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THESIS

**THE FUTURE OF JAPAN'S SECURITY POLICY: IS
NORMALIZATION A POSSIBILITY?**

by

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March 2009

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POSSIBILITY?**

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This thesis considers the future direction of Japanese security policy by examining the debate on whether or not Japan will “normalize.” Normalization is defined as the process of Japan removing its restrictions on the use of military force. Arguments exist that Japan is on the path to removing these restrictions because of a variety of factors such as Japan’s worsening security environment and its recent decision to introduce a ballistic missile defense (BMD) program. In contrast to these views, this thesis suggests that Japan will not normalize due to the presence of strong anti-military feelings that exist within the society, both at the public and political levels. To test this hypothesis public opinion, politician opinions, and political party opinions are researched on four issues: general Constitutional revision, specific revision of Article 9, possible changes in the right to exercise collective self-defense, and opinions on Japan’s new BMD program. It is concluded that strong anti-military feelings continue to persist at both levels of Japanese society and that these feelings are an effective obstacle to Japan’s normalization. Based on this conclusion, it is recommended that the United States increase its efforts to secure Japan’s participation in non-combat-related activities.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

Among security experts, the future direction of Japan's security policy has been an issue of debate for many years. Part of the debate revolves around the question of if Japan will ever become a "normal" country by removing the restrictions that exist on its ability to use military force. This thesis will shed some light on this question by examining certain aspects of the domestic Japanese security debate to determine what they suggest about whether or not Japan is about to "normalize" by removing its long-standing restrictions on the use of military force.¹ The aspects to be examined are: the opinions of the Japanese public, the opinions of Japanese politicians, and the opinions of Japan's political parties. These areas were chosen because they represent a broad sampling of how Japanese society in general thinks about these issues. The results of this examination will then be analyzed to determine if "normalization" is a possibility for Japan's future security policy.

B. IMPORTANCE

This research question is important because Japanese normalization could potentially have severe ramifications on U.S. national security in two vital areas. First, if Japan were to remove the existing restrictions on the use of military force, it could have a major impact on the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance, which has been the cornerstone of U.S. policy in Asia for over six decades. Second, such a decision would run the risk of negatively affecting the regional security and stability of East Asia, an area of increasing importance to the economy and security of the United States.

First, a significant change to Japan's security policy could have a tremendous effect on the existing U.S.-Japan Security Alliance. Everything from the scope of the

¹ For the purposes of this thesis, "normalization" is defined as Japan removing its restrictions on the use of military force; specifically Article 9 and the prohibition of collective self-defense. This author acknowledges that others may define it differently.

alliance to the level of defense cooperation between both countries could be subject to change. On the positive side, Japan could become more of an equal partner within the alliance and bear more of the burden for maintaining security in the region, as well as internationally. This would improve the effectiveness and the significance of the alliance.

Conversely, if Japan removed its restrictions on the use of military force, it could also decide that there was no longer a need for the alliance to exist. Instead, Japan could take a more independent path without a close relationship with the United States. This would lead to a decrease in the U.S. presence in East Asia as well as a corresponding loss of influence and prestige in the region.

Second, Japan's removal of its restrictions could have profound repercussions on the regional security and stability of East Asia. Many of Japan's neighbors, especially China and the two Koreas, would view this development with anxiety and suspicion. This could lead to an arms race between Japan and its neighbors that could destabilize the region and possibly lead to conflict. The probability that the U.S. would be involved militarily in this type of scenario is high. It is also possible that this event could lead to a change in the existing security structure within East Asia. An unconstrained Japan might force a change in the current U.S. system of bilateral security agreements that are in place. How would the new Japan fit into the existing regional setting?

Given these possible developments, the direction Japan takes with its future security policy could have a considerable impact on the national interests of the United States. In light of this, an examination of the current debate within Japan itself will provide greater understanding of the potential direction Japan may take in the future. This understanding will also allow the United States to be better prepared for any ramifications on the U.S.-Japan alliance and on the regional security and stability of East Asia.

C. ISSUES

The primary issue addressed by this thesis involves Japan's restrictions on the use of military force. The two restrictions that will be addressed by this thesis are Article 9

of the 1947 Constitution and the prohibition on the right of collective self-defense (CSD). Other restrictions do exist, such as Japan's Three Non-Nuclear Principle for example, but these will not be discussed.

Many people have heard of the Japanese Constitution's Article 9, but probably few have actually read it. It is composed of two paragraphs and states:

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.²

This article has fueled an intense debate that has lasted for decades in Japan. It remains a topic of great sensitivity and has, at times, caused tension in Japan's relationship with the United States. This is particularly ironic given the U.S. role in creating it in the first place. Despite the strict wording of the article, Japan has interpreted it to mean that Japan has the right to maintain a Self-Defense Force (SDF), but the roles and responsibilities of the SDF are very narrow.

The second restriction is Japan's prohibition on participating in CSD. CSD, or cooperating with other states for security purposes, is a right that is recognized by the Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. That article states:

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.³

² Constitution of Japan, Article 9, website of the Prime Minister of Japan and his Cabinet, available at: http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html (accessed March 22, 2009). The website provided the English translation.

³United Nations Charter, Chapter VII, Article 51, website of the United Nations, available at: <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/> (accessed March 22, 2009).

Despite this, the Japanese government has deemed that participating in CSD is not a right that Japan's Constitution allows. The annual white paper entitled "The Defense of Japan 2007" summarized the stance as follows:

International law permits a state to have the right of collective self-defense, which is the right to use force to stop an armed attack on a foreign country with which the state has close relations, even if the state itself is not under direct attack. Since Japan is a sovereign state, it naturally has the right of collective self-defense under international law. Nevertheless, the Japanese Government believes that the exercise of the right of collective self-defense exceeds the limit of self-defense authorized under Article 9 of the Constitution and is not permissible.⁴

Thus, these two restrictions prevent Japan from officially maintaining a military and from participating with other countries in self-defense. There are two methods that Japan could employ to remove these restrictions. First, Japan could either rewrite or amend its Constitution to remove the restrictions of Article 9. Second, Japan could change its current interpretation regarding its prohibition on the ability to exercise the right of CSD. Taking either of these actions would result in a removal of Japan's restrictions and cause significant changes to Japan's security policy.

D. HYPOTHESIS

There are some who believe that Japan is on the road to removing its restrictions on the use of military force. They cite a variety of reasons, including Japan's worsening security environment and Japan's current BMD program as evidence to support their arguments. By contrast, the hypothesis presented in this thesis suggests that Japan is *not* about to remove its current restrictions on the use of military force because of the strength of anti-military feelings that exist within the society, both at the political and public level. This thesis thus predicts that Japan will continue to implement its security policy within the restrictions created by Article 9 and the prohibition of CSD.

⁴ Defense of Japan 2007, Part II "The Basics of Japan's Defense Policy," Chapter 1, Section II "The Constitution and the Right of Self Defense," Paragraph 2, Subparagraph 4, p. 111, website of Japan's Ministry of Defense, available at: http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2007/21Part2_Chap1_Sec2.pdf (accessed March 22, 2009).

As stated above, this thesis uses the single term “restrictions” to refer to only two separate aspects: Article 9 and the prohibition of the exercise of the right to CSD. When this thesis mentions “restrictions,” the reader should understand that it is referring to both concepts. Therefore, the hypothesis states that Japan will neither revise Article 9 nor remove its ban on CSD.

E. LITERATURE REVIEW

1. Japan Will Not Remove its Restrictions

Numerous political scientists interested in questions of “national identity” have pointed out that the norm of pacifism, which has sprung up within post-World War II Japan, plays a major role in restraining Japan’s security policies. Thomas Berger calls this norm, “Japan’s culture of anti-militarism”⁵. He contends, “The experience of defeat, and how that experience came to be interpreted and institutionalized in the Japanese political system and in Japanese defense policy, continue [sic] to shape Japan’s willingness to make use of the military today.”⁶ Berger concludes:

...I have argued that it is highly unlikely that the Japanese would set out to become a military superpower. Even if Japanese policy makers were to conclude that dramatic change was necessary, given the existing culture of anti-militarism they would encounter strong opposition from the general populace as well as from large sections of the elite.⁷

Peter Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara agree. They claim that Japan’s security policy is swayed by both the structure of the state as well as legal and social norms.⁸ They reject realist arguments that changes in the international system are responsible for Japan’s security policy⁹ and conclude that, “Both state structure and social and legal

⁵Thomas Berger, “From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan’s Culture of Anti-militarism,” *International Security* 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993).

⁶*Ibid.*, p. 131.

⁷*Ibid.*, p. 147.

⁸ Peter Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, “Japan’s National Security: Structures, Norms, and Policies,” *International Security* 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993): p. 86.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 116.

norms explain why Japan's security policy has eschewed the traditional trappings of military status and power."¹⁰ They do, however, leave the possibility open that large changes in the international system may cause Japan to change its security policy.¹¹

Mike Mochizuki also emphasizes the importance of norms. He argues, "Despite the emergence of the so-called new nationalism in Japan, the possibility of a strategic breakout involving both remilitarization...and security independence from the United States remains remote. The anti-military pacifist culture is still robust enough in Japan to check moves in this direction."¹² He does, however, acknowledge that this could change. He states, "The only development that could drive Japan in this direction would be a drastic weakening of the U.S. security commitment in the context of a more militarily powerful and threatening China."¹³

Yoshihide Soeya also argues on the strength of this norm. He states, "Of particular importance in the Japanese context is the persistent strength of 'pacifism' as the most critical reference point informing the content and the policy making process of security policy."¹⁴ He argues that Japan is actually transforming this norm into a new strategy that he calls "proactive pacifism with an internationalist bent."¹⁵ He claims, "[Japan's] Greater participation in international peace keeping operations, the rise of human security, and renewed attention to regional community building are clear cases of

¹⁰ Peter Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, "Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms, and Policies," *International Security* 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993): p. 115.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 117.

¹² Mike Mochizuki, "Japan: Between Alliance and Autonomy," in *Strategic Asia 2004-05: Confronting Terrorism in the pursuit of Power*, eds. Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills (Seattle, Washington: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2004), p. 128.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ Yoshihide Soeya, "Redefining Japan's Security Profile: International Security, Human Security, and an East Asian Community," Institute for International Policy Studies International Conference speech, given November 30 – December 1, 2004, p. 2, website of the Institute for International Policy Studies, available at: http://www.iips.org/04sec/04asiasec_soeya.pdf (accessed March 22, 2009).

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

this internationalist pacifism of post-Cold War Japan.”¹⁶ He argues that this new type of pacifism has arisen “in parallel with, not despite” the threat from North Korea and the concern over the rise of China.¹⁷

2. Japan *Will* Remove its Restrictions

Christopher Layne argued back in 1993 that Japan could be on its way to great power status. He discusses the post-Cold War world and explains how Germany and Japan have increased their relative power.¹⁸ He then argues, “As their stakes in the international system deepen, so will their ambitions and interests. Security considerations will cause Japan and Germany to emulate the United States and acquire the full spectrum of great power capabilities, including nuclear weapons.”¹⁹ In the sixteen years since this article was published, this has not occurred. However, Layne’s prediction seems contingent upon Japan continuing to increase its economic power relative to the United States which has not occurred.²⁰

More recently, Takashi Inoguchi and Paul Bacon think Japan’s security policy may ultimately result in the removal of the restrictions on military power. They claim that, pacifism will be one of the key components of Japan’s security policy during the years 2005 to 2020.²¹ But they go on to predict that “...constitutional revisions are more likely to take place during the 2005-2020 period. If the LDP [Liberal Democratic Party] continues to hold power in one way or another, as it seems set to, constitutional revisions

¹⁶Yoshihide Soeya, “Redefining Japan’s Security Profile: International Security, Human Security, and an East Asian Community,” Institute for International Policy Studies International Conference speech, given November 30 – December 1, 2004, p. 2, website of the Institute for International Policy Studies, available at: http://www.iips.org/04sec/04asiasec_soeya.pdf (accessed March 22, 2009).

¹⁷*Ibid.*

¹⁸ Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great powers Will Rise,” *International Security* 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), p. 37.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 42-43. On page 51, Layne also predicted conflict between Japan and the United States if Japan continues to grow in power.

²¹ Takeshi Inoguchi and Paul Bacon, “Rethinking Japan as an Ordinary Country,” in *The United States and Northeast Asia*, eds. G. John Ikenberry and Chung-in Moon (Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007):p. 93.

are likely to take the following form: endorsement of the ordinary use of force in the settlement of international disputes...”²² They explain their rationale based on domestic politics:

...The LDP contains a large group of legislators who talk tough on self-strengthening. The LDP is more likely to endorse the overseas deployment of troops than the DPJ [Democratic Party of Japan], and less concerned than the DPJ about whether such a dispatch is authorized by a UN Security Council resolution or not. The LDP would countenance the dispatch of Japanese forces to join a coalition not authorized by the UN, whereas the DPJ would not.²³

Finally, they do also state that their prediction does not mean that Japan will engage in “adventurism,” because Japan will remain close to the United States and will therefore be constrained by that relationship.²⁴

Christopher Hughes predicts that Japan will partially remove its restrictions because of its external security environment. He states:

Japan’s evolving security policy has been occasioned by the changed strategic environment and a series of key security crises in the East Asia region and beyond. The Gulf War, the North Korean nuclear crises, the Taiwan Crisis, the rise of China, 11 September and the ‘war on terror’ have all convinced Japan that the status quo in its security policy and the strategic bargain with the US are no longer tenable in their current form..²⁵

He goes on to say that Japan is “...increasingly shifting to a position that the route to ‘normality’ lies in the strengthening of US-Japan alliance cooperation, out-of-area

²² Takeshi Inoguchi and Paul Bacon, “Rethinking Japan as an Ordinary Country,” in *The United States and Northeast Asia*, eds. G. John Ikenberry and Chung-in Moon (Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007):p. 94.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 95.

²⁵ Christopher Hughes, “Japan’s shifting security trajectory and policy system,” *Adelphi Papers* 44, Issue 368 & 369 (November 2004): p. 140.

JSDF [Japanese SDF] dispatch and the gradual abandonment of previous constitutional constraints, *including, most notably, the exercise of the right of collective self-defence.*”[Italics added]²⁶

He also predicted that a revision of Article 9 may occur, but this revision would likely not be a removal of restrictions, but rather, “...to specify the existence of the JSDF [Japan Self-Defense Force] as a military force, and to clarify the right of collective self-defense and legitimize the JSDF’s role in international cooperation with the US and UN.”²⁷ However, he also says, “If [North Korea’s nuclear program or China’s military ambitions] were to become clear and immediate threats to Japan, then, combined with the trends that have served to raise Japan’s national military profile in recent years, Japan could quickly reveal itself as a fully fledged military great power.”²⁸

Michael Green’s assessment also predicts a partial removal of restrictions. Discussing the future direction of Japan’s security policy, he states, “Eventually the Diet will probably also revise the Constitution, with incremental changes to recognize the right of [collective self-defense].”²⁹ He believes this change will occur because of “...the economic problems Japan faces, by the growing sense of vulnerability to China and North Korea, and by generational change.”³⁰ However, Green also mentions that there are several factors, such as a conflict over Taiwan or on the Korean Peninsula among others, which could be a catalyst towards large changes in Japan’s security policies.³¹

Additionally, several authors point out that Japan’s implementation of a BMD program will collide with its prohibition on the exercise of collective self defense. Amy

²⁶ Christopher Hughes, “Japan’s shifting security trajectory and policy system,” *Adelphi Papers* 44, Issue 368 & 369 (November 2004): p. 140.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 65.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

²⁹ Michael Green, *Japan’s Reluctant Realism* (New York City, New York: Palgrave, 2001), p. 272. The original text does not say “collective self-defense” but “collective defense”. This author has confirmed with Green that he used that term synonymously with CSD.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 276-277.

Freedman and Robert Gray speculate that the close cooperation needed to successfully operate a missile defense system will touch on “collective defense” and cause problems within the Japanese government.³²

Aurelia Mulgan agrees. She says, “While the Japanese government insists that introducing such a system [BMD] will not breach any constitutional prohibition, and that it will develop an independent system that defends only Japanese territory, it will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for Japan to avoid being drawn into the collective defense of U.S. forces in East Asia and even on the continental United States.”³³ She goes on to speculate, “From a U.S. perspective, Japan’s prohibition on exercising the right of collective self-defence is a constraint on alliance cooperation. Hence Japan’s participation in missile defence represents an opportunity to force a Japanese breach of the ban on collective self-defence through the backdoor.”³⁴

Mulgan continues, “In this way, missile defence will act as an important agent of change in the alliance. By driving policy on collective self-defence, increasing integration of US and Japanese forces, including coordination of Japanese and American MD systems, will act as bottom-up method of transforming the US-Japan alliance into a normal alliance.”³⁵ Her idea here highlights how the nature of the BMD program itself may impel Japan to resolve its restrictions on CSD.

Finally, there are also some experts who point out the inadequacy of the argument regarding Japan’s anti-military norms. Toshio Nagahisa, for one, does not believe these norms are the driving reason for defense policy. He gives the example of how Japan continued with the SDF’s activities in Indian Ocean and sent the SDF to Iraq despite

³²Amy Freedman and Robert Gray, “The Implications of Missile Defense for Northeast Asia,” *Orbis* 48, No. 2 (Spring 2004): p. 344. Freedman and Gray also use the term “collective defense.” This author assumes that CSD is what they are referring to.

³³Aurelia Mulgan, “Japan’s Defence Dilemma,” *Security Challenges* 1, No. 1 (November 2005): p. 63.

³⁴*Ibid.*, p. 64.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 65.

strong public opposition.³⁶ He states, “In short, while politicians may take advantage of public opinion when it supports them, their decisions are not controlled by public opinion.”³⁷ Instead, he argues that, “...Japan expanded its security commitments because Japan had a “right” person as the Prime Minister under the “right” institutions when external and internal factors demanded to do so.”³⁸

Jennifer Lind also questions the argument for norms. She convincingly argues that Japan’s post-World War II foreign policy was never based on anti-military norms but is better explained by the motivation to “pass the buck” to its stronger alliance partner, the United States.³⁹ Thus, Nagahisa and Lind cast doubt about the argument on the strength of Japan’s anti-military norms.

F. METHODS AND SOURCES

This thesis will rely on both primary and secondary sources for information. Unless otherwise noted, all translations from the original Japanese are by the author. The basic analytical approach will be the case study method. It will be an examination of three facets of the Japanese security debate. The three facets that will be researched are public opinion data, surveys of politicians, and the opinions of political parties.

For public opinion data, it will examine public opinion polls published by major newspapers within Japan and the government of Japan. For survey data of politicians, this thesis will examine the results of surveys by major newspapers in Japan as well as data from collaboration between the *Asahi Shimbun* (newspaper) and the University of Tokyo. Finally, the opinions of Japan’s two biggest political parties, the LDP and the DPJ, shall be examined by studying policy documents that they have published.

³⁶ Toshio Nagahisa, “Reasons that Activated Japan in Security Commitments: Shocks, Sentiments, Institutions and Prime Minister,” PHP Research Institute, Inc. March 10, 2007, p. 14, website of Yale University, available at: <http://research.yale.edu/eastasianstudies/japanworld/nagahisa.pdf> (accessed March 22, 2009).

³⁷Ibid.

³⁸Ibid., p. 22.

³⁹Jennifer Lind, “Pacifism or Passing the Buck? Testing Theories of Japanese Security Policy,” *International Security* 29, No. 1 (Summer 2004): p. 93.

G. THESIS OVERVIEW

This thesis will examine the opinions of the public, opinions of Japanese politicians, and Japanese political parties on four key issues: Constitutional revision, Article 9 revision, the exercise of the right of CSD, and opinions about the BMD program. The opinions on each of these four issues will suggest whether or not Japan is going to remove its restrictions on the use of military force. Additionally, a justification for the relevance and importance of opinion polls and political party documents will be explained in the appropriate chapters.

To determine the opinions of the Japanese populace, public opinion polls from major Japanese newspapers and the Japanese government shall be studied. By examining public opinion on the four key issues mentioned above, this data will offer insights into the minds of the Japanese citizenry and will help determine if a political mandate exists for Japan to remove its restrictions. If a large portion of the public supports a removal of these restrictions, it is likely that politicians would be willing to move forward with change. Conversely, if the public does not support removing the restrictions, it is not likely a change to these restrictions is forthcoming.

Next, the opinions of Japanese politicians will be analyzed by examining the results of survey data. Japanese news organizations and universities periodically conduct surveys to determine where politicians stand on various issues. While politicians' opinions do not directly drive policy, they are still valuable because they reveal general thoughts and attitudes about issues and thus suggest how future policies may be shaped. The survey results will be examined to understand how Japanese politicians think about the four key issues. These results will then be compared with the public opinion data. If both politicians and the public are in favor of removing Japan's restrictions, then there is a good possibility that it will occur. On the other hand, if both politicians and the public do not support it, it is highly unlikely that it will occur.

Then, this thesis will investigate the opinions of Japan's two major political parties, the LDP and the DPJ, as expressed by their published documents. This information is different from the opinions expressed by politicians in a survey. It

represents the consensus views of the parties and thus is a good reflection of how the various politicians had to compromise with others to reach a mutually agreeable policy. This thesis will not examine the views of other political parties in Japan due to their relatively small size compared to the LDP and DPJ. Because of this, they are arguably less influential in determining the future course of Japan's security policy.

Then, this thesis will test some of the arguments made for Japan removing its restrictions. Based on the literature review, these arguments are represented by the following two statements: 1) Japan will remove its restrictions because of its worsening security environment; 2) Japan's involvement in BMD will force Japan to allow the exercise of CSD. Finally, this thesis will make a determination regarding the validity of the hypothesis based on the evidence and offer some thoughts on implications for U.S. policy.

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II. PUBLIC OPINION

The purpose of this chapter is to examine Japanese public opinion polls to determine how the public feels about removing the restrictions on the use of military force. In any democracy, public opinion is an important bellwether for political action. Policies with strong public support tend to be pursued, while those with low support normally do not. Despite this, there are some who argue about the relevancy and influence of public opinion polls on actual policy making. Nagahisa expressed this idea in Chapter I with the following statement, “In short, while politicians may take advantage of public opinion when it supports them, their decisions are not controlled by public opinion.”⁴⁰

This is an interesting point and should be addressed. First, this thesis does not argue that public opinion data is always an influential factor for politicians as they decide on policy. There are certainly times when public opinion polls and government policies diverge. However, there is nothing about Japan that would suggest public opinion polls do not have some influence on politicians. It is likely that a political price would have to be paid by a politician pursuing unpopular policies. Therefore, politicians would be aware of public opinions on many issues and take them into consideration.

In Japan, however, public opinion takes on additional significance when dealing with constitutional issues. This is due to the strict requirements for the passage of constitutional amendments stipulated by the Japanese Constitution. The text of that passage reads:

CHAPTER IX AMENDMENTS

Article 96.

Amendments to this Constitution shall be initiated by the Diet, through a concurring vote of two-thirds or more of all the members of each House and *shall thereupon be submitted to the people for ratification, which shall*

⁴⁰Nagahisa, “Reasons that Activated Japan in Security Commitments: Shocks, Sentiments, Institutions and Prime Minister,” p. 14.

require the affirmative vote of a majority of all votes cast thereon, at a special referendum or at such election as the Diet shall specify.

Amendments when so ratified shall immediately be promulgated by the Emperor in the name of the people, as an integral part of this Constitution. [Italics added for emphasis] ⁴¹

The Japanese Constitution requires not only that a two-thirds majority from each house, but also that a majority of the population must vote for the amendment in a national referendum. The inclusion of the need for a national referendum makes public opinion data so influential in this debate because strong polling data on either side of the argument could be the deciding factor on which direction Japan's future security policy will take. However, it should be taken into consideration that some of these opinions may change within the focused environment of a national referendum debate on Constitutional revision. With that in mind, it is still reasonable to assume that the polling data presented in this chapter is an accurate representation of Japanese public opinion.

Additionally, it must be acknowledged that the above argument is only valid for Constitutional revision. It is possible for the prohibition on the exercise of the right of CSD to be lifted without a Constitutional revision. Thus, public opinion does not have a direct impact on the issue of CSD. However, it is possible that very strong public opinion may have an influence on politicians as they decide matters of policy. Therefore, public opinion data on the issue of CSD is presented.

This chapter will now explore the available public opinion data to see how Japanese citizens think and feel about Japan's restrictions on the use of military force. The data will be presented topically and will focus on the four key issues that are relevant to this thesis: Constitutional revision, Article 9 revision, CSD, and BMD.

⁴¹ Constitution of Japan, Article 9, website of the Prime Minister of Japan and his Cabinet, available at: http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html (accessed March 22, 2009). The website has provided the English translation.

A. CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION

For many years, the Constitution has been a regular topic of research by Japanese public opinion polls. There are a variety of organizations that conduct polls probing people's thoughts on almost every aspect of the document. Of all the available polls, the *Yomiuri Shimbun*, a major newspaper, has shown to be the most consistent regarding the Constitution. This author has found periodic polls regarding the Constitution conducted by the *Yomiuri* going back to 1981 with annual polls beginning in 1993. Many of the questions are identical (with a few exceptions) and thus grant an opportunity to see how attitudes have changed over the years.




Figure 1. *Yomiuri Shimbun* Public Opinion Poll: Do you think it is right to revise the current Constitution or do you think it is right to not revise it?⁴²

The data presented in Figure 1 begins in 1981 and ends in 2008. 1981 was the first year poll data was found for the *Yomiuri* on this topic. By presenting the data all the way back to 1981, it is possible to get a better understanding of how Japanese have

⁴²Compiled from the following sources: 1981, 86, 91, 93-96, 98 data from Elizabeth H. Hastings and Philip K. Hastings, eds. *Index for International Public Opinion* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, various years); 1997 data from the website of the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, Japanese Data Archive, available at: <http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/jpoll/JPOLL.html> (accessed March 22, 2009); 1999-2000 data from website of the Japan Foundation Library (), available at: <http://nippon.zaidan.info/seikabutsu/2002/01252/contents/340.htm> and <http://nippon.zaidan.info/seikabutsu/2002/01252/contents/348.htm> respectively (accessed March 22, 2009); 2001-2006 data from the Private Sector Constitution Commission () website, available at: <http://www.k3.dion.ne.jp/~keporin/siryou.htm#sankou> (accessed March 22, 2009); 2007 data from the website of the Mansfield Foundation, available at: <http://www.mansfieldfdn.org/polls/2007/poll-07-7.htm> (accessed March 22, 2009); 2008 data from the website of the *Yomiuri Shimbun*, available at: <http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/feature/fe6100/koumoku/20080408.htm> (accessed March 22, 2009); The author did not have access to get the original Japanese text of the 1981, '86, '91, '93, '94, '95, '96, '97, '98, '07 polls, so it is impossible to see if the wording of the questions and answers were consistent with the other years. Additionally, the questions and answers that are available in Japanese are not worded identically throughout the years. In light of this, the author has taken some liberty to present the data in such a continuous fashion. Despite minor changes in wording, the author feels that data in Figure 1 presents an accurate picture of Japanese public opinion regarding Constitutional revision for the given time period. Also, the polls were not taken on an annual basis until 1993. Prior to that, there are only three years that had polls: 1981, 1986 and 1991. To deal with the gaps in data, the graph connects the surrounding points with a straight line. This also occurs for the "Other/No Answer" data in 2000 because this data was not found. Finally, some of the data was reported to one decimal place; however other data was rounded to a whole number. Consequently, all of the data has been rounded to whole numbers.

viewed Constitutional revision over the years. Additionally, it gives more weight to recent trends because they can be viewed in a greater context.

The evidence presented in Figure 1 is very clear. It is obvious that since 1993, those who favor revision have outnumbered those who oppose it by differing margins, with 2004 representing the extremes of both sides. However, an interesting trend is visible beginning in 2004 that is of particular relevance to this thesis.

Since 2004, public support for Constitutional revision has fallen by a staggering 22.5% while opposition has increased 20.4%. In fact, 2008 marks the first year since 1993 that those who oppose revision (43.1%) outnumber those who favor it (42.5%).⁴³ The *Yomiuri* claims that the reason for the decline in revision support has to do with domestic political issues such as the resignation of Prime Minister Abe (who was a strong proponent of Constitutional revision) and the frustration caused by the divided Diet.⁴⁴

While this author does not refute the *Yomiuri's* claim, he speculates that the difficulties encountered during the war in Iraq might also have played a role in the decline of support. It is likely that daily news reports of the problems in Iraq made an impression on the Japanese public and may have contributed to their unwillingness to support revision for fear that Japan might get pulled into an international conflict by the United States.

It is impossible to predict if the trend in Figure 1 will continue into the future. Japan is now on its second prime minister since Abe's resignation, but the divided Diet continues. Also, the war in Iraq has improved, but things appear to be going poorly in Afghanistan. What effect will these have on future response rates? It is impossible to know.

It can be said, however, that the data from Figure 1 suggests that Constitutional revision is not a popular topic to pursue politically right now. The numbers of those who

⁴³*Yomiuri Shimbun*, "Those who oppose Constitutional revision 43%, surpass those who support it...*Yomiuri Shimbun* Public Opinion Poll," April 8, 2008, website of the *Yomiuri Shimbun*, available at: <http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/feature/20080116-907457/news/20080408-OYT1T00041.htm> (accessed March 22, 2009).

⁴⁴*Ibid.*

support revision have begun to dwindle, while opposition has been on the rise. Unfortunately, Figure 1 does not give us the entire picture regarding the public's opinion on revision because it does not reveal the reasons for their responses. Other poll questions provide this data.




Figure 2. *Yomiuri Shimbun* Public Opinion Poll: [Of those who answered “It is better to revise it” in Figure 1] What is the reason for why you think it is better to revise it? Please select as many you would like from the list:⁴⁵

The data presented in Figure 2 begins in 1999. This date was chosen because it becomes difficult to create a coherent timeline much before 1998 as the *Yomiuri* provided

⁴⁵ Compiled from the following sources: 1999 and 2000 data from the website of the Japan Foundation Library (), available at: <http://nippon.zaidan.info/seikabutsu/2002/01252/contents/340.htm> and <http://nippon.zaidan.info/seikabutsu/2002/01252/contents/348.htm> respectively (accessed March 22, 2009); 2001 through 2006 data from the website of the Private Sector Constitution Commission (), available at: <http://www.k3.dion.ne.jp/~keporin/siryuu.htm#sankou> (accessed March 22, 2009); 2007 data from the website of the Mansfield Foundation, available at: <http://www.mansfieldfdn.org/polls/2007/poll-07-7.htm> (accessed March 22, 2009); 2008 data from the website of the *Yomiuri Shimbun*, available at: <http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/feature/fe6100/koumoku/20080408.htm> (accessed March 22, 2009); The question has been slightly reworded from the original to ensure it makes sense within the context of this thesis. Translations for the answers are from the Mansfield Foundation. Unfortunately, the author did not have access to the original Japanese version of the 2007 data, so it is not possible to verify that the questions and answers were identical to the other years. Also, the question presented in 2008 had a minor change in the wording from the previous years. Despite this, the author feels that the data in Figure 4 presents an accurate picture of Japanese public opinion regarding the reasons for desiring Constitutional revision for the given time period. Additionally, the author made two minor grammatical corrections to the Mansfield translations. Additionally, there were two more possible responses labeled “Other” and “Do Not Know / No Answer”. They have been omitted to prevent the information presented in the graph from becoming too cluttered.

different possible answers for its respondents. It is also an appropriate starting point because it focuses the debate on current times and was the first poll taken since North Korea's August 1998 ballistic missile launch over Japan.

Figure 2 spells out very clearly the many reasons that the Japanese public has for wanting to revise its Constitution. The primary reason for those who support revision is because they believe that the current document is unable to deal with new problems that have surfaced in the contemporary world. This author assumes that this reason partially deals with Japan's difficulty in participating in U.N.-sanctioned international security actions.

While the inability to deal with new problems is consistently cited as the number one reason by a wide margin, the other responses seem to be all grouped together. Based on the most recent poll, the second reason reflects Japanese dissatisfaction with how the original document was influenced by the U.S. occupation. The third reason shows their unhappiness with the confusion caused by the interpretation and application of their Constitution. It can be inferred from this that the public desires a document that clearly spells out what Japan can and cannot do.

While the reasons given in Figure 2 reveals why Japanese want Constitutional revision, the reasons not given are also significant to note. It is worth mentioning that of all the reasons cited, the desire to become a nation that can freely use its military is not included. This shows that the desire to remove Japan's restrictions of the use of military force is not even being considered in the general debate on whether or not to revise the Constitution.

Instead, the public's desire for revision seems to be rooted in other issues of less importance to security affairs. The only reason that deals specifically with security would be one that mentions the SDF. However, this reason merely gives voice to those who want to resolve the contradiction of Article 9 and the existence of the SDF itself.

Thus, this reason does not support a renewed interest in remilitarization at all. Instead, it reflects a desire for a further institutionalization of Japan's defense-oriented security policies.




Figure 3. *Yomiuri Shimbun* Public Opinion Poll: [Of those who answered “It is better not to revise it” in Figure 1] What is the reason for why you think it is better not to revise it? Please select as many you would like from the list:⁴⁶

Figure 3 summarizes the various motivations for those who oppose Constitutional revision. There are several interesting points that can be shown with the data. First, the

⁴⁶ Compiled from the following sources: 1999 and 2000 data from the website of the Japan Foundation Library (), available at: <http://nippon.zaidan.info/seikabutsu/2002/01252/contents/340.htm> and <http://nippon.zaidan.info/seikabutsu/2002/01252/contents/348.htm> respectively (accessed March 22, 2009); 2001-2006 data from the website of the Private Sector Constitution Commission (), available at: <http://www.k3.dion.ne.jp/~keporin/siryuu.htm#sankou> (accessed March 22, 2009); 2007 data from the website of the Mansfield Foundation, available at: <http://www.mansfieldfdn.org/polls/2007/poll-07-7.htm> (accessed March 22, 2009); 2008 data from the website of the *Yomiuri Shimbun*, available at: <http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/feature/fe6100/koumoku/20080408.htm> (accessed March 22, 2009); The question has been slightly reworded from the original to ensure it makes sense within the context of this thesis. Translations for the answers are from the Mansfield Foundation. Unfortunately, the author did not have access to the original Japanese version of the 2007 data, so it is not possible to verify that the questions and answers were identical to the other years. Also, the question presented in 2008 had a minor change in the wording from the previous years. Despite this, the author feels that the data in Figure 4 presents an accurate picture of Japanese public opinion regarding the reasons for not desiring Constitutional revision for the given time period. Additionally, there were two more possible responses labeled “Other” and “Do Not Know / No Answer.” They have been omitted to prevent the information presented in the graph from becoming too cluttered.

current primary reason reflects the pride that some Japanese feel in the unique, peaceful nature of their Constitution. This reason has trended upwards significantly since 2001 and has been the number one reason since 2004. Apparently, there are a growing number of Japanese who do not want to revise the Constitution because of the example it provides to the rest of the world of what a Constitution can stand for.

The most significant reason for the purposes of this thesis, however, is the third reason. This reason is a clear example of the strand of thought that firmly opposes Constitutional revision due to the fear that it will lead to remilitarization. This fear peaked in 2004 (perhaps in response to Japan's January 2004 involvement in the reconstruction of Iraq) but has since decreased. However, at 32.4%, it is still a significant concern for those who oppose revision.

There are two conclusions that can be drawn from the *Yomiuri Shimbun* data presented in Figures 1-3. First, the Japanese population does not support Constitutional revision now. However, the most recent poll numbers show that this is a recent occurrence and the margin is slim enough to not be decisive.

Second, of the reasons given by those who desire revision, none directly reflect the desire for Japan to remove its restrictions on the use of military force. It is possible that those who responded "New Issues have arisen in which the current Constitution cannot handle" may be referring to a desire for Japan to be able to use military force. By contrast, of those who oppose revision, there is a significant number who openly fear a return to remilitarization. This suggests that even if Constitutional revision did occur, the chances that it would result in a removal of Japan's restrictions on the use of military force are slim.

B. ARTICLE 9 REVISION

When examining public opinion polls on Constitutional issues, it is easy for people to directly link the issue of Constitutional revision with Japan's attitude towards Article 9. However, the previous section demonstrated its complexity and revealed the many different issues involved. Therefore, it is not sufficient to simply examine what percentage of the Japanese public desires to revise the Constitution. It is also necessary

to examine public opinion regarding Article 9 itself to see if they believe it should be revised and what that revision would look like. The purpose of this section will be to examine and discuss the polling data specific to Article 9 to determine what this suggests for future Japanese security policy.




Figure 4. *Yomiuri Shimbun* Public Opinion Poll: To the present day Japan has acted in accordance with interpretation and use of the disputed Article 9 of the Constitution, by which war was abandoned and military power was discarded. Henceforth, what do you feel should be done about Article 9? Please select from the following list one option:⁴⁷

This data can be reconstructed beginning in 2002. Figure 4 reveals that for most of the past six years, most Japanese respondents have felt the need to revise Article 9. However, trends since 2004 show a gradual changing of opinion on this topic. The year 2007

⁴⁷ Compiled from the following sources: 2002-2006 data from the website of the Private Sector Constitution Commission (), available at: <http://www.k3.dion.ne.jp/~keporin/siryoku.htm#sankou> (accessed March 22, 2009); 2007 data from the website of the Mansfield Foundation, available at: <http://www.mansfieldfdn.org/polls/2007/poll-07-7.htm> (accessed March 22, 2009); 2008 data from the website of the *Yomiuri Shimbun*, available at: <http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/feature/fe6100/koumoku/20080408.htm> (accessed March 22, 2009); Translations for this question and its corresponding answers are from the Mansfield Foundation. Unfortunately, the author did not have access to the original Japanese version of the 2007 data, so it is not possible to verify that the questions and answers were identical to the other years. Also, the question presented in 2008 had a minor change in the wording from the previous years. Despite this, the author feels that the data in Figure 4 presents an accurate picture of Japanese public opinion regarding Article 9 for the given time period. Additionally, the “Other” data for 2007 is listed by Mansfield as 20% which the author believes is a typo. This is because Mansfield also lists the “Other” data for 2008 as 30%, which the *Yomiuri* lists as 0.3%. The author believes that the “Other” data for 2007 should be 0.2% which is more consistent.

marks when those who prefer the status quo outnumbered those who favored revision. This trend has continued through to the most recent polls. It is interesting that these two trends closely match the trends shown in Figure 1. Thus, support for both Constitutional revision and Article 9 revision, has dropped significantly since 2004.

Additionally, it is also worth noting that the numbers of those who prefer a strict interpretation of Article 9 have slowly been increasing. In fact, if one adds up those who favor strict interpretation with the percentage of those who prefer the status quo, a total of 60.1% of the Japanese public does not want to revise Article 9. This is an almost 2 to 1 advantage over those who do want to revise Article 9. The implication of this is that any substantive change to Article 9 does not appear to be imminent.

As explained in Chapter I, Article 9 is composed of two paragraphs that each address different issues. Paragraph one states Japan’s renunciation of war and Paragraph two states Japan’s refusal to maintain land, sea, and air forces and other war potential as well as their refusal to recognize the right of the belligerency of the state. Recent polls have examined Japanese attitudes about each of these paragraphs.




Figure 5. 2008 *Yomiuri Shimbun* Public Opinion Poll: Regarding paragraph one which established the “renunciation of war”, do you think there is a need to revise it or not?⁴⁸

⁴⁸*Yomiuri Shimbun*, “Yearly Survey: Japanese Person (4) Constitution,” March 15-16, 2008, Question 21, S1, website of the *Yomiuri Shimbun*, available at: <http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/feature/fe6100/koumoku/20080408.htm> (accessed March 22, 2009).

Figure 5 is very clear. In 2008, a vast majority of Japanese did not support any changes to Japan's renunciation of war. This is strong evidence that there is no public support for Japan to remilitarize in a way that allows the use of force in security policy.




Figure 6. 2008 *Yomiuri Shimbun* Public Opinion Poll: What about paragraph two which established “Not being able to maintain war potential” among other things?⁴⁹

As Figure 6 shows, the opinions regarding paragraph two are not as definitive as for paragraph one. The poll data does not delve into the reasons for the responses, but this author feels that the results presented in Figure 2 suggests that those who do want to revise paragraph two may be interested in legitimizing the SDF. For more information on this, it is possible to look at other polls conducted by different organizations.

⁴⁹ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, “Yearly Survey: Japanese Person (4) Constitution,” March 15-16, 2008, Question 21, S2, website of the *Yomiuri Shimbun*, available at: <http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/feature/fe6100/koumoku/20080408.htm> (accessed March 22, 2009).




Figure 7. *Asahi Shimbun* Public Opinion Poll: Do you think that Article 9 of the Constitution should be changed, or do you think that it should not be changed?⁵⁰

Figure 7 presents Japanese public opinion regarding Article 9 in a more stark light. Instead of asking respondents about how Article 9 should be addressed, it simply asks whether or not the article needs to be revised. It is interesting to note that the results of the *Asahi* poll are similar to the results of the *Yomiuri* poll presented in Figure 4. In both polls, the numbers of people who do not want Article 9 to be revised have increased in recent years.

The *Asahi* poll also queried its respondents as to why they answered the way they did. These questions have not been consistently asked in all of the polls, but an

⁵⁰Compiled from the following sources: 2001, 2004, and 2005 data from the website of the Private Sector Constitution Commission (), available at: : <http://www.k3.dion.ne.jp/~keporin/siryuu.htm#sankou> (accessed March 22, 2009); 2007 data from the website of the Mansfield Foundation, available at: <http://www.mansfieldfdn.org/polls/2007/poll-07-12.htm> (accessed March 22, 2009); 2008 data from the website of the Asahi, available at: <http://www.asahi.com/special/08003/TKY200805020272.html> (accessed March 22, 2009). The translation for this question and its corresponding answers are from the Mansfield Foundation. The author has made one minor grammatical correction to the Mansfield translations. Also, a different question regarding this issue was asked in 2006 so it is not possible to plot a point for that year. Also, there is no data for 2002 and 2003. The information presented in this graph simply draws a line between surrounding points when do data is available. Also, this author has omitted the data for those who responded “No Answer/Other” because consistent data was not available for the entire span of time. It also appears that the wording of the question was changed slightly over the years. The author has taken some liberty to present the data in this consistent matter. It is believed that Figure 7 is an accurate representation of Japanese public opinion on this matter.

examination of the results from a single year is still valuable because it offers insight into how the Japanese public views this particular issue.




Figure 8. 2004 *Asahi Shimbun* Public Opinion Poll: [Of those who said “Should be changed” in Figure 7] How should it be revised? (Please select one answer)⁵¹

The data from Figure 8 is from the 2004 *Asahi Shimbun* poll. It is the most recent poll data from *Asahi* that directly addresses this question. The author acknowledges that it is five-year-old data, but stresses that the results are still relatively timely and offer a glimpse into how the public thinks.

The data reveals that a staggering 93.4% (adding the percentages from the top three responses) of respondents cite reasons that have nothing to do with a desire for Japan to be able to use unrestricted military force. The primary reason given relates to the desire to spell out the ability of the SDF to make an international contribution. This author assumes that the international contribution would be non-combat related.

⁵¹*Asahi Shimbun*, May 1, 2004, Question 10, website of the Private Sector Constitution Commission (), available at: <http://www.k3.dion.ne.jp/~keporin/siryoku.htm> (accessed March 22, 2009). The question has been slightly reworded from the original to ensure it makes sense within the context of this thesis. Also, the percentages presented in this paper have been adjusted to a 100% scale. The original percentages added up to 31% which corresponds to the percentage of those who supported Article 9 revision in 2004. Also, Figure 8 has omitted the “Don’t Know / No Answer” response which the website claims 0% answered.

Regarding reason #3, the author assumes that the idea of defining the SDF as an army does not mean removing the restrictions that currently exist on the SDF. This is assumed because the poll goes on to show that a small minority (6.4%) of respondents cited their desire to have a military force that can be used overseas. The *Asahi* poll also queried the reasons for those who do not desire revision of Article 9.




Figure 9. 2004 *Asahi Shimbun* Public Opinion Poll: [Of those who said “Should not be changed” in Figure 7] Why? (Please select one answer)⁵²

The data presented in Figure 9 shows that a large majority of respondents believe Article 9 should be kept as it is because it affects the peace of Japan and is a document to take pride in for its ideals.

Public opinion regarding Article 9 is clear. None of the data presented in this section suggests that the Japanese public supports a revision to Article 9 that result in the removal of its restrictions on the use of military force. Instead, the data suggests that there is strong support among the Japanese public for a continuation of pacifist policies.

⁵² *Asahi Shimbun*, May 1, 2004, Question 11, website of the Private Sector Constitution Commission (), available at: <http://www.k3.dion.ne.jp/~keporin/siryuu.htm> (accessed March 22, 2009). The question has been slightly reworded from the original to ensure it makes sense within the context of this thesis. The percentages presented in this paper have been adjusted to a 100% scale. The original percentages added up to 60% which corresponds to the percentage of those who opposed Article 9 revision in 2004.

C. COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE

Another important issue to understand regarding Japan’s future security policy has to do with CSD. This section will examine public opinion polls to determine how the Japanese public feels about the issue of CSD. As mentioned in Chapter I, public opinion does not play a direct role in whether or not the Government of Japan will decide to change its interpretation regarding the exercise of the right to CSD. However, strong public opinion on this matter may have an influence on politicians.




Figure 10. *Yomiuri Shimbun* Public Opinion Poll: The “right to collective defense” is the privilege to counterattack an enemy that attacks a country neighboring Japan, when that attack could threaten the safety of Japan. In the opinion of the government, Japan possesses that privilege as well, but upon interpreting the Constitution, it was made so that they cannot use it. From the following list, please choose the option most resembling your opinion concerning the right to collective defense:⁵³

⁵³ Compiled from the following sources: 2002-2006 data from the website of the Private Sector Constitution Commission (), available at: <http://www.k3.dion.ne.jp/~keporin/siryuu.htm#sankou> (March 22, 2009); 2007 data from the website of the Mansfield Foundation, available at: <http://www.mansfieldfdn.org/polls/2007/poll-07-7.htm> (accessed March 22, 2009); 2008 data from website of the *Yomiuri Shimbun*, available at: <http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/feature/fe6100/koumoku/20080408.htm> (accessed March 22, 2009); The translation for this question and its corresponding answers are from the Mansfield Foundation. Unfortunately, the author did not have access to the original Japanese version of the 2007 data, so it is not possible to verify that the questions and answers were identical to the other years. Also, the question presented in 2008 had a minor change in the wording from the previous years. Despite this, the author feels that the data in Figure 4 presents an accurate picture of Japanese public opinion regarding CSD for the given time period. Additionally, the data prior to 2006 did not differentiate between exercise of CSD via revision or interpretation. This differentiation begins in 2006 and continues through 2008. To get a consistent graph, this author has combined the responses for the years after 2006 into a single variable called “Use either revision or interpretation to allow CSD”. Thus, for 2006-2008, the percentages of those who favored CSD via revision were added to those who favored CSD via Constitutional interpretation. Additionally, the response that this author translated as “Can’t say either way” was discontinued after 2005. Perhaps this explains the large jump in the percentage of those who favored CSD in 2006.

The results of the poll given in Figure 10 clearly show the trends of Japanese thinking regarding the issue of CSD. Recent trends show that those who oppose CSD have been steadily increasing since 2005 and those who support CSD have been decreasing. This evidence suggests that a public mandate does not exist for Japan to change its interpretation regarding CSD. The same trends are also evident in a similar *Asahi Shimbun* poll done between 2004 and 2006.




Figure 11. *Asahi Shimbun* Public Opinion Poll: Concerning the U.S.-Japan alliance, the right of CSD has become a problem. This refers to the right to view an attack on another country as an attack on one’s own country and to then join that country and fight alongside it. The government interprets that Japan has this right, but because of Article 9 of the Constitution cannot use it. How do you think regarding the right of CSD? (Please choose one from the answer card)⁵⁴

⁵⁴ Compiled from the website of the Private Sector Constitution Commission (), available at: <http://www.k3.dion.ne.jp/~keporin/siryoku.htm#sankou> (accessed March 22, 2009). For those who favored the use of CSD, the 2006 poll question did not allow respondents to differentiate between use of CSD via revision or interpretation. This is a change from the 2004 and 2005 question which did allow this differentiation. For the sake of continuity, this author has combined these responses into a single variable called “Make it so that we can exercise the right.” Thus, for each of the years 2004 and 2005, the variable “Make it so that we can exercise the right” represents the addition of those who favored CSD through interpretation and those who favored it through revision. Additionally, the question was not worded consistently throughout the years. The author has taken some liberty to present the data in this consistent manner, but believes that the information presented is an accurate representation of Japanese public opinion on this matter.

The results of the *Asahi* poll are somewhat similar to the *Yomiuri* data discussed in Figure 10. In both polls, the recent trends have shown support for CSD declining, while the numbers of those who do not believe that Japan should engage in CSD have been on the increase. Thus, the evidence from both the *Yomiuri* and *Asahi* polls suggest that a political mandate does not exist for a change in the Japanese government's CSD policy. However, it is questionable whether or not these results would be strong enough to influence the decisions of Japanese politicians.

D. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

Unfortunately, there is very little polling data that deals specifically with the issue of BMD. However, it is still possible to gain an understanding of public opinion on this issue. In addition to the one question that directly addresses BMD, it is also possible to examine the responses to SDF poll questions to infer how the public feels about the BMD program.

The Cabinet Secretariat Government Information Office (CSGIO) in Japan conducted a public opinion poll regarding the SDF and various defense related problems every three years. It is a useful source of information to determine public attitudes regarding aspects of the SDF as well as broader questions of what Japan's role should be internationally. The following polls will provide some understanding regarding how the Japanese view the SDF but, more importantly, they will offer some insight into how the Japanese view the BMD system.




Figure 12. CSGIO Public Opinion Poll: What do you think about the defense capability of the SDF?⁵⁵

The results presented in Figure 12 covers 1994 to 2006, which is a different time line than presented in the Constitutional issues section. If the 1998 North Korean missile launch was used as the starting point for this poll, there would be only three data points for analysis. Thus, the author has chosen to begin in 1994 because it provides a longer trend line for analysis.

Examining Figure 12, it is significant to note that Japanese attitudes towards the SDF have hardly changed. Those who favor the status quo hold a strong majority by a very wide margin. The trend line for the status quo has only waivered by about five percentage points over the years. These results suggest that the public does not want any significant changes to the SDF.

⁵⁵ Cabinet Office of Japan, “Public Opinion Poll Related to the SDF and the Defense Problem,” February 2006, Section 3, Question #1, website of the Cabinet Office of Japan, available at: <http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/h17/h17-bouei/index.html> (accessed March 22, 2009). The original question on the poll was simply worded, “The defense capability of the SDF.” For the sake of better understanding, this author has rewritten out what he believes is the implied question.




Figure 13. 2006 CSGIO Public Opinion Poll: Why does the SDF exist? (Multiple answers allowed).⁵⁶

Figure 13 presents the many opinions regarding what the Japanese view as the purpose of the SDF. Examining the data, there are several conclusions that can be drawn. First, the Japanese currently believe that the SDF primarily exists for disaster relief-type operations. This is a very different conception that other countries may have about their “military” forces.

Second, the idea that the SDF exists to protect Japan from ballistic missile attacks is quite low on the list. This is especially puzzling considering the very real threat North

⁵⁶Cabinet Office of Japan, “Public Opinion Poll Related to the SDF and the Defense Problem,” February 2006, Section 4, Question #1, Sub question , website of the Cabinet Office of Japan, available at: <http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/h17/h17-bouei/index.html> (accessed March 22, 2009). The original question on the poll was simply worded, “The purpose for the existence of the SDF.” For the sake of better understanding, this author has rewritten it in the form of a question. There were also two more possible responses (“Other” and “I don’t know”) which have been omitted for the sake of a simpler graph.

Korea poses to the Japanese population. Yet, a vast majority of the public does not think that it is one of the top responsibilities of the SDF. The author believes that this data reveals the relatively low importance the public attaches to the issue of BMD. This is interesting given the support of the public for BMD as well as the amount of concern the public apparently has towards the Korean peninsula (this will be discussed in Figure 15). Before examining the Japanese public’s security concerns, their attitude about BMD will be presented.




Figure 14. 2006 CSGIO Public Opinion Poll: What do you think about the completion of a BMD system?⁵⁷

Of all the polls examined, this is the only question that deals directly with the public’s opinion of the Japanese BMD system. It shows that 56.6% of the public supports the idea of a BMD system, while 25.1% opposes it. This shows over a 2 to 1

⁵⁷ Cabinet Office of Japan, “Public Opinion Poll Related to the SDF and the Defense Problem,” February 2006, Section 4, Question 7, website of the Cabinet Office of Japan, available at: <http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/h17/h17-bouei/index.html> (accessed March 22, 2009). The original question can be translated as “For or Against the Completion of a BMD System.” For the sake of readability, this author has taken the liberty of wording it to ask the implied question.

margin of support. This data, along with the results from Figure 15 (discussed below), suggest that the Japanese public strongly supports the creation of a BMD program because of the threat from North Korea.




Figure 15. 2006 CSGIO Public Opinion Poll: What topics are you interested in from the point of view of Japan's peace and security? (Multiple answers allowed)⁵⁸

Figure 15 reveals the top six security concerns of the Japanese public in 2006. It is important to note that the #1 and #4 concerns can be seen to relate to the threat from North Korea. The relatively low ranking of the SDF's BMD mission (shown in Figure 13) is puzzling when compared with this data. It would seem logical that such a strong concern among the public would translate into a greater role for the SDF to deal with BMD. This suggests that the public does not view BMD as an important role for the SDF and that the public does not want the acceptance of a BMD program to result in a drastic change to Japan's security policies.

⁵⁸ Cabinet Office of Japan, "Public Opinion Poll Related to the SDF and the Defense Problem," February 2006, Section 6, Question 5, website of the Cabinet Office of Japan, available at: <http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/h17/h17-bouei/index.html> (accessed March 22, 2009). The original question provided 13 possible responses. For the purposes of legibility, Figure 15 only includes the top 6 responses.

E. CONCLUSION

The purpose of this chapter was to examine public opinion polls to determine if the public supports the removal of Japan's restrictions on the use of military force. The evidence presented strongly suggests that there is little support among the public for this change and that there is no public mandate for a fundamental change in Japan's security policy. There are also some important conclusions that can be drawn from the data that are relevant to this thesis.

First, the Japanese public does not support the idea of a Constitutional revision. Despite support in the past, recent trends show a loss of support while those who oppose revision have increased. Even if Constitutional revision were to occur, it is apparent that a majority of those who favor a revision are seeking changes that will have little or no effect on Japan's security policies.

Second, the public does not desire a revision of Article 9 that will result in a removal of Japan's restrictions. If a revision of Article 9 were to occur, it would not lead to a drastic change in Japan's security policy. Instead, it would likely legally recognize the SDF as well as institutionalize the ability of the SDF to participate in international activities that have nothing to do with Japan's ability to participate in combat operations.

Third, the issue of CSD is not resonating with the public. Despite mild support in the past, recent trends reveal that the public does not support a change in Japan's position regarding the exercise of this right. This suggests that there is little popular support for a change in Japan's interpretation of the right to exercise CSD. It is difficult to tell whether public opposition to CSD is strong enough to influence the opinions of politicians who are the ultimate deciders on this issue.

Finally, the public does not expect the new BMD program to represent a new direction for Japan's security policy. They acknowledge and understand the need for BMD, but still assign it as a low priority for the SDF. This is particularly interesting given the high attention that the situation on the Korean Peninsula receives among the public. This suggests that BMD is not viewed as a step towards a more aggressive national security policy.

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III. THE OPINIONS OF POLITICIANS

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the opinions of politicians within Japan to determine if they support a removal of Japan's restrictions on the military use of force. Similar to the frequent public opinion polls, Japanese news organizations and universities periodically conduct surveys of current politicians to understand their stands on various issues. Obviously, the issues of Constitutional revision, Article 9, and CSD are frequently covered.

This author was unable to find any survey data that directly dealt with the issue of BMD. However, it is possible to examine questions related to the SDF to infer how Japanese politicians think about BMD. Additionally, all of the surveys examined take place after the December 2003 decision by the government of Japan to introduce BMD, so lawmakers were aware of the issue and must have considered its implications as they responded to all the questions. The surveys examined are organized topically in the same sequence as the Chapter II.

Unfortunately, the surveys were not systematically applied on a consistent, annual basis. Instead, the various data available focuses on different target groups with slightly differently worded questions and at inconsistent intervals. This prevents the creation of a time-series graph that allows us to chart Diet member opinions as they change over time. However, valuable insight can still be gained by examining the evidence that does exist.

The Japanese Diet is composed of two houses, the Lower House, called the House of Representatives, and the Upper House called the House of Councillors. The surveys examined within this chapter target both houses of the Diet together, as well as each house individually. A few things must be kept in mind as the data is discussed and evaluated.

First, the Lower House surveys are significant because within the Japanese bicameral political system, the Lower House is the more powerful of the two houses. This is due to its ability to override Upper House decisions by a two-thirds majority after 60 days. The Lower House is currently controlled by the LDP along with its coalition

partner, Komeito (Clean Government Party), which is much smaller. The last Lower House election occurred in 2005 and was a strong victory for the LDP. Thus, the results of the 2005 Lower House survey are strongly influenced by LDP opinion. Unfortunately, this survey was taken four years ago and it is possible that opinions have since changed.

Second, the Upper House is currently controlled by the DPJ, which won a landslide victory in 2007. Thus, the 2007 Upper House surveys reveal the influence of DPJ lawmakers. Although the Upper House is the weaker of the two houses, the Upper House survey is significant because it reflects the latest data available on politician opinions.

Third, survey data from both houses are included to show the collective opinions of Japanese lawmakers on the issues of interest. This data is from 2004 and is a little dated. However, it offers the best insight into the opinion of the entire Diet and thus is valuable.

Finally, before the data is presented it is necessary to discuss counter-arguments regarding the importance of this data. Some may question why politician surveys are relevant to Japan's future security policy, while others may wonder how the veracity of the responses may be verified. These are good questions that deserve attention.

Much like its argument for public opinion polls, this thesis does not argue that the results of these politician surveys are a definitive driver of where Japan's security policy is headed. Policy is not created by individuals, but rather by groups of politicians working together in political parties that frequently involves mutual compromise. However, the survey data presented in this chapter is relevant because it reveals the general attitudes and opinions of individual Japanese politicians before they begin to work together to form government policies. Therefore, the opinions expressed in these surveys are the building blocks upon which those policies will be built and suggest how the policies will be formulated and what kinds of compromises may be made. This makes their results worth considering.

Secondly, regarding the veracity of the data, it must be acknowledged that no survey or poll can guarantee that the respondents have been honest. However, it appears

that the results of the surveys were presented anonymously so there is no reason why a politician would not want to answer honestly. The *Asahi Shimbun*/University of Tokyo data does link actual names to responses, but it is not readily accessible. Additionally, Japanese politicians are frequently asked to fill out surveys and there is nothing that compels them to respond.⁵⁹ This author actually found one survey in which a very small percentage of politicians actually answered. The significance of this is that Japanese politicians probably did not lie on these surveys. If they did not want to reveal their true opinions, it would be much more probable that they would simply decline to answer the question.

A. CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION




Figure 16. 2005 *Asahi Shimbun*/University of Tokyo Survey of the Lower House: Do you think the Constitution needs to be revised? Please select only one.⁶⁰

⁵⁹ Robert Weiner, personal communications, March 2009.

⁶⁰ *Asahi Shimbun*/University of Tokyo Collaborative Politician Survey, “2005 Lower House Election Candidate Survey”, August 8, 2005, Question 8, Sub question 1, data is offered at the website of the University of Tokyo Faculty of Law and the University of Tokyo Graduate Schools for Law and Politics, available at: <http://www.j.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~masaki/ats/atpsdata.html> (accessed March 22, 2009). Codebook for interpreting the data is available from *Japan Political Research* () 5, No. 1/2, (January 2008), p. 288. This graph was created by sorting the data to only include responses from winners of the 2005 election. Based on this, the survey covers 79.8% of the winners in 2005.

Figure 16 shows the results of a 2005 survey given to members of the Lower House who were asked to give their opinions regarding the issue of Constitutional revision. Those who favored revision made up 84.8% while those who opposes were only 8.6%. Comparing this data to public opinion data from the same period shows that Lower House Diet Members were much more in favor of Constitutional revision than the public. The *Yomiuri* public opinion poll data showed 60.6% in favor and 26.6% opposed (see Figure 1).

Figure 1 also showed a noticeable decline in the public’s support rate for Constitutional revision beginning in 2004. Without consistent survey data, it is impossible to determine if the opinion of politicians followed the same trend. The most recent survey, however, was done in 2007 and targeted Upper House Diet Members. It is possible to examine their response on this question to determine if there has been a decline in the support rate. The author acknowledges that the surveys gauged the responses of different target populations, but contends that the results are still worth considering.




Figure 17. 2007 *Asahi Shimbun*/University of Tokyo Survey of the Upper House: Do you think the Constitution needs to be revised? Please select one.⁶¹

⁶¹ *Asahi Shimbun*/University of Tokyo Collaborative Politician Survey, “2007 Upper House Members and Upper House Election Candidate Survey”, May – July, 2007, Question 3, Sub question 1, data is offered at the website of the University of Tokyo Faculty of Law and the University of Tokyo Graduate Schools for Law and Politics, available at: <http://www.j.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~masaki/ats/atpsdata.html> (accessed March 22, 2009). Codebook for interpreting the data is available from *Japan Political Research* () 5, No. 1/2, (January 2008), p. 279. This author sorted the data from the 2007 *Asahi Shimbun*/University of Tokyo surveys to only include responses from incumbent members of the Upper House and the winners of the 2007 election. Based on this, the survey covers 82.5% of the current members of the Upper House.

Figure 17 reveals that the data from a 2007 Upper House survey does show a marked decline in the support rate for Constitutional revision among respondents. Only 52.5% of respondents in the Upper House support revision, which is a 32.3% drop. Conversely, the ranks of those who oppose revision now stand at 27.5%, which is an increase of 18.9%.

Using these numbers as a guide, it is obvious that the data shows similar trends in survey data of politicians as well as public opinion data. Despite their declining numbers, it is also revealing to examine the reasons respondents gave for their support of Constitutional revision. The data here shows another similar correlation with public opinion data. Results from both houses will be presented, beginning with the Upper House.




Figure 18. 2007 *Asahi Shimbun*/University of Tokyo Survey of the Upper House: We will now ask a question to those who answered, “It should be revised” and “If I had to say, it should be revised” [see Figure 17]. Why do you answer this way? Please select only one.⁶²

⁶² *Asahi Shimbun*/University of Tokyo Collaborative Politician Survey, “2007 Upper House Members and Upper House Election Candidate Survey”, May – July, 2007, Question 3, Sub question 2, data is offered at the website of the University of Tokyo Faculty of Law and the University of Tokyo Graduate Schools for Law and Politics, available at: <http://www.j.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~masaki/ats/atpsdata.html> (accessed March 22, 2009). Codebook for interpreting the data is available from *Japan Political Research* () 5, No. 1/2, (January 2008), p. 278. This author sorted the data from the 2007 *Asahi Shimbun*/University of Tokyo surveys to only include responses from incumbent members of the Upper House and the winners of the 2007 election. Based on this, the survey covers 82.5% of the current members of the Upper House. Figure 17 had 105 individuals answer “It should be revised” and “If I had to say, it should be revised.” However, the data for Figure 18 only showed 95 answers. Thus, this author took the liberty of putting those ten individuals in the “No Answer” column.

It is significant to note that Figure 18 shows the top reason for desiring Constitutional revision has nothing directly to do with security issues, although it is possible that some who gave this reply were referring to a desire for Japan to be able to exercise the right of collective security or collective self-defense. Despite this possibility, this author assumes that security issues do not play a major role in reason #1. It is also interesting that the issue of Article 9 comes in fourth place at 7.6% while this reason was not mentioned in the public opinion poll (see Figure 2). The response on Article 9 is also worded in such a way that it is a little unclear exactly what is being said. The 2005 *Asahi Shimbun*/University of Tokyo survey did not ask this question of its respondents, but a 2005 survey of Lower House members done by the *Yomiuri Shimbun* did.




Figure 19. 2005 *Yomiuri Shimbun* Survey of Diet Members from the Lower House: What are some concrete contents for a revised Constitution?⁶³

⁶³ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, September 13, 2005, website of the Private Sector Constitution Commission (), available at: <http://www.k3.dion.ne.jp/~keporin/sinbun/yoron/kokkai1709.htm> (accessed March 22, 2009). Survey targeted winners of the 2005 Lower House Elections. The website does not mention how many responses were allowed, but it is obvious that respondents were allowed to choose more than one answer. The original question was quite short so it has not been translated verbatim. Instead, it was worded to better convey the question. The answers are similarly short, but they have been translated verbatim. Additionally, the website does not list the source as the *Yomiuri*, but lists it as “ ” which does not exist. However, elsewhere on the website the *Yomiuri* is clearly identified as the source despite being listed as “ .” Therefore, this author assumes this is a *Yomiuri* survey.

Figure 19 asks Lower House Diet members how they want to see the Constitution revised. Much like the Upper House data presented in Figure 18, it is obvious that the issue of Constitutional revision encompasses many issues. What is interesting to note is that the Lower House's two primary reasons have to do with spelling out Japan's right to maintain self-defense ability and participate in international cooperation.⁶⁴ The next three reasons all deal with issues that do not relate to security matters. This reveals that the Lower House is more concerned with security issues than the Upper House. Regardless of this difference, however, the data presented in Figures 18 and 19 reveal very few in the Diet desire Constitutional revision for the purpose of remilitarizing in some way.

Interestingly, public opinion data showed a slightly different result. Figure 2 revealed that the most recent 2008 data shows the number one reason the public desired revision had to do with the Constitution's inability to handle new problems. As discussed above, this answer could include desires for Japan to participate in international activities which would deal with security issues. This shows that Lower House opinion regarding revision is much more in line with public opinion. However, despite the slight discrepancy between public and politician opinion regarding the reasons for Constitutional revision, the data shows that a desire to revise Japan's Constitution in a way that would involve remilitarization is apparently not part of the agenda in either the public or the political spheres.

⁶⁴ This author makes the assumption that reason #2 is discussing non-combat-related activities done on the international stage.




Figure 20. 2007 *Asahi Shimbun*/University of Tokyo Survey of the Upper House: We will now ask a question of those who answered, “If I had to say, it shouldn’t be revised” and “It shouldn’t be revised” [see Figure 17]. Why did you answer this way? Please select only one.⁶⁵

Figure 20 reveals the reasons given by Upper House members regarding why they oppose Constitutional revision. The data shows a vast majority of respondents are worried about what Constitutional revision may mean in terms of Article 9. This percentage is higher than the most recent public opinion polls which showed 27.3% of

⁶⁵ *Asahi Shimbun*/University of Tokyo Collaborative Politician Survey, “2007 Upper House Members and Upper House Election Candidate Survey”, May – July, 2007, Question 3, Sub question 4, data is offered at the website of the University of Tokyo Faculty of Law and the University of Tokyo Graduate Schools for Law and Politics, available at: <http://www.j.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~masaki/ats/atpsdata.html> (accessed March 22, 2009). Codebook for interpreting the data is available from *Japan Political Research* () 5, No. 1/2, (January 2008), p. 277. This author sorted the data from the 2007 *Asahi Shimbun*/University of Tokyo surveys to only include responses from incumbent members of the Upper House and the winners of the 2007 election. Based on this, the survey covers 82.5% of the current members of the Upper House. The original question mentions that this question targets those who answered negatively to sub question 1. The author omitted that part of the question from the translation and directs readers to Figure 17 for the results of sub question 1.

respondents were concerned about the effects of Constitutional revision on Article 9 (see Figure 3 above). This suggests the Diet members are much more protective of Article 9 than the public.




Figure 21. 2005 *Yomiuri Shimbun* Survey of Diet Members from the Lower House: What do you think about Constitutional revision?⁶⁶

In 2005, the *Yomiuri* conducted a poll of Lower House Diet members that shows similar data to the *Asahi Shimbun*/University of Tokyo survey presented in Figure 16. Although this information has already been covered, this survey data is significant because it provides more detailed information regarding how each political party responded. There are two important points that can be concluded from this data.

⁶⁶ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, September 13, 2005, website of the Private Sector Constitution Commission (), available at: <http://www.k3.dion.ne.jp/~keporin/sinbun/yoron/kokkai1709.htm> (accessed March 22, 2009). Survey targeted winners of the 2005 Lower House Elections. The website does not print a specific question, but a question is strongly implied. This author has taken the liberty of composing what he believes the implied question is. Additionally, the website does not list the source as the *Yomiuri*, but lists it as “ ”. See the footnote associated with Figure 19 for an explanation on why this author lists it from the *Yomiuri*. Finally, the reader will notice that the graph does not present a percentage for some responses from various parties. The website simply shows a dash (-) for these answers. The context does not lead this author to believe those dashes represent 0%, but there is no explanation for what it means. Consequently, this author has simply left them out of Figure 21.

First, it is obvious that there is a strong divide between the two major parties (LDP and DPJ) on the one hand and the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) and Japan Communist Party (JCP) on the other. Both the JCP and JSP are relatively small political parties and have 100% (in the case of the JCP) and 86% (in the case of the JSP) of their Diet members voting against Constitutional revision. Unfortunately, this graph does not present the relative number of individuals represented by each party. A sense of how small the JSP and JCP are can be seen in the incredibly small percentage (6%) they make up in the overall data despite the large numbers within their party who oppose revision.

Second, there is strong support for revision within the LDP and its coalition partner, Komeito. Conversely, the DPJ shows less support as well as more members are undecided regarding the issue. This disparity between the LDP and DPJ is important in light of their probable win in the upcoming 2009 Lower House election. If this occurs, the party with the strongest support for revision, the LDP, will lose power.

The conclusion to be drawn from this section is that politicians support Constitutional revision, despite a recent decline in their numbers. However, the data also suggests that if Constitutional revision were to occur, it would likely not result in a fundamental change to Japan's security policy. Article 9 will now be examined.

B. ARTICLE 9 REVISION

The survey data presented so far has revealed the general thoughts of politicians regarding Constitutional revision. This next section will explicitly deal with the issue of Article 9 revision. This evidence will further support the conclusions that have been drawn thus far.




Figure 22. 2007 *Asahi Shimbun*/University of Tokyo Survey of the Upper House: Do you think Article 9 should be changed?⁶⁷

The data presented here is the most recent survey data regarding the issue of Article 9. It is obvious from the results that opposition to revision of Article 9 is strong within the Upper House of the Diet. Unfortunately, the most recent Lower House data regarding this issue comes from 2004.

⁶⁷ *Asahi Shimbun*/University of Tokyo Collaborative Politician Survey, “2007 Upper House Members and Upper House Election Candidate Survey”, May – July, 2007, Question 4, data is offered at the website of the University of Tokyo Faculty of Law and the University of Tokyo Graduate Schools for Law and Politics, available at: <http://www.j.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~masaki/ats/atpsdata.html> (accessed March 22, 2009). Codebook for interpreting the data is available from *Japan Political Research* () 5, No. 1/2, (January 2008), p. 277. This author sorted the data from the 2007 *Asahi Shimbun*/University of Tokyo surveys to only include responses from incumbent members of the Upper House and the winners of the 2007 election. Based on this, the survey covers 82.5% of the current members of the Upper House.




Figure 23. 2004 *Yomiuri Shimbun* Survey of Diet Members from the Lower House: In particular, how do you feel about Article 9?⁶⁸

The data presented in Figure 23 is from 2004 and reveals a strong majority within the Lower House want to revise Article 9. It is not possible to determine if this opinion has changed in the intervening years. Also, it is unfortunate that this survey does not delve further into the reasons for the Lower House members’ responses. In light of these two problems, it is difficult to include the results of Figure 23 into our understanding of politician opinions. However, other survey data may help to give further insight.

A *Mainichi Shimbun* survey conducted around the same time offers some more information regarding this issue. The survey focused on members of both houses and asked for specific opinions regarding each paragraph of Article 9.

⁶⁸ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, March 17, 2004, Question #2, website of the Private Sector Constitution Commission (), available at: <http://www.k3.dion.ne.jp/~keporin/siryoku.htm> (accessed March 22, 2009). Survey targeted members of the Lower House. There is a type on the website regarding the date of this data. The left hand column labels it as March 16, 2004, but when you examine the actual data it is dated March 17, 2004.




Figure 24. 2004 *Mainichi Shimbun* Survey of Diet Members from Both Houses: Is there a need to revise Paragraph one (war renunciation) of Article 9 in the Constitution?⁶⁹

The results of this question show an interesting three-way split among respondents. Clearly, there is no majority within the Diet that believes in removing the renunciation of war. The survey goes on to provide some more information regarding party affiliation. Of those who said “no,” 55% were from the LDP, 74% were from the DPJ, and 94% were from Komeito.⁷⁰

⁶⁹*Mainichi Shimbun*, May 3, 2004, Question #5, website of the Private Sector Constitution Commission (), available at: <http://www.k3.dion.ne.jp/~keporin/siryoku.htm> (accessed March 22, 2009). According to the website, the survey was given to all Diet members except winners of the April 25, 2004 Lower House by-elections and members missing from the Upper House.

⁷⁰ *Mainichi Shimbun*, May 3, 2004, Question #5, website of the Private Sector Constitution Commission (), available at: <http://www.k3.dion.ne.jp/~keporin/siryoku.htm> (accessed March 22, 2009). The website does not indicate how the individual parties answered for the other responses. This author believes that the Private Sector constitution Commission simply chose not to report that information.




Figure 25. 2004 *Mainichi Shimbun* Survey of Diet Members from Both Houses: Is there a need to revise Paragraph two (no maintenance of war potential) of Article 9 in the Constitution?⁷¹

A clear trend is visible when the question focuses on paragraph two. Clearly, a strong majority exists within the Diet that wants to clarify Japan’s right to maintain war potential. The author assumes that this refers to clarifying Japan’s right to maintain those forces for the purpose of self-defense.

The conclusion that can be drawn from the evidence presented in Figures 23 through 25 is that in 2004, a majority from both houses of the Diet desired revision of Article 9. This revision did not involve a removal of the restrictions on the use of military force because no clear majority desired a change to paragraph one of Article 9. Instead, the support for revision of Article 9 was based on the desire to change paragraph two so that it can make Japan’s right to maintenance of land, sea, and air forces and other war potential for the purposes of self-defense clear.

⁷¹ *Mainichi Shimbun*, May 3, 2004, Question #7, website of the Private Sector Constitution Commission (), available at: <http://www.k3.dion.ne.jp/~keporin/siryou.htm> (accessed March 22, 2009). According to the website, the survey was given to all Diet members except winners of the April 25, 2004 Lower House by-elections and members missing from the Upper House.

Interestingly, the most recent survey data presented in Figure 22 reveals that even this desire for revision has subsided in recent years (at least within the Upper House). This suggests that politicians do not currently support revision of Article 9.

C. COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE




Figure 26. 2005 *Asahi Shimbun*/University of Tokyo Survey of the Lower House: The government should change the Constitutional interpretation so we can exercise the right of CSD.⁷²

Figure 26 reveals that opinions on the issue of CSD are fairly close within the Lower House. While 33.1% supports changing the Constitutional interpretation, 38.9% oppose it, with 25.3% undecided. Comparing this data to the *Yomiuri* Public Opinion poll presented in Figure 10 reveals similar results. In 2005, the public was also relatively evenly split over the issue. However, beginning in 2006, the *Yomiuri* public opinion data

⁷² *Asahi Shimbun*/University of Tokyo Collaborative Politician Survey, “2005 Lower House Election Candidate Survey”, August 8, 2005, Question 9, Sub question 6, data is offered at the website of the University of Tokyo Faculty of Law and the University of Tokyo Graduate Schools for Law and Politics, available at: <http://www.j.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~masaki/ats/atpsdata.html> (accessed March 22, 2009). Codebook for interpreting the data is available from *Japan Political Research* () 5, No. 1/2, (January 2008), p. 286. This graph was created by sorting the data to only include responses from winners of the 2005 election. Based on this, the survey covers 79.8% of the winners in 2005.

showed support for CSD decreasing while the numbers of those who oppose its use have increased. It is impossible to determine if opinions within the Lower House have followed a similar trend because more recent survey data does not exist. However, it is possible to examine Upper House survey data from 2007.




Figure 27. 2007 *Asahi Shimbun*/University of Tokyo Survey of the Upper House: Japan should exercise the right of CSD.⁷³

While acknowledging that the target population for Figure 27 is different from Figure 26, it is still interesting to notice that if you examine Figures 26 and 27 together, opinions regarding CSD have trended similarly to the public opinion data presented in Figure 10. Support for exercising the right to CSD has dropped to 23.0%, which is a 10.1% drop. Conversely, opposition to CSD has risen from 38.9% to 51.0% and those

⁷³ *Asahi Shimbun*/University of Tokyo Collaborative Politician Survey, “2007 Upper House Members and Upper House Election Candidate Survey”, May – July, 2007, Question 10, sub question 7, data is offered at the website of the University of Tokyo Faculty of Law and the University of Tokyo Graduate Schools for Law and Politics, available at: <http://www.j.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~masaki/ats/atpsdata.html> (accessed March 22, 2009). Codebook for interpreting the data is available from *Japan Political Research* () 5, No. 1/2, (January 2008), p. 273. This author sorted the data from the 2007 *Asahi Shimbun*/University of Tokyo surveys to only include responses from incumbent members of the Upper House and the winners of the 2007 election. Based on this, the survey covers 82.5% of the current members of the Upper House.

who are undecided have dropped to only 15%. It is also possible that the 2007 data is different than the 2005 data because the results were heavily influenced by the DPJ.




Figure 28. 2007 *Asahi Shimbun*/University of Tokyo Survey of the Upper House: Prime Minister Abe has established a private advisory agency to research CSD. What is your thinking regarding the exercise of the right to CSD? Please select only one.⁷⁴

The data presented here provides some more insight into how exactly Upper House members feel about CSD. Specifically, it breaks down how respondents would like to see Japan exercise the right of CSD. While 50% oppose exercising the right, 18% desire the more drastic option of Constitutional change and 13% would prefer a simpler interpretational change. This data further strengthens the argument that a strong desire for a change in the government’s CSD policy does not exist within the Upper House. A

⁷⁴ *Asahi Shimbun*/University of Tokyo Collaborative Politician Survey, “2007 Upper House Members and Upper House Election Candidate Survey”, May – July, 2007, Question 8, data is offered at the website of the University of Tokyo Faculty of Law and the University of Tokyo Graduate Schools for Law and Politics, available at: <http://www.j.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~masaki/ats/atpsdata.html> (accessed March 22, 2009). Codebook for interpreting the data is available from *Japan Political Research* () 5, No. 1/2, (January 2008), p. 276. This author sorted the data from the 2007 *Asahi Shimbun*/University of Tokyo surveys to only include responses from incumbent members of the Upper House and the winners of the 2007 election. Based on this, the survey covers 82.5% of the current members of the Upper House.

clear majority prefers the status quo while the opposition is divided over the best method for changing the policy. Before moving on to the next section, it is interesting to examine party opinions on this issue.




Figure 29. 2005 *Mainichi Shimbun* Survey of Lower House Members Question: What do you think about the exercise of the right of CSD?⁷⁵

The data presented in Figure 29 is from a 2005 Lower House survey. As discussed previously, it is possible that these numbers have changed in the intervening years. However, the data is interesting because it shows a sharp difference in the opinions of the major political parties in Japan. Clearly, the LDP has a strong contingent of members who favor the exercise of the right of CSD. Conversely, Komeito is almost completely opposite. To continue to be the ruling party, the LDP needs its coalition partner Komeito. Thus, it is likely that the LDP has tempered its overtures to changing the interpretation on CSD out of respect for Komeito. Also, the results of the DPJ show a mixed opinion regarding this issue with 50% opposing CSD and 39% supporting it.

⁷⁵ *Mainichi Shimbun*, September 13, 2005, website of the Private Sector Constitution Commission (), available at: <http://www.k3.dion.ne.jp/~keporin/sinbun/yoron/kokkai1709.htm> (accessed March 22, 2009). This survey targeted winners of the 2005 Lower House election. The website does not provide the actual question used in the survey, but the question can be implied. This author has taken the liberty to write the question the way it is implied. Additionally, the data showed a dash (-) for the Komeito response of “It should be recognized”. The context does not imply that the dash represents 0%. It appears that the Private Sector Constitution Commission chose not to report the information.

The results of this section suggest that a removal of the ban on CSD is unlikely, given the recent drop in support for CSD within the Diet and the strong feelings of Komeito, which prevent the LDP from pursuing CSD.

D. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

Unfortunately, there is no survey data that directly asks individual politicians their opinions regarding BMD. However, it is possible to infer their thoughts about BMD by examining the answers to questions about the SDF, which is the organization that would operate Japan’s BMD system. All of the survey data on the SDF was taken after Japan’s decision in 2003 to pursue its own BMD system, so it is logical to assume that respondents were aware of the BMD mission as they answered questions about the SDF.

If there is support for an SDF that can act unhindered by restrictions, it may be an indication that politicians view the BMD program as a move towards a less restrictive security policy. Conversely, if there is limited support for the SDF to become an unrestricted military power, it suggests that politicians do not view the BMD program as a new direction for Japan’s security policy.




Figure 30. 2004 *Mainichi Shimbun* Survey of Both Houses of the Diet Question: What is the most desirable scope of international activities for the SDF?⁷⁶

⁷⁶ *Mainichi Shimbun*, May 3, 2004, Question 11, website of the Private Sector Constitution Commission (), available at: <http://www.k3.dion.ne.jp/~keporin/siryoku.htm> (accessed March 22, 2009). According to the website, the survey was given to all Diet members except winners of the April 25, 2004 Lower House by-elections and members missing from the Upper House.

The survey results presented in Figure 30 are from 2004, but are still significant because it reveals the entire Diet's thoughts regarding the SDF. The results reveal that there is a sharp divide between two camps. Those who desire the SDF to support peace keeping operations (PKO)/disaster relief-type activities and those who desire the SDF to participate in U.N.-sanctioned activities. Figure 31 will suggest that this divide has all but disappeared in recent years.




Figure 31. 2007 *Asahi Shimbun*/University of Tokyo Survey of the Upper House: How far do you think you would approve of overseas activities for the SDF? From among the following, please choose the answer that is most close to your thoughts.⁷⁷

The most recent data available regarding this question is from the 2007 survey of the Upper House. This survey had a different target population than the results presented in Figure 30 and the questions/answers are slightly different, so it is difficult to draw a

⁷⁷ *Asahi Shimbun*/University of Tokyo Collaborative Politician Survey, “2007 Upper House Members and Upper House Election Candidate Survey”, May – July, 2007, Question 5, data is offered at the website of the University of Tokyo Faculty of Law and the University of Tokyo Graduate Schools for Law and Politics, available at: <http://www.j.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~masaki/ats/atpsdata.html> (March 22, 2009). Codebook for interpreting the data is available from *Japan Political Research* () 5, No. 1/2, (January 2008), p. 277. This author sorted the data from the 2007 *Asahi Shimbun*/University of Tokyo surveys to only include responses from incumbent members of the Upper House and the winners of the 2007 election. Based on this, the survey covers 82.5% of the current members of the Upper House. Additionally, there was a likely typo and an obscured kanji characters in two of the answers. Thus, “given the current restrictions on the use of force, I approve of overseas activities,” and “I absolutely disapprove of overseas activities” are both inferred.

direct comparison between the two graphs. However, the data presented in Figure 31 suggests that the policy divide that existed in 2004 has disappeared and has been replaced by a strong consensus for approval of overseas activities as long as force is not used. Thus, a large majority within the Upper House opposes the use of force internationally.

The author contends that the data presented in Figures 30 and 31 suggest that Diet members do not desire the SDF to engage in the unrestricted use of military force. Since the SDF is the organization that operates the BMD system, it is assumed that this also applies to the Japanese BMD program. There is nothing about the program itself to suggest that it would not fall within these expectations. Fortunately, some more direct insight regarding BMD is available in party documents and is discussed in Chapter IV.

E. CONCLUSION

The purpose of this chapter was to determine if politicians support the removal of Japan's restrictions on the use of military force. The data clearly shows that there is no support among politicians for this to occur. This is the same as the conclusion drawn from Chapter II. This strongly suggests that a substantive change in Japan's security policies is not imminent. There are also several conclusions that can be drawn from the evidence.

First, there is little support among politicians for any meaningful change to Japan's restrictions. Much like the public opinion data presented in Chapter II, politicians do not appear to support the removal of these restrictions. Instead, what little support exists for change is focused more on issues such as legitimizing the SDF and clarifying Japan's right to maintain forces for the purpose of self-defense.

Second, politicians' opinions regarding the SDF has shifted in recent years to strongly support an international role for the SDF as long as it does not involve the use of force. This evidence suggests that we may see a broader international role for the SDF, but that role will focus on defense-oriented activities, such as peace-keeping and disaster relief.

Finally, the evidence on the SDF suggests that politicians do not view the BMD program as a step by Japan to a more aggressive security policy. There is nothing exceptional about the BMD program itself to suggest that it would be excluded from the opinions expressed within this chapter. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that politicians expect the BMD program to conform to Japan's existing restrictions on the use of military force.

IV. THE OPINIONS OF POLITICAL PARTIES

This chapter will focus on Japan's two major political parties to determine whether they support a removal of the restrictions on the use of military force as a matter of policy. Both the LDP and the DPJ have released various documents and statements that reveal their thoughts on all four key issues we have been examining. Some may argue that this information is redundant in light of the evidence presented in Chapter III or that these published documents are not relevant. These are good critiques and will now be addressed.

First, this information is unique because it offers a different perspective of politicians' opinions that the survey data presented in the previous chapter misses. While survey data of Diet members offer insight into how individual politicians think on the various issues, the documents produced by each political party represents its consensus opinion on these issues and its official stance to the Japanese people. As politicians with different ideas come together to discuss and debate the issues, they engage in compromise to reach their common goals. The results of this process are the policies of the party, and these policies are of arguably greater significance than survey data which only represents individual opinions. However, this does not mean that party opinion outweighs the opinions of individual politicians. Rather, it is necessary to consider both in determining where Japan's future security policy may go.

Second, some may also argue about the relevancy of these documents to actual policies that are implemented. Regarding this idea, this author points out the creation of written platforms by Japanese political parties is a relatively new phenomenon and therefore is not a routine that is redone every year.⁷⁸ This suggests that the documents are likely accurate reflections of current party policy and thus there is reason to believe they are sincere.

The information in this chapter is presented topically by party. The LDP will be examined first because of its dominant position within Japanese domestic politics. It has

⁷⁸ Robert Weiner, personal communication, March 2009.

been the ruling party in Japan almost continually since its formation back in 1955. The DPJ will then be considered. It has only recently become a viable alternative party that could actually replace the LDP. If the results of the Upper House election in 2007 are an indicator of what will happen in the Lower House of 2009, the opinions expressed by the DPJ could carry more weight in the calculations of what Japan's future security policy will look like. Therefore, the opinions as expressed by the DPJ are also a significant factor to consider.

A. LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY

1. Article 9

In 2005, the LDP of Japan unveiled a draft Constitution which represented exactly how the LDP proposed that the Constitution be rewritten and thus offers insight into Japan's future security policy. The draft Constitution includes changes to many parts of the original Constitution. For the purposes of this thesis, however, only the new Article 9 will be examined.

It is also important to mention that this document was unveiled in 2005 and thus does not necessarily reflect the LDP's viewpoints now. As the survey data revealed, there has been a recent decrease in support for Constitutional revision among Diet members. Regardless of this decrease, however, the 2005 LDP draft Constitution is valuable because it reveals the consensus opinion of the LDP at the time of its writing.

Also, this author will skip the first issue of Constitutional revision for the LDP. This is because the very fact that the LDP produced a draft Constitution implies that the party does favor some form of revision. Thus, the first issue that will be examined is the LDP's opinion on Article 9.

The LDP's draft Constitution does make changes to Article 9. Article 9 from the current Japanese Constitution is composed of two paragraphs. The LDP left the first paragraph unchanged, but did change paragraph two. While the original Article 9 is presented in the first chapter of this thesis, it is also reproduced here for comparative purposes:

1947 Japanese Constitution

Chapter II: Renunciation of War

Article 9

Paragraph One: Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.

Paragraph Two: In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.⁷⁹

2005 LDP Draft Constitution

Chapter II: *Security*

(Pacifism)

Article 9

Paragraph One: No change

(Self-Defense Army⁸⁰)

Paragraph Two: Original paragraph two has been removed and replaced with the following four sections:

To ensure our country's peace and independence, as well as the security of our country and citizens, we shall maintain a Self-Defense Army with the Prime Minister of Japan as the supreme commander.

⁷⁹Constitution of Japan, Article 9, website of the Prime Minister of Japan and his Cabinet, available at: http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html (accessed March 22, 2009). The website provided the English translation.

⁸⁰ The kanji character translated as “Army” is the character “.” In this context, this character does not necessarily mean just a land force, but a more inclusive word encompassing all military forces (land, sea, and air).

As determined by law, the Diet shall approve and control the Self-Defense Army with regard to the activities that they will accomplish in order to fulfill the provisions of the preceding paragraph.

In addition to the missions spelled out in paragraph one, when decided by law, the Self-Defense Army can carry out activities that ensure the peace and security of the international community through international cooperation, maintain public order during emergency situations, as well as protect the lives and freedom of our citizens.

Other than what has been explained in paragraph two, all matters related to the organization and regulation of the Self-Defense Army shall be decided by law. [Italics added to indicate changes]⁸¹

There are several conclusions that can be drawn regarding the LDP's views from studying the changes they propose to Article 9. First, it is notable that the title of Chapter II has been changed from the "Renunciation of War" to simply, "Security." Yet, the first paragraph of Article 9 (which spells out Japan's renunciation of war) remained unchanged in the 2005 document. This author concludes that the title change reflects the LDP's desire for the new Constitution of Japan to include a security policy that is broader than the previous Constitution's policy of simply renouncing war.

Second, although the draft Constitution changed the SDF into an "army," this army's scope of activities would not be drastically different from the current SDF. It is significant to notice that the LDP specifically renamed the SDF a "Self-Defense Army" (SDA). This implies that the LDP wants this new army to be primarily for the purpose of self-defense. This idea is clearly seen in public opinion and survey data as well. The name change also suggests that the LDP was primarily concerned with removing the apparent contradiction between Article 9 of the 1947 Constitution and the existence of the SDF.

⁸¹Liberal Democratic Party's New Constitution Draft, website of the Liberal Democratic Party, available at: http://www.jimin.jp/jimin/shin_kenpou/shiryu/pdf/051122_a.pdf (accessed March 22, 2009). There is no explanation of what the parenthesis are used to indicate. This author assumes that the draft Constitution will not include these parenthetical comments and that they are simply there to provide readers a brief summary of what the changes are. They would not be in a new Constitution if it was approved. Additionally, this author acknowledges that section 3 of paragraph two could be read to mean that the LDP would approve of use of military force internationally, but assumes that it refers to non-combat-related activities.

Thus, the LDP does want to revise Article 9. However, the revisions they propose would not change the fundamental nature of Article 9. Instead, the LDP proposed to legitimize the SDF while maintaining restrictions regarding the use of military force. This idea was reflected in the additional wording added to paragraph two of Article 9 that spelled out the rules and regulations that would govern the new SDA.

2. Collective Self-Defense

The LDP's draft Constitution does not specifically deal with the issue of CSD. However, it has published documents that reveal its opinion regarding this matter. The following document was created in 2004 and is entitled, "Points of Constitutional Revision: Chief Points of Issue regarding Constitutional Revision." While the document contains six points of discussion, this chapter will only focus on a section of the second point entitled, "To Prepare for a State of Emergency by Creating a 'Real Peace.'"

To Prepare for a State of Emergency by Creating a "Real Peace"

The fictitious nature of the Constitution's Article 9 and endeavoring for the creation of a "Real Peace"

Because Article 9 of the Constitution prohibits the maintenance of war potential, Japan does not have an army. But because Japan is an independent country, it does have a self-defense force for self-defense.

The heart of the postwar Constitutional discussion was the relationship between Article 9 and the SDF.

Right now, many of the country's citizens highly value the existence of the SDF. Recently, the SDF has been allowed to labor at overseas Peace Keeping Operations and Humanitarian activities. Some have pointed to the inadequacy of the constitutional interpretation that deployed personnel can use their weapons to protect themselves and their colleagues but cannot use their weapons to protect foreign troops or personnel from international organizations who are deployed to the same area and doing the same duties. It is ridiculous to say that this is an army.

As for the interpretation that Article 9 prevents CSD, there is also the critique that it not only inflates the danger of lessening the U.S.-Japan alliance's deterrent strength, but also is an obstacle to effective progress in collective security cooperation in Asia.

Our aim in revising Article 9 is first to establish the SDF as an army. *Next, it is also necessary to have the possibility of exercising the right of CSD.*

Presently, such things as international terrorism and the North Korean abduction issue exist and circumstances are not such that we can say “if we just publicize Article 9 of the Constitution, it will become peaceful.” It is necessary to revise our Constitution's Article 9 to guarantee our country's and our citizens' security. [Italics added for emphasis]⁸²

This clearly spells out the LDP consensus view regarding the issue of CSD. This stance is very consistent with survey data presented in the previous chapter. Figure 29 presented a 2005 Lower House survey and broke down the responses by party and revealed that 75% of the LDP believed that the right of CSD should be recognized.

This document also reveals the reasons the LDP wants to change the existing policy on CSD. First, it believes it is ridiculous that the SDF cannot fight to defend those who are working alongside them. Second, it decreases the deterrent effect of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Third, it is a hindrance to the formation of a collective security arrangement by the countries in Asia. Survey results on CSD presented in Chapter III revealed a recent decrease in the support rate for CSD. However, the LDP has not removed this document, so this author assumes that it is still the official policy of the party.

There are several conclusions that can be drawn based on these stated reasons. First, the LDP does not desire to change the current U.S.-Japan Alliance structure. Instead, their reason for changing the current interpretation of CSD has to do with removing the weaknesses in the alliance and ensuring it is viable.

⁸²Liberal Democratic Party, “Points of Constitutional Revision: Chief Points of Issue regarding Constitutional Revision” website of the Liberal Democratic Party, available at: http://www.jimin.jp/jimin/jimin/2004_seisaku/kenpou/contents/02.html (accessed March 22, 2009).

Interestingly, the second conclusion is that the LDP appears to also be interested in pursuing a collective security arrangement with other nations. This is suggested by the LDP's stated comment regarding the current CSD policy's negative effect on the creation of a collective security arrangement among the nations of Asia. The participants of this arrangement are not specified and it is logical to assume that the United States would likely be a member of any arrangement. However, it is interesting that the LDP wants to expand Japan's security policies from reliance only upon the United States. As stated above, this does not mean a lessening of the U.S.-Japan Alliance, but rather that the LDP is interested in expanding Japan's security policy to include other nations as well.

3. Ballistic Missile Defense

In December of 2003, Japan's Cabinet Office published its official statement that Japan had decided to introduce a BMD system. The document was authored by the then-Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda, who would later go on to become Prime Minister from 2007 to 2008. In it, he laid out the government's view on BMD. As the main player in the government's ruling coalition, this author assumes that this statement is a good reflection of the LDP's own views. Relevant portions of the statements are printed below:

2. The Government of Japan, recognizing that rapid progress on the relevant technologies of BMD has recently been made and that technological feasibility of BMD system is high, and noting that *BMD system is suitable for our exclusively defensive national defense policy*, decided to introduce the multi-layered defense system based on the Aegis BMD system and Patriot PAC-3 (Patriot Advanced Capability-3).

4. BMD system is the *only and purely defensive measure, without alternatives, to protect life and property of the citizens of Japan against ballistic missile attacks, and meets the principle of exclusively defense-oriented national defense policy*. Therefore, it is considered that this presents no threat to neighboring countries, and does not affect the regional stability.

5. *As for the issue of the right of collective self-defense, the BMD system that the Government of Japan is introducing aims at defending Japan. It will be operated based on Japan's independent judgment, and will not be*

used for the purpose of defending third countries. Therefore, it does not raise any problems with regard to the issue of the right of collective self-defense. The BMD system requires interception of missiles by Japan's own independent judgment based on the information on the target acquired by Japan's own sensors.

6. In legal terms on the operation of the BMD system, interception of ballistic missile attack is basically conducted under Defense Operations Order in Armed Attack Situation. In addition, *due to the nature of ballistic missile and the characteristics of BMD, the Government will conduct specific studies on necessary measures including legal ones, which enable appropriate responses to each situation.* [Italics added for emphasis]⁸³

From the above four paragraphs, it is possible to draw several conclusions about the LDP's view of BMD. First, the LDP understands that the introduction of a BMD system may not be completely compatible with current Constitutional restrictions. Both paragraphs 2 and 4 include specific language explaining the strictly defensive nature of the BMD system. However, it is interesting that they still had to include paragraph 6, which explains how the government will work to enact measures that will allow the BMD system to be used in specific situations. Based on this, it is obvious that the LDP does acknowledge some of the complications posed to a BMD system by Japan's restrictions.

Second, the LDP is committed to resolve those complications through any means including legal measures. Based on the language in paragraphs 2 and 4, it is logical to assume that the LDP wants to resolve the complications, while still maintaining Japan's current security policy. Thus, it can be assumed that whatever measures are undertaken to allow the use of BMD within Japan, they will not fundamentally change the restrictions that currently exist in Japan.

B. DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF JAPAN

The DPJ has emerged only recently as a serious alternative to the long-ruling LDP. However, it has produced significant documents that reveal the collective opinions

⁸³“Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary 19 December 2003,” from the website of the Prime Minister of Japan and his Cabinet, available at http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/tyokan/2003/1219danwa_e.html (accessed March 23, 2009). This website provided the English translation.

of the party regarding many of the issues voters care about. This section will examine the documents that deal specifically with the issues of relevance to this thesis.

The first document is the DPJ's "Constitutional Proposal," which was published in October of 2005. This document is not as specific as the LDP's draft Constitution, but offers insight into the DPJ's views on issues like Article 9. The LDP's document allowed a line-by-line comparison with the 1947 Constitution, but the DPJ document is not presented in this manner. Instead, it presents the ideas and the framework from which the party approaches Constitutional revision. From this, it is possible to understand the DPJ's consensus opinions on certain security issues.

1. Constitutional Revision and Article 9 Revision

DPJ Constitutional Proposal 31 Oct 2005

Section 5 "Towards Forming a More Certain Security Framework"

1. The Basic Thinking of the DPJ

1. Putting pacifism, as the basic norm of the Constitution, at the core

In the first place, Japan's Constitution is based on the U.N. charter and the system of collective security rooted therein. Given this, Japan, through Article 9, has exemplified the spirit of the U.N. Charter, which generally prohibits the unilateral use of force, and has zealously promulgated pacifist principles.

The country of Japan desires U.N. collective security to be sufficient and so, we aspire to ordinarily endeavor towards a realization of that. And, in light of that intention and reflecting upon the historical use of unrestricted force in the name of the "right of self-defense," *Japan's Constitution shall create equally rigid regulations regarding the exercise of the right of self-defense as well as to the prohibition of its use.*

For this purpose, consistent, strong arguments have been aired regarding the method of participation in U.N.-sanctioned collective security activities. But, how can we pass beyond the arguments? We can through the one important, foundational model principle that the Japanese Constitution is based on, "pacifism." Regarding "pacifism," it has taken root deeply within the citizen's livelihoods and we should declare the style

of peace-loving Japan to our citizens as well as overseas. From now on, we should pass it on. What is important is that Japan becomes “a country that creates peace” or rather “a new Japan that manufactures peace” as we move on from what we were, “a Japan that received peace.”

2. Without permitting our Constitution to become meaningless, advancing towards the establishment of a more certain pacifism

For the establishment of international peace and the realization of Japan’s pacifism, now, the most dangerous things are the making of our Constitution into a meaningless document through Constitutional revision via interpretation which has no brakes, and the continuance of the idea/attitude that we will provide unclear efforts towards active cooperation with international society. The DPJ will not get caught up in accommodationist constitutional interpretation, at whose core has been a CLB [Cabinet Legislation Bureau] that has repeated these two mistakes, but will instead aim to establish a more certain path of Japanese pacifism, and to pursue nation-building that contributes broadly to international society and earns the trust of Asia and the world.

Through a diverse and free, broad-minded Constitutional debate, 1) *regarding the “right of self-defense,” without approving of the vague, circumstances-driven principles of Constitutional interpretation, we shall define a more rigid/strict “limited right of self defense” that reflects the framework of international law,* 2) *we will make the framework for international contributions a more certain thing, and after putting the brakes on our government’s selfish interpretation of Constitutional application, we will tackle the establishment of a Constitution for our nation.* Together, we shall define our nation’s active role towards supporting what today’s international community desires, “Human Security.” [Italics added for emphasis]⁸⁴

This section is entitled “The Basic Thinking of the DPJ” and from it, much can be understood of the DPJ’s political opinion on security issues. First, the DPJ wants to revise the Constitution. It makes clear its disapproval of the government’s current method of dealing with security issues through inconsistent Constitutional interpretations.

⁸⁴Democratic Party of Japan, “Democratic Party of Japan Constitutional Proposal” October 31, 2005, p. 14, website of the Democratic Party of Japan, available at: <http://www.dpj.or.jp/news/files/20051031181802.pdf> (accessed March 22, 2009).

Instead, the DPJ states its desire to create a new Constitution, which will clearly establish the framework for Japan's security policy, including how they will participate in international activities.

Second, the DPJ is both strongly committed to, and proud of, the principle of pacifism. It is impossible to read this section and not come away with a sense of the DPJ's firm commitment to the principles of pacifism as described in Article 9. They envision Japan as a country that can help to create international peace by spreading the idea of pacifism at home and abroad. It can be inferred from this that the DPJ does not want to revise the fundamental principles of Article 9.

Third, the DPJ wants to create a more restrictive definition of the right of self-defense. Based on this document, it is not satisfied with the current definition and wants to impose stronger restrictions on the exercise of this right. The DPJ gives more detail regarding its new definition in a later section entitled, "Four Principles and Two Prerequisites of the Constitution Relating to Our Nation's Security." The DPJ's stance on what is allowed under self-defense is presented in Principle #2 below:

DPJ Constitutional Proposal 31 Oct 2005

Section 5 "Towards Forming a More Certain Security Framework"

Four Principles and Two Prerequisites of the Constitution Relating to Our Nation's Security

Four principles relating to our nation's security activities

2. Defining the "Limited Right of Self Defense," for the U.N Charter as described above

Having reflected upon the fact that the last war was prosecuted under the name of "the right to self defense," "limited self defense" is specified clearly in the Constitution. *The "self-defense" specified in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter is limited to emergency refuge-like activities conducted before U.N. collective security activities begin. This is important part of the "non-aggressive defense policy" kind of thinking that was fostered in postwar Japan. In light of this, a much more rigid application of*

international law and Constitutions shall be established, while suppressing the selfish interpretations of self-defense that are given by governments. [Italics added for emphasis]⁸⁵

Based on this more restrictive definition, it is logical to assume that the DPJ would not support any Constitutional revision that would allow an unrestricted use of military force.

2. Collective Self-Defense

CSD is also covered in the section entitled, “The Four Principles and Two Prerequisites of the Constitution that Relates to Our Nation’s Security.” Principles #1 and #3 as well as Prerequisite #1 offer insight into how the DPJ views the issue of CSD. They will now be presented:

DPJ Constitutional Proposal 31 Oct 2005

Section 5 “Towards Forming a More Certain Security Framework”

Four Principles and Two Prerequisites of the Constitution Relating to Our Nation’s Security

Four principles relating to our nation’s security activities

1. To believe in the pacifist thoughts that postwar Japan fostered.

The pacifism of Japan’s Constitution is based on these foundational standards: “the sovereignty of the people,” and “respect for basic human rights.” From now on, even during Constitutional discussions, we need make these foundational intents the basis, and, without looking to our own nation, *have the attitude of being willing to engage in U.N.-sanctioned international activities and cooperation to deal with those who threaten international peace.*

⁸⁵ Democratic Party of Japan, “Democratic Party of Japan Constitutional Proposal” October 31, 2005, p. 15, website of the Democratic Party of Japan, available at: <http://www.dpj.or.jp/news/files/20051031181802.pdf> (accessed March 22, 2009).

3. To place our participation in the U.N.'s collective security activities.

The constitution addresses participation in UN-led peacekeeping activities, removing vague and arbitrary interpretations and establishing clear guidelines. In this way, *it distinguishes between peacekeeping activities based on legitimate decision-making by the UN and all other activities, and clarifies that it is the will of the Japanese people not to participate in the latter. This posture makes it possible to participate in multinational force activities and UN peacekeeping operations (PKO) currently underway as part of the UN's collective security activities. Those activities may include the use of force as part of collective self defense, but Japan may autonomously determine its degree of participation in this.*

Two prerequisites that must be met before the four principles that relate to our nation's security can be born

1. Armed force must be maximally suppressed.

Even regarding the newly specified "right of self defense," we must remain true to the idea of "non-aggressive defense policy" developed by postwar Japan and keep the use of force to the absolute minimum necessary. Again, even regarding participation in U.N.-sanctioned collective security activities, a strong suppressing attitude towards the use of armed force must be put into place. This guideline must be specified in Constitutions with an attachment that relates to basic security laws. [Italics added for emphasis]⁸⁶

There are several conclusions that can be drawn about the DPJ's view of CSD. First, the DPJ only supports collective security, not CSD. While these terms may be similar, they do not the same thing. Hughes provides a good explanation:

'Collective security' is seen to differ from 'collective self-defense' in that the latter is an inherent right under the UN Charter that can be exercised without UN approval in instances where it is deemed necessary to defend another state or ally as if your own territory were attacked, whereas the

⁸⁶Democratic Party of Japan, Constitutional Proposal, October 31, 2005, website of the Democratic Party of Japan, pp. 15-16, available at: <http://www.dpj.or.jp/news/files/SG0065.pdf> (accessed March 22, 2009).

former is a right that can only be exercised if sanctioned by the UN and is for the purposes of collective retaliation by UN members against an aggressor.⁸⁷

Second, the DPJ believes that it is possible for Japan to participate in collective security activities that may entail the use of force. However, Principle #3 states that it is up to the Japanese people to decide exactly what level of participation they can bring. The DPJ is very explicit that any use of force must be under the auspices of the United Nations, but it is very interesting that the DPJ is willing for Japan to use force and this is a significant difference between the DPJ and the LDP.

Third, despite its willingness to use force internationally, the DPJ believes that the amount of force to be used must be kept to an absolute minimum. To them, this is in keeping with the defensively focused security policy that Japan has had since 1947. It appears that the DPJ would like this idea to be fully embraced by the international community as well.

3. The Self-Defense Forces

Chapters II and III did not specifically examine the SDF, but rather looked at opinions on this issue to try to infer ideas about BMD. However, in light of the LDP's idea to create an SDA, it would be appropriate to also examine the DPJ's plan for the SDF. It is presented in the following policy document

Democratic Party of Japan Magna Carta

Chapter III: Build Peace Ourselves: Diplomacy and Security Policy

Paragraph 7: Limit the exercise of the right of self defence to an exclusively defensive stance

We will play an active role in preserving the peace of Japan and the world, based on the philosophy of the Japanese Constitution. Regardless of past debate regarding the concepts of individual and collective self defence, *the right to self defence will only be exercised, in accordance with Article 9*

⁸⁷ Hughes, Japan's Re-emergence as a 'Normal' Military Power, p. 50.

*and based on the principle of exclusively defensive security, if our nation is faced with an imminent and unlawful infringement that directly threatens the peace and security of Japan. We will not engage in the use of force in any other case. [Italics added for emphasis]*⁸⁸

From this paragraph the DPJ's consensus view of the SDF can be inferred. While no specific mention is made of the SDF, it is clear that the DPJ wants to narrow the scope of activities that the SDF can be involved in. However, based on the DPJ's opinion regarding CSD, it is assumed that the DPJ would approve of the SDF participating in international activities that are sanctioned by the United Nations.

Contrasting this view with the LDP, it is interesting to note that this is a fundamentally different opinion between these two major parties. The LDP wants to change the name of the SDF, but not change the scope of its activities (by continuing to focus on defensive activities). Conversely, the DPJ does not want to change the name of the SDF, but wants to increase the scope of its activities (by allowing use of force under the United Nations).

4. Ballistic Missile Defense

In 2003, before Chief Cabinet Secretary published his statement regarding Japan's introduction of a BMD system, the DPJ offered up its opinion regarding the same issue. The DPJ statement was authored by Matsumoto Takeaki, who was serving as the "Next" Director General of the Defense Agency. The title of "Next" simply means that he was the chosen individual to head the Defense Agency if the DPJ came into power. It is a similar concept to Britain's "shadow cabinet." The statement was entitled, "Regarding the introduction of ballistic missile defense 9 December 2003 (A Conversation)":

DPJ Next Director General of Defense Agency Matsumoto Takeaki

Today, the government decided on the introduction of ballistic missile defense (MD).

⁸⁸Democratic Party of Japan, Basic Policies for Government (Policy Magna Carta), December 2006, website of the Democratic Party of Japan, available at: <http://www.dpj.or.jp/english/policy/basic2006.html#anchor37> (accessed March 22, 2009). The website provided the English translation.

Missile defense has a character that agrees with the spirit of nonaggressive defense, as a defensive step, and I think embarking on an examination of it is above mere security, but an obligation/duty. For that purpose, the DPJ will continue with “an examination of cost-effectiveness and synthetic point of view to appraise its necessity” (Administration’s public platform/Manifesto). At the same time, MD has the possibility of changing the trend of our nation’s security policy in a big way and it is essential to discuss the overall picture. All together, we must examine the practical possibilities of the three principles of arms export, or the right of collective self-defense, as well as the understanding of our neighboring countries.

But there is no sense of this type of thinking, or of efforts to explain this to foreign countries, on the part of the government. The government should fully discharge its explanatory responsibilities. [Italics added for emphasis]⁸⁹

There are several conclusions regarding the DPJ’s collective opinion that can be drawn based on Matsumoto’s statement. First, the DPJ is in agreement with the LDP regarding the defensive nature of the BMD system. This is remarkable because it shows a convergence of opinions between two parties. This lends credibility to the argument that the BMD system is strictly defensive because if it was not, the DPJ would surely use this opportunity to criticize and attack the LDP. Instead, it acknowledges up front that the system is defensive.

Second, despite the belief that the BMD system is defensive, the DPJ is also aware of some of the complications that are created by the introduction of a BMD system. Whereas the LDP commits itself to the resolution of these issues, the DPJ merely suggests that an examination is needed.

Finally, the DPJ feels the BMD system may cause problems with Japan’s policy on CSD and arms exports as well as Japan’s relations with its neighbors. This is different

⁸⁹Matsumoto Takeaki, “Regarding the introduction of ballistic missile defense 9 December 2003,” from the Democratic Party of Japan’s website, available at <http://www.dpj.or.jp/news/?num=10505> (accessed March 22, 2009).

from the LDP opinion, which does not believe there is a problem. The DPJ does not make any recommendations regarding how to resolve this issue, but merely blames the government for not doing enough.

C. CONCLUSION

An examination of the policy positions of Japan's two leading political parties reveals two differences in the key issues that we have been discussing. The first difference regards each party's view of the SDF. The LDP wants to revise the Constitution to acknowledge the existence of the SDF and to change its name to something more in line with its nature, a Self-Defense Army (SDA). The activities of this SDA would include participation in international activities, but would not include the use of force apart from defensive activities. Aside from the name change, this proposal is essentially a continuation of the current status quo.

Conversely, the DPJ prefers more limited activities for the SDF unless it is in support of U.N.-sanctioned actions. Additionally, it wants to tighten its definition of what is allowed under self-defense to limit how much force would be appropriate. But it must be acknowledged that the approval for the use of force would be a definite departure from Japan's status quo.

The second difference involves the issue of CSD. The LDP supports Japan's involvement in CSD, but the DPJ does not. Instead, the DPJ supports Japan's involvement in collective security activities that are sanctioned by the United Nations. As stated above it is significant that the DPJ is willing to allow Japan to use military force as long as those actions are supported by the United Nations.

Excepting the differences on the SDF and CSD, both parties are essentially in agreement on all the other issues. Both parties have offered concrete examples of how they would change the Constitution indicating that they would be willing to engage in this activity. Both parties' agree that the vital nature of Article 9 should not be changed and both parties agree on the strictly defensive nature of BMD.

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V. CONCLUSION / IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

Now that an examination of all the evidence is complete, this thesis will analyze two arguments that are made by those who believe Japan is about to remove its restrictions on the use of military force: Based on the literature review in Chapter I, these arguments can be summarized in the following way: 1) Japan will remove its restrictions because of its worsening security environment; 2) Japan's involvement in BMD will force Japan to allow the exercise of CSD.

A. ASSESSING ARGUMENT #1: JAPAN WILL REMOVE ITS RESTRICTIONS BECAUSE OF ITS WORSENING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

The reasoning of this argument makes intuitive sense. It is only logical to assume that a state will react to external dangers by ensuring its ability to respond appropriately. Japan's current security environment has arguably gotten much more threatening in recent years due to the current North Korean missile threat, as well as the possible future dangers of China's military modernization. If Japan was going to respond to these external threats, now would be an understandable time. Perhaps surprisingly, the evidence does not support this argument.

Despite a strong awareness among the public of many of these dangerous situations, it does not appear to have translated into a desire for a change in Japan's security policy. Instead, the evidence shows that public support for Constitutional revision has actually fallen in recent years. It is not as definitive, but the evidence also suggests the support has fallen among politicians as well. Specifically regarding Article 9, the evidence shows that both the public and the politicians do not support a revision of the article that would represent a fundamental change from Japan's pacifist traditions.

The evidence is not quite as clear regarding the exercise of the right to CSD. The LDP's official stance does support it. However, it does appear that support from both the public and the politicians has dropped in recent years. Therefore, the evidence presented

in this thesis suggests that Argument #1 is incorrect. Despite the worsening security environment, Japan does not appear to have experienced an increase in a desire for the removal of its restrictions on the use of military force.

B. ASSESSING ARGUMENT #2: JAPAN'S INVOLVEMENT IN BMD WILL FORCE JAPAN TO ALLOW THE EXERCISE OF CSD

As discussed in Chapter I, some have pointed out that a Japanese BMD program may cause problems with the prohibition on CSD. None of the evidence examined within this thesis deals with the technical issues of how a Japanese BMD program would operate. However, the evidence does suggest that Japan will do what it takes to ensure that its BMD program does not violate the existing restrictions regarding CSD. Even if it was impossible to operate a completely independent system, it is likely that Japan would respond by employing a flexible interpretation to ensure that its prohibition of CSD is not violated.

As discussed in Section A above, support for CSD is decreasing. Additionally, Fukuda's statement presented in Chapter IV demonstrated that the LDP is aware of the challenges posed by a BMD system and that it was committed to resolving those differences. The DPJ is also aware of the potential problems. It is also officially opposed to CSD so it is logical to assume that if it did take power in 2009, it would not allow BMD to violate the rules on CSD.

C. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE VALIDITY OF THE HYPOTHESIS

The evidence presented in this thesis suggests that the hypothesis is correct: Japan is *not* about to remove its current restrictions on the use of military force because of the strength of its anti-military feelings which exist within the society, at both the political and public level. The existence of this anti-military norm is evident in all three areas examined within this thesis: the opinions of the public and the politicians, as well as the published documents of the two major political parties. While few can dispute the existence of this norm within society, the true question is how much of an effect does it have on Japan's security policy?

With respect to Constitutional revision, the requirement for a national referendum is a formidable obstacle that must be acknowledged. Without public support, it is impossible to change the current Constitution and this thesis has clearly demonstrated strong public opinion against removing Japan's existing restrictions. Without a Constitutional revision, it is impossible for Japan to change Article 9.

The other possible change would involve an interpretive change to allow the exercise of CSD. This would not involve a national referendum and is therefore not directly influenced by public opinion. However, it is affected by the opinions of politicians. The evidence suggests that support among politicians for CSD has fallen in recent years. Despite the LDP's desire for CSD, it still must deal with its coalition partner, Komeito, who does not support CSD. Therefore, an interpretive change does not appear likely. Additionally, the DPJ's official stance against CSD makes it even more likely for CSD to be allowed if the DPJ takes power in 2009.

Finally, it is interesting to consider if there are certain tipping points that may cause Japan to remove its restrictions. Perhaps an actual attack by North Korea or a definitely aggressive move by China would provide enough impetus for Japan to remove its restrictions. However, this author wonders if the depth of anti-military feelings within Japanese society might still be deep enough to prevent Japan from removing its restrictions on the use of military force.

D. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

This thesis will now offer some concluding thoughts on what the evidence presented in this thesis implies for future U.S. policy towards Japan. The data suggests that a less restrictive Japanese security policy and greater military involvement in the Japan-U.S. alliance is not about to occur. The data also suggests the existence of a political "red line" that the government of Japan will not cross in its international activities. This "red line" is the unrestricted use of military force overseas.

The data also reveals that there is strong support both at the public and politician levels for a greater level of involvement by Japan in *non-combat-related* activities. This reinforces the idea that the United States should increase its efforts to secure Japanese

cooperation on non-combat-related activities. Considering the demonstrated eagerness of the Japanese to play a larger role in international non-combat-related roles, it would not be too difficult politically to receive greater participation from Japan in these types of activities. This participation could improve the effectiveness of the alliance by relieving some of the burden borne by the United States and allowing a capable ally to leverage its abilities towards the fulfillment of a common goal.

Japan's role in these non-combat-related activities could be in one of two forms. The first could involve Japan actually taking over and accomplishing certain non-combat-related parts of the missions that the United States has traditionally done. The second form would be to have Japan supplement U.S. efforts overseas by providing some of vital reconstruction efforts that otherwise the United States may not be able to provide. Regardless of the way it is carried out, the end result would be an increase in the effectiveness of the alliance.

The evidence also suggests there is a possible limitation to the level of Japan's involvement in future international activities. There appears to be some opposition to Japan's participation in these types of activities without the sanction of the United Nations. This thought is best expressed by the DPJ, which may become the ruling party in Japan after the elections to be held later this year.

This implication suggests that future Japanese international cooperation with the United States may be contingent upon a U.N. resolution. Without it, there could likely be opposition to cooperation in what could be seen by Japan as U.S. unilateralism. The United States would have to recognize that without strong support from the U.N., Japanese cooperation may not occur.

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