



# NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

## THESIS

**MEASURING PREPAREDNESS: ASSESSING THE  
IMPACT OF THE HOMELAND SECURITY GRANT  
PROGRAM**

by

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March 2009

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HOMELAND SECURITY GRANT PROGRAM**

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## ABSTRACT

Since the creation of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2003, DHS has awarded over 28.7 billion dollars in grant funds to states, locals, territories and tribal entities to enhance prevention, protection, response, and recovery efforts. Yet, the homeland security community continues to struggle with measuring the impact these investments have made toward improving preparedness. The 2009 *Federal Preparedness Report* highlighted that the nation lacks risk-based performance metrics, accurate data, and analytical tools to measure how these investments have improved preparedness. This thesis outlines the challenges of measuring preparedness across the numerous federal funding streams, assesses the prevalence of these factors, and proposes five recommendations for improving the capacity to answer how prepared we are; how prepared we need to be; and how we close the gap between the two.

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## LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AEL	Authorized Equipment List
BSIR	Bi-annual Strategy Implementation Report
CAR	Capability Assessment for Readiness
CPA	Comprehensive Performance Assessment
DHS	United States Department of Homeland Security
EMA	Emergency Management Agency
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FS	Fire Service
G&T	Grants and Training
GA	Government Agency
GAO	United States Government Accountability Office
GAP	Gap Analysis Program
GPRA	Government Performance and Results Act
GRT	Grants Reporting Tool
HS	Homeland Security
HSGP	Homeland Security Grant Program
HSPD	Homeland Security Presidential Directive
ISIP	Initial Strategy Implementation Report
LE	Law Enforcement
LETPP	Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program
LRF	Local Resiliency Forum
NIMS	National Incident Management System
NIMSCAST	NIMS Compliance Assessment Support Tool
NPD	National Preparedness Directorate
NPG	National Preparedness Guidelines
NPS	National Preparedness Assessment
NRF	National Response Framework
ODP	Office For Domestic Preparedness
OIG	Office of Inspector General
OJP	Office of Justice Programs

PCA	Pilot Capability Assessment
PKEMRA	Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act
RRF	Regional Resiliency Forum
SAA	State Administrative Agency
SHSP	State Homeland Security Program
SLGCP	Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness
SPR	State Preparedness Report
UASI	Urban Area Security Initiative
UAWG	Urban Area Working Group
UK	United Kingdom
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction



## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Since the creation of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2003, DHS has awarded over 28.7 billion dollars in grant funds to states, locals, territories and tribal entities to enhance prevention, protection, response, and recovery efforts.<sup>1</sup> Yet, the homeland security community continues to struggle with measuring the impact these investments have made toward improving preparedness. The 2009 *Federal Preparedness Report* highlighted that the nation lacks risk-based performance metrics, accurate data, and analytical tools to measure how these investments have improved preparedness.<sup>2</sup> This thesis outlines the challenges of measuring preparedness across the numerous federal funding streams, assesses the prevalence of these factors, and proposes five recommendations for improving the capacity to answer how prepared we are; how prepared we need to be; and how we close the gap between the two.<sup>3</sup>

The Fiscal Year 2008 Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) guidance identified three overarching priorities, the first of which was the ability to measure the progress towards meeting the *National Preparedness Guidelines (NPG)*.<sup>4</sup> Performance evaluation is a requirement of federal financial assistance programs, but in the arena of homeland security, it has been challenging to quantify the impact that the grant funds have had in meeting strategic objectives, minimizing threats and vulnerabilities, and increasing capacity to respond and

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<sup>1</sup> *The Federal Preparedness Report*, vi.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, v.

<sup>3</sup> *National Strategy for Homeland Security* (2007), 43.

<sup>4</sup> *Fiscal Year 2008 Homeland Security Grant Program: Guidance and Application Kit* (Washington, D.C., United States Department of Homeland Security, February 2008), 3, [www.fema.gov/pdf/government/grant/hsgp/fy08\\_hsgp\\_guide.pdf](http://www.fema.gov/pdf/government/grant/hsgp/fy08_hsgp_guide.pdf) (accessed February 4, 2008).

recover should an event occur.<sup>5</sup> While states and locals maintain detailed records of what has been purchased, there has been little evaluation of how the equipment, planning activities, training, and exercises has translated into improved capabilities and ultimately reduced risk.

## **Methodology**

The research for this thesis was conducted using a hybrid approach including a national survey of homeland security professionals and a case study of the United Kingdom's preparedness structure. The intent of these two methodologies was to identify universal challenges faced by federal, state, and local stakeholders, explore the prevalence of these difficulties, and provide recommendations for improving the capability to measure the impact of the HSGP.

## **Analysis**

In a recent article, Josh Filler summarized the challenges facing states and locals,

urban areas can, at best, provide only an itemized list of things it purchased, such as the type of first responder equipment or the number of people trained on a given topic. However, it can not explain those acquisitions and activities in the context of value-added risk management and capability enhancements based on a comprehensive plan.<sup>6</sup>

After careful analysis of the survey results and the corresponding comments, several themes emerged. Respondents recognized that reporting requirements are a necessary responsibility, but all are looking for more

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<sup>5</sup> Electronic Code of Federal Regulations, "Title 44: Emergency Management Assistance, Part 13 Uniform Administrative Requirements for Grants and Cooperative Agreements to State and Local Governments, Subpart C-Post-Award Requirements Reports, Records Retention, and Enforcement, 13.40 Monitoring and Reporting Program Performance," <http://ecfr.gpoaccess.gov/cgi/t/text/text-idx?c=ecfr&sid=ca75ca22190756eb143a9a98bb4255fc&rgn=div8&view=text&node=44:1.0.1.1.14.3.22.16&idno=44> (accessed January 27, 2009).

<sup>6</sup> Joshua D. Filler, "Not Just a Check from Uncle Sam," *Homeland Security Today*, September 30, 2008, <http://hstoday.us/content/view/5405/201/> (accessed October 16, 2008).

efficient and cost effective ways to complete these requirements. Respondents would like to see more streamlined processes that provide value for all stakeholders. Further, reducing the number of reporting requirements and eliminating duplicative reports could minimize the resource drain on states and locals and ultimately lead to improved accuracy in reporting. Numerous respondents noted that the short submission timelines has severely hampered the integrity of the final product. By minimizing the bureaucratic red tape and amount of time and effort required to complete the reporting requirements, states and locals may have more time to dedicate to strategic planning. This in itself may improve the efficacy of reporting and provide a greater opportunity for stakeholders to make wiser investment decisions. The majority of respondents felt that additional requirements are necessary for measuring preparedness, including a national capabilities assessment, performance management system, risk management program, and analytical capabilities.

Rather than awarding federal grants to local municipalities, the United Kingdom has taken a different approach to initiating preparedness programs. The U.K. passed legislation requiring localities to adopt a risk management program that evaluates the threats, vulnerability, and underlying causes to gain a better understanding on how to prevent terror attacks, respond and manage when they do occur, and minimize the consequences post-event.<sup>7</sup> Through this legislation, the U.K. has established Local and Regional Resiliency Forums (LRFs and RRFs), a risk assessment process, and performance oversight to ensure that the national, regional, and local levels of government are effectively managing risk. While the U.K. acknowledges that not all risks can be mitigated or prevented, they have taken a proactive approach toward managing risk.

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<sup>7</sup> *The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Security in an Interdependent World*, (London, United Kingdom: Cabinet Office, March 2008), 4.

## Recommendations

This thesis made five recommendations including:

- *Initiate a National Capabilities Assessment.* A national capabilities assessment could assist state and locals with creating a realistic baseline of capabilities founded on analysis rather than perception. It could assist states and locals with defining current preparedness.
- *Initiate a National Risk Assessment.* This activity would assist states and locals with developing an analytical methodology for evaluating threat, vulnerability and consequences that may impact their jurisdiction. It would assist states and locals with defining a desired level of preparedness based on the risk to their individual jurisdiction.
- *Institute an Integrated Technology Platform.* To track progress and measure the impact grant programs are making toward the reduction of risk, an integrated technology platform should be instituted. Numerous reporting systems have been developed or are under construction that can collect a large amount of data. To convert this data into knowledge, though, it must be analyzed. These systems are not electronically connected, limiting the capacity to analyze the various reports.
- *Augment Connectivity of Federal Grant Reporting Systems.* It may be implausible to develop a single integrated reporting system since there are numerous federal agencies that administer homeland security related grant programs. An alternative would be to augment the connectivity between reporting systems. This may assist with collecting a more comprehensive picture of preparedness. The ability to analyze expenditures across programs and jurisdictions could strengthen local, state and national preparedness activities and assist with directing future grant funding towards identified shortfalls in prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery efforts.
- *Augment Federal, State and Local Partnerships.* The implementation of national assessments would take time to develop and roll-out. In the interim, the homeland security community could focus on relationship building. Following the example of the United Kingdom, states and locals could adopt the local/regional resiliency forum concept. Collectively, this group of public, private, and civilian organizations could leverage resources towards the reduction and mitigation of risk.

## **Conclusion**

The number of widgets that have purchased will not measure the success of the national preparedness movement, but rather, the strength of the relationships that have been developed in the process will. States and locals will be more apt to contribute resources if they are considered equal partners in the process. States and locals want to understand how the information collected will be analyzed, how it will be packaged for decision makers, and how the results may impact future funding. While this information is not secret, the lack of transparency creates the illusion that the analysis may negatively impact future grant opportunities. Overall, stakeholder buy-in is and will continue to be the critical component of measuring preparedness.

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## I. INTRODUCTION

We as a Nation-Federal, State, and local governments; the private sector; as well as communities and individual citizens-have not developed a shared vision of or commitment to preparedness: what we must do to prevent (when possible), protect against, respond to, and recover from the next catastrophe. Without a shared vision that is acted upon by all levels of our Nation and encompasses the full range of our preparedness and response capabilities, we will not achieve a truly transformational national state of preparedness.<sup>8</sup>

### A. PROBLEM STATEMENT

Homeland Security encompasses an expansive mission that exceeds the capabilities of any one jurisdiction, discipline and level of government. This role has forced jurisdictions to evaluate and reconcile how the additional responsibilities blend with traditional public safety duties, leaving many states and locals seeking national direction. The development of a national approach entails the integration and collaboration of multiple disciplines from the local, state, and federal levels of government, the private sector, and civilian population. The United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has worked to strengthen these partnerships and to develop a national preparedness framework for prevention, protection, response, and recovery from accidental, intentional, and natural disasters. To support the development of this system, the federal government created financial assistance programs, including the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI), State Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSP), and the Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Programs (LETPP).<sup>9</sup> The federal government also released national guidance including *The National Strategy for Homeland Security*, the *National Preparedness Guidelines (NPG)*, and the

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<sup>8</sup> *The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, February 2006), 66, [www.whitehouse.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-learned.pdf](http://www.whitehouse.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-learned.pdf) (accessed August 18, 2008).

<sup>9</sup> Each grant program was congressionally appropriated as a unique budget item. Later, they were rolled under the Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP).

*National Response Framework (NRF)* to encourage the development of collaborative partnerships and enhancement of federal, state, and local preparedness capacity.

Despite these efforts, grant funding has been and continues to be the primary means for DHS to influence state and local behavior.<sup>10,11</sup> While these federal assistance programs have provided much needed equipment and technology for public safety agencies to respond in the post-911 environment, the intense focus on spending the funds quickly has had unintended consequences. First, the Homeland Security Grant Programs (HSGP)<sup>12</sup> was initiated prior to the development of an infrastructure to implement the programs. This included the necessary staff at the federal, state and local levels to oversee and manage the programs, as well as the strategy and doctrine to guide program development. For most jurisdictions, homeland security has become an additional responsibility filled by existing personnel. Further, the distribution of grants from the federal government to states, who in turn sub-grant the majority of the funds to local jurisdictions, created additional strain on limited resources. The disbursement of funds in this manner shaped the information flow and created a separation between first responders and policy makers who were developing the strategic direction of the program.

Each level of government has faced unique challenges. The federal government had to establish processes to dispense the funds to states, guidance to define the scope of the program, and procedures for monitoring the implementation of the HSGP. As the program evolved, the program also faced

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<sup>10</sup> *Guide to Opportunities for Improving Grant Accountability* (Washington, D.C.: Domestic Working Group, Grant Accountability Project, October 2005), 1, [www.nsf.gov/oig/Grant\\_Accountability\\_Guide\\_1005.pdf](http://www.nsf.gov/oig/Grant_Accountability_Guide_1005.pdf) (accessed August 7, 2008).

<sup>11</sup> Todd Masse, Siobhan O'Neil, and John Rollins, *The Department of Homeland Security's Risk Assessment Methodology: Evolution, Issues and Options for Congress* (Washington, D.C., Congressional Research Service, February 2, 2007), <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/80208.pdf> (accessed December 30, 2008).

<sup>12</sup> The HSGP includes the State Homeland Security Grant Program, Urban Area Security Initiative, Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program, Metropolitan Medical Response System and Citizen Corps Program.

organizational restructuring. Prior to September 11, the Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP) coordinated the Nunn-Lugar Domenici Program under the Office of Justice Programs (OJP). In 2002, ODP was moved under the Office of Homeland Security and was charged with administering the State Homeland Security Grant Program. In 2003, ODP became the Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness (SLGCP) under DHS and in 2005 SLGCP was renamed Grants and Training (G&T). As of March 31, 2007 G&T was transferred to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and became the Office of Grant Programs.<sup>13</sup> The organizational restructuring impacted the allocation of resources, personnel and relationships between the federal, state and local level of government. The shifting of personnel created a loss of institutional knowledge and a greater strain on state and local resources, as new personnel had to be educated about the state and local political environment and the status of the programs.

States play the intermediary role in the distribution of funds, while at the same time maintaining authority over the implementation of programs within the state. The states have been charged with identifying the primary agency responsible for the administration of the grant programs (State Administrative Agency (SAA)). As the principle recipient of the HSGP, the states had to develop an equitable/risk-based distribution formula and dispense the grants to local jurisdictions. Since the HSGP was a new program, states had to develop administrative protocols, which entailed the monitoring of financial and programmatic performance of local jurisdictions.

As the federal and state governments struggled to develop guidance, local jurisdictions had to maneuver through a highly political environment to determine how the funds should be invested. Sub-recipients toiled in political uncertainty, because a designated lead agency or jurisdiction with legal

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<sup>13</sup> U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Implementation of the Post-Katrina Reform Act and other Organizational Changes," [http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/gc\\_1169243598416.shtm](http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/gc_1169243598416.shtm) (accessed August 16, 2008).

responsibility/authority for coordination of the critical disciplines, agencies, and jurisdictions does not exist within the geographic boundaries of a particular grant program. The identification of stakeholders, development of investment priorities and navigation through local legal/procurement processes added to the slow implementation of the program. The time-compressed environment though, forced many sub-recipients to spend the money quickly versus spending the funds towards strategic objectives. These conditions have made it extremely difficult for locals to move beyond the operational issues and focus on the strategic vision of the program. Even with the expanded 36 month performance period, initiated in the FY06 HSGP, it has been an arduous process to coordinate an agreed upon strategy, create budget, procure the necessary equipment, complete all planning, training, and administrative activities, receive and install all items, and complete the necessary paperwork to close out a single grant within the allotted time period.

Compounding the complexity of this situation, are the numerous homeland security and emergency preparedness grant programs. At the state and local level, the facilitation of the numerous homeland security grant programs causes a great strain on the staffing resources of the SAA and the sub-recipients, making it extremely difficult to evaluate the collective impact. Since fiscal year 2001, more than 90 different homeland security related grant programs have been administered by ODP, SLGCP, G&T, and FEMA. Table 1 provides the breakdown of grant programs and the fiscal years in which the programs were appropriated.



	FY01	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	FY06	FY07	FY08	FY09
Trucking Security Grant Program								X	X
Buffer Zone Protection Program (BZPP)				X	X	X	X	X	X
Operation Stone Garden Grant Program (OSGP)					X	X	X	X	X
Public Safety Interoperable Communications (PSIC)						X			
Interoperable Emergency Communications Grant									X
Regional Catastrophic Preparedness Grant Program								X	X
Emergency Operation Center Grant								X	X
REAL ID								X	X

In addition to the homeland security related grants that FEMA administers, there are additional emergency preparedness grants awarded to states and locals. Table 2 provides a list of additional emergency preparedness grant programs.

Table 2. Additional Emergency Preparedness Grant Programs<sup>17</sup>

	FY01	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	FY06	FY07	FY08	FY09
National Bioterrorism Hospital Preparedness Program (HPP) <sup>18, 19</sup>		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Bioterrorism Training and Curriculum Development Program (BTCDP) <sup>20</sup>		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Public Health Emergency Preparedness Cooperative Agreement (PHEPCA) <sup>21</sup>				X	X	X	X	X	X

<sup>17</sup> FY 2007 Homeland Security Grant Program: Supplemental Resource: Federal Preparedness Programs, 2-3.

<sup>18</sup> U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, "The Hospital Preparedness Program," <http://www.hhs.gov/aspr/opeo/hpp/> (accessed January 12, 2009).

<sup>19</sup> Lt. Commander Sumner L. Bossler, "National Bioterrorism Hospital Preparedness Program: Surge Capacity and Health System Preparedness Surge Capacity," (webconference, July 13, 2004), slide 2, <http://www.ahrq.gov/news/ulp/btsurgefacil/bossltxt.htm> (accessed January 12, 2009).

<sup>20</sup> U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, "Bioterrorism Training and Curriculum Development Program," <http://www.hhs.gov/aspr/opeo/nhpp/btcdp/btcdp.html> (accessed January 12, 2009).

<sup>21</sup> Center for Disease Control and Prevention, "Emergency Preparedness and Response," <http://emergency.cdc.gov/cotper/coopagreement/> (accessed January 12, 2009).

	FY01	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	FY06	FY07	FY08	FY09
FEMA Pre-Disaster Mitigation Grants <sup>22</sup>			X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Program (JAG) <sup>23</sup>					X	X	X	X	
Hazard Materials Emergency Preparedness Grant Program (HMEP) <sup>24</sup>	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Assistance to Firefighters Grant (AFG) <sup>25</sup>	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

Each grant program has unique guidance packages, funding restrictions, and reporting requirements, as mandated by the congressional appropriation and directed by the federal administrative agency. This has created additional complexity in evaluating the impact that federal grant dollars have made towards minimizing gaps and shortfalls in prevention and protection efforts and the development of response and recovery capabilities.

There is a reoccurring theme within the national guidance, the need for a “capabilities-based process for making informed decisions about managing homeland risk and prioritizing homeland security investments across disciplines, jurisdictions, regions, and levels of government.”<sup>26</sup> After five fiscal years of homeland security grant funding, the nation has spent an enormous amount of money, but the federal, state, and local levels of government lack a mechanism to measure the impact that these investments have made. While states and locals maintain detailed records of what has been purchased, there has been

<sup>22</sup> Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Pre-disaster Mitigation Grant Program,” <http://www.fema.gov/government/grant/pdm/index.shtm> (accessed January 12, 2009).

<sup>23</sup> Bureau of Justice Assistance, “Justice Assistance Grant Program,” <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/grant/jag.html> (accessed January 12, 2009).

<sup>24</sup> U.S. Department of Transportation Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, “HMEP Grant Program Fact Sheet,” <http://phmsa.dot.gov/portal/site/PHMSA/menuitem.ebdc7a8a7e39f2e55cf2031050248a0c/?vgnextoid=2b133074e1db8110VgnVCM1000009ed07898RCRD&vgnextchannel=b9623074e1db8110VgnVCM1000009ed07898RCRD&vgnextfmt=print> (accessed January 9, 2009).

<sup>25</sup> Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Assistance to Firefighters Grant,” [www.firegrantsupport.com/afg/guidance/](http://www.firegrantsupport.com/afg/guidance/) (accessed January 12, 2009).

<sup>26</sup> *National Strategy for Homeland Security* (Washington, D.C.: Homeland Security Council, October 2007), 43.

little evaluation of how the equipment, planning activities, training, and exercises have translated into improved capabilities and/or reduced risk. As early as 2004, the Department of Justice, Office of Inspector General (OIG) reported that ODP, lacked a performance measurement system to “create a national picture of the increases in first responder preparedness and response capabilities and that can demonstrate the overall success of its grant programs.”<sup>27</sup> Four years later, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported that this is still a major concern requiring congressional attention.

DHS has taken steps to establish goals, gather information, and measure progress, yet its monitoring of grant expenditures does not provide a means to measure the achievement of desired program outcomes to strengthen the nation’s homeland security capabilities. We still know little about how states have used federal funds to build their capabilities or reduce risks. This is because neither FEMA nor its predecessor for grant management (from fiscal years 2003 through 2007) has yet developed a system to compile grant information in a manner that allows for effective analysis of the obligation, expenditure, and use of homeland security grants funds. For example, FEMA officials said that they currently rely on the grant monitoring process to assess the extent that states and urban areas are building capabilities. However, these efforts do not provide information on how states and localities finance their efforts in this area, how federal funds have been used, the extent to which federal funds supplement or supplant ongoing state and local expenditures, and the effectiveness of those funds in improving the nation’s capabilities or reducing risk.<sup>28</sup>

Performance evaluation is a requirement of federal financial assistance programs, but in the arena of homeland security, it has been challenging to quantify the impact that the grant funds have had in meeting strategic objectives,

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<sup>27</sup> *An Audit of Distributing and Spending “First Responder” Grant Funds* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, March 2004), 17, [www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/mgmt/rpts/OIG\\_ODP\\_03-04.pdf](http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/mgmt/rpts/OIG_ODP_03-04.pdf) (accessed August 7, 2008).

<sup>28</sup> GAO, “Homeland Security: DHS Improved its Risk-Based Grant Programs’ Allocation and Management Methods, but Measuring Programs’ Impact on National Capabilities Remains a Challenge,” GAO-08-488T, March 11, 2008, [www.gao.gov/new.items/d08488t.pdf](http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08488t.pdf) (accessed June 5, 2008).



minimizing threats and vulnerabilities, and increasing capacity to respond and recover should an event occur.<sup>29</sup> Former FEMA Administrator, David Paulison, acknowledged the difficulty of measuring progress of the HSGP.

We've put a lot of money in the system and now we want to see what type of impact we've had and what our recognition in Congress is going to be to move on with the project.<sup>30</sup>

Since the creation of the DHS in 2003, DHS has awarded over 28.7 billion dollars<sup>31</sup> in grant funds to states, locals, territories and tribal entities to enhance prevention, protection, response, and recovery efforts.<sup>3233</sup> In fiscal year 2008, the Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP), DHS identified three overarching priorities for the implementation of all grant programs, the first of which was the ability to measure the progress towards meeting the *National Preparedness Guidelines (NPG)*.<sup>34</sup> Designed to assist homeland security professionals prioritize preparedness efforts, the NPG is composed of the national preparedness vision, the fifteen *National Planning Scenarios, Universal Task List (UTL)*, and *Target Capability List (TCL)*. A recent CNA report, though, highlighted that top-down frameworks, such as the NPG, actually lead to a weakened

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<sup>29</sup> Electronic Code of Federal Regulations, "Title 44: Emergency Management Assistance, Part 13 Uniform Administrative Requirements for Grants and Cooperative Agreements to State and Local Governments, Subpart C-Post-Award Requirements Reports, Records Retention, and Enforcement, 13.40 Monitoring and Reporting Program Performance," <http://ecfr.gpoaccess.gov/cgi/t/text/text-idx?c=ecfr&sid=ca75ca22190756eb143a9a98bb4255fc&rqn=div8&view=text&node=44:1.0.1.1.14.3.22.16&idno=44> (accessed January 27, 2009).

<sup>30</sup> Corey McKenna, "Grants Gaining Traction on Reducing Risk, Chertoff Says," *Government Technology*, July 31, 2008, [www.govtech.com/gt/print\\_article.php?id=382935](http://www.govtech.com/gt/print_article.php?id=382935) (accessed August 1, 2008).

<sup>31</sup> As of March of 2009, the FY 2009 Preparedness grants have been appropriated, but have not been awarded to state and local jurisdictions.

<sup>32</sup> Federal Emergency Management Agency, "DHS Announces Release of Application Guidance for over \$3 Billion in Grant Programs."

<sup>33</sup> Federal Emergency Management Agency, "DHS Announces Fiscal Year 2009 Grant Guidance for over \$3 Billion in Preparedness Grant Programs," [www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr\\_1225900531284.shtm](http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_1225900531284.shtm) (November 12, 2008).

<sup>34</sup> *Fiscal Year 2008 Homeland Security Grant Program: Guidance and Application Kit* (Washington, D.C., United States Department of Homeland Security, February 2008), 3, [www.fema.gov/pdf/government/grant/hsgp/fy08\\_hsgp\\_guide.pdf](http://www.fema.gov/pdf/government/grant/hsgp/fy08_hsgp_guide.pdf) (accessed February 4, 2008).

preparedness system because they do not generate action among the field personnel who complete the required security related tasks.<sup>35</sup> This can be seen with the *TCL and UTL*. Both guidance documents are cumbersome for state and local stakeholders to evaluate their individual jurisdiction capabilities against a national standard. Each region, state, and locality faces unique threats and hazards, making it extremely difficult to overlay a universal measurement system. States and locals also struggle to plan against the *National Planning Scenarios* due to the catastrophic nature of the scenarios. These events often overwhelm local capacity and force the planning entities to focus on the integration of state and federal assets.

## **B. RESEARCH QUESTION**

After five years of HSGP spending, it is apparent that all levels of government struggle to define the return on investment. While all grant managers can provide a detailed list of how the funds were used to support equipment, planning, training and exercise activities, the current system lacks a means to translate how investments have increased local, state and national preparedness. A recent Government Accountability Office report noted that DHS does not have a monitoring process in place to measure the impact of homeland security grant programs.<sup>36</sup> The federal grant guidance packages have directed states and locals to develop measurable performance metrics, but there is currently no mechanism for states and locals to evaluate preparedness activities across the numerous homeland security grant related programs. DHS and FEMA have taken steps to increase accountability and oversight of homeland security spending, by requiring Strategies, Enhancement Plans and State Preparedness

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<sup>35</sup> Robert Bach and David J. Kaufman, *A Social Infrastructure for Hometown Security: Evolving the Homeland Security Paradigm* (Washington, D.C.: CNA Analysis and Solutions, January 23, 2009), 5, [www.cna.org/documents/Social%20Infrastructure%20for%20Hometown%20Security.pdf](http://www.cna.org/documents/Social%20Infrastructure%20for%20Hometown%20Security.pdf) (accessed January 29, 2009).

<sup>36</sup> GAO, "Homeland Security: DHS Improved its Risk-Based Grant Programs' Allocation and Management Methods, But Measuring Programs' Impact on National Capabilities Remains a Challenge," *GAO-08-488T*, 18.

Reports, and investment justifications, yet, connecting investments to the reduction of threats, mitigation of vulnerabilities, and the development of capabilities to respond to and recover should an event occur remains a great challenge. This thesis attempts to identify the difficulties that local, state and federal stakeholders face, explore the prevalence of these challenges, and provide recommendations for improving the capability to measure the impact the HSGP has made on preparedness.

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## II. LITERATURE REVIEW

Federal grant programs to state and locals for prevention, protection, response and recovery to acts of terrorism began long before the creation of DHS. In the wake of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the 1995 Tokyo subway sarin attack, and the 1995 Oklahoma City Murrah building bombing, Congress passed the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici amendment<sup>37</sup> to appropriate funds to enhance Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) training and planning at the federal, state, and local levels of government.<sup>38</sup> This federal initiative was plagued with criticisms of “duplication, poor coordination, incoherence, and unclear or incorrect priorities.”<sup>39</sup>

Prior to the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks, a WMD attack requiring the coordination and cooperation of local, state and federal response partners was viewed as being highly improbable. The *National Strategy for Homeland Security* acknowledged that prior to the 9/11 homeland security was a:

patchwork of efforts undertaken by disparate departments and agencies across all levels of government...we [United States] lacked a unifying vision, a cohesive strategic approach, and the necessary institutions within government to secure the Homeland against terrorism.<sup>40</sup>

The term “homeland security” did not exist within the American lexicon. With the release of the 2002 *National Strategy for Homeland Strategy*, the Federal Government attempted to define homeland security, prioritize mission-

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<sup>37</sup> Also known as the Defense against Weapons Destruction Act of 1996.

<sup>38</sup> Richard Falkenrath, “Problems of Preparedness: U.S. Readiness for a Domestic Terrorist Attack,” *International Security* 25, no. 4 (Spring 2001): 162, <http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0162-2889%28200121%2925%3A4%3C147%3A%3E2.0.CO%3B2-8> (accessed: December 30, 2007).

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, 166.

<sup>40</sup> *National Strategy for Homeland Security* (2007), 3.

critical activities, and clarify the role of non-federal government partners.<sup>41</sup> A series of strategies, guidance documents and presidential directives soon followed. *Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5)* established the National Incident Management System (NIMS) to ensure that the local, state, and federal responders could efficiently and effectively manage the response to domestic incident.<sup>42</sup> *Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD-8)* called for the creation of a *National Preparedness Goal*,<sup>43</sup> now known as the *National Preparedness Guidelines (NPG)*, to develop performance metrics for preparedness activities to increase the national capacity to prevent, protect, respond and recover from acts of terrorism and natural disasters.<sup>44</sup> The NPG was designed to provide a capabilities-based framework for assessing risk and prioritizing limited resources across jurisdictions, disciplines, regions, and states to evaluate “how prepared we are, how prepared we need to be, and how we prioritize efforts to close the gap.”<sup>45</sup>

In a recent article, Josh Filler, a former director of SLGCP, noted that the three main challenges to the successful implementation of homeland security grant programs are establishing a management structure, developing a risk-based strategy; and creating a system to track and measure the impact investments are making toward meeting the strategic goals and objectives.<sup>46</sup> Filler’s comments precisely pinpoint the underlying challenges that states and

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<sup>41</sup> *National Strategy for Homeland Security* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, July 16, 2002), 4.

<sup>42</sup> *Homeland Security Presidential Directive / HSPD-5* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2003), [www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/hspd-5.html](http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/hspd-5.html) (accessed October 11, 2007).

<sup>43</sup> As of September 2007, the *National Preparedness Goal* became the *National Preparedness Guidelines*.

<sup>44</sup> *Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-8* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2003), 3, [www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12/print/20031217-6.html](http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12/print/20031217-6.html) (accessed October 11, 2007).

<sup>45</sup> *National Strategy for Homeland Security* (2007), 43.

<sup>46</sup> Joshua D. Filler, “Not Just a Check from Uncle Sam,” *Homeland Security Today*, September 30, 2008, <http://hstoday.us/content/view/5405/201/> (accessed October 16, 2008).

locals face as they implement the HSGP. For this reason, the literature reviewed focused on 1) Grant Management, 2) Risk Management, and 3) Performance Management.

## **A. GRANT MANAGEMENT**

In April of 2002, Patricia Dalton, Director of Strategic Issues for the GAO, testified before the House Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial Management and Intergovernmental Relations, Committee on Government Reform. During her testimony, she expressed a need for, “definition and clarification of the roles and responsibilities of federal, state, and local entities.”<sup>47</sup> With over 40 federal agencies involved in homeland security, the GAO identified fragmentation, overlap/duplication of programs, and accountability as problems with federal preparedness programs.<sup>48</sup> The GAO commented that these challenges made it extremely difficult for states and locals to partner with the federal government.<sup>49</sup>

With the release of the FY03 SHSP and UASI grant programs, ODP encouraged states and locals to develop state and urban area working groups focused on the coordination of homeland security mission capabilities. ODP identified the principal first responders necessary for mounting a swift and effective response to a terrorism incident. The critical disciplines included law enforcement, emergency medical services, emergency management, fire, hazardous materials, public works, government, public safety communications, health care, and public health.<sup>50,51</sup> The State Administrative Agency<sup>52</sup> was

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<sup>47</sup> GAO, “Combating Terrorism: Intergovernmental Cooperation in the Development of a National Strategy to Enhance State and Local Preparedness,” *GAO-02-550T*, April 2, 2002, 2, <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02550t.pdf> (accessed January 6, 2008).

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, 2.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>50</sup> *Fiscal Year 2003 Urban Area Security Initiative Grant Program II: Program Guidelines and Application Kit* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office for Domestic Preparedness, n.d.), 5.

<sup>51</sup> In Fiscal Year 2004, non-profit organizations were added as a required discipline.

charged with the identification of the Urban Area Working Groups (UAWG) Points of Contact in conjunction with the Mayor and Chief Elected Official from the core-city and core-county.<sup>53</sup> The UAWG was then tasked with establishing a governance structure to identify the geographic boundaries of the urban area, assess the region's risk, and develop an investment strategy. While ODP identified critical disciplines vital to national preparedness, the composition of the steering committee was left to the discretion of the SAA, core-city, and core-county representatives. This had the potential to aggravate existing political tension because it placed the large metropolitan areas in control of the vast majority of homeland security dollars and created animosity between city and county officials as to who would control the funds.

Complicating the situation were the requirements to identify representatives for the UAWG, define the geographic boundaries of the Urban Area, and develop the investment strategy for the FY 2003 grant dollars. While some urban areas had success in creating a regional steering body, many struggled with political turf issues that hindered an integrated planning approach. The journal articles reviewed are critical of the Department of Homeland Security's slow response to publish guidance to the states and locals. As Peter Eisinger notes, states and locals have been looking to the federal government to clearly delineate the roles and responsibilities for each layer of government to provide a coordinated approach to achieving national preparedness.<sup>54</sup> DHS has recognized that governance is a critical component of program implementation and that many jurisdictions still have not formalized a process. In the FY08

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<sup>52</sup> The State Administrative Agency (SAA) is the lead state agency charged with managing the policy, programmatic, and fiscal requirements of the HSGP.

<sup>53</sup> The core-city is the recognized Urban Area Security Initiative City. The core county is the county in which the core-city resides.

<sup>54</sup> Peter Eisinger, "Imperfect Federalism: The Intergovernmental Partnership for Homeland Security," *Public Administration Review* 66, no. 4 (July 2006): 542.



HSGP grant guidance, DHS has required each urban area to develop an official UAWG charter to solidify membership, roles and responsibilities, voting rights, and funding allocation methodology.<sup>55</sup>

## **1. Grants Reporting**

As a means to report and monitor homeland security and emergency preparedness spending, DHS implemented an electronic data collection tool, called Grants Reporting Tool (GRT).<sup>56</sup> In the initial iterations of the GRT, reporting consisted of the designated SAA completing the Initial Strategy Implementation Plan (ISIP) at the beginning of each new grant fiscal year. The ISIP is the projected spending plan for each particular grant program. Semi-annually, SAAs and local sub-recipients are then required to upload funding allocations per grant program, critical discipline, and allowable cost category for the Bi-annual Strategy Implementation Report (BSIR).

With the shift to a competitive grant program in 2006, eligible jurisdictions were required to submit investment justifications detailing the purpose and scope of each project proposal. The GRT provided a platform to upload the state and urban area strategies as well as the investment justifications. The goal of the investment justification process was to gather a better understanding of state and local capabilities, resources, preparedness plans, and strategies for implementation of the proposed initiatives.<sup>57</sup> Once jurisdictions received notification of the actual grant award amount, they were then required to enter projects to be funded into the ISIP. Every six months thereafter, the SAA and local sub-recipients are required to update the BSIR to show how funds have been allocated and/or expended per project during the previous reporting period.

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<sup>55</sup> *Fiscal Year 2008 Homeland Security Grant Program: Guidance and Application Kit*, 31.

<sup>56</sup> Formerly under the Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP); The GRT is now coordinated through the Federal Emergency Management National Preparedness Directorate (NPD).

<sup>57</sup> Grants Reporting Tool, "Grant Reporting Lifecycle Overview," <https://www.reporting.odp.dhs.gov/docs/GrantReportingLifecycleOverview.pdf> (accessed January 14, 2008).

Once grant funds have been expended, the SAA completes the grant close-out report, showing that all funds have been expended. See Figure 1 for a graphic depiction of the grant reporting cycle.




Figure 1. Grant Reporting Tool Life Cycle

The federal grant guidance packages have directed states and locals to develop performance measures and to show measurable progress towards meeting the *NPG*. Released in September of 2007, the *NPG* serves to assist decision makers with implementing a capability-based and risk-based planning process to ensure that investments are strengthening national preparedness.<sup>58</sup> The *NPG* calls for the development of readiness metrics to gauge progress and determine the local, state, and federal capacity to respond to a future incident.<sup>59</sup> While the *NPG* provides a good framework for identifying the necessary preparedness activities, there is minimal guidance and accountability for developing measurable performance metrics across the numerous homeland security grant related programs that may flow into a state, region or locality. A one-stop-repository does not exist to determine how much money flows into a region for the purpose of homeland security and emergency preparedness. While FEMA can run reports and query data of all HSGP spending, the GRT is structured around individual grant funding streams, leaving states and locals with a limited capacity to track the accomplishments of the numerous grant programs, fiscal years, and the activities of contiguous jurisdictions/sub-recipients.

The GRT has been used to streamline reporting processes, but the current system is aggregating data into stovepipes and minimizing the capability for state and local partners to view a complete picture of the impact that grant spending has had on improving preparedness within their locality. Instead of leveraging all available grant opportunities towards the implementation of strategic goals, program managers are reporting on spending in a piece meal fashion. Since each grant program has unique grant guidance, cover a specific geographic location and are awarded to numerous local and regional sub-recipients, stakeholders struggle to coordinate all of the grant related activities. Figure 2 provides a graphic depiction of the disparate grant reporting by the state and local grant recipients.

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<sup>58</sup> Grants Reporting Tool, "Grant Reporting Lifecycle Overview," 1.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*




Figure 2. National Preparedness Directorate: Users Guide-Grants Reporting Tool–Implementation at the Local level<sup>60</sup>

Homeland security and emergency preparedness grant funding opportunities have served to bolster the local, regional, and state homeland security efforts, but the receiving entity ultimately has the authority to decide which priorities the funds will support. There is also no mechanism to confirm contiguous jurisdictions are leveraging individual grant programs to support local and regional homeland security initiatives.

<sup>60</sup> National Preparedness Directorate: Users Guide-Grants Reporting Tool (Washington, D.C., FEMA, December 2007), 6.

## 2. Bi-annual Strategy Implementation Report

The Bi-annual Strategy Implementation Report captures the funding strategy for each grant program under the HSGP umbrella. Figure 3 provides a graphic depiction of the GRT reporting options.

The screenshot displays the BSIR Grantee Welcome Page. At the top, there are navigation tabs: Recipients, Award, Project, Project (\$), Project Detail, Allocations, Strategies, and Metrics. On the left, a sidebar menu includes: Current User, Welcome!, IJ Submission, Funding, Organization, Users, Strategy, and Logout. The main content area is titled 'Grantees/Subgrantees For Ohio' and features two dropdown menus: 'Grant Award Year' set to 2007 and 'Reporting Period' set to BSIR (June 08). Below these is a table with the following data:

Grantees/Subgrantee	Grantee Type	Total Award	Last Updated
<a href="#">Cincinnati/Hamilton Urban Area</a>	Local Jurisdiction/Entity	\$6,343,121.60	07/09/08
<a href="#">Hamilton County EMA</a>	Local Jurisdiction/Entity	\$935,623.00	07/09/08

Figure 3. BSIR Grantee Welcome Page

States and local sub-recipients are required to update the allocation plan every six months. The total grant award is broken down into projects. Each project is then tied to an investment justification, state and urban area strategy goals and objectives, target capabilities, and national priorities that will be enhanced. Recipients and sub-recipients then must enter the funding plan. The HSGP is divided into six authorized solution areas: equipment, training, planning, organization, exercise, and management and administration. Within each solution area, allocations are aggregated by discipline and allowable cost category also known as the Authorized Equipment List (AEL) category. DHS has identified the critical disciplines eligible for the HSGP, which include law

enforcement, fire, emergency medical, emergency management, hazmat, public safety communications, public health, health care, public works, government, and non-profit entities. The Authorized Equipment List is the master list of eligible expenditures for the HSGP. Table 3 outlines the 21 authorized equipment list categories.<sup>61</sup>

Table 3. Authorized Equipment List Categories

1. Personal Protective Equipment	8. Decontamination	15. Inspection and Screening
2. Explosive Device Mitigation and Remediation	9. Medical Supplies and Limited Pharmaceuticals	16. Agriculture Terrorism Prevention, Response and Mitigation
3. Search & Rescue	10. Power Equipment	17. Watercraft
4. Information Technology	11. Reference Materials	18. Aviation Equipment
5. Cyber Security	12. Incident Response Vehicles	19. Logistical Support Equipment
6. Interoperable Communications	13. Terrorism Incident Prevention	20. Intervention
7. Detection	14. Physical Security Enhancements	21. Other Authorized Equipment

The BSIR report captures a historical record of individual grant programs, but the aggregation of data by AEL category and discipline provides only general information on which disciplines are receiving funds and broad focus areas in which funds are allocated. The data collected could easily be taken out of context, misleading policy makers to overestimate or even underestimate state and local capabilities. Reporting grant funds allocations does not necessarily mean that jurisdictions have increased capabilities. For example, if policy makers

<sup>61</sup> The Authorized Equipment List (AEL) can be found at [www.rkb.us](http://www.rkb.us). Within the AEL, there is a breakdown of types of allowable equipment by category.

were to request information on the current state of interoperable communications, FEMA could generate a report of the interoperable communications cost category through the GRT, but there is no explanation of how these investments translated into increased communication capabilities or to what threshold states/locals even need to develop their individual capacity. How can policy-makers make effective decisions based on how much money was spent on a specific allowable category, with no understanding of what was purchased? It could be the difference between purchasing portable radios for an individual department and developing an 800 MHz system that allows police, fire, public health and emergency management to communicate effectively. One of the primary functions of the GRT is to provide DHS with an electronic database to query in the event of a Congressional data call. In its current collection format, the FEMA can only answer how much money was allocated to a specific discipline with any certainty. This is the 30,000-foot level view and does not provide the clarity of what was purchased and/or how it enhanced the capacity of the local jurisdiction or region. To gather that level of detail, FEMA would have to poll all of the states and sub-recipients or look through paper budget detail worksheets. This would only serve to stress overloaded state and local partners, by creating additional requirements.

Once the grant recipient has completed the allocations section of the BSIR, they are then transferred into the metrics component of the system. Based on the solution areas funded, the recipient must respond to the pre-identified metrics. The recipient has the option of clicking yes, no, not applicable, or no metrics associated with this project. If the recipient has allocated funds for equipment, two pre-identified metrics will be displayed, the number of critical infrastructures hardened and the number of Community Emergency Response Team (CERT)<sup>62</sup> kits purchased. While the number of critical infrastructures hardened may be a key component of the Buffer Zone Protection Program and

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<sup>62</sup> CERT is a citizen preparedness initiative in which citizens receive 16 hours of training on how to be better prepared in the case of catastrophic emergencies when emergency services will be overwhelmed.



the CERT kits are a vital statistic for the Citizen Corps Grant Program, this does not reflect the overarching strategy for the UASI, SHSP, or LETTP grant programs. If these two metrics are not applicable to the particular project, then the sub-recipients click the no metrics applicable button to proceed. Since the majority of funding is dedicated to equipment expenditures, these pre-identified metrics fail to provide any additional insight into spending patterns. Further, the segregation of grant programs by year creates the illusion that each project is independent of previous funding opportunities. The tool does not ask if the initiative is a continuation of a previous project, nor does it ask if the investment completes the build out of the primary target capability for the receiving jurisdiction or region.

The pre-identified metrics for planning and training also fail to provide an accurate picture of state and local capacity. In most cases, approved training is limited to the pre-approved DHS training courses through the National Domestic Preparedness Consortium.<sup>63</sup> If the training course is approved, grant funds can be allocated for travel, overtime, backfill, registration, etc. The Consortium courses are currently free of charge to state and local participants, so there is no cost to the jurisdiction. If grant funding is not utilized, then the individuals who attended the training cannot be counted towards the overall numbers in the metric component of this solution area. The planning metrics focus on risk and vulnerability assessments, emergency operation plans, risk communication, and citizen outreach. Again, sub-recipients are limited in accounting for only those plans or planning activities directly supported by grant funds. Even if general fund dollars are dedicated for personnel working on critical infrastructure/key resources assessments relevant to the LETPP or BZPP grant programs, the sub-recipient cannot report the activity through the GRT. Since the metrics are pre-

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<sup>63</sup> Federal Emergency Management Agency, "National Domestic Preparedness Consortium (NDPC)," [http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/training\\_ndpc.htm](http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/training_ndpc.htm) (accessed February 24, 2008).

identified and are limited to yes, no, or not applicable, there is no option for state and local grant managers to provide additional feedback as to the capabilities being enhanced through other indirect means.

### **3. Challenges for State and Local Partners**

As the Homeland Security Grant Program has matured, the GRT has been modified and adapted for changing reporting requirements. State and urban area strategies are now collected and stored within the GRT, but due to limitations of the tool, state and local partners are unable to analyze the data. This tool has become merely a one-way data entry portal. The tool lacks an output mechanism or query capability that can assist states and locals with future strategic planning. Local planners are unable to view how contiguous counties and partners are investing homeland security funds. Creating greater operational awareness will enhance regional relationships through the sharing of mutual aid assets and allow regional partners to share the burden of sustainment.

## **B. RISK MANAGEMENT**

Risk management is a “strategy for helping policy makers make decisions about assessing risk, allocating resources, and taking actions under conditions of uncertainty.”<sup>64</sup> As a requirement of the FY 2003 SHSP and UASI grants, states and urban areas were required to complete a risk assessment. This assessment, though, was heavily focused on the state and local capacity to respond to a terrorist attack.<sup>65</sup> Furthermore, the urban area assessments were centered on the core-city/core-county. Since fiscal year 2006, DHS has encouraged urban areas to regionalize and expand their geographical boundaries to include a 10-mile buffer zone around the core-city. In FY 2008, DHS expanded the 10-mile

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<sup>64</sup> GAO, “Homeland Security: Applying Risk Management Principals to Guide Federal Investments,” *GAO-07-386T*, February 7, 2007, 3, [www.gao.gov/new.items/d07386t.pdf](http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07386t.pdf) (accessed June 6, 2008).

<sup>65</sup> Dave Kaufman, formerly of DHS Grants and Training, personal communication, July 11, 2008.

buffer zone to include the Metropolitan Statistical Areas for determining the eligibility of the program.<sup>66</sup> Even with the expansion of the geographic boundaries, states or urban areas have not been required to update their risk assessments. Without revisiting the additional risk factors, such as critical infrastructure and potential threat elements, states and urban areas may not have a clear understanding of how investments are addressing the reduction of threat, minimization of vulnerability, and mitigation of consequences. Further, the lack of understanding of the regional risk makes it extremely difficult to evaluate the impact the numerous grant programs have made toward improving preparedness. The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act (PKEMRA) (Public Law 109-295) requires that DHS evaluate the impact that federal financial assistance has made on the development of target capabilities as well as led to the reduction of risk.<sup>67</sup> While all states and urban areas have complied with the grant requirements, the implementation of a comprehensive risk management program continues to be difficult.

The diversity of disciplines, activities, and grant programs that fall under the homeland security umbrella, creates a challenge for measuring the impact the HSGP has had on reducing risk. Risk is dynamic, so while the money may be invested wisely, it is extremely difficult to directly correlate grant investments to the reduction of risk. Further, some critics feel that Washington has failed to assist states and urban areas with identifying vulnerabilities.<sup>68</sup> With little guidance, states and locals began spending the grant funds on wants versus assessing their respective risk and vulnerability.<sup>69</sup> As Veronique de Rugy of American Enterprise Institute points out, the risk of terrorism is hard to quantify, it

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<sup>66</sup> Fiscal Year 2008 Homeland Security Grant Program, 30.

<sup>67</sup> Public Law 109-295 (Washington, D.C.: 109<sup>th</sup> Congress, October 2006), sec 652, [www.iaem.com/committees/GovernmentAffairs/documents/PL109-295DHSAppropriationFY07andFEMAREform.pdf](http://www.iaem.com/committees/GovernmentAffairs/documents/PL109-295DHSAppropriationFY07andFEMAREform.pdf) (accessed January 29, 2009).

<sup>68</sup> Peter Eisinger, "Imperfect Federalism," 542.

is possible that states and locals would inflate their risk to justify additional homeland security funding.<sup>70</sup> Worse, jurisdictions may underestimate current capacity by inflating capability shortfalls to justify continued homeland security appropriations. Either way, the reverse engineering of investment justifications to receive homeland security funding is only creating a further drain on the federal budget and not necessarily increasing the local, regional, state or federal capacity to prevent, protect, respond or recover from acts of terrorism or other natural disasters.

### C. PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT

In 1993, Congress passed the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) to “improve the confidence of the American public in the capability of the federal government, by systematically holding federal agencies accountable for achieving program results.”<sup>71</sup> Recognizing that the implementation of federal programs is largely dependent on state and local government agencies for the accomplishment of goals and objectives, Congress followed the GPRA by passing the Federal Financial Assistance Management Improvement Act of 1999.<sup>72, 73</sup> The purpose was to improve the performance of federal grant programs, simplify application and reporting requirements, improve service

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<sup>69</sup> Patrick S. Roberts, “Shifting Priorities: Congressional Incentives and the Homeland Security Granting Process,” *Review of Policy Research* 22 no. 4 (July 2005), 440, <http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db+bth&AN=17380596&site=ehost-live&scope=site> (accessed December 30, 2007).

<sup>70</sup> Veronique de Rugy, “What Does Homeland Security Spending Buy?” *American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research*, Working Paper #107 (April 2005), 2, [www.aei.org/doclib/20050401\\_wp107.pdf](http://www.aei.org/doclib/20050401_wp107.pdf) (accessed December 30, 2007).

<sup>71</sup> *Government Performance Results Act of 1993* (Washington, D.C.: 103<sup>rd</sup> Congress of the United States of America, January 5, 1993), 2, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/mgmt-gpar/gplaw2m.html> (accessed August 7, 2008).

<sup>72</sup> Also known as Public Law 106-107 (P.L. 106-107).

<sup>73</sup> Shelley H. Metzenbaum, *Strategies for Using State Information: Measuring and Improving Program Performance* (Washington, D.C.: IBM Center for The Business of Government, December 2003), 4, [www.businessofgovernment.org/publications/grant\\_reports/details/index.asp?GID=112](http://www.businessofgovernment.org/publications/grant_reports/details/index.asp?GID=112) (accessed August 7, 2008).

delivery, and foster greater coordination amongst stakeholders.<sup>74</sup> The act also required agencies to “establish performance measures and a process for assessing the extent to which specified goals and objectives have been achieved.”<sup>75</sup>

Performance measurement requirements are not meant to be an exercise in futility, but rather to gather data on the outcomes, activities, inputs and outputs and put them into a format that can be shared with other stakeholders.<sup>76</sup> It provides for greater transparency and a clearer understanding of the purpose of the programs. Federal grant guidance packages and the *NPG* have directed states and locals to develop measurable performance metrics, but the GAO continues to report that DHS does not have a monitoring process in place to measure the impact of the HSGP.<sup>77</sup>

The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act required a Federal Preparedness Report and individual State Preparedness Reports.<sup>78</sup> This included an assessment of current capabilities, an assessment of resources necessary to attain the preparedness priorities; and an explanation of how the previous funding had been used to improve preparedness capabilities.<sup>79</sup> The 2009 Federal Preparedness Report acknowledges that the capability to evaluate grant effectiveness is still in its infancy.

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<sup>74</sup> Grants.gov, “Grants Streamlining Initiative,” [http://atweb.grants.gov/aboutgrants/streamlining\\_initiatives.jsp](http://atweb.grants.gov/aboutgrants/streamlining_initiatives.jsp) (accessed August 7, 2008).

<sup>75</sup> GAO, “Grants Management: Additional Actions Needed to Streamline and Simplify Processes,” *GAO-05-335*, April 2005, 11, [www.gao.gov/new.items/d05335.pdf](http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05335.pdf) (accessed August 7, 2008).

<sup>76</sup> Shelley H. Metzenbaum, *Strategies for Using State Information*, 6, [www.businessofgovernment.org/publications/grant\\_reports/details/index.asp?GID=112](http://www.businessofgovernment.org/publications/grant_reports/details/index.asp?GID=112) (accessed August 7, 2008).

<sup>77</sup> GAO, “Homeland Security: DHS Improved its Risk-Based Grant Programs’ Allocation and Management Methods, But Measuring Programs’ Impact on National Capabilities Remains a Challenge,” *GAO-08-488T*, March 11, 2008, 18.

<sup>78</sup> Public Law 109-295, sec. 652.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*

We [DHS] have had less success in the Evaluate and Improve area where the lack of risk-informed performance measures, data, and analytical approaches has hampered our ability to assess the effectiveness of our investments and preparedness efforts.<sup>80</sup>

To meet the requirements of PKEMRA, DHS is in the process of collecting additional assessment data, evaluating the existing capability assessment tools, and revising the Target Capability List.<sup>81</sup> Currently, DHS has six assessment systems, which include: NIMS Compliance Assessment Support Tool (NIMSCAST), Gap Analysis Program (GAP), Pilot Capabilities Assessment (PCA), National Preparedness System (NPS), State Preparedness Reports (SPR), and Capabilities Assessment for Readiness (CAR).<sup>82</sup> DHS is in the process of evaluating all systems to determine if one system could be transformed, if two or more of the tools could be merged, or if a new system is necessary to meet the comprehensive assessment system requirement. A new/modified system will utilize the target capabilities list (TCL) metrics (currently under revision). The updated TCL is expected to contain capability classifications, objectives and requirements to meet performance standards.<sup>83</sup> The performance classification and objectives will assist jurisdictions with identifying the threshold they should develop capabilities based on their individual risk and threat profile.<sup>84</sup>

The literature reviewed was consistent in that a national preparedness system will take time to develop. With each successive year, the federal guidance becomes more direct in delineating the roles and responsibilities of each layer of government. The grant guidance packages have directed states and locals to develop investment proposals that support state strategies and

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<sup>80</sup> *Federal Preparedness Report* (Washington, D.C.: The U.S. Department of Homeland Security, January 13, 2009), v, <https://www.hsdl.org/homesec/docs/dhs/nps36-012709-> (accessed January 29, 2009).

<sup>81</sup> *Federal Preparedness Report*, 109.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*, 112.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, 31.

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*

contain measurable performance metrics. The challenge continues to be that while striving to develop a national preparedness system, each region, state, and locality has a varied threat and vulnerability profile, leaving states and localities struggling to identify at what point have jurisdictions invested enough to be considered prepared. Disasters are often not confined to a particular jurisdiction or geographic area, which makes contingency planning an infinite and enormous task for states and locals. Also, the focus catastrophic disasters, immediately overwhelms the capacity of the locals, so planning becomes focused on the integration of state and federal resources. While the development of the comprehensive assessment system and the updated target capability list will assist states and locals with developing risk-based investment strategies, these processes and documents will take time to develop. For these tools to be successful, states and locals must derive some value from complying with these new requirements. As Josh Filler noted, “meeting these [risk and capabilities assessments] requirements has become a ‘check the box’ form any urban areas that are drowning in federal requirements and don’t see the value or results from compliance.”<sup>85</sup>

#### **D. SUMMARY**

Since 2001, the federal government has awarded over 145 grant programs to states, locals, territories and tribal entities to enhance prevention, protection, response, and recovery efforts.<sup>86</sup> There is not a one-stop-shop for determining how much money flows into a region for the purpose of homeland security and emergency preparedness. Although Congress has recognized the complexity created by the numerous homeland security grant programs, both the House of Representatives and the Senate have been unable to pass legislation that will simplify the grant process. Academics highlight the inefficiency of the current congressional appropriation system, but they too, fall short in evaluating

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<sup>85</sup> Filler, “Not Just a Check from Uncle Sam.”

<sup>86</sup> See Section I.

the role states and locals play in building the national preparedness system. There has been limited evaluation of the role states and locals play in the development of strategies and spending plans that will ultimately enhance or detract from national preparedness goals. Little analysis has been done on how the shift to a competitive application process for the UASI and SHSP has had on refocusing states' and locals' strategies toward enhancing the 37 target capabilities and the 15 *National Planning Scenarios*. While the literature identifies the difficulties that states and locals experience due to the array of homeland security related grant programs, no commentary exists on improvements states and locals can implement to minimize the complexity and avoid duplication of effort.



### **III. METHODOLOGY**

The research for this thesis was conducted using a hybrid approach including a national survey of homeland security professionals and a case study of the United Kingdom's preparedness structure. The intent of these two methodologies was to identify universal challenges faced by federal, state, and local stakeholders, explore the prevalence of these difficulties, and provide recommendations for improving the capability to measure the impact of the HSGP.

#### **A. MEASURING PREPAREDNESS SURVEY**

For this component of the research process, homeland security professionals were surveyed through the on-line tool, Survey Monkey. Participants were solicited through three professional e-mail listservs: the Urban Area Security Initiative Conference, the International Association of Emergency Managers, and the Big 30 Emergency Management Directors. The survey was open from November 18 to December 12, 2008. Two hundred and five people started the survey and of that, 140 individuals completed the survey.

The on-line survey consisted of 20 questions broken into four sections, which included affiliation, general perceptions, perceptions on preparedness, and recommendations. The first section focused on the respondent association to the HSGP process. This included the level of government in which the respondent participated (local not affiliated with an Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) City; local affiliated with a UASI; state or territory; federal; or private sector). Respondents were then asked to specify the primary discipline they represented and the HSGP grant(s) that they participated. This information was used to categorize and filter respondents for more in-depth analysis. Personal information was not requested or captured to ensure that respondents would be as honest as possible in completing the survey.

The second section was designed to obtain information on the cost and benefits of participation in the HSGP as well as the usefulness of current reporting tools to assist states and locals with tying investments to improved capabilities. Respondents were asked to comment on the level of coordination and the cost to coordinate the multiple HSGP and emergency preparedness grant programs distributed to the states and locals.

The third section focused on the participants' perception of current preparedness capabilities. Respondents were asked to rate preparedness for their locality and the nation based on the four mission areas of homeland security (prevention, protection, response and recovery) and the 15 *National Planning Scenarios*. The respondents were also asked to rate their understanding of their jurisdictions investment strategy.

The final section of the survey was designed to solicit feedback from the participants on how to optimize future investment strategies and strengthen preparedness. Respondents were asked a series of questions on how future investments should be prioritized at the federal, state, and local level of government. Respondents were asked to provide recommendations for enhancing future grant reporting.

Using a Likert scale,<sup>87</sup> the survey participants were asked their perceptions using a rating scale of none, low, medium, high and very high. The survey tool captured the number of respondents per rating scale value. This data was then used to calculate frequency and central tendency.

## **1. Frequency**

To standardize the data, the number of responses was converted into the frequency of responses. This allowed for the inclusion of all survey responses including those respondents that did not complete the survey. The frequency of each particular rating scale value was calculated by dividing the number of

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<sup>87</sup> Likert Scales are used in social science research to measure attitudes.

responses per scale by the total number of responses for the question and then converting the value into a percentage. For example, survey respondents were asked to rate the cost to participate in the HSGP process. Of the 152 participants that responded: 10 selected none; 29 low; 57 medium; 39 high; and 17 very high.

$$\text{Frequency} = [\# \text{ Responses per Rating} \div \text{Total Number of Responses}] \times 100$$

$$\text{Frequency (None)} = (10 \div 152) = 6.6\%$$

$$\text{Frequency (Low)} = (29 \div 152) = 19.1\%$$

$$\text{Frequency (Medium)} = (57 \div 152) = 37.5\%$$

$$\text{Frequency (High)} = (39 \div 152) = 25.7\%$$

$$\text{Frequency (Very High)} = (17 \div 152) = 11.2\%$$

This normalized the data from question to question and provided an analysis of the percentage of respondents per rating scale. Histograms were then drawn to provide graphical analysis.

## 2. Central Tendency

For the evaluation of central tendency, each rating scale was assigned a numerical conversion value.

None	= 1
Low	= 2
Medium	= 3
High	= 4
Very High	= 5

The rating scale value was calculated by multiplying the number of respondents by the assigned numerical value. The average rating was calculated through the summation of each individual rating scale value and dividing by the total number of respondents.

Using the same example as above,

$$\text{Avg. Rating} = \frac{[\text{sum of } (\# \text{ of respondents per rating scale} \times \text{numerical conversion})]}{\text{total \# of responses}}$$

$$\text{Avg. Rating} = \frac{[(10 \times 1) + (29 \times 2) + (57 \times 3) + (39 \times 4) + (17 \times 5)]}{152}$$

$$\text{Avg. Rating} = 3.16$$

This calculation provided the central tendency or average rating of all respondents. It can be converted back into the Likert scale as a medium value.

### **3. Analysis**

A more thorough analysis was conducted by aggregating the data by the respondents' discipline and affiliation. This allowed for the evaluation of biases that may be linked to a particular level of government and/or discipline that each respondent represented. At the conclusion of the mathematical analysis, the participant comments were reviewed. Universal themes were identified as respondents provided both positive and negative antidotal stories of the grant reporting processes. From this data, recommendations were developed that could potentially improve the implementation and overall coordination of the HSGP.

### **B. CASE STUDY: THE UNITED KINGDOM**

The case study methodology was selected to evaluate an alternative approach to implementing a national preparedness system. The United Kingdom faces similar terrorism threats and natural hazards, but they have adopted a different method for managing risk and encouraging the coordination between the local, regional and national public safety agencies. This case study focuses on understanding the strengths of the U.K.'s preparedness system including: local/regional resiliency forums, risk assessment processes, and performance assessments. The intent is to recommend smart practices and determine the applicability and feasibility of implementing these philosophies within the United States.

## **IV. MEASURING PREPAREDNESS SURVEY**

### **A. POTENTIAL BIAS**

As described in Section I, a national survey was conducted to solicit feedback from HSGP stakeholders. This survey was distributed to homeland security professionals through industry recognized e-mail distribution lists including the National UASI Conference, International Association of Emergency Managers, and the Big 30 Emergency Management Directors. Due to the recruitment method used, some potential bias existed that could shape the survey findings. First, the National UASI Conference and listserv were developed to promote information sharing amongst UASI cities. The International Association of Emergency Managers listserv is a platform for sharing amongst the international emergency management community. Further, the Big 30 Emergency Management Directors listserv was initiated to engage the largest 30 metropolitan area emergency management directors. Due to the distribution method, the survey findings could be potentially swayed by the opinions of the respondents who are affiliated with UASI cities and the Emergency Management discipline.

### **B. SURVEY SECTION: AFFILIATION**

In this section, the respondents were asked a series of questions on their affiliation: the level of government, discipline, and the HSGP programs that the respondent was associated. Table 4 provides the breakdown by affiliation.

Table 4. Survey Respondent Affiliation

Affiliation	Response Frequency	Response Count
Local including Tribal-not affiliated with an Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) City	7.1%	13
Local including Tribal-affiliated with a UASI City	48.9%	90
State or Territory	17.4%	32
Federal	14.1%	26
Private Sector	4.9%	9
Other (please specify)	7.6%	14
<b>answered question</b>		<b>184</b>

To ensure clarity of analysis, the Local-not affiliated with a UASI will be referred to as local and the Local-affiliated with an Urban Area will be referred to as UASI. Respondents were then asked to identify the primary discipline represented. Table 5 provides the breakdown of the disciplines represented in the survey.

Table 5. Disciplines Represented

Discipline Represented	Response Frequency	Response Count
Critical Infrastructure	0.0%	0
Emergency Management	45.9%	84
Emergency Medical Services (EMS)	1.6%	3
Fire Service	13.7%	25
Government Agency	10.4%	19
HazMat	1.1%	2
Health Care	1.1%	2
Homeland Security	11.5%	21
Law Enforcement	9.3%	17
Military	0.0%	0
Nonprofit	0.0%	0
Public Health	2.7%	5
Public Safety Communications	2.2%	4
Public Works	0.5%	1
<b>answered question</b>		<b>183</b>

As mentioned in Section 1, the HSGP contains five separate grant programs.<sup>88</sup> To determine if the challenges associated with participation are universal across the grant programs, it was vital that the respondents provided the grant program(s) they participated. Table 6 provides the percentage of respondents participating in the grant programs within the HSGP umbrella.

Table 6. Homeland Security Grant Program Participation

Grant Program	% Participation
Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI)	84.80%
State Homeland Security Program (SHSP)	90.12%
Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program (LETPP)	75.17%
Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS)	72.26%
Citizen Corps Program (CCP)	75.48%

### C. SURVEY SECTION: GENERAL PERCEPTIONS

Using a Likert scale,<sup>89</sup> the respondents were asked a series of questions on their perception of the HSGP administration. Granted, not all of the respondents are the primary recipients of the grant program(s), but many are sub-recipients and/or participated in the planning and allocation processes and have experienced some of the reporting requirements. Respondents were asked to rate the cost to participate versus the benefits gained from participation in the grant programs. A histogram of the data (Figure 4) reveals that the majority of respondents perceive the cost to participate to be lower than the benefits gained from participation.

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<sup>88</sup> The LETPP grant was rolled into the UASI and SHSP grant as of fiscal year 2008. Prior to FY08 it was a separate grant program.

<sup>89</sup> Respondents were asked to rate their level of agreement, using the Likert scale, of no/no connection, low, medium, high, or very high.




Figure 4. What is your perception of the cost to your organization/jurisdiction to participate in the grant program (e.g., attending planning meetings; writing investment justifications; completing procurement processes, monitoring, and auditing requirements, etc.)? What is your perception of the benefits gained from participation (e.g., equipment received; coordination and planning; training and exercises, etc.)?

By segregating the data by discipline and affiliation, this data was analyzed further. Table 7 provides the cross-tabulation of the five major disciplines<sup>90</sup> including emergency management agencies (EMA), fire service (FS), government agencies (GA), homeland security (HS), and law enforcement (LE).

<sup>90</sup> The remaining disciplines were excluded from this analysis due to the small number of respondents. The information would not be statistically significant and assertions could not be made that would represent the discipline. The following disciplines were excluded: Critical Infrastructure, Emergency Medical Service (EMS), Hazardous Materials, Military, Nonprofit, Public Health, Public Safety Communications, and Public Works.



Table 7. Costs versus Benefits by Discipline

	EMA	FS	GA	HS	LE
<b>Cost to Participate</b>	<b>Overall Average 3.18 (136)</b>				
None (1)	6%	0%	0%	20%	7%
Low (2)	14%	23%	33%	13%	27%
Medium (3)	40%	50%	8%	40%	40%
High (4)	32%	18%	33%	13%	7%
Very High (5)	8%	9%	25%	13%	20%
Average Rating	3.24 (72)	3.14 (22)	3.50 (12)	2.87 (15)	3.07 (15)
<b>Benefits Gained</b>	<b>Overall Average 3.90 (131)</b>				
None (1)	3%	0%	8%	14%	0%
Low (2)	7%	0%	0%	7%	0%
Medium (3)	23%	10%	17%	29%	21%
High (4)	30%	71%	50%	36%	36%
Very High (5)	37%	19%	25%	14%	43%
Average Rating	3.91 (70)	4.10 (21)	3.83 (12)	3.29 (14)	4.21 (14)

Overall, the fire service and law enforcement agencies perceive the benefits of participation to be greater than the average (4.1 and 4.2 to 3.9) while homeland security professionals rated the benefits lower than average (3.29 to 3.9). Since these grants have been structured as equipment grants, law enforcement and fire agencies may have received new equipment such as mobile command vehicles, decontamination tents and trailers, and urban search and rescue vehicles/trailers. The fact that equipment is tangible and resonates with the fire and law enforcement community may have elevated the perception of benefits over disciplines that are utilizing funds for planning, training, and/or exercises. Overall, government agencies perceive a much higher cost for participation (3.5 to 3.18, respectively), while the homeland security discipline found the cost to be lower than average (2.87 to 3.18, respectively). This deviation may be due the administrative burden placed on governmental agencies over other disciplines such as homeland security. On average, the private sector perceived their cost to participate as low and the benefits gained as minimal. The low ratings by the private sector could be expected since the private sector is not an official critical discipline as identified by DHS. This means that the HSGP cannot be used to support private sector homeland security

projects financially.<sup>91</sup> When this same data was aggregated by the respondents' affiliation, the data showed that UASIs perceived greater benefits from participation, but they also reported that the cost to participate was higher as well. Table 8 provides the breakdown for the local, UASI, state, federal and private sector partners.<sup>92</sup>

Table 8. Costs versus Benefits by Affiliation

	Local	UASI	State	Federal	Private
<b>Cost to Participate</b>	<b>Overall Average 3.14 (140)</b>				
None (1)	0%	1%	8%	20%	33%
Low (2)	38%	10%	23%	33%	50%
Medium (3)	46%	46%	35%	13%	17%
High (4)	8%	35%	19%	20%	0%
Very High (5)	8%	8%	15%	13%	0%
Average Rating	2.85 (13)	3.38 (80)	3.12 (26)	2.73 (15)	1.83 (6)
<b>Benefits Gained</b>	<b>Overall Average 3.88 (135)</b>				
None (1)	9%	0%	0%	20%	20%
Low (2)	0%	5%	4%	7%	20%
Medium (3)	18%	19%	35%	13%	40%
High (4)	55%	40%	35%	20%	20%
Very High (5)	18%	36%	27%	40%	0%
Average Rating	3.73 (11)	4.06 (78)	3.85 (26)	3.53 (15)	2.60 (5)

To understand the costs to administer the program better, the respondents were queried on the usefulness of current reporting tools to connect investments to improved capabilities. The respondents were asked to rate the required strategies, investment justifications, Bi-Annual Strategy Implementation Report (BSIR), Programmatic Monitoring Visits, and State Preparedness Reports (SPR).

<sup>91</sup> The exception to this is the Infrastructure Protection Grants administered by FEMA.

<sup>92</sup> For this analysis, respondents who selected 'other' were excluded.




Figure 5. Rate the usefulness of current reporting tools to connect investments to improved capabilities within your locality?

As the graph shows, the majority of respondents felt that strategies and investment justifications were more effective than the BSIR, programmatic monitoring visits, and SPRs. Strategies and investment justifications are a requirement for both the state and UASI jurisdictions, so it is reasonable that these tools would be perceived as a more effective method for connecting investments to increased capabilities. While the strategy document is a thirty thousand foot view of the state/UASI goals and objectives, investment justifications are written to outline how a future investment supports the implementation of the strategy and also to identify the potential return on investment. Since Fiscal Year 2006, the states and UASI investment justifications have been subjected to a peer review process, which is one component of the grant award process. This process encourages states and UASIs to submit comprehensive investment justifications and to update their strategies on a regular basis to ensure that peer reviewers can understand the state/UASI intentions.

Unlike the strategy and investment justification process, on average, the respondents viewed the BSIR as the least effective tool in translating investments into capability gains. As one state level respondent noted,

The BSIR does not help local jurisdictions or states at all. It is purely a federal reporting tool that supposedly is used to provide the federal government information about how the funding is being allocated among disciplines and between allowable grant categories. It is purely a requirement for local jurisdictions; however, they gain no benefit from it (SAA included).

While the BSIR collects a large quantity of data from state and locals, it lacks an analytical capability to tie how the funds invested increased capabilities. As mentioned in Section II, the HSGP was structured to be an equipment grant and the metrics associated with equipment purchases within the BSIR are limited to the number of Community Emergency Response Kits (CERT) purchased and the number of critical infrastructure hardened. These two metrics fail to address the development/sustainment of the thirty-seven target capabilities.

Also, Programmatic Monitoring Visits are viewed as a poor tool for connecting investments to increased capabilities. The purpose of the programmatic monitoring visit is to evaluate the implementation of the program. It is completed independently of fiscal monitoring. Urban areas receive a programmatic monitoring visit every other year, but as one respondent noted the overlap of grant programs and the multiple “open” fiscal years makes it extremely difficult to identify clearly which grant was responsible for the improved capability. Also, the process is structured to ask the jurisdiction to identify the percentage of completion, but does not require the jurisdiction to provide solid support of this improved capability. As one respondent noted, “the data collected can not be relied upon for accurate analysis.”

The SPR is a relatively new reporting requirement. A Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act requirement, the SPR replaced the State Enhancement Plan. As multiple respondents noted, the short time frame for completion and limited guidance from the federal level, has left many feeling as if

the SPRs are being developed in a vacuum. In time, the SPR may be viewed as a more effective tool, but there needs to be a greater connection between the SPR, state and urban area strategies, and investment justifications. While reporting requirements come with federal grants, the respondents agree that there is room to improve the methods used to gather and analyze the data. Multiple federal respondents highlighted that due to the lack of electronic connectivity between reports, there are “buckets of information” with limited means to analyze and identify trends across state and jurisdictional lines.

Question seven assessed the respondents’ perceptions of the benefits gained from participation in the HSGP program. Figure 6 provides a line graph of the survey results.




Figure 6. Rate the benefits you locality has gained from participation in the HSGP.

Overwhelmingly, respondents perceive the equipment purchased as the greatest benefit of the HSGP. Coordination and Planning is also rated high, but training and exercises are perceived less favorably. When cross-tabulated by discipline, the fire service and law enforcement responded with the highest values on the equipment received, where as government agencies and homeland security perceived the benefit of equipment below average. Across the board, the local

respondents perceived a lower than average benefit from equipment, coordination and planning, training, and exercises. This could be attributed to the smaller percentage of funds distributed to non-UASI jurisdictions. Some respondents noted that training and exercise dollars are under-utilized due to perceived or real limitations on the use of grant funds.

As noted in Section I, numerous homeland security and emergency preparedness grant programs provide financial assistance to states and locals. The final question of this section asked the respondents to rate the coordination of the multiple homeland security and emergency preparedness grant programs. Respondents were also asked to rate the political, social, and financial cost to coordinate these grant programs within their locality.




Figure 7. Rate the coordination between the multiple homeland security and emergency preparedness grant programs (DHS/FEMA, Health and Human Services, Center Disease Control, Agriculture, Commerce, etc.)? Rate the political, social, and financial cost to coordinate these grant programs?

On average, the respondents perceived the cost to coordinate to be greater than the level of coordination taking place. The comments from the state, UASI, and local respondents confirm the perception that the grant programs are stove piped

and that little coordination is occurring as programs are administered at the federal level. This makes it extremely difficult for states, UASIs and locals to coordinate the multiple programs.

**D. SURVEY SECTION: VIEWS ON PREPAREDNESS**

In this section, respondents were asked a series of questions on the perception of current homeland security capabilities based on the four mission areas of preparedness and the fifteen national planning scenarios. Question nine asked the respondents their level of understanding of their locality’s investment strategy. Overwhelmingly, 66.2% of respondents said that they could explain how their locality had invested funds to enhance both day-to-day operations as well as to improve terrorism prevention, protection, response, and recovery efforts. A minimal 6.3% of respondents were incapable of explaining their locality’s investment strategy. This data supports the notion that most jurisdictions are working to tie investments to improved capabilities.

Questions 8-9 were designed to identify baseline preparedness levels within the respondent’s jurisdiction and on a national scale. Respondents were asked to rate four mission areas of preparedness (prevention, protection, response and recovery).




Figure 8. Based on the four mission areas of preparedness, how would you rate your locality's current capabilities?




Figure 9. Nationally, how would you rate preparedness for the four homeland security mission areas?

Comparing both charts simultaneously, one can see that the respondents perceive the jurisdictional level to have a higher response capability than the national capability. Prevention, protection, and recovery capabilities appear to be relatively constant between the locality and the national level. When cross-tabulated by discipline and affiliation, the federal level and the fire service rated their jurisdictional prevention activities lower than the average. The fire service and law enforcement disciplines rated protection efforts lower than average. Homeland Security professionals rated their jurisdictional response capabilities at a lower level than the majority and the local and UASI respondents rated recovery lower than average.

Delving deeper into the perceptions of preparedness, respondents were asked to rate the capabilities to prevent, protect against, respond to and recover from the fifteen national planning scenarios. Figures 10-24 provide histogram comparisons of the jurisdictional to national perception of preparedness for each planning scenario.






Figure 10. Scenario 1: 10 Kiloton Improvised Nuclear Device




Figure 11. Scenario 2: Aerosol Anthrax




Figure 12. Scenario 3: Pandemic Influenza




Figure 13. Scenario 4: Plague




Figure 14. Scenario 5: Blister Agent




Figure 15. Scenario 6: Toxic Industrial Chemicals




Figure 16. Scenario 7: Nerve Agent




Figure 17. Scenario 8: Chlorine Tank Explosion




Figure 18. Scenario 9: Major Earthquake




Figure 19. Scenario 10: Major Hurricane




Figure 20. Scenario 11: Radiological Dispersal Device




Figure 21. Scenario 12: Improvised Explosive Device




Figure 22. Scenario 13: Food Contamination




Figure 23. Scenario 14: Foreign Animal Disease




Figure 24. Scenario 15: Cyber Attack

On average, respondents perceived their jurisdiction as moderately prepared for all scenarios except the 10-kiloton nuclear detonation and cyber attack. Respondents felt that their jurisdictions are less prepared for the 10-kiloton nuclear detonation and the cyber attack. Respondents felt that their jurisdictions are most prepared for toxic industrial incidents, chlorine tank explosions, and improvised explosive devices. Interestingly, when compared with the perception of national capabilities, the chlorine tank explosion scenario was the only scenario to receive a high preparedness rating. The majority perceived that the nation is least prepared for the 10 Kilo-ton nuclear. All of the remaining scenarios

averaged medium preparedness ratings. Respondents perceive their jurisdiction to be more prepared for pandemic influenza, plague, blister agents, toxic industrial chemical explosions, and improvised explosive devices than the collective national capabilities. In contrast, respondents felt that their jurisdictions are less prepared for earthquakes and major hurricanes than the nation as a whole.

The final question of this series sought the respondent’s opinion on the prioritization of investments to optimize and strengthen preparedness. The respondents were eligible to select more than one answer.

Table 9. In your opinion, where should future investments be focused in order to optimize benefits and strengthen preparedness?

Level of Government	Prevention	Protection	Response	Recovery	Other	Response Count
Local Level	63%	61%	69%	47%	4%	137
State Level	53%	52%	49%	66%	1%	117
Regional Level	51%	46%	52%	53%	2%	117
National Level	67%	43%	37%	65%	0%	116

At the local level, the majority of respondents felt that the focus should be on response activities (69%), with second and tertiary focuses on prevention (63%) and protection (61%), respectively. The overwhelming majority of respondents felt the state should focus on recovery efforts (66%). At the regional level, respondents were more closely grouped within the recovery (53%), response (52%), and prevention (51%) areas. The respondents felt that the federal level should focus on prevention (67%) and recovery (65%) efforts. Due to the delay in response capability, many respondents noted that the state and federal government should focus on recovery efforts.

## **E. SURVEY SECTION: RECOMMENDATIONS**

In the final section, respondents were asked to provide recommendations on how to improve grant-reporting systems and enhance the ability to tie investments to improved capabilities. When asked what would make the HSGP more successful, 57% of respondents felt that there should be a greater focus on local priorities. Granted, with the overwhelming number of UASI and local respondents, it is difficult to accept this assertion as a majority opinion of the entire homeland security community. Very few respondents (13.9%) felt that the current system adequately addressed local, state, and national preparedness priorities. This supports the assertion that the system could be more effective. Many respondents noted that there could be better coordination between levels of government in terms of grant reporting and the development of capabilities. The UASI and local respondents provided numerous anecdotal stories highlighting the need to focus on jurisdictional risk factors to optimize planning efforts. The federal mandates to focus on particular mission responsibilities, such as evacuation planning, improvised explosive devices deterrence and response, has forced jurisdictions to tackle scenarios that do not necessary align with their perceived priorities and has pulled personnel and resources away from other jurisdictional activities.

Respondents were also asked to provide recommendations for improving the capability to measure the impact grant spending has made on preparedness. Forty-six percent of respondents felt that a national preparedness assessment of current capabilities was needed. Following closely behind, 41% of respondents felt that a performance management system should be integrated into existing reporting processes. A smaller percentage felt that a final grant close out report (35.5%) should be implemented to address accomplishments of each particular grant. Only 7% of respondents felt that the current reporting processes sufficiently addressed how investments were improving preparedness capabilities. Even though the majority of respondents favored additional requirements, the comments highlighted that the existing grant reporting

requirements are causing too much strain on the limited resources. Question 17 further pressed the respondents to identify which partner or level of government should be responsible for measuring the impact of the grant programs. The majority of respondents (32.8%) felt that this issue could not be tackled by any one agency or level of government and that it required a concerted effort of all levels of government, the private sector, and the civil sector. Interestingly though, when cross-tabulated by affiliation, 33% of locals and 24% of UASI respondents felt that the locals should be accountable for this effort, while 41% of state and 45% of federal respondents felt this responsibility should fall to the state level.

Survey question 18 queried the respondent's opinion on future investment planning strategies. For this question, respondents were eligible to make multiple selections. The slight majority (54.3%) felt that a risk-based planning process should be the primary driver of future investments. Following closely behind was the capability-based and local/regional scenario-based planning options (39.1% and 37.7%, respectively). The outlier was the use of the national planning scenarios to direct future investments. Only 4% of respondents felt that this was good strategic driver. As one local respondent commented,

the use of scenario-based planning is a military convention that does not appear to be the best use of planning within civil government capacity. These civil government plans should follow the functional planning approach—identifying the functions common to all emergencies, and then identifying the roles and responsibilities of local governments to execute those functions.

Another respondent noted that the challenges associated with measuring against the *National Planning Guidelines* stem from the fact that local jurisdictional needs do not always coincide.

At the conclusion of the survey, respondents were provided an opportunity to share any additional comments on how participation in the HSGP has impacted their organization and/or recommendations on how to improve the

reporting processes. Respondents reported frustration due to the numerous administrative reporting requirements. One federal respondent eloquently summarized these frustrations,

to spend so much time measuring the capabilities seems like a drain on the funding to increase capabilities. All of the money the federal government is spending on creating new tools to measure capabilities and progress, so that they can report to Congress, could alternatively be spent to fund more emergency planners, managers, and first responders at the local and regional levels. That would build capabilities.

Respondents also commented that the HSGP has been like shooting at a moving target. To measure progress over time, respondents vocalized the need for a consistent methodology that does not vary as dramatically as the HSGP has over the past five years.

## **F. EMERGING THEMES**

In a recent article, Josh Filler summarized the challenges facing states and locals, when he wrote,

urban areas can, at best, provide only an itemized list of things it purchased, such as the type of first responder equipment or the number of people trained on a given topic. However, it can not explain those acquisitions and activities in the context of value-added risk management and capability enhancements based on a comprehensive plan.<sup>93</sup>

After careful analysis of the survey results and the corresponding comments, several themes emerged. Respondents recognize that reporting requirements are a necessary responsibility, but all are looking for more efficient and cost effective ways to complete these requirements. Respondents would like to see

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<sup>93</sup> Filler, "Not Just a Check from Uncle Sam."



more streamlined processes that provide value for all stakeholders. Table 10 provides the breakdown of the themes based on items that could potentially be eliminated, reduced, raised or created.

Table 10. Emerging Themes

<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Eliminate</b></p> <p>Fragmentation of grant reporting Duplicative reporting requirements</p> <p>Condensed Timelines</p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Raise</b></p> <p>Coordination between grant programs Connectivity between Reporting</p> <p>Strategic planning capability</p> <p>Stakeholder buy-in of strategic goals and objectives</p> <p>Coordination and communication between federal, state and Locals</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Reduce</b></p> <p>Grant program silos</p> <p>Number of reporting requirements Bureaucracy and Red tape</p> <p>Time and effort required to fulfill requirements</p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Create</b></p> <p>Performance Management</p> <p>Risk-based investment planning Analytics</p> <p>Local/regional planning scenarios</p> <p>National capabilities assessment</p>

The elimination of the fragmented grant reporting systems would reduce stove piping and improve the coordination between the various grant programs. Further, reducing the number of reporting requirements and eliminating duplicative reports would minimize the resource drain on states and locals and could ultimately lead to improved accuracy in reporting. Numerous respondents noted that the short submission timelines has severely hampered the integrity of the final product. By minimizing the bureaucratic red tape and amount of time and effort required to complete the reporting requirements, states and locals may have more time to dedicate to strategic planning. This in itself will improve the efficacy of reporting and provide a greater opportunity for stakeholder to make

wiser investment decisions. In terms of creating new requirements, the majority of respondents felt that a national capabilities assessment was needed to determine the state of preparedness. Also, respondents felt that a performance management system, risk management program, and analytical capabilities were necessary for a comprehensive assessment tool. A new tool should allow for individual jurisdictional analysis as well as the ability to roll-up the data and evaluate national preparedness.

## V. CASE STUDY: THE UNITED KINGDOM

The United Kingdom has taken a different course of action for initiating preparedness programs. Instead of using grant funding as a means for enhancing preparedness, the U.K. has passed legislation requiring localities to adopt a risk management program. While DHS cannot officially mandate states and locals implement a risk management program, DHS has encouraged the adoption of risk-based investment planning. The Fiscal Year 2009 HSGP guidance is an example of how DHS is trying to coerce states and locals tactfully to focus on measuring the impact the grant programs have made toward achieving the *National Preparedness Guidelines*. DHS identified overarching national priorities, which include the following.

- Addressing capability requirements and measuring progress in achieving the National Preparedness Guidelines
- Strengthening Planning and Citizen Preparedness Capabilities<sup>94</sup>

While states and locals seek analytical capabilities to make informed, risk-based investment decisions, the *reporting* requirements are overshadowing the preparedness planning effort. The U.K. provides some insight into the development of a national preparedness system.

### A. STRENGTHS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM'S RISK MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

Committed to addressing “the underlying drivers of security and insecurity, rather than just the immediate threats and risk,” the U.K. has implemented a risk management program that evaluates the threats, vulnerability, and underlying causes to gain a better understanding on how to prevent terror attacks, respond

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<sup>94</sup> *Fiscal Year 2009 Homeland Security Grant Program Guidance and Application Kit* (Washington, D.C.: United States Department of Homeland Security, November 2008), I, <http://www.fema.gov/government/grant/hsgp/index.shtm#more> (accessed December 1, 2008).

and manage when they do occur, and minimize the consequences post-event.<sup>95</sup> Recognizing that the U.K. needed a formal civil protection structure, Parliament passed the Civil Contingency Act of 2004. The goal of the Civil Contingency Act was to have a single civil protection framework to meet the challenge of natural, accidental, and intentional disasters.<sup>96</sup> Part 1 of the Act outlines the roles and responsibilities for the local and regional civil protection efforts.<sup>97</sup> Through this legislation, the U.K. has established Local and Regional Resiliency Forums (LRFs and RRFs), a risk assessment process, and performance oversight to ensure that the national, regional, and local levels of government are effectively managing risk. While the U.K. acknowledges that not all risks can be mitigated or prevented, they have taken a proactive approach toward managing risk.

## 1. Local / Regional Resiliency Forums

The U.K. risk management philosophy is that the lowest level of government should have responsibility for managing risk.<sup>98</sup> In keeping with this risk management approach, Local Resiliency Forums (LRFs) were formed. The LRF are composed of the “core first responders”<sup>99</sup> including the local police, British Transport Police, fire, ambulance service, Maritime and Coast Guard, local elected officials, Port Health Authorities, primary care, Acute, and Foundation Trusts, local Boards of Health, Health Protection Agency, and the Environmental Agency.<sup>100</sup> Utilizing the established police districts as the

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<sup>95</sup> *The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Security in an Interdependent World* (London, United Kingdom: Cabinet Office, March 2008), 4.

<sup>96</sup> *Civil Contingencies Act of 2004: A Short Guide (revised)* (London, United Kingdom: Cabinet Office: Civil Contingencies Secretariat, n.d.). [www.ukresilience.gov.uk/preparedness/~media/assets/www.ukresilience.info/15mayshortguide%20pdf.ashx](http://www.ukresilience.gov.uk/preparedness/~media/assets/www.ukresilience.info/15mayshortguide%20pdf.ashx) (accessed July 13, 2008), 2.

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid.*, 2.

<sup>98</sup> *Risk: Improving Government's Capability to Handle Risk and Uncertainty* (London, United Kingdom: Strategy Unit, November 2002), 11, [www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/strategy/work\\_areas/~media/assets/www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/strategy/su%20risk%20summary%20pdf.ashx](http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/strategy/work_areas/~media/assets/www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/strategy/su%20risk%20summary%20pdf.ashx) (accessed July 13, 2008).

<sup>99</sup> Also called Category 1 Responders.

<sup>100</sup> *Civil Contingencies Act of 2004*, 7.

geographic boundaries, the LRFs are responsible for the multi-jurisdictional coordination of the required Category 1 civil protection duties as mandated in the Civil Protection Act of 2004.<sup>101</sup> The Act requires that Category 1 responders assess the risk of emergencies, develop emergency and business continuity plans, share and coordinate plans with other local responders; and have the ability to warn and inform the civilian population in the event of a disaster.<sup>102</sup> The risk assessments are limited to only those emergencies or disasters likely to occur within the defined geographic area. The LRF is then responsible for coordinating all of the risk assessments, developing an agreed upon risk profile, and coordinating cross-disciplinary emergency response and continuity of operations planning.<sup>103</sup>

The Regional Resilience Forums (RRFs) are responsible for coordinating the civil protection duties for Category 1, Category 2<sup>104</sup> responders, and the Central Government. The RRF builds on the work of the LRF, but assesses the regional threats and impacts of a disaster. The RRF links the risks faced by the local entities with the strategic threat that the Central Governing bodies are concerned. This coordinated effort provides for comprehensive and uniform emergency planning across the entire country and feeds into the National Risk Assessment that evaluates the vulnerability, likelihood, and consequences of an event over a five-year period.<sup>105</sup>

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<sup>101</sup> *Emergency Preparedness: Guidance on Part 1 of the Civil Contingency Act of 2004, Its Associated Regulations and Non-statutory Arrangements* (Easingwold, UK: HM Government, 2005), 11, [www.ukresilience.gov.uk/preparedness/ccact/eppdfs.aspx](http://www.ukresilience.gov.uk/preparedness/ccact/eppdfs.aspx) (accessed July 13, 2008).

<sup>102</sup> *Civil Contingencies Act of 2004*, 3-4.

<sup>103</sup> *Emergency Preparedness: Guidance on Part 1 of the Civil Contingency Act of 2004*, 11.

<sup>104</sup> Category 2 responders include utilities, transport and rail network, passenger and freight operators, London Underground, Transport for London, Airport operations, harbor authorities, Highway Agency, Strategic Health Authorities, and the Health and Safety Executive.

<sup>105</sup> UK Resilience, "UK Resilience-EP-Risk," [www.ukresilience.gov.uk/preparedness/risk.aspx](http://www.ukresilience.gov.uk/preparedness/risk.aspx) (accessed July 13, 2008).

## **2. Risk Assessment Process**

In dealing with the internal threat and the external threat to U.K. interests, the U.K. has identified three critical roles of government. Government must be concerned with regulation of risk imposed by individuals/businesses against one another; stewardship of risk that is not directly attributed to a person/business and must be protected or mitigated; and management of risks that may impact their citizens or businesses.<sup>106</sup> The U.K. has adopted a six-step risk assessment process that can be broken down into three phases: contextualization, risk evaluation, and risk treatment.<sup>107</sup> In the contextualization phase, the LRFs and RRFs identify the risks that each area/region faces, define the scope, and develop a management process.<sup>108</sup> Once the risks have been identified, the LRFs/RRFs evaluate the likelihood and consequences of each risk to develop a risk score.<sup>109</sup> During the risk treatment phase, the LRF/RRFs evaluate the risk scores and determine which risks must be addressed first. The LRFs and RRFs then develop a strategy for the mitigation of those risks that can be eliminated and prepare contingency plans for those that cannot.<sup>110</sup> As the nature of the threat changes, the risk assessments are updated.

## **3. Performance Assessment**

Recognizing the need for a mechanism to measure performance toward meeting the Civil Contingency Act of 2004, the U.K. selected the Audit Commission to complete the Comprehensive Performance Assessment (CPA) Framework. The CPA is an existing government wide tool that is used to

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<sup>106</sup> *Risk: Improving Government's Capability to Handle Risk and Uncertainty*, 5.

<sup>107</sup> *Emergency Preparedness: Guidance on Part 1 of the Civil Contingency Act of 2004*, 40.

<sup>108</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>109</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>110</sup> *Ibid.*

measure the effectiveness of local council's public service delivery.<sup>111</sup> This assessment provides each council the opportunity evaluate their current service delivery and identify areas in need of improvement and then combines this with the external auditor's assessment to produce a numerical score. This numerical score is then published. This audit is performed every three years and under the initiative for 'Safer and Stronger Communities.'<sup>112</sup>

## **B. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS**

While the United States can learn from the United Kingdom's national implementation of a risk management program, the U.S. political system prevents the federal government from mandating actions of states and locals. Founded on the principle of federalism, the U.S. is structured to encourage coordination between levels of government while at the same time supporting the sovereignty of federal, state, and local governments.<sup>113</sup> Whereas, the U.K.'s constitutional monarchy is based on a centralist state structure which places a greater authority with the central government.<sup>114</sup> Since the U.K. does not have a written constitution, Parliament can implement legislative changes by passing Acts such as the Civil Contingency Act of 2004.<sup>115</sup> The United States civil protection framework delineates public safety and law enforcement to the lowest level of government. As the *National Response Frameworks* highlights, "[i]ncidents begin and end locally, and most are wholly managed at the local

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<sup>111</sup> *Civil Contingencies Act of 2004: Performance Assessment Frameworks* (London: Cabinet Office: Civil Contingencies Secretariat, July 28, 2006), Annex A, [www.ukresilience.gov.uk/preparedness/~media/assets/www.ukresilience.info/performance280706%20pdf.ashx](http://www.ukresilience.gov.uk/preparedness/~media/assets/www.ukresilience.info/performance280706%20pdf.ashx) (accessed July 13, 2008).

<sup>112</sup> *Ibid.*, *Civil Contingencies Act of 2004: Performance Assessment Frameworks*, Annex A.

<sup>113</sup> *The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned*, 11.

<sup>114</sup> Colin Talbot, "UK Public Services and Management (1979-2000): Evolution or Revolution?" *The International Journal of Public Sector Management* 4, no. 4 (2001): 289. <http://proquest.umi.com.library.nps.edu/pgdweb?index=O&did=21756516&SrchMode=1&Sid=2&Fmt=6> (accessed August 29, 2008).

<sup>115</sup> *Ibid.*, 282.

level.”<sup>116</sup> If the local level of government becomes overwhelmed, a request for additional resources can be made through mutual aid compacts from neighboring jurisdictions or the state. If state resources become overwhelmed, then the state can request assistance from the federal government. While this bottom up approach has served the United States well when responding to small scale emergencies, it poses a great challenge when considering the integration of resources into a national preparedness system.

### **C. SUMMARY**

The United Kingdom and the United States share a growing dilemma that the general public is willing to accept fewer risks to their health and security. At the same time, though, the public wants the freedom to take on additional risks, as well as have access to high quality public services.<sup>117</sup> As the U.K. system highlights, the engagement of the general public is a vital step in the development of preparedness efforts. Public rapport can be gained from improving confidence that the federal, state, and local levels of government are effectively implementing the HSGP to reduce threats, minimize vulnerabilities, and increase the capability to respond and recover. The U.K. has taken steps to clearly define their goals for improving public trust by outlining strategic objectives of government institutions; creating transparency in decision making; basing decisions on evidence; allowing the public to share concerns and weigh in on decisions; providing sufficient information to stakeholders so that individuals can make informed decisions; and providing timely acknowledgement of mistakes with a plan for corrective action.<sup>118</sup>

The Government Accountability Office has reported that the DHS faces three critical challenges in the implementation of a risk management program

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<sup>116</sup> *The National Response Framework* (Washington, D.C.: United States Department of Homeland Security, January 2008), 10, [www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-core.pdf](http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-core.pdf) (accessed August 29, 2009).

<sup>117</sup> *Risk: Improving Government's Capability to Handle Risk and Uncertainty*, 4.

<sup>118</sup> *Ibid.*, 16.



“improving risk communication, political obstacles to allocating resources based on a consideration of risk, and a lack of strategic thinking about managing homeland security risks.”<sup>119</sup> While grant funding opportunities have been allocated for the improvement of state and local capacity to prevent, protect, respond and recover from an emergency, the current grant system lacks a mechanism to evaluate the impact spending has had on reducing threats, minimizing vulnerabilities, and lessening the consequences of a natural, accidental or intentional disaster. A recent GAO report noted that the public has an expectation that the government will be more open about the risks faced,

they [the public] seek reassurance from government, but are skeptical of what they are told unless they can clearly see it is not influenced by vested interests. They want openness and independent advice. High levels of public expectation are set against a backdrop of declining trust in institutions, declining deference, and increased activism around specific issues, with messages amplified by news media seeking market share and aiming to meet the demands of round the clock coverage.<sup>120</sup>

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<sup>119</sup> GAO, “Risk Management: Strengthening the Use of Risk Management Principles in Homeland Security,” *GAO-08-904*, June 25, 2008, 2, [www.gao.gov/docsearch/locate?to=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.gao.gov%2Fnew.items%2Fd08904t.pdf](http://www.gao.gov/docsearch/locate?to=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.gao.gov%2Fnew.items%2Fd08904t.pdf) (accessed July 9, 2008).

<sup>120</sup> *Ibid.*, 7.

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## VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

The more interdependent we become, the more we require order.

Walter Issacson, President and CEO of Aspen Institute<sup>121</sup>

The lack of a common preparedness vision, the numerous homeland security/emergency preparedness grant programs, and the time compressed requirements have all contributed to the inability to measure the impact the HSGP has made on preparedness. The survey participants acknowledged the importance of measuring progress and the need to explain how the funds have been invested, but their comments highlight that the time and effort required could be better directed toward improving planning and coordination activities.

Since the beginning of the HSGP, states and locals have repeatedly requested that the administrative requirements remain relatively constant from year to year. This was recognized by FEMA and its predecessors who modified the grant processes minimally between FY06 and FY09. For this reason, this thesis does not recommend broad sweeping changes, but rather recommends minor adjustments to the already existing infrastructure. The overall intent is to bring the nation closer to answering “how prepared we are, how prepared we need to be, and how we prioritize efforts to close the gap.”<sup>122</sup>

### A. INITIATE A NATIONAL CAPABILITIES ASSESSMENT

To answer how prepared the nation is today, a national capability assessment should be initiated. This will assist states and urban areas with developing a baseline level that can be used to benchmark future progress. This assessment process should be a collaborative effort between the federal, state

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<sup>121</sup> Mark Gerencser, Reginald Van Lee, Fernando Napolitano, and Christopher Kelly, *Megacommunities: How Leaders of Government, Business, and Non-profits Can Tackle Today's Global Challenges Together* (New York City, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008), 1.

<sup>122</sup> *National Strategy for Homeland Security* (2007), 43.

and local levels of government and should focus on the education of stakeholders. This could be an opportunity for partners to explain their unique reporting requirements and to develop innovative solutions that benefit all stakeholders. As survey respondents noted, the BSIR holds minimal value for state and local partners. If there is a platform for discussion and understanding, stakeholders may be more inclined to participate and have a vested interest in collecting the most accurate information.

The first task should be the engagement of federal, state and local stakeholders in updating the *Target Capabilities List* and *Universal Task List*. FEMA has currently undertaken this process. Future revisions of the TCL and UTL need to address universal and cross-disciplinary performance metrics as well as provide an opportunity for jurisdictions to tailor performance goals to their unique threats and hazards. The updated TCL should also define minimum and maximum thresholds to assist state and local partners with setting attainable short-term and long-term goals. Some of the survey respondents also proposed shifting from the *National Planning Scenarios* to state/local specific planning scenarios. Planning efforts could then be focused on the prevalent localized threats and hazards. Each state and urban area faces unique hazards and some of the survey respondents commented that the heavy focus on national scenarios is pulling limited resources away from the more prevalent hazards.

Technical Assistance programs should be established to assist state and local stakeholders with understanding how the revised TCL, UTL, and localized planning scenarios can be utilized to measure preparedness. Subject matter experts (SME) could be identified to assist in the evaluation of each state and urban area capabilities. The SME panel should be comprised of local, state, and federal officials, as well as the private sector and the general public. The panel should be representative of the critical disciplines. Due to the time constraints of an extensive assessment process, the amount of data collected may need to be minimized to the assessment of the ten most prominent target capabilities within

each state/urban area. Likert-based scales could be used in the initial assessment. This will provide a relatively straightforward process for evaluation and will generate results that can be analyzed.

State and local respondents acknowledged the need for a systematic means to evaluate capabilities, but the fear of reprisal for negative findings looms in the background. One state respondent commented, “an independent, ‘no fault’ assessment of results of states might encourage candor and reasonable, practical recommendations.” The success of a national assessment process will reside in the development and roll out of the process. If all partners are treated as equals with knowledge and expertise to shape the outcome, then this assessment has the potential to be a success. If this process is driven from the top-down with limited stakeholder involvement, it is possible the assessment will be viewed unfavorably by state and local partners. This, in turn, could minimize the efficacy of the results.

## **B. INITIATE A NATIONAL RISK ASSESSMENT**

States and urban areas were required to complete a risk assessment as a component of the 2003 SHSP and UASI grant programs. Even though the geographic area of the urban areas has been expanded to include the metropolitan statistical areas, an updated risk assessment has not been required. Building on the U.K. experience, risk may be better managed by the lowest possible level community (e.g., public, private and/or civil sectors). Revisiting the state and urban area risk assessments may enhance local, state and regional planning efforts by providing a clearer operating picture of the current threats that each jurisdiction faces as well as assisting with prioritizing future preparedness activities. The risk assessment process could identify previously unknown equipment, training, planning, and exercise shortfalls. It may also create organizational structure to connect spending to the reduction of risk factors. This will assist state and locals in answering how prepared does each jurisdiction need to be.

Risk is dynamic and can change from day to day. A technical assistance program could improve state and local stakeholders understanding of risk, and assist with the integrating a risk management program into daily operations. A recent GAO report highlighted the need for risk management education to foster risk-based decision making.<sup>123</sup> DHS has created an algorithm for evaluating state and urban area risk scores, but this score is one dimensional and does not provide the operating picture needed to make investment decisions. A national risk assessment process could assist jurisdictions with identifying and managing the potential threats, vulnerabilities, and the resulting consequences. This may enable practitioners to more effectively communicate funding needs and assist decision makers with prioritizing future resources.

### **C. INSTITUTE AN INTEGRATED TECHNOLOGY PLATFORM**

States and locals are significantly burdened with numerous and lengthy reporting requirements. Six different national assessment systems exist including the *NIMS Compliance Assessment Tool*, *Gap Analysis Program*, *Pilot Capabilities Assessment*, *National Preparedness System*, *State Preparedness Reports*, and *Capabilities Assessment for Readiness*. DHS is also in the process of developing the Cost-to-Capability assessment tool. While all of these systems hold value, they are not connected, drain state and local resources, and could lead to duplicative reporting. One federal respondent noted,

There are too many reporting tools, and the move to consolidate back to one reporting tool is going to have much complexity and probably lots of growing pains, but it is the right move. The State Preparedness Reports are a positive step, but becoming another mountainous effort requested of over-worked State EM/HS [Emergency Management/Homeland Security] officials.

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<sup>123</sup> GAO, "Homeland Security Risk Management Forum: Strengthening the Use of Risk Management Principals in Homeland Security," GAO-08-627SP, April 2008, <http://www.gao.gov/docsearch/locate?to=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.gao.gov%2Fnew.items%2Fd08627sp.pdf> (accessed June 9, 2008).

A future technology platform should integrate the capability assessment, updated risk assessment, and performance management tracking so that state and local partners can show how investments are reducing risk, building capabilities, and achieving results. This would help to answer how each jurisdiction, state and the nation are progressing toward the quintessential preparedness capabilities. Stakeholder contribution and buy-in of the new technology platform are vital to the successful implementation.

#### **D. AUGMENT CONNECTIVITY OF FEDERAL GRANT REPORTING SYSTEMS**

The initiation of a new integrated technology platform will take a significant amount of time to develop. In the interim, FEMA could address the limited connectivity between systems. This limitation has suppressed coordination across grant programs and the ability to analyze the impact investments are making toward improved preparedness.

One respondent commented,

the biggest problem with the reporting system is that none of them are electronically connected. We end up with buckets of information, with no way to analyze them to determine trends or easily coordinate across State and jurisdictional lines.

Due to the diversity of partners, activities, and grant programs that fall under the homeland security umbrella, the federal government may want to focus resources towards the integration and connectivity of the various reporting tools. This challenge has been recognized and federal partners are currently working to enhance data collection and analysis capabilities.<sup>124</sup>

Additional modifications could be made to improve performance evaluation in the interim. FEMA could establish a post-award process whereby grant recipients complete detailed work plans that identify performance benchmarks for the successful implementation of projects. Grant reporting

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<sup>124</sup> *The Federal Preparedness Report*, 114.

systems could be modified to capture performance metrics and allow grant recipients to track investment progress during the performance period. This approach would allow state and local stakeholders to define their strategic objectives and identify how spending will be measured over the course of each grant program. This may provide DHS, FEMA, and other federal agencies with a better understanding of the current capacities of state and local entities as well as define the expected accomplishments prior to the release of federal dollars. The federal administrative agency could have the capability to monitor progress and it may provide a platform for state and local partners to communicate when jurisdictional goals do not fit within the confines of a particular grant program. The danger of this approach would be that jurisdictional objectives may not always fall in line with the national priorities. It also puts a greater responsibility on the state and federal administrative agencies to monitor state and local implementation, so that the grant dollars are spent according to the initial implementation plan. From the state/local perspective, the downside of this approach may be the flexibility to change direction if a project is no longer feasible.

#### **E. AUGMENT FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL PARTNERSHIPS**

The foundation of preparedness activities resides in the relationships that have been built between and amongst the federal, state, local, private sector, and civilian communities. The survey comments, though, highlighted that each level of government holds some animosity against the other layers of government. The reasons vary from time compressed requirements to the perceived lack of understanding of stakeholder intentions. Reframing how partners are engaged could dramatically improve stakeholder participation and support of a national preparedness system. Mark Gerencser, Reginald Van Lee, Fernando Napolitano and Christopher Kelly recently released a book that could assist homeland security professionals with reconciling autonomy concerns amidst the interdependency of preventing, protecting, responding and recovering from a catastrophic disaster. The term mega-community has been coined to



describe “communities of organizations whose leaders and members have deliberately come together across national, organizational and sectoral boundaries to reach the goals they cannot achieve alone.”<sup>125</sup> Figure 25 is a graphic depiction of a mega-community.




Figure 25. Mega-Community Diagram

For homeland security purposes, though, a one-dimensional depiction does not adequately address the autonomy of the federal, state and local level of government. A three-dimensional, pyramid-shaped mega-community more accurately addresses the roles and responsibilities of all layers of government, the private sector, and the civilian population. Each layer of government has a unique homeland security role and strategy that coalesces and supports the national preparedness system. For this reason, it is most practical to differentiate each layer as a unique mega-community intertwined with the other mega-communities. Figure 26 provides a graphic depiction of the pyramid mega-community concept.

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<sup>125</sup> Gerencser, Van Lee, Napolitano, and Kelly, *Megacommunities: How Leaders of Government, Business, and Non-profits Can Tackle Today's Global Challenges Together*, 28.




Figure 26. Pyramid Mega-Community Diagram

The pyramid shape ensures autonomy while at the same time highlights the interconnectivity of layers working towards mutual goals such as national preparedness.<sup>126</sup>

Since all disasters start and end at the local level, it is vital that the local level be treated as an equal partner in the development of a national preparedness system. Following the U.K. LRF model, the local mega-community could be comprised of the local first response community, private sector critical infrastructure and key resources (CI/KR), and civic/volunteer organizations such as the American Red Cross, Salvation Army, and Citizen Corps. The local mega-community contributes innovative investment strategies to address the unique threats and hazards prevalent within each locality.

States are charged with the protection of their citizenry. In the HSGP process, they play an intermediary role between the federal level and the local levels of government. Some respondents noted frustration with the states' authoritative role and infringement on what some believe are local issues. The clear delineation of responsibilities may reduce this friction. The state/regional

<sup>126</sup> Gerencser, Van Lee, Napolitano, and Kelly, *Megacommunities: How Leaders of Government, Business, and Non-profits Can Tackle Today's Global Challenges Together*, 28.

mega-community could encompass the state and regional homeland security councils, private sector partners, and statewide civic and volunteer associations. The state/regional mega-community could focus on the issues that extend beyond the confines of a single locality and identify/develop solutions to address cascading impacts of a disaster. Due to the interconnectedness of critical infrastructure, the state/regional mega-community could also take steps to mitigate and develop response strategies to potential state/region-wide failures.

From a national perspective, the national mega-community could integrate the national intelligence community, federal response agencies, national and multi-national corporations, and international response and relief organizations. The national mega-community could focus on horizon scanning and the analysis of the changing threat environment to develop strategies to mitigate national risks that extend beyond the confines of a particular state or region. The national mega-community could evaluate the interdependence of global critical infrastructure and key resources and develop mitigation and response strategies to potential enterprise-wide failures.

While states and locals have called for a national approach to preparedness, the survey respondents are critical of federal requirements and mandates. Some respondents perceive that state and local stakeholders have not been included in decision making that directly impacts resources at the state and local level. The pyramid mega-community could tackle this issue head on by reminding stakeholders that each layer has an equal responsibility to participate and support the development of a national preparedness system. The issue of national preparedness is too broad for any one layer to tackle alone. Only when all three mega-communities are put together into the pyramid it is possible to begin to develop a shared, layered strategy for preparedness. Goals can then be broken down into mission critical responsibilities for each individual mega-community. Based on the strengths and skill sets of the mega-community partners, the activities can be parceled out to the stakeholder best suited to the task. This concept already exists. States and locals have developed multi-

disciplinary working groups to address homeland security issues. The challenge the homeland security community faces is developing an implementation strategy that dissolves the animosity between partners and sells that idea that this is an equal partnership.

## **F. IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES**

FEMA recently commissioned a panel of federal, state and local officials to assess the federal preparedness requirements. This report confirmed that state and local stakeholders feel the reporting requirements are “voluminous and time consuming.”<sup>127</sup> The stakeholders surveyed requested the elimination of all unnecessary reporting.<sup>128</sup> Of the states surveyed, 100% felt that they needed additional resources to administer the grants.<sup>129</sup> The respondents also requested greater flexibility in how the funds were used to hire personnel to plan and coordinate the implementation of programs as well as sustain the capabilities that had been created with the HSGP.<sup>130</sup> Large quantities of data are currently collected through numerous reporting processes such as Strategies, Investment Justifications, BSIR, SPRs, and programmatic monitoring visits. These requirements are time intensive and provide only moderate flexibility among the diverse grant recipients/sub-recipients. A new or modified grant reporting system would have to consider the constraints of the end-user. Concessions would be necessary to minimize time requirements. This would include reducing the amount of data collected. End-users may in turn have to compromise on the flexibility of the grant programs and the reporting processes.

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<sup>127</sup> *Analysis of State and Local Officials' Views on Federal Preparedness Requirements* (Washington, D.C.: Federal Emergency Management Agency, January 2009), 28, [www.ilis.dhs.gov/docdetails/details.do?contentID=34103](http://www.ilis.dhs.gov/docdetails/details.do?contentID=34103) (accessed January 31, 2009).

<sup>128</sup> *Ibid.*, 22.

<sup>129</sup> *Ibid.*, 28.

<sup>130</sup> *Ibid.*

## G. IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY

To assist with the packaging and dissemination of these recommendations, a strategy canvas was developed. The strategy canvas, a concept of the 2005 book, *Blue Ocean Strategy*, provides a means to assess industry competition and identify innovative strategies to migrate into new, untapped, and profitable markets.<sup>131</sup> The purpose of this planning technique is to assess current market forces and evaluate performance across these factors. The canvas can be then used to illustrate an action plan for improving operations and creating new market space.<sup>132</sup> However, for this particular issue, the strategy canvas does not focus on competitive forces, instead, it is structured to enhance grant-reporting processes, improve the ability to measure preparedness, and garner stakeholder support. Figure 27 is a graphic depiction of the strategy canvas.




Figure 27. Strategy Canvas

The horizontal axis of the canvas captures the areas that federal, state, and local stakeholders currently invest or have been encouraged to invest resources for

<sup>131</sup> W. Chan Kim and Renee Mauborgne, *Blue Ocean Strategy* (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 2005), 4.

<sup>132</sup> *Ibid.*, 25.

the administration of the HSGP. The vertical axis captures the stakeholder perception of value for the identified factors. The perception of value for current grant reporting systems is represented by the red boxes. A value curve has been plotted to show the relative performance of current HSGP reporting. The perceived values for the modified grant reporting system have been depicted by the blue triangles. The recommended modifications have been plotted against the same profile to show the variation in perceived value. The profile has been further sub-divided into three sections: criteria that exist, but can be compromised to suit available resource constraints; criteria that exist, but could be augmented; and criteria that do not currently exist within the global system and that should be instituted. This canvas could be used as a blueprint for institutionalizing behaviors/operational activities that will help to answer “how prepared we are, how prepared we need to be, and how we prioritize efforts to close the gap.”<sup>133</sup>

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<sup>133</sup> *National Strategy for Homeland Security* (2007), 43.

## VI. CONCLUSION

The 2009 Federal Preparedness Report highlighted that the “lack of risk-informed performance measures, data, and analytical approaches has hampered our [DHS’s] ability to assess the effectiveness of our investments and preparedness efforts.”<sup>134</sup> This research has attempted to delve deeper into the root causes of these issues, explain why these challenges prevail, and provide recommendations to improve the capability to measure the return on investment. Five recommendations have been offered to resolve or minimize these challenges for stakeholders. The recommendations include the initiation a nation-wide capabilities assessment. This will assist state and locals with creating a realistic capabilities baseline founded on analysis rather than perception. In concert, the homeland security community should initiate of a nation-wide risk assessment. This activity will assist states and locals with developing an analytical methodology for evaluating threat, vulnerability and consequences that may impact their jurisdiction. These processes alone will enhance coordination and strategic planning amongst stakeholders and develop the foundation for implementing performance management and risk management practices.

To track progress and measure the impact the grant programs are making toward the reduction of risk, an integrated technology platform should be developed. Numerous reporting systems exist that have been developed or are under construction that can collect a large amount of data. To convert this data into knowledge, though, it must be analyzed. The existing systems are not electronically connected, which limits the capacity to analyze the various reports.

It may be implausible to develop a single integrated reporting system since there are numerous federal agencies that have a homeland security function. An alternative would be to augment the connectivity between reporting systems. This may assist with developing a more comprehensive picture of

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<sup>134</sup> *The Federal Preparedness Report*, v.

preparedness. The ability to analyze expenditures across programs and jurisdictions could strengthen local, state and national preparedness activities and assist with directing future grant funding towards identified shortfalls in prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery efforts. With the current grant reporting systems, it is difficult to get a handle on the disparate homeland security initiatives developing at the state, regional, and local level.

The implementation of national assessments and integrated technology platforms will take time to develop and roll-out. In the interim, the homeland security community could focus on relationship building. Following the example of the United Kingdom, states and locals could adopt the local/regional resiliency forum concept. This process serves to bring all of the partners together that have a vested interest in managing risk. Collectively, the group, also referred to a pyramid mega-community, can more efficiently manage resources towards the reduction and mitigation of risk. If the foundation of these planning activities is not equitable, participation may dwindle and the data collected could be compromised. In turn, this would diminish the validity of findings.

The number of widgets purchased will not measure the success of national preparedness, but rather the strength of the relationships developed in the process will. States and locals will be more apt to contribute to this endeavor if they are considered equal partners in the process. States and locals want to understand how the data will be analyzed, how it will be packaged for decision makers, and how the results may impact future funding. While this information is not secret, the lack of transparency creates the illusion that the analysis may negatively impact future grant opportunities. Overall, stakeholder buy-in is and will continue to be the critical component of national preparedness.

The Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) was created to target specific shortfalls in the state and local capacity to equip, plan, train, and exercise to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from a terrorist incident. The current reporting systems have left the federal, state and local partners with an incomplete picture of what these grant programs have




accomplished. The homeland security community should initiate a national capability assessment, national risk assessment, and an integrated technology platform that connects how the HSGP investments are reducing risk, building capabilities, and measuring progress toward meeting preparedness goals. These recommended actions will take a significant amount of time to complete. In the mean time, all stakeholders should continue to integrate/connect reporting systems, enhance coordination amongst grant programs, and strengthen partnerships within the homeland security community. As this process unfolds, stakeholders will have to come to a consensus on the amount/type of data that will be collected, the flexibility that will be afforded to state and local recipients, and the time commitment required for the completion of reporting.







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# APPENDIX.

## A. MEASURING PREPAREDNESS SURVEY RESULTS

1. Informed Consent I understand that no information will be listed that would identify me in any way and that the results of this survey will be used in a graduate level thesis. I understand that this project does not involve greater than minimal risk and involves no known reasonably foreseeable risks or hazards greater than those encountered in everyday life. I have also been informed of any benefits to myself or to others that may reasonably be expected as a result of this research. I understand that no tangible compensation will be given. I understand that a copy of the research results will be available at the conclusion of the experiment, through the Homeland Security Digital Library. I understand that all records of this study will be kept confidential and that my privacy will be safeguarded. No information will be publicly accessible which could identify me as a participant. I understand that my participation is strictly voluntary, and if I agree to participate, I am free to withdraw at any time without prejudice. I understand that if I have any questions or comments regarding this project upon the completion of my participation, I should contact the researcher, Pam Broughton, 513-470-3174, pam.broughton@hamilton-co.org, or the Principal Investigator, Dr. Lauren F. Wollman, (831) 236 4636, lwollman@nps.edu. Any medical questions should be addressed to LTC Eric Morgan, MC, USA, (CO, POM Medical Clinic), (831) 242-7550, eric.morgan@nw.amedd.army.mil. Any other questions or concerns may be addressed to the IRB Chair, LT Brent Olde, 656-3807, baolde@nps.edu. I have been provided with a full explanation of the purpose, procedures, and duration of my participation in this research project. I understand how my identification will be safeguarded and have had all my questions answered. I understand that by agreeing to participate in this research, I do not waive any of my legal rights.

	Response Percent	Response Count
I consent 	100.0%	205
I do not consent	0.0%	0
<i>answered question</i>		205
<i>skipped question</i>		0

2. Affiliation		
	Response Percent	Response Count
Local including Tribal - not affiliated with an Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) City 	7.1%	13
Local including Tribal - affiliated with a UASI City 	48.9%	90
State or Territory 	17.4%	32
Federal 	14.1%	26
Private Sector 	4.9%	9
Other (please specify) 	7.6%	14
	<i>answered question</i>	<b>184</b>
	<i>skipped question</i>	<b>21</b>

3. Discipline Represented		
	Response Percent	Response Count
Critical Infrastructure	0.0%	0
<b>Emergency Management</b>	<b>45.9%</b>	<b>84</b>
Emergency Medical Services (EMS)	1.6%	3
Fire Service	13.7%	25
Government Agency	10.4%	19
HazMat	1.1%	2
Health Care	1.1%	2
Homeland Security	11.5%	21
Law Enforcement	9.3%	17
Military	0.0%	0
Nonprofit	0.0%	0
Public Health	2.7%	5
Public Safety Communications	2.2%	4
Public Works	0.5%	1
	<i>answered question</i>	<b>183</b>
	<i>skipped question</i>	<b>22</b>

**4. Please specify the HSGP grant program(s) that your agency/organization has participated in or will be participating in the future.**

	Yes	No	Response Count
Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI)	84.8% (145)	15.2% (26)	171
State Homeland Security Program (SHSP)	90.1% (155)	9.9% (17)	172
Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program (LETPP)	75.2% (112)	24.8% (37)	149
Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS)	72.3% (112)	27.7% (43)	155
Citizen Corps Program (CCP)	75.5% (117)	24.5% (38)	155
	<i>answered question</i>		<b>181</b>
	<i>skipped question</i>		<b>24</b>

**5. What is your perception of the cost to your organization/jurisdiction to participate in the grant program (e.g. attending planning meetings; writing investment justifications; completing procurement processes, monitoring, and auditing requirements; etc.)? What is your perception of the benefits gained from participation (e.g. equipment received; coordination and planning; training and exercises; etc.)?**

	None	Low	Medium	High	Very High	Rating Average	Response Count
Cost to Participate	6.6% (10)	19.1% (29)	37.5% (57)	25.7% (39)	11.2% (17)	3.16	152
Benefits Gained	3.4% (5)	5.5% (8)	22.6% (33)	37.7% (55)	30.8% (45)	3.87	146
	Comments:						40
	<i>answered question</i>						<b>154</b>
	<i>skipped question</i>						<b>51</b>

**6. How would you rate the usefulness of current reporting tools to connect investments to improved capabilities within your locality? Rate the following tools:**

	No connection	Low	Medium	High	Very High	N/A	Response Count	
Strategies	7.3% (11)	17.9% (27)	<b>43.0% (65)</b>	22.5% (34)	5.3% (8)	4.0% (6)	151	
Investment Justifications	5.3% (8)	20.0% (30)	<b>38.7% (58)</b>	26.7% (40)	4.0% (6)	5.3% (8)	150	
Bi-Annual Strategy Implementation Report (BSIR)	11.3% (17)	<b>34.7% (52)</b>	32.7% (49)	10.7% (16)	1.3% (2)	9.3% (14)	150	
Programmatic Monitoring Visits	8.0% (12)	<b>34.7% (52)</b>	31.3% (47)	14.7% (22)	6.7% (10)	4.7% (7)	150	
State Preparedness Reports	6.7% (10)	<b>36.7% (55)</b>	32.0% (48)	16.7% (25)	4.0% (6)	4.0% (6)	150	
						Comments:	26	
							<i>answered question</i>	151
							<i>skipped question</i>	54







**7. How would you rate the benefits your locality has gained from participation in the Homeland Security Grant Program?**

	No Benefit	Low	Medium	High	Very High	N/A	Response Count	
Equipment Received	4.6% (7)	4.6% (7)	9.3% (14)	27.8% (42)	<b>47.7% (72)</b>	6.0% (9)	151	
Coordination and Planning	5.3% (8)	7.3% (11)	27.2% (41)	<b>32.5% (49)</b>	22.5% (34)	5.3% (8)	151	
Training	3.3% (5)	9.9% (15)	<b>33.8% (51)</b>	27.2% (41)	20.5% (31)	5.3% (8)	151	
Exercises	7.3% (11)	14.0% (21)	<b>32.7% (49)</b>	26.0% (39)	14.7% (22)	5.3% (8)	150	
						Comments:	24	
							<i>answered question</i>	151
							<i>skipped question</i>	54

**8. Within your locality, how would you rate the coordination between the multiple homeland security and emergency preparedness grant programs (DHS/FEMA, Health and Human Services, Center Disease Control, Agriculture, Commerce, etc.)? How would you rate the political, social, and financial cost to coordinate these grant programs?**

	None	Low	Moderate	High	Very High	Response Count
Coordination	7.9% (12)	33.6% (51)	35.5% (54)	17.1% (26)	5.9% (9)	152
Cost to Coordinate	5.4% (8)	19.7% (29)	44.9% (66)	25.9% (38)	4.1% (6)	147
Comments:						20
<i>answered question</i>						152
<i>skipped question</i>						53

**9. Do you feel that you could explain how your locality has invested HSGP funds to improve preparedness?**

	Response Percent	Response Count
Not at all. 	6.3%	9
I could explain what my individual agency has received from the HSGP funding. 	21.8%	31
I could explain how the equipment my agency has received improved daily operations. 	21.1%	30
I could explain how the equipment, planning, and training/exercises has improved my agency's capability to respond to a terrorism incident. 	33.8%	48
I could explain how my locality has invested HSGP funds to enhance both day-to-day operations as well as my locality's ability to coordinate terrorism prevention, protection, response, and recovery efforts. 	66.2%	94
Other (please specify) 	5.6%	8
<i>answered question</i>		142
<i>skipped question</i>		63
















10. Based on the four mission areas of preparedness, how would you rate your locality's current capabilities?						
	None	Low	Medium	High	Very High	Response Count
Prevention	2.2% (3)	28.8% (40)	<b>46.0% (64)</b>	21.6% (30)	1.4% (2)	139
Protection (Mitigation / Target Hardening)	2.2% (3)	27.3% (38)	<b>53.2% (74)</b>	15.1% (21)	2.2% (3)	139
Response	1.4% (2)	2.1% (3)	25.0% (35)	<b>57.1% (80)</b>	14.3% (20)	140
Recovery	1.4% (2)	33.6% (47)	<b>42.1% (59)</b>	20.0% (28)	2.9% (4)	140
<i>answered question</i>						140
<i>skipped question</i>						65

12. Nationally, how would you rate preparedness for the four homeland security mission areas?						
	None	Low	Medium	High	Very High	Response Count
Prevention	1.4% (2)	25.7% (36)	55.7% (78)	15.0% (21)	2.1% (3)	140
Protection (Mitigation / Target Hardening)	1.4% (2)	29.3% (41)	52.9% (74)	15.7% (22)	0.7% (1)	140
Response	1.4% (2)	6.5% (9)	42.4% (59)	39.6% (55)	10.1% (14)	139
Recovery	2.1% (3)	34.3% (48)	45.0% (63)	17.1% (24)	1.4% (2)	140
					<i>answered question</i>	140
					<i>skipped question</i>	65

13. How would you rate national preparedness for the following scenarios?							
	None	Low	Medium	High	Very High	N/A	Response Count
10 Kilo-ton Nuclear Detonation	5.8% (8)	<b>57.7% (79)</b>	25.5% (35)	8.0% (11)	0.7% (1)	2.2% (3)	137
Aerosolized Anthrax Attack	0.7% (1)	35.0% (48)	<b>46.7% (64)</b>	16.8% (23)	0.7% (1)	0.0% (0)	137
Pandemic Influenza	0.7% (1)	25.5% (35)	<b>49.6% (68)</b>	21.9% (30)	2.2% (3)	0.0% (0)	137
Plague	2.2% (3)	35.8% (49)	<b>47.4% (65)</b>	11.7% (16)	1.5% (2)	1.5% (2)	137
Blister Agent Attack	2.2% (3)	37.2% (51)	<b>43.8% (60)</b>	13.9% (19)	2.2% (3)	0.7% (1)	137
Toxic Industrial Chemical Incident	1.5% (2)	13.2% (18)	<b>40.4% (55)</b>	36.0% (49)	8.8% (12)	0.0% (0)	136
Nerve Agent Attack	2.2% (3)	34.1% (46)	<b>43.0% (58)</b>	17.8% (24)	2.2% (3)	0.7% (1)	135
Chlorine Tank Explosion	0.7% (1)	11.0% (15)	33.8% (46)	<b>44.1% (60)</b>	9.6% (13)	0.7% (1)	136
Major Earthquake	1.5% (2)	14.6% (20)	<b>49.6% (68)</b>	27.0% (37)	7.3% (10)	0.0% (0)	137
Major Hurricane	0.7% (1)	4.4% (6)	<b>45.3% (62)</b>	33.6% (46)	15.3% (21)	0.7% (1)	137
Radiological Dispersal Device	1.5% (2)	28.5% (39)	<b>53.3% (73)</b>	14.6% (20)	2.2% (3)	0.0% (0)	137
Improvised Explosive Device	0.7% (1)	14.0% (19)	<b>40.4% (55)</b>	34.6% (47)	9.6% (13)	0.7% (1)	136
Food Contamination	0.7% (1)	28.1% (38)	<b>42.2% (57)</b>	25.2% (34)	3.7% (5)	0.0% (0)	135
Foreign Animal Disease	1.5% (2)	32.4% (44)	<b>46.3% (63)</b>	18.4% (25)	0.7% (1)	0.7% (1)	136
Cyber Attack	1.5% (2)	38.5% (52)	<b>43.0% (58)</b>	14.1% (19)	2.2% (3)	0.7% (1)	135
<i>answered question</i>							137
<i>skipped question</i>							68






14. In your opinion, where should future investments be focused in order to optimize benefits and strengthen preparedness?						
	Prevention	Protection	Response	Recovery	Other	Response Count
Local Level	62.8% (86)	61.3% (84)	<b>68.6% (94)</b>	46.7% (64)	3.6% (5)	137
State Level	53.0% (62)	52.1% (61)	48.7% (57)	<b>65.8% (77)</b>	0.9% (1)	117
Regional Level	51.3% (60)	46.2% (54)	52.1% (61)	<b>53.0% (62)</b>	1.7% (2)	117
National Level	<b>67.2% (78)</b>	43.1% (50)	37.1% (43)	64.7% (75)	0.0% (0)	116
If you selected Other (please explain)						12
<b>answered question</b>						<b>141</b>
<b>skipped question</b>						<b>64</b>

15. Do you feel that the HSGP would be more successful if there was:			Response Percent	Response Count
Greater focus on local priorities.			56.9%	78
Greater focus on state priorities.			22.6%	31
Greater focus on national priorities.			12.4%	17
Greater transparency and communication on what was purchased and for what purpose.			37.2%	51
The current status adequately addresses local, state, and national preparedness priorities.			13.9%	19
Other (please specify)			16.1%	22
<b>answered question</b>				<b>137</b>
<b>skipped question</b>				<b>68</b>

16. What recommendation(s) would you make for improving the capability to measure the impact that grant spending has made towards national preparedness?		
		Response Percent    Response Count
Requiring quarterly reporting on the progress of investments.		18.1%    25
Requiring a final grant close out report that addresses accomplishments.		35.5%    49
Increasing programmatic monitoring by FEMA representatives.		16.7%    23
<b>Initiating a national preparedness assessment to evaluate current capabilities.</b>		<b>45.7%    63</b>
Integrating a performance management system into grant reporting processes.		41.3%    57
Modifying the current grant reporting processes is not necessary. The process sufficiently addresses how investments are improving national preparedness capabilities.		7.2%    10
Other (please specify)		17.4%    24
		<b>answered question    138</b>
		<b>skipped question    67</b>

17. In the FY08 and FY09 HSGP Grant Guidance, DHS has identified measuring the progress of investments against the National Preparedness Guidelines as a high priority. Which agency, jurisdiction, or partner should be responsible for measuring the impact of the HSGP?

	Response Percent	Response Count
Locals - the locals receive 80% of the funds, they are accountable for how the funds are spent and should be responsible for measuring the impact of the funds.	20.4%	28
The State Administrative Agency - the SAA is the recipient of the HSGP and are in the best position to evaluate how the grant funds are improving statewide preparedness efforts	24.1%	33
FEMA Grants Preparedness Division - states and locals provide data on how the funds are allocated through the Grants Reporting Tool, Strategic Plans, State Preparedness Reports, Enhancement Plans, and Budget Worksheets. FEMA has the necessary data to evaluate national preparedness.	15.3%	21
No one agency or level of government has the capacity to measure national preparedness and it requires a concerted effort amongst all levels of government, the private sector and the civil sector.	32.8%	45
Other (please specify)	7.3%	10
<b>answered question</b>		<b>137</b>
<b>skipped question</b>		<b>68</b>

18. What method(s) should be used to drive future investment planning and the measurement of accomplishments?			Response Percent	Response Count
Capacity building - development of core capabilities around the Target Capability List (TCL).			39.1%	54
Scenario driven - development of capabilities around the national planning scenarios.			4.3%	6
Scenario driven - development of capabilities around local/regional planning scenarios.			37.7%	52
<b>Risk based - development of capabilities based on the reduction and mitigation of threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences.</b>			54.3%	75
Other (please specify)			7.2%	10
			<i>answered question</i>	138
			<i>skipped question</i>	67

19. At this time, do you have any additional comments you would like to share on how the HSGP has effected your organization/locality?		Response Count
		32
		<i>answered question</i>
		32
		<i>skipped question</i>
		173

20. Any additional thoughts or recommendations that could improve the capability to measure the impact that the HSGP has made on preparedness?		Response Count
		26
		<i>answered question</i>
		26
		<i>skipped question</i>
		179

## B. MEASURING PREPAREDNESS SURVEY RESULTS BY DISCIPLINE

1. Informed Consent I understand that no information will be listed that would identify me in any way and that the results of this survey will be used in a graduate level thesis. I understand that this project does not involve greater than minimal risk and involves no known reasonably foreseeable risks or hazards greater than those encountered in everyday life. I have also been informed of any benefits to myself or to others that may reasonably be expected as a result of this research. I understand that no tangible compensation will be given. I understand that a copy of the research results will be available at the conclusion of the experiment, through the Homeland Security Digital Library. I understand that all records of this study will be kept confidential and that my privacy will be safeguarded. No information will be publicly accessible which could identify me as a participant. I understand that my participation is strictly voluntary, and if I agree to participate, I am free to withdraw at any time without prejudice. I understand that if I have any questions or comments regarding this project upon the completion of my participation, I should contact the researcher, Pam Broughton, 513-470-3174, pam.broughton@hamilton-co.org, or the Principal Investigator, Dr. Lauren F. Wollman, (831) 236 4636, lwollman@nps.edu. Any medical questions should be addressed to LTC Eric Morgan, MC, USA, (CO, POM Medical Clinic), (831) 242-7550, eric.morgan@nw.amedd.army.mil. Any other questions or concerns may be addressed to the IRB Chair, LT Brent Olde, 656-3807, baolde@nps.edu. I have been provided with a full explanation of the purpose, procedures, and duration of my participation in this research project. I understand how my identification will be safeguarded and have had all my questions answered. I understand that by agreeing to participate in this research, I do not waive any of my legal rights.

	Discipline Represented					Response Totals
	Emergency Management	Fire Service	Government Agency	Homeland Security	Law Enforcement	
I consent	100.0% (84)	100.0% (25)	100.0% (19)	100.0% (21)	100.0% (17)	100.0% (166)
I do not consent	0.0% (0)	0.0% (0)	0.0% (0)	0.0% (0)	0.0% (0)	0.0% (0)
<i>answered question</i>	84	25	19	21	17	166
					<i>skipped question</i>	0



2. Affiliation							
	Discipline Represented						
	EMA	FS	GA	HS	LE	Response Frequency	Response Count
Local including Tribal-not affiliated with an Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) City	9	1	0	0	2	7.3%	12
Local including Tribal-affiliated with a UASI City	43	20	4	5	10	49.7%	82
State or Territory	12	1	6	6	3	17.0%	28
Federal	10	0	7	9	0	15.8%	26
Private Sector	4	1	1	1	0	4.2%	7
Other (please specify)	6	2	1	0	1	6.1%	10
<i>answered question</i>							<b>165</b>
<i>skipped question</i>							<b>1</b>

3. Discipline Represented							
	Discipline Represented						
Answer Options	EMA	FS	GA	HS	LE	Response Frequency	Response Count
Critical Infrastructure	0	0	0	0	0	0.0%	0
Emergency Management	84	0	0	0	0	50.6%	84
Emergency Medical Services (EMS)	0	0	0	0	0	0.0%	0
Fire Service	0	25	0	0	0	15.1%	25
Government Agency	0	0	19	0	0	11.4%	19
HazMat	0	0	0	0	0	0.0%	0
Health Care	0	0	0	0	0	0.0%	0
Homeland Security	0	0	0	21	0	12.7%	21
Law Enforcement	0	0	0	0	17	10.2%	17
Military	0	0	0	0	0	0.0%	0
Nonprofit	0	0	0	0	0	0.0%	0
Public Health	0	0	0	0	0	0.0%	0
Public Safety Communications	0	0	0	0	0	0.0%	0
Public Works	0	0	0	0	0	0.0%	0
<i>answered question</i>							<b>166</b>
<i>skipped question</i>							<b>0</b>

<b>4. Please specify the HSGP grant program(s) that your agency/organization has participated in or will be participating in the future.</b>						
	<b>Discipline Represented</b>					
	<b>EMA</b>	<b>FS</b>	<b>GA</b>	<b>HS</b>	<b>LE</b>	<b>Response Count</b>
<b>Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI)</b>						
Yes	67	23	14	14	14	
No	14	2	2	6	1	
Total	81	25	16	20	15	
<b>State Homeland Security Program (SHSP)</b>						
Yes	75	23	16	13	16	
No	6	2	1	6	0	
Total	81	25	17	19	16	
<b>Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program (LETPP)</b>						
Yes	58	11	14	10	15	
No	15	6	2	8	1	
Total	73	17	16	18	16	
<b>Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS)</b>						
Yes	57	18	12	11	7	
No	19	4	3	7	6	
Total	76	22	15	18	13	
<b>Citizen Corps Program (CCP)</b>						
Yes	65	14	13	9	9	
No	15	5	3	8	3	
Total	80	19	16	17	12	
<i>answered question</i>						<b>163</b>
<i>skipped question</i>						<b>3</b>

**5. What is your perception of the cost to your organization/jurisdiction to participate in the grant program (e.g. attending planning meetings; writing investment justifications; completing procurement processes, monitoring, and auditing requirements, etc.)? What is your perception of the benefits gained from participation (e.g. equipment received; coordination and planning; training and exercises, etc.)?**

	Discipline Represented						
	EMA	FS	GA	HS	LE	Rating Average	Response Count
<b>Cost to Participate</b>							
None	4	0	0	3	1		
Low	10	5	4	2	4		
Medium	29	11	1	6	6		
High	23	4	4	2	1		
Very High	6	2	3	2	3		
Average	3.24 (72)	3.14 (22)	3.50 (12)	2.87 (15)	3.07 (15)	3.18	136
<b>Benefits Gained</b>							
None	2	0	1	2	0		
Low	5	0	0	1	0		
Medium	16	2	2	4	3		
High	21	15	6	5	5		
Very High	26	4	3	2	6		
Average	3.91 (70)	4.10 (21)	3.83 (12)	3.29 (14)	4.21 (14)	3.90	131
Comments:							35
<i>answered question</i>							<b>138</b>
<i>skipped question</i>							<b>28</b>

**6. How would you rate the usefulness of current reporting tools to connect investments to improved capabilities within your locality? Rate the following tools:**

	Discipline Represented					Response Count
	EMA	FS	GA	HS	LE	
<b>Strategies</b>						
No connection	5	1	0	1	0	
Low	12	7	2	3	1	
Medium	28	11	5	7	10	
High	20	3	3	2	4	
Very High	6	1	0	0	0	
N/A	1	0	2	2	0	
Count	72	23	12	15	15	137
Avg. Rating	3.14	2.83	3.10	2.77	3.20	
<b>Investment Justifications</b>						
No connection	4	1	0	0	0	
Low	15	6	1	3	4	
Medium	26	7	7	8	7	
High	24	8	2	2	4	
Very High	2	1	0	0	0	
N/A	1	0	2	2	0	
Count	72	23	12	15	15	137
Avg. Rating	3.07	3.09	3.10	2.92	3.00	
<b>Bi-Annual Strategy Implementation Report (BSIR)</b>						
No connection	4	3	2	2	2	
Low	31	4	5	6	3	
Medium	23	8	2	5	8	
High	9	3	2	0	1	
Very High	2	0	0	0	0	
N/A	3	4	1	2	1	
Count	72	22	12	15	15	136
Avg. Rating	2.62	2.61	2.36	2.23	2.57	
<b>Programmatic Monitoring Visits</b>						
No connection	6	1	1	1	0	
Low	24	8	4	6	4	
Medium	25	6	3	4	8	
High	10	6	2	1	1	
Very High	5	1	1	1	1	
N/A	2	0	1	2	1	
Count	72	22	12	15	15	136
Avg. Rating	2.77	2.91	2.82	2.62	2.93	

6. How would you rate the usefulness of current reporting tools to connect investments to improved capabilities within your locality? Rate the following tools:						
	Discipline Represented					Response Count
	EMA	FS	GA	HS	LE	
<b>State Preparedness Reports</b>						
No connection	2	2	0	2	0	
Low	30	9	3	4	5	
Medium	23	4	6	5	6	
High	13	5	1	2	4	
Very High	3	1	1	0	0	
N/A	1	1	1	2	0	
Count	72	22	12	15	15	136
Avg. Rating	2.79	2.71	3.00	2.54	2.93	
Comments:						23
<i>answered question</i>						<b>137</b>
<i>skipped question</i>						<b>29</b>

7. How would you rate the benefits your locality has gained from participation in the Homeland Security Grant Program?						
	Discipline Represented					Response Count
	EMA	FS	GA	HS	LE	
<b>Equipment Received</b>						
No Benefit	1	1	1	1	0	
Low	4	0	0	0	1	
Medium	6	1	1	2	2	
High	24	4	5	4	2	
Very High	34	16	4	4	10	
N/A	2	1	1	4	0	
Count	71	23	12	15	15	
Avg. Rating	4.25	4.55	4.00	3.91	4.40	
<b>Coordination and Planning</b>						
No Benefit	3	1	1	1	0	
Low	6	2	0	0	1	
Medium	20	8	3	3	6	
High	20	6	5	6	5	
Very High	20	5	2	2	3	
N/A	2	1	1	3	0	
Count	71	23	12	15	15	
Avg. Rating	3.70	3.55	3.64	3.67	3.67	
<b>Training</b>						
No Benefit	1	1	1	1	0	
Low	6	3	1	1	1	
Medium	25	7	2	6	5	
High	20	5	4	3	5	
Very High	17	6	3	1	4	
N/A	2	1	1	3	0	
Count	71	23	12	15	15	
Avg. Rating	3.67	3.55	3.64	3.17	3.80	
<b>Exercises</b>						
No Benefit	4	2	1	1	0	
Low	9	4	1	1	3	
Medium	22	6	3	5	8	
High	20	6	4	4	2	
Very High	13	4	2	1	2	
N/A	2	1	1	3	0	
Count	70	23	12	15	15	
Avg. Rating	3.43	3.27	3.45	3.25	3.20	
Comments:						20
<i>answered question</i>						136
<i>skipped question</i>						30

**8. Within your locality, how would you rate the coordination between the multiple homeland security and emergency preparedness grant programs (DHS/FEMA, Health and Human Services, Center Disease Control, Agriculture, Commerce, etc.)? How would you rate the political, social, and financial cost to coordinate these grant programs?**

	Discipline Represented					Response Count
	EMA	FS	GA	HS	LE	
<b>Coordination</b>						
None	4	2	1	1	1	
Low	28	8	3	4	5	
Moderate	27	8	5	5	5	
High	11	3	1	5	3	
Very High	2	2	1	0	1	
Count	72	23	11	15	15	136
Avg. Rating	2.71	2.78	2.82	2.93	2.87	
<b>Cost to Coordinate</b>						
None	4	1	1	0	0	
Low	13	5	2	4	4	
Moderate	35	10	2	7	3	
High	16	5	5	2	7	
Very High	2	1	1	1	0	
Count	70	22	11	14	14	131
Avg. Rating	2.99	3.00	3.27	3.00	3.21	
Comments:						19
<i>answered question</i>						<b>136</b>
<i>skipped question</i>						<b>30</b>



9. Do you feel that you could explain how your locality has invested HSGP funds to improve preparedness?							
	Discipline Represented					Response Frequency	Response Count
	EMA	FS	GA	HS	LE		
Not at all.	2	1	1	2	0	4.7%	6
I could explain what my individual agency has received from the HSGP funding.	13	7	1	2	4	20.9%	27
I could explain how the equipment my agency has received improved daily operations.	13	6	0	2	6	20.9%	27
I could explain how the equipment, planning, and training/exercises has improved my agency's capability to respond to a terrorism incident.	22	7	3	5	6	33.3%	43
I could explain how my locality has invested HSGP funds to enhance both day-to-day operations as well as my locality's ability to coordinate terrorism prevention, protection, response, and recovery efforts.	45	19	5	8	10	67.4%	87
Other (please specify)	4	1	2	1	0	6.2%	8
<b>answered question</b>							<b>129</b>
<b>skipped question</b>							<b>37</b>

<b>11. How would you rate your locality's preparedness for the following scenarios?</b>						
	<b>Affiliation</b>					<b>Response Count</b>
	<b>EMA</b>	<b>FS</b>	<b>GA</b>	<b>HS</b>	<b>LE</b>	
<b>10 Kilo-ton Nuclear Detonation</b>						
None	12	7	1	1	4	
Low	31	10	3	8	8	
Medium	14	5	3	1	2	
High	5	0	0	1	0	
Very High	1	0	0	0	0	
N/A	4	0	3	2	0	
Count	67	22	10	13	14	
Avg. Rating	2.24	1.91	2.29	2.18	1.86	
<b>Aerosolized Anthrax Attack</b>						
None	2	1	0	0	1	
Low	18	8	1	3	6	
Medium	31	9	5	6	5	
High	11	4	2	2	2	
Very High	2	0	0	0	0	
N/A	2	0	2	2	0	
Count	66	22	10	13	14	
Avg. Rating	2.89	2.73	3.13	2.91	2.57	
<b>Pandemic Influenza</b>						
None	0	0	0	0	1	
Low	8	6	1	3	1	
Medium	40	10	5	4	8	
High	15	4	2	4	4	
Very High	3	2	0	0	0	
N/A	1	0	2	2	0	
Count	67	22	10	13	14	
Avg. Rating	3.20	3.09	3.13	3.09	3.07	
<b>Plague</b>						
None	0	2	0	0	0	
Low	17	8	3	5	4	
Medium	37	9	4	5	8	
High	9	2	1	1	2	
Very High	2	1	0	0	0	
N/A	2	0	2	2	0	
Count	67	22	10	13	14	
Avg. Rating	2.94	2.64	2.75	2.64	2.86	

11. How would you rate your locality's preparedness for the following scenarios?						
	Affiliation					Response Count
	EMA	FS	GA	HS	LE	
<b>Blister Agent Attack</b>						
None	3	2	0	0	1	
Low	18	2	2	4	8	
Medium	30	13	5	4	5	
High	11	3	1	2	0	
Very High	2	2	0	1	0	
N/A	3	0	2	2	0	
Count	67	22	10	13	14	126
Avg. Rating	2.86	3.05	2.88	3.00	2.29	
<b>Toxic Industrial Chemical Incident</b>						
None	0	0	0	0	1	
Low	6	1	1	2	2	
Medium	24	5	4	3	7	
High	24	13	2	4	2	
Very High	12	3	1	2	2	
N/A	1	0	2	2	0	
Count	67	22	10	13	14	126
Avg. Rating	3.64	3.82	3.38	3.55	3.14	
<b>Nerve Agent Attack</b>						
None	2	0	0	0	1	
Low	23	7	2	3	8	
Medium	26	8	5	5	4	
High	12	5	1	2	1	
Very High	2	2	0	1	0	
N/A	2	0	2	2	0	
Count	67	22	10	13	14	126
Avg. Rating	2.83	3.09	2.88	3.09	2.36	
<b>Chlorine Tank Explosion</b>						
None	0	0	0	0	1	
Low	5	1	0	1	3	
Medium	17	7	5	4	4	
High	27	10	2	4	2	
Very High	16	3	1	2	4	
N/A	2	1	2	2	0	
Count	67	22	10	13	14	126
Avg. Rating	3.83	3.71	3.50	3.64	3.36	

<b>11. How would you rate your locality's preparedness for the following scenarios?</b>						
	<b>Affiliation</b>					<b>Response Count</b>
	<b>EMA</b>	<b>FS</b>	<b>GA</b>	<b>HS</b>	<b>LE</b>	
<b>Major Earthquake</b>						
None	5	2	2	0	1	
Low	18	8	0	4	2	
Medium	23	7	1	1	5	
High	7	4	2	3	3	
Very High	2	1	0	0	1	
N/A	12	0	5	5	2	
Count	67	22	10	13	14	126
Avg. Rating	2.69	2.73	2.60	2.88	3.08	
<b>Major Hurricane</b>						
None	5	1	1	1	2	
Low	8	6	1	2	3	
Medium	9	5	1	2	1	
High	18	4	0	2	2	
Very High	7	2	2	1	2	
N/A	20	4	5	5	4	
Count	67	22	10	13	14	126
Avg. Rating	3.30	3.00	3.20	3.00	2.90	
<b>Radiological Dispersal Device</b>						
None	1	0	0	0	1	
Low	19	7	2	3	8	
Medium	29	9	4	5	2	
High	14	4	2	3	1	
Very High	3	2	0	0	1	
N/A	1	0	2	2	0	
Count	67	22	10	13	13	125
Avg. Rating	2.98	3.05	3.00	3.00	2.46	
<b>Improvised Explosive Device</b>						
None	1	0	0	0	0	
Low	5	2	2	2	1	
Medium	21	4	2	2	5	
High	31	11	3	7	3	
Very High	8	5	1	0	5	
N/A	1	0	2	2	0	
Count	67	22	10	13	14	126
Avg. Rating	3.61	3.86	3.38	3.45	3.86	

<b>11. How would you rate your locality's preparedness for the following scenarios?</b>						
	<b>Affiliation</b>					<b>Response Count</b>
	<b>EMA</b>	<b>FS</b>	<b>GA</b>	<b>HS</b>	<b>LE</b>	
<b>Food Contamination</b>						
None	1	0	0	0	1	
Low	15	8	3	3	5	
Medium	28	5	2	3	7	
High	17	5	1	5	0	
Very High	3	3	1	0	1	
N/A	2	0	3	2	0	
Count	66	21	10	13	14	
Avg. Rating	3.09	3.14	3.00	3.18	2.64	
<b>Foreign Animal Disease</b>						
None	2	0	0	0	1	
Low	23	12	3	5	7	
Medium	27	6	3	4	6	
High	11	2	0	2	0	
Very High	1	1	1	0	0	
N/A	3	1	3	2	0	
Count	67	22	10	13	14	
Avg. Rating	2.78	2.62	2.86	2.73	2.36	
<b>Cyber Attack</b>						
None	2	0	0	0	0	
Low	26	11	3	5	5	
Medium	27	6	4	5	5	
High	7	2	1	1	2	
Very High	1	1	0	0	2	
N/A	4	2	2	2	0	
Count	67	22	10	13	14	
Avg. Rating	2.67	2.65	2.75	2.64	3.07	
<b>answered question</b>						<b>126</b>
<b>skipped question</b>						<b>40</b>

12. Nationally, how would you rate preparedness for the four homeland security mission areas?						
	Discipline Represented					Response Count
	EMA	FS	GA	HS	LE	
<b>Prevention</b>						
None	0	0	0	1	0	
Low	17	5	3	3	5	
Medium	34	14	8	7	6	
High	14	3	0	3	1	
Very High	1	0	0	0	2	
Count	66	22	11	14	14	127
Avg. Rating	2.98	2.91	2.73	2.86	3.00	
<b>Protection (Mitigation / Target Hardening)</b>						
None	0	0	0	1	0	
Low	19	7	1	5	5	
Medium	32	13	8	7	8	
High	14	2	2	1	1	
Very High	1	0	0	0	0	
Count	66	22	11	14	14	127
Avg. Rating	2.95	2.77	3.09	2.57	2.71	
<b>Response</b>						
None	0	0	0	1	0	
Low	4	2	1	1	1	
Medium	22	13	8	4	6	
High	30	7	2	8	3	
Very High	9	0	0	0	4	
Count	65	22	11	14	14	126
Avg. Rating	3.68	3.23	3.09	3.36	3.71	
<b>Recovery</b>						
None	0	1	0	1	0	
Low	22	7	5	7	4	
Medium	28	13	6	2	8	
High	15	1	0	4	2	
Very High	1	0	0	0	0	
Count	66	22	11	14	14	127
Avg. Rating	2.92	2.64	2.55	2.64	2.86	
<b>answered question</b>						<b>127</b>
<b>skipped question</b>						<b>39</b>

<b>13. How would you rate national preparedness for the following scenarios?</b>						
	<b>Discipline Represented</b>					<b>Response Count</b>
	<b>EMA</b>	<b>FS</b>	<b>GA</b>	<b>HS</b>	<b>LE</b>	
<b>10 Kilo-ton Nuclear Detonation</b>						
None	2	3	0	0	1	
Low	41	13	6	7	6	
Medium	13	5	2	5	6	
High	7	1	0	1	1	
Very High	1	0	0	0	0	
N/A	2	0	1	0	0	
Count	66	22	9	13	14	
Avg. Rating	2.44	2.18	2.25	2.54	2.50	
<b>Aerosolized Anthrax Attack</b>						
None	0	0	0	0	0	
Low	26	8	3	4	4	
Medium	28	12	6	7	6	
High	11	2	0	2	4	
Very High	1	0	0	0	0	
N/A	0	0	0	0	0	
Count	66	22	9	13	14	
Avg. Rating	2.80	2.73	2.67	2.85	3.00	
<b>Pandemic Influenza</b>						
None	0	0	0	0	0	
Low	18	6	1	3	3	
Medium	29	12	7	7	7	
High	16	4	1	3	4	
Very High	3	0	0	0	0	
N/A	0	0	0	0	0	
Count	66	22	9	13	14	
Avg. Rating	3.06	2.91	3.00	3.00	3.07	
<b>Plague</b>						
None	1	0	1	0	0	
Low	24	10	3	5	3	
Medium	31	11	5	4	8	
High	6	1	0	4	3	
Very High	2	0	0	0	0	
N/A	2	0	0	0	0	
Count	66	22	9	13	14	
Avg. Rating	2.75	2.59	2.44	2.92	3.00	

<b>13. How would you rate national preparedness for the following scenarios?</b>						
	<b>Discipline Represented</b>					<b>Response Count</b>
	<b>EMA</b>	<b>FS</b>	<b>GA</b>	<b>HS</b>	<b>LE</b>	
<b>Blister Agent Attack</b>						
None	2	0	0	0	0	
Low	23	10	5	4	4	
Medium	33	7	4	5	7	
High	5	4	0	4	3	
Very High	2	1	0	0	0	
N/A	1	0	0	0	0	
Count	66	22	9	13	14	
Avg. Rating	2.72	2.82	2.44	3.00	2.93	
<b>Toxic Industrial Chemical Incident</b>						
None	1	0	0	0	0	
Low	9	2	3	0	1	
Medium	23	10	5	7	6	
High	23	7	1	6	7	
Very High	9	3	0	0	0	
N/A	0	0	0	0	0	
Count	65	22	9	13	14	
Avg. Rating	3.46	3.50	2.78	3.46	3.43	
<b>Nerve Agent Attack</b>						
None	2	0	0	0	0	
Low	23	8	5	3	4	
Medium	27	8	4	7	8	
High	11	5	0	3	2	
Very High	2	1	0	0	0	
N/A	1	0	0	0	0	
Count	66	22	9	13	14	
Avg. Rating	2.82	2.95	2.44	3.00	2.86	
<b>Chlorine Tank Explosion</b>						
None	0	0	0	0	0	
Low	7	2	2	0	1	
Medium	17	7	6	6	5	
High	33	10	1	7	6	
Very High	8	2	0	0	2	
N/A	1	0	0	0	0	
Count	66	21	9	13	14	
Avg. Rating	3.65	3.57	2.89	3.54	3.64	



<b>13. How would you rate national preparedness for the following scenarios?</b>						
	<b>Discipline Represented</b>					<b>Response Count</b>
	<b>EMA</b>	<b>FS</b>	<b>GA</b>	<b>HS</b>	<b>LE</b>	
<b>Major Earthquake</b>						
None	1	0	0	0	0	
Low	10	3	2	1	1	
Medium	35	11	5	5	6	
High	14	8	2	7	5	
Very High	6	0	0	0	2	
N/A	0	0	0	0	0	
Count	66	22	9	13	14	
Avg. Rating	3.21	3.23	3.00	3.46	3.57	
<b>Major Hurricane</b>						
None	0	0	0	0	0	
Low	4	0	1	0	1	
Medium	30	12	6	4	5	
High	21	7	2	7	4	
Very High	11	3	0	2	3	
N/A	0	0	0	0	1	
Count	66	22	9	13	14	
Avg. Rating	3.59	3.59	3.11	3.85	3.69	
<b>Radiological Dispersal Device</b>						
None	1	0	0	0	0	
Low	18	7	1	2	5	
Medium	36	11	8	8	6	
High	9	4	0	3	3	
Very High	2	0	0	0	0	
N/A	0	0	0	0	0	
Count	66	22	9	13	14	
Avg. Rating	2.89	2.86	2.89	3.08	2.86	
<b>Improvised Explosive Device</b>						
None	0	0	0	0	0	
Low	9	4	1	1	1	
Medium	24	8	7	5	5	
High	28	7	0	7	5	
Very High	5	2	1	0	3	
N/A	0	0	0	0	0	
Count	66	21	9	13	14	
Avg. Rating	3.44	3.33	3.11	3.46	3.71	

13. How would you rate national preparedness for the following scenarios?						
	Discipline Represented					Response Count
	EMA	FS	GA	HS	LE	
<b>Food Contamination</b>						
None	0	0	0	0	0	
Low	19	7	5	2	2	
Medium	26	11	4	2	9	
High	19	3	0	8	2	
Very High	2	0	0	0	1	
N/A	0	0	0	0	0	
Count	66	21	9	12	14	122
Avg. Rating	3.06	2.81	2.44	3.50	3.14	
<b>Foreign Animal Disease</b>						
None	1	0	0	0	0	
Low	22	8	4	2	5	
Medium	29	13	4	6	6	
High	13	0	1	5	3	
Very High	0	0	0	0	0	
N/A	1	0	0	0	0	
Count	66	21	9	13	14	123
Avg. Rating	2.83	2.62	2.67	3.23	2.86	
<b>Cyber Attack</b>						
None	0	0	0	1	0	
Low	29	7	4	2	5	
Medium	25	12	5	7	4	
High	9	1	0	3	4	
Very High	2	0	0	0	1	
N/A	0	1	0	0	0	
Count	65	21	9	13	14	122
Avg. Rating	2.75	2.70	2.56	2.92	3.07	
<i>answered question</i>						124
<i>skipped question</i>						42

<b>14. In your opinion, where should future investments be focused in order to optimize benefits and strengthen preparedness?</b>						
	<b>Discipline Represented</b>					<b>Response Count</b>
	<b>EMA</b>	<b>FS</b>	<b>GA</b>	<b>HS</b>	<b>LE</b>	
<b>Local Level</b>						
Prevention	39	12	6	9	10	
Protection	43	7	5	11	9	
Response	43	17	8	10	8	
Recovery	33	7	5	7	7	
Other	3	0	0	1	0	
Count	161	43	24	38	34	
<b>State Level</b>						
Prevention	31	10	4	3	8	
Protection	31	12	4	4	7	
Response	29	5	6	5	7	
Recovery	38	12	6	6	9	
Other	1	0	0	0	0	
Count	130	39	20	18	31	
<b>Regional Level</b>						
Prevention	36	10	4	2	6	
Protection	25	13	3	3	8	
Response	26	10	5	10	5	
Recovery	29	8	6	10	8	
Other	1	1	0	0	0	
Count	117	42	18	25	27	
<b>National Level</b>						
Prevention	43	14	6	1	9	
Protection	26	10	3	3	5	
Response	19	8	4	3	5	
Recovery	37	10	8	9	6	
Other	0	0	0	0	0	
Count	125	42	21	16	25	
If you selected Other (please explain)						11
<b>answered question</b>						<b>128</b>
<b>skipped question</b>						<b>38</b>

15. Do you feel that the HSGP would be more successful if there was:							
	Discipline Represented					Response Frequency	Response Count
	EMA	FS	GA	HS	LE		
Greater focus on local priorities.	32	12	5	11	8	54.8%	68
Greater focus on state priorities.	12	5	4	2	3	21.0%	26
Greater focus on national priorities.	7	4	1	4	0	12.9%	16
Greater transparency and communication on what was purchased and for what purpose.	28	7	3	3	3	35.5%	44
The current status adequately addresses local, state, and national preparedness priorities.	8	2	2	0	3	12.1%	15
Other (please specify)	13	4	0	2	2	16.9%	21
<i>answered question</i>							<b>124</b>
<i>skipped question</i>							<b>42</b>

**16. What recommendation(s) would you make for improving the capability to measure the impact that grant spending has made towards national preparedness?**

	Discipline Represented					Response Frequency	Response Count
	EMA	FS	GA	HS	LE		
Requiring quarterly reporting on the progress of investments.	10	2	4	3	2	16.8%	21
Requiring a final grant close out report that addresses accomplishments.	23	7	5	5	3	34.4%	43
Increasing programmatic monitoring by FEMA representatives.	12	4	1	4	2	18.4%	23
Initiating a national preparedness assessment to evaluate current capabilities.	27	15	5	8	2	45.6%	57
Integrating a performance management system into grant reporting processes.	25	12	7	5	3	41.6%	52
Modifying the current grant reporting processes is not necessary. The process sufficiently addresses how investments are improving national preparedness capabilities.	6	0	0	0	3	7.2%	9
Other (please specify)	16	2	0	1	2	16.8%	21
<i>answered question</i>							<b>125</b>
<i>skipped question</i>							<b>41</b>

**17. In the FY08 and FY09 HSGP Grant Guidance, DHS has identified measuring the progress of investments against the National Preparedness Guidelines as a high priority. Which agency, jurisdiction, or partner should be responsible for measuring the impact of the HSGP?**

	Discipline Represented					Response Frequency	Response Count
	EMA	FS	GA	HS	LE		
Locals-the locals receive 80% of the funds, they are accountable for how the funds are spent and should be responsible for measuring the impact of the funds.	11	3	2	3	5	19.4%	24
The State Administrative Agency-the SAA is the recipient of the HSGP and are in the best position to evaluate how the grant funds are improving statewide preparedness efforts	18	6	4	3	0	25.0%	31
FEMA Grants Preparedness Division-states and locals provide data on how the funds are allocated through the Grants Reporting Tool, Strategic Plans, State Preparedness Reports, Enhancement Plans, and Budget Worksheets. FEMA has the necessary data to evaluate national preparedness.	10	5	1	0	1	13.7%	17
No one agency or level of government has the capacity to measure national preparedness and it requires a concerted effort amongst all levels of government, the private sector and the civil sector.	21	6	4	5	6	33.9%	42
Other (please specify)	7	2	0	0	1	8.1%	10
<i>answered question</i>							<b>124</b>
<i>skipped question</i>							<b>42</b>

18. What method(s) should be used to drive future investment planning and the measurement of accomplishments?							
	Discipline Represented					Response Frequency	Response Count
	EMA	FS	GA	HS	LE		
Capacity building-development of core capabilities around the Target Capability List (TCL).	27	8	5	6	3	39.2%	49
Scenario driven-development of capabilities around the national planning scenarios.	1	3	0	1	1	4.8%	6
Scenario driven-development of capabilities around local/regional planning scenarios.	25	11	5	5	1	37.6%	47
Risk based-development of capabilities based on the reduction and mitigation of threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences.	35	10	6	10	9	56.0%	70
Other (please specify)	7	1	1	0	0	7.2%	9
<b>answered question</b>							<b>125</b>
<b>skipped question</b>							<b>41</b>

### C. MEASURING PREPAREDNESS SURVEY RESULTS BY AFFILIATION

1. Informed Consent I understand that no information will be listed that would identify me in any way and that the results of this survey will be used in a graduate level thesis. I understand that this project does not involve greater than minimal risk and involves no known reasonably foreseeable risks or hazards greater than those encountered in everyday life. I have also been informed of any benefits to myself or to others that may reasonably be expected as a result of this research. I understand that no tangible compensation will be given. I understand that a copy of the research results will be available at the conclusion of the experiment, through the Homeland Security Digital Library. I understand that all records of this study will be kept confidential and that my privacy will be safeguarded. No information will be publicly accessible which could identify me as a participant. I understand that my participation is strictly voluntary, and if I agree to participate, I am free to withdraw at any time without prejudice. I understand that if I have any questions or comments regarding this project upon the completion of my participation, I should contact the researcher, Pam Broughton, 513-470-3174, pam.broughton@hamilton-co.org, or the Principal Investigator, Dr. Lauren F. Wollman, (831) 236 4636, lwollman@nps.edu. Any medical questions should be addressed to LTC Eric Morgan, MC, USA, (CO, POM Medical Clinic), (831) 242-7550, eric.morgan@nw.amedd.army.mil. Any other questions or concerns may be addressed to the IRB Chair, LT Brent Olde, 656-3807, baolde@nps.edu. I have been provided with a full explanation of the purpose, procedures, and duration of my participation in this research project. I understand how my identification will be safeguarded and have had all my questions answered. I understand that by agreeing to participate in this research, I do not waive any of my legal rights.

	Affiliation					Response Totals
	Local including Tribal - not affiliated with an Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) City	Local including Tribal - affiliated with a UASI City	State or Territory	Federal	Private Sector	
I consent	100.0% (13)	100.0% (90)	100.0% (32)	100.0% (26)	100.0% (9)	100.0% (170)
I do not consent	0.0% (0)	0.0% (0)	0.0% (0)	0.0% (0)	0.0% (0)	0.0% (0)
<i>answered question</i>	13	90	32	26	9	170
				<i>skipped question</i>		0



2. Affiliation							
	Affiliation					Response Frequency	Response Count
	Local	UASI	State	Federal	Private Sector		
Local including Tribal-not affiliated with an Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) City	13	0	0	0	0	7.6%	13
Local including Tribal-affiliated with a UASI City	0	90	0	0	0	52.9%	90
State or Territory	0	0	32	0	0	18.8%	32
Federal	0	0	0	26	0	15.3%	26
Private Sector	0	0	0	0	9	5.3%	9
Other (please specify)	0	0	0	0	0	0.0%	0
<b>answered question</b>							<b>170</b>
<b>skipped question</b>							<b>0</b>

3. Discipline Represented							
	Affiliation					Response Frequency	Response Count
	Local	UASI	State	Federal	Private Sector		
Critical Infrastructure	0	0	0	0	0	0.0%	0
Emergency Management	9	43	12	10	4	46.2%	78
Emergency Medical Services (EMS)	0	2	0	0	0	1.2%	2
Fire Service	1	20	1	0	1	13.6%	23
Government Agency	0	4	6	7	1	10.7%	18
HazMat	0	2	0	0	0	1.2%	2
Health Care	0	1	0	0	1	1.2%	2
Homeland Security	0	5	6	9	1	12.4%	21
Law Enforcement	2	10	3	0	0	8.9%	15
Military	0	0	0	0	0	0.0%	0
Nonprofit	0	0	0	0	0	0.0%	0
Public Health	1	0	3	0	0	2.4%	4
Public Safety Communications	0	3	0	0	1	2.4%	4
Public Works	0	0	0	0	0	0.0%	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>9</b>		
<i>answered question</i>							<b>169</b>
<i>skipped question</i>							<b>1</b>

**4. Please specify the HSGP grant program(s) that your agency/organization has participated in or will be participating in the future.**

	Affiliation					Response Count
	Local	UASI	State	Federal	Private Sector	
<b>Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI)</b>						
Yes	5	89	23	17	2	159
No	5	1	3	8	6	
Count	10	90	26	25	8	
<b>State Homeland Security Program (SHSP)</b>						
Yes	13	82	30	17	2	159
No	0	2	0	7	6	
Count	13	84	30	24	8	
<b>Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program (LETPP)</b>						
Yes	9	65	19	11	0	137
No	3	8	4	10	8	
Count	12	73	23	21	8	
<b>Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS)</b>						
Yes	5	65	20	16	1	143
No	4	12	5	8	7	
Count	9	77	25	24	8	
<b>Citizen Corps Program (CCP)</b>						
Yes	5	66	22	16	1	142
No	4	10	3	8	7	
Count	9	76	25	24	8	
<i>answered question</i>						<b>168</b>
<i>skipped question</i>						<b>2</b>

**5. What is your perception of the cost to your organization/jurisdiction to participate in the grant program (e.g. attending planning meetings; writing investment justifications; completing procurement processes, monitoring, and auditing requirements, etc.)? What is your perception of the benefits gained from participation (e.g. equipment received; coordination and planning; training and exercises, etc.)?**

	Affiliation					Rating Average	Response Count	
	Local	UASI	State	Federal	Private Sector			
<b>Cost to Participate</b>								
None	0	1	2	3	2			
Low	5	8	6	5	3			
Medium	6	37	9	2	1			
High	1	28	5	3	0			
Very High	1	6	4	2	0			
Average	2.85 (13)	3.38 (80)	3.12 (26)	2.73 (15)	1.83 (6)	3.14	140	
<b>Benefits Gained</b>								
None	1	0	0	3	1			
Low	0	4	1	1	1			
Medium	2	15	9	2	2			
High	6	31	9	3	1			
Very High	2	28	7	6	0			
Average	3.73 (11)	4.06 (78)	3.85 (26)	3.53 (15)	2.60 (5)	3.88	135	
Comments:							38	
							<i>answered question</i>	<b>142</b>
							<i>skipped question</i>	<b>28</b>

**6. How would you rate the usefulness of current reporting tools to connect investments to improved capabilities within your locality? Rate the following tools:**

	Affiliation					Response Count
	Local	UASI	State	Federal	Private Sector	
<b>Strategies</b>						
No connection	4	2	1	0	3	
Low	1	15	4	3	1	
Medium	5	33	15	9	0	
High	1	24	6	0	1	
Very High	1	5	0	0	0	
N/A	0	0	1	3	1	
Count	12	79	27	15	6	139
Avg. Rating	2.50	3.19	3.00	2.75	1.80	

**6. How would you rate the usefulness of current reporting tools to connect investments to improved capabilities within your locality? Rate the following tools:**

	Affiliation					Response Count
	Local	UASI	State	Federal	Private Sector	
<b>Investment Justifications</b>						
No connection	2	1	1	0	3	
Low	2	16	4	3	1	
Medium	5	30	13	7	0	
High	2	27	6	2	1	
Very High	0	5	0	0	0	
N/A	1	0	2	3	1	
Count	12	79	26	15	6	138
Avg. Rating	2.64	3.24	3.00	2.92	1.80	
<b>Bi-Annual Strategy Implementation Report (BSIR)</b>						
No connection	3	6	4	1	2	
Low	1	27	9	7	3	
Medium	6	27	9	3	0	
High	1	11	4	0	0	
Very High	0	1	0	1	0	
N/A	1	6	1	3	1	
Count	12	78	27	15	6	138
Avg. Rating	2.45	2.64	2.50	2.42	1.60	
<b>Programmatic Monitoring Visits</b>						
No connection	1	4	3	0	2	
Low	3	31	7	5	3	
Medium	6	25	9	6	0	
High	2	12	5	1	0	
Very High	0	5	3	0	0	
N/A	0	1	0	3	1	
Count	12	78	27	15	6	138
Avg. Rating	2.75	2.78	2.93	2.67	1.60	
<b>State Preparedness Reports</b>						
No connection	1	4	2	0	2	
Low	2	37	7	3	2	
Medium	7	21	9	6	1	
High	2	12	7	2	0	
Very High	0	3	2	1	0	
N/A	0	1	0	3	1	
Count	12	78	27	15	6	138
Avg. Rating	2.83	2.65	3.00	3.08	1.80	
Comments:						25
<i>answered question</i>						139
<i>skipped question</i>						31

<b>7. How would you rate the benefits your locality has gained from participation in the Homeland Security Grant Program?</b>						
	<b>Affiliation</b>					<b>Response Count</b>
	<b>Local</b>	<b>UASI</b>	<b>State</b>	<b>Federal</b>	<b>Private Sector</b>	
<b>Equipment Received</b>						
No Benefit	0	0	1	2	3	
Low	2	4	0	0	1	
Medium	1	8	4	0	0	
High	4	21	9	5	0	
Very High	5	47	12	2	0	
N/A	0	1	1	5	2	
Count	12	81	27	14	6	140
Avg. Rating	4.00	4.39	4.19	3.56	1.25	
<b>Coordination and Planning</b>						
No Benefit	2	0	0	1	3	
Low	0	9	0	0	1	
Medium	7	23	8	2	0	
High	3	26	10	6	0	
Very High	0	22	8	1	0	
N/A	0	1	1	4	2	
Count	12	81	27	14	6	140
Avg. Rating	2.92	3.76	4.00	3.60	1.25	
<b>Training</b>						
No Benefit	0	1	0	1	2	
Low	3	11	0	1	0	
Medium	6	27	10	4	2	
High	3	25	6	3	0	
Very High	0	16	10	1	0	
N/A	0	1	1	4	2	
Count	12	81	27	14	6	140
Avg. Rating	3.00	3.55	4.00	3.20	2.00	
<b>Exercises</b>						
No Benefit	2	2	1	1	3	
Low	1	14	2	2	0	
Medium	4	33	6	2	1	
High	4	20	9	4	0	
Very High	0	11	8	1	0	
N/A	0	1	1	4	2	
Count	11	81	27	14	6	139
Avg. Rating	2.91	3.30	3.81	3.20	1.50	
Comments:						22
<i>answered question</i>						140
<i>skipped question</i>						30

**8. Within your locality, how would you rate the coordination between the multiple homeland security and emergency preparedness grant programs (DHS/FEMA, Health and Human Services, Center Disease Control, Agriculture, Commerce, etc.)? How would you rate the political, social, and financial cost to coordinate these grant programs?**

	Affiliation					Response Count
	Local	UASI	State	Federal	Private Sector	
<b>Coordination</b>						
None	2	3	2	1	2	
Low	4	26	8	6	4	
Moderate	6	31	10	3	0	
High	1	14	6	4	0	
Very High	0	6	1	0	0	
Count	13	80	27	14	6	140
Avg. Rating	2.46	2.93	2.85	2.71	1.67	
<b>Cost to Coordinate</b>						
None	1	2	1	1	2	
Low	3	16	4	1	3	
Moderate	4	36	16	7	1	
High	3	21	3	5	0	
Very High	1	2	2	0	0	
Count	12	77	26	14	6	135
Avg. Rating	3.00	3.06	3.04	3.14	1.83	
Comments:						20
<i>answered question</i>						<b>140</b>
<i>skipped question</i>						<b>30</b>

<b>9. Do you feel that you could explain how your locality has invested HSGP funds to improve preparedness?</b>							
	<b>Affiliation</b>					<b>Response Frequency</b>	<b>Response Count</b>
	<b>Local</b>	<b>UASI</b>	<b>State</b>	<b>Federal</b>	<b>Private Sector</b>		
Not at all.	1	0	0	2	5	6.1%	8
I could explain what my individual agency has received from the HSGP funding.	5	14	6	3	0	21.4%	28
I could explain how the equipment my agency has received improved daily operations.	5	17	6	1	0	22.1%	29
I could explain how the equipment, planning, and training/exercises has improved my agency's capability to respond to a terrorism incident.	4	24	14	2	0	33.6%	44
I could explain how my locality has invested HSGP funds to enhance both day-to-day operations as well as my locality's ability to coordinate terrorism prevention, protection, response, and recovery efforts.	6	65	14	2	0	66.4%	87
Other (please specify)	0	1	0	5	1	5.3%	7
<b><i>answered question</i></b>							<b>131</b>
<b><i>skipped question</i></b>							<b>39</b>



**10. Based on the four mission areas of preparedness, how would you rate your locality's current capabilities?**

	Affiliation					Response Count
	Local	UASI	State	Federal	Private Sector	
<b>Prevention</b>						
None	0	1	0	1	0	
Low	2	25	4	4	2	
Medium	8	32	13	4	2	
High	1	17	6	2	2	
Very High	0	2	0	0	0	
Count	11	77	23	11	6	
Avg. Rating	2.91	2.92	3.09	2.64	3.00	
<b>Protection (Mitigation / Target Hardening)</b>						
None	0	1	0	1	0	
Low	5	19	7	3	2	
Medium	6	48	11	3	1	
High	0	8	5	4	2	
Very High	0	1	0	0	1	
Count	11	77	23	11	6	
Avg. Rating	2.55	2.86	2.91	2.91	3.33	
<b>Response</b>						
None	0	0	0	1	0	
Low	1	1	0	0	1	
Medium	3	17	9	2	1	
High	8	44	12	8	3	
Very High	0	15	2	0	1	
Count	12	77	23	11	6	
Avg. Rating	3.58	3.95	3.70	3.55	3.67	
<b>Recovery</b>						
None	0	0	0	1	0	
Low	4	32	3	3	1	
Medium	7	31	13	2	3	
High	1	12	7	3	2	
Very High	0	2	0	2	0	
Count	12	77	23	11	6	
Avg. Rating	2.75	2.79	3.17	3.18	3.17	
<b>answered question</b>						<b>129</b>
<b>skipped question</b>						<b>41</b>

<b>11. How would you rate your locality's preparedness for the following scenarios?</b>						
	<b>Affiliation</b>					<b>Response Count</b>
	<b>Local</b>	<b>UASI</b>	<b>State</b>	<b>Federal</b>	<b>Private Sector</b>	
<b>10 Kilo-ton Nuclear Detonation</b>						
None	3	19	3	2	0	
Low	6	42	8	3	3	
Medium	1	12	7	1	1	
High	0	2	2	1	1	
Very High	0	1	0	0	0	
N/A	2	1	2	4	1	
Count	12	77	22	11	6	
Avg. Rating	1.80	2.00	2.40	2.14	2.60	
<b>Aerosolized Anthrax Attack</b>						
None	1	3	0	0	0	
Low	7	17	9	4	2	
Medium	3	44	8	1	2	
High	0	12	5	1	1	
Very High	0	1	0	0	0	
N/A	1	0	0	4	1	
Count	12	77	22	10	6	
Avg. Rating	2.18	2.88	2.82	2.50	2.80	
<b>Pandemic Influenza</b>						
None	0	1	0	0	0	
Low	1	12	3	0	2	
Medium	11	42	12	4	1	
High	0	20	6	3	1	
Very High	0	2	1	0	1	
N/A	0	0	0	4	1	
Count	12	77	22	11	6	
Avg. Rating	2.92	3.13	3.23	3.43	3.20	
<b>Plague</b>						
None	0	2	0	0	0	
Low	7	22	4	1	3	
Medium	5	42	14	5	1	
High	0	9	3	1	1	
Very High	0	1	0	0	0	
N/A	0	0	1	4	1	
Count	12	76	22	11	6	
Avg. Rating	2.42	2.80	2.95	3.00	2.60	

<b>11. How would you rate your locality's preparedness for the following scenarios?</b>						
	<b>Affiliation</b>					<b>Response Count</b>
	<b>Local</b>	<b>UASI</b>	<b>State</b>	<b>Federal</b>	<b>Private Sector</b>	
<b>Blister Agent Attack</b>						
None	1	5	0	0	0	
Low	5	19	6	3	3	
Medium	4	37	11	4	2	
High	0	14	2	0	0	
Very High	1	2	1	0	0	
N/A	1	0	2	4	1	
Count	12	77	22	11	6	
Avg. Rating	2.55	2.86	2.90	2.57	2.40	
<b>Toxic Industrial Chemical Incident</b>						
None	0	1	0	0	0	
Low	2	3	5	0	2	
Medium	6	26	7	3	2	
High	3	30	8	4	1	
Very High	0	17	2	0	0	
N/A	1	0	0	4	1	
Count	12	77	22	11	6	
Avg. Rating	3.09	3.77	3.32	3.57	2.80	
<b>Nerve Agent Attack</b>						
None	1	3	0	0	0	
Low	6	23	8	3	3	
Medium	4	31	10	3	1	
High	0	18	2	1	1	
Very High	1	2	1	0	0	
N/A	0	0	1	4	1	
Count	12	77	22	11	6	
Avg. Rating	2.50	2.91	2.81	2.71	2.60	
<b>Chlorine Tank Explosion</b>						
None	0	1	0	0	0	
Low	4	4	2	0	1	
Medium	4	22	7	4	2	
High	2	30	10	3	1	
Very High	2	19	2	0	1	
N/A	0	1	1	4	1	
Count	12	77	22	11	6	
Avg. Rating	3.17	3.82	3.57	3.43	3.40	

<b>11. How would you rate your locality's preparedness for the following scenarios?</b>						
	<b>Affiliation</b>					<b>Response Count</b>
	<b>Local</b>	<b>UASI</b>	<b>State</b>	<b>Federal</b>	<b>Private Sector</b>	
<b>Major Earthquake</b>						
None	1	9	3	1	0	
Low	3	20	6	0	1	
Medium	4	22	6	2	2	
High	2	8	3	4	1	
Very High	0	4	0	0	1	
N/A	2	14	4	4	1	
Count	12	77	22	11	6	
Avg. Rating	2.70	2.65	2.50	3.29	3.40	
<b>Major Hurricane</b>						
None	0	7	3	0	1	
Low	4	12	1	1	2	
Medium	2	11	3	0	1	
High	0	12	6	5	2	
Very High	0	11	3	1	0	
N/A	6	24	6	4	0	
Count	12	77	22	11	6	
Avg. Rating	2.33	3.15	3.31	3.86	2.67	
<b>Radiological Dispersal Device</b>						
None	1	2	0	0	0	
Low	5	21	9	4	3	
Medium	5	34	8	2	0	
High	1	14	5	1	2	
Very High	0	5	0	0	0	
N/A	0	0	0	4	1	
Count	12	76	22	11	6	
Avg. Rating	2.50	2.99	2.82	2.57	2.80	
<b>Improvised Explosive Device</b>						
None	1	0	0	0	0	
Low	2	6	3	1	2	
Medium	5	18	10	2	1	
High	4	38	9	4	1	
Very High	0	15	0	0	1	
N/A	0	0	0	4	1	
Count	12	77	22	11	6	
Avg. Rating	3.00	3.81	3.27	3.43	3.20	

11. How would you rate your locality's preparedness for the following scenarios?						
	Affiliation					Response Count
	Local	UASI	State	Federal	Private Sector	
<b>Food Contamination</b>						
None	1	1	0	0	0	
Low	4	24	3	1	2	
Medium	6	25	9	3	1	
High	1	20	8	3	1	
Very High	0	5	1	0	1	
N/A	0	0	1	4	1	
Count	12	75	22	11	6	126
Avg. Rating	2.58	3.05	3.33	3.29	3.20	
<b>Foreign Animal Disease</b>						
None	1	2	0	0	0	
Low	5	36	5	1	3	
Medium	6	27	12	3	1	
High	0	8	3	3	1	
Very High	0	2	1	0	0	
N/A	0	2	1	4	1	
Count	12	77	22	11	6	128
Avg. Rating	2.42	2.63	3.00	3.29	2.60	
<b>Cyber Attack</b>						
None	1	1	0	0	0	
Low	3	40	9	2	1	
Medium	6	24	8	4	2	
High	1	6	2	1	1	
Very High	0	3	1	0	1	
N/A	1	3	2	4	1	
Count	12	77	22	11	6	128
Avg. Rating	2.64	2.59	2.75	2.86	3.40	
<b>answered question</b>						<b>128</b>
<b>skipped question</b>						<b>42</b>

<b>12. Nationally, how would you rate preparedness for the four homeland security mission areas?</b>						
	<b>Affiliation</b>					<b>Response Count</b>
	<b>Local</b>	<b>UASI</b>	<b>State</b>	<b>Federal</b>	<b>Private Sector</b>	
<b>Prevention</b>						
None	0	0	0	1	0	
Low	3	23	6	2	2	
Medium	8	36	13	8	3	
High	1	15	3	1	1	
Very High	0	3	0	0	0	
Count	12	77	22	12	6	129
Avg. Rating	2.83	2.97	2.86	2.75	2.83	
<b>Protection (Mitigation / Target Hardening)</b>						
None	0	0	0	1	0	
Low	5	24	7	2	1	
Medium	6	38	13	9	2	
High	1	14	2	0	3	
Very High	0	1	0	0	0	
Count	12	77	22	12	6	129
Avg. Rating	2.67	2.90	2.77	2.67	3.33	
<b>Response</b>						
None	0	0	0	1	0	
Low	1	5	1	1	1	
Medium	6	31	12	2	1	
High	4	29	8	8	4	
Very High	0	12	1	0	0	
Count	11	77	22	12	6	128
Avg. Rating	3.27	3.62	3.41	3.42	3.50	
<b>Recovery</b>						
None	0	0	0	1	0	
Low	4	31	5	4	2	
Medium	7	34	14	1	1	
High	1	10	3	6	3	
Very High	0	2	0	0	0	
Count	12	77	22	12	6	129
Avg. Rating	2.75	2.78	2.91	3.00	3.17	
<b>answered question</b>						<b>129</b>
<b>skipped question</b>						<b>41</b>

<b>13. How would you rate national preparedness for the following scenarios?</b>						
	<b>Affiliation</b>					<b>Response Count</b>
	<b>Local</b>	<b>UASI</b>	<b>State</b>	<b>Federal</b>	<b>Private Sector</b>	
<b>10 Kilo-ton Nuclear Detonation</b>						
None	0	7	0	0	0	
Low	6	49	9	8	3	
Medium	4	14	8	1	2	
High	1	6	1	2	1	
Very High	0	0	1	0	0	
N/A	0	1	2	0	0	
Count	11	77	21	11	6	
Avg. Rating	2.55	2.25	2.68	2.45	2.67	
<b>Aerosolized Anthrax Attack</b>						
None	0	0	0	0	0	
Low	3	28	8	6	2	
Medium	4	38	11	3	3	
High	4	11	1	2	1	
Very High	0	0	1	0	0	
N/A	0	0	0	0	0	
Count	11	77	21	11	6	
Avg. Rating	3.09	2.78	2.76	2.64	2.83	
<b>Pandemic Influenza</b>						
None	0	0	0	0	0	
Low	2	22	6	2	2	
Medium	6	37	12	4	3	
High	3	17	2	5	0	
Very High	0	1	1	0	1	
N/A	0	0	0	0	0	
Count	11	77	21	11	6	
Avg. Rating	3.09	2.96	2.90	3.27	3.00	
<b>Plague</b>						
None	0	1	0	1	0	
Low	4	32	7	3	2	
Medium	7	33	12	5	2	
High	0	9	0	2	2	
Very High	0	1	1	0	0	
N/A	0	1	1	0	0	
Count	11	77	21	11	6	
Avg. Rating	2.64	2.70	2.75	2.73	3.00	

13. How would you rate national preparedness for the following scenarios?						
	Affiliation					Response Count
	Local	UASI	State	Federal	Private Sector	
<b>Blister Agent Attack</b>						
None	0	1	0	0	1	
Low	5	27	8	5	3	
Medium	6	34	10	5	1	
High	0	13	1	1	1	
Very High	0	2	1	0	0	
N/A	0	0	1	0	0	
Count	11	77	21	11	6	
Avg. Rating	2.55	2.84	2.75	2.64	2.33	
<b>Toxic Industrial Chemical Incident</b>						
None	0	0	0	0	1	
Low	2	6	4	3	1	
Medium	3	37	9	2	2	
High	5	25	7	6	2	
Very High	1	8	1	0	0	
N/A	0	0	0	0	0	
Count	11	76	21	11	6	
Avg. Rating	3.45	3.46	3.24	3.27	2.83	
<b>Nerve Agent Attack</b>						
None	0	1	0	0	1	
Low	5	22	9	5	2	
Medium	4	36	8	3	3	
High	2	15	1	3	0	
Very High	0	2	1	0	0	
N/A	0	0	1	0	0	
Count	11	76	20	11	6	
Avg. Rating	2.73	2.93	2.68	2.82	2.33	
<b>Chlorine Tank Explosion</b>						
None	0	0	0	0	0	
Low	2	7	2	2	1	
Medium	3	25	12	1	4	
High	6	34	6	8	0	
Very High	0	10	0	0	1	
N/A	0	0	1	0	0	
Count	11	76	21	11	6	
Avg. Rating	3.36	3.62	3.20	3.55	3.17	



<b>13. How would you rate national preparedness for the following scenarios?</b>						
	<b>Affiliation</b>					<b>Response Count</b>
	<b>Local</b>	<b>UASI</b>	<b>State</b>	<b>Federal</b>	<b>Private Sector</b>	
<b>Major Earthquake</b>						
None	1	0	0	0	0	
Low	1	13	4	2	0	
Medium	5	40	12	5	3	
High	4	17	5	3	2	
Very High	0	7	0	1	1	
N/A	0	0	0	0	0	
Count	11	77	21	11	6	
Avg. Rating	3.09	3.23	3.05	3.27	3.67	
<b>Major Hurricane</b>						
None	0	0	0	0	0	
Low	1	3	1	1	0	
Medium	6	35	12	4	2	
High	4	24	7	3	2	
Very High	0	14	1	3	2	
N/A	0	1	0	0	0	
Count	11	77	21	11	6	
Avg. Rating	3.27	3.64	3.38	3.73	4.00	
<b>Radiological Dispersal Device</b>						
None	0	1	0	0	0	
Low	5	20	6	2	4	
Medium	5	42	13	6	2	
High	1	13	1	3	0	
Very High	0	1	1	0	0	
N/A	0	0	0	0	0	
Count	11	77	21	11	6	
Avg. Rating	2.64	2.91	2.86	3.09	2.33	
<b>Improvised Explosive Device</b>						
None	0	0	0	0	0	
Low	2	8	4	0	4	
Medium	4	29	13	6	1	
High	5	30	4	5	1	
Very High	0	9	0	0	0	
N/A	0	0	0	0	0	
Count	11	76	21	11	6	
Avg. Rating	3.27	3.53	3.00	3.45	2.50	

13. How would you rate national preparedness for the following scenarios?						
	Affiliation					Response Count
	Local	UASI	State	Federal	Private Sector	
<b>Food Contamination</b>						
None	0	0	0	0	0	
Low	6	22	4	3	1	
Medium	4	33	11	2	2	
High	1	19	5	6	1	
Very High	0	2	1	0	1	
N/A	0	0	0	0	0	
Count	11	76	21	11	5	124
Avg. Rating	2.55	3.01	3.14	3.27	3.40	
<b>Foreign Animal Disease</b>						
None	0	1	0	0	0	
Low	7	26	4	2	2	
Medium	4	37	11	4	2	
High	0	12	5	5	2	
Very High	0	0	0	0	0	
N/A	0	0	1	0	0	
Count	11	76	21	11	6	125
Avg. Rating	2.36	2.79	3.05	3.27	3.00	
<b>Cyber Attack</b>						
None	0	0	0	0	1	
Low	4	35	7	3	1	
Medium	5	29	13	5	2	
High	2	8	1	3	2	
Very High	0	2	0	0	0	
N/A	0	1	0	0	0	
Count	11	75	21	11	6	124
Avg. Rating	2.82	2.69	2.71	3.00	2.83	
<b>answered question</b>						<b>126</b>
<b>skipped question</b>						<b>44</b>

<b>14. In your opinion, where should future investments be focused in order to optimize benefits and strengthen preparedness?</b>						
	<b>Affiliation</b>					<b>Response Count</b>
	<b>Local</b>	<b>UASI</b>	<b>State</b>	<b>Federal</b>	<b>Private Sector</b>	
<b>Local Level</b>						
Prevention	7	52	14	5	3	
Protection	5	51	13	7	4	
Response	10	51	14	8	2	
Recovery	6	38	11	3	2	
Other	1	3	1	0	0	
Count	29	195	53	23	11	
<b>State Level</b>						
Prevention	3	30	15	6	2	
Protection	4	32	11	6	3	
Response	6	24	14	6	2	
Recovery	6	45	12	4	2	
Other	1	0	0	0	0	
Count	20	131	52	22	9	
<b>Regional Level</b>						
Prevention	4	36	8	5	2	
Protection	5	31	6	5	2	
Response	5	32	11	5	4	
Recovery	2	36	13	4	2	
Other	1	0	0	0	0	
Count	17	135	38	19	10	
<b>National Level</b>						
Prevention	7	45	10	6	2	
Protection	3	25	10	5	2	
Response	2	24	6	3	3	
Recovery	4	46	12	8	3	
Other	0	0	0	0	0	
Count	16	140	38	22	10	
If you selected Other (please explain)						11
<b>answered question</b>						<b>130</b>
<b>skipped question</b>						<b>40</b>

15. Do you feel that the HSGP would be more successful if there was:							
	Affiliation					Response Frequency	Response Count
	Local	UASI	State	Federal	Private Sector		
Greater focus on local priorities.	8	48	11	3	3	57.9%	73
Greater focus on state priorities.	3	7	11	6	2	23.0%	29
Greater focus on national priorities.	1	5	3	4	2	11.9%	15
Greater transparency and communication on what was purchased and for what purpose.	5	28	9	4	0	36.5%	46
The current status adequately addresses local, state, and national preparedness priorities.	2	10	2	2	0	12.7%	16
Other (please specify)	2	14	4	0	1	16.7%	21
<i>answered question</i>							<b>126</b>
<i>skipped question</i>							<b>44</b>

**16. What recommendation(s) would you make for improving the capability to measure the impact that grant spending has made towards national preparedness?**

	Affiliation					Response Frequency	Response Count
	Local	UASI	State	Federal	Private Sector		
Requiring quarterly reporting on the progress of investments.	0	13	6	4	2	19.7%	25
Requiring a final grant close out report that addresses accomplishments.	1	31	11	3	1	37.0%	47
Increasing programmatic monitoring by FEMA representatives.	1	11	5	4	0	16.5%	21
Initiating a national preparedness assessment to evaluate current capabilities.	4	35	12	4	2	44.9%	57
Integrating a performance management system into grant reporting processes.	4	31	10	7	1	41.7%	53
Modifying the current grant reporting processes is not necessary. The process sufficiently addresses how investments are improving national preparedness capabilities.	2	6	1	0	0	7.1%	9
Other (please specify)	3	10	5	1	2	16.5%	21
<i>answered question</i>							<b>127</b>
<i>skipped question</i>							<b>43</b>

**17. In the FY08 and FY09 HSGP Grant Guidance, DHS has identified measuring the progress of investments against the National Preparedness Guidelines as a high priority. Which agency, jurisdiction, or partner should be responsible for measuring the impact of the HSGP?**

	Affiliation					Response Frequency	Response Count
	Local	UASI	State	Federal	Private Sector		
Locals-the locals receive 80% of the funds, they are accountable for how the funds are spent and should be responsible for measuring the impact of the funds.	4	18	3	1	0	20.6%	26
The State Administrative Agency-the SAA is the recipient of the HSGP and are in the best position to evaluate how the grant funds are improving statewide preparedness efforts	2	15	9	5	1	25.4%	32
FEMA Grants Preparedness Division-states and locals provide data on how the funds are allocated through the Grants Reporting Tool, Strategic Plans, State Preparedness Reports, Enhancement Plans, and Budget Worksheets. FEMA has the necessary data to evaluate national preparedness.	0	14	2	1	2	15.1%	19
No one agency or level of government has the capacity to measure national preparedness and it requires a concerted effort amongst all levels of government, the private sector and the civil sector.	5	24	6	3	3	32.5%	41
Other (please specify)	1	4	2	1	0	6.3%	8
<i>answered question</i>							<b>126</b>
<i>skipped question</i>							<b>44</b>

<b>18. What method(s) should be used to drive future investment planning and the measurement of accomplishments?</b>							
	<b>Affiliation</b>					<b>Response Frequency</b>	<b>Response Count</b>
	<b>Local</b>	<b>UASI</b>	<b>State</b>	<b>Federal</b>	<b>Private Sector</b>		
Capacity building-development of core capabilities around the Target Capability List (TCL).	4	28	13	5	0	39.4%	50
Scenario driven-development of capabilities around the national planning scenarios.	1	3	0	1	1	4.7%	6
Scenario driven-development of capabilities around local/regional planning scenarios.	3	34	7	5	2	40.2%	51
Risk based-development of capabilities based on the reduction and mitigation of threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences.	6	45	10	5	3	54.3%	69
Other (please specify)	1	3	1	1	1	5.5%	7
<i>answered question</i>							<b>127</b>
<i>skipped question</i>							<b>43</b>

**D. MEASURING PREPAREDNESS SURVEY COMMENTS AGGREGATED BY AFFILIATION<sup>135</sup>**

**Q5. What is your perception of the cost to your organization/jurisdiction to participate in the grant program (e.g. attending planning meetings; writing investment justifications; completing procurement processes, monitoring, and auditing requirements, etc.)? What is your perception of the benefits gained from participation (e.g. equipment received; coordination and planning; training and exercises, etc.)?**

**Federal**

- As a federal employee, I see the cost to participate more as the “taxpayers” cost of federal government offering the program. Benefits gained are tremendous and can be enhanced moving forward.
- Job/agency is all about the development and administration of the grants

<sup>135</sup> All references to a particular jurisdiction or state have been removed.

- Cost is primarily staff time to attend meetings across the Regions. The benefits are better knowledge of state and local capabilities.
- In our case, involvement is attending meetings and assisting the state, local and UASI organizations with grant information, etc. The benefits gained include a stronger knowledge of the capabilities of state and local governments.

## State

- We need M&A in the stonegarden grant!
- Monitoring and auditing, attending planning meetings, strategic planning, target capabilities, and IJ writing takes up a significant amount of time. When we went from a purely base + population methodology at the federal level to a risk and “need” methodology, our state tracked over 2000 man-hours dedicated to completing the Enhancement Plan requirement and the Investment Justifications. After all of that investment, however, our state only increased in award by less than \$1 million and our IJs were in the top 15% of the nation. Was 2000 man-hours, which were taken away from actual homeland security planning/training/exercising, to complete the application requirements worth that \$1 million? Most would say no-as there were critical gaps that were not being addressed due to the administrative requirements. Similarly, the IG came and visited our state. They were here for nearly two months, and were very unorganized and wasted a significant amount of the SAA and subgrantee's time. Directly on their heels, DHS came out to do a monitoring visit, and now we have been notified that FEMA will be spending 9 months in our state monitoring our grants. We are going to have to take people off of the front line and put them on administrative duty to deal with the audits/monitoring. That does not make good business sense.
- For FY07 and FY08 HSGP grant cycles, the amount of time and money that went in to developing the grant applicant (IJs) were probably too much given that the IJs really only counted for a maximum of 10% of the award received. I like that DHS now gives us a targeted allocation-this helps our planning process for the application tremendously.
- The program has been haphazardly administered. There was no end state describe or identified when we started. No real standardized target for each State, in other words 50 different approaches. Emergency Management did not reap the benefits it should have; the program has been overly structured toward law enforcement. During this same period of time federal dollars for Emergency Management has been reduced.
- It “costs” to participate, but those costs themselves are funded in the grant.
- The Grants Management System in our state is a complex system that requires an extraordinary amount of time to process financial information and payments with many redundancies. The time my Fiscal Officer spends on Citizen Corps Program finances with GMS has increased from 5% to 25% of her time.
- We serve as the state administrative agent (SAA). I work for the State Police, Emergency Management and Homeland Security Division. I deal with the Citizen Corps program

## UASI

- To oversee a grant program, and do so properly, takes an extreme amount of time.
- A new Administrative branch of three staff was created to develop and prepare the Investment justifications required by DHS and the SAA. Their work performance along with the public safety practitioners to meet plan, prepare, and present for consideration is inordinately long compared to the outcome and receipt of funding.
- Return on investment is extremely high (operating budget divided by grant dollars received).
- As a general statement we have spent a lot of time and we have received benefits from the programs. Some programs more than others.
- Our region has been the recipient of a tremendous amount of free training over the past 18 months that has assisted the region in being prepared for a CBRNE terrorist incident.



- The system has improved over the years. One issue is the States involvement. The state is not a level of authority over jurisdictions it is a pass through. Direct funding to jurisdictions should be considered.
- Unfortunately, the city controls the entire UASI program. The outlying counties in the UASI have no say into what IJs are developed or oversight in any of the IJs. We do get some benefit, but we never know what equipment we are getting until after the fact...and often, the equipment we get does not meet our needs at all. Until this year, we were not able to submit for projects with the state. In the past, state agencies decided on all the IJs for the locals. Then, if we got anything, we had to immediately sign the money back over to the state. The only money we seemed to get directly through the grant pram was the money for the Citizen Corps programs. It has been a very discouraging process for us because our needs are not being addressed (or even heard). We are hopeful that will change this year at the state. The UASI has shown no desire to listen to or meet our needs at all even though we are "part of" the UASI.
- Participation requires a significant commitment of time and work but it's benefit far outweighs the individual cost.
- Benefits exceed costs.
- The collaborative structure begun in this region more than 5 years ago has significantly streamlined the grants processes for planning, training, exercising, and equipment justifications and procurement. It requires shared effort among all disciplines and jurisdictions.
- Our City, County and Fire Department believe that there is substantial value in all of the Homeland Security programs. Building sustainable relationships with our regional, state, and Federal partners is the long-term goal.
- "my perception" is actually high, but the costs are low....not sure how you wanted that answered
- The reduction of M&A from 3% to 5% is very problematic for funding administrative staff when grant conditions and requirements keep increasing.
- We have 1.5 FTE's that work on HSGP programs-these positions are funded by our cities general fund-not directly grant supported (they also work on other DHS grants not directly under the HSGP umbrella.)
- With local dollars being stretched very thin the grant program has been a way to obtain needed items while not over extending the budget.
- We have hired specific grant employees, yet our workload of our regular employees has been raised considerably with no ability to pay them for this extra amount of activity (existing employees).
- The purchase of items through grant funds does not account for the long term cost to maintain the same items.
- We all participate in the grant planning meetings, writing investment justifications, etc. but only a select few cities seem to receive the grant funds once released...
- Administrative burden cannot be totally paid through HSGP funding so that is part of the known cost when applying for funds; however we have received many items we could not have afforded without the HSGP funds.
- Feds make the investments too complicated. Problem with grants is that cities and states are either unwilling or unable to continue/sustain program on its own.
- Lots of staff time and effort goes into managing these grants.

## Local

- Well worth the cost of participation
- We are a large local public health department and therefore, our participation is limited to helping fellow cities and tribes with fulfilling their grant deliverables.
- The use of a regional system by our State appears to have created divisions among local governments that were previously cooperating.

- the last few grant cycles have been very frustrating for local jurisdictions, that are basically told what we can and cannot apply for and actually have been pretty much left out of the process for the last two years, unless you were affiliated with a law enforcement agency. emergency management programs/funding have been non existent for local governments. All the funding has gone to the boys and their toys.

#### Private Sector

- We are a hospital, and many of the grants and their structure are oriented to government. Because of rules, we have had only minimal usage.
- The administrative tail to government grants (record keeping, statistical reporting etc.,) makes most grants unattractive

#### Other

- We have a small staff that deals with HS issues, this staff also deals with the admin end of the grants. We get good return on this investment
- We have had some outstanding training. We also received equipment, but the use of the equipment and the training for it's use has been sporadic and inconsistent.

#### **Q6. How would you rate the usefulness of current reporting tools to connect investments to improved capabilities within your locality? Rate the following tools:**

##### Federal

- There are too many reporting tools, and the move to consolidate back to one reporting tool is going to have much complexity and probably lots of growing pains, but it is the right move. The State Preparedness Reports are a positive step, but becoming another mountainous effort requested of over-worked State EM/HS officials. BSIR had potential, but isn't doing the job for at least some of the preparedness grants. Programmatic Monitoring Visits yield some information, but a problem I see is related to lengthy performance periods tied to grants that are churned out every year, resulting in overlapping performance periods, and some confusion resulting from the many "open" grants going at any given time. The monitoring visits themselves, the tools used to gather data, the method of gathering data, all need to be improved upon. Asking a person for the percentage complete on a project, but not requiring solid proof to back up the assertion is a little loose, and the data coming from monitoring visits cannot be relied upon for accurate analysis connecting investments to improved capabilities.
- The biggest problem with the reporting system is that none of them are electronically connected. We end up with buckets of information, with no way to analyze them to determine trends or easily coordinate across State and jurisdictional lines.
- The biggest problem with the current reporting systems is that they are not electronically linked. They are buckets of information that can not be easily searched or analyzed; making trend analysis very difficult.

##### State

- The BSIR does not help local jurisdictions or states at all. It is purely a federal reporting tool that supposedly is used to provide the federal government information about how the funding is being allocated among disciplines and between allowable grant categories. It is purely a requirement for local jurisdictions, however, and they gain no benefit from it (SAA included). The IJs are getting easier now that we have been using a similar template for 3 years running (thank you, DHS). However, it is crazy that we have to do strategies AND state preparedness reports, and DHS does not come out with the guidance in a timely manner. It makes it very difficult for states to not just write things in a vacuum-again, these become short term, high resource products in order to get grants.

They aren't really used very well as actual strategic tools that all stakeholders have bought into. This is because it is almost impossible for a SAA to "sell" a local jurisdiction on participating when DHS is just going to change the process and make them do something different the next year.

- The SHSS, IJs, and SPR are valuable tools. However, I think there needs to be better explanation as to how the SPR and SHSS align with and support one another.
- We are struggling to measure improved capabilities.
- The controls of strategies, justifications, and monitoring and the reporting done via the BSIR and other DHS or federal initiatives should have "very high" usefulness. This effect is abated by the frequent changes in information requirements or priorities du jour.
- Often the DHS program manager would visit but had had a limited amount of information to share because they weren't prepared to visit the States. Typically, the program manager was just out of the military (not meant negatively, purely an observation) and had a limited background on State Government and Emergency Management.
- Difficult to understand question

## UASI

- Sudden "new" ideas from DHS to provide updates are time consuming and are not used by DHS.
- A bureaucratic tool rather than any sort of planning and policy process.
- Unfortunately, like most grants reporting requirements take up a considerable amount of time. We currently have to dedicate staff specifically to manage all of these reporting requirements thus reducing the effectiveness of the grant programs.
- Strategies are wonderful tools, but DHS seems to be minimizing their role (not requiring updates of local UASI strategies, emphasizing the SPR, etc.)  
In our state, local jurisdictions never receive or have access to the BSIR.  
Our monitoring visit was a joke.  
Our state's SPR was developed in a vacuum...they didn't engage locals and it doesn't reflect any local level accomplishments or priorities. Heck, they couldn't even identify the number of UASIs within the state (they listed four, six and seven at different places in the document...there are actually five).
- The visits are key to our success with US DHS
- We scored in the top five percent with our IJs but the funding for our UASI was significantly cut. It seems that there is a definite East/West Coast bias based on density of population, not threat assessment.
- See comments above
- I have not participated or seen the BSIR or had any Programmatic Monitoring Visits. I did not have any knowledge.
- Strategies, like a picture on the puzzle box, give us a view of where we want to go and how we should look when we get there. BSIRs allow the oversight of how we are spending our monies to achieve the "picture on the box."; IJs are a statement of "if I have this much money, this is what I can do with it."; But since we never receive the money needed to complete the work cited in an IJ, we have to do it piecemeal. And, since situations change (e.g., impact of a natural hazard) the next IJs may not look like the past IJs. Visits are well-meaning, but generally do not have a positive outcome since the visitor has little, if any, actual awareness of the local "ground truth"; State Preparedness Reports seem equally out of phase, especially in a state with wide disparities in geography, needs, and available resources. My region is resource-rich compared to most of my state and consequently we are ahead of most of the state in what we are accomplishing in the HLS arena. We will not "mark time"; while the state tries to catch up. Instead, we will continue to advance and offer our processes and products as models for other regions in the state.

- Although I'm not directly involved with the administration of the grants, I do know that we'd be a lot better at understanding and following the model/guidance if it didn't change so often.
- I believe the BSIR is a useful tool that provides our local representatives with monetary picture of what homeland security project dollars have allowed us to do in terms of preparedness and response.
- BISR is simply filling out a lot of information that does not really capture the programs and plans we have in place or are a part of our strategy.
- The IJ process doesn't accurately capture true preparedness. The IJs are written purposely vague to allow for manipulation and greater level of project acceptance. The IJs are typically written well before a call for projects is made at the local level.

The BSIR is utilized for paperwork and does not accurately portray the strategy or implementation of the projects at the local level. Often the BSIRs are written then changed as funding level or focus changes mid-year.

The state preparedness report has never been a useful tool in my opinion. There simply is not a "one report" to fit all. I would prefer to see a comparison of rural vs. urban area report or regional reports conducted within FEMA regions.

- Why aren't we utilizing information from EMAP to determine our levels of capabilities now and where we want to be? State Preparedness Reports are only good enough if they know what they're doing. Sometimes the state is reluctant to take the lead when it is their role to do so.

#### Local

- Overall, I find the reports utilized by DHS on these streams of funding to not be very reflective of reality. I believe that reporting systems like the Comprehensive Cooperative Agreement -- formerly utilized by FEMA -- were much better measures of program output.
- From a local government perspective they are not considering the needs of our jurisdictions, but the "regional approach" is leaving many cities in the dust. How can we justify radiological detection vehicles, when our own personnel don't have appropriate levels of PPE?

#### Other

- The strategies are essentially disconnected at the local level, people are trying to address their needs and the implementation and focused areas pushed down, seem random.

#### **Q7. How would you rate the benefits your locality has gained from participation in the Homeland Security Grant Program?**

#### Federal

- As a federal agency we do have receive funding under HSGP
- NA-to me as a federal agency. Unless you consider, all the localities my agency assists in enhancing HS capabilities. I think that overall, entities/jurisdictions participating in HSGP are much more capable for WMD and other hazards, than they were prior to HSGP participation.

## State

- It difficult to conduct an exercise when there is no plan in place to test.
- This question is hard to apply to the coordination of the state Citizen Corps Program.
- The HSGP grant program has brought together localities.

## UASI

- Because of manpower issues, it is often difficult for us to provide staff to participate in regional training exercises.
- The exercise program isn't as robust as it could be. Would like to see more emphasis placed on areas of weakness identified through exercises.
- Still in first year; no benefits realized as yet. Based on award, equipment received will ultimately be a high rating.
- With specific respect to exercises, we could be benefiting to a much higher degree, but our state constrains us to using a single vendor, won't allow us to tailor exercises to local needs, and basically makes it a pretty worthless endeavor.
- We would not be where we are without the US DHS Grant Programs
- In 2007 our UASI (City and County) expanded to include 6 additional counties. This has been a fatal flaw in which the funding is now shared in the name of Collaboration/Regionalization. This significantly hurts the efforts on the major (core) city and county. the 1/7th share for the highest risk jurisdictions does little in our efforts to protect, prevent and mitigate acts of terrorism and other all hazard events.
- See comments above. We have gotten equipment, but frankly, we have no idea we are getting anything from the UASI until we are called and told to pick up the equipment. The equipment we get really meets a need for the city, not something that necessarily meets a critical need for our County. We do receive the benefit from having a very well equipped, trained and exercised City...but unfortunately, we have received no training, coordination and planning, and exercise benefit directly for county responders from the grant dollars received by the state or the UASI. We are hopeful that the state has made the necessary changes to open up their grant dollars to local entities for FY 09.
- Obviously a quality program.
- Training and Exercise is being under utilized. More emphasis should be made in this area in our region.
- We've gained these benefits because to be successful the process requires collaboration. While we have a history of collaboration on issues such as fire or law mobilization, HLS has required us to expand our collaborative efforts to non-traditional responders including the private sector. For example, we modeled our Terrorism Early Warning group on the Los Angeles model, but early on we recognized that we needed to include more than just law enforcement. We expanded our TEW to include all of Public Safety and then the Private Sector. We've broken down many barriers to information sharing and cooperation. We've been collaborating like this for more than 7 years; a success of which we're very proud.
- I think the training piece or component should extend further and in time I am sure it will.
- The equipment we have purchased would not be here without the grants. The coordination and planning efforts have resulted in a multi-county work group that never worked together before and should continue to work together long after these grants are gone.
- Our UASI monies are invaluable.

## Local

- Equipment procurement is excellent, but planning and training fall more to local responsibility.
- Overall, since the inception of a regional system within the State, our county has received very little to no funding. And, we are the second largest county in the state.

- Again, too much emphasis on the big ticket items rather than the needs of the local community, especially when it comes to development of functioning EOC's and equipment.

#### Private Sector

- We had \$60,000 set aside for training reimbursement we were unable to use it as the rules were too restricted. The return on investment was a negative number.

#### Other

- We have gotten great equipment that is necessary and we would not have received otherwise. Training also. I think improved coordination and planning is a byproduct of the grant process we use in the city.
- we are a rural county

**Q8. Within your locality, how would you rate the coordination between the multiple homeland security and emergency preparedness grant programs (DHS/FEMA, Health and Human Services, Center Disease Control, Agriculture, Commerce, etc.)? How would you rate the political, social, and financial cost to coordinate these grant programs?**

#### Federal

- Always an area that can be improved upon. At federal levels, agencies know they have work to do, and I see active, engaged participation for the most part, among the referenced agencies.
- High for HHS and CDC  
Low for Agriculture and Commerce
- Not applicable
- Coordination between the various Federal preparedness grant programs needs much improvement.
- There needs to be more field support from the FEMA Regions for grants

#### State

- It is complete lip service that DHS and HHS/CDC have worked together. There are innumerable letters where one federal agency is pointing to another federal agency with requirements. There is NO coordination.
- As far as I can tell, there is little coordination between the different emergency preparedness grant programs. Perhaps this is occurring, but not to a great degree at my level. In my State, the SAA is responsible for HSGP, but not ASPR/CDC, Ag or any other funding streams.
- The state has broken down to seven regions. It has brought together many jurisdictions.

#### UASI

- Federal grants to agencies (health in particular) often create competition and duplication of effort. In my jurisdiction, there are 6 FTE dedicated to Emergency Preparedness in Health, only 2 for the legally designated agency for Emergency Management/Homeland Security. Silos still exist in grant programs from the federal level, creating issues at the local and state level.
- Coordination has been good, however the process was more to share based upon role rather than define a specific policy direction or the selection of the best alternatives, much was discipline driven
- Often difficult to identify the grant opportunities because of the numerous programs. Many times there is little coordination and administration is complex.

- In our County, we have tremendous cooperation from all agencies that receive grant dollars, both in the private sector (the hospital) and the public sector (i.e., health department).
- some agencies are high others are not
- Our homeland security personnel work with these grants in our office. I specialize in the UASI grant program. I did not comment.
- Coordination between DHS/FEMA and HHS seems minimal at best. Coordination between DHS/FEMA and Commerce has definitely improved, especially when dealing with port security issues. I'm not in a position to see the connections with Agriculture.
- I am a Committee chair for the UASI and the North Central Region of our State. The committee I chair has little or no interaction with the list above except that the UASI and NCR coordinate very well and have joint committees for the 37 target capabilities.
- Outside of the "homeland security grants" we have limited or no information on the other grants (Health and Human Services, CDS, Agriculture, etc.).
- The Office of Emergency Management is the focal point for coordinating these programs and we have been able to leverage our coordination with only a moderate expenditure of resources (staff). Our governing body and executive group have supported our initiatives.

#### Local

- I would like to cite a particular instance of funding provided to the State University Medical Center to do training and exercises. Because the stream of funding originated within DHHS, there was no requirement that the resulting exercise be HSEEP compliant. As a result, a major effort of coordination went into an activity that could not count toward exercise compliance through DHS because the activity was not HSEEP compliant. This stems from the lack (in my opinion) of a requirement for Federal Cabinet Secretaries to coordinate their program requirements and streams of funding.
- There has been no coordination from my perspective as a local jurisdiction.

#### **Q9. Do you feel that you could explain how your locality has invested HSGP funds to improve preparedness?**

##### Federal

- Federal agency-n/a
- Again, as a federal agency we do not receive HSGP funding.
- As Federal agency rep, I could give information based on reporting, but the reporting is a bit unwieldy to unravel and analyze.
- These questions are not applicable to be as a Federal employee
- Since I'm with the Federal Gov't, we do not receive funding.

##### UASI

- Add all hazards.

##### Other

I can also explain what is going on with the other disciplines, as they could for me.

#### **Q14. In your opinion, where should future investments be focused in order to optimize benefits and strengthen preparedness?**

##### Federal

- I think the national level needs a certain response capability, but not the level currently being pursued.

## State

- Funding should be equitable at all levels of government. Unfortunate but true, typically investments have been driven by Homeland Security personnel who are well meaning but clearly not familiar with Regional (FEMA Regions), State or local governments. A large majority of DHS funding has been driven by the Law Enforcement community. If this was meant to be an across the board build-up of capabilities, it didn't work.

## UASI

- Block grants, support for staffing at the local level, and a consistent way to assess preparedness. If the TCL is the standard, let's assess against it and fund local levels to meet them.
- The local level is where it all happens, this is where capabilities need to be maximized.
- medical (hospital, Public Health and EMS) preparedness in protection and recovery
- Whether it's a terrorist attack or a natural calamity, it's all about recovery: bouncing back quickly and effectively.
- It's a huge undertaking, but we all have our role in the process. I'm most disappointed that the regions have not taken a role in the Stafford Act disaster declaration process and have not been eligible for the EMPG program to sustain the regions long-term.
- Immediate response should and prevention should be focused at local level, followed by regional and state level of assistance. The recovery efforts will need to be supplemented by the State, Regional and National partners, especially in the area of funding (FEMA Reimbursements) for cleanup, etc.
- All disasters are local and immediate response is necessary to deal with any incident minor, major or catastrophic. Only in long term disaster recovery situations will State and Federal resources have an impact. It takes people and equipment to deal with a disaster and resources other than local cannot respond quickly enough.

## Local

- I believe that prevention is not a legitimate part of the emergency management cycle. If the questions were phrased to offer the choices of mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery -- these are the areas in which we should be investing. I believe the prevention of terrorist activities is a law enforcement specific responsibility.
- It starts with the local jurisdiction, that's obvious as every disaster begins and ends with us. regardless of who rides in on a white horse. most local agencies are strapped financially and don't even have full time emergency coordinators who do the work. So how can we even think about going up the chain until our "house" is taken care of.

## Other

- I am struggling with the protection answer, I'm not sure where that lies-it depends on the strategy and the scenario used to combat a threat or risk that is unique to a specific local.

## **Q15. Do you feel that the HSGP would be more successful if there was:**

### State

- Giving better definition of what should be accomplished using the grant (outcome) or in some other way limiting the scope of the grant would be beneficial.
- Regional priorities (FEMA) should be considered. The system is already like an Area Command, why not use the structure.
- The state priorities can leverage resources for local priorities
- I believe the current strategy of developing capabilities is the correct one. I think funding should be directed to areas that have demonstrated the capability to develop capabilities



## UASI

- UASI funding should bypass the state and be awarded directly to locals. States are obstructionist and fail to engage major urban areas in a meaningful way. We lose funds (M&A) and performance period to the state. In most cases, what we are doing is far more consistent with DHS priorities (and our own risk profile) than the state.
- All incidents are local and the capabilities at the local level should be where we concentrate.
- We must focus on the jurisdictions who are at risk. The current lack of definition of collaboration and regionalization must be corrected. The risk base concept of Metro Statistical Area (MSA) must be clarified as well. In addition, monies received for each investment must be know and tracked. Deviations must be validated and approved by DHS. SAA must be held accountable and in how they manage the program as well as how they spend monies (20%) received from grant, in support of the jurisdiction (UASI) etc.
- The Feds need to make a commitment. The annually changing federal emphasis (LETTP in/out; IEDs in/out) coupled with the split in funding UASIs/States often leads to conflicting processes and weakened effectiveness. The ever-changing landscape (e.g., new UASIs or others demoted) and federal requirements are indicative of a lack of a clear commitment to a long-term, systematic path to achieving the goals of HLS.
- We've invested billions in the regional system model with little accountability except at the state and local level. Let's focus on the regions and their long-term success. There are huge economies to scale and they provide for the leveraging of resources. Formalize, legitimize, and sustain the regional component of Homeland Security.
- Generally, funding to support local preparedness, response , prevention, and recovery will support the overall preparedness of the region, state and the nation.
- The locals understand their needs and unique situations of their communities. At the State and Federal level, there are too many mandates to address issues that may not be as critical at the local level. For example, the need to develop an evacuation plan for an entire city, located in the Midwest, in response to the evacuation issues surrounding the Florida and Louisiana hurricanes, was a waste of time and energy. There are no scenarios in which our city would need to evacuate, on a preplanned basis, to any event, yet we were all tasked to develop such a plan.
- Much better coordination as to the purchases-duplication of effort at the regional level is wasting money
- Less specification on spending. One size does not fit all.
- priorities need to first be established at the national level using a national assessment. How can you prioritize without knowing where you are at for the 37 capabilities?
- Local priorities will differ depending on location, size, population, C/I, etc.
- The initial response to major incident rests at the local level for the first 8-12 hours. Regionally we are very well prepared due to our infrastructure. However recent events have demonstrated the personnel and equipment can and are consumed very quickly. Long term maintenance is an issue.
- Basically we all need to be cognizant of each levels priorities, local, state and federal and need to work together to get them into sync.
- I believe there is a dearth of sharing good ideas among the states and localities due to the competitive nature of the grants.

## Local

- There needs to be a higher degree of working relationship existing between the SAA and the local governments within our state. In our case, the SAA is not the State Emergency Management Agency. I believe a large part of our problems stem from this issue.
- Already stated, but it has to focus on local governments first, then maybe we wouldn't need to have the State or Feds intervene if we all started from a level playing field.

## Private Sector

- Since disasters happen to locals help them improve capabilities this includes personnel

## Other

- The system has evolved over time to be pretty reflective of what the strategic issues and priorities currently are.

## **Q16. What recommendation(s) would you make for improving the capability to measure the impact that grant spending has made towards national preparedness?**

### Federal

- Developing a system that actually shows what we are getting for the dollars spent.

### State

- national assessments have been done “on the fly” in the past and have yielded one-sided results that are not representative of the preparation given by the states. An independent, “no fault” assessment of results of states might encourage candor and reasonable, practical recommendations.
- take out the BSIR and require a final grant close out report. Do not ADD requirements, but think about what is really needed and only require those. We have too many requirements right now and can't focus on our mission due to the administrative burden.
- A standard, national capability and risk assessment model. The DHS Comprehensive Assessment System (CAS) that I have heard about sounds like it may be the answer, but I will not know until Summer 2009 when it is rolled out.
- We need a systematic way to evaluate current capabilities.
- Replace report writing with a competency based demonstration.

### UASI

- establishing the standards and then provide funding to support their development!
- Program evaluation for investments, evaluation of programs selected over those not selected, validation and jurisdiction for expenditures.
- None at this time, the local jurisdictions already have enough on their plate. Some locals EMAs have only one or two people doing everything. Another required federal reporting requirement just takes more time away from getting important things done in our communities.
- A national assessment is a great idea but the issue as always becomes “who”. Who will do it? Is there a goal other than increasing our capability and what is the goal? At what level are jurisdictions completely capable?
- Honestly, this would be a waste of time and money in my opinion. I believe, based on what I have seen over the past five years, Whatever system is put in place will be effectively “gamed” by the “haves” to exclude the “have nots” I have seen so much grant money wasted and abused that we, who do not get much, if any grant money, so desperately need. Adding another level of oversight and/or reports won't help matters. Its the whole allocation process that needs to change, in my opinion.
- The challenge is how to improve accountability and focus funding to achieve results. It seems that there as so many perspectives out there that it becomes just another battle to share Federal grant dollars. And yes, everyone has legitimate needs.
- To create more reports or grant close out requirements would only create more paper work. The true test or measurement of success lies at the local level. Can the locals explain what they have purchased, why, and demonstrate how it is being used. This would require someone in the FEMA to get out and visit the locals-not for a monitoring visit, to really sit down and discuss the overall strategy and review the overall process in

implementing that strategy. There is no simple report that can replace this type of interaction.

- How about DHS informing us what the performance measures are and how they will be measured. If you call and ask, you'll get a different response each time. Primarily, I've been told to develop my own measurement system.
- we have been doing annual capabilities assessments for the last 4 years using a modified version of the DHS Pilot tool which has been tremendously helpful in measuring impact of the grant funding
- Problem has been in determining best methods to measure preparedness. Utilize colleges and universities who have think tanks capable of coming up with additional forms of measurement!

#### Local

- The current economic situation is incurring massive, substantial personnel layoffs and financial cutbacks to local agencies that undermines the current reporting system. Address this reality.
- I believe a narrative tool -- similar to the Comprehensive Cooperative Agreement (CCA) formerly utilized by FEMA would be a more suitable device with which to measure capability improvement.
- the only true measure of how effective the grant funds are is when there is a crisis, I don't see any improvement from 911 to Katrina to today. the response priorities are like the flavor of the month, whatever disaster we face we focus all our attention on that until something else happens. Look at Ike you still had thousands that did not evacuate, there's been no work on a mass evacuation plan.

#### Private Sector

- Paper trail is too time consuming
- have the grantee show how it has made things safer

#### Other

- Show up and ask to spenders or execs within the spending agency/jurisdiction to justify and explain how the investment improved a capability, that simple-no fancy surveys, national studies.
- I do not think long reports are beneficial. Emergency Managers and First Responders do not have time and/or they do not want to read them. I think we need an easy to ready catalog/database of what resources (physical and non-physical) are available at the federal, state, regional, and local levels.
- All of these are currently being performed in some manner (from our view at the regional level). Most of these are addressed at the state level, since they are the SSA. At the regional level (8 counties), we place most emphasis upon tracking our own accomplishments through annual objectives and the TCL process.

**Q17. In the FY08 and FY09 HSGP Grant Guidance, DHS has identified measuring the progress of investments against the National Preparedness Guidelines as a high priority. Which agency, jurisdiction, or partner should be responsible for measuring the impact of the HSGP?**

#### Federal

- This reminds me of when someone says-hey we wrote a plan ten years ago, why are we still doing this? Preparedness is a constant. To spend so much time measuring the capabilities seems like a drain on the funding to increase capabilities, to me. All the money the federal government is spending on creating new tools to measure capabilities

and progress, so that they can report to Congress, could alternatively be spent to fund more emergency planners, managers, and first responders at the local and regional levels. That would build capabilities.

### State

- Really, this should be a collaborative effort among all levels of gov't and the private and civil sectors. The problem is that locals rarely adopt and really are conversant in the National Priorities; they are 'buzz words' to securing funding. Once the funding is secured, the accountability for meeting those goals seems to be lost.
- Should be a team approach from all levels of government, non-profit organizations and the private sector.

### UASI

- every grant recipient should be required to map how the resources are applied to achieve the identified goals/expectations.
- The SAA is an administrative pass through with no operational capabilities. They have no institutional knowledge and are politically appointed. The locals are the operational component who do the heavy lifting. Having said that there should be a third party evaluator (possibly FEMA or a Contractor)
- The state takes 20% of all the grant funds so they should have the resources available. Homeland Security at the local level is our second job- we all have a first one- like being a district fire chief, so let the SAA and the Feds conduct meaningful assessments.
- The problem is the measurement against the "National Preparedness Guidelines" and "National Strategies" which may not always coincide with the local needs or issues. These national guidelines should serve as exactly that-a guideline. Locally, we should establish what our needs are, articulate those needs in the process, and demonstrate how we have met those needs with the grant funds.

### Local

- To the extent that the National Preparedness Goals are based on the National Planning Scenarios, they are faulty. The National Planning Scenarios are faulty and do not accurately represent the full range of threats likely to be experienced in the United States of America. In addition, there was extremely limited stake holder involvement in the creation of the National Planning Scenarios. Further, the use of scenario-based planning is a military convention that does not appear to be the best use of planning within the civil government capacity. These civil government plans should follow the functional planning approach -- identifying the functions common to all emergencies, and then identifying the roles and responsibilities of local governments to execute those functions.

### Other

- See above, responsibility probably resides in DHS or FEMA
- The state has the best perspective. We are a large non-UASI region; if we had to pick up many of the monitoring tasks that are done by the SSA at the state level, it would be a substantial admin burden.

### **Q18. What method(s) should be used to drive future investment planning and the measurement of accomplishments?**

### Federal

- The TCL should only be used if there are benchmarks for jurisdictions to work towards.

## State

- The Target Capabilities List do not account for differences in governmental levels or geographic areas. Investment plans should be built around a combination of risk analysis, capability assessment and vulnerability identification.

## UASI

- realistic risks and capabilities. Not everyone can prepare for a major hurricane-what about a crippling ice storm?
- System and standard based assessment of system capabilities
- We're currently on the right track so let's don't start over again. If we could predict the next disaster or attack we'd prepare for it instead of preparing for the last one. Let's keep the all-hazard perspective.

## Local

- Future measurement should not be based on the Target Capability List (TCL) because of the reasoning articulated in the previous answer. However, I do agree that any measurement should be based on capacity building. Using the flawed tool of the TCL is the problem that I see with this issue currently.

## Private Sector

- A security risk management could show how we are safer

## Other

- We need to include natural hazards in the risk based model.
- Don't think it is one size fits all. From a strategic perspective, it should be risk-based processes. The scenarios should evolve from the identified threats / risk assessment process. Ultimately, at the discipline level, it becomes capabilities-based, dependent upon the identified threats and associated scenarios.

## **Q19. At this time, do you have any additional comments you would like to share on how the HSGP has effected your organization/locality?**

### State

- Too much work for so little benefit.
- Could have been a great program but got to one sided. For all intent and purposes we have two federal law enforcement agencies. The Dept. of Justice could have done the same thing DHS has. Emergency Management via FEMA should answer directly to the President.

### UASI

- There is very little oversight when the grants get to the "Regional" level. It becomes more of a money grab instead of giving the money/putting it towards risk, consequence and threat projects. The Politicians MUST stay out of it and allow the first responders/law enforcement/health departments decide what the need is and how to spend the money.
- State and Federal partners need to collaborate in an open meaningful manner. Locals and regional practitioners are successful acquiring equipment to meet the gaps in capabilities through regional collaboration, it would be helpful for the State and Federal partners to participate as a true partner not after the fact. State does not share what they are funding in support of the regional preparedness effort.

- I believe from an overall perspective the funds have been appropriately spent. I do believe that these expenditures were made from a tool based goal, rather than program and planning. Power and politics became the common denominator, the notion of a pure and rational perspective were not achieved. The planning, education, and exercise to improve the system were not well addressed.
- We are doing a lot of great work with UASI and other funding. We have confidence that our state (SAA or otherwise) has a clue what we're up to. They're [State's] focused on micro-managing every individual purchase instead of on connecting the projects to the bigger picture IJs and strategies.
- The HSGP has allowed our UASI area and our State to receive equipment and training that previously would be unavailable due to lack of funding. The grants have also provided a reason to network and develop good working relationships with other agencies and jurisdictions throughout our State.
- HSGP has increased our city's and regions capability more than we could have predicted. It is not a perfect system. It benefits our first responders every day.
- HSGP has definitely had a huge impact on our region. It has facilitated the building and strengthening of partnerships that are extremely important for building an all-hazards capability. It has created a regionalization culture that has greatly impacted collaboration and cooperation in agencies that would otherwise continue to operate in a vacuum.
- If HSGP goes away tomorrow, so do most of the people doing the bulk of the HLS work at state and local levels.
- If I were making the decisions my top priority would be to build and sustain the local homeland security regions because there are a lot of economies to scale for local emergency management. I'd also include the local regions in the disaster declaration process, which would force the local jurisdictions to develop strong relationships for mitigation, preparedness, response , and recovery.
- I believe the HSGP has been successful because of the unprecedented cooperation among all of the regional partners based largely on the leadership qualities of the points of contact and their professional staff.
- HSGP has improved communication equipment regional and local. Better equipment and training and excellent exercises
- The Terrorism Liaison Officer Position in relation to the Fusion centers needs to be funded and wholly include the Fire service without regard to function.
- Significantly enhanced response equipment availability, not necessarily capabilities. Regional, multi-jurisdictional collaboration has increased significantly.
- The money that has been directed to our region has enabled us to come together as a region, implement regional planning, training and exercising, as well as recognize the need to prepare for regional response to these large scale events. The workload, the unending rules and regulations that stand in the way of our progress (for example, NEPA), is frustrating and only serves to delay our preparedness efforts.
- Without a capabilities assessment, the locals submit IJs for their own pet projects versus the needs of the region for building capabilities.
- As a UASI, the regional focus has been tremendously helpful in building capability
- Government and coordination do not seem to go hand in hand. The government sector has a lot to learn in putting together business cases to justify why grant funding is needed and what it will be used for. Many government people could use a class in just educating them about strategic planning, business case justification and project management!
- Our municipality has been very fortunate in receiving HS grants. We have been equally fortunate to be part of a "enlightened" regional group of governments where solid strategies have been developed and our grants have been wisely used for the benefit of the individual counties and cities but also the region as a whole.

## Local

- Provided funding to increase capabilities at the local level.
- We appreciate the funds, but has it improved our level of preparedness, not really, we have a few more toys to play with, but the responsibility of preparedness and planning falls on me as the emergency manager and until the recent 5.4 earthquake my position was slated for layoff, so emergency managers have all the responsibility but no authority when it comes to grants and most of the time are not even invited to the party even though we're responsible for planning it and making sure everyone has a good time!!

## Private Sector

- an old song... Allow locals to hire personnel not just buy things would go a long way.

## Other

- I would like my discipline to reflect both Fire and Emergency Medical Services.
- From a regional basis, we have substantially improved our preparedness across all response disciplines. However, this process isn't a sprint, but is a marathon. The challenge is to develop a regional preparedness system / organization that will survive over time.
- This county has received no HSGP funding.

## **Q20. Any additional thoughts or recommendations that could improve the capability to measure the impact that the HSGP has made on preparedness?**

## Federal

- Give all this Gap Analysis, Cost to Capabilities stuff a rest, or at least concentrate the efforts in areas that local and State governments have a stake in identifying. Perform the monitoring, require the reporting and conduct grant processes as they are currently prescribed, and we could get some good data for analysis. Why are we so concerned with measuring the impact from HSGP? It has improved things, but we are never there because there is only a second in time, and you are on to the next there the next second in time. Communicate, coordinate, allow State and Local Governments flexibility in their approach to use of funding, but with good monitoring to assure compliance with grant regulations. Have dialogue to identify problems early. Respect the views of the local and state government EM/HS community.

## State

- A national standard that does not change greatly over time-something that, after a few years, you can go back and measure progress. I have heard countless stories of numerous assessments done in my State, and every few years they change. Sometime due to change in front-line personnel or senior leadership; sometimes because what is being done at the state level is replaced with a federal mandate. Regardless, it seems to create a moving target mentality that is very frustrating.
- Since the 70's behavioral scientist have told us that demonstrating a competent is the best method for evaluating a capability.

## UASI

- If there are model deployments in the Nation, these models should be shared throughout the Nation as examples of proven, measured, capability improvements.
- Program evaluation component to look at how the funds were spent and their impact in terms of overall preparedness.

- Start small...pick one or two UASIs that are ready for this and let them develop a report...perhaps even a mini-SPR to demonstrate what evaluation of a program of this magnitude can look like.
- The grant guidance (UASI) must be changed to ensure that the funding received goes to the major jurisdiction (s) it was intended for. While collaboration is a must. simply because you are a neighbor should not mean that you should have equal share in the funding and have equal say in how another jurisdiction spends it funding to protect, prevent and respond to its threats.
- I didn't think I would ever admit this, but TOPOFF 4 was perhaps the best test of the HSGP capability and partnership that we could ever hope for. Those that played hard in our community, received tenfold the benefit than those that did not. Those that did well, do so due to an understanding of the response and recovery mechanism provided by the HSGP experience.
- The Feds have appeared to have passed off a big part of the homeland defense mission to states and locals. If indeed the homeland defense mission is now part of states and locals responsibilities, then it is incumbent on the Feds to fund this mission at a level commensurate with the needs of the country and for a long-term duration (decades).
- Emergency managers of larger municipalities and regional coordinators must take a greater role in the program. The states must provide funding for additional staff to evaluate-audit the program.
- Measures to ensure gaps identified in the HSGP requests, training or exercises are completed prior to eligibility to apply for future grants.
- Yes, have one consistent methodology and message.
- DHS needs to pick a tool and move forward with it. They also need to decide on what the "targets" are that we are shooting for. Without some sort of standardized assessment tool, we will never be able to answer the fundamental questions: How prepared are we? How prepared do we need to be? And how do we fill the gap?
- Yes, start using methods of community outreach and action from the community to show that they are prepared. How about a tax write-off for purchasing an emergency kit and plan?
- Hard to quantify. TCL is to complex and big (588 pages) to be used as a measure from my perspective.

#### Local

- Capabilities should be coordinated with a more regional approach rather than small local agencies duplicating efforts.

#### Other

- You are asking some good questions. I'm a Program Manager for an 8-county regional task force in South Central region of our state.
- My understanding is the program has had a measureable impact on most jurisdictions throughout the county.



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