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**MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA**

## **THESIS**

**INCREASING NAVAL SECURITY COOPERATION  
BETWEEN THE U.S., CHILE AND PERU**

by

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March 2009

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**INCREASING NAVAL SECURITY COOPERATION BETWEEN  
THE U.S., CHILE AND PERU**

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## **ABSTRACT**

Naval Security Cooperation can take many forms from joint exercises to bilateral and multilateral agreements. In response to the challenges of providing stability and security for the world's oceans the Thousand-Ship-Navy was born. In the Thousand-Ship-Navy, partner-nation-navies would voluntarily participate in common maritime goals in a "come as you are" manner. One possible vehicle for implementing the Thousand-Ship-Navy concept is Maritime Domain Awareness, which seeks to create a Common Operating Picture from Naval, Federal, State, Private and International partners. These partners would be able to feed into the system any information they gather and would be able to access the combined information from all sources in the Common Operating Picture. This thesis examines the probability of using Maritime Domain Awareness to pursue a Thousand Ship Navy style of Naval Security Cooperation in the Eastern Pacific between navies of the United States, Chile and Peru.

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# **I. INTRODUCTION**

## **A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION**

This thesis seeks to understand the challenges involved in balancing national interest and advancing international naval security cooperation. It will examine the cases of the Chilean and Peruvian navies juxtaposed with the U.S. Navy. In particular, it looks at current and future possibilities for cooperation with the United States to meet shared security concerns in the Eastern Pacific. The current position of the U.S. on the world stage makes it essential that the Navy be able to monitor and respond to maritime threats and/or emergencies anywhere on the globe. The U.S. cannot maintain its global naval commitments alone. Hence, the concept of the Thousand-Ship-Navy was born and securing the cooperation of allied navies has become a significant priority for the United States Navy.

Understanding the hurdles that need to be overcome to achieve cooperation between two maritime states that have had conflicts in the past is crucial to building an effective alliance that will in turn allow for the operation in concert with U.S. Navy goals and action. This thesis will assist Navy planners and operational commanders with insights to promote effective cooperation with partner states like Chile and Peru.

The study of Chile and Peru offers interesting aspects for study in security relations and naval cooperation. The first one is willingness, as the literature will show, Chile is very willing to engage in security cooperation with the United States and Peru's willingness is tempered by a reluctance which centers around 'sovereignty'. As is often the case in other parts of the world (in fact, Latin America as a whole has limited experience of inter-state warfare compared to elsewhere), the navies of Chile and Peru have gone to war with one another. The War of the Pacific (1879-1883) had clear and definite objectives – the gain of resource rich land for Chile and the loss of land by Peru, as well as the loss of access to the sea for Bolivia, all of which remain sources of contention to this day. U.S. interests may require international partners that do not always see eye to eye, as in the case of India and Pakistan in the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian

Sea. Also at issue is how nation-states that seek to expand their influence might react to U.S. efforts to deepen naval cooperation. A greater role for these rising naval powers will mean more power for them, and the more the United States depends on them, the less influence it might have in that region. Finally, we can learn lessons about how to enable navies, characterized by different levels of professionalism and capabilities, to work together in a shared maritime area of operations.

## **B. GLOBAL CONTEXT**

Today, the oceans of the world, like the situation on land, provide an arena of operations for terrorism, political and religious extremism, weapons proliferation including weapons of mass destruction, trade disruption, environmental attack, human smuggling and slavery, banditry, illegal immigration, illegal drug trafficking, smuggling and piracy.<sup>1</sup> To put the maritime domain in perspective it is important to note the fact that: worldwide about 80% of the world's trade is transported by sea by over 50,000 large ships each year. It is also the way in which about 1.9 billion tons of petroleum is shipped worldwide – approximately 60% of the world's petroleum.<sup>2</sup> Trade is the lifeblood that feeds the economies of seagoing nations. To preserve their way of life and grow in the 21<sup>st</sup> century the legitimate use of the sea must not only be maintained, but improved upon.

This leads to the realization that no country, not even the U.S. can do it alone. Maritime security, being an international problem, requires an international solution. No single nation has the resources, capacity, sovereignty, or control over the assets, or venues from which transnational threats endanger global security.<sup>3</sup> In this situation we are faced with the need to embrace international collaboration to secure the seas, which, in turn, led to the development of the Thousand-Ship-Navy concept. The Thousand-Ship-Navy concept envisions a voluntary coalition of the navies of the world that engage in the

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<sup>1</sup> John G. Morgan and Charles W. Martoglio, "The 1,000 Ship Navy Global Maritime Network," *Proceedings*, November 2005, 15.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

development of a network that vastly increases the number of sensors to monitor the security of the world's oceans while increasing the number of available units capable of responding to any matter pertaining to maritime security.<sup>4</sup> To date, the U.S. Navy has largely focused on the technical challenges of developing these monitoring and response networks – for example, building the combined command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) platforms that need to be in place for effective navy-to-navy cooperation and working out equipment interoperability issues in the course of joint exercises.

Just as important, if not more so, is determining whether partner navies are willing and able to cooperate in the development of these networks. If they are not willing at this point, then attention needs to be turned to creating the conditions for effective cooperation.

### **C. PROBLEMS TO CONSIDER AND HYPOTHESIS**

A study of security issues quickly reveals that there are problems with this concept. The first problem the U.S. faces when seeking cooperation in maritime security from partner countries is willingness. If some countries view certain actions as a violation of the sovereignty of another state and they have a policy of “not meddling in other country's matters,” where do countries draw the line between the activities that countries are willing to support? How aggressive are these countries going to be in stopping, boarding and searching vessels that carry other nations' flags of convenience?

The next problem after willingness is actual capability. If given information on a probable surface vessel that is engaged in illicit activities, piracy or contributing to terrorism, can one of our partner navies respond in time to a designated point in their area of responsibility where the vessel is, and effectively interdict that vessel? This includes the issue of how fuel costs are likely to affect cooperation. How much equipment and resources are nations able and willing to invest in securing the Eastern Pacific, when they all have competing national goals vying for limited funds? Is a U.S. financing of oil

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<sup>4</sup> Morgan and Martoglio, “The 1,000 Ship Navy Global Maritime Network.”

going to be required in certain security operations for them to take place, like the U.S. paying all partner nations' fuel bills during the UNITAS exercise to achieve maximum participation?

The hypothesis I submit is that there is a point of mutual concordance, a “sweet spot,” where the security concerns of these three countries meet. What needs to be determined is where the point of mutual concordance for the U.S., Chile and Peru is in relation to the Eastern Pacific. These three nation's goals will have to be set in a framework that generates agreement and resolves differences for security cooperation to work. To the degree that the U.S. can help fill gaps in capability, in ways that are mutually beneficial and non-threatening to both Chile and Peru, then we can garner a higher degree of cooperation. Following the resolution of these issues, a deepening of security cooperation in the Eastern Pacific could mean that our partners will assume the role that the limited U.S. assets may not be able to perform on a continuous basis.

To address the problems and possibilities of naval cooperation in the Eastern Pacific this thesis seeks to identify the national perspective, the regional issues and discuss the process of harmonizing these to enhance naval security cooperation. Chapter II is a literature review that will discuss the concept of the Thousand-Ship-Navy and how it calls for the navies of the world to participate voluntarily in a program of mutually shared goals of security and stability for the maritime domain. Next, we will see that one likely vehicle for this concept to be implemented is the Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) initiative. MDA seeks to maximize the number of sensors to gain intelligence about what happens in the world's oceans. MDA is a highly collaborative effort across many agencies, including military, law enforcement, state agencies and private enterprise and that has different structures and responsibilities at the tactical, operational and strategic level.

Chapter III will discuss Chile and its history, specifically its naval history to illustrate that Chile is a seagoing country whose long strip of land depends on the sea to accomplish its national objectives. It will discuss the Armada de Chile of today along with its participation in current exercises with the United States. Chilean politics will be

discussed to see how the concept of ‘Mar Presencial,’ which calls for the outward expansion of Chile into the sea as an inherent right and responsibility, is now able to take hold and be implemented with the capacity that Chile now possesses to implement such a strategy.

Chapter IV will discuss Peru and its history and show that it too is a country with a proud maritime tradition, whose economy is also highly dependent on the sea for growth and economic prosperity. The Marina de Guerra del Peru also has a long history of participation with the U.S. Navy: it is the only nation with which our forces practice their submarine hunting skills outside of a simulator. The politics of Peru that include the rise of an outsider into the presidency, Alberto Fujimori, and its impact on the political landscape of Peru still has reverberations to this day. As such, Peru has more of an inward focus than perhaps the United States or Chile at this point, even though they do demonstrate willingness to be an active participant in naval security cooperation efforts in the Eastern Pacific.

Chapter V addresses the United States and their history in Latin America, from the Monroe Doctrine, to the Cold War, the War on Drugs and our current war against terrorism. It will analyze the documents that delineate U.S. policy and lay the foundation for international naval security cooperation, National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy and National Strategy for Maritime Security. This will include examples of naval security cooperation around the world, as well as examples from the SOUTHCOM theater: such as Enduring Friendship and Global Fleet Station.

Chapter VI is the conclusion and it will discuss to what we can expect in the near future in naval security cooperation between the United States, Chile and Peru and what the questions and directions for future research ought to be.

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## II. LITERATURE REVIEW

### A. SECURITY COMMUNITIES

Adler and Barnett suggest that security communities share “values, norms and symbols that provide a social identity, and engage in various interactions in myriad spheres that reflect long-term interest, diffuse reciprocity, and trust.”<sup>5</sup> While this statement is meant to refer to states, for our purposes it can be applied directly to the navies of the United States, Chile and Peru. The navies of these three countries share very similar values. The U.S. Navy holds Honor, Courage and Commitment as its values; the Chilean Navy (Armada de Chile) has Honor, Professionalism, Loyalty and Willingness to Sacrifice<sup>6</sup> as their values; and the Peruvian Navy (Marina de Guerra del Peru) reflects similar values in their motto “Only one north, duty, only one course, honor.”<sup>7</sup> Here we have three institutions in three separate states which share the fundamental values of Honor, Duty and Professionalism, that have been brought up through their respective naval academies and commissioning sources to have similar if not identical norms and symbols that provide a social identity that transcends borders. The U.S. Navy has lent support to both the Chilean and Peruvian Navy in setting up and training their submarine and naval aviation arms and they have participated in many maritime exercises over the past decades such as UNITAS, PASSEX and PANAMAX, thus implying their long-term interest, reciprocity and trust.

Conceptually the security community “exists at the international level...whenever states become integrated to the point that they have a sense of community; which in turn, creates the assurance that they will settle their differences short of war, (which creates) a

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<sup>5</sup> Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, *Security Communities* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 3.

<sup>6</sup> Fundamentos Valoricos de Nuestra Armada de Chile (Fundamental Values of the Chilean Navy), [http://www.armada.cl/arm\\_rumbo/site/artic/20030512/pags/20030512183405.html](http://www.armada.cl/arm_rumbo/site/artic/20030512/pags/20030512183405.html).

<sup>7</sup> “Un solo norte, el deber, un solo rumbo, el honor” in El Monitor, the Official publication of the Peruvian Navy (Marina de Guerra del Peru), [http://www.marina.mil.pe/revistas/monitor/revista\\_monitor6.pdf](http://www.marina.mil.pe/revistas/monitor/revista_monitor6.pdf).

stable peace.”<sup>8</sup> The Chilean and Peruvian navies both have the assurance that the U.S. Navy will not conduct hostile actions against either of these two navies and more importantly, it is becoming apparent that the Chilean and Peruvian navies will not engage each other militarily. This is important because the navies of Chile and Peru did go to war with one another during the War of the Pacific (1879-1883). This war had clear and definite implications – the gain of resource rich land for Chile and the loss of land by Peru and the loss of access to the sea for Bolivia, realities that are still part of consciousness of these countries to this day. However, there is evidence that they will solve their differences peacefully. For example, a current maritime boundary dispute between Chile and Peru is the subject of a lawsuit before the International Court of Justice at The Hague.<sup>9</sup>

“Some states are revising the concept of power to include the ability of a community to defend its values and expectations of proper behavior against an external threat and to attract new states with the ideas that convey a sense of national security and material progress.”<sup>10</sup> The navies of the world are paying attention and following the lead of the U.S. Navy Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) “Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Seapower,” presented at the International Seapower Symposium held at Newport, RI on October 17, 2007. This cooperative strategy emphasizes that our oceans are essential to global commerce and our way of life, with 80% of the world’s people living near a coast and 90% of our world’s commerce moving by sea, therefore making maritime forces a critical element in providing global security and stability. Chile has 17 ports on which it relies for over 80% of its trade and Peru has 14 ports, which also provides a high percentage of its trade. Securing the seas to promote the economic and material progress of these countries as well as increasing national security by thwarting any terrorist or illegal activity is in the interest and purview of the three navies.

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<sup>8</sup> Adler and Barnett, *Security Communities*, 3.

<sup>9</sup> Xinhua, *Peru, Chile Locked in Maritime Territory Dispute*, January 19, 2008, [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-01/19/content\\_7451066.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-01/19/content_7451066.htm).

<sup>10</sup> Adler and Barnett, *Security Communities*, 4.

While we have examined security communities, a pluralistic security community “retains the legal independence of separate governments. These states within the pluralistic security community possess a compatibility of core values derived from common institutions, and a mutual responsiveness – a matter of mutual identity and loyalty, a sense of “we-ness.”<sup>11</sup> While we have already mentioned the compatibility of core values, these three navies also have common institutions, from naval academies and enlisted training schools, to the staff and operational commands that provide very closely matched divisions of labor and expertise across these three navies. Naval officers of the United States, Chile and Peru are more alike than are civilians in the three countries. Furthermore, none of them views their counterparts as “the adversary” they are preparing to fight and defeat in battle. Chile and Peru have displayed a mutual responsiveness to perform Search and Rescue operations (SAR) in their territorial waters and willingly accept support from each other’s navies for this purpose. Both the Chilean and Peruvian government agree that the prevention of loss of life is of paramount importance, as it would be a blow to national prestige to have people die in your territorial waters because naval assistance could not arrive in time. A cooperative framework that allows Peruvian naval assets in Chilean waters and vice versa is already in place in this regard. Thus, the East Pacific is engendering a sense of “we-ness” between the Chilean and Peruvian navies and as a worldwide maritime power with the U.S. Navy as well.

“Communication is the cement of social groups in general and political communities in particular.”<sup>12</sup> The navies of these three countries are constantly communicating, perhaps better than the states themselves, because even when relations between states turn cold, military-to-military programs remain in place. They provide the constant communications between officers who spend twenty or more years working together versus political players who can fade in or out of the scene in relatively quick bursts. Technically this issue is being addressed, as some of the most important problems these navies are trying to iron out are interoperability, command-and-control and

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<sup>11</sup> Adler and Barnett, *Security Communities*, 7.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

networks. The first and most important challenge associated with joint endeavors in the Eastern Pacific is going to be interoperability, “the ability of systems, units, or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units, or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together.”<sup>13</sup>

The second issue is command-and-control. How do you delineate tasking? How do you get assets to where they are needed? What are the communication methods that going to be used so that information can be delivered transparently and securely across the board between the U.S., Chile and Peru? The U.S. Navy is thinking about and addressing these communication questions. Significantly, they are not just building on the military-to-military program level, but also the ships at sea level and across the three navies, so that Third Fleet in San Diego could communicate and relay information to the Chilean and Peruvian navies directly.

According to Charles L. Munns, one of the ways to enable communication among these three nation’s navies is through networks. “Networks have enabled quantum leaps in capabilities because they rapidly move things to those who can use them.”<sup>14</sup> The biggest challenge with networks is interoperability - are all the computers in the network using the same language and are the systems compatible for information exchange. This includes the interoperability of U.S. assets with foreign navies and organizations. In fact, as former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated, “possibly the single most transforming thing in our force will not be a weapon system, but a set of interconnections and a substantially enhanced capability because of that awareness.”<sup>15</sup> This leads to the realization that “one of the biggest obstacles to realizing an effective partnership is technical. How do navies of various nations, aiming to operate together at sea, secure

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<sup>13</sup> DoD interoperability definition, <http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/2002sba/garber.pdf>.

<sup>14</sup> Charles L. Munns, “The Big Network Could Save Your Life,” *Proceedings*, September 2004, 56.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, 58.

compatible command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) that will facilitate a true network and make the partnership a reality?”<sup>16</sup>

Galdorisi and Hsieh state that international security cooperation demands that its international partners “be as interoperable as possible. Not being interoperable means you are not on the net, so you are not in a position to derive power from the information age.”<sup>17</sup> The number one issue to achieve this goal is coalition communications.<sup>18</sup> The preferred method would be some kind of network at the “sensitive but unclassified level where possible” for all coalition partners to participate in an ensure interoperability.<sup>19</sup> So far we have three efforts underway to help achieve this. They are: 1) Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System (CENTRIX) – “a global information-sharing network established in 2002,”<sup>20</sup> 2) The Technical Cooperation Program (TTCP) – “a forum for defense science and technology collaboration between Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK and the U.S.,”<sup>21</sup> and 3) FORCE Net – “the operational construct and architectural framework for Naval Warfare in the information age, to integrate WARRIORS, sensors, networks, command-and-control, platforms, and weapons into a networked, distributed combat force, scalable across the spectrum of conflict from seabed to space and sea to land.”<sup>22</sup> If coalition partners make themselves FORCE Net compatible, and it appears that this is not yet a reality, then there would be an increase in interoperability.

The region already has been introduced to at least one model of security cooperation by ADM James Stavridis, Commander, U.S. Southern Command

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<sup>16</sup> George Galdorisi and Stephanie Hsieh, “Speaking the Same Language,” *Proceedings*, March 2008, 57.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., 59.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

<sup>22</sup> FORCENet definition, <http://forcenet.navy.mil/fn-definition.htm>.

(SOUTHCOM). His vision for this area of operations emphasizes that. “We need more relevant fusion technologies that allow all-source fusion, distributed dissemination, collaborative planning, and multiple-node sensor resource management. But we can’t keep such a system to ourselves; we need a system for precision-guided intelligence that we can share with our partners.”<sup>23</sup> Stavridis then notes that the establishment of CENTRIXS has been underway in the Americas since 2006. Furthermore, “the foundation of the Maritime Domain Awareness effort will be an unclassified common operational picture available via the Internet to all participants in the initiative.”<sup>24</sup>

This is important because the literature states transactions have to be “not only with the elites but also the masses, instilling in them a sense of community.”<sup>25</sup> As the navies work together, it will not just be Admirals talking to one another at embassy functions, but junior officers in the different ships and command centers for these three navies in the Eastern Pacific entering into direct communication. Further, the security community “perspective relies on shared knowledge, ideational forces, and a dense normative environment.”<sup>26</sup> This is precisely the type of cooperation for the three navies that would strengthen their collective presence in the Eastern Pacific. Successful implementation of this approach would involve the shared knowledge of all commercial assets and targets of interest by all three navies. All three navies have a commitment to the ideology of security and stability in the maritime theater and are equally determined to thwart the threat presented by terrorists and the illegal drug trade in their areas of responsibility. Navies operate in a dense normative environment as a matter of routine. In this case, with three navies and the international implications that can result from their actions, we can expect an even more normative framework when these three navies operate together than we they operate independently in their own territorial waters for matters of their own national security that does not involve the partner nations.

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<sup>23</sup> James Stavridis, “Sailing in Southern Waters,” *Proceedings*, May 2007, 21.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> Adler and Barnett, *Security Communities*, 7.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid., 8.

Adler and Barnett address four implications for security communities. First is the concept of an international community. Second is the “examination of the relationship between the transnational forces, state power, and security politics in novel ways.”<sup>27</sup> Third is the relation between transactions and interactions, which “generate reciprocity, new forms of trust, the discovery of new interests, and even collective identities.”<sup>28</sup> Finally, security communities imply the possibility of shifting from a realist perspective into an idealist one.

When the CNO invites the navies of the world to participate in this new concept of the Thousand-Ship-Navy with its equal weight partner nations, it is the beginning of a maritime international community. Second, when these navies band together to increase their security and stability against common threats they agree upon, mainly terrorism and transnational crime, they have joined state power in a new and novel way. Third, these interactions are generating a collective maritime identity for the world’s navies and the effective implementation of this concept requires trust on the partner navies. The element of reciprocity will have to wait until we have better data to see how this initiative affects the interactions of these navies and states. Fourth, when states that have gone to war in the past, as in the case of Chile and Peru, and who militarily see each other as an unlikely but plausible threat in the theater, can start working together for joint security goals, we are effectively shifting from a realist to an idealist perspective. Otherwise, a terrorist or criminal threat that weakens one state is good for the other state, because their relative power is increased while the power of the state expending resources to deal with the threat is diminished. This is not an alliance in the traditional sense, because they are not balancing against another power, but rather working together under the premise, the idea, of joint maritime common goals of security, stability and trade.

Adler and Barnett provide a three-tiered framework for security communities. The first tier, or what they call a nascent security community, is when “precipitating factors encourage states to orient themselves in each other’s direction and coordinate their

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<sup>27</sup> Adler and Barnett, *Security Communities*, 14.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

policies.”<sup>29</sup> The second tier, or an ascendant security community, “consists of the ‘structural’ elements of power and ideas, and the ‘process’ elements of transactions, international organizations and social learning.”<sup>30</sup> The third tier, or mature security community, is “the development of trust and collective identity formation.”<sup>31</sup>

The literature review to this point suggests that the navies of the United States, Chile and Peru are effectively engaged in a tier-two security community and that this in turn brings the countries into a tier-one security community. For the navies of the world the first-tier is already being addressed with the precipitating conditions being international terrorism and criminal organizations that operate in the seas. This has allowed the states and specifically their navies to orient themselves around one another and coordinate their policy into a joint security environment. Presently, the navies of the world, and in particular the United States, Chile and Peru, find themselves in the middle of the tier two process of becoming an ascendant security community. The structural element is in place with the commitment of the strategic policy makers of these three navies to the idea of a joint maritime security environment and in each of them willing to back this idea with the power and assets of their respective navies. This is critical, agreement to an idea means nothing until assets and relationships are put in place to turn the ideas into action. The process elements are being closely addressed by the review of technical hurdles that are needed to make this concept work to include interoperability, command-and-control issues, and networks that these three navies can communicate and operate with in the Eastern Pacific. This is a key point and makes clear why this really is the realization of a nascent security community. It is one thing to engage in exercises and war games where navies play and interact for a very definite period of time, for example commencement of exercise to its termination, and another to have a standing working relationship with the expectation of continuity. To make this a reality these three navies need to find the way to have the structural and process elements integrated at the

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<sup>29</sup> Adler and Barnett, *Security Communities*, 29.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid.



operational level. While the ships of these three navies can talk bridge to bridge when they are in radio range of each other, it is another different matter to have Third Fleet in San Diego in contact with Valparaiso in Chile and Callao in Peru in regards to the security of the Eastern Pacific. This would be a new level of naval security and cooperation, in the absence of war, which has no parallel anywhere in history. This will also be an example of the noncontiguous nature of security communities where members do not have to be in proximity of one another. While Peru and Chile are bordering states, for the United States these two partners are noncontiguous and are similar to the security community that United States has with Israel and Australia.

Two ideas that foster tier two security communities in today's world are liberalism and democracy.<sup>32</sup> In the case of United States, Chile and Peru, this can be translated into economic liberalism, with its free trade, lowering of trade barriers, and unhampered flow of capital across borders to stimulate economic growth and foreign investment, which has been a key economic policy in boosting Chile's economy and one that Peru is emulating to some degree. The widespread implementation of the "Washington Consensus" in the 1990s in Latin America did not bring about the great economic transformation across the region that was expected. However, it did provide the tools for some countries to emerge victorious from the debt crisis of the 1980s and to learn the lessons and state controls they need to implement to have a continued economic upward spiral. Some countries, however, continue to challenge economic liberalism. The most prominent figure in this wider challenge has been Venezuela's President, Hugo Chávez. He argues that Latin America has not been able to prosper because of the "imperialist agenda" imposed by the United States on the region and that the answer to economic prosperity lies in the implementation of a socialist state that nationalizes foreign investments and has the government impose aggressive controls on the economy. Chile and Peru, though both have passed through periods of military dictatorships, are now fully functioning democracies, that even though they are currently ruled by elected

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<sup>32</sup> Adler and Barnett, *Security Communities*, 40.

leaders of the left, still hold the value of democracy dear. This again can be contrasted with other governments in the areas that favor a hard line socialist government with actions being taken to erode democracy in favor of more authoritarian institutions.

## **B. VISION FOR NAVAL SECURITY COOPERATION**

In 2005, Admiral Michael G. Mullen, then the U.S. Navy's Chief of Naval Operations, coined the Thousand-Ship-Navy term to address the security and stability of the world's ocean in a collective and collaborative effort with the world's navies. In his statements, Mullen indicated that the U.S. Navy cannot preserve the freedom of the world's waterways by itself and called upon the assistance of like-minded navies to participate in this initiative for global maritime security.<sup>33</sup>

Ronald Ratcliff offers insights by citing ADM Mullen in stating that this thousand-ship navy would serve as an international maritime force composed of not only the world's navies, but also the world's coast guards, seaborne shipping enterprises, nongovernmental bodies and some governmental agencies. While concerns about sovereignty can negatively impact some navies predisposition to participate in this joint venture the U.S. Navy has spread forth the message that participation would be on a strictly voluntary basis and in an ad hoc fashion. The idea is to create a global maritime navy that protects the lifeblood of most countries economic development, trade, by allowing it to flow unencumbered and freely.<sup>34</sup>

The public statements of the U.S. Navy have established ten guiding principles. First, and most important, is the principle of respect for national sovereignty at all times. Second, nations and their maritime components, to include navies, coast guards and maritime shipping, would participate when they have common interests. Third, the focus of this endeavor is maritime security and the maritime domain. This includes international straits and the high seas and the more nation focused areas of territorial waters, ports and harbors. Fourth, the recognition in the international stage that no one

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<sup>33</sup> Ronald Ratcliff, "Building Partners' Capacity the Thousand-Ship Navy," in *Shaping the Security Environment*, ed. Derik S. Reveron (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2007), 59.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, 61.

nation, in this case the United States can do everything or be everywhere it needs to be at the same time, but that all participating nations can contribute something significant. Fifth, the thousand-ship navy would be an integrated network of commercial maritime elements such as port operators and commercial shippers, local law enforcement agencies from the host countries *and* the international navies and coast guards. Sixth, the idea or expectation that the more developed nations or navies will help increase the ability and capacity of the less capable ones in the network. Seventh, U.S. assistance would only be provided if it was asked for, by the nation or navy concerned. Eighth, is the development of regional maritime networks. Ninth, the dissemination of information to a wide audience is considered a key element for effectiveness, transparency and efficiency, and as such there will be an effort to keep classified maritime intelligence to a minimum. Finally, this is not a short term or easy fix, rather a long-term effort that will require commitment from the world's navies and the time to start is now.<sup>35</sup>

Two key objectives for facilitating the free flow of trade among nations and protecting the world's maritime domain are as follows. Increased "maritime domain awareness" which involves the free transfer of information among the world's navies about anything in the maritime realm and the capability to respond to situations as they arise, be they crises, emergencies or targets of opportunity by positioning assets where they count.<sup>36</sup>

### **C. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES AND FEEDBACK**

While the idea of global maritime cooperation might be a novel concept, international maritime cooperation is not. There are numerous examples, such as: MALSINDO, a counter-piracy agreement between Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore; Task Force 150, which has had the participation of United States, Canada, Denmark, Pakistan, Germany, France, United Kingdom, Australia, Italy, Turkey, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal and Spain, for operations in and around the North Arabian Sea and

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<sup>35</sup> Ratcliff, "Building Partners' Capacity the Thousand-Ship Navy," 61.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid.

Indian Ocean; and the Indonesian tsunami relief efforts carried out in 2004-2005. At the same time, there has been a clear lack of support among the international community for the U.S. Navy approach to naval security cooperation using the Thousand-Ship-Navy. Three reasons have been offered to explain its lack of support on the world stage. First, there needs to be a sufficient investment of the intellectual, administrative and monetary resources to attain the goals of the program. Second, it is suggested in the literature that the U.S. Navy does not fully understand the nature and the challenges involved in creating a global maritime endeavor in what has been called the “tragedy of the commons.”<sup>37</sup> This “tragedy of the maritime commons” is the belief among nations that while securing the maritime environment does benefit everyone, it benefits the richer countries the most by keeping trade open and their economies growing. From this perspective, the plight of the poorer countries are ignored at the same time as they are asked to commit limited resources in tasks that do not help their pressing concerns, like human trafficking or waterborne pandemics, but that help the richer countries of the world get richer.<sup>38</sup> The third obstacle the thousand-ship navy concept has to overcome is the fact that the U.S. Navy has not made this concept part of the current maritime strategy. Some nations have interpreted this as a sign of a lack of commitment on the part of the United States.<sup>39</sup>

However, while the U.S. has made clear that it will not be dictating terms to other nations and navies, it expects to provide the leadership role for this concept to succeed. Critical to this effort will be the ability to coordinate actions between participating units and the influx to all participating units of current and actionable intelligence. The U.S. Navy must show and demonstrate how it plans to accomplish these two actions, coordination and intelligence, if it wants to generate greater buy-in from the world’s navies.<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>37</sup> Ratcliff, “Building Partners’ Capacity the Thousand-Ship Navy,” 60.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid., 64.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid., 60.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid., 62.

#### **D. CHALLENGES TO BE OVERCOME**

There are four critical challenges to overcome. First is the building of trust. More specifically, what needs to be addressed is the idea that this is a push for the United States to secure its homeland by interfering with other nations' sovereignty at sea. The historic rivalries between countries, as well as the suspicion of other nations' true intentions, also need to be overcome. The list of countries with differences that might affect their contribution to a global maritime effort is large, for example, India and Pakistan, China and India, Japan and Korea, China and Japan, China and Southeast Asia, Asia and Australia, Argentina and Chile and the United States and Venezuela. The second challenge has to do with capacity and capability. Most of the navies of the world are designed for operations close to its littorals such as border and customs patrol, monitoring fisheries and other economic maritime interests. They are not designed, nor are they proficient in anti-terrorist operations or in stopping the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. By the same token, the U.S. Navy and its carrier-centric stance is not the best navy to address littoral concerns around the world. The third challenge is jurisprudence. Domestic and international law regarding conduct at sea can dovetail and create legal vagaries that undermine a global maritime partnership. Individual navies or commanders may be impeded from acting by sovereign authorities and undermine the thousand-ship navy concept. The last challenge is communication, while most ships can communicate ship to ship via VHR radios, new technologies offer many channels and for a maritime domain awareness strategy relying on the free and unimpeded flow of information and actionable intelligence in a "common operating picture" that is seen by all will require more than radio circuits and web portals. Lack of information for a couple of hours can destroy and undermine any chance for a successful coordinated action among many international players.<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>41</sup> Ratcliff, "Building Partners' Capacity the Thousand-Ship Navy," 68.

## **E. STEPS TO IMPROVE BUY IN**

While the challenges are being overcome, there are six key steps that the U.S. Navy can take to make the thousand-ship navy a reality. First is to make it a priority and have it reflected in the U.S. maritime strategy. Other countries are not going to make a commitment to the Thousand-Ship-Navy unless they see that the United States is serious enough about it to make it part of the way it does business. Second will be the delineation of clear guidelines about the structure of the Thousand-Ship-Navy. The ad hoc nature of the Thousand-Ship-Navy and its non-committal arrangements are meant to minimize barriers to participation. Establishing a rudimentary command structure dividing the world's oceans into defined operating areas and pointing out regional powers for nominal leadership would help as well as establishing basic rules of engagement. Third, Ratcliff recommends a focus on thousand-ship navy over the Global Fleet Station ship concept. Instead of a Global Fleet Station ship you could have a thousand ship navy fleet station ship under U.S. administrative control to show U.S. commitment and test communications, operating concepts and command-and-control procedures. The Global Fleet Station will be visited later in this paper. Fourth is to make the U.S. Coast Guard a vital element for the Thousand-Ship-Navy. Fifth, the U.S. Navy must be able to provide its partners in the Thousand-Ship-Navy a portal through which all players can have access to the same information and a common operating picture. Finally, the United States must take steps to ratify the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) within the near future.<sup>42</sup>

The Maritime Domain Awareness concept could “operationalize” the Thousand Ship-Navy. Lloyd's of London estimates that the world's maritime domain has to contend with 89,000 ships, in the 100-ton to 565,000-ton range, manned by a multitude of seafarers from every nationality and flying the flags of 150 nations.<sup>43</sup> Maritime Domain Awareness will require the integration of all open-source data and intelligence to

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<sup>42</sup> Ratcliff, “Building Partners’ Capacity the Thousand-Ship Navy,” 70.

<sup>43</sup> Kevin D. Long, *1,000-Ship Navy: New Concept or Current SOUTHCOM Maritime SOP*, Naval War College (Newport, R.I., May 10, 2007), 5, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA470851&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>.

maintain visibility on those 89,000 ships. For this venture to be effective information must be both accurate and immediately transferred across international boundaries and across varying levels of state, military, law enforcement and private enterprise. In the SOUTHCOM theater the Panama Canal is one of those critical chokepoints in the maritime domain through which 13,000 to 14,000 transoceanic vessels pass, ferrying with them approximately five percent of the world's trade.<sup>44</sup>

Authors such as Kevin D. Long put forth the notion that examples for Thousand–Ship–Navy style cooperation other than MDA already exist and one of those is the Global Fleet Station concept. In the Global Fleet Station concept maritime elements from the civilian, coast guards and navies from partner-countries join together to achieve common interests and cross-training. The HSV-2 SWIFT, a wave-piercing catamaran with speeds up almost 50 knots, has been picked as the USN ship for this pilot program in the SOUTHCOM theater where multi-agency and multi-national entities will work together to strengthen naval security cooperation in the Caribbean and Atlantic.<sup>45</sup> We will look at the Global Fleet Station concept in further detail in the U.S. chapter.

## **F. MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS**

Long states that Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) is an effort to gain knowledge of everything that happens in the maritime domain to include vessels, cargo, passengers and the anomalies that could signify danger on a global scale to maintain the security of the United States. Further Long clarifies that this is an outgrowth of the U.S. Coast Guard's Special Interest Vessel (SIV) tracking program, which is supposed to track vessels and their approach to the United States. After the attacks on 9/11, it grew in scope, size and objectives to keep the homeland safe from any kind of threat that affects security to include terrorist attacks. One of the key aspects of MDA is its inter-agency bias from the design and its multiple liaisons across state, military, law enforcement and civilian sectors. All these agencies will have to agree on how to create, design, and

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<sup>44</sup> Long, *1,000-Ship Navy: New Concept or Current SOUTHCOM Maritime SOP*, 6.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, 10.

implement a Common Operational Picture (COP). They will also have to decide what their contributions and responsibilities will be to this venture. While MDA is new, the concept of ship tracking by various agencies is not new, as the U.S. Navy, U.S. Coast Guard, Law Enforcement and other maritime intelligence agencies have worked jointly in the past regarding the security of the maritime sector.<sup>46</sup>

We can analyze the infrastructure of MDA at the tactical, operational and strategic level. At the tactical level, Joint Harbor Operations Center (JHOCs) have been created where the Navy, Coast Guard and other multi-agency partners can focus their attentions on individual ports and specific areas. At the operational level, the Maritime Intelligence Fusion Centers (MIFCs) which were created by the U.S. Coast Guard and have the ability to fuse with other agencies like Department of Homeland Defense (DHS) and Department of Defense (DoD). The best place to handle the strategic level is the Navy's National Maritime Intelligence Center (NMIC). Worldwide analysis of shipping and maritime activity is carried out here. The key will be in establishing a common operating protocol that will feed the tactical, operational and strategic levels with the appropriate information in a timely manner. Then further thought will have to be given as to how our international partners can contribute and at what level.<sup>47</sup>

R. B. Watts states that one thing that needs to be made clear is that MDA is about information gathering at a grand scale. While this information could lead to actions carried out by DHS or DoD operational forces, that is not the purpose of MDA. MDA is not an effort to take operational control over forces operating on the seas, either ours or partners navies operating under Thousand-Ship-Navy frameworks. What MDA seeks to gain is intelligence. This includes manifests, crew lists, merchant activity recreational boating, port activity and other peripheral activities, combined with information about potential threats, to create a global and comprehensive picture.<sup>48</sup> There are a number of angles though which strategic planners can view threats to the United States emanating

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<sup>46</sup> R. B. Watts, *Implementing Maritime Domain Awareness* (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2006), 1-2.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid., 2-3.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid., 5-6.



from the maritime realm. Those looking to protect the country from terrorist threats from the sea must contend with 95,000 miles of coastline, 3.4 million square miles in the U.S. maritime domain, 1000 ports and harbors, 21,000 daily containers that carry 100% of our petroleum imports, 76 million recreational boaters and six million cruise ship passengers.<sup>49</sup> A significant disruption to the ports and harbors can affect the United States unrestricted access to the sea, and this in turn can affect the ability to project national power.<sup>50</sup>

The bottom line is that MDA is a way to find these threats in the maritime domain. These threats can hide or avoid detection from sensors due to the challenges provided by coastal land masses, sea states and weather. These considerations then have to be considered in relation to the fact that any sea-going vessel could be used for terrorist attacks against the United States, from bringing in terrorist operatives to carrying Weapons of Mass Destruction into our shores. These actions will likely start in foreign ports overseas and this is why MDA has to be a global effort. MDA currently brings 16 departments and agencies that are able to fuse all their intelligence into one coherent picture. The goal of this activity is to accurately detect, localize, classify and target suspect vessels before they can be engaged. This will include information of the vessels, their cargo, their crews, their passengers and their intended routes.<sup>51</sup>

There is a five-stage process to MDA, which is surveillance, detection, tracking, classification and targeting. In this manner, threats can be separated from the thousands of vessels operating in the seas for legitimate purposes. Surveillance is the observation of all activity in the Area of Responsibility or Area of Interest. In the maritime domain, it includes the air and undersea responsibilities. Detection is the indication by one of the sensors that a potential threat exists in the surveillance area. Tracking applies to any element in the surveillance area, neutral or not, where the known positions are recorder

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<sup>49</sup> J. Z. Hecker, "Port Security: Nation Faces Formidable Challenges in Making New Initiative Successful," *GAO Publication No. GAO-2-993T* (Washington D.C.: United States General Accounting Office, August 2002), 3.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, 7.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, 9-12.

and displayed and estimated future position based on course and speed is estimated. Tracking allows decision makers to monitor, interdict or destroy the threat. Classification determines vessels from each other, friendly, foe, hostile, white shipping, etc and each classification has different rules of engagement that can determine courses of actions. For example, a vessel that is suspect of terrorist activities can be monitored, but it is only when a vessel is declared hostile that it can be fired upon. Targeting is the evaluation of vessels in the surveillance area and determining the level of risk and intentions. The end result is to push the envelope on potential threats to the United States as far away from continental coast as possible.<sup>52</sup>

#### **G. JOINT HARBOR OPERATIONS CENTER**

The tactical level of MDA is focused on the 30-40 miles offshore and the maritime approaches to the United States and its ports and harbors. Before 9/11 this tactical responsibility laid in the hands of the U.S. Coast Guard in the two roles of either a Captain of the Port (COTP) with a respective Marine Safety Office (MSO) responsible for regulatory functions such as licensing, vessel inspections and environmental responses or a “Group” that handled search and rescue, fisheries enforcement and counter narcotics. After 9/11 Sector Command Centers (SCC) were designed to join the Group and MSO functions under one banner with multi-agency cooperation. When DoD stepped into the mix a special SCC called the Joint Harbor Operations Center (JHOC). San Diego and Norfolk became the first two JHOCs of the United States with the goal of working towards tactical level MDA. The JHOCs seek to fuse information from U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Navy, Law Enforcement, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Harbor Police and Port Agencies, Customs and Border Patrol, local Joint Terrorism Task Force, and state agencies to form a Common Operating Picture. The San Diego JHOC was able to fuse the information from the following systems: border patrol cameras, San Diego port control camera system (civilian), USN radar systems, USCG coastal radar, Automated Identification System processors and Navy waterside security systems.

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<sup>52</sup> Watts, *Implementing Maritime Domain Awareness*, 13-14.

Everyone with a stake in the maritime realm has billets in these JHOCS and the liaison system established in this center is critical to fuse information from customs, regarding vessel tracking, the FBI tracking terrorists and the Navy's anti-terrorism force protection forces.<sup>53</sup>

## **H. MARITIME INTELLIGENCE FUSION CENTERS**

The literature on Maritime Intelligence Fusion Centers (MIFC) is restricted and focused mostly in professional channels. Navy authors, such as R.B. Watts, have contributed insights in the public domain into MIFC and how they can be used by nations to bind international actors together. The relevance of the MIFC will be reinforced in this paper's conclusion.

MIFCs are best suited to deal with information and intelligence at the operational or regional level, often referred to as the Fleet level in naval terms or Agency level in state and federal terms. Components of a MIFC include Federal Law Enforcement, FBI, Custom Border Patrol (CBP), Coast Guard Intelligence, Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), Joint Inter-Agency Task components, Staff N2 (intelligence) all the way up to Fleet/Combatant Commander (COCOM). The MIFC deals with the combined intelligence of these groups and agencies and can possess intelligence specialists and analysts in the upwards of 50 personnel in order to collect, analyze and disseminate intelligence downwards, sideways and up the chain of command.<sup>54</sup>

What MIFCs do at the operational level that is missing at the tactical level, i.e., JHOCs, is the analysis of all the data and intelligence that is collected in both the short and long term that builds into plans for responding to events, attacks and crises. This leads the MIFC to conduct a regional analysis incorporating and analyzing intelligence from the following sources. First is the field intelligence from all the sources in the AOR. Second is the Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) that is collected and fused with other sources. Third is the fusion of MIFCs liaisons with USN Fleet Commanders to create one

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<sup>53</sup> Watts, *Implementing Maritime Domain Awareness*, 17-24.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, 25-26.

common picture. Fourth is the production of intelligence products that coordinate all of the above for use by tactical and field units. To give an example of the level of integration at a MIFC here is the list of participating partners at the Pacific Area (PACAREA) MIFC: Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Agency (NSA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Naval Ocean Processing Facility (NOPF) Whidbey Island, Canadian Maritime Forces Pacific, Commander Third Fleet Battle Watch, Joint Intelligence Center Pacific, National Maritime Intelligence Center, MIFC Atlantic, NORTHCOM Intelligence Watch, Coast Guard Operational Commands, Joint Inter-Agency Task Force South, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC), California Anti-Terrorism Information Center, Air Marine Operations Center, Coast Guard Investigative Services, Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF), “Legacy” Customs, ICE/CBP Intelligence Coordination Center (USCG), and Department of Homeland Security.<sup>55</sup>

## **I. NATIONAL MARITIME INTELLIGENCE CENTER**

A key factor is that MDA is about awareness and not operational control of military or law enforcement assets’ use at any level. Even though the information gathered from MDA can lead to actions, MDA seeks only to extend information collection and analysis into the world’s entire maritime domain simultaneously to achieve true global awareness.

This will require a level of complexity and integration that is not as transparent as the military model where the JHOCs feed the MIFCs, which in turn feed the NMIC. The multitude of agencies and groups involved in this endeavor, with all their different cultures, procedures and specific interests will have to collaborate in a new way to accomplish the purpose of global maritime domain awareness, which further refined is the maritime vehicle to accomplish the goal of protecting the U.S. homeland.<sup>56</sup>

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<sup>55</sup> Watts, *Implementing Maritime Domain Awareness*, 27-29.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, 31-32.

At the strategic level, nations will have NMICs to coordinate, correlate and analyze the data from the sources already mentioned at the JHOC and MIFC level. It will add important players such as Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA), Coast Guard Information Coordination Center (ICC), Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), Department of State, Department of Transportation, Department of Commerce (DoC), and the private industry into a coherent whole that analyzes and then diffuses intelligence at a global level. It is important to note that this effort will not be focused in military naval activity, but rather on the entire international transshipment process to include “white” shipping, cargo-container movements, and international port activity.<sup>57</sup>

One of the end results of a functioning NMIC in MDA would be a COP that would feed and link to the MIFCs, JHOCs, and Combatant Commanders. This would create a situation where in MIFC’s and JHOCs can immediately benefit from the superior resources and analytical resources available at the strategic level while at the same time being able to feed the system with recent real time intelligence. This free flow of information at the tactical, operational and strategic level allows for the long-term analysis of the maritime domain and detect any potential enemy trends. Threats that are detected and identified can then be passed down to the operational and tactical levels for appropriate action.<sup>58</sup>

When Navy battle groups deploy they have a wide array of sensors that are collecting during their transit and on-station times that can feed overseas global intelligence into the strategic COP. Two other sensors that can be linked to the strategic level of MDA are satellites and underwater sensors. The National Security Agency and National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) have space based reconnaissance and surveillance satellites that can feed into the COP along with the Integrated Underwater

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<sup>57</sup> Watts, *Implementing Maritime Domain Awareness*, 33-34.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid., 35-36.

Surveillance System (IUSS). This is why the multi-agency nature of MDA becomes important and why it is paramount to maintain effective liaison channels and manned billets at these strategic centers combined with a robust analysis capability.<sup>59</sup>

These institutions are not set in stone at the tactical, operational and strategic level as MDA is a new and evolving plan. This leads to the question of where do our international partners fit in? In the case of Chile and Peru, do we develop tactical level centers in the Eastern Pacific or do they feed into the San Diego JHOC? It seems that the distances involved from Chile and Peru might preclude it from being used at the tactical level for stateside JHOCs. Is the information provided by these navies in a thousand ship navy concept using MDA as a vehicle better suited at the operational level or strategic level? The answers to these questions and the appropriate structures that will allow them to feed into the system and be able to benefit from a COP they can see are open to further research.

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<sup>59</sup> Watts, *Implementing Maritime Domain Awareness*, 38.

### III. CHILE

#### A. HISTORY

Chileans have never lost a war or conflict. Chile is building on a basis of significant achievements. They view themselves highly, are willing to work hard and are self-sufficient. (They can attain a strong position in South America) if they can resolve border conflicts with Peru and Argentina, which is hampered by a Prussian view of the nation where the state is sacred and any loss (of land) is a terrible tragedy.<sup>60</sup>

Chile first governed itself with a Junta, beginning in September 18, 1810. One of its first acts was to declare Chilean ports open to all ships. However, the Chileans did not have a Navy to protect them, thus leaving an Achilles heel in Chile's defense: the sea.<sup>61</sup> This led to Spanish loyalist attacks from the Viceroyalty of Peru, which were finally defeated on February 12, 1817 at Chacabuco near Santiago, Chile. General Bernardo O'Higgins, who secured the victory for Chile and later ruled as its governor, "knew that without a proper naval force Chile was vulnerable to landing by enemy forces."<sup>62</sup> This led to a national effort to control the seas that remains a basic tenet of Chilean strategy to this day.

The Chilean Navy was first set-up under British auspices when Lord Thomas Cochrane, was appointed commander in chief of the Chilean fleet. After the independence of Chile was established, the next task for the Chilean navy was to liberate Peru from Spanish rule. This tasking included naval gun battles and blockading the port of Callao in the Viceroyalty of Peru from Spanish naval forces.<sup>63</sup>

Then in 1863, the Spanish took the Chincha Islands from Peru - which were rich in guano - blockaded the ports and later imposed heavy sanctions on Chile which led to

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<sup>60</sup> Professor Dan Masterson, Department of History, U.S. Naval Academy, telephone conversation on May 29, 2008.

<sup>61</sup> Carlos López, *Chile, A Brief Naval History* (Valparaiso, Chile: Imprenta de la Armada, 2001), 31.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid., 36-37.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid., 44-62.

war with Spain.<sup>64</sup> When the war was over, the Chilean economy had been setback, “but at the same time the country had finally been made painfully aware that Chile had to maintain a Navy to defend her coast.”<sup>65</sup>

Chile continued to build its navy and in 1879, it was called to duty again. In this year, Bolivia increased taxes on Chilean nitrate mining. The Chileans refused and the Bolivian government seized the Chilean assets. The government of Peru signed a secret alliance with Bolivia and the War of the Pacific ensued when Chile declared war on Peru.<sup>66</sup> After fierce naval warfare between Chile and Peru, Chile emerged victorious and secured the Peruvian territories of Tacna and Arica. Bolivia lost its access to the sea. These victories and defeats are memories that are alive and well in the present national conscience of Chile, Peru and Bolivia.

The relations between Chile and the U.S. continued to grow and weather the occasional ruffle that most countries endure. In 1891, the U.S. and Chile almost went to war when two sailors on liberty in Valparaíso were killed. The diplomatic efforts of Capt Robley D. Evans convinced the Chileans to compensate the victim’s relatives and the matter was resolved.<sup>67</sup> In the beginning of the twentieth century, the U.S. would assist the Chilean navy in new technologies and tactics that were becoming standard fare in the naval realm. Chilean naval aviation started in 1916 with 50 British planes. In 1930 a portion of these forces went on to become the Chilean Air Force but the navy retained an air arm and “Navy personnel continued to be trained as pilots, mechanics, and maintenance personnel and some were sent to U.S. installations.”<sup>68</sup> In 1961, the Chileans received two “Balao” class submarines from the U.S.<sup>69</sup>

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<sup>64</sup> López, *Chile, A Brief Naval History*, 80-86.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid., 87.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid., 94.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid., 132.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid., 143.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid., 141.



## B. CHILEAN POLITICS

The transition to democracy from the Pinochet regime in Chile allowed the Chilean military to “secure extensive institutional safeguards and financial guarantees before leaving the government.”<sup>70</sup> Nevertheless, Chilean politics have “diminished the armed forces’ institutional powers and made policy decisions against military preferences.”<sup>71</sup> The Chilean government does so while remaining wary of not pushing the military beyond a perceived tipping point

With the specter of human rights issues and their implications for members of the military, three shields between the military and civilian government were seen to be put in place. The first was “the strong position that the constitution gave it (the military). Pinochet had remained as head of the army for eight years after the inaugural democratic elections... so that his men would not be touched. A second shield had been the judiciary, and the third was the weight of the parties of the Right.”<sup>72</sup> Also, the organic law of the armed forces prevented the president from eliminating the top commanders of the armed forces from service.<sup>73</sup>

Some of the moves the government has made to reduce the military’s influence were returning the *Carabineros* to the Interior Ministry. This move helped delineate the military’s role along national defense and separate it from internal security matters by rejecting the Army’s presence in the *Oficina Coordinadora de Seguridad Publica* (Coordinating Agency of Public Security).<sup>74</sup>

Chile’s civilian government strategy has been labeled as deliberate internationalist because “governing leaders of a democratizing country prefer to negotiate with

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<sup>70</sup> Wendy Hunter, “Continuity or Change? Civil-Military Relations in Democratic Argentina, Chile and Peru,” *Political Science Quarterly*, 112, no. 3 (1997): 454.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, 455.

<sup>72</sup> Felipe Aguero, “Chile Unfinished Transition and Increased Political Competition,” in *Constructing Democratic Governance in Latin America*, ed. Dominguez and Shifter (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 300.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>74</sup> Hunter, “Continuity or Change? Civil-Military Relations in Democratic Argentina, Chile and Peru,” 458.

adversaries and have cohesive political support that enables politicians to formulate serious foreign policy initiatives they are committed to pursue.”<sup>75</sup> This strategy is accredited to the *Concertación* coalition that follows cooperative international policies instead of exacerbating rivalries with neighbors, as for example with Argentina.<sup>76</sup> In the case of Peru it is interesting to note the involvement of Chile in the Peruvian economy. This creates an intermingling of interests where military action against Peru would hurt Chile’s economic pursuits. While not a guarantee for anything, investing in another country’s economy is an indicator of an internationalist strategy.

However, a plausible explanation for Chile’s expanding Naval role despite the increasing civilian control of the military and in line with the internationalist strategy is the influence of the “Mar Presencial” concept in both naval and political circles. “Mar Presencial” was born out of the nationalist writings of Diego Jose Victor Portales in the 1830s, which proposed that Chile was destined to control the South Pacific.<sup>77</sup> Today, Chilean government seems to believe that greater usage and control of the South Pacific is necessary for Chile’s growth and development.<sup>78</sup> The Chilean navy is well fitted in the government’s view to fill this role. “The purpose of Mar Presencial is to patrol and exploit the defined ocean space so as to protect national interests and contribute to Chile’s development. Mar Presencial thus becomes the theoretical basis for possible future unilateral action, to be justified under the name of national security.”<sup>79</sup>

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<sup>75</sup> Mani, *Democratization and Defense: Rethinking Rivalry in South America*, 26.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid., 27.

<sup>77</sup> Howard T. Pittman, “From O’Higgins to Pinochet: Applied Geopolitics in Chile,” in *Geopolitics of the Southern Cone and Antarctica*, ed. Phillip Kelly and Jack Childs (Boulder, CO: Lynsee Reinner Publisher, 1988), 175-176.

<sup>78</sup> James L. Zackrison and James E. Meason, “Chile, Mar Presencial and the Law of the Sea,” *Naval War College Review*, L, no. 3 (Summer 1997): 72.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid.

The real driving force for “Mar Presencial” is not saber rattling on the part of Chile, but rather economic concerns about who controls the high seas and the bounty to be generated from it. Control of the sea-bottom resources has been called “oceanopolitics, a perception of the ocean as a legitimate area for expanding and developing national interest.”<sup>80</sup>

Of particular interest are the notions of “sovereignty” and “sovereign rights” over the Economic Exclusion Zones (EEZ). “Sovereignty entails full and unquestionable ability to act, while sovereign rights reflect a distinct circumscription of the state’s authority.”<sup>81</sup> The Chilean government is interested in “fishing, scientific research, the laying of cables and pipelines, and the construction of artificial islands and installations”<sup>82</sup> as well as the extensive deposits of underwater gas hydrates that have been discovered along the Chilean coast.

Now that Chile has the naval capability to claim and enforce “Mar Presencial” it is becoming a real component of the country’s overall strategy. What may have been a nationalistic notion in the past with no means to enforce it has now become an idea whose time has come. With all the bounties for economic growth that the sea provides, it makes sense for Chile to seek to extend its naval reach and makes it more likely to cooperate with the U.S. in any global maritime endeavor.

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<sup>80</sup> Zackrisson and Meason, “Chile, Mar Presencial and the Law of the Sea,” 74.

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, 76.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*




Figure 1. Mar Presencial<sup>83</sup>

<sup>83</sup> Zackrisson and Meason, "Chile, Mar Presencial and the Law of the Sea," 73.

### C. TODAY'S ARMADA DE CHILE

The Chileans view their navy as having various roles. The first one is to win wars, protect the sea and to prepare for war during peace. The second is the perceived duty to develop the remote and sparsely populated areas of country with examples as Navarrino Island, Easter Island and Antarctic operations.<sup>84</sup> The third role is assistance in natural disasters. The fourth and final role is assistance to navigators to include Search and Rescue.<sup>85</sup>

Despite an apparent lack of bilateral exercises between the Chilean and Peruvian navy, Chile maintains avid relations with the U.S. According to the Chilean Navy website (Armada de Chile), they have participated in the following joint (multi-service – Army, Air Force, Navy and Marines) and combined (multi-national) exercises: UNITAS, RIMPAC, PANAMAX and various PASSEX.<sup>86</sup>

Chile participated in both UNITAS Atlantic and UNITAS Pacific. UNITAS is a USSOUTHCOM sponsored multi-national exercise that allows partner navies to participate with each other in security cooperation exercises. This allows for improved interoperability and the fostering of relations during peacetime that are meant to smooth out the human interactions in coalition operations and in future endeavors. This exercise is designed to train each of the partner navies in a multitude of maritime scenarios that serve to enhance the international standing and proficiency of individual navies as well as improve the ability of the region as a whole to address challenges, threats and emergencies. Great importance was given to maritime interdiction operations, theater security operation, interoperability and establishing security as “a necessary condition for prosperity and lasting democratic institutions.”<sup>87</sup>

Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) is a major maritime exercise intended to “enhance the tactical proficiency of participating units in a wide array of combined operations at

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<sup>84</sup> Zackrisson and Meason, “Chile, Mar Presencial and the Law of the Sea,” 73.

<sup>85</sup> Ibid., 156.

<sup>86</sup> Armada de Chile, [http://www.armada.cl/p4\\_armada/site/edic/2004\\_08\\_09\\_1/port/portada1.html](http://www.armada.cl/p4_armada/site/edic/2004_08_09_1/port/portada1.html).

<sup>87</sup> USSOUTHCOM, <http://www.southcom.mil/AppsSC/factFiles.php?id=10>.

sea. By enhancing interoperability, RIMPAC helps to promote stability in the Pacific Rim region.”<sup>88</sup> RIMPAC objectives include war fighting skills as well as security cooperation items like Maritime Interception Operations (MIO), Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) and Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). In 2008, RIMPAC was composed of ten participating countries which “support the Maritime Strategy by building trust. Trust enables partnerships and strong partnerships increase maritime security.”<sup>89</sup> RMSI is intended to “develop a partnership of willing regional partners with varying capabilities and capacities to identify, monitor, and intercept transnational maritime threats under existing international and domestic laws” while PSI is “a global effort to stem the proliferation, by any means, of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.”<sup>90</sup>

PANAMAX is a “U.S. Southern Command-sponsored exercise focused on ensuring the defense of the Panama Canal, one of the most strategically and economically crucial waterways in the world. FA PANAMAX 2008 exercised ground, sea and air responses to any request from the government of Panama to assist in protecting and guaranteeing safe passage through the canal and ensuring its neutrality.”<sup>91</sup> Naval objectives for this exercise include maritime interdiction and increasing interoperability. Twenty nations participated in PANAMAX 2008 due to the “importance that the international community places on freedom of navigation as a pillar of security and stability worldwide.”<sup>92</sup>

All these exercises have a common theme of increasing interoperability, the ability to work as a multi-nation naval coalition and practicing maritime interdiction operation. These are going to be the key skill sets when working with partner navies to maintain the security and stability of the oceans of the world. The fact that Chile chooses

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<sup>88</sup> Commander, U.S. Third Fleet, [http://www.c3f.navy.mil/RIMPAC\\_2006/about\\_rimpac.htm](http://www.c3f.navy.mil/RIMPAC_2006/about_rimpac.htm).

<sup>89</sup> Commander, U.S. Third Fleet, [http://www.c3f.navy.mil/RIMPAC\\_2008/Press%20Releases/01-08%20RIMPAC%2008%20ANNOUNCEMENT.doc](http://www.c3f.navy.mil/RIMPAC_2008/Press%20Releases/01-08%20RIMPAC%2008%20ANNOUNCEMENT.doc).

<sup>90</sup> GlobalSecurity.org, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/rmsi.htm>.

<sup>91</sup> USSOUTHCOM, <http://www.southcom.mil/AppsSC/factFiles.php?id=66>.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid.

to participate in these U.S. sponsored exercises demonstrates a level of interest in being an active participant in the naval security cooperation initiatives that are being carried out in the Eastern Pacific.

A PASSEX is simply a passing exercise done between two navies to practice communication and coordination drills to be proficient during times of war. The fact that the Chilean navy performs these exercises with the U.S. is an indicator that the navies of these two countries work together and would like to remain proficient at doing so.

Looking at the present to determine the future, the statements of the Chilean Commanders since 2003 are revealing. In 2003, Chilean ADM Miguel Vergara expressed an interest in obtaining unmanned vehicles with the “aim of having real-time information from the air for different zones of interest.”<sup>93</sup> In 2004, he also stated that the Chilean Navy wanted to fulfill two missions: presence and control, and that to fulfill this purpose his units needed to be interoperable with other navies.<sup>94</sup> The following year he again stressed interoperability and a “common doctrine and a workable command-and-control system in place so as to share and understand the tactical picture, have timely knowledge of relevant intelligence, and comprehend what is expected of each participant nation.”<sup>95</sup> These statements indicate that the Chilean Admirals view interoperability in the Chile-U.S. or Chile-NATO sense and not particularly in regards to Peru. In 2006, Chilean ADM Rodolfo Codina Diaz mentioned “capabilities to interoperate with other navies, not only those with high technological development, but also those of the same region.”<sup>96</sup> In 2007, ADM Codina was asked “From your point of navy’s point of view, what elements do you think should be included in the new U.S. maritime strategy, and what elements do you suggest that the United States avoid?” ADM Codina response was “rapid response structures that include a combination of maritime domain awareness network, rapid inter- and intra-theater maritime transportation, forces that are forward deployed, and other

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<sup>93</sup> Proceedings Staff, “The Commanders Respond,” *Proceedings*, March 2003, 36.

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*, 55.

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*, 46.

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*, 36.

forces at home, in their respective countries. For this last case, those forces closest to the threat focus will be first to respond. Here is where the 1,000-Ship Navy concept comes into play, sharing the load of providing maritime security in common interest of the international community, both regionally and globally.”<sup>97</sup> Finally, in 2008, ADM Codina’s statement was that “international security is now everyone’s responsibility. With the downsizing of forces common across the globe, emphasis is on the need for cooperation to maintain international peace and security – the mandatory condition in the pursuit of development.”<sup>98</sup> What these statements from 2003 to the present reveal is a shared desire for interoperability and a willingness of the Chilean Navy to take part in the international stage and the MDA environment in partnership with the U.S. One of the key points is that Chile is looking North, past Peru, to the U.S. and East to Europe for support and partnership.

The Chilean Navy’s area of responsibility is 799,600 square miles (3,998 of coastline and 200 miles of Economic Exclusion Zone). However, the figure jumps up to 19,486, 252 square miles when taken all the way to the international date line (3,998 of coastline and 4,874 miles – the distance between Valparaiso and the International Date Line). The Chilean Navy has the “Mar Presencial” concept, which operates on the assumption that a country’s interests are frequently beyond the limits of its economic exclusion zone and should consequently be monitored and protected.”<sup>99</sup> This doctrine partly explains their desire to push for the International Date Line along with economic expansion. The resources for the Chilean navy to meet MDA requirements up to the EEZ include: eight helicopter capable aircraft, four submarines, nine fast attack craft, six large patrol craft and ten coastal patrol craft.<sup>100</sup> Also, the Chilean Navy is limited to one oiler that, “diminishes the navy’s capacity to patrol Chile’s long coast and deep into the Pacific. Acquiring a second oiler is therefore high among the service’s current

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<sup>97</sup> Proceedings Staff, “The Commanders Respond,” 17.

<sup>98</sup> Ibid., 33.

<sup>99</sup> Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessments, *Chile*, December 14, 2007, 48.

<sup>100</sup> Ibid., 49.



priorities.”<sup>101</sup> The Coast Guard contributes with “three converted fishing vessels, two coastal patrol craft, 10 high-speed cutters, 15 inshore patrol craft, two pilot cutters, numerous surface skimmers and Zodiac craft for inshore patrol and rescue, (and) sixteen fast patrol craft.”<sup>102</sup> Besides considering if these ships are enough to provide MDA coverage for all of Chile’s responsibility in the Eastern Pacific, it is going to be interesting to see how the increasing cost of fuel will affect future operations.

Chile has a national objective to extend its reach to the International Date Line. This will require a greater maritime reach and capability. There are economic reasons that drive Chile and its navy into a greater role that goes beyond the Mar Presencial concept. Among these reasons is Chile as the sixth largest exporter of fish products in the world, with China being number one and Peru number two. The fishing sector is the third exporting sector of the country after mining and industry. Fisheries usually account for 12-13 percent of external sales for Chile and so is a significant part of the Chilean economy.<sup>103</sup> The discovery of underwater gas hydrates along the coast of Southern Chile also calls for expanded maritime presence, as “one cubic meter of methane hydrate...is equivalent to more than 100 kilograms of liquid gas.”<sup>104</sup> Finally, the Armada de Chile will reopen the Arturo Prat naval base on Greenwich Island, which was closed down in 2002, to counter British plans to increase their Antarctic holdings and the natural resources that this area might provide.<sup>105</sup> For all the reasons mentioned above the Area of Responsibility for the Armada de Chile has grown to over 26 million square kilometers as indicated by the image below.

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<sup>101</sup> Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessments, *Chile*, 40.

<sup>102</sup> *Ibid.*, 48.

<sup>103</sup> Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, *Chile, Fishery Country Profile*, <http://www.fao.org/fi/oldsite/FCP/es/CHL/profile.htm>.

<sup>104</sup> “The Chilean Navy,” *Vigia, The Chilean Navy Magazine*, 2006, [http://www.revistavigia.cl/prontus4\\_revistavigia/site/edic/base/port/cover.html](http://www.revistavigia.cl/prontus4_revistavigia/site/edic/base/port/cover.html).

<sup>105</sup> “Chile to Reopen Antarctic Base,” *The Australian*, October 25, 2007, <http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,22645012-12377,00.html>.




Figure 2. Chilean Navy Area of Responsibility<sup>106</sup>

<sup>106</sup> Provided by Chilean Naval Attaché Office, Washington, D.C.

## IV. PERU

To carry out the vigilance, protection and defense of the patrimony and National Interest in the maritime realm; assume Internal Control in states of emergency, when decreed by the President of the Republic, participate in the economic and social development of the country and in the Civil Defense according to the law, with the end to contribute in guaranteeing the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic against any threat external or internal and to achieve the national objectives.

### Mission of the Peruvian Navy

#### A. HISTORY

The Chilean expedition to liberate Peru carried with it the seeds of the Peruvian Navy in 1821 when José de San Martín arrived with Lord Cochrane in Peru, but chose to stay there to fight and expel the Spanish. San Martín believed in “the necessity to dominate the sea to reach Lima and guarantee Independence as well as the urgent formation of a wartime navy.”<sup>107</sup> Unlike Chile, whose naval tradition is based on the British model, the Peruvian navy retained its Spanish heritage. When the Peruvian Navy was first created, on October 8, 1821, it retained the Spanish Naval Ordnances of 1802.<sup>108</sup> However, they did have a British officer, Marín Jorge Guise, who achieved the rank of Vice Admiral and Chief of the Squadron. He handled some reorganization issues like the running of the Naval School, but the running of the navy was basically in accordance with the inherited Spanish naval tradition.<sup>109</sup>

During the 1820's there was a period of anarchy in Peru, which was resolved when Simón Bolívar was installed as dictator of Peru. Later, Grand Marshall Andres de Santa Cruz was named interim president of the republic and Peru sought a total break away from Bolívar who was in Gran Colombia at the time. To further increase tensions

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<sup>107</sup> José de la Puente Brunke, *Los Hombres del Mar: La Marina de Guerra en la historia del Perú* (Lima: Marina de Guerra del Perú, 1994), 184.

<sup>108</sup> *Ibid.*, 188.

<sup>109</sup> *Ibid.*, 191-193.

“the Peruvian army had contributed in Bolivia to an abdication of General Sucre, abolish the Bolivian constitution and (attempt) the election of General Santa Cruz as president of Bolivia.”<sup>110</sup> In response to this, Bolivar ordered his troops to “fly to the border of Peru to avenge this outrage.”<sup>111</sup> This led to the War with Gran Colombia in 1828. When the tally was made “the labor carried out by the Peruvian navy was efficacious and very certain; however the overall conclusion is not so positive when we see how the land campaign did not go as planned.”<sup>112</sup>

The 1830’s saw the creation of a Peru-Bolivian Confederation, which worried Chile. On August 21, 1836, the “Surprise of Callao” happened when two Chilean vessels approached Callao in a peaceful manner, but at night captured three Peruvian vessels which were to be kept under Chilean control until the Peruvians could give “sufficient guarantees of peace.”<sup>113</sup> The Peruvian response was to legalize the Chilean possession of the three vessels and to promise not to arm any ship for four months.<sup>114</sup> The 1830s would see a total of four Chilean incursions and naval gun battles into Peruvian waters.

In the mid 1840’s, a commission was sent to the U.S. which ended up purchasing the first steam powered warship for the Peruvian navy, the *Rímac*.<sup>115</sup> In 1848, California’s gold rush attracted Peruvians and Peruvian merchant marine ships to California coast. Merchant ship’s crews would desert to try their luck at finding gold and leave the Peruvian ships unmanned on U.S. coasts. Because of this need to protect and recuperate the ships of the Peruvian maritime trade, the Peruvian warship *Gamarra* was sent on a voyage to San Francisco to provide crews to all the abandoned boats in January of 1849. Upon her successful return in July of that year, the Peruvian navy felt they

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<sup>110</sup> de la Puente Brunke, *Los Hombres del Mar: La Marina de Guerra en la historia del Perú*, 205.

<sup>111</sup> Ibid.

<sup>112</sup> Ibid., 210.

<sup>113</sup> Ibid., 229.

<sup>114</sup> Ibid., 230.

<sup>115</sup> Ibid., 246.

contributed to “the international presence of Peru” and talks were held to see if they needed to permanently station a Peruvian warship in San Francisco harbor to protect Peruvian interests.<sup>116</sup>

In 1866, the War with Spain ensued when they took over the Chincha Islands for their guano. Peru declared war on Spain on January 14, 1866 and when the Spanish bombarded Valparaiso, this brought Chile into the war and the result was the retreat of the Spanish vessels from the South American coast. As such, it was hailed as a victory for Peru over Spanish reassertions in the South American continent.<sup>117</sup>

Peru’s role in the War of the Pacific (1879-1884) included the great naval gun battles of the Huascar. This included five successful campaigns against the Chilean navy, usually outnumbered. Of the Huascar, President Theodore Roosevelt said, “the most famous and remembered ship, upon which the greatest acts of heroism the world has ever seen have been committed in an ironclad of any nation in the world.”<sup>118</sup> This led to the Chilean preoccupation with the Huascar driving it into a focal point of the battle, and eventually leading to its capture. The Chileans still hold the Huascar as a memorial ship and is a point of contention with Peru, who wants its return.

During the remainder of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the Peruvian Navy was involved in scientific pursuits to include hydrography, astronomy and the founding members of the Lima Geographical Society were naval officers.<sup>119</sup>

Peruvian Naval Aviation was born in the 1920s. At the same time, an American Naval Mission was sent to Peru. This is said to have led to “great progress in the national navy: for example rigorous physical and mental standards were set for personnel

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<sup>116</sup> de la Puente Brunke, *Los Hombres del Mar: La Marina de Guerra en la historia del Perú*, 252.

<sup>117</sup> Ibid., 264.

<sup>118</sup> Ibid., 302.

<sup>119</sup> Ibid., 342.

selection, a great part of the regulations were reformed, greater efficiency was brought into the functioning of the Navy, and great enthusiasm and work in the service of the Armada.”<sup>120</sup>

## **B. PERUVIAN POLITICS**

The importance of parties lies in that they provide “critical information about what candidates stand for and how they can be expected to govern.”<sup>121</sup> Parties also “hold elected leaders accountable” and when they are strong, which is not the case in Peru, are able to provide checks and balances.<sup>122</sup> In Peru, a weak four-party system composed of United Left (IU), the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA), Popular Action (AP) and the Popular Christian Party (PPC) was established with all the structures in place for democratic governance.<sup>123</sup> However, one event would drastically alter their established order. This was the “structural” change, which included “the elimination of the last barriers to full suffrage, large scale urban migration, and the expansions of the urban informal sector.”<sup>124</sup> Here, it is important to note how the inclusion of indigenous voters who before suffered from a “crisis of representation” change the way the elites and their parties had been managing their parties and how these parties now have to take into account this part of the population if they want to get elected. On top of that, there was the insurgency started by Shining Path coupled with up to 7,000 percent inflation during the presidency of Alan Garcia, which eroded the public’s confidence in the power of parties to effectively govern the Peruvian state and increase the quality of life of their citizens.<sup>125</sup>

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<sup>120</sup> de la Puente Brunke, *Los Hombres del Mar: La Marina de Guerra en la historia del Perú*, 322.

<sup>121</sup> Steven Levitsky and Maxwell A. Cameron, “Democracy without Parties? Political Parties and Regime Change in Fujimori’s Peru,” *Latin American Politics and Society* 45, no. 3 (2003).

<sup>122</sup> *Ibid.*, 4.

<sup>123</sup> *Ibid.*, 6.

<sup>124</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>125</sup> Deborah J. Yashar, “Indigenous Politics in the Andes: Changing Patterns of Recognition, Reform and Representation,” in *The Crisis of Democratic Representation in the Andes*, ed. Mainwaring, Bejarano and Leongomez (CA: Stanford University Press, 2006), 259.

With the political parties in Peru suffering from a lack of popular support and legitimacy, there was a “crisis” moment. This event has been called the “rise of the outsider” and explains how a political outsider can take hold of power and undermine the democratic institutions to avoid checks to their increasing power.

In Peru, the run-off election laws served to put an unknown candidate into power. No one expected Fujimori to scrape into second place in the elections where the famous author Mario Vargas Llosa, running under the PPC, was advocating neo-liberal reform for Peru. Garcia backed Fujimori’s candidacy, which opposed neo-liberal reform, and sacrificed his party for his gain instead of supporting the APRA candidate. Therefore, the two factors that allowed Fujimori to gain the presidency in Peru as an independent unknown were the “structural” nature of the weak party system and socio economic factors of that point in time and the “fortuitous” nature of how the events played out to include Garcia’s backing and large abstentions from the opposition.

In 1992, Fujimori carried out a self-coup (*autogolpe*) claiming it was “necessary to rid Peru of a false democracy.”<sup>126</sup> The success of this *autogolpe* was based on “Fujimori (vanquishing) two forces that Peruvians had come to find unbearable: hyperinflation and the cycle of protest and violence that had culminated in the terrorism of Shining Path.”<sup>127</sup>

Fujimori’s success with the *autogolpe* consolidated popular support in Peru as the “strong leader for whom they had been yearning” and this in effect, “buried the established parties,” creating a new paradigm in Peruvian politics, Fujimori versus the opposition.<sup>128</sup> Because parties were discredited in Peru and Fujimori’s rise to power was achieved without an established party, this led to two conclusions for Peruvian politicians. “First, they concluded that a defense of the political *status quo ante* was not a viable electoral strategy. Not only did public support for Fujimori make the defense of

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<sup>126</sup> Levitsky and Cameron, “Democracy without Parties? Political Parties and Regime Change in Fujimori’s Peru,” 8.

<sup>127</sup> Ibid.

<sup>128</sup> Ibid., 9.

democratic institutions unprofitable, but such a strategy associated politicians with the discredited old guard elite that led the opposition.”<sup>129</sup> The second conclusion for politicians was “that they no longer needed parties.”<sup>130</sup> This led to a rise of independent candidates as “new and aspiring politicians began to create their own parties instead of joining existing ones” as was the case with Alejandro Toledo’s *Peru Posible* which “had no *raison d’être* other than Toledo’s presidential candidacy.”<sup>131</sup>

Another obstacle to democracy was the use of social spending as a political tool. When Fujimori needed to garner votes or political support, he simply turned on the spigot of funds and this in turn served to crowd out the opposition who had nothing to compete with other than words. “The second Fujimori administration saw the highest social expenditure levels in two decades, and this helps explain the regime’s greater support among the poorest of the poor. This support was based through effective clientelistic schemes which targeted social expenditure under a centralized structure, controlled by the presidency.”<sup>132</sup>

While these examples of Peruvian politics have put foreign policy into the interests of the political leaders and their allies, Peru is characterized as a harboring deliberate statist-nationalist strategy. Mani states that this is because “leaders favor exclusionary methods and enjoy cohesive political support, translating belligerent opportunism into systematically- implemented policy decisions that promote international conflict.”<sup>133</sup> This argument is based on the Peru-Ecuador conflict and sheds interesting insight when trying to understand Peruvian strategic thinking. However, there is an

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<sup>129</sup> Levitsky and Cameron, “Democracy without Parties? Political Parties and Regime Change in Fujimori’s Peru,” 10.

<sup>130</sup> Ibid.

<sup>131</sup> Ibid., 12.

<sup>132</sup> Tanaka Martin, “From Crisis to Collapse of the Party Systems and Dilemmas of Democratic Representation: Peru and Venezuela,” in *The Crisis of Democratic Representation in the Andes*, ed. Mainwaring, Bejarano and Leongomez (CA: Stanford University Press, 2006), 67.

<sup>133</sup> Mani, *Democratization and Defense: Rethinking Rivalry in South America*, 28.



example when this strategic mindset affecting the Peru-Chile relationship when Peru initiated an arms race in 1974, “leading to war scares, military mobilizations, and continued tension for several years.”<sup>134</sup>

During the Fujimori years, the threat of Shining Path was neutralized in 1992 and the military was no longer needed for an internal security role and was used by the regime to do saber-rattling under statist-nationalist lines which eventually lead to the 1995 war with Ecuador.<sup>135</sup> Peru lost this war and due to the equipment losses, it led to the “purchase of a record number of new aircraft – 18 MiG29 attack aircraft and 18 SU-25 close support aircraft.”<sup>136</sup> Even though these purchases would constitute the “most sophisticated fighters of any Latin American country” the lack of maintenance and upgrading clauses into the deal would render this a deterrent threat based on perception more than actual capability.<sup>137</sup> Regardless, these purchases are seen to affect the balance of power and serve to boost acquisition programs in surrounding countries for advanced aircraft.

### **C. TODAY’S MARINA DE GUERRA DEL PERU**

Today, the Peruvian Navy has a history of working with the United States. According to the Peruvian Navy website (Marina de Guerra del Peru) the Peruvian Navy has participated in the following joint exercises with the U.S.: UNITAS, RIMPAC, SIFOREX, joint submarine training with the U.S., and PASSEX.<sup>138</sup>

Silent Force Exercise (SIFOREX) an Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) exercise where the U.S. Navy trains against real diesel submarines as opposed to synthetic threats or nuclear submarines. “Diesel electric submarines’ ability to run virtually silent presents a detection challenge to ships and aircraft. These subs are only used by foreign navies, so

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<sup>134</sup> Mani, *Democratization and Defense: Rethinking Rivalry in South America*, 3.

<sup>135</sup> Ibid., 229.

<sup>136</sup> Ibid., 248.

<sup>137</sup> Ibid.

<sup>138</sup> From Marina de Guerra del Peru,  
[http://www.marina.mil.pe/marina\\_actual/contribucion\\_pais/ejercicios\\_navales.htm](http://www.marina.mil.pe/marina_actual/contribucion_pais/ejercicios_navales.htm).

the United States depends on countries such as Peru to conduct these training exercises.”<sup>139</sup> These exercises strengthen relationships and interoperability between the U.S. Navy and the Peruvian Navy.

Statements by Peruvian Admirals in Proceedings reveal a willingness to work with the U.S., but with a prime importance given to sovereignty. In 2005, Peruvian ADM Jose Luis Noriega Lores stated, “interoperability with other navies and the exchange of doctrine and procedures are crucial nowadays” and mentioned Peruvian participation in U.S. naval exercises involving frigates and submarines.<sup>140</sup> In 2006, Peruvian ADM Jorge Ampuero Trabucco stated the “desire to develop an interoperable capability among our navies” and “the principle of no intervention in others state matters.”<sup>141</sup> In 2007, Peruvian RADM Wladimirio Giovannini y Freire, Secretary General, Peruvian Navy stated that “cooperative work on a global scale should be included in the general strategy, as should development of a legal framework in accordance with international law...the importance of not intervening in other countries’ internal affairs...Respect for sovereignty is high.”<sup>142</sup> Thus while both Chile and Peru seek greater levels of interoperability, Chile seems to be more interested in participating in the world stage and Peru seems to be more interested in respecting sovereignty.

The Peruvian Navy’s area of responsibility is 300,000 square miles (1,500 miles of coastline x 200 miles of EEZ) To cover this area the navy has the following: eight frigates, one cruiser, seven fast attack craft, four patrol craft, and six submarines.<sup>143</sup> This excludes riverine craft and auxiliaries. They also have five tankers. The Coast Guard assets include 61 varied types of patrol craft.<sup>144</sup> As is the case with Chile, besides considering if these ships are enough to provide MDA coverage for Peru’s responsibility

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<sup>139</sup> USSOUTHCOM, <http://www.southcom.mil/AppsSC/news.php?storyId=1123>.

<sup>140</sup> Proceedings Staff, “The Commanders Respond,” 54.

<sup>141</sup> Ibid., 46.

<sup>142</sup> Ibid., 27.

<sup>143</sup> Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessments, *Peru*, April 14, 2008, 35.

<sup>144</sup> Ibid., 36.

in the Eastern Pacific, it is going to be interesting to see how the increasing cost of fuel will affect future operations. However, Peru does not have a “Mar Presencial” or equivalent concept like Chile.

One of the goals of this thesis is to understand the reason for Peru’s concern with sovereignty, the operational implications of this concern, and how these concerns might be addressed. It is possible that past conflicts with both the United States and Chile are the sources of these concerns. Perhaps one of the explanations for the Peruvian stance is the previous conflict with the U.S. in the Economic Exclusion Zone over the protection of marine resources. History reminds us of the U.S.-Peruvian “Tuna War” of 1969 when U.S. vessels were fishing 40 miles off the coast of Peru. This led to two Peruvian patrol boats being deployed. One U.S. ship was detained and fined \$10,500 and a second U.S. ship was strafed with “40-60 machine gun bullets into her upper parts.”<sup>145</sup> In the case of Chile/Peru cooperation, another hurdle to be overcome is the loss of land to Chile in the War of the Pacific (1879-1883) as well as current maritime boundary dispute, with Peru filing a lawsuit against Chile in the International Court of Justice at The Hague.<sup>146</sup>

The Peruvian naval goals and objectives are more inward looking, because besides control of the seas, the role of the Peruvian navy is “assume internal control in states of emergency, when deemed appropriate by the President of the Republic, participate in the social and economic development of the country and with Civil Defense according to law, with the end to guarantee the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the Republic against any threat, external or internal.”<sup>147</sup> Peru has the world’s second largest commercial fisheries, and is a “key component of the country’s economy. It is the second highest generator of foreign currency after mining, accounting for U.S.\$ 1,124 million dollars in export in 2001.”<sup>148</sup> Therefore, protection of their ‘territorial seas’

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<sup>145</sup> Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessments, *Peru*, 64-65.

<sup>146</sup> Xinhua, *Peru, Chile Locked in Maritime Territory Dispute*, January 19, 2008, [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-01/19/content\\_7451066.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-01/19/content_7451066.htm).

<sup>147</sup> Mision de la Marina de Guerra del Peru, [http://www.marina.mil.pe/marina\\_actual/mision.htm](http://www.marina.mil.pe/marina_actual/mision.htm).

<sup>148</sup> Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, *Peru, Fishery Country Profile*, <http://www.fao.org/fi/oldsite/FCP/en/PER/profile.htm>.

and preventing other countries from reaping unauthorized benefits from the use of their fisheries remains a vital national security issue.<sup>149</sup> Another reason for Peru be highly interested in securing their territorial seas is Petro-Tech Peruana Oil Company confirmed reserves of 1.132 billion barrels of high quality oil off the coasts of the provinces of Piura and Lambayaque.<sup>150</sup>

In the case of Peru, they have a history of working with the U.S. that is likely to keep deepening the relationship between these two navies. They have had a historic rivalry with Chile that still affects state and military decision making. Perhaps inroads are being made to transform the perception of Chile as a hostile country; some evidence of this is both Chile and Peru's ability to resolve their maritime dispute in the ICJ at the Hague while maintaining cordial relationships with one another. Peru holds faster to the statist-nationalist strategy than Chile this might mean a more hesitant approach to naval cooperation with Chile and a focus on sovereignty that trumps intervention except in clearly delineated cases.

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<sup>149</sup> Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, *Peru, Fishery Country Profile*, 40.

<sup>150</sup> Xinhua, *Peru Confirms over 1 Billion Barrels of Oil Reserves*, April 16, 2008, [http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-04/17/content\\_7993359.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-04/17/content_7993359.htm).

## V. UNITED STATES

Whenever and wherever the opportunity exists, we must develop and sustain relationships that will help to improve the capacity of our emerging and enduring partners' maritime forces, and help them achieve common desired effects.

Admiral Mike Mullen

### A. U.S. BACKGROUND

The American background is well known to readers, notable professional authors such as Holden and Zolov paint an interesting picture concerning security cooperation between the United States and Latin America. The relationship between the United States and Latin America can be traced to aspects of our foreign policy dating back to the nineteenth century. Starting with the No Transfer Doctrine signed by Congress in 1811 which stipulated that no land currently in Spanish hands would “pass from the hands of Spain into those of any other foreign power”<sup>151</sup> to prevent any British and French designs upon Latin America and Florida. This paternal mantle that the United States visited upon Latin America would be formalized in the Monroe Doctrine in 1823 where the United States warned the European powers that “any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere (will be considered) as dangerous to our peace and safety.”<sup>152</sup> The ability to enforce the Monroe Doctrine, however, did not come to pass until the twentieth century and even then, it was not until after 1945 that U.S. influence in the Western Hemisphere came into its own. For many observers the loss of the USS Maine in Havana, which brought about the Spanish-American War (1898-1902), was a crucial turning point. The war, which the U.S. won, led to the transfer of Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam, the Philippines and the Caroline Islands from Spain to the United States. The Platt Amendment of 1901 created the legal backing for “the right to intervene

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<sup>151</sup> Robert Holden and Eric Zolov, *Latin America and the United States: A Documentary History* (NY: Oxford University Press, 2000), 6.

<sup>152</sup> *Ibid.*, 13.

for...the protection of life, property and individual liberty.”<sup>153</sup> In 1904, the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine stated that foreign interference in Latin America by Western Powers “may force the United States, however reluctantly... to the exercise of an international police power.”<sup>154</sup> Against this backdrop, the U.S. Navy carried out foreign policy in Latin America in the first half of the twentieth century using “gunboat diplomacy.” However, this would change as the Cold War emerged.

During the Cold War, especially the U.S. concern about the Cuban Revolution of 1959 spreading to other countries in Latin America, the United States engaged in a concerted effort to keep communism out of the Western Hemisphere. The National Security Doctrine established for Latin America was that the United States would fight the external communist threat and the countries in the Western Hemisphere would root out communism within their borders. The National Security Council’s “policy for the 1950’s was to support Latin American dictators, (because) these friendly dictators helped the United States by repressing communists.”<sup>155</sup> Our relation with Latin American leaders who supported our agenda was supportive, “where anticommunist dictators were able to maintain stability, U.S. support continued, particularly in the form of military assistance.”<sup>156</sup> During the Cold War, Latin America would have its share of military dictatorships that thwarted communist forces to include: Nicaragua, Chile, Brazil, and Argentina. Eventually all these countries transferred back to democracy. As the Cold War was waning, a new joint venture appeared on the scene in Latin America, the War on Drugs.

The “War on Drugs” in the 1980s brought a wave of security cooperation and assistance aimed at “enhancing the ability of Latin American armed forces to carry out

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<sup>153</sup> Holden and Zolov, *Latin America and the United States: A Documentary History*, 82.

<sup>154</sup> Ibid., 101.

<sup>155</sup> Lars Schoultz, *Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy toward Latin America*, (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1998), 347.

<sup>156</sup> Ibid., 354.

counternarcotics initiatives.”<sup>157</sup> This led the United States to fund the creation of units to include “a Bolivian air force unit and a naval group to carry out drug interdiction operation”<sup>158</sup> and “a ‘riverine’ program to help the security forces of Colombia and Peru to interdict drugs on rivers.”<sup>159</sup> Also militaries in the region received training from U.S. forces which some critics claim have precipitated a higher degree of “militarization” in the region, with Mexico, Brazil, Colombia and pre-Evo Morales Bolivia relying on the armed forces for internal problems.

Now we are engaged in the “War on Terror” and this has changed the focus of the lens through which we view aid and cooperation to a much broader scale. These broad definitions blur the lines between police and military roles with U.S. view advocating cooperation within all the resources of the state and restructuring them to meet the state’s security needs. One of the most known of these programs is “Plan Colombia,” which started out as a counter-drug aid program and after 9/11 has been expanded to include counter-terror aid. This new way of looking at a state’s security resources is also making its way to the maritime side as joint cooperation between the navy and coast guard of these countries is now being looked upon to keep the oceans safe against the wide number of threats that can fall under the “terrorism” namesake. Bottom line: The literature suggests that the following are necessary ingredients, but are sometimes overlooked by the U.S., particularly when the technical challenges of cooperation are great: shared threat assessment/ priority assigned by both sides; understanding of sovereignty issues; resource issue (who’s paying?) Drug control efforts, for example, are often a priority for the U.S. but not for the partner country, which is willing to extend formal cooperation in return for CD assistance funds.

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<sup>157</sup> Gaston Chillier and Laurie Freeman, “Potential Threat: The New OAS Concept of Hemispheric Security,” *WOLA Special Report*, July 2005, 2.

<sup>158</sup> Chillier and Freeman, “Potential Threat: The New OAS Concept of Hemispheric Security,” 2.

<sup>159</sup> “Below the Radar: U.S. Military Programs with Latin America, 1997-2007,” *Center for International Policy, Latin American Working Group Education Fund and the Washington Office on Latin America*, March 2007, 9.

## **B. U.S. POLICY**

The foundations for Security Cooperation between the U.S. Navy and the navies of Chile and Peru can be traced to our national policy. In the National Security Strategy (NSS) of The United States of America, it is stated that our national security strategy is “founded on two pillars: The first pillar is promoting freedom, justice and human dignity. The second pillar is confronting the challenges of our time by leading a growing community of democracies... Effective multinational efforts are essential to solve these problems.”<sup>160</sup> The NSS then outlines nine “essential tasks,” four of which directly tie in to security cooperation. These are “1) Strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends; 2) Work with others to diffuse regional conflicts; 3) Ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and trade; and 4) Develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global power.”<sup>161</sup> The last item stresses the need to “join with other nations around the world...to improve the capacity of all nations to defend their homelands against terrorism and transnational criminals.”<sup>162</sup> All these policy statements lay the groundwork for the behavior and actions of the U.S. Government and its agencies like the U.S. Navy with other states. The four strategic priorities of the USG in the Western Hemisphere are “bolstering security, strengthening democratic institutions, promoting prosperity, and investing in people.”<sup>163</sup> From these statements it is clear that the policy of the United States mandates working with other governments and securing the avenues of commerce and stability, like the sea for Chile and Peru that rely on 80% of their trade through their 17 and 14 ports, respectively, as “essential tasks” of our NSS.

The next level of policy is the National Military Strategy (NMS) of the United States of America. In this document it is stated that “we must strengthen collaboration (with our) multinational partners. Key to such collaboration is an improved ability to

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<sup>160</sup> The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2006.pdf>.

<sup>161</sup> Ibid., 1.

<sup>162</sup> Ibid., 35.

<sup>163</sup> Ibid., 37.



collect, process and share information.”<sup>164</sup> The concept of integration is one of the strategic principles and it is important because of its “enabling multinational partners through security cooperation and other engagements (to) enhance the ability of the Armed Forces to not only prevent conflict and deter aggression but also supports combatant commanders’ plans to quickly undertake operations over great distances and in sometimes overlapping conflicts.”<sup>165</sup> The NMS has three objectives, these are: “protect the United States; prevent conflict and surprise attack; and prevail against adversaries.”<sup>166</sup> Under protect the United States, a key component is Creating a Global Anti-Terrorism Environment. This means “working with other nation’s militaries and other governmental agencies, the Armed Forces help to establish favorable security conditions and increase the capabilities of its partners. The relationships developed in these interactions contribute to the global antiterrorism environment that further reduces threats to the United States, its allies and its interests.”<sup>167</sup> To Promote Security the NMS directs “military forces (to) engage in security cooperation (SC) activities to establish important military interactions, building trust and confidence between the United States and its multinational partners. These relatively small investments often produce results that far exceed their cost.”<sup>168</sup> SC is seen as a win-win strategy as besides helping further U.S. NMS objectives it also “encourages nations to develop, modernize and transform their own capabilities, thereby increasing the capability of partners and helping them to help themselves.”<sup>169</sup>

The National Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS) states, “The safety and the economic security of the United States depend in substantial part upon the secure use of the world’s oceans. The United States has a vital national interest in maritime security.

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<sup>164</sup> The National Military Strategy of the United States of America, iv, <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/d20050318nms.pdf>.

<sup>165</sup> Ibid., 8.

<sup>166</sup> Ibid., 9.

<sup>167</sup> Ibid., 11.

<sup>168</sup> Ibid., 12.

<sup>169</sup> Ibid.

We must be prepared to stop terrorists and rogue states before they can threaten or use weapons of mass destruction or engage in other attacks against the United States and our allies and friends. Toward that end, the United States must take full advantage of strengthened alliances and other international cooperative arrangements.”<sup>170</sup> The two main threats identified by the NSMS are terrorists and the transnational criminal/piracy threat.

The terrorist threat can use multiple venues in the maritime environment to further their goals. “Some terrorist groups have used shipping as a means of conveyance for positioning their agents, logistical support and generating revenue.”<sup>171</sup> Terrorist can also use the maritime environment to perpetrate attacks via “explosives-laden suicide boats, merchant and cruise ships as kinetic weapons to ram another vessel, warship, port facility or offshore platform.”<sup>172</sup> Finally, the NSMS states “terrorists can also take advantage of a vessel’s legitimate cargo, such as chemicals, petroleum, or liquefied natural gas, as the explosive component of an attack. Vessels can be used to transport powerful conventional explosives or WMD for detonation in a port or alongside an offshore facility.”<sup>173</sup>

Transnational criminal activities and piracy poses a threat to maritime security. “Piracy and incidents of maritime crime tend to be concentrated in areas of heavy commercial maritime activity.”<sup>174</sup> As stated before, Chile and Peru depend heavily on their commercial maritime activity for their economic prosperity and the stability of the region.

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<sup>170</sup> The National Strategy for Maritime Security, 1, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/4844-nsms.pdf>.

<sup>171</sup> Ibid., 4.

<sup>172</sup> Ibid.

<sup>173</sup> Ibid.

<sup>174</sup> Ibid., 5.

Hence, the NSMS has three principles. “First, *preserving the freedom of the seas* is a top national priority. Second, the United States Government *must facilitate and defend commerce* to ensure this uninterrupted flow of shipping. Third, the United States Government *must facilitate the movement of desirable goods and people across our borders*, while screening out dangerous people and material.”<sup>175</sup>

These guiding principles direct the maritime forces of the United States to prevent terrorist acts from taking place with the specific guidance to “detect, deter, interdict, and defeat terrorist attacks, criminal acts, or hostile acts in the maritime domain, and prevent its unlawful exploitation for those purposes.”<sup>176</sup> Integral to achieving this objective is working with international partners. “Assisting regional partners to maintain the maritime sovereignty of their territorial seas and international waters is a longstanding objective of the United States and contributes directly to the partners’ economic development.”<sup>177</sup>

Enhancing international cooperation is part of the NSMS. This will include the creation of new initiatives and the enforcement of existing ones such as the Container Security Initiative, the Proliferation Security Initiative, the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism and others. These initiatives “will be coordinated by the Department of State and will include provisions such as: Developing, funding, and implementing effective measures for interdicting suspected terrorists or criminals; Developing and expanding means of rapid exchanges among governments of relevant intelligence and law enforcement information concerning suspected terrorist or criminal activity in the maritime domain; Adopting procedures for enforcement action against vessels entering or leaving a nation’s ports, internal waters, or territorial seas when they are reasonably suspected of carrying terrorists or criminals or supporting a terrorist or criminal endeavor;

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<sup>175</sup> The National Strategy for Maritime Security, 8.

<sup>176</sup> Ibid.

<sup>177</sup> Ibid., 12.

and adopting streamlined procedures for inspecting vessels reasonably suspected of carrying suspicious cargo and seizing such cargo when it is identified as a subject of confiscation.”<sup>178</sup>

In order to accomplish this, the United States will engage in a concerted effort to maximize maritime domain awareness by leveraging its “global maritime intelligence capabilities. This intelligence enterprise will support United States Government agencies and international partners in securing the maritime domain.”<sup>179</sup> This will require a robust maritime command-and-control structure that will allow all “international coalitions to share maritime situational awareness on a timely basis.”<sup>180</sup>

One of the ways this global intelligence network of partner navies securing the maritime domain will achieve its goal is by “interdiction of personnel and material. The United States, along with its international partners, will monitor those vessels, cargoes, and people of interest from the point of origin, through intervening ports, to the point of entry to ensure the integrity of the transit, to manage maritime traffic routing, and, if necessary, to interdict or divert vessels for inspection and search.”<sup>181</sup>

The NSMS clearly states that the U.S. maritime assets will work with partner nations, share intelligence, and, when deemed necessary, interdict suspect vessels.

### **C. EXAMPLES OF NAVAL COOPERATION**

Some examples of naval cooperation include the United States and India in the Indian Ocean as well as the Royal Australian Navy in the Pacific Ocean. On September 2007, a conference was held in New Delhi to discuss the future of a U.S.-India Strategic Partnership. The following are key points that also have bearing on the U.S., Chile and Peru naval cooperation. First, there is the consensus on U.S. supremacy that “the United States will continue to be the major power in the Indian Ocean and beyond for the

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<sup>178</sup> The National Strategy for Maritime Security, 15.

<sup>179</sup> Ibid., 16.

<sup>180</sup> Ibid., 17.

<sup>181</sup> Ibid., 22.

foreseeable future, but other countries and non-state actors have the potential to create serious security problems.”<sup>182</sup> The same can be said for the Eastern Pacific in relation to U.S. Supremacy and the understanding of this by Chile and Peru as well as the potential threat of non-state actors to the region. Second, is the navy as a foreign policy tool, in this case it was “the Indian Navy is a powerful tool for Indian foreign policy and diplomacy, a fact that is beginning to be recognized by civilian policy makers in India.”<sup>183</sup> The governments of Chile and Peru, by engaging their navies in these security cooperation agreements are indeed recognizing the foreign policy potential of their navies. The third item of relevance is technology, “India remains very keen on gaining access to U.S. defense technology to facilitate its plans to play a larger role in the Indian Ocean region.”<sup>184</sup> Both Chile and Peru are currently engaged in modernization programs and they stand to benefit from technology transfer programs that participation in a joint maritime environment would bring about, specially in the areas of interoperability, command-and-control and networks.

The challenges to interdiction cooperation between the United States and India include “legal concerns; operational concerns (such as command of operations and intra- and inter-state coordination); practical problems (bureaucracies, the difficulty of intelligence sharing, and the dichotomy between secrecy and transparency); the political limits of support for the program; and the attitudinal issues, primarily the resistance to the program being led by the United States and the challenges of commercial opportunities versus security.”<sup>185</sup> These serve as an indicator as what the likely hurdles to interdiction cooperation between the U.S., Chile and Peru are likely to be. For example, “Indian

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<sup>182</sup> Peter Lavoy and Robin Walker, “U.S.-India Maritime Cooperation: A Track-Two Dialogue,” *Center for Contemporary Conflict*, Naval Postgraduate School, September 18, 2007, 1.

<sup>183</sup> Ibid.

<sup>184</sup> Ibid.

<sup>185</sup> Ibid., 12.

concerns with the Container Security Initiative (CSI) include the political issues, the fact that India is uncomfortable with U.S. inspectors in Indian ports, the mandated use of only American equipment, and concerns over time delays and commercial losses.”<sup>186</sup>

Another challenge lies with WMD interdiction in the maritime domain and “the difference between interdicting actual nuclear, chemical, biological, or radiological weapons and interdicting dual-use components of WMD and delivery systems.”<sup>187</sup> The article then points out that interdiction is more effective against states than terrorists or non-state actors, however, laying the basis for interdiction across the world by partner navies from India in the Indian Ocean to Chile and Peru in the Eastern Pacific is the new challenge and reality that the navies of this era are going to have to deal with.

So far, we have seen the challenges facing joint naval security cooperation, but what are the enablers of cooperation. Five key factors are suggested, these are: “relaxing sovereignty sensitivities, extra regional power interests, increased prevalence of cooperation of norms, improving state resources, and increasing prioritization of maritime security.”<sup>188</sup>

States sometimes tend to equate sovereignty with security and a “reduction of sovereignty seems tantamount to decreased security”<sup>189</sup> or that foreign powers will operate in national waters to undermine security. “Nonetheless, in recent years states have been increasingly willing to allow infringement upon or qualification of their sovereignty for the sake of improved maritime security.”<sup>190</sup> For example, Malaysia and Indonesia brought differences regarding the ownership of the Litigan and Sipadan Islands to the ICJ and both parties accepted the ruling in favor of Malaysia.<sup>191</sup> This is remarkably similar to Chile and Peru resolving their maritime border dispute at the ICJ as well.

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<sup>186</sup> Lavoy and Walker, “U.S.-India Maritime Cooperation: A Track-Two Dialogue,” 12.

<sup>187</sup> Ibid.

<sup>188</sup> John F. Bradford, “The Growing Prospects for Maritime Security Cooperation in Southeast Asia,” *Naval War College Review* 58, no. 3 (Summer 2005): 73.

<sup>189</sup> Ibid.

<sup>190</sup> Ibid., 74.

<sup>191</sup> Ibid.

Extra regional power interests include initiatives such as the CSI and PSI that “draw attention to transnational maritime threats and the desirability of greater cooperation.”<sup>192</sup> While these initiatives receive strong support from the U.S., its success is increased by the participation of partner navies and by doing so it draws them into a cooperative arrangement to the benefit of all. Some examples include, the Indian and U.S. navies working together to “ensure the safe transit of high-value units through the Straits of Malacca” in 2002.<sup>193</sup> The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) has “increasingly assumed constabulary roles appropriate to trans-national threats, and in 2004 it carried out command-level sea-lane security exercises with several regional states.”<sup>194</sup> In fact, the RAN has international engagement at the strategic, operational and tactical level. At the strategic level, the RAN has established “dialogue and reciprocal visit with counterparts; Navy HQ level Navy to Navy talks; and an International Fora.”<sup>195</sup> Operationally, “Fleet Commander visits regional counterparts and the RAN participates in combined multi-lateral and bi-lateral operations and exercises.”<sup>196</sup> The tactical level includes ship visits, PASSEXs, individual training and training exchanges.<sup>197</sup>

The forms of cooperation that we can learn and profit from are bilateral cooperation and networked cooperation. “Bilateral cooperation, though it involves only two states, can be more productive than multilateral initiatives in producing operational maritime cooperation.”<sup>198</sup> This make sense as it takes more effort to get three or more nations to get to agree on a set of mutual goals and objectives than it is to get two nations that have similar security interests. Thus instead of pushing for some global standard, the

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<sup>192</sup> Bradford, “The Growing Prospects for Maritime Security Cooperation in Southeast Asia,” 76.

<sup>193</sup> Ibid., 77.

<sup>194</sup> Ibid.

<sup>195</sup> Vince Di Pietro, Commodore, RAN, “The RAN’s Perspective on the New Maritime Strategy,” 37<sup>th</sup> IFPA-Fletcher Conference on National Security Policy, September 27, 2007, [http://www.fletcherconference.com/oldpowrpoint/2007/Di\\_Pietro.ppt](http://www.fletcherconference.com/oldpowrpoint/2007/Di_Pietro.ppt).

<sup>196</sup> Ibid.

<sup>197</sup> Ibid.

<sup>198</sup> Bradford, “The Growing Prospects for Maritime Security Cooperation in Southeast Asia,” 81.

best way to achieve this is by working with the other nations on a state by state basis and for the case of this research creating a bilateral U.S.-Chile agreement and a bilateral U.S.-Peru agreement.

This takes us to the next level, which would be the “synergetic network of bilateral arrangements. Because they are based on bilateral agreements, networked cooperation agreements enable states to customize the most direct relationships to maximize the value and minimize risk. The networks, however, also increase trust and understanding between all their members, thus reducing the cost of building further cooperative relationships.”<sup>199</sup>

#### **D. ENDURING FRIENDSHIP**

SOUTHCOM already has some programs that are pre-existing and have been ongoing prior to the arrival of the thousand ship navy concept. One of these is Enduring Friendship, which aims to enhance or build up the maritime capabilities of certain key partner nations so they can better police their territorial waters and in so doing, lessen the burden on U.S. Navy assets and thus make them available for other missions. This program will provide the ability to monitor the coastline with radars, improved communications to share information, access to high-speed patrol boats and the implementation of command-and-control forces for effective maritime security in the Caribbean.<sup>200</sup>

The first phase of Enduring Friendship involved the Bahamas, Jamaica, Panama and the Dominican Republic. These countries will receive four forty three foot interceptor boats with radios, RADAR, Forward Looking Infrared, GPS and the Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System (CENTRIXS). They will also receive training for operators in Ft. Myers, Florida and maintenance sustainment. With this equipment, training and maintenance it is expected that they will have improved potential for transit zone detection and interdiction as well as combating illicit

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<sup>199</sup> Bradford, “The Growing Prospects for Maritime Security Cooperation in Southeast Asia,” 82.

<sup>200</sup> Long, *1,000-Ship Navy: New Concept or Current SOUTHCOM Maritime SOP*, 7-8.



trafficking. Phase two will include Nicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala and Belize. Phase three will incorporate the remainder of the Eastern Caribbean and Regional Security System countries.<sup>201</sup>

In the past initiatives have failed because of technological hurdles and the lack of capability in coordinating elements with adequate command-and-control. Enduring friendship comes with CENTRIXS, which is a system designed to easily share information in an inexpensive yet interconnected and interoperable manner. With Enduring Friendship 32, boats distributed over eight countries will have the capability to speak to one another and build a maritime information network that will allow for the shared use of video, data and voice.<sup>202</sup>

#### **E. GLOBAL FLEET STATION**

The Global Fleet Station is a vision of the future in which the different maritime components like military, coast guard and civilian fuse in an integrated environment to cross train and promote common interests. In SOUTHCOM, this program was carried out under as the Caribbean Support Tender. The USCGC GENTIAN mission was to foster cooperation and improve the operational capability of navies in service across the Caribbean by engaging in training, maintenance and logistics with partner and multinational players. The crew consisted of 29 members of the U.S. Coast Guard and 16 representatives from the Caribbean countries performing duties side by side who made 155 country visits delivering over 3.9 million dollars in supplies while assisting in the training and development of over 5,500 Caribbean maritime personnel. The successor to the GENTIAN under the Global Fleet Station pilot program is the HSV-2 SWIFT wave piercing catamaran with an aluminum hull ideal for coastal waters. SWIFT will be making port calls and training personnel from Panama, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Dominican Republic and Belize. Multi-national and multi-agency teams will train in the following areas: patrol craft operations, maintenance, medical readiness, port

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<sup>201</sup> Long, *1,000-Ship Navy: New Concept or Current SOUTHCOM Maritime SOP*, 8-9.

<sup>202</sup> *Ibid.*, 9.

security and professional development. Global Fleet Station continues the legacy of the GENTIAN and while some have criticized this approach, it still remains a viable tool for increasing naval security cooperation in the SOUTHCOM area.

## **VI. CONCLUSION**

Naval security cooperation is not a new phenomenon on the world stage. We have already seen several examples, such as the Container Security Initiative, the Proliferation Security Initiative, multi-national efforts ensuring the safety of the Straits of Malacca, the Royal Australian Navy's role as a constabulary force in its region, multiple bilateral and multilateral treaties, and Enduring Friendship and the Global Fleet Station. However, we are exploring a new concept that has been put forth in recent years called the thousand ship navy which calls for a global maritime navy of voluntary nations who share common goals and are willing to work together to promote stability and security. One possible vehicle to implement this thousand ship navy concept is Maritime Domain Awareness.

In the Eastern Pacific, two maritime states that can engage in this endeavor are Chile and Peru. Both of these states have a strong naval tradition and depend heavily on their ports for their economic well being and development. The strategic policy makers of both of these navies have expressed a willingness to participate in this naval security endeavor with the United States.

This thesis has six conclusions. The first one is that Chile and Peru have common goals of security, stability, trade that are in line with the overall scope of the U.S. Navy's push for security cooperation in the Eastern Pacific. Second, the navies Chile and Peru are likely to continue interacting with the U.S. Navy at current or more integrated levels to include the established exercises and new initiatives. Third, the U.S. is primary force behind this initiative. If nothing else, this is indicative of an increase in U.S. cooperation with the navies of Chile and Peru. Fourth, based on statements by Chilean and Peruvian naval officers mentioned earlier in the text, both of these navies currently do interact when it comes to matters of preserving life at sea which is the case in Search and Rescue (SAR) operations. Fifth, the likelihood of armed conflict between Chile and Peru has become remote. The sixth and final conclusion is that we can expect increased naval security cooperation between the U.S., Peru and Chile to be cautious, on the part of the latter two countries.

Naval security cooperation between Chile and the U.S. Navy can be expected to remain at current levels and increase in future years. Chile can be categorized as a country in expansion and hence more eager to engage in internationalist efforts. This shows in an increased willingness to participate in the world stage. With the boom in copper paving the way for modernization of naval assets, the Chilean navy is poised to adopt a greater role. Of course, these expenditures will continue be challenged by political forces in Chile concerned with social inequality and would like to see a different use of those funds.

The case of Peru while also positive in continuing a successful working relationship with the U.S. Navy offers a more guarded approach. Peru is emerging from a slightly more rocky political landscape. From the dictatorship of Velasco it faced Shining Path on the eve of its democratization. The violence generated by this conflict caused the military to look inwards. With Fujimori in power, democracy was compromised while devastating blows were landed to Shining Path and MRTA. Fujimori is out of power, but the example of an outsider coming to the presidency without the use of parties is still a part of the Peruvian political landscape. For these reasons, Peru is more likely to look inward and participate in a more guarded manner in global maritime efforts, yet participate nonetheless.

Identified areas for further research include the understanding of how the navies of Chile and Peru would assist in naval security cooperation in the Eastern Pacific. Are they content to prolong the status quo, participate in joint exercises, and be active in the Container Security Initiative? Or are they willing and ready to aggressively push for a thousand ship navy construct in the Eastern Pacific using MDA as a vehicle? If they choose MDA as a vehicle how would it work? How would the sensors and intelligence these navies and their multi-agencies provide be incorporated into a global MDA picture? Would their inputs be sent to Third Fleet or Fourth Fleet? Does the future hold the probability of a JHOC-like structure in the Eastern Pacific in either Chile or Peru? Or would their inputs go to an operational or strategic level organization in the United States?

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