policies like this could help to further estrange young Muslims.

The Internet is described as helping to make training and indoctrination possible without leaving home and contributing to furthering a sense of community among radicals. Powers suggests that European counter-terrorism officials are concerned that policies being pursued by the U.S. and its allies in response to the terrorist threat might actually be helping to further galvanize the radicals.

**Rabasa, Angel M. *Political Islam in Southeast Asia: Moderates, Radicals and Terrorists*. Adelphi Paper 358. International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), May 2003.**

*Source Type:* Think Tank (International)

*Topic Area(s):* International

***Key Points:***

Rabasa assesses trends in the Southeast Asian Islamic community with particular attention to the upsurge in Islamic self-awareness and political activism in the Muslim world, which has resulted in not only greater “religiosity,” but in some cases, political extremism and a propensity for violence.

The article offers an analysis of the international experience with competing political forces for Islamic radicalization and moderation among key countries in Southeast Asia with large Muslim populations.

Rabasa reviews external and internal sources of Islamic radicalism through a series of case studies, providing trends in key Southeast Asia countries, including Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, and Thailand.

Factors contributing to the rise of Islamic radicalism among the Muslim populations in Southeast Asia include:

- External factors: globalization and the intrusion of Western culture, the catalyst of specific events (e.g., Islamic revolution in Iran, the Afghan war against the Soviets, the spread of Islamic fundamentalism, particularly of the Saudi Wahhabi variant, spread of madrassas and social welfare organizations)
- Internal factors: the deterioration of economic and social conditions in Southeast Asia after the 1997-1998 economic crisis, and the consequent weakening of state authority (e.g., Suharto’s resignation in Indonesia in 1998), the rise of radical militias and armed vigilante groups with secular associations, and the growth of resurgence of separatist movements (e.g., Muslim separates in the southern Philippines and in southern Thailand)

Rabasa considers factors in Southeast Asia that inhibit Islamic radicalism, including: cultural diversity among countries has long traditions of coexisting with substantial non-Muslim communities; diversity of Islamic views that includes “modernists” who are more willing to adjust Islamic law (*sharia*) to current conditions and to work within the political process through secular parties.

Also, governments have been reluctant in several South Asia countries to recognize and take strong actions against militant and violent forms of Islamic radicalism before indisputable terrorist behavior was evident; examples include:

- Indonesia: the rise of Islamic radicalism was encouraged by the weak governance and economic and social stress of the Asian economic crisis; militant Islamic factions grew rapidly and pursued jihad through sectarian violence with Christian communities in eastern Indonesia, as well as gave rise to the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) terrorist group that has ties to al Qaeda; the JI links to the Bali bombing (2002) finally prompted the Indonesian government to crack down on extremists and terrorists. This growing radicalization was encouraged by the limited appeal of moderate political Islam, including political parties, within Indonesia.

- Malaysia: among the countries of Southeast Asia, Malaysia is distinctive in identifying itself as an Islamic country, which has fostered an internal political competition between the domestic UMNO party and the Islamic fundamentalist opposition party, the PAS; the post-9/11 environment has substantially changed the Malaysian political environment and resulted in the flow of moderate Muslims and non-Muslims back into the ruling coalition and marginalized the more hard-line PAS party, which was linked to a fledgling terrorist group (Kumpulan Militant Malaysia), and government actions to increase supervision on private Islamic schools.
- Singapore: having a Muslim minority population with a predominantly Chinese population, it has been careful to encourage a national identity independent of religion and ethnicity while responding seriously to the post-9/11 evidence that al-Qaeda and JI terrorist attacks were planned against national and Western targets in Singapore.
- Philippines: Islamic radicalism in the Philippines is closely associated with the long-standing discontent of Muslim minorities in Mindanao, which have fostered a separatist movement. Muslim society there has been challenged by external government policies and a large-scale Christian immigration. These conditions have encouraged a continuing insurgency involving the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), and a more radical faction, the Abu Sayyaf, that engage in terrorist actions and has been associated with al-Qaeda. Efforts at national reconciliation continue.
- Thailand (as of 2003): Muslim separatism, in the form of Muslim separatist groups in southern Thailand, have engaged in armed resistance to the government. They appear to be waning although it is still too early to conclude that armed separatism is at an end in southern Thailand.

**Rabasa, Angel M. *The Causes of the Radicalization of the Muslim Communities in Southeast Asia*. RAND Corporation.**

**Source Type:** Think Tank (Domestic)

**Topic Area(s):** International, Gaps/Recommendations

**Web Link:** [http://www.kaf.ph/pdfdb//109\\_pub.pdf](http://www.kaf.ph/pdfdb//109_pub.pdf)

**Key Points:**

Rabasa discusses how the process of radicalization in the Muslim communities of Southeast Asia is accelerating. External and internal factors have been catalysts for radicalization and violent extremism in Southeast Asia. The beginnings of radicalization were already present and this process was catalyzed by the worldwide Islamic revival in its Salafi and Wahhabi manifestations.

Rabasa notes that violent extremism and radicalization are separate but related—stages of radicalization are non-violent but have potential to lead to violence. While not all extremist groups are violent, they can still propagate ideologies that create conditions for violence. Additionally, a “propensity for violence is certainly a defining characteristic of the most extreme segment of the radical spectrum.” He notes that “violent extremism and the radicalization of the Muslim communities are recent phenomena.”

Individuals recruited to Salafi decide that mentors are not Islamic enough and move onto more extreme or violent groups. “This progression from religious radicalism to violent extremism is made possible by the absence of firewalls between mainstream Islam and radicals and violent extremists.”

The author notes that extremists cloak themselves in the language of religion. Radicals are a minority but have developed extensive networks across and past the Muslim world; liberal and moderate Muslims have not created similar networks.

Rabasa discusses various recruitment nodes, which include mosques, Islamic study circles, schools, universities, youth organizations, health and welfare organizations, charities, and other social clusters.

Rabasa claims that “only Muslims themselves can effectively challenge the message of radicals” but that others can empower that community. A strong international network of moderate Muslims must be created.

**Ramakrishna, Kumar. “Indoctrination Processes within Jemaah Islamiyah.” In *The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training, and Root Causes, Volume Two, Training*, ed. James J.F. Forrest, 211-224. Westport, CN: Praeger Security International, 2006.**

*Source Type:* Book

*Topic Area(s):* International

*Key Points:*

In Chapter 13 of *The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training, and Root Causes (Volume 2, Training)*, Ramakrishna examines the processes used by the Indonesia-based Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) terrorist group to indoctrinate new militants. The chapter highlights the social and psychological processes that the JI terrorist group employs to encourage terrorist recruitment by fostering an “us-versus-them” mentality.

According to Ramakrishna, the JI relies on three intersecting processes to radicalize potential recruits into becoming terrorists:

- 1) Radical Islamist ideology: the potential recruits of the JI, who are already drawn to the Islamic fundamentalism that underlies the activities of the JI, are given exposure to al Qaeda’s ideology of engaging in the “Salafi Jihad” against the “near enemy” in the form of the Indonesian state; JI members with experience in the Afghan jihad played important roles in shaping the JI’s connection to the al Qaeda’s global vision of jihad.
- 2) Psychological programming: JI relies on a broader social psychological process to reinforce the acceptance of its militant ideology among JI recruits by fostering prejudice, bigotry, and hatred, particularly of non-Muslims and Westerners.

- 3) Isolated “in-group space”: Another important element for conducting both ideological and psychological programming with maximum efficiency is isolation of the JI recruits into a clearly defined and sharply demarcated in-group space where group welfare becomes more important than individual identities and welfare; deliberate in-group isolation helps to nurture and legitimize out-group hatred; hatred is encouraged through the use of atrocity propaganda in the form of homemade video compact disks.

**RAND National Security Research Division. *A Future for the Young: Options for Helping Middle Eastern Youth Escape the Trap of Radicalization*. RAND Working Paper, WR-354. RAND National Security Research Division, September 2005.**

**Source Type:** Think Tank (Domestic)

**Topic Area(s):** International, Gaps/Recommendations

**Web Link:** [http://www.rand.org/pubs/working\\_papers/2006/RAND\\_WR354.pdf](http://www.rand.org/pubs/working_papers/2006/RAND_WR354.pdf)

**Key Points:**

RAND’s Center for Middle East Public Policy and the Initiative for Middle East Youth (IMEY) sponsored a workshop in late September 2005 to address reasons why young people join Jihadist groups and possible prevention or disengagement approaches. At the initiative of Dr. Cheryl Benard, Director of IMEY, specialists from the U. S., Europe, Afghanistan, and Iraq were invited to attend, present, and discuss their findings. Participants came to the following conclusions:

- No framework exists to properly understand terrorism. A new analytical framework should be developed to help researchers understand terrorism, taking into account its complexity.
- Insufficient research exists on the developmental process of becoming a terrorist.
- Attempts to generalize and create templates for terrorism should be discouraged because each terrorist group is specific to its time and location.

Participants made recommendations for addressing the gaps of disengagement from terrorist groups, including:

- Mapping out the process of recruitment, participation, and disengagement in an attempt to understand the role of the individual, organizational dynamics, and relationship of the group with its government during each stage
- Studying the nature of discourse used to disengage members from groups
- Identifying the contexts in which disengagement processes may emerge or be accepted
- Engaging in case studies of disengagement from individual groups and then comparing across groups

**Richards, Alan. *Socio-economic roots of radicalism? Towards explaining the appeal of Islamic radicals*. Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) of the U.S. Army War College, July 2003.**

*Source Type:* Government (Domestic)

*Topic Area(s):* Domestic, International, Gaps/Recommendations

*Web Link:* <https://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/PUB105.pdf>

***Key Points:***

This monograph examines links between radicalism and a series of crises associated with modernization in the Islamic World. Richards conducts a demographic analysis of the Middle East and North Africa, finding that high unemployment and increasing poverty, among other forces, have alienated large sectors of the Muslim youth. He argues that “radicalism is a political response to the deepening economic, social, political, and cultural crisis in the Muslim world,” concluding that there are no easy solutions and current U.S. policies do little to ameliorate Mid-East conditions.

**Rotella, Sebastian. “Al-Qaeda’s Stealth Weapons.” *Los Angeles Times*, 20 September 2003.**

*Source Type:* Press Report

*Topic Area(s):* International

***Key Points:***

Rotella finds that the number of converts has grown as Islamic militants have struck a chord with young Europeans from non-Muslim backgrounds.

He notes that Oliver Roy said “...the young people in working class urban areas are against the system, and converting to Islam is the ultimate way to challenge the system...they convert to stick it to their parents...they convert in the same way people in the 1970s went to Bolivia or Vietnam. I see a very European tradition of identifying with a Third World cause.”

Rotella discusses Pierre Richard Robert and Christian Ganczarski who are two Europeans in custody who converted to Islam and joined al Qaeda. They represent a dangerous trend: converts who assume front-line roles as al Qaeda recruiters and plotters. Extremists of European descent worry police for the same reasons that al Qaeda prizes them: their symbolic value, their Western passports, and their fanaticism.

**Rotella, Sebastian. “Terrorists Seen Turning to Campuses for Skills.” *LA Times*, 1 April 2006.**

*Source Type:* Press Report

*Topic Area(s):* International

*Web Link:* <http://pewforum.org/news/display.php?NewsID=10348>

*Key Points:*

Rotella provides details on a case involving a cell of young Muslims students who were arrested for their suspected involvement in an attack against U.S. contractors in Iraq. According to Rotella, French investigators and U.S. intelligence linked calls made from a man involved in the killing of 4 American contractors in Iraq (March 2004) to a suspected extremist cell of Moroccan students at the University of Montpellier.

A French anti-terrorism official is quoted as claiming that the students oriented their scientific studies to learn terrorist techniques and planned their course work to gather information and materials for the network. The students sought expertise in electronics and telecommunications to help them develop long-range detonators for bomb attacks and participated in paid internships with companies that would give them access to labs and the opportunity to order components in the name of their employers.

Rotella claims that this case helps to illustrate that universities and the Internet may be replacing terrorist training camps.

**Roy, Olivier. “EuroIslam: The jihad within?” *The National Interest* 71 (Spring 2003).**

*Source Type:* Academic Research/Journal

*Topic Area(s):* Domestic, International

*Web Link:* [http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\\_m2751/is\\_2003\\_Spring/ai\\_99377576](http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2751/is_2003_Spring/ai_99377576)

*Key Points:*

Roy discusses jihadism in Europe: who is affected by radicalization and why radicalization is occurring. He presents the argument that re-Islamization is a necessary condition for radicalization. It can be linked to one’s country of origin or be more ideological. Generally it is young alienated individuals who are affected, and the situation in Europe is that of well-educated youths generally leading westernized lives, who then are “born again” and become radical.

Roy also notes that “radicalization is a peripheral result of the Westernization of Muslims born and living in Europe” and is linked with a generation gap, lower social status, and perpetuates preexisting leftist anti-imperialist protests within these communities.

Roy describes an Algerian group (FIS) that illustrates a general process of radicalization: 1) detachment of Islamic radical European youth from the politics of country of origin, and 2)

resulting in a polarization because they are not as attracted to political nationalistic approach to Islam—instead the mother country becomes even more “Islam-nationalist.”

He writes that lack of assimilation into European society coupled with no connection to country of origin can lead to radicalization. Radical Islam can be appealing to alienated youth because it gives them justification for finding a new Islam. Radicals target people are in doubt about their identity and faith. “To convert to Islam today is a way for a European rebel to find a cause; it has little to do with theology.”

Roy asserts that “a universal form of Islam is also developing in the United States and Canada, but it differs in structure and implication from that in European countries.”

**Roy, Olivier. “Why Do They Hate Us? Not Because of Iraq.” *New York Times*, 22 July 2005.**

***Source Type:*** Press Report

***Topic Area(s):*** Domestic, International

***Key Points:***

Roy notes that “the Western-based Islamic terrorists are not the militant vanguard of the Muslim community; they are a lost generation, unmoored from traditional societies and cultures, frustrated by a Western society that does not meet their expectations. And their vision of a global ummah is both a mirror of and a form of revenge against the globalization that has made them what they are.”

**Sageman, Marc. “Understanding Jihadi Networks.” *Strategic Insights* 4.4 (April 2005).**

***Source Type:*** Academic Research/Journal

***Topic Area(s):*** International, Models/Frameworks

***Web Link:*** <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2005/Apr/sagemanApr05.asp>

***Key Points:***

Sageman has applied extensive data to dispel some common myths about terrorism. He tested theories of terrorism, including poverty, socio-economic status, age, education, occupation, religious devotion as youth, family status, criminality, lack of skills, mental health, and religious fanaticism.

Sageman’s data provide the following conclusions: members of jihadi networks were middle-class; the average age when recruited was 25.69; many members received secular (vs. religious) education; many were highly educated; many were professional or skilled; 73 percent of the members were married and most with children; the vast majority of the members did not have a criminal background, or only had history of petty crime; and mental health issues among members were rare.

The author found that joining jihad is a bottom-up, self-organizing activity; he did not find indications of a top-down recruitment process; he found that social bonds come before ideological commitment. Joining the jihad seems to be a dynamic, group process; 68 percent was based on friendship (pre-existing); 20 percent was based kinship (sons, brothers, cousins); and 10 percent was based on discipleship. Many of the jihadi network group members studied turned to mosques for companionship versus religion.

The study shows that 70 percent of the members joined the jihad while in a foreign country, where the majority were alienated from surrounding society, cut off from cultural and social origins, and far from family and friends.

Women are the “critical invisible infrastructure of the jihad,” because they encourage friends and family to join, cement friendship bonds through marriage, and provide evaluative criterion through marriage.

Sage man concludes the following:

- Global Salafi jihad is grounded in group dynamics rather than individual pathology.
- Once in the movement, it is difficult to abandon the group without betraying close friends and/or family.
- The natural and intense loyalty to the group, inspired by a violent Salafi script, transforms alienated young Muslims into fanatic terrorists.
- Members are not evil, but evil-doers.

**Schmidt, G. “Islamic Identity Formation among Young Muslims: The Case of Denmark, Sweden and the United States.” *Journal of Muslim Affairs* 24.1 (April 2004): 31-45.**

**Source Type:** Academic Research/Journal

**Topic Area(s):** Domestic, International

**Key Points:**

This paper explores transnational identity formation among young Muslims in Denmark, Sweden, and the United States. The focus is on young, well-educated Muslims of immigrant background between 15 and 30 years of age, either born or raised in the West.

The process of transnational identity formation is described according to four overall conditions and themes:

- Visibility and aesthetics
- Choice
- Transnationalism
- Social ethics

The young Muslims interviewed frequently argued that their religious identity is a consequence of individual choice. They stated that the message from the imams and their own generation’s interpretation of Islam was awkward. Young Muslims criticize the imams for lacking knowledge of the country in which they had settled.

One way that young Muslims often find the answers they seek is to participate in discussion groups or the Internet. Young Muslims believe they follow an authentic Islam that is perfectly adaptable to and perfectly fulfilling of the ideal of Western democracies. Islam is used to transcend aspects of identity that otherwise could be problematic.

**Silke, Andrew. “Terrorist Threats to the UK Homeland: 7/7 and Beyond.” *The Journal of Counterterrorism and Homeland Security International* 11.4 (Winter 2005).**

**Source Type:** Academic Research/Journal

**Topic Area(s):** International, Gaps/Recommendations

**Key Points:**

Silke discusses how the attacks against the London subway system led the U.K. to realize that the terrorist threat in Britain had changed; namely, that there are a variety of terrorist groups and supporters operating within the country that pose a serious risk. While the U.K. has built up considerable expertise, resources, and skills confronting terrorism in the 40 years that they have been dealing with the problem, this new threat has resulted in their security branches having to acknowledge and adapt to a terrorist threat that is growing and changing.

Silke suggests that the following should be considered when developing or enhancing strategies to deal with new and emerging terrorist threats in the U.K.:

- The factors leading to Islamic extremism can provide policymakers with innovative methods for countering it.
- Proactive steps can be taken to assure that radicalization does not become uncontrollable.
- Policymakers should not myopically focus on one form of terrorism (e.g. Islamic extremism) while disregarding other groups and individuals that may become violent.
- Focus must be placed on leaderless resistance movements and lone actors because these threats pose new dangers and challenges.

**Simon, Steven. “Her Majesty’s Secret Service.” *The National Interest* 82 (Winter 2005/2006).**

**Source Type:** Academic Research/Journal

**Topic Area(s):** International, Gaps/Recommendations

**Key Points:**

Simon describes a study that was conducted by the U.K. following the terrorist attacks on Madrid. The study, entitled “Young Muslims and Extremism,” used assessments provided by the MI5 and found that extremism and violence were on the rise in the U.K.. The reasons cited for their increase were the perceived anti-Islamic bias of British social and foreign policies, the disproportionate number of Muslim arrests and detentions, and the U.K.’s participation in the

U.S.-led war in Iraq. The study also found that jihadist groups were heavily recruiting educated British Muslims.

The article explains how the U.K. used both overt and covert campaigns to address the increase of extremism among young Muslims. Simon describes the public relations campaign as involving various outreach efforts as well as strict enforcement of anti-discrimination laws. The overt campaign, led by the MI5 and referred to as “Operation Contest,” placed hundreds of undercover agents into the Muslim community to monitor the activities of suspected terrorists and to map the “terrorist career path” in order to develop intervention strategies.

Simon suggests that the U.S. could wind up with a “fifth column” if it becomes complacent to the issues of extremism and radicalization. He offers the following suggestions:

- Operation Contest, initiated after radicalization had already spread throughout the U.K., could be the right fit for the U.S. domestic security environment.
- The U.S. could consider placing more weight in foreign/domestic security policies to achieve better accommodation with the Muslim community and re-engage them.
- Public information and awareness campaigns (e.g., like those following 9/11) could be used to prevent anti-Muslim bias.
- American Muslims could be consulted to advise the government on foreign policy issues and could be recruited for policy positions. Giving more authority to American Muslims could result in greater government credibility from both Muslims and non-Muslims alike.
- If the campaign against transnational Islamic terrorism were viewed as an internal security issue, then law enforcement could be integrated with terrorism prevention, not just respond. For example, the FBI could be supplemented by persons with cultural knowledge to ensure that we possess domestic intelligence and analytic capabilities about Islamic threats.
- The American public should be kept informed about the development of any full-scale domestic intelligence capacity.

**Sinai, Joshua. “A Jihad on U.S. Soil?” Washington Times, 23 November 2005.**

*Source Type:* Press Report

*Topic Area(s):* Domestic, International

*Web Link:* <http://www.washingtontimes.com/op-ed/20051122-091752-5605r.htm>

*Key Points:*

This article is a review of “The Next Attack: The Failure of the War on Terror and a Strategy for Getting It Right,” by Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon (New York: Times Books, 2005). Sinai notes that increasing numbers of Muslims are joining the radical Islamists in terrorist violence.

He writes that jihadist ideology has become the bloody banner for grievances around the world, merging into a pervasive hatred of the United States, its allies, and the international order they uphold. This hatred has so loosened Muslim religious and social inhibitions on violence that it now justifies an attack on infidels such as the United States using weapons of mass destruction.

Sinai notes that still “in their assessment of potential radicalization among American Muslims that could lead to future violence, the authors [Benjamin and Simon] correctly point out that a greater proportion of American Muslims is more inhospitable to jihadism than their European counterparts.”

**Stevenson, Jonathan. “The Qaeda Vipers in Europe’s Bosom.” *New York Times*, 1 February 2003.**

***Source Type:*** Press Report

***Topic Area(s):*** International

***Key Points:***

According to Stevenson, Europe needs to tackle the root causes that make young Muslims resort to terrorism. But it needs to act to protect itself as well. The obvious first steps are tightening border security, developing a Europe-wide immigration policy, and resolving the economic and political problems that could make al Qaeda attractive to a young Muslim.

**Sullivan, Kevin & Joshua Partlow. “Young Muslim Rage Takes Root in Britain: Unemployment, Foreign Policy Fuel Extremism.” *Washington Post*, 13 August 2006, A01.**

***Source Type:*** Press Report

***Topic Area(s):*** International

***Web Link:*** [http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/08/12/AR2006081201036\\_pf.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/08/12/AR2006081201036_pf.html)

***Key Points:***

According to Sullivan and Partlow, Britain has become an incubator for violent extremism fueled by disenchantment at home and growing rage about international events. A long tradition of tolerance has created an oasis in the U.K. for immigrants and political outcasts from around the world. This occurred especially in the 1980s and 1990s when Britain became the refuge of choice for scores of Islamic radicals who had been expelled or exiled from their home countries for their inflammatory sermons and speeches.

Factors that have been identified for radicalization include young men who face lack of jobs, poor educational achievement, and discrimination in a highly class-oriented culture.

A number of common factors contribute to youth outrage. Unemployment rates are higher among Muslims than any other religion. Isolation and disenchantment among young Muslims provides fertile environment for extremist groups recruiting new members. The identity of Muslims in the U.K. is Muslim first and British second. Since the July 2005 attacks, Tony Blair’s government has tightened anti-terrorism laws and increased the number of Muslim police officers in the field.

**Taarnby, Michael. "The European Battleground." *Terrorism Monitor* 2.23 (2 December 2004).**

**Source Type:** Think Tank (Domestic)

**Topic Area(s):** International

**Web Link:** [http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?issue\\_id=3161](http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?issue_id=3161)

**Key Points:**

Taarnby notes that new jihadists are part of loosely connected networks with little or not organizational links to al Qaeda.

He discusses that Europe does not need former Afghanistan veterans or al Qaeda operatives in order to stage attacks because a small minority can attack in their host country. Taarnby states that it is beyond dispute that militant Islam firmly is entrenched in European heartland.

The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) noted in 2004 that support and recruitment for Islamist terrorism is increasing worldwide. Taarnby writes, "while Islamists have been quite successful in presenting their struggle in religious terms, religion is in fact a secondary issue in the radicalization process in Europe."

He claims that European Islamism is not an original construct but rather an artificial construction that was born out of an "unsuccessful encounter with European socioeconomic structures." He also states, "instead of a religious awakening, Islamism signifies a spiritual wasteland inhabited by self-appointed prophets and brigands, usually without any form of theological schooling or authorization. This is where terrorist recruitment thrives. Not in mainstream Muslim communities across Europe, but through underground mosques and social networks of likeminded people."

Taarnby posits that there are three type of recruits:

- Unassimilated newcomers from Muslim countries who cannot adapt
- Second- or third-generation immigrants who should be considered Europeans
- Converts

Regarding European efforts, he states that MI5 "is looking for foreigners while al Qaeda is principally interested in Europeans."

**Taarnby, Michael. *Recruitment of Islamist Terrorist in Europe: Trends and Perspectives*. Research Report. Danish Ministry of Justice, 14 January 05.**

**Source Type:** Government (International)

**Topic Area(s):** Definitions, International

**Web Link:** <http://www.jm.dk/image.asp?page=image&objno=73027>

**Key Points:**

Taarnby provides definitions for the following terms:

- Cell: A small group of terrorists. A closed unit but with one or more links to a network.
- European: For the purpose of this study, defined as individuals residing in Europe, whether as migrant workers, foreign students, asylum seekers or citizens.
- Gatekeeper: A militant Islamist who is personally connected to a terrorist network.
- Islamist: A Muslim who follows one of the very conservative branches of Islam, often the Salafi or Wahabi creed, and who has turned Islam into a self-contained lifestyle.
- Mujahideen: Literally, Holy Warrior, but most often associated with militant Islamists fighting guerrilla warfare.
- Network: A number of cells interrelated through personal relationships.
- Recruitment: Recruitment for the Jihad is understood as an activity that intends to enlist militant Islamists in an existing terrorist cell. Recruitment is the bridge between a personal belief and violent activism.
- Radicalization: The progressive, personal development from law-abiding Muslim to militant Islamist.

He discusses recruitment in Europe and notes that terrorist recruitment is on the rise, but “militants and terrorists only represent a fraction of a minority.”

There is an absence of top-down recruitment, but rather a bottom-up process through friendships and connections—a self-generating process—is how young people becoming radicalized.

Taarnby states that recruitment is defined by shared ideology and personal interaction; connections between people are crucial. The terrorist presence in Europe is organized by friendships and mutual ideologies. The process from alienated individual to committed activist requires investment and intense personal interaction. He notes that the fear of Internet recruitment may be overblown.

According to Taarnby, the recruitment process may contain these elements:

- Alienation and marginalization
- Spiritual quest
- Process of radicalization
- Meeting like-minded people
- Gradual seclusion and cell formation
- Acceptance of violence as legitimate political means
- Connection with a gatekeeper in the know
- Going operational

Newer generation of Islamist terrorists are less linked to al Qaeda and more to global jihad. Current networks are diffuse cells, which means that if one is taken down the others are not necessarily affected. This is a strength and a weakness.

He describes those who might join radical groups. Second-generation immigrants are susceptible because radical Islam presents a vehicle of protest against problems of access to employment, housing, discrimination and negative public image of Islam. Converts represent a minority of militant Islamists. Often, radicals come from the margins of society or have a history of drug use or petty crime. He states that “social conditions serve as the foundation” for understanding Islamist terrorism. Motivation cannot be reduced to a single factor.

Taarnby describes places where recruitment occurs, such as radical mosques which serve as radicalization agent and provide a social environment that fosters transformation for young and alienated Muslims. The role of clerics has changed; they are not able to recruit openly but instead use massive propaganda effort and underground mosques. Recruitment in mosques has become more difficult because of the scrutiny by security and law enforcement authorities.

He also discusses why and how radicalization occurs. “The militants believe they are fighting a last-ditch battle for the survival of their society, culture, religion and way of life” (Taarnby citing Burke 2004). The ideology feeds off polarization and radicalization in Europe so that even trivial issues like a dress code in French schools can become significant.

This article also provides some information regarding specific countries such as the U.S., Britain, France, the Netherlands and Italy.

**Taspinar, Omer. *Europe’s Muslim Street*. Foreign Policy Studies. The Brookings Institution, March 2003.**

**Source Type:** Think Tank (Domestic)

**Topic Area(s):** Domestic, International

**Web Link:** <http://www.brookings.edu/views/op-ed/fellows/taspinar20030301.htm>

**Key Points:**

According to Taspinar, there are 15 million Muslims in Europe and up to three times as many in the U.S.

He discusses that “although the majority of Muslims living in Europe (or, for that matter, the United States) are peaceful and law abiding, many European governments worry under their breath about the role of some European Muslims in past and future terrorist attacks—a concern stoked by the discovery of al Qaeda cells in Germany, France, Italy, and Britain. Given these not-so-latent suspicions and prejudices, one casualty of a major Islamic terrorist attack on European soil would likely be Europe’s budding multiculturalism.”

He notes that demographic growth and enfranchisement are already integrating European Muslims into the political mainstream and have the potential to produce a moderate type of Euro-Islam.

**Turkish Institute for Police Studies (TIPS). *NATO & TIPS Terrorism Project: Understanding and Responding to Terrorism—A Multi-Dimensional Approach*. Turkish Institute for Police Studies (TIPS), September 2006.**

**Source Type:** Academic Research/Journal

**Topic Area(s):** Domestic, International

**Key Points:**

This report provides a list of sessions that were presented at a workshop, “Understanding and Responding to Terrorism,” that was held on September 8 and 9, 2006. The workshop brought together people from academia and law enforcement to identify terrorism threats, to advance cooperation levels, and to explore ways of countering terrorism.

Over 100 presentations were made during the conference. The presentations were not available. Those that may be potentially related to radicalization include:

- “Social Causes of Terrorism,” by Diab Al-Badayneh, Mutah University, Jordan
- “Does Inequality Trigger Terrorism in the New World Order?” by Mustafa Kayaoglu, University of North Texas
- “The Socio-Economic Sources of Terrorism in the Muslim World,” by Taha Ozkan, Seta Foundation, Turkey
- “Becoming a Terrorist: The Psychology of Recruitment in Terrorist Organizations,” by Mini Mamak, Forensic Service, St. Joseph’s Healthcare, Canada
- “The Role of Religions in Combating Terrorism,” by Zeki Saritoprak, John Carroll University
- “Role of Religion in Social Integration,” Ali Murat Yel, Fatih University, Turkey
- “Global Social Integration as a Solution in the War Against Global Terrorism,” by Kenan Bayhan, University of North Texas
- “The Role of Family in the Fight Against Terrorism,” Ersin Oguz, Ankara Police Department, Turkey

**U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Intelligence. Bruce Hoffman testimony on the Use of Internet by Islamic Extremists. RAND Corporation, 4 May 2006.**

*Source Type:* Congressional Testimony

*Topic Area(s):* Domestic, International

*Web Link:* [http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/2006/RAND\\_CT262-1.pdf](http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/2006/RAND_CT262-1.pdf)

***Key Points:***

In his testimony before the House, Hoffman discusses that Islamic extremists are well-versed in technology, and new forms of media enhance the adversary's ability to shape and share their messages and bypass traditional forms of media. "Radical Islamist terrorist organizations in particular are seen as being on the 'cutting edge of organizational networking.'"

They use technology for a variety of purposes including propaganda, education/information, recruitment, coercion, training, instruction, planning, and internal propaganda to strengthen morale and provide inspiration. The Internet provides a way to promote a "global dialectic" from a local base that can be spread throughout the world in a cost effective way.

According to Hoffman, most terrorist and insurgent groups have websites, and Arab and Islamic groups are regarded by knowledgeable observers to have the largest presence on the Internet. According to a Professor at Haifa University, there are about 4,800 terrorist related websites. A problem with Internet information is that it is not monitored and may not be accurate, but people have no way of checking this.

There is no direct link between Internet recruitment and radicalization to mainstream terrorist organizations, but it does provide inspiration and motivation.

**U.S. Congress. House. Subcommittee on Europe & Emerging threats of the Committee on International Relations. Claude Moniquet testimony on The Radicalisation of Muslim Youth in Europe: The Reality and the Scale of the Threat. 109<sup>th</sup> Cong., 1st sess., 27 April 2005.**

*Source Type:* Congressional Testimony

*Topic Area(s):* International

*Web Link:* <http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov/archives/109/mon042705.pdf>

***Key Points:***

Moniquet discusses radicalization in Europe. He suggests the European Union countries that are most exposed to fundamentalists include France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, Spain, Great Britain, and Germany; outside the EU, Bosnia is at high risk.

Author suggests that youth associations are being used as front organizations for the *Muslim Brothers* and are extremely popular; some have recruited very young children to fight in Iraq.

Article indicates that de facto sexual segregation has been occurring in some schools and hospitals in Europe, where it is common for boys to group themselves away from girls in schools and it is becoming more common for men to refuse treatment to women patients and vice versa in hospitals.

Moniquet presents a formula (developed by French domestic intelligence service, les Renseignements Generaux, based on “extensive screening of the French scene”) for calculating the number of fundamentalists in a given population: in a given Muslim population there is an average of five percent fundamentalists, of which three percent could be considered as dangerous. For example, with a Muslim population of six million people in France, there are 300,000 fundamentalists, 9,000 of which are potentially dangerous.

Article suggests that the last couple of years have brought about “a lot of very negative signals from the third generation” including increase of violence in schools and rejection of European “values” such as sexual equality.

Moniquet provides explanations for the increase in radicalization, including:

- Lack of integration/racism
- Lifestyles that reinforce the rejection of Muslim values
- Economic/social crisis
- Information exchange (Internet helping bonds with other Muslim “victims”)
- Clerics come from abroad (mostly Saudi) and don’t speak the language, so they can’t help ease tensions
- Rejection of clerics for preaching “Islam of the rich” makes many turn to non-official mosques or “Islam of the cellars and garages” where the clerics’ knowledge of the religion is questionable and radical Islam is preached
- Presence of refugees and cells of various Islamist terror movements are present in universities
- Iraq is a mobilizer

Article cautions that ease of travel should be considered when addressing radicalization, especially given that most of the second-generation and almost all of the third-generation hold European passports and can travel freely to the U.S.

**U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Mary Habeck testimony on Islamist Extremism in Europe. 109<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2d sess., 5 April 2006.**

*Source Type:* Congressional Testimony

*Topic Area(s):* International

*Web Link:* <http://www.senate.gov/~foreign/testimony/2006/HabeckTestimony060405.pdf>

**Key Points:**

Habeck discusses the growing threat of radicalization in Europe, providing some historical background and making distinctions between Islamism and Jihadism. According to Habeck, about 20 percent of the Islamic world follow some version of Islamism; 80 percent are moderate or traditional Muslims who disagree with this vision of Islam.

She makes the distinction between Islamism and Jihadism, suggesting that the main characteristic of Islamism is the belief that Islam must have political power and state control in order to be correctly implemented, while Jihadism is the radical version of Islamism and suggests that only violence will allow the creation of the perfect Islamic state.

Habeck indicates that Jihadism is comprised of the following beliefs:

- Democracy is wrong and directly contradicts the fundamental principles of Islam; anyone who supports democracy is an infidel and should be killed.
- Only one version of Islamic law (Sharia) is correct, and any Muslim who doesn't follow Sharia is a non-believer.
- The world should be ruled by Islamic law; it is necessary to vow eternal hatred and violence toward all non-Muslims until this occurs.

She suggests that European jihadists were sheltered for years under the "covenant of security" whereby they were provided shelter and did not attack in-country. She indicates that Spain and Britain betrayed this covenant by joining wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, breaking the covenant.

Habeck proposes that Jihadism and radicalization is a growing threat in Europe due to the following:

- Other underlying causes of radicalism in Europe are not adequately dealt with (e.g., Muslim alienation from their European homes and unemployment).
- Jihadi leaders proselytize, especially seeking disillusioned young Muslims; recruit them by promising "answer to all their problems."
- Jihadis threaten violence against moderates in their own communities and moderates are afraid to speak up, "atmosphere of intimidation."
- Europe is now viewed as a legitimate target, since the "covenant of security" was broken.

**U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Bruce Hoffman testimony on Islam and West: Searching for Common Ground: The Terrorism Threat and Counter-Terrorism Effort. 109<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2d sess., 18 July 2006.**

*Source Type:* Congressional Testimony

*Topic Area(s):* Domestic, International, Gaps/Recommendations

*Web Link:* <http://www.senate.gov/~foreign/testimony/2006/HoffmanTestimony060718.pdf>

***Key Points:***

Hoffman notes that the adversary is dynamic, and it evolves and adjusts to our countermeasures. He describes four types of al Qaeda:

- al Qaeda Central
- al Qaeda Affiliates and Associates
- al Qaeda Locals, which consists of those with prior terrorism experience and local recruits in other countries
- al Qaeda Network, which consists mostly of homegrown radicals and local converts

Hoffman states that those who are homegrown are generally from the margins of society, often involved in petty crime, students at universities, and feel a sense of alienation.

He describes a pathway to radicalization which begins by focusing on being a good Muslim where one is then exposed to propaganda about perceived injustices and perception of a war against Islam and forms more radical opinions.

Hoffman purports that success against terrorism will require a strategy that combines tactics and breaking cycle of recruitments. It cannot be a purely militaristic endeavor but must also involve parallel political, social, economic, and ideological activities. Other areas of importance include negotiation, psychology, social and cultural anthropology, foreign area studies, and complexity theory and systems management.

**U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.  
Director Frank J. Cilluffo statement on Prison Radicalization: Are Terrorist Cells Forming  
in U.S. Cell Blocks? 109th Cong., 2d sess., 19 September 2006.**

*Source Type:* Congressional Testimony

*Topic Area(s):* Domestic, International, Models/Frameworks, Gaps/Recommendations

*Web Link:* <http://www.gwu.edu/~newsctr/testimony.pdf>

***Key Points:***

Cilluffo presents findings from a study of prison radicalization that examined the process by which inmates become motivated to listen to or read about radical ideas, enlist in or respond to terrorist recruiting efforts, or undertake terrorist activity. He provides examples of persons who have been radicalized while in prison or spread radical ideology while serving prison sentences.

He also discusses radicalization in European prisons, claiming that European Muslims are more socio-economically marginalized than in the U.S., making them more vulnerable to radical messages. Cilluffo warns that European prison radicalization presents a containment challenge, as radicals from European prisons could travel to the U.S. or participate in U.S.-based terrorist networks.

Considering prisons to be an incubator for radical ideas, he notes several factors as having the potential to impact U.S. prison radicalization, including the following:

- Prison officials lack the manpower to oversee every prayer service or investigate every lead related to radicalization
- A lack of suitably qualified Muslim religious providers results in radical prisoners assuming religious authority
- Inmates leaving prison often have little financial or social support, making them vulnerable to recruitment by radical groups that can offer this support

Violent prison gangs and extremist Christian groups, according to Cilluffo, are compounding the threat from radical Islamic groups. Gangs and extremist Christian groups can share their recruiting approaches with radical Muslim groups; they also may engage in mutually beneficial criminal enterprises to gain funding. Christian extremist groups (which have a history of attacks on U.S. soil) can assist radical Islamic groups in areas where they have a common cause, including hostility towards the U.S. government and Israel. Secret communication practices used by gangs and Christian extremist groups can be adapted for use by radical Muslim groups (e.g., using Arabic language and script to communicate in secret).

Roadblocks to combating radicalization in prisons are discussed by Cilluffo, including:

- Local information on radicalization is easily transferred into regional and national intelligence networks.
- Cultural/bureaucratic obstacles prevent the flow of information.
- Different levels of government have different views on “tradecraft” for countering radicalization. Some agencies want to step in early while others want to let the situation play out in order to learn additional information about the radicalization issue.

- The lack of a database to track inmates after they have served their sentence as well as prisoners or prison religious providers associated with radical groups or espousing radical views.
- The lack of standard policy for vetting religious providers, even for prisons within the same state, and the lack of standards to determine whether reading material is appropriate.

Initiatives for addressing radicalization in prisons are described, including efforts in certain California prisons as well as efforts underway by the Federal Bureau of Prisons (FBOP). Limitations on research on radicalization in prisons are described by Cilluffo, including the lack of data, limited access provided to researchers to enter prison facilities, and lack of information-sharing among authorities due to ongoing investigations.

**U.S. Congress. Senate. Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations. Henry A. Crumpton statement on Islamist Extremism in Europe. 109<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2d sess., 5 April 2006.**

*Source Type:* Congressional Testimony

*Topic Area(s):* International, Gaps/Recommendations

*Web Link:* <http://www.senate.gov/~foreign/testimony/2006/CrumptonTestimony060405.pdf>

**Key Points:**

Crumpton suggests that the threat in Europe is coming from smaller, more diffuse, locally-based groups that are not under al Qaeda command but share its vision of a global war against the civilized world. He states that the threat manifests itself in a variety of ways, including direct attacks (e.g., Madrid and London); recruitment of terrorists and foreign fighters for Iraq; and ideological safe havens in immigrant communities isolated from mainstream society.

Crumpton recommends that Europe needs to address the underlying conditions that terrorists may exploit to promote the growth of extremism, including:

- Local groups
- Long-standing grievances
- Communal conflicts
- Societal structures

Author suggests that terrorist networks could be countered by building alternative networks that work to find ways to meet people's social and economic needs and prevent them from gravitating toward extremist networks. The article indicates that the U.S. and the U.K. are working on cooperative efforts to address terrorist use of the Internet by collaborating to counter the extremists' message.

It is suggested that European partners find ways to build trusted networks of their own that isolate and marginalize terrorists and their supporters, galvanize revulsion against the murder of innocents, and empower legitimate alternatives to extremism. He recommends that a counterinsurgency strategy must be developed that incorporates all the tools of governance to

attack the enemy, deny safe haven, and address the socio-economic and political needs of at-risk populations; enduring and constructive programs are needed to undercut extremists' ability to appeal to the disaffected.

**U.S. Congress. Senate. Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations. Dr. Robin Niblett statement on Islamic Extremism in Europe. 109<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2d sess., 5 April 2006.**

*Source Type:* Congressional Testimony

*Topic Area(s):* Domestic, International, Gaps/Recommendations

*Web Link:* <http://www.senate.gov/~foreign/testimony/2006/NiblettTestimony060405.pdf>

**Key Points:**

Niblett discusses current thinking pertaining to the factors that have led to the rise of Islamic extremism in Europe and the connections to violent terrorist action; how European governments perceive the threat and what steps are they taking to address this phenomenon; and the transatlantic dimensions of this danger.

The European experience is described as being different than the United States; in the U.S., the threat posed by Islamic extremism has been kept and addressed primarily off-shore.

He suggests that a combination of external and internal forces is driving Islamic extremism in Europe. Niblett indicates that Islamic extremism is being fed internally by the growing sense of frustration and alienation felt by second and third-generation children of the Muslim economic immigrants to Europe of the 1950s and 1960s.

Niblett indicates that the concerns of European policymakers include:

- Rioting in Paris last fall, Muslim reactions to the “cartoon” controversy, and a continuing influx of Muslim immigrants will feed an expanding popular backlash in Europe against Muslims which will, in turn, drive new converts into the extremist Islamic camp.
- A larger proportion of Muslim communities might be sufficiently radicalized or isolated to offer a popular base either of support or of acceptance within which extremists can circulate, making the work of law enforcement and intelligence services that much harder.
- Well-educated young Muslims, especially those studying in the areas of information technology, computer sciences, chemistry, and biotechnology might be drawn to the cause of Islamic extremism and put their knowledge to the service of groups wanting to carry out spectacular attacks on European soil.
- There will be a further expansion and deepening of cross-border linkages across Europe among radical Islamist terrorist groups.
- Returnees from Iraq might bring organizational and operational skills to Europe that could further increase the lethality and frequency of attacks.
- European countries offer an infinite number of potential targets for terrorist attack and that no country is immune from being considered a target.

- European police, intelligence, customs, and judicial services are not well enough organized to confront this fluid new threat.

The author presents the four broad strategies that have been undertaken by European governments to combat radicalization and extremism:

- 1) They are taking collective as well as individual steps to lessen their vulnerability to the threat posed by terrorist groups, primarily in the field of asylum law, police and intelligence cooperation, and judicial coordination.
- 2) They are trying to improve the social integration of these communities by offering better economic opportunities to young Muslims living in deprived neighborhoods.
- 3) They are combating the “ghettoization” and separation of their Muslim populations from the rest of society by instituting programs designed to force Muslim communities to integrate better with the rest of domestic society.
- 4) They are trying to break the linkages between Islamic extremist ideology and Muslim youth across Europe, with measures to block entry to or expel radical imams; criminalize incitement to hate and violence; and to encourage the growth of Islamic groups with closer ties to local communities.

Niblett suggests that progress to combat radicalization and extremism has been limited due to the following:

- EU-level cooperation against extremism and terrorism remains very difficult operationally.
- Ability to institute economic reforms that will open new job opportunities in deprived economic areas and reduce high levels of unemployment among immigrant communities are limited.
- European governments are being simultaneously driven to act and constrained by the sorts of steps they can take in promoting social integration due to the growing public hostility toward Islam and Muslim immigration.
- Many of Europe’s new “citizenship” programs seem limited in their potential impact.
- European governments face serious opposition to some of the measures that they are undertaking from domestic human rights groups and the judiciary.
- There appears to be a deeper, structural stand-off between European societies and their Muslim communities.
- Europeans themselves are uncertain about what sort of identity they are trying to promote or protect.

Niblett indicates that the U.S. government and its European counterparts have taken a number of steps to try to confront extremism and other risks posed by international terrorism, including:

- They regularly exchange intelligence information on potential threats
- They enacted Mutual Extradition and Legal Assistance Agreements to help expand law enforcement and judicial cooperation
- They instituted procedures to tackle terrorist group financing
- They have strengthened international standards for the International Port Facility and Vessel Security Codes
- They have established a policy dialogue on border and transportation security
- They have stationed U.S. Customs officials at European ports as part of the U.S. Container Security Initiative

Niblett points to two broader sets of long-term concerns for U.S. interests:

- 1) Islamic extremists based in Europe could increasingly provide the spark that ignites popular revolts against moderate Arab governments in North Africa, the Middle East, and the Gulf region, or against other vulnerable allies of the United States, such as Pakistan.
- 2) European governments faced with large, growing, and restive Muslim populations might tailor or manage some of their foreign policies toward the Arab world in ways that cut across U.S. and transatlantic interests (less well-defined risk for the U.S.).

**U.S. Congress. Senate. Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Daniel Fried testimony on Islamic Extremism in Europe. 109<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2d sess., 5 April 2006.**

*Source Type:* Congressional Testimony

*Topic Area(s):* International, Gaps/Recommendations

*Web Link:* <http://www.senate.gov/~foreign/testimony/2006/FriedTestimony060405.pdf>

***Key Points:***

Fried presents the nature of Islamic extremism in Western Europe as being distinct both in its character and in its potential to threaten the U.S.

He suggests that most Muslims in Western Europe are outside the mainstream in several ways, including they are predominantly viewed as foreign; many struggle with unemployment, discrimination, and integration that has resulted in them being open to receiving an extremist message; and many have a deeply negative perception of U.S. foreign policy. Free speech is also exploited by extremists, encouraging many Muslims to have a “tolerance of intolerance.” These factors, coupled with relative freedom of movement across the Atlantic, result in a dangerous mix.

Fried presents demographics for the number of Muslims in Western Europe, indicating they comprise 5 percent of total population; this number has tripled over last 30 years and is expected to double again by 2025. There are over 5 million Muslims in France (primarily Algerians and Moroccans); over three million Muslims in Germany (primarily Turkish); over two million Muslims in the U.K. (primarily South Asians); over one million Muslims in Italy; and approximately 950,000 Muslims in the Netherlands.

According to Fried, only a small fraction of the Muslims in Western Europe have the potential to cross the critical threshold into terrorism. However, pockets of extremists exist throughout Western Europe, many where mujahideen from other wars have settled.

Fried claims that there are several groups spreading extremism across Europe by claiming to be non-violent and moderate while appealing to idealism of socially alienated and/or spiritually hungry Muslims in Europe; groups include Hizb ut-Tahir (Party of liberation), Al Muharajiroun (splinter group/radical youth movement of HT), and GSPC.

He points to a variety of factors that are driving Islamist extremism in Europe by creating a sense of alienation from mainstream, secular society, including:

- Demographics
- High rates of poverty and unemployment
- Anti-Muslim discrimination and racism
- Strict adherence by Muslims to the language and traditions of their countries of origin
- Issues of identity
- General opposition to U.S. and Western policies in the Middle East, including support for Israel and operations in Afghanistan and Iraq

He suggests that marginalized European Muslims who cross the threshold to extremism are driven by a sense of spiritual alienation, because their parents are unable to provide cultural or spiritual guidance, and their communities lack imams with modern or democratic orientation. Fried says that foreign financiers and religious activists act to “fill the spiritual vacuum” by building local mosques and supplying them with extremist imams that disconnect them from the tolerant traditions of their family’s homelands. He explains that the second- and third-generation are most susceptible to foreign propaganda and sermons that preach narrow and hateful interpretation of Islam.

Fried points out that Muslims are underrepresented in Europe’s national parliaments and governments and at the municipal level. However, he indicates there are some signs that political involvement is increasing (e.g., in the Netherlands a record number of Muslims voted and immigrants were elected to city councils).

He suggests there are few opportunities for Muslims in Western Europe to interact with or learn about Muslims in the West who are successful and have found balance between living in a Western country and practicing Islam.

Fried suggests that the two common models of integration, assimilation and multiculturalism, have both failed.

Fried explains that some European governments hesitate to take action against extremist preaching. The governments are concerned that actions may bring about issues related to free speech and fear that crackdowns could drive radicals underground. Fried indicates that while radicals are believed to have taken over several major mosques, where recruitment is occurring, that hard-core members will leave mosques for more covert places that are less likely to be under surveillance.

Extremist recruitment is described as a “bottom-up” process with no real structure or process for enlisting recruits. Often, terrorists undergo “self-radicalization” whereby they seek out extremist mentorship. Recruiters are said to organize bonding activities (e.g., camping trips and sporting activities) to seek out vulnerable second- and third-generation youths in their neighborhoods. Fried indicates that if recruiters can provide kids with social integration and spiritual meaning, they can intensify radicalization and tighten bonds.

Fried indicates that one half of the prison population in France is Muslim. He quotes a study by the French Interior Ministry that concluded that radical Muslims are actively trying to convert

other prisoners in one of three French prisons. He indicates that only 7 percent of prison chaplains are Muslim.

Describes some European government initiatives that are attempting to counter extremism. These initiatives, which are in the early stages, include:

- France has appointed a Minister Delegate for the Promotion of Equal Opportunity and a High Authority for the Fight Against Discrimination and for Equal Opportunity; trying to counter extremist recruiters through training of imams in local languages, history, and democratic values.
- The U.K. has created several committees with a mix of government and Muslim members to improve dialogue and explore measures.
- The government in the Netherlands launched a comprehensive program for empowerment and integration; the Consulate General (the U.S. embassy representative) in Amsterdam consults with local police and community leaders on efforts to connect at-risk Muslim youth with Dutch society in order to get them to resist recruiters; also launched a speaker series with veterans of civil rights movement to get better understanding of anti-discrimination law; trying to counter extremist recruiter through training of imams in local languages, history, and democratic values.

Fried recommends that the U.S. intensify its efforts to counter the extremist ideas that drive Islamist terrorism and suggests that responsibility to address the extremist trend also rests with the legitimate Muslim leadership.

He suggests that the main goal of the U.S is to improve European Muslims' understanding of the U.S. and to deepen their appreciation for the United States' success in achieving integration; the U.S. should use exchange programs and innovative outreach at U.S. embassies to help dispel misperceptions.

**U.S. Congress. Senate. Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Daniel Benjamin testimony on Islamic Extremism in Europe. 109<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2d sess., 5 April 2006.**

*Source Type:* Congressional Testimony

*Topic Area(s):* Domestic, International

*Web Link:* <http://www.senate.gov/~foreign/testimony/2006/BenjaminTestimony060405.pdf>

***Key Points:***

Benjamin describes radicalization in Europe. He points to marginality in Europe as helping to explain the appeal of radicalization; Muslims live in ghetto-like segregation, have second-rate schooling, higher levels of unemployment, and are more likely to have either low-wage or dead-end jobs.

He explains that many European Muslims are picking religion as their determining trait; in the U.K., 41 percent of Muslims under 35 years of age described themselves as solely "Muslim"

versus “British and Muslim” (from a 2002 survey); in France, preferential identification with Islam among Muslims has increased 25 percent between 1994 and 2001.

Benjamin indicates that although recruitment is taking place at the local level, the motivations that guide the group can be both local (e.g., unemployment, discrimination) and global (Iraq, Afghanistan, Guantanamo). He says that many Muslims in Europe perceive anti-terror laws as being unfairly enforced, believe they are subjected to abuse or hostility, and feel they are politically underrepresented.

He describes the Muslim perception of the West, explaining that they believe the West equates Islam with terrorism and thinks that the West believes Islam is an intolerant religion. Many do not think that Islam fits into Western culture.

Benjamin concludes “the eruption of jihadist violence in Europe must become a major concern for Washington for reasons that transcend concern for the safety of friends across the Atlantic. For one thing, the U.S. and Europe share a security perimeter. Not only are there more Americans and American businesses in Europe than virtually anywhere else, but most Europeans have easy access to the U.S. through the visa waiver program. (It is a disturbing oddity that the U.S. immigration system is now optimized to allow in people from the area of the world where Islamist radicalism may be growing the fastest.) Moreover, the numbers of radicals in Europe and the civil liberties protections means that the continent will remain the most likely launching pad for attacks against Americans.”

**U.S. Congress. Senate. Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Tom C. Korologos testimony on Islamic Extremism in Europe. 109<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2d sess., 5 April 2006.**

*Source Type:* Congressional Testimony

*Topic Area(s):* Domestic, International, Gaps/Recommendations

*Web Link:* <http://www.senate.gov/~foreign/testimony/2006/KorologosTestimony060405.pdf>

***Key Points:***

Korologos describes an approach that was used by the U.S. Embassy in Brussels to engage Muslims there. The approach—public diplomacy based on dialogue, not monologue—supplemented the extensive U.S. financial, intelligence, law enforcement, defense, private diplomatic and other initiatives directed at Islamic extremism in Europe. He suggests this model can generate a movement of mainstream Muslims across Europe to ease Muslim alienation and combat extremism.

Korologos explains that while the U.S. embassy in Belgium was performing Muslim outreach with local and elected officials, they found there was no communication between American Muslims and European Muslims in Belgium to share lessons learned (re: identity), balancing faith and nationality, and integration.

The embassy arranged to bring American Muslims together with Belgium Muslims to discuss issues of Muslim participation in society, including Muslim identity, civic life, economic opportunity, media portrayal, youth development, and women's issues. The discussions were framed around domestic issues of importance to minorities. Both groups shared good practices and success strategies. ("Muslim Communities Participating in Society: A Belgium-U.S. Dialogue" – Nov 2005)

Korologos suggests that the forum resulted in Belgian Muslims seeing the U.S. Government in a more positive light; attempted to empower Muslims to counter the alienation that can spur radicalism and terrorism; encouraged them to define themselves and Islam as peaceful and moderate; helped to enfranchise Muslims with larger society, to move Muslims from margins to the mainstream. "We discovered a new form of U.S.-sponsored Muslim engagement and empowerment—based on dialogue, not monologue among Muslims themselves."

Korologos also mentions a program where the Annenberg School for Communications at the University of Southern California and a Belgium partner are working on a program to engage Belgian and American reporters, editors, anchors, and producers on the challenges of good practices related to covering Muslims and Islam in the media.

**U.S. Congress. Senate. Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland Security of the Committee on the Judiciary. Michael Waller statement on Terrorist Recruitment and Infiltration in the United States: Prisons and Military as Operational Base. 108<sup>th</sup> Cong., 1st sess., 14 October 2003.**

*Source Type:* Congressional Testimony

*Topic Area(s):* Domestic, International, Gaps/Recommendations

*Web Link:* [http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=960&wit\\_id=2719](http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=960&wit_id=2719)

**Key Points:**

Waller presents the following information regarding prison recruitment efforts:

- Recruits are mainly black, with a growing Hispanic minority.
- Radical imams in prisons demand and are granted exclusive permission to proselytize for Islam; 80 percent of religious conversions that occur in prisons are to Islam.
- Radicals commonly prey on inmates' disaffection from society, such as by praising 9/11 and al Qaeda.
- There are disproportionate amounts of Muslim literature available in prisons, especially in the U.K.
- Islam is appealing because it "revenges [inmates] upon the whole of society;" inmates believe society has mistreated them and want revenge.

Documentation of Waller's testimony provides appendices that include "Key Organizations Involved in Muslim Prison Recruitment," and several articles reporting on the paths of Europeans who were recruited into radical Islam and became terrorists.

**Zambelis, Chris. “Radical Networks in Middle East Prisons.” *Terrorism Monitor* 4.9 (4 May 2006): 7-10.**

*Source Type:* Think Tank (Domestic)

*Topic Area(s):* International

*Web Link:* <http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369985>

***Key Points:***

Zambelis describes prisons as a fertile breeding ground for radical groups. Author claims that, just as gangs based on racial and ethnic lines have appeared in U.S. prisons, the Middle East penal systems have fostered the development of radical Islamic networks. In several cases, these groups have rioted or escaped, almost certainly in coordinated efforts orchestrated through elaborate communications schemes.

Article describes recent uprisings or escapes from Middle East prisons, including one in Jordan (March 2006), in Afghanistan (March 2006), and in Yemen (February 2006); in each case, regional sources believe the uprisings were the result of well-planned and coordinated efforts.

Zambelis claims that harsh conditions or torture is believed to contribute to radicalization in prisons in the Middle East. He suggests possible causes of prison radicalization, including:

- Placing violent extremists together reinforces and sustains the network
- Placing violent criminals with extremists creates dangerous potential recruits
- Periodic release of extremists is a favorite political tactic used to quell popular unrest

**“Islamist Terrorism in London: Unsettling Implications,” *Strategic Comments London: International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)*, 2.5. July 2005.**

*Source Type:* Think Tank (International)

*Topic Area(s):* Domestic, International

***Key Points:***

The IISS notes that the global jihadist network has successfully adapted to the removal of its operating base in Afghanistan, has drawn inspiration and energy from the U.S.-led intervention in Iraq, and seeks to isolate America from its European allies and partners and perhaps establish a strong European network with which to target the United States.

Outrage at the terror attacks in London among moderate Muslims appears likely to make them more cooperative with the government and more proactive in confronting radicalism within the Muslim community. But these effects could also antagonize Muslim radicals, and so the government needs to use discretion in its community outreach and clandestine penetration efforts.

EU partners have a program in place called the Schengen Information System. Each participating country is required to issue alerts on illegal aliens from outside the EU seeking visas, including authorized documentary, photographic, and biometric identification.

According to IISS, the United States remains al Qaeda's prime enemy and prize target, but it must rely increasingly on local groups that are merely ideologically inspired, rather than operationally controlled, by al Qaeda leadership. Currently, such groups are more likely to coalesce in Europe, where there are more Muslims and a more energized radicalization movement than in the U.S.

**“Muslim Extremism in Europe: The Enemy Within.” *Economist* (14 July 2005).**

**Source Type:** Press Report

**Topic Area(s):** International

**Key Points:**

The *Economist* article states that in an age of globalized ideologies, globalized communications, and porous borders, no real distinction remains between domestic and foreign threats.

Although paths to extremism vary widely, they tend to follow certain social and psychological patterns. A young Muslim becomes alienated from mainstream society and his parents' version of Islam, and may become more devout or may turn to drugs and crime before finding a “solution” to his problems in radical Islam.

The *Economist* cites Oliver Roy, who notes that a recent trend is the mass withdrawal by militants from mosques that are under surveillance. This has made extremism even more elusive, and the Internet's influence even greater.

The article notes that patterns of self-recruitment and self-radicalization are a headache for security services, which have no easy way to infiltrate close-knit, local groups that operate at first without foreign help. But in the Netherlands the intelligence services believe they have identified three broad categories of people from which actual and potential terrorists are drawn: recent arrivals, second-generation members of immigrant communities, and converts.

The vast majority of “white” converts to Islam adhere to forms of the faith that avoid violence. But some of them turn to violent Islam in a spirit of alienation from society or due to personal bitterness. Some are “rescued” from a life of petty crime, and a reasonable number convert in prison. Lacking any sense of Islamic tradition, and perhaps eager to prove themselves to their new peers, they are susceptible to extremism.

## MODELS/FRAMEWORKS

**Bayat, A. “Islamism and social movement theory.” *Third World Quarterly* 26 (2005): 891-908.**

*Source Type:* Academic Research/Journal

*Topic Area(s):* Models/Frameworks, Gaps/Recommendations

***Key Points:***

Bayat examines social movement theory in the context of Islamist movements and notes that prevailing social movement theories have often been assumed to be unitary in nature, and have been applied to technologically advanced and politically open societies. The author examines whether these theories can account for the complexities of socio-political activism in contemporary Muslim societies, which are often characterized by political control and limited communication. Islamism is described as dynamic, fragmented, and in constant motion. Social movements, according to the author, change at their own pace and direction. The conditions that fostered the emergence of the movement in the first place also may change.

The author argues for a better understanding of the dynamics of social movements, which may explain the differentiated and changing disposition of such movements as Islamism. In this context, he proposes the concept of “imagined solidarities,” which might illustrate modes of solidarity building in such closed political settings as the contemporary Muslim Middle East.

**Borum, Randy. “Understanding the Terrorist Mind-Set.” *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin* 72 (July 2003): 7-10.**

*Source Type:* Government (Domestic)

*Topic Area(s):* Models/Frameworks

*Web Link:* [http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/fbi/terrorist\\_mindset.pdf](http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/fbi/terrorist_mindset.pdf)

***Key Points:***

Borum describes how extremist ideology is often used to justify violence. He identifies four observable stages that commonly appear during the ideological development process:

- 1) Identifying some undesirable event or condition (“It’s not right.”)
- 2) Framing the undesirable condition as an injustice (“It’s not fair.”)
- 3) Holding an individual or group responsible and identifying that individual or group as the target (“You’re evil.”)
- 4) Deeming the target responsible for the injustice (“It’s your fault.”) to dehumanize them, make it easier to commit violence against them, and promote oneself as good.

Borum suggests that understanding these stages can help investigators pinpoint those who are desirable targets for recruitment (It's not fair.), to identify possible sites of indoctrination (It's not right, It's your fault.), or to recognize extremists that may use violent tactics (you're evil).

**Borum, Randy. *Psychology of Terrorism: Reference List*. Tampa, FL: University of South Florida, 2004.**

**Source Type:** Academic Research/Journal

**Topic Area(s):** International, Models/Frameworks

**Web Link:** <http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/208551.pdf>

**Key Points:**

This document contains the bibliography from Borum's, *Psychology of Terrorism* (2004). Three types of annotations are the bibliography's 300 entries: 1) original author's abstract, 2) editor's annotation, and 3) key quote summary. The bibliography was derived from a search of major academic databases focusing on professional social science literature on psychology and terrorism. The entries of most relevance to radicalization include:

- #23: Borum, "Understanding the terrorist mindset," which identifies four observable stages of ideological development and extremist behavior.
- #39: Clark, "Patterns in the lives of ETA members," which describes the radicalization of Basque youth, including recruitment processes and termination of their relationship with Euzkadi ta Askatasuna (ETA), the Basque separatist group. ETA members were not found to be alienated or psychologically distressed but instead to have the support of their families and ethnic community.
- #132: Horgan, "The social and psychological characteristics of terrorism and terrorists," examines social and psychological characteristics of terrorism and terrorists. According to Horgan, numerous pathways exist by which people enter, remain, or leave a terrorist organization.
- #158: Keppel, "Muslim extremism in Egypt," which examines international extremist movements from the 1960s onward from a historical-political perspective.
- #261: Silke, "Becoming a terrorist," which concludes that no evidence of psychopathological, genetic, or biological explanations exist for why individuals become terrorists.
- #293: Taylor & Horgan, "The psychological and behavioral bases of Islamic fundamentalism," which explores the relationship between Islamic fundamentalism and violence to understand the nature of religious and ideological control over behavior.

**Borum, Randy. *Thwarting tomorrow's terrorists*. University of South Florida, n.d.**

*Source Type:* Other (Unpublished manuscript)

*Topic Area(s):* Models/Frameworks, Gaps/Recommendations

*Key Points:*

Borum addresses terrorism by focusing on the most militant element of radical Islam. He identifies the need for systematic collection of information, data, and case studies to develop a common framework of ideologies, recruitment practices, organization, and decision making or command and control in violent political groups.

Barriers to making progress toward understanding and stopping radicalization and recruitment include:

- A lack of conceptual clarity about the radicalization process.
- Researchers do not see the need to view recruitment and radicalization as both a clandestine and public process.
- The role of root causes is often seen as “either-or” rather than a complex role of a variety of factors.
- Islam and militant Islam are often not distinguished from each other.

To make progress, Borum states, one first step may be to understand that countering militant Islam is the fundamental problem. He identifies existing theories that could be used to guide the study of radicalization processes, including social movement theory, social marketing frameworks, and public health models. Social movement theory has been used to create a framework for studying radicalization processes in a global militant jihadist movement. Social marketing frameworks may be useful for understanding voluntary behavior change. A public health model can be used to better understand radicalization and recruitment processes and derive steps for countering them.

**Clingendael Centre for Strategic Studies. *Countering Radicalization: Communication and Behavioral Perspectives*. CCSS Insight, no. 1. The Hague, Netherlands: Clingendael Centre for Strategic Studies, January 2006.**

*Source Type:* Think Tank (International)

*Topic Area(s):* Models/Frameworks

*Web Link:* [www.ccss.nl/publications/2006/20060100\\_ccss\\_insight\\_1.pdf](http://www.ccss.nl/publications/2006/20060100_ccss_insight_1.pdf)

*Key Points:*

CCSS describes radicalization as a behavioral process in which communication plays a central role. Radicalism and extremism are used interchangeably, even in dictionaries; yet in intelligence circles, extremism has an almost exclusively negative connotation while radicalization does not. Radicalism is defined as “the active pursuit of and/or support to far-reaching changes in society which may constitute a danger to (the continued existence of) the democratic legal order (aim),

which may involve the use of undemocratic methods (means) that may harm the functioning of the democratic legal order (effect). The process of radicalization is a person's (growing) willingness to pursue and/or support such changes himself (in an undemocratic way or otherwise), or his encouraging others to do so" (citing AIVD: *From dawa to jihad*).

CCSS notes that three components make up the definition of radicalism: it involves behavior, communication, and individual attitudes. To counter radicalization, all three components must be addressed. By obtaining baseline data, efforts to counter radicalization can be assessed quantitatively.

Based on consultations with intelligence and security professionals and through examination of available literature, 10 indicators related to successful social integration were identified: acceptance, welcome, integration level, entitlement, equal opportunity, social access, loyalty, citizenship/pride, acceptance of social values in society, and language competency.

CCSS describes a communication model of radicalization. Communication theory states that communication problems can occur as a result of technical, semantic, or effectiveness problems. Technical problems concern how accurately symbols of communication can be transmitted. Semantic problems relate to how accurately the desired meaning is conveyed by symbols. Effectiveness problems concern whether the received meaning changes behavior in the desired way.

According to CCSS, in countering radicalization, the transmission problem is addressed by intelligence services. They attempt to identify websites with radical content, for example, and close them down. Extremists send messages that are received as intended (semantic problem) and that result in the intended action (effectiveness problem). Yet many government messages attempting to counter radicalization are not understood by the intended audience. "Public information campaigns" are an acceptable means of transmitting information (e.g., Saudi campaign of "just say no to terrorism"). Psychological interference (or psychological noise) can occur by blocking the intended communication to high-risk groups.

CCSS writes that radicalization has traditionally been conceptualized through a socio-political model that attempts to address root causes and triggers. By changing the root causes and triggers (usually proposed as integration policies, job creation, political inclusion, improved economic situation and living conditions, improved intelligence, or similar ideas), one eliminates the cause of radicalization. Although these factors may play a role, they do not provide the solution.

In contrast, a communication behavioral model focuses on identifying targets for countering radicalization resulting from analysis of proposed indicators. High-risk groups can be identified, and progress toward countering radicalization can be assessed.

**Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS). *Identifying entry points of action in counter radicalisation: Countering Salafi-Jihadi ideology through development initiatives--strategic openings*. Working Paper, no. 6. Copenhagen, Denmark: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2006.**

**Source Type:** Think Tank (International)

**Topic Area(s):** Models/Frameworks

**Web Link:** <http://www.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/WP2006/DIIS%20WP%202006-6.web.pdf>

**Key Points:**

This paper discusses militant Salafi ideology in relation to radicalization and generates hypotheses about how development initiatives can help counter radicalization. It proposes a continuum of radicalization that spans from first encountering the Salafi-Jihadi worldview to commission of violent acts. For each part of the continuum the authors offer recommendations as to how to counter the ideology. They term these recommendations “strategic openings—entry points for action.”

Salafi-Jihadi ideology is said to act as an interpretive and prescriptive device that details the ills facing human society, the Muslim individual, and the *ummah*; Salafi-Jihadi ideology presents a simple solution to address the ills—physical jihad to defend Muslim lands against infidels.

DIIS presents research by Marc Sageman and Quintan Wiktorowicz that emphasizes the role of ideology and beliefs in conjunction with structural explanations for jihadi violence.

Several phases, identified by Michael Taarnby, preceded the Hamburg cell’s decision to stage the 9/11 attacks, including:

- 1) Individual alienation and marginalization
- 2) Spiritual quest
- 3) Process of radicalization
- 4) Meeting and associating with like-minded people (socialization)
- 5) Gradual seclusion and cell formation
- 6) Acceptance of violence
- 7) Connection with a gatekeeper (a militant connected to a terrorist network)
- 8) Going operational

DIIS proposes an alternative conceptualization that generalizes and expands on Taarnby’s phases and outlines the functions of Salafi-Jihadi ideology, including:

- 1) Interprets and prescribes (often through online publications)
- 2) Separates and obligates (often done at a personal or cell level via “active” propaganda)
- 3) Activates (through passive and face-to-face mediums)
- 4) Defends (legitimizes jihadi violence)

This process is represented as a pyramid, where the first phase is the base of the pyramid and the fourth phase is the tip of the pyramid. It represents an increasing focus on radicalization and recognizes the number of individuals who follow the ideology to its violent conclusions become more limited.

DIIS claims that the pyramid model can be used to identify strategic openings (i.e., vulnerabilities) where development initiatives could be applied to counter Salafi jihadi ideology. Three schools of thought are presented:

- The root causes explanation
- The rational actor explanation (see Robert Pape's work and Scheuer's explanation of an instrumental-political framework)
- A combination of beliefs and rational calculations that include social processes and benefits (see Wiktorowicz and Wickham)

At the individual level, religious-ideological frameworks define self-interest. At the organizational level, the culture of global jihad and strategic logic co-exist to shape violence. Thus, a multiple level model is proposed.

Recommendations for countering terrorism are derived from the model:

- Develop a counter-narrative that would attack the idea that the Salafi-Jihadi battle is part of an epic struggle between good and evil and that the West is opposed to Islam and is warring against it. The counter-narrative would tap into debates within Islam on the role and legitimacy of violence in jihad.
- Increase dialogue.
- Both counter-narratives and dialogues must be based on Aristotelian logic of *ethos*, *pathos*, and *logos*. That is, they must be credible and credibly-derived, appeal to audiences' emotions, and appeal to the facts. Thus, they must come from the Muslim world itself.

**Grier, S. and C.A. Bryant. "Social marketing in public health." *Annual Review of Public Health* 26 (2005): 319-339.**

**Source Type:** Academic Research/Journal

**Topic Area(s):** Models/Frameworks, Gaps/Recommendations

**Key Points:**

Social marketing is the use of marketing to design and implement programs to promote socially beneficial behavior change. It has grown in popularity and use within the public health community. Several case studies are described to illustrate social marketing's application in public health and discuss challenges that inhibit the effective and efficient use of social marketing in public health. Social marketing in public health is seen as achieving success in motivating voluntary behavior change. It has been used by the Centers for Disease Control, U.S. Department of Agriculture, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, and other governmental and nonprofit organizations.

Social marketing applies a marketing conceptual framework and also draws on concepts of exchange theory, audience segmentation, competition, the marketing mix, consumer orientation, and continuous monitoring. Steps in the social marketing process are:

- initial planning
- formative research

- strategy development
- program development
- pre-testing of material and nonmaterial interventions
- implementation
- monitoring and evaluation.

Education, according to the author, is effective when societal goals are consistent with the target audience's goals, the benefits of behavior change are attractive, immediate, and obvious, and the costs of changing are low.

Finally, challenges and misconceptions to social marketing are discussed, including misconceptions that it is manipulative.

**Harrison, Mark. *An economist looks at suicide terrorism*. United Kingdom: University of Warwick, n.d.**

*Source Type:* Academic Research/Journal

*Topic Area(s):* Models/Frameworks, Gaps/Recommendations

*Web Link:* [http://www.securitymanagement.com/library/Suicide\\_Harrison0803.pdf](http://www.securitymanagement.com/library/Suicide_Harrison0803.pdf)

*Key Points:*

Suicide terrorism is examined from an economic perspective. Previous applications of economics to suicide terrorism have examined the relationship between the propensity to commit suicide and such factors as lower life expectancy, age, and economic status and have viewed suicide as a strategic action to resolve internal and interpersonal conflict.

The article examines the role of individual identity in an economic context. Harrison identifies three elements that must be present for suicide terrorism to occur—young people, a social environment with conflict and oppression, and a terrorist faction. Organizing a suicide mission requires an incentive, a voluntary transaction, and a contract that is enforceable by the parties to it. A terrorist faction that competes for power in a community that is both oppressed and oppressive provides young people with an incentive to invest in an identity that is rendered more valuable by death. Thus, suicide attacks are the outcome of a voluntary agreement between the faction and the young person who trades life for identity. Suicide terrorism is regarded as the outcome of an individual rational choice.

**Inaba, Keishin.** *Conversion to new religious movements: Reassessment of Lofland/Skonovd conversion motifs and Lofland/Stark conversion process.* Japan: Kobe University, n.d.

**Source Type:** Academic Research/Journal

**Topic Area(s):** Models/Frameworks, Gaps/Recommendations

**Web Link:** [http://keishin.way-nifty.com/keishin\\_inaba\\_site/files/inaba01.pdf](http://keishin.way-nifty.com/keishin_inaba_site/files/inaba01.pdf)

**Key Points:**

This article reviews a body of literature on conversion to new religious movements, including the conversion process model (i.e., the Lofland and Stark model) and the conversion motifs model (i.e., the Lofland and Skonovd conversion motifs). Two case studies of conversion to new religious movements are used to re-examine the model and motifs. For the two movements examined, affiliation to the movement was not a conversion from another religion but rather a first involvement in a religion or religious movement. Conversion is considered as a process over a period of time rather than a single event. Using a descriptive approach, the case studies are examined to see what actually happens in conversion processes.

The Lofland/Stark model of conversion is one in which “the person must (a) experience enduring and acutely-felt tension, (b) within a religious problem-solving perspective, (c) which results in self-designation as a religious seeker, and the prospective convert must (d) encounter the movement or cult at a turning point in life, (e) wherein an affective bond is formed with one or more converts, (f) where extra-cult attachments are absent or neutralized, and (g) where the convert is exposed to intensive interaction to become an active and dependable adherent.” The Lofland/Skonovd conversion motifs represent different themes that characterize individuals’ conversion processes. The motifs are intellectual conversion, mystical conversion, experimental, affectional conversion, revivalist conversion, and coerciveness.

**Jost, John T., Jack Glaser, Arie W. Kruglanski, and Frank J. Sulloway,** “Political conservatism as motivated social cognition.” *Psychological Bulletin* 129 (2003): 339-375.

**Source Type:** Academic Research/Journal

**Topic Area(s):** Models/Frameworks, Gaps/Recommendations

**Web Link:** <http://www.wam.umd.edu/~hannahk/bulletin.pdf>

**Key Points:**

A meta-analysis, a statistical technique for combining the results of independent studies, was conducted to identify variables that predict political conservatism. The meta-analysis included over 22,000 cases from 88 samples across 12 countries. The study confirmed that several psychological variables predict political conservatism: death anxiety; system instability; dogmatism—intolerance of ambiguity; openness to experience; uncertainty tolerance; needs for order, structure, and closure; integrative complexity; fear of threat and loss; and self-esteem. The analysis, according to the author, views political conservatism as motivated social cognition and integrates several theories, including personality theory (authoritarianism, dogmatism—intolerance

of ambiguity), epistemic and existential needs theory (need for closure, regulatory focus, terror management), and ideological rationalization theory (social dominance, system justification). The author concludes that a core ideology of conservatism stresses resistance to change, justification of inequality and is motivated by needs that vary with situations and individual dispositions to manage uncertainty and threat.

**Krueger, Alan B. and Jitka Maleckova. “Education, poverty and terrorism: Is there a causal connection?” *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* 17.4 (Fall 2003): 119-144.**

*Source Type:* Academic Research/Journal

*Topic Area(s):* Models/Frameworks

*Web Link:* <http://www.krueger.princeton.edu/terrorism2.pdf>

**Key Points:**

The authors review results of public opinion surveys conducted in the West Bank and Gaza about views toward terrorism, economic conditions in those locations, and characteristics of Hezbollah militants and the general Lebanese population, and Palestinian suicide bombers. Evidence suggests little direct connection between poverty and education, or education and participation in terrorism.

Members of Hezbollah’s militant wing or Palestinian suicide bombers are at least as likely to come from economically advantageous families and have a relatively high level of education as to come from the ranks of the economically disadvantages and uneducated.

**Kruglanski, Arie W. and Shira Fishman. “Terrorism Between ‘Syndrome’ and ‘Tool.’” *Current Directions in Psychological Science* 15 (2006): 45-48.**

*Source Type:* Academic Research/Journal

*Topic Area(s):* International, Models/Frameworks

**Web Link:**

<http://www.wam.umd.edu/~hannahk/SHORTENED%20DHS%20BOSTON%20TALK,%20APRIL%202013.doc>

**Key Points:**

Two psychological views of terrorism are described. One approaches it as a “syndrome” and the other views it as a “tool.” Implications of either or both approaches can be used to better understand the psychology of terrorism.

This article presents two major psychological approaches to terrorism including the “syndrome” perspective and the “tool” perspective.

- *A syndrome.* According to this view, a set of identifiable characteristics distinguish terrorists from nonterrorists. Pathological personality traits or motivations distinguish individuals, while a distinct organizational structure and evolutionary trajectory distinguishes terrorist groups from nonterrorist groups.

The article notes, however, that research appears to show little support for this approach. No empirical evidence shows a relationship between terrorism and any of the following: poverty, education, economic conditions, or political repression. Where poverty and oppression could be contributing factors to terrorism, so could a large variety of motivations, such as religious fervor, nationalistic zeal, quest for personal glory, or greed.

- *A tool.* This approach assumes little about the uniform properties of terrorists or terrorist organizations. It suggests that terrorism is an instrument, or immoral means, used by some groups to achieve their goals. As a tool, terrorism is an action available to countries, states, groups, and individuals.

The article suggests that several implications come from the “tool” view of terrorism. One is that a moral argument must be made to convince others to not use terrorism. The ends justifies the means is the basis of this view. Terrorists and their supporters may feel morally justified, and moral relativism is implicit in the “ends justifies the means” argument. One must decide which end is more important—for or against terrorism—which is influenced by psychological factors.

The tool view implies that to discourage terrorism, the perpetrator must be convinced that terrorism as a means is ineffective, that alternative and more effective means will better achieve his goals, and that terrorism hinders attainment of other important goals. One difficulty of discouraging terrorism is that it advances the perpetrator’s goals on many levels—ideological (political, religious, ethno-nationalistic) and emotional (inflicting pain and suffering on the enemy).

**Moghaddam, F.M. “The staircase to terrorism: A psychological explanation.” *American Psychologist* 60 (2005): 161-169.**

**Source Type:** Academic Research/Journal

**Topic Area(s):** Models/Frameworks

**Key Points:**

Examining the psychological processes leading to terrorism, the author conceptualizes the terrorist act as the final step on a narrowing staircase. According to the staircase metaphor, the vast majority of people, even when feeling deprived and unfairly treated, remain on the ground floor. Some individuals climb the staircase and are eventually recruited into terrorist organizations. These individuals believe they have no effective voice in society, are encouraged by leaders to displace aggression onto out-groups, and become socialized to see terrorist organizations as legitimate and out-group members as evil.

Individuals must first perceive that there are higher levels of the staircase available to them. As they climb the staircase, they see fewer and fewer choices available until the only possible outcome is the destruction of others, or oneself, or both. The staircase consists of a ground floor and five higher levels:

- *Ground floor: Psychological interpretation of material conditions.* At the ground floor, individuals psychologically interpret the material conditions in their surrounding environment. They may perceive injustice and feel frustrated and shameful based on their evaluation of their material conditions. Perceived deprivation, not absolute material conditions, is said to play a role their interpretation of their material conditions. Poverty and lack of education have not been found to characterize captured terrorists. However, those factors may play a role in an individual's decision to proceed up the staircase. Individuals with a sense of deprivation and resulting feelings of injustice and frustration may then proceed to the first floor in an attempt to address their feelings.
- *First floor: Perceived options to fight unfair treatment.* Individuals climb to the first floor to pursue options for addressing their perceptions of injustice. Two psychological factors influence their behavior at this level—their perceptions of personal mobility for improving their own situation and their perceptions of procedural justice. People want to believe that the world is fair and that their efforts will be fairly rewarded. A range of possible interpretations exist for individuals at this stage. Those who blame others for their perceived problems proceed to the next floor.
- *Second floor: Displacement of aggression.* At this level, individuals look for opportunities to displace, or find an outlet for, their aggression. Some individuals become prepared to do so via physical or violent means, often influenced by anti-American messages that are channeled through violent religious movements (e.g., Salafi jihadist movements). Those seeking opportunities to physically displace their aggression move up to the third level to try to take action against their perceived enemies.
- *Third floor: "Moral engagement."* At this level, individuals are "morally disengaged" due to their willingness to commit acts of violence against civilians. From their perspective, however, they are "morally engaged" against their perceived enemies according to their own morality. Terrorist organizations begin to play a role at this level and are seen as a means to justify the struggle against society. Recruits for terrorist acts are persuaded to commit to the terrorist morality. They become engaged in an extremist morality of isolated, secretive organizations that declare to change the world by any means available to them.
- *Fourth floor: Solidification of categorical thinking and the perceived legitimacy of the terrorist organization.* At this level, individuals have entered the terrorist organization, with little chance to exit alive. They engage in a categorical us-versus-them thinking, seeing their actions as legitimate and moral. Recruits at this stage become long-term members of the terrorist organization and/or foot soldiers who carry out violent attacks or suicide bombs.
- *Fifth floor: The terrorist act and sidestepping inhibitory mechanisms.* Terrorist acts occur at this level. Two psychological mechanisms come into play on this floor—social categorization and psychological distance. These mechanisms are central to the terrorist group's internal dynamics and for the individual to justify taking terrorist action. Social categorization is the process of viewing civilians as part of the out-group or enemy. Psychological distance is the act of exaggerating differences between the in-group and out-group. Those who reach this floor become psychologically prepared and motivated to commit terrorist acts.

Moghaddam discusses implications of the staircase metaphor, including reforming conditions on the ground floor as a prevention mechanism, supporting contextualized democracy, and procedural justice (i.e., finding a way to give citizens a voice in their own government in a way that fits with the country's culture and customs), educating against a categorical us-versus-them thinking, and promoting dialogue to improve understanding between cultures. He concludes that current policy of focusing on individual already at the top of the staircase brings only short-term gains. The best long-term policy against terrorism is prevention, which is made possible by nourishing contextualized democracy on the ground floor.

**Munthe, Teri. "Terrorism: Not Who But Why?" *RUSI Journal* 150.4 (1 August 2005).**

**Source Type:** Think Tank (International)

**Topic Area(s):** International, Models/Frameworks, Gaps/Recommendations

**Web Link:**

<http://www.opendemocracy.net/debates/article.jsp?id=2&debateId=124&articleId=2692>

**Key Points:**

Munthe suggests that, to understand radicalization, we must understand its terms: "If we can't ask 'Who?' then we must ask 'Why?' The way we answer that question will determine our policy approach."

Munthe presents three frameworks—religious, cultural, and political—that are frequently used to explain radicalization; he suggests the flaws of each and provides a "cocktail" in exchange.

According to Munthe:

- The religious framework suggests that jihadism is the truthful expression of Islam; implicit in this is an "inevitable and perfectly natural conflict between Islam and the West...the evil 'other' and clash of the civilizations." Being modern means one is a bad Muslim; value schemes are different, with the issue of women most often cited.
- The culture framework argues that jihadism expresses a profound cultural malaise in the Muslim world; jihadism is symbolic of a massive identity-breakdown. "Multi-culturalizing" is suggested to encourage dialogues of civilizations, coming up with alternative "universalisms" which establish a core of shared values.
- The political framework argues that jihadism is due to political suffering and injustice; the main culprit is the West, which has exploited the natural resources of the Middle East to further its own growth; the West, particularly the U.S., is ultimately responsible for the continued humiliation of Palestinians and is the "ultimate tormentor" of the region; this framework is most current in Europe and most common in the Middle East and North Africa. Reform is encouraged both within and outside the Muslim world.

Munthe suggests that radicalization, Islamism, and jihadism in the Middle East are responses to three kinds of oppression or occupation, including:

- Occupation of the domestic political sphere (exclusion from the sphere of participatory politics forced 'perfectly reasonable opposition movements towards violence)
- Occupation of territory

- Occupation of global sphere of dominance (U.S. military bases in Gulf, exploitation of natural resources, Western exploitation vs. partnership)

The author suggests that the radicalization process follows different patterns in different parts of the world and, therefore, source materials should address the areas being studied; for example, French studies have used data from the West and Western Muslim countries, where the radicalization process may be very different.

Munthe proposes that a combination of political, cultural, and doctrinal approaches will work to tackle the radicalization problem: “Start with Politics, then add Culture, and finally—though it sounds dangerously politically incorrect—throw a little Islam into the mix.”

**Norwegian Defence Research Establishment. *Causes of terrorism: An expanded and updated review of the literature.* FFI/RAPPORT Report no. 04307. Kjeller, Norway: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, 28 June 2005.**

**Source Type:** Government (International)

**Topic Area(s):** Models/Frameworks, Gaps/Recommendations

**Web Link:** <http://rapporter.ffi.no/rapporter/2004/04307.pdf>

**Key Points:**

This report examines academic literature on explanations of terrorism at individual, group, and societal levels, concluding that there is no single psycho-pathological profile of a terrorist and external influences play a prominent role in understanding terrorism.

The report attempts to fill the research gap that is said to exist at the societal level—reasons why some countries and regions experience more terrorism than others. Psychological explanations addressed by the report include:

- Psycho-pathological theories (i.e., terrorists show psychopathology), for which there is no research support
- Psycho-sociological theories, which examine the influence of environment on the individual, for which some support exists.

Specifically, at the micro- and macro-societal levels, several studies support deprivation theories. Also, skewed gender balance (i.e., high proportions of unmarried males) tends to be associated with intra-societal violence and social instability. Finally, both political and criminally motivated violence are shown overwhelmingly to be the work of young unmarried men.

Additional societal explanations that have been examined include the impact of modernization, democracy, and ecology (e.g., modern circumstances make terrorist methods easy). Causes of international terrorism also are reviewed, including globalization; state and non-state sponsorship of terrorism; hegemony, bipolarity, and unipolarity in world politics; state strength; and armed conflicts.

**Post, Jerrold. “When Hatred is Bred in the Bone: The Psychocultural Foundations of Contemporary Terrorism.” Presentation, joint meeting sponsored by the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Division of International Security Studies, the RAND corporation, and the U.S. Army’s Eisenhower National Security Series, 21 November 2005.**

*Source Type:* Think Tank (Domestic)

*Topic Area(s):* Models/Frameworks, Gaps/Recommendations

*Web Link:* [http://eisenhowerseries.com/pdfs/terrorism\\_06/presentations/Post\\_2005-11-21.pdf](http://eisenhowerseries.com/pdfs/terrorism_06/presentations/Post_2005-11-21.pdf)

***Key Points:***

Post proposes that individual psychology is insufficient to understand why people become involved in terrorism and suggests that the unique cultural, historical, political context of each situation needs to be better understood.

He suggests that the most constructive framework for understanding terrorist psychology and behavior is one that focuses on group, organizational, and social psychology with an emphasis on the “collective identity.”

Terrorist leaders recruit alienated, frustrated individuals and transform them into a coherent group by providing “sense making” unifying message, to convey justification (religious, political, ideological).

Post recommends that for a counter-terrorism strategy to be effective, it should be tailored to a particular context; aim to inhibit potential terrorists from joining the group in the first place; facilitate the ability of members to exit from the group; reduce support for the group and de-legitimize its leader; and in the target states, reduce societal vulnerability to terror.

**Pyszczynski, T., S. Solomon, S., and J. Greenberg. *In the wake of 9/11: The psychology of terror*. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2003.**

*Source Type:* Book

*Topic Area(s):* Models/Frameworks, Gaps/Recommendations

***Key Points:***

This book presents Terror Management Theory, which addresses behavioral and psychological responses to terrorist events. An existential psychological model is used to try to explain why people react the way they do to the threat of death and how this reaction affects their post-threat cognition and emotion. The theory’s implications are presented for understanding and reducing the effects of terrorism and to identify possible resolutions to conflicts involving terrorism.

**Sageman, Marc. “Understanding Jihadi Networks.” *Strategic Insights* 4.4 (April 2005).**

**Source Type:** Academic Research/Journal

**Topic Area(s):** International, Models/Frameworks

**Web Link:** <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2005/Apr/sagemanApr05.asp>

**Key Points:**

Sageman has applied extensive data to dispel some common myths about terrorism. He tested theories of terrorism, including poverty, socio-economic status, age, education, occupation, religious devotion as youth, family status, criminality, lack of skills, mental health, and religious fanaticism.

Sageman’s data provides the following information: members of jihadi networks were middle-class; the average age when recruited was 25.69; many members received secular (vs. religious) education; many were highly educated; many were professional or skilled; 73 percent of the members were married and most with children; the vast majority of the members did not have a criminal background, or only had history of petty crime; and mental health issues among members were rare.

The author found that joining jihad is a bottom-up, self-organizing activity; he did not find indications of a top-down recruitment process; he found that social bonds come before ideological commitment. Joining the jihad seems to be a dynamic, group process; 68 percent was based on friendship (pre-existing); 20 percent was based kinship (sons, brothers, cousins); and 10 percent was based on discipleship. Many of the jihadi network group members studied turned to mosques for companionship versus religion.

The study shows that 70 percent of the members joined the jihad while in a foreign country, where the majority were alienated from surrounding society, cut off from cultural and social origins, and far from family and friends.

Women are the “critical invisible infrastructure of the jihad,” because they encourage friends and family to join, cement friendship bonds through marriage, and provide evaluative criterion through marriage.

Sageman concludes the following:

- Global Salafi jihad is grounded in group dynamics rather than individual pathology.
- Once in the movement, it is difficult to abandon the group without betraying close friends and/or family.
- The natural and intense loyalty to the group, inspired by a violent Salafi script, transforms alienated young Muslims into fanatic terrorists.
- Members are not evil, but evil-doers.

**Sternberg, R. “A duplex theory of hate: Development and application to terrorism, massacres, and genocide.” *Review of General Psychology* 7 (July 2003): 299-328.**

*Source Type:* Academic Research/Journal

*Topic Area(s):* Models/Frameworks, Gaps/Recommendations

***Key Points:***

This article presents a duplex theory of hate, which addresses both the structure and development. Hate is proposed to be a contributing cause of many, although certainly not all, massacres and genocides. Theories of the instigation of massacres and genocides also are reviewed, and the role of propaganda and other instigating factors are discussed. The benefits and limitations of the duplex theory of hate are reviewed, along with possible remedies.

**U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Director Frank J. Cilluffo statement on Prison Radicalization: Are Terrorist Cells Forming in U.S. Cell Blocks? 109th Cong., 2d sess., 19 September 2006.**

*Source Type:* Congressional Testimony

*Topic Area(s):* Domestic, International, Models/Frameworks, Gaps/Recommendations

*Web Link:* <http://www.gwu.edu/~newsctr/testimony.pdf>

***Key Points:***

Cilluffo presents findings from a study of prison radicalization that examined the process by which inmates become motivated to listen to or read about radical ideas, enlist in or respond to terrorist recruiting efforts, or undertake terrorist activity. He provides examples of persons who have been radicalized while in prison or spread radical ideology while serving prison sentences.

He also discusses radicalization in European prisons, claiming that European Muslims are more socio-economically marginalized than in the U.S., making them more vulnerable to radical messages. Cilluffo warns that European prison radicalization presents a containment challenge, as radicals from European prisons could travel to the U.S. or participate in U.S.-based terrorist networks.

Considering prisons to be an incubator for radical ideas, he notes several factors as having the potential to impact U.S. prison radicalization, including the following:

- Prison officials lack the manpower to oversee every prayer service or investigate every lead related to radicalization
- A lack of suitably qualified Muslim religious providers results in radical prisoners assuming religious authority
- Inmates leaving prison often have little financial or social support, making them vulnerable to recruitment by radical groups that can offer this support

Violent prison gangs and extremist Christian groups, according to Cilluffo, are compounding the threat from radical Islamic groups. Gangs and extremist Christian groups can share their

recruiting approaches with radical Muslim groups; they also may engage in mutually beneficial criminal enterprises to gain funding. Christian extremist groups (which have a history of attacks on U.S. soil) can assist radical Islamic groups in areas where they have a common cause, including hostility towards the U.S. government and Israel. Secret communication practices used by gangs and Christian extremist groups can be adapted for use by radical Muslim groups (e.g., using Arabic language and script to communicate in secret).

Roadblocks to combating radicalization in prisons are discussed by Cilluffo, including:

- Local information on radicalization is easily transferred into regional and national intelligence networks.
- Cultural/bureaucratic obstacles prevent the flow of information.
- Different levels of government have different views on “tradecraft” for countering radicalization. Some agencies want to step in early while others want to let the situation play out in order to learn additional information about the radicalization issue.
- The lack of a database to track inmates after they have served their sentence as well as prisoners or prison religious providers associated with radical groups or espousing radical views.
- The lack of standard policy for vetting religious providers, even for prisons within the same state, and the lack of standards to determine whether reading material is appropriate.

Initiatives for addressing radicalization in prisons are described, including efforts in certain California prisons as well as efforts underway by the Federal Bureau of Prisons (FBOP).

Limitations on research on radicalization in prisons are described by Cilluffo, including the lack of data, limited access provided to researchers to enter prison facilities, and lack of information-sharing among authorities due to ongoing investigations.

**U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.  
Gregory B. Saathoff statement on Religious Radicalization Behind Bars. 109<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2d  
sess., 19 September 2006.**

*Source Type:* Congressional Testimony

*Topic Area(s):* Domestic, Models/Frameworks, Gaps/Recommendation

*Web Link:* <http://hsgac.senate.gov/files/091906Saathoff.pdf>

***Key Points:***

Saathoff describes radicalization from a behavioral sciences perspective and presents prisons as a potential source for terrorist recruitment. Psychological traits of prisoners, he states, are similar to those of terrorist recruits, including disillusionment with society, violent impulses, high level of distress, lack of intrinsic religious beliefs or values, dysfunctional family system, and dependent personalities. Prisoners may see themselves as victims of society and radical groups may promise them the opportunity to seek retribution.

According to Saathoff, prior to their prison experience, inmates may have little exposure to organized religion, so they depend on the interpretations of religious officials in the prison or in

the religious literature they are given. Prisoners also have indirect access to the Internet, through which they can correspond with “50 to 500” pen pals, who disseminate information to them. Prison officials, he notes, may be unable to recognize jihadist material advocating violence or radicalized inmates taking steps toward becoming terrorists. Prison officials, inmates, and visitors can unwittingly be cajoled or bribed into transmitting radical messages and materials without being aware of their purpose, which Saathoff calls *para-radicalization*.

Obstacles to radicalization prevention include the inability to identify inmates associated with radical groups, track inmates after release, or track religious providers as they move between prisons. The lack of intelligence sharing on emerging threats is another obstacle. Saathoff also notes several limitations for researching prison radicalization—a limited awareness and understanding of the issue at the state and local level, where the vast majority of prisoners are held; and scholars are often constrained or denied permission to do research in prisons due to history of abuse by researchers using human subjects from prisons.

**Wiktorowicz, Quintan. “Joining the Cause: Al-Muhajiroun and Radical Islam.” *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* (Forthcoming).**

**Source Type:** Academic Research/Journal

**Topic Area(s):** Models/Frameworks

**Web Link:**

<http://www.yale.edu/polisci/info/conferences/Islamic%20Radicalism/papers/wiktorowicz-paper.pdf>

**Key Points:**

Wiktorowicz describes how individuals are socialized into joining radical groups. Four key processes are cited as enhancing the possibility that a person will be drawn to, and perhaps join, a radical Islamic group. The first three processes need to occur before the fourth process will occur.

- 1) **Cognitive opening:** the individual is receptive to new ideas; prior socialization experiences influence views of groups, but the person must be open to ideas of the movement in order to be recruited; can be self-initiated or active outreach (blatant or seemingly innocuous discussions).
- 2) **Religious seeking:** the individual seeks meaning through religion and searches for a meaning for their discontent; prior socialization and sense of self probably influence decision to seek religion; either self-initiated (where look into religion more deeply), or “guided religious seeking” wherein a recruiter guides the person toward the movement’s ideology, and makes the person feel empowered in making the decision to join.
- 3) **Frame alignment:** the individual decides that what the religious group has to offer makes sense to him/her and is attracted by or interested in the group.
- 4) **Socialization:** the individual participates in religious lessons or activities that facilitate indoctrination, the construction of his/her identity and changes in his/her values.

Wiktorowicz addresses a common assumption regarding radical Islam, which is that radicalization is the result of “grievances [that] are generated by socio-cultural, economic, and political strains and crises which produce psychological distress and prompt individuals to

participate in collective action.” He suggests this assumption cannot fully explain why people join radical groups because:

- Some places that have strains in above areas do not move toward radical action.
- Some people join and others do not; “even if one accepts the argument that particular constituencies have a greater propensity to join because of a shared set of grievances and psychological stress, there must be other mechanisms that help explain why this commonality translates into joining in some cases but not in others.”
- The socio-psych framework does not explain differential patterns of joining among Islamic movements.



## **GAPS/RECOMMENDATIONS**

**Askelin, Jan-Ivar. “Inadequate Knowledge of the Driving Force Behind Terrorism.”** *Framsyn Magazine* (February 2005).

*Source Type:* Government (International)

*Topic Area(s):* Gaps/Recommendations

*Web Link:* [http://www.foi.se/FOI/templates/Page\\_4405.aspx](http://www.foi.se/FOI/templates/Page_4405.aspx)

***Key Points:***

Askelin provides an overview of the discussions that were held at an international conference sponsored by the Swedish National Defence College. The purpose of the conference was to find out if researchers are addressing the right questions when it comes to terrorism.

The article quotes Taarnby indicating that thousands of Muslim communities are in Europe and that different behaviors in the different communities. He suggests that more research is needed to figure out why certain people, in certain communities, become terrorists while others do not; he provides the example that Turkish Muslims seldom become terrorists.

Conference attendees singled out the psychology of terrorism as being an underdeveloped area when it comes to terrorism research. The participants recommended that the function of terrorist groups should be studied instead of studying individuals, because terrorist groups are not homogeneous, and there is not one profile of a terrorist.

**Atran, Scott. “Genesis of suicide terrorism.”** *Science* 299 (2003): 1534-1540.

*Source Type:* Academic Research/Journal

*Topic Area(s):* Gaps/Recommendations

***Key Points:***

Atran reviews research that addresses explanations for suicide terrorism, including poverty, psychopathology, and lack of education. He concludes that none of these explanations are linked to an individual becoming a suicide terrorist and that suicide terrorists show no socially dysfunctional attributes or suicidal symptoms. Atran discusses how terrorist organizations use leadership, recruitment, and training to manipulate the terrorist’s emotions so that the organization, not the individual, benefits. He concludes that communities from which suicide attackers come can be considered a first line of defense in stopping the attacks.

Atran, Scott. "The Virtual Hand of Jihad." *Terrorism Monitor* 3.10 (May 19, 2005): 8-11.

*Source Type:* Think Tank (Domestic)

*Topic Area(s):* International, Gaps/Recommendations

*Web Link:* <http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369701>

*Key Points:*

Atran proposes that current risk management approaches to countering terrorism do not suffice in that they assume that adversaries model the world on the basis of rational choices that are comparable across cultures. When Atran interviewed would-be martyrs he found that "devotional values are not very sensitive to standard calculations of cost and benefit, to quantity or to tradeoffs across different moral and cultural frameworks. This means that traditional calculations of how to defeat or deter an enemy (for example by eliminating top operatives of threatening destruction of supporting populations) may not succeed."

According to Atran, "arguably the greatest potential terrorist threat in the world today lies with uprooted and egalitarian Muslim young adults in European cities, who provided the manpower for both the 9/11 and Madrid train-bombing attacks. Immigrant integration into European societies has always been more difficult than in America, being more state-driven or 'top-down' than community-based or bottom-up. There is no indication that any rival to Jihadism's uncompromising vision of a fair and just society—which debriefings show clearly motivate these people—is being conveyed to would-be jihadist youth in Europe."

Atran claims that al Qaeda-Central no longer exists and has been replaced with groups of friends and family who are bonded into action by Jihadist websites; he proposes that radicalization is proceeding apace with the exponential growth in Internet connections and points out that in the past 5 years, active Jihadist websites have increased from 14 to over 4,000.

Atran presents Sageman's research, which studied 500 globally-networked Jihadists and found that social networks of the militant groups were hard-to-penetrate, spontaneously formed, and self-mobilizing with few direct physical contacts with other cells; there is little homogeneity across Jihadist diaspora, which makes profiling "worthless."

He recommends the "deployment of more diverse talent and flexible tools to grapple with the variable and virtual hand of global network jihad," the need to dispel myths, and the need for other approaches to gain a better understanding of radicalization.

**Balzacq, Thierry and Sergio Carrera. *The EU's Fight against International Terrorism: Security Problems, Insecure Solutions*. CEPS Policy Brief, no. 80. Centre for European Policy Studies, July 2005.**

*Source Type:* Think Tank (International)

*Topic Area(s):* International, Gaps/Recommendations

*Web Link:*

[http://www.libertysecurity.org/IMG/pdf/TheEU\\_sFightagainstInternationalTerrorism.pdf](http://www.libertysecurity.org/IMG/pdf/TheEU_sFightagainstInternationalTerrorism.pdf)

*Key Points:*

The Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) suggests that EU policies may be compounding problems of terrorism because policies put in place do not match the diagnosis or fully comply with principles of legitimacy, proportionality and efficiency.

The EU's counter-terrorism policies have two purposes:

- A psychological aspect by which to strengthen bonds between Member States, and promote solidarity and empathy.
- Defensive and proactive political actions such as legislative initiatives.

CEPS notes that skepticism exists over whether these legal instruments are effective in curbing threats of political violence. It suggests that, "The EU needs to rethink its discourse and overall approach towards groups of its citizens (and non-citizens) who are of different racial and religious backgrounds."

**Baran, Zeyno. "Fighting the War of Ideas." *Foreign Affairs* 84.6 (November/ December 2005): 68-78.**

*Source Type:* Academic Research/Journal

*Topic Area(s):* International, Gaps/Recommendations

*Web Link:* [http://www.hizb.org.uk/downloads/pdfs/fighting\\_the\\_war\\_of\\_ideas.pdf](http://www.hizb.org.uk/downloads/pdfs/fighting_the_war_of_ideas.pdf)

*Key Points:*

Baran discusses nonviolent groups that share a similar ideology to al Qaeda but do not carry out terrorist attacks. He indicates that these groups promote radicalization by indoctrinating individuals with the radical ideology in order to prime them for recruitment by more extreme organizations where they can take part in actual operations.

Baran recommends that rehabilitating the U.S.'s image will require an "ideological campaign" that highlights values common to the Western and Muslim world.

**Bayat, A. "Islamism and social movement theory." *Third World Quarterly* 26 (2005): 891-908.**

*Source Type:* Academic Research/Journal

*Topic Area(s):* Models/Frameworks, Gaps/Recommendations

***Key Points:***

Bayat examines social movement theory in the context of Islamist movements and notes that prevailing social movement theories have often been assumed to be unitary in nature, and have been applied to technologically advanced and politically open societies. The author examines whether these theories can account for the complexities of socio-political activism in contemporary Muslim societies, which are often characterized by political control and limited communication. Islamism is described as dynamic, fragmented, and in constant motion. Social movements, according to the author, change at their own pace and direction. The conditions that fostered the emergence of the movement in the first place also may change.

The author argues for a better understanding of the dynamics of social movements, which may explain the differentiated and changing disposition of such movements as Islamism. In this context, he proposes the concept of "imagined solidarities," which might illustrate modes of solidarity building in such closed political settings as the contemporary Muslim Middle East.

**Bloom, Mia. "Mother. Daughter. Sister. Bomber." *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 61.6 (November/December 2005): 54-62.**

*Source Type:* Academic Research/Journal

*Topic Area(s):* International, Gaps/Recommendations

*Web Link:* [http://www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art\\_ofn=nd05bloom](http://www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art_ofn=nd05bloom)

***Key Points:***

Bloom discusses the phenomenon of females as suicide bombers. Although Islamic leaders were initially opposed to using females as suicide bombers, in recent years, religious terrorist groups have increasingly used women. Bloom claims that among Islamic groups, the trend toward women suicide bombers appears to be "contagious."

She also suggests that terrorist groups will continue to recruit women as long as they can offer the women an escape route from their societies and a chance to participate as a full person in something they find important. Consequently, protecting and promoting the rights of these women, during times of peace and conflict, must be a centerpiece, not an afterthought, of policy.

**Borum, Randy. *Thwarting tomorrow's terrorists*. University of South Florida, n.d.**

*Source Type:* Other (Unpublished manuscript)

*Topic Area(s):* Models/Frameworks, Gaps/Recommendations

***Key Points:***

Borum addresses terrorism by focusing on the most militant element of radical Islam. He identifies the need for systematic collection of information, data, and case studies to develop a common framework of ideologies, recruitment practices, organization, and decision making or command and control in violent political groups.

Barriers to making progress toward understanding and stopping radicalization and recruitment include:

- A lack of conceptual clarity about the radicalization process.
- Researchers do not see the need to view recruitment and radicalization as both a clandestine and public process.
- The role of root causes is often seen as “either-or” rather than a complex role of a variety of factors.
- Islam and militant Islam are often not distinguished from each other.

To make progress, Borum states, one first step may be to understand that countering militant Islam is the fundamental problem. He identifies existing theories that could be used to guide the study of radicalization processes, including social movement theory, social marketing frameworks, and public health models. Social movement theory has been used to create a framework for studying radicalization processes in a global militant jihadist movement. Social marketing frameworks may be useful for understanding voluntary behavior change. A public health model can be used to better understand radicalization and recruitment processes and derive steps for countering them.

**Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS). *The Transatlantic Dialogue on Terrorism. Initial Findings.* Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), August 2004.**

**Source Type:** Think Tank (Domestic)

**Topic Area(s):** Domestic, International, Gaps/Recommendations

**Web Link:** [http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/0408\\_transatlanticterrorism.pdf](http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/0408_transatlanticterrorism.pdf)

**Key Points:**

This article summarizes the findings from three high-level meetings held by the Transatlantic Dialogue on Terrorism; the purpose of the meetings was to assess the understanding of terrorism among experts, policymakers, and the public in the U.S. and Europe. Participants included experts from the government, academia, and think tanks.

The first meeting of the Transatlantic Dialogue on Terrorism focused on developing a better understanding of radical Islam's ideology and identity, its organizational advantages, and its spread. Participants discussed the following statements:

- Radical Islamist violence is driven, in part, by a global religious revival, and a key challenge in addressing the ideology of radical Islam is navigating the complex motivations of its adherents.
- The movement continues to gain strength over a broad geographical area, and substantial evidence of ongoing radicalization of Muslim minorities can be seen in Southeast Asia, Europe, South America, North America, and Australia.
- Radicalization is not limited to parts of the world that are economically deprived: the movement spreads easily among those who are privileged.
- Radical Islamists are now willing to partner with groups and individuals even if they are not Muslim, and it is difficult for national governments to undermine the appeal of jihadist groups for a number of reasons including that jihadists are skilled at using their deeds as propaganda, al Qaeda is constantly finding ways to penetrate all social classes, jihadists are becoming more innovative in their use of recruiting tools, and the appeal of the radical ideology is strengthened by the war in Iraq and the lack of a Middle East peace process.

The second and third meetings focused on the U.S. and European perspectives of the factors that contribute to the radicalization of ideology. The four factors that were identified include:

- 1) **Poverty:** the importance of addressing poverty is commonly recognized as part of a wider strategy to reduce the appeal of radical Islamist violence; however, U.S. and European attitudes on using development assistance as part of the war on terrorism vary; U.S. policymakers see development assistance as playing a supporting role to tactical counter-terrorism operations; Europeans believe that the goal of assistance is to alleviate suffering from poverty and hope that decrease in lure of radicalism will be a byproduct.
- 2) **Role of Muslim NGOs:** Americans and Europeans agree that reducing the power and influence of Muslim NGOs is essential, although neither has figured out how to do this; one possibility might be supporting work of international NGOs instead of those run by the U.S. or Europe.

- 3) Demographics: evidence suggests that escalations in violence correspond with large youth bulges, most notably during periods of high unemployment rates and scarcity of resources; Europeans and Americans agree that demographic issues are serious and rarely receive sufficient attention from political leaders.
- 4) Radicalization of education: participants agree that education can be important in both the growth and decline of radicalism.

The report provides the main areas of agreement between American and European participants regarding the radicalization of ideology, including:

- The threat is serious.
- The search by jihadist groups for weapons of mass destruction is a worrying trend.
- Some suggested that the U.S. sees the war on terrorism as ending in victory or defeat and that Europeans see the war on terrorism as a long-term threat to be managed; these differences were not evident in the Dialogue participants, and any differences of opinion on this question were minimal.
- No quick fixes will resolve the problem of terrorism.
- Political leaders in the U.S. and Europe have not bridged the gap and built a common sense of purpose among their people; differences in public opinion reflect less on terrorism and more on varying political and cultural contexts in the U.S. and European societies.
- Intelligence and law enforcement cooperation between the U.S. and Europe is excellent.
- The U.S. and Europe have a limited understanding of the jihadist movement and the ideologies that sustain it.

The report outlines ways of addressing underlying causes of the rise of terrorism, including:

- What is the most effective way to use development assistance to counter terrorism?
- How can the West deal with NGOs that provide social services and contribute to the spread of radical ideologies?
- How can the U.S. and Europe encourage a reform agenda for education in Muslim countries?
- How can American and European policymakers be convinced to deal with long-term demographic challenges?
- How can the U.S. and Europe take steps to make sure that WMD stay out of the hands of radical Islamist groups?
- How can the U.S. and Europe (and others) breathe new life into the Middle East peace process?

**Cilluffo, Frank and Gregory Saathoff. GWU Homeland Security Policy Institute, UVA Critical Incident Analysis Group. *Out of the Shadows: Getting Ahead of Prisoner Radicalization*: 2006.**

**Source Type:** Academic Research/Journal

**Topic Area(s):** Domestic, International, Gaps/Recommendations

**Web Link:** <http://hsgac.senate.gov/files/091906Report.pdf>

**Key Points:**

This report describes research conducted by a task force led by the George Washington University's Homeland Security Policy Institute (HSPI) and the University of Virginia's Critical Incident Analysis Group (CIAG). The task force's purpose was to study the issue of radicalization and recruitment in U.S. prisons.

According to the report, the U.S. has the world's largest prison population (over two million, 93 percent of whom are in state and local prisons and jails) and the highest incarceration rate (701 out of every 100,000). This fact presents the possibility that every radicalized prisoner could become a terrorist recruit. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales recently stated that "[t]he threat of homegrown terrorist cells—radicalized online, in prisons, and in other groups of socially isolated souls—may be as dangerous as groups like al Qaeda, if not more so. They certainly present new challenges to detection." The London transit bombings of 2005 and the Toronto terrorist plot of 2006, for example, illustrate the threat posed by a state's own radicalized citizens. By acting on international lessons learned, the U.S. may operate from a proactive position.

The report presents reasons why prisons can be considered an ideal environment for radicalization, including the high prevalence of individuals with the characteristics of typical terrorist recruits (e.g., young, unemployed, alienated, need for sense of self-importance, need to belong to a group, and need for protection); inmates have anti-social attitudes and need an outlet for their violence impulses; and many inmates have no prior exposure to Islam and therefore are vulnerable to extremist interpretation including the radical literature that is widespread in prisons.

Prison gangs may adopt "Jailhouse Islam" unique to prison that incorporates values of gang loyalty and violence. Other radical groups in prisons that may share some common ideological causes with radical Islam (e.g., hostility towards Israel) include right-wing extremists and cults; terrorists and criminal gangs have occasionally cooperated (e.g., the Madrid train bombings).

The spread of Muslim radicalization in U.S. prisons is linked to the following:

- A shortage of Muslim chaplains is due to a lack of organizations to administer a vetting process, and a reliance on non-vetted contractors and volunteers who are not required to have formal religious training.
- Standard policies for vetting religious providers at state and local levels are lacking.
- Half of prison religious services are unsupervised, run by inmates, and lack audio/video monitoring.
- Arabic language and script is used to communicate secretly and to transmit radical materials; also, extremist versions of the Qur'an are found in prisons.

- Tracking of former inmates and religious provider is lacking; providers dismissed from one facility may simply enter another.
- Radical groups with well-financed backers can offer substantial social and financial support to released prisoners.

The report describes efforts undertaken in California prisons to combat radicalization, including terrorism awareness courses; posting liaison officers at different prisons who meet monthly to share info; and the use of fusion centers to facilitate information sharing across federal, state, and local levels. Also described are efforts by the Federal Bureau of Prisons (FBOP) to address radicalization, including extensive questioning of religious service providers regarding their beliefs on violence, ties to and/or funding from foreign governments, willingness to provide services for all faiths; conducting rigorous background checks; involving Muslim chaplains in the screening process; requiring endorsement from national religious organizations; implementing best practices guidelines for approval of religious materials; mandating constant supervision of inmate-led groups; and requiring that Islamic materials be prepared by chaplains who are full-time FBOP staff. Lessons learned from Europe to control prison radicalization are also presented.

Key findings of the task force include:

- Radicalization is neither a recent phenomenon, nor unique to Islam.
- An inadequate number of Muslim religious service providers increases the risk of radicalization; the lack of social support and the inability to track inmates makes them vulnerable to recruitment.
- Information sharing between federal, state, and local prison systems is key; change has been made at the federal level but most prisoners are at state and local prisons.
- Limited manpower and funding hinder efforts to combat radicalization; the inability to follow up on leads uncovered in investigations is another obstacle.
- Radicalization is a global problem; thus, information sharing with other countries is important.
- Insufficient information about prisoner radicalization is available.
- Prison officials are stretched thin due to prison overcrowding.
- A multi-disciplinary approach to the problem is necessary; perspectives from religion, criminal justice, intelligence, law, and behavioral sciences are needed.
- Awareness, education, and training programs are needed for personnel working in prison, probation, and parole settings.
- A Congressional risk assessment is recommended.

**Eidelson, Roy J. & Eidelson, Judy I. “Dangerous ideas: Five beliefs that propel groups toward conflict.” *American Psychologist* 58 (March 2003): 182-192.**

*Source Type:* Academic Research/Journal

*Topic Area(s):* Gaps/Recommendations

*Web Link:* <http://www.psych.upenn.edu/sacsec/eidelson/ap2003.pdf>

***Key Points:***

The authors address the issue of group conflict by presenting five core beliefs held at the individual and collective (group) levels that may serve to trigger or constrain violent struggles:

- 1) Superiority: Aspects of this belief were described a century ago at the group level as ethnocentrism. A related concept is ethnocentric monoculturalism, or the belief in superiority of one group cultural heritage (e.g., history, values, language, traditions, arts, and crafts) over another’s. A collective superiority mindset has disadvantages, such as groupthink, unquestioned assumptions of invincibility, and overly optimistic calculations of military success.
- 2) Injustice: This belief pertains to perceived mistreatment by others or the world at large.
- 3) Vulnerability: This is the belief that the person is living in harm’s way.
- 4) Distrust: This belief focuses on the presumed hostility and malign intent of others.
- 5) Helplessness: The idea that even carefully planned and executed actions will fail to produce desired outcomes.

**European Commission. *Addressing the factors contributing to violent radicalisation Communication*. Brussels, Belgium: Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Counsel, 9 September 2005.**

*Source Type:* Government (International)

*Topic Area(s):* Definitions, International, Gaps/Recommendations

*Web Link:* <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52005DC0313:EN:NOT>

***Key Points:***

This report discusses the factors that contribute to violent radicalization, including a threat from Islam, reasons for radicalization, and where radicalization is occurring.

The European Commission states that the main threat to Europe and the West comes from an abuse of Islam. The Commission believes “there is no such thing as ‘Islamic terrorism,’ nor ‘catholic’ nor ‘red’ terrorism...The fact that some individuals unscrupulously attempt to justify their crimes in the name of a religion or an ideology cannot be allowed in any way and to any extent whatsoever to cast a shadow upon such a religion or ideology.”

Although the threat from an abuse of Islam is relatively recent, Europe has a long history of fighting terrorism (e.g., ETA, IRA). The ideologies range from extreme right or left, anarchist,

religious, or nationalist. Terrorist cells have been known to Europe before 11 March 04 bombings in Madrid and the 7 July 05 bombings in London.

The Commission states that today's threats are small scale organizations and groups across Member States that advocate radical beliefs or encourage young people to take social or political action against Islamophobia or perceived anti-Islamic politics of the West.

According to the Commission, those involved in radicalization may be European citizens whose motivations defy simplistic categorization. Those involved may or may not be socially-excluded, socio-economically disadvantaged, unemployed or living in deprived suburbs of large cities or inner-city housing estates, or from immigrant families.

The Commission discusses factors contributing to radicalization:

- On a broad level, some perceive injustice or exclusion, allowing them to fight under a common political, religious, national, or ethnic banner. With these group affiliations they can carry out acts of violence in the name of a cause.
- On an individual psychological level, some may feel discriminated against or may not feel accepted in society, and therefore are unwilling to identify with the values of the larger society.

The Commission says that people are exposed to new ideas through universities, the Internet, chat rooms, places of worship, political parties and organizations; and the media, including radio and satellite TV. These can help disseminate propaganda that contributes to violent radicalization, facilitates recruitment, and influences the way the public is informed.

The Commission also discusses the root causes of radicalization:

- An individual's negative feelings of exclusion exist alongside positive mobilizing feelings about becoming part of a group and taking action for change.
- Social factors such as exclusion—perceived or real—are often partial reasons given for becoming prone to radical opinion or joining radical movements. Others include feeling discriminated against, threatened identity, immigration, and globalization.
- Identity issues come into play because youth do not feel connected to the linguistic, religious, or political beliefs of their parents' generation or that of the host country.

The Commission also notes that some people, particularly young people from poorer, or excluded backgrounds, may feel a strong attraction for the "certainties" of extreme ideologies, although it is not only individuals in these categories who are found to have turned to violent radicalization.

According to the commission, the development and implementation of a European Strategy on violent radicalization will be a long-term effort. The immediate focus areas are broadcast media, the Internet, education, youth engagement, employment, social exclusion and integration issues, equal opportunities, and nondiscrimination and intercultural dialogue.

Member States have been studying the phenomenon of violent radicalization concentrating on recruitment hotspots like prisons, religious centers, and schools. The Commission believes Europe should draw on available expertise but at the same time not limit itself to it.

**Frattini, Franco. "Responses to the threat of terrorism and effects on communities."  
London: Speech at Conference sponsored by EU JHA Committees, 24 November 2005.**

*Source Type:* Government (International)

*Topic Area(s):* Definitions, International, Gaps/Recommendations

*Web Link:*

[http://europapoort.eerstekamer.nl/9310000/1/j9tvgajcovz8izf\\_j9vvgbwoimqf9iv/vgbwr4k8ocw2/f=/vh67or54zexu.pdf](http://europapoort.eerstekamer.nl/9310000/1/j9tvgajcovz8izf_j9vvgbwoimqf9iv/vgbwr4k8ocw2/f=/vh67or54zexu.pdf)

*Key Points:*

Frattini discusses the action plan developed by the European Union (EU) for mitigating the factors that create fertile ground for radicalization. Involvement and interaction with minority communities is said to be a key part of the EU's plan.

The author defines "European citizenship" as a sense of belonging to European society and sharing its fundamental common values, as opposed to a feeling of separateness based on religion or immigration status. Frattini says that European citizenship can be a confusing term, in that it is not referring to a legal status created to replace national citizenship, but rather a buzzword being used in the EU to describe the concept of common identity.

Frattini explains that the European Commission has adopted a statement called "Terrorist Recruitment: Addressing the Factors Contributing to Violent Radicalization," which outlines initiatives in various areas that have been implemented to date, including:

- Broadcast media/Internet: prohibit programs that can incite hatred; removal of terrorist propaganda from the Internet.
- Education, youth engagement, and European citizenship: develop among youth an understanding of Europe's cultural diversity and common values; promote intercultural dialogue; promote concept of active "European citizenship."
- Integration, inter-cultural dialogue, and dialogue with religions: promote a sense of European identity, not just with immigrants, but also with second- and third-generation; support inter-religious dialogue through a network of representatives from different faith groups, as well as conferences and seminars; designate 2008 as the Year of Intercultural Dialogue.
- Law enforcement/security services: engage more at the local level with youth; exchange best practices of minority recruitment in police and security services.
- Expert networks: create a network of European experts to study the root causes and responses to violent radicalization.
- External relations: dialogue with countries that could serve as breeding grounds and training sites for terrorists.

Frattini recommends that additional research is needed that looks into the root causes of violent radicalization.

**Grier, S. and C.A. Bryant** “Social marketing in public health.” *Annual Review of Public Health* 26 (2005): 319-339.

*Source Type:* Academic Research/Journal

*Topic Area(s):* Models/Frameworks, Gaps/Recommendations

***Key Points:***

Social marketing is the use of marketing to design and implement programs to promote socially beneficial behavior change. It has grown in popularity and usage within the public health community. Several case studies are described to illustrate social marketing's application in public health and discuss challenges that inhibit the effective and efficient use of social marketing in public health. Social marketing in public health is seen as achieving success in motivating voluntary behavior change. It has been used by the Centers for Disease Control, U.S. Department of Agriculture, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, and other governmental and nonprofit organizations.

Social marketing applies a marketing conceptual framework and also draws on concepts of exchange theory, audience segmentation, competition, the marketing mix, consumer orientation, and continuous monitoring. Steps in the social marketing process are:

- initial planning
- formative research
- strategy development
- program development
- pre-testing of material and nonmaterial interventions
- implementation
- monitoring and evaluation. Education is an alternative approach to social marketing is also discussed

Education, according to the author, is effective when societal goals are consistent with the target audience's goals, the benefits of behavior change are attractive, immediate, and obvious, and the costs of changing are low. Finally, challenges and misconceptions to social marketing are discussed, including misconceptions that it is manipulative.

**Harrison, Mark.** *An economist looks at suicide terrorism.* United Kingdom: University of Warwick, n.d.

*Source Type:* Academic Research/Journal

*Topic Area(s):* Models/Frameworks, Gaps/Recommendations

*Web Link:* [http://www.securitymanagement.com/library/Suicide\\_Harrison0803.pdf](http://www.securitymanagement.com/library/Suicide_Harrison0803.pdf)

**Key Points:**

Suicide terrorism is examined from an economic perspective. Previous applications of economics to suicide terrorism have examined the relationship between the propensity to commit suicide and such factors as lower life expectancy, age, and economic status and have viewed suicide as a strategic action to resolve internal and interpersonal conflict.

The article examines the role of individual identity in an economic context. Harrison identifies three elements that must be present for suicide terrorism to occur—young people, a social environment with conflict and oppression, and a terrorist faction. Organizing a suicide mission requires an incentive, a voluntary transaction, and a contract that is enforceable by the parties to it. A terrorist faction that competes for power in a community that is both oppressed and oppressive provides young people with an incentive to invest in an identity that is rendered more valuable by death. Thus, suicide attacks are the outcome of a voluntary agreement between the faction and the young person who trades life for identity. Suicide terrorism is regarded as the outcome of an individual rational choice.

**Inaba, Keishin.** *Conversion to new religious movements: Reassessment of Lofland/Skonovd conversion motifs and Lofland/Stark conversion process.* Japan: Kobe University, n.d.

*Source Type:* Academic Research/Journal

*Topic Area(s):* Models/Frameworks, Gaps/Recommendations

*Web Link:* [http://keishin.way-nifty.com/keishin\\_inaba\\_site/files/inaba01.pdf](http://keishin.way-nifty.com/keishin_inaba_site/files/inaba01.pdf)

**Key Points:**

This article reviews a body of literature on conversion to new religious movements, including the conversion process model (i.e., the Lofland and Stark model) and the conversion motifs model (i.e., the Lofland and Skonovd conversion motifs). Two case studies of conversion to new religious movements are used to re-examine the model and motifs. For the two movements examined, affiliation to the movement was not a conversion from another religion but rather a first involvement in a religion or religious movement. Conversion is considered as a process over a period of time rather than a single event. Using a descriptive approach, the case studies are examined to see what actually happens in conversion processes.

The Lofland/Stark model of conversion is one in which “the person must (a) experience enduring and acutely-felt tension, (b) within a religious problem-solving perspective, (c) which results in self-designation as a religious seeker, and the prospective convert must (d) encounter the

movement or cult at a turning point in life, (e) wherein an affective bond is formed with one or more converts, (f) where extra-cult attachments are absent or neutralized, and (g) where the convert is exposed to intensive interaction to become an active and dependable adherent.” The Lofland/Skonovd conversion motifs represent different themes that characterize individuals’ conversion processes. The motifs are intellectual conversion, mystical conversion, experimental, affectional conversion, revivalist conversion, and coerciveness.

**Jones, George. “Blair to curb human rights in war on terror.” U.K.: *Telegraph*, 8 June 2005.**

*Source Type:* Press Report

*Topic Area(s):* International, Gaps/Recommendations

*Web Link:*

<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/core/Content/displayPrintable.jhtml;jsessionid=A4OIN0B3XXXA3QFIQMGSFGGAVCBQWIV0?xml=/news/2005/08/06/nblair06.xml&site=5&page=0>

*Key Points:*

Jones states that Blair is “no longer prepared to allow Britain to be a haven for Muslim extremist whose presence in London has resulted in its being dubbed ‘Londonistan.’”

Blair has outlined 12 far-reaching curbs on civil liberties to tackle the growth of Islamic extremism, which include deportation laws to deport religious fanatics and extremists who abuse the tolerant policies in the U.K., and requirements for people who want to become citizens such as an oath of allegiance to the U.K., a citizenship ceremony, and requiring an adequate grasp of the English language.

**Jost, John T., Jack Glaser, Arie W. Kruglanski, and Frank J. Sulloway, “Political conservatism as motivated social cognition.” *Psychological Bulletin* 129 (2003): 339-375.**

*Source Type:* Academic Research/Journal

*Topic Area(s):* Models/Frameworks, Gaps/Recommendations

*Web Link:* <http://www.wam.umd.edu/~hannahk/bulletin.pdf>

*Key Points:*

A meta-analysis, a statistical technique for combining the results of independent studies, was conducted to identify variables that predict political conservatism. The meta-analysis included over 22,000 cases from 88 samples across 12 countries. The study confirmed that several psychological variables predict political conservatism: death anxiety; system instability; dogmatism—intolerance of ambiguity; openness to experience; uncertainty tolerance; needs for order, structure, and closure; integrative complexity; fear of threat and loss; and self-esteem. The analysis, according to the author, views political conservatism as motivated social cognition and

integrates several theories, including personality theory (authoritarianism, dogmatism–intolerance of ambiguity), epistemic and existential needs theory (need for closure, regulatory focus, terror management), and ideological rationalization theory (social dominance, system justification). The author concludes that a core ideology of conservatism stresses resistance to change, justification of inequality and is motivated by needs that vary with situations and individual dispositions to manage uncertainty and threat.

**Marks, Alexandra. “Islamist Radicals in Prison: How Many?” *Christian Science Monitor* (20 September 2006).**

**Source Type:** Press Report

**Topic Area(s):** Domestic, Gaps/Recommendations

**Web Link:** <http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0920/p03s02-ussc.html>

**Key Points:**

This article warns against using isolated cases of prison radicalization to dictate “what could ultimately end up being bad policy” that could play into the hands of terrorist recruiters. Differences between immigrant Muslim prisoners and American-born Muslim prisoners are shown—immigrant Muslim prisoners tend to be more radicalized than American-born Muslim prisoners, according to the article.

The lack of a coherent system for screening out extremist chaplains is discussed, along with the lack of supervision for over half of prison religious services. The article further states that it is critical for authorities to share information, especially because inmates are often moved between prisons and could bring radicalization and recruitment agendas with them.

**Munthe, Teri. “Terrorism: Not Who But Why?” *RUSI Journal* 150.4 (1 August 2005).**

**Source Type:** Think Tank (International)

**Topic Area(s):** International, Models/Frameworks, Gaps/Recommendations

**Web Link:**

<http://www.opendemocracy.net/debates/article.jsp?id=2&debateId=124&articleId=2692>

**Key Points:**

Munthe suggests that, to understand radicalization, we must understand its terms: “If we can’t ask ‘Who?’ then we must ask ‘Why?’ The way we answer that question will determine our policy approach.”

Munthe presents three frameworks—religious, cultural, and political—that are frequently used to explain radicalization; he suggests the flaws of each and provides a “cocktail” in exchange.

According to Munthe:

- The religious framework suggests that jihadism is the truthful expression of Islam; implicit in this is an “inevitable and perfectly natural conflict between Islam and the West...the evil ‘other’ and clash of the civilizations.” Being modern means one is a bad Muslim; value schemes are different, with the issue of women most often cited.
- The culture framework argues that jihadism expresses a profound cultural malaise in the Muslim world; jihadism is symbolic of a massive identity-breakdown. “Multi-culturalizing” is suggested to encourage dialogues of civilizations, coming up with alternative “universalisms” which establish a core of shared values.
- The political framework argues that jihadism is due to political suffering and injustice; the main culprit is the West, which has exploited the natural resources of the Middle East to further its own growth; the West, particularly the U.S., is ultimately responsible for the continued humiliation of Palestinians and is the “ultimate tormentor” of the region; this framework is most current in Europe and most common in the Middle East and North Africa. Reform is encouraged both within and outside the Muslim world.

Munthe suggests that radicalization, Islamism, and jihadism in the Middle East are responses to three kinds of oppression or occupation, including:

- Occupation of the domestic political sphere (exclusion from the sphere of participatory politics forced ‘perfectly reasonable opposition movements towards violence)
- Occupation of territory
- Occupation of global sphere of dominance (U.S. military bases in Gulf, exploitation of natural resources, Western exploitation vs. partnership)

The author suggests that the radicalization process follows different patterns in different parts of the world and, therefore, source materials should address the areas being studied; for example, French studies have used data from the West and Western Muslim countries, where the radicalization process may be very different.

Munthe proposes that a combination of political, cultural, and doctrinal approaches will work to tackle the radicalization problem: “Start with Politics, then add Culture, and finally—though it sounds dangerously politically incorrect—throw a little Islam into the mix.”

**National Intelligence Estimate. *Declassified Key Judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States.* Washington, D.C.: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, April 2006.**

**Source Type:** Government (Domestic)

**Topic Area(s):** Domestic, Gaps/Recommendations

**Web Link:** <http://www.cnn.com/2006/images/09/26/nie.declass.pdf>

**Key Points:**

The National Intelligence Estimate assesses that “the operational threat from self-radicalized cells will grow in importance to U.S. counterterrorism efforts, particularly abroad but also in the homeland.” Anti-U.S. and anti-globalization sentiment is on the rise and is fueling other radical ideologies. This could prompt some leftist, nationalist, or separatist groups to adopt terrorist methods to attack U.S. interests.

Four underlying factors are presented that are exploited by jihadists to fuel the spread of the jihadist movement, including:

- 1) Entrenched grievances, such as corruption, injustice, and fear of Western domination, leading to anger, humiliation, and a sense of powerlessness
- 2) The Iraq “jihad”
- 3) The slow pace of real and sustained economic, social, and political reforms in many Muslim majority nations
- 4) Pervasive anti-U.S. sentiment among most Muslims

The radicalization process is described as occurring more quickly, more wisely, and more anonymously in the Internet age, raising the likelihood of surprise attacks by unknown groups whose members and supporters may be difficult to pinpoint. The Muslim mainstream has emerged as the most powerful weapon in the war on terror and could help to facilitate the growth of a constructive alternative to jihadist ideology.

**Norwegian Defence Research Establishment. *Causes of terrorism: An expanded and updated review of the literature*. FFI/RAPPORT Report no. 04307. Kjeller, Norway: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, 28 June 2005.**

**Source Type:** Government (International)

**Topic Area(s):** Models/Frameworks, Gaps/Recommendations

**Web Link:** <http://rapporter.ffi.no/rapporter/2004/04307.pdf>

**Key Points:**

This report examines academic literature on explanations of terrorism at individual, group, and societal levels, concluding that there is no single psycho-pathological profile of a terrorist and external influences play a prominent role in understanding terrorism.

The report attempts to fill the research gap that is said to exist at the societal level, reasons why some countries and regions experience more terrorism than others. Psychological explanations addressed by the report include:

- Psycho-pathological theories (i.e., terrorists show psychopathology), for which there is no research support
- Psycho-sociological theories, which examine the influence of environment on the individual, for which some support exists.

Specifically, at the micro- and macro-societal levels, several studies support deprivation theories. Also, skewed gender balance (i.e., high proportions of unmarried males) tends to be associated with intra-societal violence and social instability. Finally, both political and criminally motivated violence are shown overwhelmingly to be the work of young unmarried men.

Additional societal explanations that have been examined include the impact of modernization, democracy, and ecology (e.g., modern circumstances make terrorist methods easy). Causes of international terrorism also are reviewed, including globalization; state and non-state sponsorship of terrorism; hegemony, bipolarity, and unipolarity in world politics; state strength; and armed conflicts.

**Perl, Raphael. *Trends in Terrorism: 2006*. Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress. The Library of Congress, 21 July 2006.**

*Source Type:* Government (Domestic)

*Topic Area(s):* Domestic, Gaps/Recommendations

*Web Link:* <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/69479.pdf>

***Key Points:***

CRS notes that “a threat from radical jihadists...is becoming more widespread, diffuse, and increasingly homegrown, often with a lack of formal operational connection with al Qaeda ideological leaders”

This report describes three trends in terrorism:

- The emergence of “micro-actors,” small autonomous cells and individuals that are becoming increasingly homegrown, resulting in a diversity in identity profiles, structures, motives, and tactics. These cells are small, decentralized, and do not have regular communication with other groups or cells.
- A trend toward sophistication in which terrorist groups use technology, such as the Internet, for a number of purposes including financing and planning
- An increasing overlap between terrorist activities and criminal activities

The report finds an increase in political influence of radical Islamist fundamentalist political parties throughout the world. The “actions and agendas of such groups could facilitate creation of a political climate in their home countries which views terrorism as a politically acceptable tactic and which might make their home countries appear as an attractive location for active terrorist groups to establish a secure base.”

The report presents a 2005 RAND study that noted the following trends:

- An increased focus on soft-civilian targets
- An ongoing emphasis on economic attacks
- A continued reliance on suicide attacks
- A desire to attack with WMD but little ability to execute these tasks
- An increase in homegrown attacks
- A possibility of future attacks from the far right, anarchists, and radical environmentalists

CRS discusses implications for U.S. policy if the trend of homegrown attacks continues: the immediate future is likely to bring a “larger number of smaller attacks, less meticulously planned, and local rather than transnational in scope.” Additionally, there is growing concern of simultaneous attacks intended to inflict economic damage.

Additionally, if terrorist acts involve local actors, the question of whether the U.S. anti-terrorism strategy and operations should reflect a more international law enforcement-oriented approach.

CRS discusses a number of recommendations for policymakers:

- Expanding programs that support foreign law enforcement training and educational exchanges
- Joint/multilateral training exercises
- The creation of bilateral or multilateral law enforcement task forces
- Exchanges of detailees among foreign and domestic law enforcement agencies
- Expansion of so-called “rule of law” programs

**Pluchinsky, Dennis. “The Global Jihad: Leaderless Terrorism?” Presentation, joint meeting sponsored by the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Division of International Security Studies, the RAND corporation, and the U.S. Army’s Eisenhower National Security Series, 20 June 2006.**

*Source Type:* Think Tank (Domestic)

*Topic Area(s):* Definition, Gaps/Recommendations

*Web Link:* [http://www.eisenhowerseries.com/pdfs/terrorism\\_06/final/final\\_2006-06-20.pdf](http://www.eisenhowerseries.com/pdfs/terrorism_06/final/final_2006-06-20.pdf)

*Key Points:*

Pluchinsky suggests that leaderless terrorism, including lone wolves and autonomous terrorist cells, is the new trend. Leaderless terrorism is an “important, growing, and permanent component of the global jihad movement.”

Autonomous terrorist cells (ATC) are defined as a group of people with similar grievances and mindsets who decide to engage in political terrorist activity but do not belong to or operate under the direct command of a larger parent organization; an example is the cell that perpetrated the London attacks in July 2005.

According to Pluchinsky, there is no “jihadist ATC template.” He suggests that each cell is constructed according to local security conditions, the degree of external connections, and the capabilities and personal dedication of cell members, which makes them virtually undetectable by design.

The threat from leaderless terrorism should be addressed by retooling analytic approaches; redirecting counter-terrorism funding; and developing effective community-based counter-extremist programs.

**Post, Jerrold. “When Hatred is Bred in the Bone: The Psychocultural Foundations of Contemporary Terrorism.” Presentation, joint meeting sponsored by the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Division of International Security Studies, the RAND corporation, and the U.S. Army’s Eisenhower National Security Series, 21 November 2005.**

*Source Type:* Think Tank (Domestic)

*Topic Area(s):* Models/Frameworks, Gaps/Recommendations

*Web Link:* [http://eisenhowerseries.com/pdfs/terrorism\\_06/presentations/Post\\_2005-11-21.pdf](http://eisenhowerseries.com/pdfs/terrorism_06/presentations/Post_2005-11-21.pdf)

***Key Points:***

Post proposes that individual psychology is insufficient to understand why people become involved in terrorism and suggests that the unique cultural, historical, political context of each situation needs to be better understood.

He suggests that the most constructive framework for understanding terrorist psychology and behavior is one that focuses on group, organizational, and social psychology with an emphasis on the “collective identity.”

Terrorist leaders recruit alienated, frustrated individuals and transform them into a coherent group by providing “sense making” unifying message, to convey justification (religious, political, ideological).

Post recommends that for a counter-terrorism strategy to be effective, it should be tailored to a particular context; aim to inhibit potential terrorists from joining the group in the first place; facilitate the ability of members to exit from the group; reduce support for the group and de-legitimize its leader; and in the target states, reduce societal vulnerability to terror.

**Pyszczynski, T., S. Solomon, S., and J. Greenberg. *In the wake of 9/11: The psychology of terror*. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2003.**

*Source Type:* Book

*Topic Area(s):* Models/Frameworks, Gaps/Recommendations

***Key Points:***

This book presents Terror Management Theory, which addresses behavioral and psychological responses to terrorist events. An existential psychological model is used to try to explain why people react the way they do to the threat of death and how this reaction affects their post-threat cognition and emotion. The theory’s implications are presented for understanding and reducing the effects of terrorism and to identify possible resolutions to conflicts involving terrorism.

**Rabasa, Angel M. *The Causes of the Radicalization of the Muslim Communities in Southeast Asia*. RAND Corporation.**

*Source Type:* Think Tank (Domestic)

*Topic Area(s):* International, Gaps/Recommendations

*Web Link:* [http://www.kaf.ph/pdfdb//109\\_pub.pdf](http://www.kaf.ph/pdfdb//109_pub.pdf)

***Key Points:***

Rabasa discusses how the process of radicalization in the Muslim communities of Southeast Asia is accelerating. External and internal factors have been catalysts for radicalization and violent extremism in Southeast Asia. The beginnings of radicalization were already present and this process was catalyzed by the worldwide Islamic revival in its Salafi and Wahhabi manifestations.

Rabasa notes that violent extremism and radicalization are separate but related—stages of radicalization are non-violent but have potential to lead to violence. While not all extremist groups are violent, they can still propagate ideologies that create conditions for violence. Additionally, a “propensity for violence is certainly a defining characteristic of the most extreme segment of the radical spectrum.” He notes that “violent extremism and the radicalization of the Muslim communities are recent phenomena.”

Individuals recruited to Salafi decide that mentors are not Islamic enough and move onto more extreme or violent groups. “This progression from religious radicalism to violent extremism is made possible by the absence of firewalls between mainstream Islam and radicals and violent extremists.”

The author notes that extremists cloak themselves in the language of religion. Radicals are a minority but have developed extensive networks across and past the Muslim world; liberal and moderate Muslims have not created similar networks.

Rabasa discusses various recruitment nodes, which include mosques, Islamic study circles, schools, universities, youth organizations, health and welfare organizations, charities, and other social clusters.

Rabasa claims that “only Muslims themselves can effectively challenge the message of radicals” but that others can empower that community. A strong international network of moderate Muslims must be created.

**RAND National Security Research Division. *A Future for the Young: Options for Helping Middle Eastern Youth Escape the Trap of Radicalization*. RAND Working Paper, WR-354. RAND National Security Research Division, September 2005.**

**Source Type:** Think Tank (Domestic)

**Topic Area(s):** International, Gaps/Recommendations

**Web Link:** [http://www.rand.org/pubs/working\\_papers/2006/RAND\\_WR354.pdf](http://www.rand.org/pubs/working_papers/2006/RAND_WR354.pdf)

**Key Points:**

RAND's Center for Middle East Public Policy and the Initiative for Middle East Youth (IMEY) sponsored a workshop in late September 2005 to address reasons why young people join Jihadist groups and possible prevention or disengagement approaches. At the initiative of Dr. Cheryl Benard, Director of IMEY, specialists from the U. S., Europe, Afghanistan, and Iraq were invited to attend, present, and discuss their findings. Participants came to the following conclusions:

- No framework exists to properly understand terrorism. A new analytical framework should be developed to help researchers understand terrorism, taking into account its complexity.
- Insufficient research exists on the developmental process of becoming a terrorist.
- Attempts to generalize and create templates for terrorism should be discouraged because each terrorist group is specific to its time and location.

Participants made recommendations for addressing the gaps of disengagement from terrorist groups, including:

- Mapping out the process of recruitment, participation, and disengagement in an attempt to understand the role of the individual, organizational dynamics, and relationship of the group with its government during each stage
- Studying the nature of discourse used to disengage members from groups
- Identifying the contexts in which disengagement processes may emerge or be accepted
- Engaging in case studies of disengagement from individual groups and then comparing across groups

**Richards, Alan. *Socio-economic roots of radicalism? Towards explaining the appeal of Islamic radicals*. Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) of the U.S. Army War College, July 2003.**

*Source Type:* Government (Domestic)

*Topic Area(s):* Domestic, International, Gaps/Recommendations

*Web Link:* <https://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/PUB105.pdf>

***Key Points:***

This monograph examines links between radicalism and a series of crises associated with modernization in the Islamic World. Richards conducts a demographic analysis of the Middle East and North Africa, finding that high unemployment and increasing poverty, among other forces, have alienated large sectors of the Muslim youth. He argues that “radicalism is a political response to the deepening economic, social, political, and cultural crisis in the Muslim world,” concluding that there are no easy solutions and current U.S. policies do little to ameliorate Mid-East conditions.

**Silke, Andrew. “Terrorist Threats to the UK Homeland: 7/7 and Beyond.” *The Journal of Counterterrorism and Homeland Security International* 11.4 (Winter 2005).**

*Source Type:* Academic Research/Journal

*Topic Area(s):* International, Gaps/Recommendations

***Key Points:***

Silke discusses how the attacks against the London subway system led the U.K. to realize that the terrorist threat in Britain had changed; namely, that there are a variety of terrorist groups and supporters operating within the country that pose a serious risk. While the U.K. has built up considerable expertise, resources, and skills confronting terrorism in the 40 years that they have been dealing with the problem, this new threat has resulted in their security branches having to acknowledge and adapt to a terrorist threat that is growing and changing.

Silke suggests that the following should be considered when developing or enhancing strategies to deal with new and emerging terrorist threats in the U.K.:

- The factors leading to Islamic extremism can provide policymakers with innovative methods for countering it.
- Proactive steps can be taken to assure that radicalization does not become uncontrollable.
- Policymakers should not myopically focus on one form of terrorism (e.g. Islamic extremism) while disregarding other groups and individuals that may become violent.
- Focus must be placed on leaderless resistance movements and lone actors because these threats pose new dangers and challenges.

**Simon, Steven. “Her Majesty’s Secret Service.” *The National Interest* 82 (Winter 2005/2006).**

*Source Type:* Academic Research/Journal

*Topic Area(s):* International, Gaps/Recommendations

***Key Points:***

Simon describes a study that was conducted by the U.K. following the terrorist attacks on Madrid. The study, entitled “Young Muslims and Extremism,” used assessments provided by the MI5 and found that extremism and violence were on the rise in the U.K.. The reasons cited for their increase were the perceived anti-Islamic bias of British social and foreign policies, the disproportionate number of Muslim arrests and detentions, and the U.K.’s participation in the U.S.-led war in Iraq. The study also found that jihadist groups were heavily recruiting educated British Muslims.

The article explains how the U.K. used both overt and covert campaigns to address the increase of extremism among young Muslims. Simon describes the public relations campaign as involving various outreach efforts as well as strict enforcement of anti-discrimination laws. The overt campaign, led by the MI5 and referred to as “Operation Contest,” placed hundreds of undercover agents into the Muslim community to monitor the activities of suspected terrorists and to map the “terrorist career path” in order to develop intervention strategies.

Simon suggests that the U.S. could wind up with a “fifth column” if it becomes complacent to the issues of extremism and radicalization. He offers the following suggestions:

- Operation Contest, initiated after radicalization had already spread throughout the U.K., could be the right fit for the U.S. domestic security environment.
- The U.S. could consider placing more weight in foreign/domestic security policies to achieve better accommodation with the Muslim community and re-engage them.
- Public information and awareness campaigns (e.g., like those following 9/11) could be used to prevent anti-Muslim bias.
- American Muslims could be consulted to advise the government on foreign policy issues and could be recruited for policy positions. Giving more authority to American Muslims could result in greater government credibility from both Muslims and non-Muslims alike.
- If the campaign against transnational Islamic terrorism were viewed as an internal security issue, then law enforcement could be integrated with terrorism prevention, not just respond. For example, the FBI could be supplemented by persons with cultural knowledge to ensure that we possess domestic intelligence and analytic capabilities about Islamic threats.
- The American public should be kept informed about the development of any full-scale domestic intelligence capacity.

**Sternberg, R. “A duplex theory of hate: Development and application to terrorism, massacres, and genocide.” *Review of General Psychology* 7 (July 2003): 299-328.**

*Source Type:* Academic Research/Journal

*Topic Area(s):* Models/Frameworks ,Gaps/Recommendations

*Key Points:*

This article presents a duplex theory of hate, which addresses both the structure and development. Hate is proposed to be a contributing cause of many, although certainly not all, massacres and genocides. Theories of the instigation of massacres and genocides also are reviewed—and the role of propaganda and other instigating factors are discussed. The benefits and limitations of the duplex theory of hate are reviewed, along with possible remedies.

**U.S. Congress. House. Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment of the Committee on Homeland Security. Donald Van Duyn statement on Islamic Radicalization. 109<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2d sess., 20 September 2006.**

*Source Type:* Congressional Testimony

*Topic Area(s):* Definitions, Domestic, Gaps/Recommendations

*Web Link:* [http://homeland.house.gov/hearings/109\\_060920\\_Radicalization/details.aspx](http://homeland.house.gov/hearings/109_060920_Radicalization/details.aspx)

*Key Points:*

Van Duyn suggests that the key to successfully stopping the spread of radicalization is identifying patterns and trends in the early stages.

The FBI definition of homegrown Islamic extremists is presented as “U.S. persons who appeared to have assimilated, but reject the cultural values, beliefs, and environment of the U.S. They identify themselves as Muslims and on some level become radicalized in the U.S. They intend to provide support for, or directly commit, a terrorist attack inside the U.S.”

According to Van Duyn, the FBI is approaching radicalization on two levels:

- 1) Attempting to understand the dynamics of individual and organizational radicalization to identify early indicators as to whether individuals or groups are demonstrating the potential for violence
- 2) Engaging in extensive outreach to Muslim communities to dispel misconceptions that may foster extremism

Van Duyn indicates that the threat from homegrown Islamic extremists is smaller in scale than that posed by overseas terrorist groups but is potentially larger in psychological impact.

He points out that the apparent increase of cases involving homegrown Islamic extremists may represent an increased sensitivity of law enforcement to activities not previously regarded as terrorism but recommends that we cannot rule out the possibility that the homegrown phenomenon is growing.

Van Duyn addresses the risks posed by extremist imams, suggesting that they can strongly influence individual belief systems by speaking from a position of authority (especially in the case of Muslim converts); can influence vulnerable followers; can spot and assess individuals who respond to their messages; and can potentially guide them into increasingly extremist circles. He says that extremist imams are active in influential venues such as prisons, publishing, online forums, audio lectures, and at Islamic conferences and institutes.

Prison radicalization is discussed. According to Van Duyn, prison radicalization occurs primarily through anti-U.S. sermons provided by contract, volunteer, or staff imams, radicalized inmates who gain religious influence, and extremist media; ideologies most often embraced by radicalized inmates include the Salafi form of Sunni Islam, sometimes called “prison Islam” and an extremist view of Shi’a Islam similar to that used by government of Iran and Lebanese Hizballah.

Van Duyn indicates that prison radicalization appears to be carried out by domestic Islamic extremist groups with few or no direct foreign connections.

According to Van Duyn, not all prison radicalization is Islamic in nature. He offers white supremacists as another type group that has been radicalizing and recruiting in prisons.

He discusses how the Internet is being used as a venue for radicalization of young Westerners. Van Duyn suggests that increased law enforcement activities following 9/11 migrated radicalization, recruitment, and material support activities online; proposes that the Internet furthers indoctrination, creates links between extremists located around the world, and may serve as a springboard for future terrorist activities.

Van Duyn proposes that overseas travel “can be a significant element in facilitating the transition from one who has the proclivity to be radicalized, and who may espouse radical rhetoric, to one who is willing and ready to act on those radicalized beliefs...foreign travel appears to provide networking that makes it possible for interested individuals to train for and participate in operational activity.” According to him, the overseas experiences of John Walker Lindh played a pivotal role in his involvement with the Taliban.

**U.S. Congress. House. Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment of the Homeland Security Committee. Steve Emerson testimony on the Homeland Security Implications of Radicalization. 109<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2d sess., 20 September 2006.**

*Source Type:* Congressional Testimony

*Topic Area(s):* Domestic, Gaps/Recommendations

*Web Link:* [http://homeland.house.gov/hearings/109\\_060920\\_Radicalization/details.aspx](http://homeland.house.gov/hearings/109_060920_Radicalization/details.aspx)

*Key Points:*

Emerson claims the radicalization of Muslim populations in Western societies has “leapt to the forefront of homeland security concerns due to the rise in homegrown terrorist plots in the U.S., Europe, Canada, and Australia.”

He points to some commonalities of radicalization, including:

- A charismatic spiritual leader
- Mosque attendance
- Internet connection
- Overseas travel

Emerson suggests that prior to radicalization, most individuals did not show evidence of extremist views or connection to terrorist activity. He indicates that American citizens who have radicalized are largely first- or second-generation Americans with a Middle Eastern or South Asian ethnic origin. Emerson also suggests that Islamic converts represent a significant portion of those who have become radicalized in the U.S., providing the Virginia Jihad Network, Folsom prison gang, and Portland 7 as examples.

Emerson describes those who have been radicalized in the U.S. as being primarily below the age of 30. He says they are often radicalized in private study circles or by people they meet at their place of worship. He indicates that an older, charismatic imam often plays a role in the radicalization process.

Emerson describes “Agents of Radicalization,” including:

- Religious leaders (e.g., charismatic leaders)
- Internet: “The Internet has become an indispensable multifaceted operational tool for terrorists in terms of psychological warfare, publicity, propaganda, data mining, fundraising, recruitment, mobilization, networking, sharing information, and coordination. Several of these functions can combine to serve the larger function of radicalization, which is crucial to the success of terrorists and extremists who propagate militant Islamism—particularly those who act on behalf of the ideology presented by al Qaeda.”

He points to domestic radical Islamic civil society groups as engendering radicalization, suggesting that they are spreading a false sense of persecution and alienation in the Muslim community in the West by labeling the war on terror as a war on Islam. Emerson indicates nearly all of the post 9/11 terrorist plots have claimed to be “avenging crimes committed by the West against Muslims.”

He suggests that the Internet has helped to spread radicalization and has increased exponentially the formation of homegrown cells. According to Emerson, the Internet “can facilitate the entire process of the development of a plot from initial radicalization to the formulation of a complex and potentially deadly terrorist attack.” He says the Internet is having a radicalizing effect on Western second-generation Muslim youths who find themselves divided between two cultures with contrasting value systems.

Emerson quotes FBI Director Mueller from June 2005, saying that there are between 5,000 and 6,000 extremist websites on the Internet encouraging extremists to initiate their own radicalization and to cultivate relationships with other like-minded persons; some provide instructions on how to contribute to violent jihad while others disseminate the extremist thought that often serves as the central ingredient in the radicalization process.

He recommends that the U.S. be vigilant in combating the ideology at home and abroad with a multi-pronged campaign that addresses root causes but not at the expense of locating and incapacitating terrorist cells, with the result of isolating, retarding, and halting radicalization.

Emerson suggests that the most viable option to prevent the spread of militant ideology is to work to insulate Muslim communities in the West from radicalizing influences through the empowerment of constructive and truly moderate Muslim leaders. “A greater effort on the part of the Muslim community must be undertaken to counter the growing trend that sees jihad as the new counterculture for a generation cause between two cultures that are often at odds.”

He advises the FBI, DHS, and State Department to be careful about the extent to which they are legitimizing radical groups that are posing as moderates and recommends that they seek out dialogue and cooperation with true Muslim moderates who do not support terrorism, justify terrorist actions, and who seek integration into America versus self-isolation.

**U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Bruce Hoffman testimony on Islam and West: Searching for Common Ground: The Terrorism Threat and Counter-Terrorism Effort. 109<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2d sess., 18 July 2006.**

*Source Type:* Congressional Testimony

*Topic Area(s):* Domestic, International, Gaps/Recommendations

*Web Link:* <http://www.senate.gov/~foreign/testimony/2006/HoffmanTestimony060718.pdf>

***Key Points:***

Hoffman notes that the adversary is dynamic, and it evolves and adjusts to our countermeasures. He describes four types of al Qaeda:

- al Qaeda Central
- al Qaeda Affiliates and Associates
- al Qaeda Locals, which consists of those with prior terrorism experience and local recruits in other countries
- al Qaeda Network, which consists mostly of homegrown radicals and local converts

Hoffman states that those who are homegrown are generally from the margins of society, often involved in petty crime, students at universities, and feel a sense of alienation.

He describes a pathway to radicalization which begins by focusing on being a good Muslim where one is then exposed to propaganda about perceived injustices and perception of a war against Islam and forms more radical opinions.

Hoffman purports that success against terrorism will require a strategy that combines tactics and breaking cycle of recruitments. It cannot be a purely militaristic endeavor but must also involve parallel political, social, economic, and ideological activities. Other areas of importance include negotiation, psychology, social and cultural anthropology, foreign area studies, and complexity theory and systems management.

**U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.  
Director Frank J. Cilluffo statement on Prison Radicalization: Are Terrorist Cells Forming  
in U.S. Cell Blocks? 109th Cong., 2d sess., 19 September 2006.**

*Source Type:* Congressional Testimony

*Topic Area(s):* Domestic, International, Models/Frameworks, Gaps/Recommendations

*Web Link:* <http://www.gwu.edu/~newsctr/testimony.pdf>

***Key Points:***

Cilluffo presents findings from a study of prison radicalization that examined the process by which inmates become motivated to listen to or read about radical ideas, enlist in or respond to terrorist recruiting efforts, or undertake terrorist activity. He provides examples of persons who have been radicalized while in prison or spread radical ideology while serving prison sentences.

He also discusses radicalization in European prisons, claiming that European Muslims are more socio-economically marginalized than in the U.S., making them more vulnerable to radical messages. Cilluffo warns that European prison radicalization presents a containment challenge, as radicals from European prisons could travel to the U.S. or participate in U.S.-based terrorist networks.

Considering prisons to be an incubator for radical ideas, he notes several factors as having the potential to impact U.S. prison radicalization, including the following:

- Prison officials lack the manpower to oversee every prayer service or investigate every lead related to radicalization
- A lack of suitably qualified Muslim religious providers results in radical prisoners assuming religious authority
- Inmates leaving prison often have little financial or social support, making them vulnerable to recruitment by radical groups that can offer this support

Violent prison gangs and extremist Christian groups, according to Cilluffo, are compounding the threat from radical Islamic groups. Gangs and extremist Christian groups can share their recruiting approaches with radical Muslim groups; they also may engage in mutually beneficial

criminal enterprises to gain funding. Christian extremist groups (which have a history of attacks on U.S. soil) can assist radical Islamic groups in areas where they have a common cause, including hostility towards the U.S. government and Israel. Secret communication practices used by gangs and Christian extremist groups can be adapted for use by radical Muslim groups (e.g., using Arabic language and script to communicate in secret).

Roadblocks to combating radicalization in prisons are discussed by Cilluffo, including:

- Local information on radicalization is easily transferred into regional and national intelligence networks.
- Cultural/bureaucratic obstacles prevent the flow of information.
- Different levels of government have different views on “tradecraft” for countering radicalization. Some agencies want to step in early while others want to let the situation play out in order to learn additional information about the radicalization issue.
- The lack of a database to track inmates after they have served their sentence as well as prisoners or prison religious providers associated with radical groups or espousing radical views.
- The lack of standard policy for vetting religious providers, even for prisons within the same state, and the lack of standards to determine whether reading material is appropriate.

Initiatives for addressing radicalization in prisons are described, including efforts in certain California prisons as well as efforts underway by the Federal Bureau of Prisons (FBOP). Limitations on research on radicalization in prisons are described by Cilluffo, including the lack of data, limited access provided to researchers to enter prison facilities, and lack of information-sharing among authorities due to ongoing investigations.

**U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Gregory B. Saathoff statement on Religious Radicalization Behind Bars. 109<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2d sess., 19 September 2006.**

*Source Type:* Congressional Testimony

*Topic Area(s):* Domestic, Models/Frameworks, Gaps/Recommendation

*Web Link:* <http://hsgac.senate.gov/files/091906Saathoff.pdf>

***Key Points:***

Saathoff describes radicalization from a behavioral sciences perspective and presents prisons as a potential source for terrorist recruitment. Psychological traits of prisoners, he states, are similar to those of terrorist recruits, including disillusionment with society, violent impulses, high level of distress, lack of intrinsic religious beliefs or values, dysfunctional family system, and dependent personalities. Prisoners may see themselves as victims of society and radical groups may promise them the opportunity to seek retribution.

According to Saathoff, prior to their prison experience, inmates may have little exposure to organized religion, so they depend on the interpretations of religious officials in the prison or in

the religious literature they are given. Prisoners also have indirect access to the Internet, through which they can correspond with “50 to 500” pen pals, who disseminate information to them. Prison officials, he notes, may be unable to recognize jihadist material advocating violence or radicalized inmates taking steps toward becoming terrorists. Prison officials, inmates, and visitors can unwittingly be cajoled or bribed into transmitting radical messages and materials without being aware of their purpose, which Saathoff calls *para-radicalization*.

Obstacles to radicalization prevention include the inability to identify inmates associated with radical groups, track inmates after release, or track religious providers as they move between prisons. The lack of intelligence sharing on emerging threats is another obstacle. Saathoff also notes several limitations for researching prison radicalization—a limited awareness and understanding of the issue at the state and local level, where the vast majority of prisoners are held; and scholars are often constrained or denied permission to do research in prisons due to history of abuse by researchers using human subjects from prisons.

**U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.  
Donald Van Duyn statement on Prison Radicalization: The Environment, the Threat, and  
the Response. 109<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2d sess., 19 September 2006.**

**Source Type:** Congressional Testimony

**Topic Area(s):** Domestic, Gaps/Recommendations

**Web Link:** <http://hsgac.senate.gov/files/091906VanDuyn.pdf>

**Key Points:**

Van Duyn states that prisons continue to present opportunities for the proselytizing of radical Islam. Prison radicalization primarily occurs through three means:

- Anti-U.S. sermons provided by contract, volunteer, or staff Imams
- Radicalized inmates who gain religious influence
- Extremist media

Radicalized inmates, according to Van Duyn, usually adhere to the Salafi form of Sunni Islam or extremist versions of Shi'a Islam similar to those found in Iran or practiced by Hezbollah. Domestic inmates who become radicalized tend not to have been born into the Muslim faith but became converts. They tend to either feel discriminated against or believe that the U.S. oppresses minorities and Muslims overseas. He notes several dangers posed by radicalized inmates, including urging other prisoners to attend certain mosques and urging them to disobey prison authorities and incite violence in the prison; they also could pass acquired terrorism skills on to other inmates.

Van Duyn provides details from cases of prison radicalization. Most radicalized inmates have not become threats to national security, and most cases of radicalization and recruitment originate from domestic extremists with few, if any, foreign connections. There is also an emerging crossover trend of gang members becoming Islamic extremists. Radicalization is most common in high population areas on the West Coast and in the Northeast.

He describes efforts by the FBI and Federal Bureau of Prisons (FBOP) to organize the Correctional Intelligence Initiative (CII). The CII is intended to improve intelligence collection to detect, deter, and disrupt prison radicalization. It also is training and providing materials on prisoner radicalization to state and local correctional institutions.

Van Duyn provides recommendations for preventing prison radicalization, including:

- Establishing vetting protocols for prison contractors and volunteers and creating databases to track them
- Improving monitoring capabilities
- Coordinating inmate transfers
- Improving information-sharing between all levels of law enforcement and prison personnel

**U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.  
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross statement on Prison Radicalization: Are Terrorist Cells Forming  
in U.S. Cell Blocks? 109<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2d sess., 19 September 2006.**

*Source Type:* Congressional Testimony

*Topic Area(s):* Domestic, Gaps/Recommendations

*Web Link:* <http://hsgac.senate.gov/files/091906GartensteinRoss.pdf>

***Key Points:***

Gartenstein-Ross presents a case study of the Al Haramain Islamic Foundation to foster an understanding of how prison access was exploited. Originally formed as a private charity in Saudi Arabia, the foundation is believed to have links to terrorism, including involvement in the East Africa embassy bombings and Bali bombings. Leaders of the foundation's U.S. branch were indicted for a money-laundering scheme that involved smuggling traveler's checks to fund the Chechen mujahideen.

He describes the Prison Dawa Program that the foundation initiated after becoming affiliated with a mosque in Oregon in 1998. The leader of its U.S. congregation recognized the potential for recruitment, referring to inmates as a "captive audience." The Al Haramain foundation forged relationships with Muslim prison chaplains, who agreed to distribute the pamphlets and questionnaires to inmates.

Gartenstein-Ross states that prisoners learned of the foundation from chaplains, word-of-mouth from other inmates, or from seeing contact information on literature sent to prisons. Prisoners initiated contact with the U.S. branch of the foundation by sending written request for Islamic literature. The foundation sent them pamphlets on the Wahhabi/Salafi version of the Qur'an and a questionnaire emphasizing concepts from Wahhabism or Salafism that could be used to gain an understanding of an inmate's theological views. The questionnaire asked for the prisoner's name, prisoner number, release dates, and address outside of prison. The foundation entered all data from questionnaires into a database, giving them the opportunity to follow up with inmates after they were released. The database contained 15,000 names in 1998.

**U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Senator Susan M. Collins statement on Prison Radicalization: Are Terrorist Cells Forming in U.S. Cell Blocks? 109th Cong., 2d sess., 19 September 2006.**

*Source Type:* Congressional Testimony

*Topic Area(s):* Domestic, Gaps/Recommendations

*Web Link:* <http://hsgac.senate.gov/files/091906SMCOpen.pdf>

***Key Points:***

Senator Collins suggests that a rise in domestic terrorist cells is inspired by, but not directly linked to, al Qaeda, representing an emerging threat to national security. She provides examples of this threat, including the Assembly for Authentic Islam (JIS) terrorist cell that formed in the Folsom State Prison in California. She poses the question of what training and skills are needed by corrections officers to be able to recognize radicalization and recruitment efforts in prisons.

**U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Javed Ali statement on Prison Radicalization: Are Terrorist Cells Forming in U.S. Cell Blocks? 109<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2d sess., 19 September 2006.**

*Source Type:* Congressional Testimony

*Topic Area(s):* Domestic, Gaps/Recommendations

*Web Link:* <http://hsgac.senate.gov/files/091906Ali.pdf>

***Key Points:***

Ali describes efforts underway by DHS's Office of Intelligence and Analysis to address how, why, and where radicalized ideas and beliefs develop over time in the U.S. Prisoners have been radicalized through charismatic religious inmates, religious volunteers and chaplains, and extremist propaganda. He summarizes research on radicalization as follows:

- Relationships between radicalization nodes and radical actor/groups vary
- Several diverse pathways exist to radicalization in the U.S.
- Radicalization is not a one-way street; certain factors can cause individuals or groups to de-radicalize, particularly in the case of prison radicalization
- Radicalization in prisons occurs predominantly among African-American inmates

**U.S. Congress. Senate. Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations. Henry A. Crumpton statement on Islamist Extremism in Europe. 109<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2d sess., 5 April 2006.**

*Source Type:* Congressional Testimony

*Topic Area(s):* International, Gaps/Recommendations

*Web Link:* <http://www.senate.gov/~foreign/testimony/2006/CrumptonTestimony060405.pdf>

***Key Points:***

Crumpton suggests that the threat in Europe is coming from smaller, more diffuse, locally-based groups that are not under al Qaeda command but share its vision of a global war against the civilized world. He states that the threat manifests itself in a variety of ways, including direct attacks (e.g., Madrid and London); recruitment of terrorists and foreign fighters for Iraq; and ideological safe havens in immigrant communities isolated from mainstream society.

Crumpton recommends that Europe needs to address the underlying conditions that terrorists may exploit to promote the growth of extremism, including:

- Local groups
- Long-standing grievances
- Communal conflicts
- Societal structures

Author suggests that terrorist networks could be countered by building alternative networks that work to find ways to meet people's social and economic needs and prevent them from gravitating toward extremist networks. The article indicates that the U.S. and the U.K. are working on cooperative efforts to address terrorist use of the Internet by collaborating to counter the extremists' message.

It is suggested that European partners find ways to build trusted networks of their own that isolate and marginalize terrorists and their supporters, galvanize revulsion against the murder of innocents, and empower legitimate alternatives to extremism. He recommends that a counterinsurgency strategy must be developed that incorporates all the tools of governance to attack the enemy, deny safe haven, and address the socio-economic and political needs of at-risk populations; enduring and constructive programs are needed to undercut extremists' ability to appeal to the disaffected.

**U.S. Congress. Senate. Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations. Dr. Robin Niblett statement on Islamic Extremism in Europe. 109<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2d sess., 5 April 2006.**

*Source Type:* Congressional Testimony

*Topic Area(s):* Domestic, International, Gaps/Recommendations

*Web Link:* <http://www.senate.gov/~foreign/testimony/2006/NiblettTestimony060405.pdf>

***Key Points:***

Niblett discusses current thinking pertaining to the factors that have led to the rise of Islamic extremism in Europe and the connections to violent terrorist action; how European governments perceive the threat and what steps are they taking to address this phenomenon; and the transatlantic dimensions of this danger.

The European experience is described as being different than the United States; in the U.S., the threat posed by Islamic extremism has been kept and addressed primarily off-shore.

He suggests that a combination of external and internal forces is driving Islamic extremism in Europe. Niblett indicates that Islamic extremism is being fed internally by the growing sense of frustration and alienation felt by second and third-generation children of the Muslim economic immigrants to Europe of the 1950s and 1960s.

Niblett indicates that the concerns of European policymakers include:

- Rioting in Paris last fall, Muslim reactions to the “cartoon” controversy, and a continuing influx of Muslim immigrants will feed an expanding popular backlash in Europe against Muslims which will, in turn, drive new converts into the extremist Islamic camp.
- A larger proportion of Muslim communities might be sufficiently radicalized or isolated to offer a popular base either of support or of acceptance within which extremists can circulate, making the work of law enforcement and intelligence services that much harder.
- Well-educated young Muslims, especially those studying in the areas of information technology, computer sciences, chemistry, and biotechnology might be drawn to the cause of Islamic extremism and put their knowledge to the service of groups wanting to carry out spectacular attacks on European soil.
- There will be a further expansion and deepening of cross-border linkages across Europe among radical Islamist terrorist groups.
- Returnees from Iraq might bring organizational and operational skills to Europe that could further increase the lethality and frequency of attacks.
- European countries offer an infinite number of potential targets for terrorist attack and that no country is immune from being considered a target.
- European police, intelligence, customs, and judicial services are not well enough organized to confront this fluid new threat.

The author presents the four broad strategies that have been undertaken by European governments to combat radicalization and extremism:

- 1) They are taking collective as well as individual steps to lessen their vulnerability to the threat posed by terrorist groups, primarily in the field of asylum law, police and intelligence cooperation, and judicial coordination.
- 2) They are trying to improve the social integration of these communities by offering better economic opportunities to young Muslims living in deprived neighborhoods.
- 3) They are combating the “ghettoization” and separation of their Muslim populations from the rest of society by instituting programs designed to force Muslim communities to integrate better with the rest of domestic society.
- 4) They are trying to break the linkages between Islamic extremist ideology and Muslim youth across Europe, with measures to block entry to or expel radical imams; criminalize incitement to hate and violence; and to encourage the growth of Islamic groups with closer ties to local communities.

Niblett suggests that progress to combat radicalization and extremism has been limited due to the following:

- EU-level cooperation against extremism and terrorism remains very difficult operationally.
- Ability to institute economic reforms that will open new job opportunities in deprived economic areas and reduce high levels of unemployment among immigrant communities are limited.
- European governments are being simultaneously driven to act and constrained by the sorts of steps they can take in promoting social integration due to the growing public hostility toward Islam and Muslim immigration.
- Many of Europe’s new “citizenship” programs seem limited in their potential impact.
- European governments face serious opposition to some of the measures that they are undertaking from domestic human rights groups and the judiciary.
- There appears to be a deeper, structural stand-off between European societies and their Muslim communities.
- Europeans themselves are uncertain about what sort of identity they are trying to promote or protect.

Niblett indicates that the U.S. government and its European counterparts have taken a number of steps to try to confront extremism and other risks posed by international terrorism, including:

- They regularly exchange intelligence information on potential threats
- They enacted Mutual Extradition and Legal Assistance Agreements to help expand law enforcement and judicial cooperation
- They instituted procedures to tackle terrorist group financing
- They have strengthened international standards for the International Port Facility and Vessel Security Codes
- They have established a policy dialogue on border and transportation security

They have stationed U.S. Customs officials at European ports as part of the U.S. Container Security Initiative

Niblett points to two broader sets of long-term concerns for U.S. interests:

- 1) Islamic extremists based in Europe could increasingly provide the spark that ignites popular revolts against moderate Arab governments in North Africa, the Middle East, and the Gulf region, or against other vulnerable allies of the United States, such as Pakistan.
- 2) European governments faced with large, growing, and restive Muslim populations might tailor or manage some of their foreign policies toward the Arab world in ways that cut across U.S. and transatlantic interests (less well-defined risk for the U.S.).

**U.S. Congress. Senate. Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Daniel Fried testimony on Islamic Extremism in Europe. 109<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2d sess., 5 April 2006.**

*Source Type:* Congressional Testimony

*Topic Area(s):* International, Gaps/Recommendations

*Web Link:* <http://www.senate.gov/~foreign/testimony/2006/FriedTestimony060405.pdf>

**Key Points:**

Fried presents the nature of Islamic extremism in Western Europe as being distinct both in its character and in its potential to threaten the U.S.

He suggests that most Muslims in Western Europe are outside the mainstream in several ways, including they are predominantly viewed as foreign; many struggle with unemployment, discrimination, and integration that has resulted in them being open to receiving an extremist message; and many have a deeply negative perception of U.S. foreign policy. Free speech is also exploited by extremists, encouraging many Muslims to have a “tolerance of intolerance.” These factors, coupled with relative freedom of movement across the Atlantic, result in a dangerous mix.

Fried presents demographics for the number of Muslims in Western Europe, indicating they comprise 5 percent of total population; this number has tripled over last 30 years and is expected to double again by 2025. There are over 5 million Muslims in France (primarily Algerians and Moroccans); over three million Muslims in Germany (primarily Turkish); over two million Muslims in the U.K. (primarily South Asians); over one million Muslims in Italy; and approximately 950,000 Muslims in the Netherlands.

According to Fried, only a small fraction of the Muslims in Western Europe have the potential to cross the critical threshold into terrorism. However, pockets of extremists exist throughout Western Europe, many where mujahideen from other wars have settled.

Fried claims that there are several groups spreading extremism across Europe by claiming to be non-violent and moderate while appealing to idealism of socially alienated and/or spiritually hungry Muslims in Europe; groups include Hizb ut-Tahir (Party of liberation), Al Muharajiroun (splinter group/radical youth movement of HT), and GSPC.

He points to a variety of factors that are driving Islamist extremism in Europe by creating a sense of alienation from mainstream, secular society, including:

- Demographics
- High rates of poverty and unemployment
- Anti-Muslim discrimination and racism
- Strict adherence by Muslims to the language and traditions of their countries of origin
- Issues of identity
- General opposition to U.S. and Western policies in the Middle East, including support for Israel and operations in Afghanistan and Iraq

He suggests that marginalized European Muslims who cross the threshold to extremism are driven by a sense of spiritual alienation, because their parents are unable to provide cultural or spiritual guidance, and their communities lack imams with modern or democratic orientation. Fried says that foreign financiers and religious activists act to “fill the spiritual vacuum” by building local mosques and supplying them with extremist imams that disconnect them from the tolerant traditions of their family’s homelands. He explains that the second- and third-generation are most susceptible to foreign propaganda and sermons that preach narrow and hateful interpretation of Islam.

Fried points out that Muslims are underrepresented in Europe’s national parliaments and governments and at the municipal level. However, he indicates there are some signs that political involvement is increasing (e.g., in the Netherlands a record number of Muslims voted and immigrants were elected to city councils).

He suggests there are few opportunities for Muslims in Western Europe to interact with or learn about Muslims in the West who are successful and have found balance between living in a Western country and practicing Islam.

Fried suggests that the two common models of integration, assimilation and multiculturalism, have both failed.

Fried explains that some European governments hesitate to take action against extremist preaching. The governments are concerned that actions may bring about issues related to free speech and fear that crackdowns could drive radicals underground. Fried indicates that while radicals are believed to have taken over several major mosques, where recruitment is occurring, that hard-core members will leave mosques for more covert places that are less likely to be under surveillance.

Extremist recruitment is described as a “bottom-up” process with no real structure or process for enlisting recruits. Often, terrorists undergo “self-radicalization” whereby they seek out extremist mentorship. Recruiters are said to organize bonding activities (e.g., camping trips and sporting activities) to seek out vulnerable second- and third-generation youths in their neighborhoods. Fried indicates that if recruiters can provide kids with social integration and spiritual meaning, they can intensify radicalization and tighten bonds.

Fried indicates that one half of the prison population in France is Muslim. He quotes a study by the French Interior Ministry that concluded that radical Muslims are actively trying to convert

other prisoners in one of three French prisons. He indicates that only 7 percent of prison chaplains are Muslim.

Describes some European government initiatives that are attempting to counter extremism. These initiatives, which are in the early stages, include:

- France has appointed a Minister Delegate for the Promotion of Equal Opportunity and a High Authority for the Fight Against Discrimination and for Equal Opportunity; trying to counter extremist recruiters through training of imams in local languages, history, and democratic values.
- The U.K. has created several committees with a mix of government and Muslim members to improve dialogue and explore measures.
- The government in the Netherlands launched a comprehensive program for empowerment and integration; the Consulate General (the U.S. embassy representative) in Amsterdam consults with local police and community leaders on efforts to connect at-risk Muslim youth with Dutch society in order to get them to resist recruiters; also launched a speaker series with veterans of civil rights movement to get better understanding of anti-discrimination law; trying to counter extremist recruiter through training of imams in local languages, history, and democratic values.

Fried recommends that the U.S. intensify its efforts to counter the extremist ideas that drive Islamist terrorism and suggests that responsibility to address the extremist trend also rests with the legitimate Muslim leadership.

He suggests that the main goal of the U.S is to improve European Muslims' understanding of the U.S. and to deepen their appreciation for the United States' success in achieving integration; the U.S. should use exchange programs and innovative outreach at U.S. embassies to help dispel misperceptions.

**U.S. Congress. Senate. Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Tom C. Korologos testimony on Islamic Extremism in Europe. 109<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2d sess., 5 April 2006.**

*Source Type:* Congressional Testimony

*Topic Area(s):* Domestic, International, Gaps/Recommendations

*Web Link:* <http://www.senate.gov/~foreign/testimony/2006/KorologosTestimony060405.pdf>

***Key Points:***

Korologos describes an approach that was used by the U.S. Embassy in Brussels to engage Muslims there. The approach—public diplomacy based on dialogue, not monologue—supplemented the extensive U.S. financial, intelligence, law enforcement, defense, private diplomatic and other initiatives directed at Islamic extremism in Europe. He suggests this model can generate a movement of mainstream Muslims across Europe to ease Muslim alienation and combat extremism.

Korologos explains that while the U.S. embassy in Belgium was performing Muslim outreach with local and elected officials, they found there was no communication between American Muslims and European Muslims in Belgium to share lessons learned (re: identity), balancing faith and nationality, and integration.

The embassy arranged to bring American Muslims together with Belgium Muslims to discuss issues of Muslim participation in society, including Muslim identity, civic life, economic opportunity, media portrayal, youth development, and women's issues. The discussions were framed around domestic issues of importance to minorities. Both groups shared good practices and success strategies. ("Muslim Communities Participating in Society: A Belgium-U.S. Dialogue" – Nov 2005)

Korologos suggests that the forum resulted in Belgian Muslims seeing the U.S. Government in a more positive light; attempted to empower Muslims to counter the alienation that can spur radicalism and terrorism; encouraged them to define themselves and Islam as peaceful and moderate; helped to enfranchise Muslims with larger society, to move Muslims from margins to the mainstream. "We discovered a new form of U.S.-sponsored Muslim engagement and empowerment—based on dialogue, not monologue among Muslims themselves."

Korologos also mentions a program where the Annenberg School for Communications at the University of Southern California and a Belgium partner are working on a program to engage Belgian and American reporters, editors, anchors, and producers on the challenges of good practices related to covering Muslims and Islam in the media.

**U.S. Congress. Senate. Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland Security of the Committee on the Judiciary. Michael Waller statement on Terrorist Recruitment and Infiltration in the United States: Prisons and Military as Operational Base. 108<sup>th</sup> Cong., 1st sess., 14 October 2003.**

*Source Type:* Congressional Testimony

*Topic Area(s):* Domestic, International, Gaps/Recommendations

*Web Link:* [http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=960&wit\\_id=2719](http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=960&wit_id=2719)

***Key Points:***

Waller presents the following information regarding prison recruitment efforts:

- Recruits are mainly black, with a growing Hispanic minority.
- Radical imams in prisons demand and are granted exclusive permission to proselytize for Islam; 80 percent of religious conversions that occur in prisons are to Islam.
- Radicals commonly prey on inmates' disaffection from society, such as by praising 9/11 and al Qaeda.
- There are disproportionate amounts of Muslim literature available in prisons, especially in the U.K.
- Islam is appealing because it "revenge[s] [inmates] upon the whole of society;" inmates believe society has mistreated them and want revenge.

Documentation of Waller's testimony provides appendices that include "Key Organizations Involved in Muslim Prison Recruitment," and several articles reporting on the paths of Europeans who were recruited into radical Islam and became terrorists.



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