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**A HIERARCHY OF NEEDS IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

by

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March 2009

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**A HIERARCHY OF NEEDS IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

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ABSTRACT

Characterizing U.S.-Russian relations as a new Cold War is nostalgic for many, but it does not accurately describe Russian motivation behind its current behavior. Abraham Maslow, a prominent behavioral psychologist, investigated motivation behind human behavior and concluded that human motivation centers on satisfying five basic “needs.” It is plausible to modify his hierarchy of basic human needs and develop a similar hierarchy of basic state needs. A single case study examining Soviet regression from a strong state identity and the Russian Federation’s attempts to reestablish it demonstrates the utility of the hierarchy. Understanding where a state falls in its pursuit of a strong state identity gives intelligence analysts providing assessments to U.S. policy makers a framework to assess, categorize, and predict general trends in state behavior. Consequently, it becomes more accurate to describe current Russian behavior as attempts to satisfy its prepotent needs for external security while also attempting to satisfy to a lesser extent its needs for prestige and domestic security. This comprehensive explanation of motivation behind Russian behavior allows U.S. policy makers to craft policy which either helps or impedes Russia in its pursuit of a strong state identity.

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I. A HIERARCHY OF NEEDS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

A. INTRODUCTION

News headlines are replete with examples of continuing friction between the United States and Russia. Many in the news media cite Russia's renewed interest in Latin America and a return of Russian bomber patrols near North America as proof of a second Cold War. Characterizing U.S.-Russian relations as a new Cold War is nostalgic for many, but it does not accurately describe Russian motivation behind these behaviors. What then is Russia's motivation for their interest in Latin American or flying bomber missions near North America? A more appropriate question to ask is what motivates states in general to undertake specific behaviors? This thesis proposes that states in the international system have five basic and universal needs that drive all of their behaviors.

The project uses the Soviet Union and Russia as its primary successor state as a case study to explore the relationship between states' needs and their behaviors. First, the project will evaluate Soviet development beginning with the period just after its victory in World War II. It examines changes in state needs and subsequent behaviors as the Soviet Union gradually declined in state power until its dissolution in December 1991. Secondly, it evaluates Russian Federation needs and resulting behaviors as it consolidated a state identity in the years during Vladimir Putin's first administration.

The concept of categorizing behaviors according to needs is not new. In fact, it was psychologist Abraham Maslow who first introduced the notion that basic needs motivate human behavior. Maslow's theory on human motivation and his subsequent hierarchy form the intellectual foundation for the remainder of this thesis.

B. PURPOSE

Abraham Maslow observed changes in individual human behavior according to a hierarchy of needs. He postulated that individuals change behavior once satisfying first tier "physiological" needs of sustenance (e.g., air, food, water) and soon adopt behaviors

to satisfy second tier “safety” needs, such as shelter and protection. Mentally healthy people progress through the five different levels of needs satisfying lower level (more basic needs) before progressing to higher level needs in the hierarchy (Figure 1).¹ They subconsciously adopt behaviors in an effort to satisfy each level of needs ultimately seeking to achieve the highest level Maslow called “self actualization.”² Subsequently, Maslow concludes the existence of a causal relationship between human needs and behavior.



Figure 1. Maslow's Hierarchy

Maslow's hierarchy ultimately seeks to define a developmental path to what he called full *humanness*, or a person with a “high level of maturation,” less dependent on others, and with a consolidated self-identity.³ In short, it seeks to define the characteristics of strong individuals. Assuming the validity of Maslow's work in the behavioral sciences, this project modifies Maslow's hierarchy to define the characteristics of strong states. It uses a modified hierarchy for investigating the relationship between

¹ Maslow advances a linear model while acknowledging the likelihood of simultaneously needs satisfaction.

² Abraham H. Maslow, *Toward a Psychology of Being*, 2nd ed. (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1982), 152-60.

³ *Ibid.*, 34, 71.

states' needs and their behaviors. Using this concept, observers would expect different behaviors from a subject progressing through the hierarchy toward strong state identity than they would expect from a subject regressing or remaining static in the hierarchy. Monitoring such changes in state behavior from the ebb and flow of its needs forms the foundation of work done by professional intelligence analysts.

C. IMPORTANCE

Exploring how needs drive state behavior is of critical interest to intelligence professionals. Intelligence analysts attempt to predict threats to U.S. national security and advise policy makers on the appropriate use of national resources to mitigate these threats. It is not sufficient to assess what a state of interest is doing in the present. Intelligence professionals must attempt to anticipate a state's behavior in the future.

Intelligence professionals analyze a state of interest's current and past behaviors to identify trends between them. After identifying these trends, the analyst must extend these same trends into the future in an attempt to predict a range of behaviors a state will take at a specific time in the future. Analysts will present this range of expected state behaviors to policy makers based on the state's short term goals (measured in days or weeks) and/or its long term goals (measured in months and years). The range usually begins with the most likely behaviors expected to the less likely or remote. Presentation of a range of predicted state behaviors allows policy makers to allocate resources efficiently to counter expected adversarial behaviors. A hierarchy of needs could provide a theoretical model and framework for formulating intelligence assessments and anticipating what a state's likely behaviors will be at some point in the future. A further review of Maslow's theories provides insight into this hypothesis.

D. HYPOTHESIS

Maslow proposed a correlation between human capacities, needs, and behavior. In his exploration of these relationships, Maslow defines needs as the capacity or capability to do something. As an example, he explains that human beings with muscles must use these muscles or, in other words, they have a *need* to use their muscles.

Humans with eyes have a *need* to use their eyes and so on.⁴ Some needs are common to all humankind (e.g., physiological needs of sustenance) while others are specific to individuals and change from person to person where “...idiosyncratic needs generate idiosyncratic values.”⁵ Maslow continues this thought by stating, “He [the subject of observation] does not know in advance that he will strive on after this gratification has come, and that gratification of one basic need opens consciousness to domination by another, higher need.”⁶ The striving that Maslow describes manifests itself as behaviors that individuals adopt to satisfy needs.

Consequently, Maslow and other psychologists observe human behavior to assess an individual’s development and progress through the hierarchy of needs. They seek to diagnose a causal relationship between unsatisfied needs and behaviors exhibited by the subject. Psychologists make these observations in an attempt to diagnose and ultimately correct “unhealthy” causal mechanisms; likewise, intelligence analysts observe state behavior and attempt to determine the state’s motivation for it. Though Maslow was interested in a subject’s unhealthy behaviors, intelligence analysts are more interested in a state’s threatening behaviors. Consequently, Maslow provides a useful tool for observers of international relations in the evaluation of states’ behaviors; however, this method is somewhat different from traditional views of state motivation.

E. TRADITIONAL VIEWS OF STATE MOTIVATION

Though political scientists and observers of international relations may concede some of the assumptions of this argument, others, concerned with the validity of this proposal, will likely reject the overall approach of using a hierarchy of needs applied to states. In fact, contradictory reasons will likely underscore rejection of this approach since political scientists often disagree over the objective reality of the international system itself.

⁴ Maslow, *Toward a Psychology of Being*, 152.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 151-2.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 152-3.

Realists will likely concede one of this proposal's premises, but will likely dismiss the argument as a whole as invalid. First, Realists (e.g., Morgenthau, Carr, and Waltz) agree that states are the primary actor in the international system.⁷ They acknowledge participation of other non-state actors in the international system, but they argue that relations among states are what constitute the international system. While Liberalists, such as Keohane, do not disagree that states are the primary actor, they do assert that non-state actors are important to the international system and play a critical role in the relations among states.⁸ In fact, Doyle proposes that non-state actors, such as international institutions and regimes, function to provide a forum for states to pursue common interests and negotiate their differences to avoid conflict.⁹ Besides debating actors in the international system, political scientists disagree on what motivates states' behaviors.

Realists will likely appreciate the pursuit of power and security as the basis for the first two tiers of the hierarchy. At the heart of Waltz's Structural or Neo-Realism is the anarchic nature of the international system.¹⁰ This anarchic system without an overarching authority above states creates a "self-help" situation where states accrue power at the expense of others in order to ensure their own security. In this zero sum game environment, "the strong do what they will, and the weak suffer what they must."¹¹

Liberalists disagree with Realists as to what motivates states' behaviors and will likely agree with the premise of the fourth tier of the hierarchy where prestige needs drive states' behaviors. Liberalists do acknowledge the importance security plays in states' foreign policy pursuits; however, they argue cooperation towards mutual benefit can

⁷ Hans J. Morgenthau, Kenneth W. Thompson and W. David Clinton, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 7th ed. (Boston: McGraw-Hill Higher Education, 2006), 8.

⁸ Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), 5-9.

⁹ Michael W. Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 12, no. 3 (Summer 1983), 232-34, <http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0048-3915%28198322%2912%3A3%3C205%3AKLLAFA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-O> (accessed March 2008).

¹⁰ Kenneth Neal Waltz, *Man, the State, and War; A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), 159-61.

¹¹ Thucydides, "The Melian Dialogue," in *Conflict after the Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War and Peace*, ed. Richard K. Betts, Updated 3rd ed. (New York: Pearson/Longman, 2008), 57.

motivate states' behaviors as well. In fact, Robert Axelrod demonstrated this opportunity for cooperation in an anarchic system of self-help using the Prisoner's Dilemma.¹² Additionally, Norman Angell proposed that economic interdependence minimizes the importance of political and military power making great conflicts less likely in the modern era.¹³ The differences between these schools of thought reside in the differences of their basic worldviews.

Realists see their approach as an empirical, descriptive method to study international relations where certain fundamental laws exist that determine the nature of the international system. Realists argue that these laws provide a certain level of predictability in the system. States can always assume that other states will act in their own best interests according to the self-help environment of the anarchic international system. Conversely, in 1909, Angell proposed that human nature is in a process of change and becomes less aggressive over time.¹⁴ In this regard, he advocates a normative approach to international relations, which is inherent in Liberalism. They acknowledge the anarchic, self-help system of national interests; but as stated above, they argue it is often in the national interests of states to cooperate with each other toward mutual benefit.

Critics are sure to question the proposed link in human behavior to the behavior of states. Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein, theorists of political science's Constructivist school of thought, offer insight to this criticism. They propose states have an inherent identity where they "...often cannot decide what their interests are until they know what they are representing, who they are, which in turn depends on their social relationships."¹⁵ They also contend that "...changes in state identity affect the national

¹² Robert M. Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation* (London; New York: Penguin Books, 1990), 190-1.

¹³ Norman Angell, *The Great Illusion; a Study of the Relation of Military Power in Nations to their Economic and Social Advantage* (New York: Garland Pub., 1972), 27-43, 215-22.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 222.

¹⁵ Ron Jepperson, Alex Wendt and Peter J. Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security," in *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 60.

security interests and policies of states.”¹⁶ This Constructivist concept of a state’s identity provides a natural bridge from the behavioral sciences into political science for applying a hierarchy of needs to states. It is the foundation of explaining how a hierarchy of needs is an appropriate model of analyzing the behavior of states within the international system and yet differs greatly with the other schools of thought.

Constructivism focuses less on constitutive features and instead centers on the intersubjective meanings shared in the international system. Constructivism rejects Realism’s notion that self-help is a constitutive feature of the international system. As an example, Realists contend that a twenty-five percent increase in State A’s defense budget poses a threat to State B who will consequently raise its budget. Constructivists argue that it makes a difference in the intersubjective meanings of that increase.¹⁷ In other words, a twenty-five percent raise in China’s defense spending has a much different meaning than a similar raise in Iceland’s (a state without a military) defense spending. China’s increase could spark an arms race with the United States or Japan where an increase in Iceland’s defense spending is likely to go unnoticed by the international community. Referring back to needs, these intersubjective meanings states place on the dynamics in the international system can contribute to the development (progression vs. regression) of a state through the hierarchy. As a result, a state’s progress within the hierarchy has concrete policy implications, yet, there is potential for error in this project.

F. AVOIDANCE OF LOGICAL FALLACIES

Several errors could undermine the results of this project. First, Edwin Nevis criticizes Maslow for cultural bias and argues for the re-ordering of the hierarchy when applying it to other cultures. As an example, Nevis contends belonging needs in Chinese culture are much more important than safety or even physiological needs. He explains “the most basic assumption is that being a good member of society and putting group

¹⁶ Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein, “Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security,” in *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, 60.

¹⁷ Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is what States make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (Spring, 1992), 411, <http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-8183%28199221%2946%3A2%3C391%3AAIWSMO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-9>.

goals before individual needs should govern all practices” in Chinese culture.¹⁸ Consequently, Nevis criticizes Maslow for constructing his hierarchy from an American point of view emphasizing individualism as a universal goal for all human beings.¹⁹ This observation underscores the importance of minimizing the influence of biases and constructing a hierarchy with the ambitious goal of universality. While cultural bias is a criticism levied at Maslow, scholars list other shortfalls as well.

One of the principal criticisms leveled at Maslow concerns his proposition of classifying human needs according to a hierarchy. Much of the critical literature on Maslow argues that humans pursue needs simultaneously and not in linear fashion. Several other psychological theories attempt to address this perceived shortcoming and propose alternative theories for human motivation (e.g., Adlefer’s ERG theory and McClelland’s Acquired Needs theory).²⁰

Ultimately, Maslow was aware of some of these criticisms during his own time and welcomed scrutiny of his findings from the scholarly community. In 1943, Maslow attempted to correct some of the misrepresentations of his theories. He acknowledged that human beings do pursue needs simultaneously and are capable of being only partially satisfied in multiple needs at the same time. Dennis O’Connor and Leodones Yballe argue that Maslow proposed needs in a hierarchical form to offer a simplistic model to describe ordinary life knowing that what takes place in reality is much more complicated.²¹ This thesis continues forward in a similar vein of offering a simplistic model representing the highly complex nature of international relations.

¹⁸ Edwin C. Nevis, “Using an American Perspective in Understanding another Culture: Toward a Hierarchy of Needs for the People’s Republic of China,” *The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science* 19, no. 3 (January 1, 1983): 249-64, http://ft.csa.com/ids70/resolver.php?sessid=479tmmdda962jhcb06apbgp1k1&server=www-ca2.csa.com&check=b98276709f109ef59ee4a045acfcf70f&db=sageman-set-c&key=0021-8863%2F10.1177_002188638301900304&mode=pdf (accessed February 26, 2008), 253.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 254.

²⁰ Sylvia Kierkegaard and Patrick Kierkegaard, *What Women (Men) Want!: E-Consumer’s Need and Right of Information*, Aalborg University, 4, <http://medforist.grenoble-em.com/Contenus/Conference%20Tunisia%20IEBC%202005/papers/June25/50.pdf> (accessed November 14, 2008).

²¹ Dennis O’Connor and Leodones Yballe, “Maslow Revisited: Constructing a Road Map of Human Nature,” *Journal of Management Education* 31, no. 6 (December 1, 2007): 740, <http://jme.sagepub.com/cgi/content/short/31/6/738> (accessed November 14, 2008).

The project also recognizes the potential for severe logical fallacies applying a theory prominent in the analysis of individual behavior to the analysis of state behavior. *Ecological fallacy* or correlations made from the analysis of group data spuriously applied to individual behavior could potentially impact the conclusions of this study.²² In a landmark study in 1950, W. S. Robinson cautioned that different levels of analysis potentially yield different results in statistical studies.²³ Specifically, he identified errors made in the study of nativity and its impact on literacy rates. He leveled criticism at the study's focus on the aggregate or ecological level of analysis attributing higher literacy rates to foreign born residents of U.S. states. In actuality, analysis at the individual level correctly attributed lower literacy rates to foreign born state residents. A propensity of the foreign born residents to settle in areas of high native literacy accounted for the erroneous results of analysis conducted at the ecological level. Robinson, therefore, cautioned against making inferences on individual behavior from conclusions drawn from aggregates.²⁴

Similarly, this thesis attempts to minimize *hasty generalizations* or what Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune called *individualistic fallacy* or “the error of incorrectly imputing to the higher order unit the aggregation of values of individuals.”²⁵ Simply put, conclusions made regarding individual behavior cannot necessarily apply directly to group behavior. For example, Mitchell Seligson criticizes Ronald Inglehart for linking “micro-level attitudes” of political culture to the “macro-level attitudes of regime type.”²⁶ Essentially, Seligson's argument was that Inglehart's study mixed levels of analysis

²² Sharon Schwartz, “The Fallacy of the Ecological Fallacy: The Potential Misuse of a Concept and the Consequences,” *American Journal of Public Health* 84, no. 5 (May 1, 1994): 819, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=0&did=1514235&SrchMode=2&sid=3&Fmt=6&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1217290303&clientId=11969> (accessed May 28, 2008), p. 819.

²³ W. S. Robinson, “Ecological Correlations and the Behavior of Individuals,” *American Sociological Review* 15, no. 3 (June 1950): 351-357, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2087176> (accessed October 23, 2008).

²⁴ David A. Freedman, *Ecological Inference and the Ecological Fallacy* (Berkeley, CA: Prepared for the International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences, (October 15, 1999), <http://www.stanford.edu/class/ed260/freedman549.pdf> (accessed October 23, 2008).

²⁵ Mitchell A. Seligson, “The Renaissance of Political Culture or the Renaissance of the Ecological Fallacy?” *Comparative Politics* 34, no. 3 (April 2002): 273, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4146954> (accessed October 23, 2008).

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 273-275.

creating spurious relationships between its variables and yielding inaccurate results.²⁷ As this thesis seeks to apply techniques of individual human analysis to states, this logical fallacy is potentially the most destructive to any conclusions reached; consequently, adjustments made to the modified hierarchy of states' needs attempt to minimize these effects. As a result, this thesis will attempt to minimize these logical fallacies and focus on the state as the appropriate level of analysis as its guiding analytical method.

G. METHODOLOGY AND SUMMARY

Though Maslow's research investigated the needs of individuals, this project investigates the needs of states and not the needs of individuals comprising the state. In this regard, the project adopts Realist and Liberal assumptions of states as the primary actors in the international system. Additionally, some political theory investigates how individual actions of ruling elites constitute national policy; this project does not apply the hierarchy to ascertaining the needs of individual people. The project assumes the primacy of the state and attributes foreign policy to a single entity called the state in an attempt to minimize the potential for individualistic fallacy. With these assumptions in mind, the thesis's argument and support will proceed in the following manner.

Chapter I introduces the thesis and outlines the link between Maslow's research and the application of his thoughts to the political sciences. It provides a brief summary of the thesis's intent and outlines its methodology. Following this introduction, the second chapter explains the application of the hierarchy to states explaining each level of the modified hierarchy in detail. Application of the hierarchy to a case study constitutes the third chapter.

The Soviet Union and Russia as its primary successor state constitute the only case study and is the focus of the third chapter. The project analyzes two specific periods of Soviet/Russian history outlined above to demonstrate the application of the modified hierarchy of needs applied to states. It examines the Soviet Union's descent through the

²⁷ Seligson, "The Renaissance of Political Culture or the Renaissance of the Ecological Fallacy?" 287.

hierarchy and the impact of this descent on Soviet/Russian foreign policy. It continues by assessing Russia's ascent up the hierarchy and how these changes affected Russia's foreign policy decisions.

Chapter IV concludes the study. It summarizes the findings of the project and proposes minor modifications before using it in an operational environment. It assesses Russia's current status within the hierarchy and forecasts general trends expected in Russian behavior during 2009. In light of these expected behaviors, the study finishes with recommendations for U.S. policy concerning Russia.

In the final analysis, this proposal holds great potential for explaining state motivation. Traditional political theory forms its foundation; however, its intent is to provide an operational tool for the U.S. intelligence community. The following chapter will discuss these assertions in greater depth and explains the hierarchy in detail.

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II. HIERARCHY IN DETAIL

A. INTRODUCTION

Political science is replete with theories and models attempting to address why states conduct themselves in the manner they do. This thesis seeks to provide an operational method for observers to categorize states' actions into five general categories loosely based on Maslow's original hierarchy. Whereas progression up Maslow's hierarchy describes an individual with a strong self-identity, progression up the modified hierarchy of states' needs describes and ultimately defines characteristics of strong states. In short, strong states maintain internal legitimacy by mitigating internal challenges to its authority. Strong states also subdue outside aggression that threatens their population and challenges their external legitimacy. Finally, strong states enjoy prestige and influence with other states in the international system. Conversely, Maslow describes regression as "stunting" and "human diminution" of the individual.²⁸ Likewise, regression in the modified hierarchy of states' needs signifies deterioration of the state into a weakened polity.

Though this thesis ultimately seeks to shed light on the relationship between a state's needs and its behavior, its intent is to provide an operational framework (vice a scholarly model) for the analysis of state intentions.²⁹ This operational framework enables intelligence analysts and policy makers to understand and communicate quickly general intentions (i.e., needs) of a state of interest. While this thesis asserts the hierarchy's use in conveying general information quickly, it will not propose a specific process for its implementation in the intelligence community. Such an endeavor could come as subsequent work to this thesis.

²⁸ Maslow, *Toward a Psychology of Being*, vii.

²⁹ While Maslow is the original inspiration for applying a hierarchy of needs to state behavior, this project takes great care not to overlay all of his concepts of human behaviors onto states. The impact of spurious data from ecological and individualistic fallacies continues to be at the forefront of this project. Additionally, this thesis assumes the following formula as a foundation of the U.S. intelligence community: threat to U.S. interests = capability to do harm + intention to do so.

Combatant Commanders and other decision makers do not often have the time to evaluate byzantine arguments of why states act the way they do during an on-going crisis. They seek to understand quickly what a state's intentions are and to possibly intercede before those intentions are realized leaving any academic post analysis for peacetime. Is it necessary for intelligence officials and policy makers to discuss the dependent and independent variables possibly explaining why Russia invaded Georgia on August 8, 2008? Or is it sufficient for intelligence officials to explain the Russian invasion of Georgia as part of a comprehensive strategy to regain great power status and block further NATO eastward expansion as attempts to satisfy its third and fourth tier needs according to the modified hierarchy of states' needs?

This statement conveys quite a bit of meaning and presents a range of policy options for decision makers. Just as Maslow attempted to diagnose maladies in individual behavior and treat them with the appropriate medical technique, intelligence professionals and policy makers can apply various techniques to developing political trauma in international relations. For example, U.S. decision makers can adopt policies that seek to counter specific state actions, or they can construct policies that seek to help the state of interest satisfy its overarching need driving its behavior in a more constructive manner. Another example may better demonstrate this concept.

China, at first glance, appears ascending up the hierarchy of needs and seems to be transitioning from fourth tier prestige needs to the fifth tier and a strong state identity. Consequently, hosting the 2008 Olympic Games was a critical event towards satisfaction of Chinese fourth tier needs during this important transition. The U.S. government has recognized the importance of the games to Chinese prestige and what it meant for China's rise as an international great power. They have attempted to help China make this transition peacefully as a partner and avoid conflict that sometimes accompanies these transitions.³⁰ Senator Hillary Clinton and others in the U.S. advised President

30 Gilpin's Hegemonic War Theory outlines conflict sometimes associated with the rise of great powers new to the state of the international system. Robert Gilpin, "The Theory of Hegemonic War," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 18, no. 4, The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars (Spring 1988), 591-613, <http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-1953%28198821%2918%3A4%3C591%3ATTOHW%3E2.0.CO%3B2-3> (accessed January 12, 2008).

George W. Bush to boycott the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympic Games in protest of Chinese repression of freedoms in Tibet and other provinces. Rather than react to this specific Chinese behavior and possibly cause antipathy between the two nations, the U.S. president chose to attend the opening ceremonies. President Bush was able to enhance Chinese prestige needs while at the same time press Chinese officials to adopt policies of restraint when dealing with political dissent. Conversely, the U.S. has not shown the same insight and flexibility to Russian needs of security and prestige concerning U.S. policy on creating a National Missile Defense (NMD) shield.

Before explaining the modified hierarchy, it is first necessary to summarize Maslow's original hierarchy. Maslow proposed a five-tiered structure to explain "normal" human progression from one level of needs to the next. He defines normal as a "psychopathology of the average, so undramatic and so widely spread that we don't even notice it ordinarily."³¹ Ultimately, his hierarchy seeks to define an individual with a strong sense of self-identity (Figure 1).

The hierarchy begins with first tier "physiological" needs where needs for basic human sustenance of air, water, and food drive all behaviors until satisfaction. The second tier is "safety" needs where priorities lie in the security of body, family, property, employment, and the like. "Belonging" needs dominate the third tier characterized by a desire for intimate and close relationships with other humans. Satisfaction of third tier needs leads to the quest for satisfying fourth tier "esteem" needs. Respect, *respect for others* and *respect by others*, characterizes these esteem needs. The fifth and final tier is "self-actualization," which Maslow describes as the ability to be fully human or autonomous.³² As previously discussed in Chapter I, Maslow acknowledges the human desire to service multiple needs simultaneously; however, he still contends that lower level needs are prepotent to needs higher in the hierarchy. Maslow summarizes his thoughts by explaining:

³¹ Maslow, *Toward a Psychology of Being*, 16.

³² *Ibid.*, 39.

...these needs or values are related to each other in a hierarchical and developmental way, in an order of strength and of priority. Safety is a more prepotent, or stronger, more pressing, more vital need than love, for instance, and the need for food is usually stronger than either.³³

Likewise, this thesis proposes states as complex entities can satisfy needs simultaneously; however, it will present them in a hierarchical construct to offer a simplistic model for what drives state behavior. Towards this end, legitimacy needs represent the most basic needs and foundation of the modified hierarchy. Upon satisfying legitimacy needs, states seek to satisfy internal security needs. The third tier of the modified hierarchy represents external security needs, and the fourth tier is prestige needs. After satisfying each level, states achieve the fifth tier known as Strong State Identity (Figure 2).




Figure 2. Modified Hierarchy of States' Needs

This method represents an ex post facto analysis of state behavior to determine what tier on the hierarchy a state's behavior represents. To use a metaphor, it attempts to draw a regression line, in a sense, through the raw data of a scatter plot of state behavior. To continue the metaphor, the state's observable actions, policy statements by its ruling

³³ Maslow, *Toward a Psychology of Being*, 153.

elites, published military doctrine, public opinion, and other possible inputs represent the data of the scatter plot. After conducting analysis on these inputs, it is possible to determine which level of the hierarchy the inputs reflect.

This determination allows a focused analysis and continued observation to ascertain the state's current status within the hierarchy. Again, analysts expect different behaviors from states remaining static in the hierarchy than they would expect from states progressing or regressing within it. Concluding an assessment of a state's needs and its current status in the hierarchy, it is possible to extend the line of logic into the future to forecast general behaviors the state could take to satisfy its needs. Intelligence professionals then present these expected behaviors that states undertake to satisfy their needs to policy makers for action. Readers of this thesis might ask what makes this approach different from current intelligence practices.

Using the modified hierarchy of states' needs attempts to minimize a tendency of intelligence personnel to "mirror image," or evaluate information through an analyst's filter of personal experience.³⁴ Analysts will often evaluate intelligence unaware they are viewing it through this filter and disregard critical information because it is "illogical" from their perspective. Another example of this same bias is analysts who think to themselves "this would be my next move if I were in their shoes." An analyst's inability to minimize this natural tendency distorts the assessment and can have devastating effects on developing a range of expected state behaviors, known as courses of action (COAs), and disseminating those COAs to U.S. decision makers.³⁵ Douglas Porch and James Wirtz attribute mirror imaging as a factor for the intelligence failures associated with the successful 9/11 and Pearl Harbor attacks against the United States.³⁶

³⁴ Lauren Witlin, "Of Note: Mirror-Imaging and its Dangers," *S AIS Review* XXVIII, no. 1 (Winter-Spring 2008): 89-90, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/sais_review/v028/28.1witlin.pdf (accessed October 20, 2008).

³⁵ Mareen Dowd, "The Mirror has Two Faces: [Op Ed]," *New York Times*, February 1, 2004, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=2&did=535578201&SrchMode=2&sid=1&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1226707142&clientId=11969> (accessed October 20, 2008).

³⁶ Douglas Porch and James J. Wirtz, "Surprise and Intelligence Failure," *Strategic Insights* 7, no. 1 (September 2002), <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/sept02/homeland.pdf> (accessed October 20, 2008).

Additionally, misperceptions of state intent can have devastating impact on analytical assessments and subsequent policies decisions. Jack Levy, expanding on Robert Jervis' Misperception Theory, outlines how inaccurate assessments of intent, over or under estimation of an adversary's capability, and misjudging the intent of third parties can lead to war.³⁷

U.S. escalation of the Vietnam War after the Tonkin Gulf incident provides an example of how perspective impacts U.S. foreign policy. Many U.S. analysts during the 1960s saw conflict in Vietnam in terms of the Domino Theory and as an extension of an international Socialist revolution; however, many historians now criticize this view as myopic and see the Vietnam War from a Vietnamese perspective where the war was merely one part of centuries old quest for national liberation against numerous invaders. Understanding a state's actions from its perspective is critical for formulating successful U.S. policy. Applying the wrong policy to an international development can be like putting a square peg into a round hole. Analysts must remain cognizant of the differences in perspective from an office cubicle in the suburbs of Washington, D.C. and how the same developments look from the capital of the country where they are happening; therefore, the modified hierarchy of states' needs attempts to keep the focus of analysis on the needs of the state from the state's perspective and not from the analyst's perspective.

Additionally, this thesis intends the hierarchy to function as a tool to bridge the periodic disconnect between strategic, operational, and tactical analyses. The tiers of the modified hierarchy are broad macro levels of analysis explaining why states undertake specific behaviors. Consequently, most states break their broad goals down into operational and tactical objectives that together accomplish the broad strategic goal. However, some intelligence analysts get tunnel vision when evaluating a single operational or tactical level event. They focus on the single event rather than explaining its contribution to the state's broad strategic goal.

³⁷ Jack S. Levy, "Misperception and the Causes of War: Theoretical Linkage and Analytical Problems," *World Politics* 36, no. 1 (October 1993): 76-99, <http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0043-8871%28198310%2936%3A1%3C76%3AMATCOW%3E2.0.CO%3B2-A> (accessed October 20, 2008).

On the surface, this thesis might appear to only assume rationality of state actions with the assertion that states break goals down into smaller constituent parts. However, it does acknowledge the relevance of Graham Allison's second and third "conceptual lenses" where "organizational processes" and "bureaucratic politics" sometimes work towards contradictory goals and undermine the notion of a unitary, rational actor.³⁸ Graham's example of the U.S. military service chiefs working against President Kennedy's goals during the Cuban Missile Crisis illustrates the irrationality that can develop during international crises.³⁹

Individual actors or different strata of the bureaucracy could potentially seek to satisfy goals at different levels of the hierarchy. For example, the military might display actions typical of third tier external security needs while the ruling elite seek to satisfy second tier internal security needs. While intelligence analysts should strive to understand these nuances in state behavior, such endeavors quickly begin to complicate the model this thesis offers and confuse its level of analysis. Therefore, the modified hierarchy of states' needs operates from a framework assuming a unitary rational actor; yet it concedes that state behavior is the result of complex interactions from multiple sub-entities. Consequently, states as unitary, rational actors have several tasks they must accomplish.

States have several primary responsibilities. According to Robert Rotberg, states must respond to the demands of their populations while at the same time directing the energies of their people towards common goals. This in no way implies states must cater to every whim of their population. Rather, states must respond to a minimum set of demands from their population to mitigate any internal challenge to the state's authority. Additionally, states engage with outside or foreign entities to represent the interests of

³⁸ Graham T. Allison, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," *The American Political Science Review* 63, no. 3 (September 1969): 689-90, <http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-0554%28196909%2963%3A3%3C689%3ACMATCM%3E2.0.CO%3B2-%23> (accessed November 17, 2008).

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 707.

their constituent population. Simply put, states provide public goods for their citizens.⁴⁰ Public goods delivered by the state create a predictable environment for its population and foster “growth of economic opportunity” for its citizens.⁴¹

Strong states are more efficient at providing public goods. They provide a variety of high quality public goods desired by its population, such as transportation infrastructure, education, and medical care. At the same time, they provide security for its population against internal and external threats. Weak states may provide some or all of these public goods to varying degrees. Yet, they are less efficient than their strong state peers.⁴² Despite this model’s potential for quickly communicating information on how a state accomplishes these primary responsibilities, it does have its limitations.

Like all models, the modified hierarchy attempts to simplify complex interactions and processes and does not entirely eliminate the potential for error. For example, the hierarchy attempts to minimize the tendency to mirror image, yet it cannot completely eliminate it. Analysts must constantly ask themselves, “What are the needs of the state from its perspective?” Failure to do so could result in an incorrect placement of a state within the hierarchy, which potentially distorts all subsequent analyses.

Additionally, the hierarchy only assigns five general possibilities explaining why states exhibit the behaviors they do. Are there unique needs of states that do not fit neatly into the hierarchy as it is currently structured? To explore some of these questions in greater detail, this thesis will begin to clarify each level of the modified hierarchy beginning with *legitimacy needs*.

B. TIER ONE: LEGITIMACY NEEDS

Maslow’s first tier, and the foundation of his hierarchy, attributes physiological needs of air, food, and water as absolute necessities to sustain human life. A person’s

⁴⁰ Robert I. Rotberg, “The Failure and Collapse of Nation-States: Breakdown, Prevention, and Repair,” in *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*, ed. Robert I. Rotberg (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004), 2.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 4.

⁴² *Ibid.*

failure to satisfy these needs results in “their deprivation [which] makes the person sicken and wither.”⁴³ The likely outcome from deprivation of these needs is the termination of the individual’s life. Likewise, states have basic needs necessary to sustain them as well.

A state’s most basic need is for legitimacy. Legitimacy can represent a state’s birth in a sense when endorsed by the international community, and it can provide the source of state power when supported by its citizens. Without either of these, the state very likely withers away and ceases to exist. Yet, legitimacy is a complex and difficult concept to define in absolute terms. It has both an internal and external component equally critical to sustaining the state.

First, states have an endogenic requirement for legitimacy. This internal aspect of legitimacy concerns the will of the governed. Wolfgang Mommsen, summarizing Max Weber, defines legitimacy as “...the empirically discernible willingness [of the ruled] to subject themselves to a particular system of domination and to accept its norms as personally binding.”⁴⁴ To Weber, the population’s happiness with the ruling elite is irrelevant to the legitimacy of the state. Their submission to the authority of the state out of fear, self interest, or other reason is all that is necessary to maintain the state’s legitimacy. In other words, the state ceases to be legitimate when the people decide it no longer is and no longer abide by the established norms of the state.⁴⁵ The collapse of the German Democratic Republic (i.e., GDR) provides an example of this endogenic nature of legitimacy.

The population of the GDR demonstrates Weber’s internal sense of legitimacy. For decades, the GDR maintained its legitimacy with the acquiescence of its people to the established totalitarian system. To Weber and the leadership of the GDR, it made no difference if the population was satisfied or not with the public goods they received from

⁴³ Maslow, *Toward a Psychology of Being*, 153.

⁴⁴ Wolfgang J. Mommsen, *The Political and Social Theory of Max Weber: Collected Essays* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 21.

⁴⁵ Max Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology* [Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft], eds. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 948-954.

the government. Their willingness to submit to the rule of the state was sufficient to maintain the legitimacy of the state.⁴⁶ Nonetheless, its legitimacy began to deteriorate by the late eighties.

Eric Honecker ruled the GDR with Soviet support for decades. After the Hungarian border opened up in the fall of 1989, East German citizens streamed across in defiance of Honecker's iron rule. Uncontrolled emigration from East Germany and popular demonstrations in public squares loosened Honecker's grip on power. Within weeks, the public spectacle of defiance forced Honecker to resign and appoint a successor in attempt to maintain the integrity of the state.⁴⁷ The public's refusal to submit to the authority of the state undermined its legitimacy until the state finally disappeared and reunited with the democratic Federal Republic of Germany (i.e., West Germany) in 1990.

Similarly, endogenic legitimacy is one of the primary obstacles in the development of Afghanistan. Though the government of President Karzai enjoys legitimacy from the residents of Kabul, the Taliban and other warlords challenge its authority in the surrounding countryside. Many observers commenting on this situation disparagingly refer to President Karzai as the Mayor of Kabul. These examples highlight Weber's view that states maintain legitimacy as long as their citizens are willing to submit to the state's domination and authority. This definition describes an endogenic nature, which only partially explains the notion of legitimacy as it relates to the foundation of the modified hierarchy.

Secondly, legitimacy has an external nature to it as well. Speaking to this external component, Martin Wight describes legitimacy in the following way:

...as the collective judgment of international society about the rightful membership of the family of nations; how sovereignty may be transferred; how state succession should be regulated, when large states break up into smaller, or several states combine into one. It concerns the presuppositions of the region of discourse that international lawyers seek

⁴⁶ Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, 954.

⁴⁷ Serge Schmemmann, "East Germany Removes Honecker and His Protégé Takes His Place," *New York Times*, sec. 2008, October 19, 1989, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=950DEEDE103CF93AA25753C1A96F948260&sec=&spoon=&pagewanted=all> (accessed November 8, 2008).

to reduce to juridical system when they write about the recognition of states. It is the answer given by each generation to the fundamental, ever-present question, what are the principles (if any) on which international society is founded?⁴⁸

Wight speaks to a *de jure* aspect of legitimacy related to the traditions of international norms. It connotes a consensus from among an established community of states, international regimes, and other institutions of the world that are external to the nascent state. They bestow “membership” upon the state thus giving it *exogenic legitimacy*.⁴⁹ Without consent of the community, polities cannot attain legitimacy as states. An example illustrates this consensus at work.

Kosovo’s declaration of independence from Serbia demonstrates the notion of exogenic legitimacy. Post Operation ALLIED FORCE Kosovo retained status as an autonomous yet integral part of Serbia. After years of stalemated negotiations for full independence, Kosovo unilaterally declared its independence from Serbia in February 2008. Yet, only forty-eight countries of the one hundred ninety-two members of the United Nations have recognized Kosovo’s sovereignty to date.⁵⁰ The United States contends that consensus is building over time and a majority of the world’s recognized states will eventually grant Kosovo membership into the community of states where *de facto* independence will morph into *de jure* sovereignty.⁵¹

Conversely, Serbia, Russia, and other states flatly refuse to accept Kosovo’s independence, and many more states are simply unsure of the legality of Kosovo’s unilateral decision. To resolve the matter of legality, the United Nations General Assembly voted in 2008 to refer the dispute over Kosovo’s independence to the World

⁴⁸ Martin Wight, “International Legitimacy,” *International Relations* 4 (May 1972): 1.

⁴⁹ Ian Clark, “Legitimacy in a Global Order,” *Review of International Studies* 29, no. S1 (December 1, 2003): 80, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=0&did=1410823951&SrchMode=2&sid=4&Fmt=6&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1226167176&clientId=11969> (accessed November 8, 2008).

⁵⁰ Bureau of Intelligence and Research, “Independent States in the World,” United States Department of State, <http://www.state.gov/s/inr/rls/4250.htm> (accessed November 8, 2008).

⁵¹ Margaret Besheer, “UN General Assembly to Ask ICJ for Ruling on Kosovo Independence,” *Voice of America*, <http://voanews.com/english/2008-10-08-voa45.cfm?renderforprint=1> (accessed November 8, 2008).

Court at The Hague for a legal ruling according to international law.⁵² With anarchy in the international system, it is still unclear whether a ruling by the court will definitively decide the matter. Yet, its decision could sway world opinion and influence the consensus the U.S. hopes to build over time.

Interestingly, such rulings were not necessary with the split of the former state of Czechoslovakia into separate Czech and Slovak states. This decision was uncontested by any party resulting in minimal time between de facto independence and du jure sovereignty for both polities. The division of Czechoslovakia into two distinct Czech and Slovak states highlights their success in obtaining both internal and external legitimacy.

Therefore, states require both aspects of legitimacy to sustain them. A polity's failure to obtain membership into the international community of states likely results in its identity well short of state designation. Likewise, a state whose population is unwilling to submit to its governing norms will not sustain itself over time. Consequently, establishing and maintaining a state's internal and external legitimacy is its basic requirement and constitutes its most fundamental need on the modified hierarchy. Once the state satisfies its first tier needs, it progresses up the modified hierarchy and attempts to satisfy its higher-level needs.

C. TIER TWO: INTERNAL SECURITY NEEDS

After gratifying a preponderance of basic physiological needs, Maslow asserts individuals seek to satisfy safety needs associated with the second tier of the hierarchy. Protection from threat, pain, loss, and fear characterize these safety needs.⁵³ He argues that unfulfilled safety needs breeds fear, which ultimately has a debilitating impact on a strong individual identity. As an example, Maslow contends a toddler must feel content in knowing his mother is nearby providing him safety before he will muster the courage to venture off and explore the world around him.⁵⁴ These excursions into the unknown

⁵² "UN Refers Kosovo Independence to World Court," Deutsche Welle, <http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,2144,3701015,00.html> (accessed November 8, 2008).

⁵³ Maslow, *Toward a Psychology of Being*, 46.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 46-9.

allow the toddler to grow and develop an individual and independent identity. However, an individual's perception of security is what matters to Maslow and not necessarily an objective determination of the actual security situation itself. He explains:

Assured safety permits higher needs and impulses to emerge and to grow towards mastery. To endanger safety, means regression backward to the more basic foundation. What this means is that in the choice between giving up safety or giving up growth, safety will ordinarily win out. Safety needs are prepotent over growth needs...In general, only a child who feels safe dares to grow forward healthily. His safety needs must be gratified. He can't be *pushed* ahead, because the ungratified safety needs will remain forever underground, always calling for satisfaction...⁵⁵

Just as Maslow was interested in an individual's perception of his safety needs, so are intelligence analysts interested in states' perceptions of their internal security needs and the actions they take in order to satisfy them. Security needs play a very important role in the development of nascent countries into strong states. Thus, the second tier of the states' hierarchy focuses on the maintenance of public order and satisfaction of internal security needs in the development of a strong state identity.

As a result, states must mitigate or eliminate entirely any challenge to their authority in order to progress towards a strong state identity. Max Weber famously defined the state as a "...compulsory political association with...a claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order."⁵⁶ Specific phenomena from time to time may undermine a state's ability to provide public goods desired by its citizens and can become the seeds of discontent. As discontent sometimes grows into direct challenges to the state's monopoly on force, it greatly affects how the state views its own security situation. The longer a state's internal security needs go unmet and the greater insecurity it perceives within its own borders, the more time, energy, and resources it must devote to addressing these internal security needs and divert the same resources away from international concerns.

⁵⁵ The italicized words are stresses made by Maslow. Ibid., 49.

⁵⁶ Max Weber and Talcott Parsons, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997), 154.

At the root of any domestic challenge to the state is the desire to distinguish between “us” and “them.” Groups within societies attempt to define the “other” to further define themselves. One goal of the hierarchy’s second tier is to discern the extent a state distinguishes the “other” within its own borders and whether this designation can lead to violence. Further investigation into some examples of economic, social, and political means of defining the “other” demonstrates their impact on the satisfaction of second tier needs and their threat to the development of a strong state identity.

Economic phenomena exist which potentially impact the satisfaction of a state’s internal security needs. Since the repudiation of Communism inherent in the fall of the Soviet Bloc in 1991, capitalism became the primary theory for organizing the world economy and a majority of states comprising the international system.⁵⁷ A definition containing the most common elements of a capitalist system is:

...an economic system where private actors are allowed to own and control the use of property in accord with their own interests, and where the invisible hand of the pricing mechanism [through competition] coordinates supply and demand in markets in a way that is automatically in the best interests of society.⁵⁸

Interestingly, capitalism itself can undermine a state’s authority. The market seeks to allocate world resources irrespective of national borders according to a competitive pricing system of supply and demand.⁵⁹ Multinational corporations such as Sony, General Motors, and Phillips stand as testaments to capitalism’s reach beyond state borders. Additionally, “creative destruction” is a constitutive feature of capitalism where inefficient and uncompetitive firms cease to exist and the more efficient firms survive to fight another day.⁶⁰

⁵⁷ Herbert J. Walberg and Joseph L. Bast, *Education and Capitalism: How Overcoming our Fear of Markets and Economics can Improve America's Schools*, 521 (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2003), 82, <http://www.hoover.org/publications/books/2995211.html> (accessed November 8, 2008).

⁵⁸ Bruce R. Scott, *The Political Economy of Capitalism*, 07-037 (Harvard Business School, 2006), Abstract, <http://www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/07-037.pdf> (accessed November 8, 2008).

⁵⁹ Charles J. Wheelan, *Naked Economics: Undressing the Dismal Science*, 1st ed. (New York: Norton, 2002), 19.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 36.

Sometimes firms undermine a state's sovereignty in order to maximize their profits and remain competitive in the marketplace. One such example was a group of investors headed by George Soros. The group made billions of dollars in the 1990s by manipulating the monetary reserves of Thailand. Their manipulation undermined Thailand's economic stability and ultimately spurred the 1997 Asian financial meltdown crippling the economies throughout the Pacific region.⁶¹ This incident demonstrates capitalism's nature of creating winners and losers within some of the same transactions. Consequently, capitalism potentially creates societal dichotomies, which further exacerbate capitalism's inherent nature to undermine state authority.

Within a capitalist economic framework, competition begins to create different dichotomies within society. These dichotomies draw distinctions between societal groups and impede the satisfaction of internal security needs. A classic example of one such dichotomy is the Marxist differentiation between the so-called workers and owners of the means of production. Marxist interpretation of history sees class struggle between these two groups as the primary cause of violence within industrialized states.⁶² Modern day scholars speak of similar struggles between society's "haves" and "have-nots" often expressed in the inequality of income distribution and measured by the Gini Index.⁶³ Numerous other economic related dichotomies also exist such as agricultural/industrial, skilled/unskilled, urban/rural, etc. Many times populations observing great disparity in the distribution of wealth use social phenomena to explain or justify the results of market forces creating economic winners and losers.

Social forces within states have the potential to become serious obstacles in the satisfaction of second tier internal security needs. Though there are potentially an infinite

⁶¹ Kenshi Taketa, "Contagion of Financial Crises," Ph.D., The University of Wisconsin - Madison, 135 pp. <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=1&did=765918621&SrchMode=2&sid=1&Fmt=2&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1226169676&clientId=11969> (accessed October 31, 2008).

⁶² Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, trans. Samuel Moore, 5th-English Edition ed. (London: W. Reeves, 1888), 31, <http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/m/marx/karl/m39c/> (accessed October 31, 2008).

⁶³ Wheelan, *Naked Economics: Undressing the Dismal Science*, 161.

number of these social forces, an example of one is the three thousand year notion of nationalism.⁶⁴ According to Rick Fawn, Adam D. Smith provides the classical definition of nationalism as:

...an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity, and identity on behalf of a population deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or potential [nation].⁶⁵

Closer inspection of this definition reveals nationalism is a double-edged sword capable of both positive and negative impacts on state development. The unifying property of nationalism enabled the consolidation of European states from the ashes of the Thirty Years War in the seventeenth century. Though scholars attribute the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 as the origin of the modern state system, many see nationalism (often resulting from common language, culture, and heritage) as the unifying force of disparate peasants and their rulers into cohesive polities known as states. Commenting on this phenomenon, Fawn says, “Security in a national identity provides a powerful existential benefit.”⁶⁶ In this regard, nationalism had a positive impact on development for states such as France and Holland, yet nationalism’s impact is not always unifying and positive.

Smith’s definition also speaks to autonomy as a characteristic of nationalism. Fawn credits the French Revolution of 1789 as the beginning of the modern ideology of nationalism.⁶⁷ Successive waves of societal atomization have hit Europe since that time where populations of large states jettisoned a common state identity. They subsequently broke up into smaller states along national or ethnic identities seeking autonomy from the control of the central government. Agitation and violence along these ethnic cleavages often times precede the devolution of these states as political entities. Though not always violent, the former countries of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia provide examples of devolved states resulting from the impact of

⁶⁴ Rick Fawn, *Ideology and National Identity in Post-Communist Foreign Policies*, 1st ed. (London; Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003), 13.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 11.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 14.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 1, 11.

competing nationalisms.⁶⁸ Though nationalism can be a strong obstacle to the satisfaction of second tier needs, other social forces can also impede the development of a strong state identity.

Religion, sometimes intertwined and indistinguishable from ethnicities who are its primary practitioners, is another example of a social phenomenon capable of preventing the satisfaction of internal security needs. Like nationalism, religion can erect barriers between populations and is another means to distinguish “them” from “us.” Historically, religion has had both a unifying and a destabilizing effect on states. For example, Judaism provided an important facet for a common identity in the consolidation of the state of Israel while differences between Sunni and Shia Muslims continue to destabilize the modern state of Iraq.

Conversely, the occurrence of violence in the Northern Ireland during the 1970s and 80s demonstrates how religious and ethnic causal factors sometimes blur together. Was violence in Northern Ireland the result of a rift between Protestantism and Catholicism, or was it merely a religious veneer covering an ethnic rivalry between the Irish and Scots-Irish? Regardless of the answer, the population viewed the “other” as internal to the polity and not external to it demonstrating a social phenomena that can impede satisfaction of internal security needs. Several other examples of destabilizing forces lie outside of the state’s social dynamics.

Political phenomena designating the “other” as internal to the state can also slow the satisfaction of internal security needs. Michael Burleigh attributes similar unifying and destabilizing characteristics to what he called “political or secular religions.”⁶⁹ He includes Jacobism, Bolshevism, and National Socialism as a few examples of political religions.⁷⁰ Their goal is not necessarily to replace theistic religion but to co-opt its ability to unify a polity or distinguish the “other” within it (e.g., revolutionaries from

⁶⁸ Juan J. Linz and Alfred C. Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 16.

⁶⁹ Michael Burleigh, *Earthly Powers: The Clash of Religion and Politics in Europe from the French Revolution to the Great War*, 1st ed. (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2005), 3.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 1-13.

monarchists, party members from non-party members, or Aryans from non-Aryans). This is one example of political phenomena that differentiates subgroups within states. Numerous others exist which accomplish the same result.

Once subgroup identities internal to a state become prepotent over a common national identity, it becomes much easier to delineate artificially “winners” and “losers” in the competition for state resources. In this situation, states can direct highly prized goods towards one group while denying them to another or “the other.” For example, many think of security as the quintessential public good which is difficult to divide between society’s winners and losers. However, the German Kristallnacht of 1938 and the subsequent Jewish pogroms demonstrate how security is divisible between societal groups in certain situations. The prepotency of subgroup identities over a national identity essentially opens the door to other political phenomena, which potentially irritates societal groups until the animosity grows into a direct challenge to the state’s monopoly on force.

Corruption, favoritism, and nepotism are other examples of political phenomena which step through the door opened by the distinction of a state’s internal “other.” Corruption, or the misuse of public office for private gain, is the nexus of where economic and social phenomena come together to influence the allocation of state resources through the political process.⁷¹ Corrupt officials can direct state resources towards members of the same clan/tribal group or possibly towards former business partners as is often alleged against American presidential administrations. Other times, government officials simply allocate resources to the highest bidder for nothing more than their own personal enrichment. Corruption’s impact on states and economies can be devastating. In fact, Charles Wheelan says corruption is “not merely an inconvenience, as it is sometimes treated; it is a cancer that misallocates resources, stifles innovation, and

⁷¹ *Module III: Introduction to Corruption*, World Bank, <http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/35970/mod03.pdf> (accessed October 30, 2008).

discourages foreign investment.”⁷² In spite of the devastating effects of corruption and the other obstacles on the satisfaction of internal security needs, the solution appears deceptively simple.

Successive U.S. presidential administrations have seen democratic government as the best solution to these problems. The goal of each administration was for new democracies to mitigate violence by providing disaffected groups within a state equal opportunity under the law to resolve their grievances. Proponents of democracy see equality under the law and procedural transparency through impartial institutions as the key to peaceful conflict resolution. They do not necessarily believe that democracy ensures the formation of a prepotent national identity; however, they contend that democracy can keep societal tensions from boiling over into violence. Consequently, American presidents have used U.S. instruments of power as carrots and sticks to encourage the creation of democracies throughout the world.⁷³ Commenting on this view from an academic perspective, Larry Diamond says the following:

The essence of democratic consolidation is a behavioral and attitudinal embrace of democratic principles and methods by both elites and mass...the political institutions of democracy must become more coherent, capable, and autonomous, so that all major political players are willing to commit to and be bound by their rules and norms...democracy [must] effectively address society's most pressing problems and, perhaps more important, provide the liberty, accountability, and responsiveness that citizens uniquely expect from democracy and the order that they expect from any government.⁷⁴

Should economic, social, and political obstacles to the satisfaction of internal security needs become overwhelming, they may potentially manifest themselves into direct and violent challenges to the state's authority. Crime syndicates, warlords, insurgents, separatists, and terror groups are all examples of groups directly challenging a state's monopoly over the legitimate use of force and grow out of the differentiations

⁷² Wheelan, *Naked Economics: Undressing the Dismal Science*, 208.

⁷³ *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. National Security Council, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2006.pdf> (accessed October 31, 2008)).

⁷⁴ Larry Jay Diamond, *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 20.

within states as a result of the phenomena mentioned above. As the state attempts to address its unmet internal security needs because of the threat posed by these groups, it must increasingly allocate more of its finite resources away from its other interests. An example demonstrates the reallocation of resources sometimes necessary to address unmet internal security needs.

The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in 1917 provides a clear example of a state's reallocation of resources to meet its unmet internal security needs. After the February Revolution of 1917, the Russian Provisional Government maintained its support for the war against Germany. With Russia's army still deployed in the field, Russia's internal security situation continued to deteriorate during 1917. Lenin and his Bolsheviks took advantage of the instability within the country and launched the October coup against Alexander's Kerensky's government.⁷⁵ Knowing he had little time to consolidate his hold on power after the coup, Lenin saw the retrenchment of Russian foreign policy initiatives as a matter of life and death. He sought to end the war with Germany almost at any cost in order to bring the army home and use them in expanding his power over the entire country. Summarizing this situation, Richard Pipes says that "in Lenin's judgment, unless his government promptly concluded an armistice, it would not survive."⁷⁶

Consequently, needs for internal security become prepotent over its other higher level needs. Further regression down the hierarchy resulting from the state's inability to meet these needs adequately can ultimately endanger the state's legitimacy and inaugurate its devolution. Conversely, adequately satisfying its internal security needs allows the state to progress to the next level of the hierarchy where external security needs take precedence.

D. TIER THREE: EXTERNAL SECURITY NEEDS

The third tier of this project marks a significant departure from concepts in Maslow's original theory. Maslow's third tier concerns an individual's need for

⁷⁵ Richard Pipes, *A Concise History of the Russian Revolution*, 1st ed. (New York: Knopf, 1995), 139-40.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 166.

belonging. Human desire for companionship and acceptance among peer groups are examples of belonging needs.⁷⁷ However, this project will further investigate the impact security has on state behavior before contemplating the impact of higher-level needs.

Safety and security for states is a much more complex concept due to the internal and external nature of state security. The internal nature of safety and security explained by the second tier of the states' hierarchy analyzes the impact of states' free-thinking, dynamic internal components on state behavior. Whereas, the third tier of the state's hierarchy focuses on the external nature of state security and a state's interaction with its external environment.

Maslow addressed the external nature of safety and security but did not assign it a unique level within his hierarchy. He characterizes the need for safety, belonging, love, and respect as needs that "can only be satisfied from outside the person."⁷⁸ In his view, the environment influences these needs to a large extent. Explaining this assertion, Maslow says:

This means considerable dependence on the environment. A person in this dependent position cannot really be said to be governing himself, or in control of his own fate...This is the same as saying that he must adapt and adjust by being flexible and responsive and by changing himself to fit the external situation. *He* is the dependent variable; the environment is the fixed, independent variable. Because of this, the deficiency-motivated man must be more afraid of the environment, since there is always the possibility that it may fail or disappoint him.⁷⁹

Outside aggression and external security is a critical concept for states. Many scholars argue the creation of states and the modern international state system resulted directly from external security concerns and the incidence of war. In fact, Charles Tilly

⁷⁷ Maslow, *Toward a Psychology of Being*, 199-200.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 34.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 34. The italicized words are original stresses made by Maslow.

famously declared “War made the state and the state made war.”⁸⁰ In this regard, he explains European state development as a direct result of different methods used for preparation and prosecution of war.⁸¹

For Tilly, war resulted from the desire of Europeans to coerce “money, goods, deference, and access to pleasures” from their weaker, less capable peers.⁸² Highly centralized and thus better organized polities usually succeeded over their less organized and decentralized opponents. Successful European polities established buffer zones patrolled by armies to secure their newly acquired spoils of war. As centralized polities began to increase their populations and territory, their buffer zones began to overlap with each other leading to conflict among them.⁸³ Explaining this model of state development as a result of war and its diffusion throughout the world as the default developmental pattern, Tilly says:

Why national states? National states won out in the world as a whole because they first won out in Europe, whose states then acted to reproduce themselves. They won in Europe because the most powerful states – France and Spain before all others – adopted forms of warfare that temporarily crushed their neighbors, and whose support generated as by-products centralization, differentiation, and autonomy of the state apparatus.⁸⁴

Assignment to the third tier of the states’ hierarchy reflects a state which has attained internal and external legitimacy to satisfy its first tier needs. It has also has sufficiently neutralized any internal threats to its authority and is capable of producing public goods for its population. Yet, it is unable to mitigate fully external threats to its sovereignty and safeguard its population from external aggression and must devote

⁸⁰ Bruce D. Porter, *War and the Rise of the State: The Military Foundations of Modern Politics* (New York: Free Press; Toronto; New York: Maxwell Macmillan Canada; Maxwell Macmillan International, 1994), xix.

⁸¹ Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992*, Rev. pbk. ed. (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1992), 271.

⁸² *Ibid.*, 70.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 70-1.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 183.

substantial resources to address these external security needs. These external security needs can revolve around a state's physical sense of security as well as its economic security.

One of the primary responsibilities a state must accomplish is the maintenance of its external legitimacy by protecting its populations from external threats. The Realist notion of the Security Dilemma, or never ending arms races that results from states seeking to gain security advantages over each other, can greatly influence the behavior of states assigned to this level of the hierarchy. Shiping Tang contends that "geographic barriers, state-to-state interactions, international structure, and military technology" are four factors that shape a state's security environment.⁸⁵ Additionally, he proposes observers measure the degree of a state's self-restraint vis-à-vis the security dilemma to ascertain its level of insecurity within the security environment created by these four factors. The more self-restrained a state is in its behavior, the less threatened it is by the behavior of neighboring states.⁸⁶ Conversely, the opposite holds true as well. An example demonstrates these forces at work.

In the years following World War I, France feared a resurgent Germany capable of launching offensives in a new war. By 1929, France had begun construction on a comprehensive defense perimeter of static forts on its frontier with Germany known as the Maginot Line. The concept behind the Maginot Line was to slow a potential German invasion down to give France the three weeks necessary for mobilization of its reserve forces.⁸⁷ Though the plan did not work out as the French administration hoped, it

⁸⁵ Shiping Tang, "A Systemic Theory of the Security Environment," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 27, no. 1 (March 1, 2004): 4, <http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~db=all?content=10.1080/0140239042000232756> (accessed November 10, 2008).

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 6.

⁸⁷ Eric A. Jr. Arnold, "Review of *the Maginot Line: None Shall Pass*," *History* 26, no. 4 (July 1, 1998): 185, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=4&did=31923166&SrchMode=2&sid=1&Fmt=6&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1226356166&clientId=11969> (accessed November 10, 2008).

demonstrates behavior of a state focused on its external security needs and unable to progress up the hierarchy of needs to a strong state identity. This represents only one aspect of security reflected in the third tier of the hierarchy.

A critical aspect of a state's security environment is a stable economic environment. Consequently, a state's economic security plays a role in satisfaction of its external security needs. Economic security is a difficult term to define; however, it entails aspects of a state's economic vulnerability to other states and "concerns access to the resources, finance and markets necessary to sustain acceptable levels of welfare and state power."⁸⁸ An example demonstrates how a state's perception of economic vulnerability can trigger regression down the hierarchy and precipitate conflict.

Many observers cite Japan's reliance on U.S. oil shipments as a major cause for conflict between the two states during World War II. Japan in 1940 was a country with limited territory and a limited supply of natural resources. It absolutely relied on access to raw materials gained from foreign markets to drive its economy. It clearly saw economic stability as a foreign policy priority. In 1940, the Japanese government concluded that access to raw materials through territorial expansion was in the interest of Japanese national security. Unfortunately for Japan, the empire obtained a majority of its oil from the United States and was fearful of losing this primary source of energy as retribution for Japanese aggression against the British and Dutch in the South Pacific.⁸⁹ President Roosevelt skillfully used U.S. shipments of oil to deter Japanese aggression in the South Pacific throughout the spring and summer of 1941. However, U.S. bureaucratic infighting undermined Roosevelt's efforts of deterrence by creating a de facto oil embargo on Japanese oil imports. The embargo greatly deteriorated relations between the two states and put them on a collision course by August 1941. The Japanese

⁸⁸ Miles Kahler, "Economic Security in an Era of Globalization: Definition and Provision," *The Pacific Review* 17, no. 4 (January 1, 2004): 485, http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/483841_731325979_748087645.pdf (accessed November 12, 2008); Liina Mauring and Daniel Schaer, "The Effects of the Russian Energy Sector on the Security of the Baltic States," *The Baltic Security and Defence Review* 8 (2006): 68, <http://www.bdcsl.ee/fileadmin/docs/bsdr/4-Russian%20Energy%20Sector%20and%20Baltic%20Security-Liina%20Mauring%20and%20Daniel%20Schaer.pdf> (accessed November 12, 2008).

⁸⁹ Scott D. Sagan, "From Deterrence to Coercion to War: The Road to Pearl Harbor," in *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, ed. Alexander L. George and others, 2nd ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 71.

saw access to oil as a matter of survival for the Japanese state. Economic vulnerability led directly to the Imperial Navy's decision to attack Pearl Harbor in December 1941.⁹⁰ This example demonstrates the close relationship between economic and physical security.

In the modern era, states see economic security as a primary foreign policy objective. Reflecting the importance of economic security in the formulation of Russian national security policy, President Vladimir Putin said during his infamous Munich speech in February 2007:

It is well known that international security comprises much more than issues relating to military and political stability. It involves the stability of the global economy, overcoming poverty, economic security and developing a dialogue between civilisations.⁹¹

Additionally, Estonia lists economic security through diversification of its external economic relationships (i.e., partners other than Russia) as one of its top national security objectives.⁹² Estonia assesses its gas and electrical system's dependence on "foreign monopolistic energy systems and suppliers" as a threat of an economic origin.⁹³ Economic security is also a critical component of U.S. national security policy. For example, the U.S. National Security Strategy of 2006 seems to consider North Korean currency counterfeiting operations, narcotics trafficking activities, and missile provocations as equal threats to U.S. security.⁹⁴

The third tier of the states' hierarchy reflects both the physical and economic nature of security. States seek protection against external physical forces as well as guaranteed access to markets that ensures a stable economic environment. States at this

⁹⁰ Sagan, "From Deterrence to Coercion to War: The Road to Pearl Harbor," 83-5.

⁹¹ Vladimir President Putin, "Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy," President of Russia - Official Web Portal, http://kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2007/02/11/0138_type82914type84779_118135.shtml (accessed November 12, 2008).

⁹² *National Security Concept of the Republic of Estonia*, Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (2004), <http://web-static.vm.ee/static/failid/335/SecurityConcept.pdf> (accessed January 28, 2008).

⁹³ *Ibid.*

⁹⁴ *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, 21.

level of development have satisfied needs to maintain their internal legitimacy; however, they have not sufficiently satisfied their needs guaranteeing external legitimacy. Their policies must help create a stable economic and security environment before it can pursue prestige needs on the fourth tier of the hierarchy.

E. TIER FOUR: PRESTIGE NEEDS

Maslow's fourth tier discusses the importance of esteem needs to human development of a strong identity. He credits fulfillment of these needs as freeing the individual from "...inhibitions, cautions, fears, doubts, controls, reservations, [and] self-criticism..." and draws a distinction between two facets of these needs.⁹⁵ First, one must have respect for oneself and, secondly, receive respect from others. Characterizing the impact of these needs, Maslow says:

All people in our society...have a need or desire for a stable, firmly based, (usually) high evaluation of themselves, for self-respect, or self-esteem, and for the esteem of others. By firmly based self-esteem, we mean that which is soundly based upon real capacity, achievement and respect from others. These needs may be classified into two subsidiary sets. These are, first, the desire for strength, for achievement, for adequacy, for confidence in the face of the world, and for independence and freedom. Secondly, we have what we may call the desire for reputation or prestige (defining it as respect or esteem from other people), recognition, attention, importance or appreciation....Satisfaction of the self-esteem needs leads to feelings of self confidence, worth, strength, capability and adequacy of being useful and necessary in the world. But thwarting of these needs produces feelings of inferiority, of weakness and of helplessness.⁹⁶

Esteem, or prestige, is also an important characteristic for states as well. Just as respect for oneself and respect from others frees individuals from inhibitions and cautions, a high degree of prestige reduces similar constraints on state behavior.

⁹⁵ Maslow, *Toward a Psychology of Being*, 107.

⁹⁶ A. H. Maslow, "A Theory of Human Motivation," in *Twentieth Century Psychology: Recent Developments in Psychology*, ed. Philip Lawrence Harriman (Freeport, N.Y.: Books for Libraries Press, 1970), 33-4.

Therefore, the fourth tier of the modified hierarchy of states' needs explores the success states achieve in the satisfaction of prestige needs. Similar to esteem needs for human beings, states' pursuit for prestige is also multifaceted and complex.

Maslow defines prestige as a concept bestowed upon an entity from an external source. It was Cardinal Richelieu and his pursuit of French *raison d'état* that made prestige in the sixteenth century almost synonymous with reputation.⁹⁷ Interestingly, the etymology of the word traces back to the Latin word *praestigiae* meaning "quick finger" or "juggler's tricks."⁹⁸ In fact, prestige shares the same root as the modern word of *prestidigitation* (i.e., magic through sleight of hand) where deception is part of their mutual historical meanings.

It is in regard to these nuances that state prestige differs slightly from Maslow's definition of esteem "...which is soundly based upon real capacity, achievement and respect from others."⁹⁹ Many times perception is the primary basis of state prestige and does not necessarily reflect real capacity or state power at all. For instance, U.S. prestige between the two world wars did not accurately reflect its growing power and influence. A situation Hans Morgenthau referred to as *negative power*.¹⁰⁰ Conversely, France's prestige during the same time period did not reflect its declining power and influence which Morgenthau called a *policy of bluff*.¹⁰¹ Generally speaking, though, an increase in one (i.e., power, influence, or prestige) reflects a similar increase in the others. Reflecting the involvement of perception to the concept of prestige, Gregory Copely likens it to a credit rating of state influence and power. Just as individual credit ratings reflect credit history as well as other factors beyond an objective assessment of current capability, so does prestige reflect a similar state capability.

⁹⁷ Youngho Kim, "Does Prestige Matter in International Politics?" *Journal of International and Area Studies* 11, no. 1 (June 2004): 41, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=69&sid=2&srchmode=1&vinst=PROD&fmt=6&startpage=-1&clientid=11969&vname=PQD&RQT=309&did=665705581&scaling=FULL&ts=1227046413&vtype=PQD&rqt=309&TS=1227046469&clientId=11969> (accessed November 18, 2008).

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 41.

⁹⁹ Maslow, *A Theory of Human Motivation*, 33-4.

¹⁰⁰ Kim, *Does Prestige Matter in International Politics?*, 42.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 42.

Prestige is the credit rating of countries. A country with a good credit rating attracts savings, investments and experts, provided the foreign owners of the assets also have confidence in the country's political ability. A country with a bad credit rating and a declining currency suffers from capital flight.¹⁰²

These subtleties represent just some of the complexities involving states' pursuit of prestige. A state's modern interest for prestige revolves around three dichotomies associated with it. Prestige has internal and external dimensions, reflects both hard and soft power, and simultaneously reinforces equality and inequality among states in the international system.

The first dichotomy is the internal and external nature of prestige. Maslow alludes to an internal and external component of esteem where self-esteem grows from inside the individual while external entities bestow prestige from outside the individual. State prestige functions in a somewhat similar fashion though self-esteem does not originate from the state itself but rather from the state's constituent population.

Populations bestow prestige on the state for a variety of reasons. The state may efficiently disperse public goods to its population and earn the respect of its citizens. Additionally, a state, such as Egypt, may enjoy respect from its population because it represents an ancient civilization whose accomplishments impacted the modern world. Or, a state may exert a great deal of influence in the international system and bring glory to its people who thus bestow internal prestige upon it. The internal prestige bestowed upon the U.S. by its population is a good example of this phenomenon and also illustrates another facet of state prestige.

States also gain external prestige from other states in the international system. International, or external, prestige stems from a variety of sources. One means to gain prestige is from military capability demonstrated through victories on the battlefield or

¹⁰² Gregory R. Copely, "The Strategic Junction Point: Why Prestige Matters," *Defense and Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy* 36, no. 3 (2008): 7, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=8&did=1468755871&SrchMode=2&sid=2&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1227043074&clientId=11969> (accessed November 18, 2008).

fielding advanced weapons system. Great Britain during the nineteenth century enjoyed great external prestige from defeating Napoleon at Waterloo and fielding the most powerful navy of the time.

Additionally, economic power can increase state prestige. Since the end of World War II, the role of Japan's military is as a self-defense force only. Despite Japan's relegation of its military capability to the back bench, it has enjoyed great external prestige for its economic strength. Today, Japan is an economic powerhouse and exerts great influence throughout international markets. The coercive capability of military and economic power defines *hard power* and underscores the second dichotomy associated with state prestige.

Prestige can reflect both *soft* and *hard* power. Joseph Nye, one of the first scholars to explore the concept of soft power, defines it as "the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments."¹⁰³ As previously stated, hard power is coercion through the use of military or economic power.¹⁰⁴ Each demonstrates different nuances of state prestige.

Hard power is the traditional use of economic carrots and military sticks to influence another state's behavior. It is traditional in the sense that empires historically used military force or monetary incentives to coerce an adversary into a more amenable position.¹⁰⁵ The common expression "turn it into a desert and call it peace" reflects this historical use of hard power. Similarly, Youngho Kim draws a distinction between negative prestige acquired through brutality and positive prestige gained from restraint.¹⁰⁶ As an example of negative prestige, Kim asserts Athens during the Peloponnesian War increased its prestige and thus its power as a result of "naked force" and brutality used

¹⁰³ Joseph S. Nye, "Soft Power and American Foreign Policy," *Political Science Quarterly* 119, no. 2 (Summer 2004): 256, <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=10&sid=1&srchmode=1&vinst=PROD&fmt=6&startpage=-1&clientid=11969&vname=PQD&RQT=309&did=708650521&scaling=FULL&ts=1227566366&vtype=PQD&rq=309&TS=1227642754&clientId=11969> (accessed November 8, 2008).

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 256.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 261-2.

¹⁰⁶ Kim, *Does Prestige Matter in International Politics?*, 40.

against the Melians.¹⁰⁷ Athens saw Melian submission as an enhancement to its international prestige and thus critical to accomplishing its foreign policy objectives with regards to other Greek city-states.¹⁰⁸

Prestige gained from hard power can provide states with concrete strategic benefits. Copely's previous metaphor of a state credit rating highlights two benefits states obtain by acquiring a high amount of international prestige. One benefit is deterrence. Adversaries are less likely to challenge a state's actual military capability if it enjoys a high rate of prestige regarding the perception of its hard power.¹⁰⁹ Thus, Athens saw prestige gained from the sacking of Melos as a deterrent to similar defections from other lesser Greek powers.¹¹⁰ States obtain other benefits as well from high levels of prestige.

A second benefit is prestige's impact on a state's decision to *bandwagon* or *balance* against threats. If balancing is developing allies *against* a threat, then bandwagoning is allying *with* the threatening state itself.¹¹¹ Scholars disagree on the causal mechanisms involved in the decision to balance or bandwagon; however, many agree that balancing is a behavior primarily done by more powerful states against each other while weaker more isolated states bandwagon when confronted by threats. State prestige influences the decision to balance or bandwagon in two ways. First, larger states may choose to balance against threats in an effort to retain "credibility" as a strong, independent power rather than bandwagon with the aggressor.¹¹² Secondly, prestige of potential allies weighted against the prestige of aggressors can impact a weaker state's decision to balance or bandwagon. For example, the Soviet Union ultimately decided to

¹⁰⁷ Kim, *Does Prestige Matter in International Politics?*, 43.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 44.

¹⁰⁹ Michael W. Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 12, no. 3 (Summer 1983): 218-19.

¹¹⁰ Kim, *Does Prestige Matter in International Politics?*, 43-4.

¹¹¹ David L. Rousseau, *Identifying Threats and Threatening Identities: The Social Construction of Realism and Liberalism* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006), 18.

¹¹² Stephen M. Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power," *International Security* 9, no. 4 (Spring 1985): 18, <http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0162-2889%28198521%299%3A4%3C3%3AAAFATBO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-K> (accessed November 8, 2008).

bandwagon with an aggressive Nazi Germany instead of balancing against it in an alliance with France or Great Britain. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact reflects the Soviet's perception of superior German capability and prestige when compared to the French, yet hard power is not the only means to achieve bandwagoning and influence state behavior.

Soft power influences state behavior as well. Nye argues the attractiveness of a state's culture and ideas can influence the behavior of other states in the international system mitigating any need for coercive or hard power.¹¹³ Essentially, winning the hearts and minds of populations around the world can augment hard power and sometimes achieve foreign policy objectives without the use of economic carrots and military sticks. Kim's concept of positive prestige gained from restrained state behavior parallels Nye's concept of soft power.¹¹⁴ Kim cites British restraint in acquiring territory and exploiting the spoils of war after its victory over Napoleon as a great source of international prestige. At the time, British Foreign Secretary Castlereagh ultimately saw the increase in international prestige from London's restraint as translating directly into an increase in British state power.¹¹⁵

Another example demonstrating this concept is the attractiveness of democratic ideals as a source of U.S. soft power against the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Great Britain and other states in the international system saw the U.S. as occupying the moral high ground when compared to the totalitarian Soviet Union. This made them more willing to adopt positions favorable to Washington at the expense of Moscow. This example highlights the role prestige plays in the relationship between powerful and less powerful states and introduces the third dichotomy associated with state prestige.

Prestige can reflect both inequality and equality in the international system. This project has so far focused on prestige as a reflection of inequality among states. In this regard, prestige is a measurement of the perceived hard and soft power a state possesses. Generally speaking, strong states seek to maintain high international prestige while

¹¹³ Nye, *Soft Power and American Foreign Policy*, 256, 263.

¹¹⁴ Kim, *Does Prestige Matter in International Politics?*, 40.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 43.

weaker states attempt to bolster their prestige. States initiate wars, host Olympic Games, and seek new economic markets partly in an attempt to increase or maintain their international prestige, for prestige is ultimately a reflection of perceived state power and influence. Nonetheless, some observers of international relations contend that prestige can reflect more than the inequality of state power.

Participation and membership in international institutions also bring prestige to states and reflect the concept of equality in the international system. Membership in international institutions and regimes, such as the World Trade Organization, gives strong and weak states a seat at the table and an equal voice. It minimizes the impact of the hierarchy of power and promotes equality of states within the international system.¹¹⁶ Besides the specific tangible benefits membership in international institutions may bring (e.g., removal of tariffs on products), it can elevate the prestige of a state. While elevating the prestige of weaker states, membership in international institutions can simultaneously minimize the power advantage of stronger states. For example, Iceland is a small island nation with little indigenous defense capability, yet NATO membership elevates its prestige and nominally makes it an equal to the U.S. in decision making for security of the Euro-Atlantic community. Thus, prestige gained from membership in international institutions can promote equality in the international system and demonstrates the final dichotomy associated with prestige.

Therefore, the fourth level of the modified hierarchy of states' needs reflects a state's attempt to satisfy its prestige needs. Fourth tier needs have an internal component where a state's population bestows prestige upon it. It also reflects the external nature of prestige where a state's prestige reflects its standing among peer in the international system. The fourth tier also reflects both hard and soft power associated with international prestige. Not only does prestige reflect the perception of military and economic power, but also the attractiveness of the ideals embodied by the state. Finally,

¹¹⁶ Rousseau, *Identifying Threats and Threatening Identities: The Social Construction of Realism and Liberalism*, 25.

international prestige reflects both equality and inequality in the international system. Upon satisfaction of the state's prestige needs, states progress to the fifth tier of the modified hierarchy.

F. TIER FIVE: STRONG STATE IDENTITY

After gratifying a preponderance of *basic* needs as explained by the first four tiers of the hierarchy, Maslow asserts individuals attain the hierarchy's fifth tier known as *Self-Actualization*.¹¹⁷ A quick summary of Maslow's very complicated and thorough definition of self-actualization is a person with a strong, unified sense of identity capable of frequent moments of "peak experience."¹¹⁸ He explains these experiences as moments when "the powers of the person come together in a particularly efficient...way...in which he is more integrated and less split...fully functioning...more independent of his lower needs...."¹¹⁹ He continues by saying:

The person in peak-experiences feels himself, more than at other times, to be the responsible, active, creating center of his activities and of his perceptions. He feels more like a prime mover, more self-determined (rather than caused, determined, helpless, dependent, passive, weak, bossed). He feels himself to be his own boss, fully responsible, fully volitional, with more "free will" than at other times, master of his fate, an agent.¹²⁰

Additionally, attaining self-actualization and the fifth tier of the hierarchy is not an end-state in itself. Nor does it reflect a static condition where the individual is absent any significant problems.¹²¹ Rather, self-actualization is a dynamic situation where peak experiences may come in "spurts" at any stage of development. What makes the self-

¹¹⁷ Maslow, *A Theory of Human Motivation*, 34.

¹¹⁸ Maslow, *Toward a Psychology of Being*, 103-114.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 97.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, 106-7.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, 115.

actualized person different from others experiencing similar moments of peak experiences is the frequency and intensity of these moments when compared to the average person.¹²² Yet, how do these characteristics apply to states?

States also seek to develop a strong, unified identity in order to function efficiently. States assessed at the fifth tier of the hierarchy have sufficiently established their legitimacy; they have mitigated challenges to their internal and external security; and they have established a good “credit rating” with negative or positive prestige.¹²³ States in this situation are more efficient at providing public goods than their counterparts regressing or stagnating at lower levels of the hierarchy. These less efficient states must devote a higher percentage of their resources than their strong state peers to deliver basic public goods necessary to sustain the state’s legitimacy, security, and prestige. Conversely, development into a strong state identity minimizes challenges to the state’s authority and frees up state resources. Ultimately, flexibility in resource allocation allows the state to deliver higher level public goods to its citizenry, some of which could include well built transportation infrastructure, functioning institutions which promote social equality and economic equal opportunity, or even free health and child care. Ultimately, this efficiency gives states more freedom and flexibility in their interactions with other states in the international system.

Consequently, states with a strong, unified identity also perceive themselves as less dependent and more fully volitional. Strong states have more flexibility in how they pursue foreign policy objectives. They are more capable of setting the agenda rather than reacting to another state’s agenda. Additionally, strong states capable of setting the agenda have more flexibility in the instruments of national power they leverage to accomplish their foreign policy objectives. In fact, states which progressed up the hierarchy to a strong state identity may possess enough power and influence to change preexisting international or regional structures to benefit themselves at the expense of weaker states in the system. Yet, this assertion prompts an important question. What is the relationship between a strong state identity and hegemony?

¹²² Maslow, *Toward a Psychology of Being*, 97.

¹²³ Copely, *The Strategic Junction Point: Why Prestige Matters*, 7.

States with strong identities are not necessarily hegemons. Conversely, all system hegemons have developed strong state identities. Critical to this assertion is a working definition of the very complicated and controversial notion of hegemony.

This thesis adopts David Wilkinson's definition of hegemony. Hegemony means more than the simple unequal distribution of power in bilateral relations. It is synonymous with domination of the international state system in both politico-military capability and international influence.¹²⁴ Attaining both constitutes a system hegemon where attaining capability without equal influence results in a unipolar world without hegemony.¹²⁵ This definition includes realist assumptions of *domination* while also including socialist assumptions of *influence*.¹²⁶ Additionally, it differentiates between great powers and true hegemons in the international state system.¹²⁷ Yet, this definition does not clarify the relationship between states with strong identities and hegemons.

Great power and *hegemon* are comparative terms that reflect the distribution of power among states in the international system. State A has more politico-military capability and influence than state B; thus, it is a greater power than state B. State A is a regional power if its capability and influence surpasses that of other states in the region. Yet, this distinction does not necessarily denote achievement of the hierarchy's fifth tier. Since these are comparative terms, it merely describes a state which has attained more capability and influence than others in the region. Additionally, state A is a hegemon if its capability and influence surpass all other states in the entire system. These terms reflect a different point of view than an assessment of a state with a strong identity.

Assessment of a strong state identity is an objective observation without any connotation of comparison to other states in the system. It assesses the behavior of a single state to determine the needs driving that behavior. With this in mind, states such

¹²⁴ David Wilkinson, "Unipolarity without Hegemony," *International Studies Review* 1, no. 2 (December 17, 2002): 142-4, <http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/119088737/PDFSTART> (accessed November 24, 2008).

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, 143.

¹²⁶ Gilpin, *The Theory of Hegemonic War*, 596; Antonio Gramsci, *Letters from Prison* [Lettere dal carcere], 1st ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), 42-5.

¹²⁷ Wilkinson, *Unipolarity without Hegemony*, 142-3.

as Sweden could have a strong state identity and not be a great power or a system hegemon. Conversely, states such as Russia can be regional powers and still not achieve the fifth tier on the hierarchy. Yet, other states such as Japan and Great Britain can attain a strong state identity and great/regional power status. The question is not whether a state has achieved more legitimacy, internal/external security, or prestige than other states. The question is has the state achieved a sufficient amount of these attributes to satisfy its own needs. If it has, it likely results in a change of behavior while it pursues needs at a new level. This ultimately underscores the dynamic nature of the hierarchy.

Much like Maslow's self-actualized person, a strong state identity is not a static condition. As internal or external forces change the circumstances of the state, sometimes it regresses to lower levels of the hierarchy. Terrorist attacks, economic downturns, revival of ethnic cleavages are a few examples of events capable of regressing states to lower levels of the hierarchy. Two examples highlight dynamicism in state development.

The terrorist attacks on September 11th had an immediate impact on status of the U.S. within the hierarchy. The attacks initiated a regression of the U.S. down from a strong state identity confident in itself as the sole superpower in the world to a state trying to satisfy its third tier external security needs. Though the immediate sense of vulnerability felt after the 9/11 attacks abated, the subsequent war in Iraq and economic recession keep the U.S. stagnant at satisfying its fourth tier needs for prestige. China, on the other hand, provides evidence of a state progressing up the hierarchy. China very likely has just transitioned from satisfying its fourth tier needs of prestige to a strong state identity after its success hosting the 2008 Olympic Games. Yet, increased ethnic tensions in Tibet and its western province of Xinjiang could initiate a regression of China back down to lower levels of the hierarchy. Each of these examples highlights the precarious nature of state identity.

Therefore, states achieving the fifth and final tier of the modified hierarchy of states' needs have adequately satisfied lower level needs of legitimacy, security, and prestige. They have frequent moments of what Maslow called "peak experiences" where they become more efficient at providing public goods which leads to more autonomy in

pursuing foreign policy objectives.¹²⁸ Additionally, states need not be a hegemon in the international state system to attain a fifth tier, strong state identity. Once achieved, states can easily regress back down the hierarchy should their circumstances change.

G. SUMMARY

This approach will appear controversial to many observers and draw immediate criticism. Some will question the legitimacy of bringing a prominent theory in the behavioral sciences to the political sciences. Concerns of spurious results from ecological and individualistic fallacies will fuel other criticisms. Still, others will discount Maslow's theories as invalid and question his model's use of a linear approach to needs satisfaction which would ultimately undermine the foundation of this thesis. Some political scientists might criticize the project's assumption of rationality of a unitary actor and question the model's representation of reality regarding foreign policy formulation. With these criticisms in mind, the reader should remember what this thesis intends to accomplish.

This project attempts to provide an additional tool to U.S. intelligence analysts and policy makers for assessing state intent. It seeks to provide a simplistic model and operational framework to ascertain states' intentions based on their developmental needs which drive their behaviors, for identifying nefarious intent is the most difficult part of determining when states become threats to U.S. interests.¹²⁹ Determining states' capability to do harm can be much easier than establishing their intent to do harm. Understanding the developmental needs of various states in the international system gives policy makers choices in the policies they choose. They can attempt to block states from accomplishing their needs-based goals or attempt to understand the needs driving its behavior and help the state accomplish its goals in a more constructive manner. This requires intelligence analysts to be familiar with a variety of disciplines to aid them in their work.

¹²⁸ Maslow, *Toward a Psychology of Being*, 106-7.

¹²⁹ Assuming capability plus hostile intent equals a threat to U.S. interests.

Good intelligence analysts use insights from the social sciences to formulate intelligence assessments. They must have a working knowledge of military doctrine and understand the employment of various weapon systems. They must understand the states' political and decision making structures. They must have knowledge of the history and to some degree the cultural-anthropology of specific regions of the world. Finally, they must be somewhat familiar with available political theory which attempts to anticipate state behavior. In short, intelligence analysts must be part historian, anthropologist, military specialist, comparative political scientist, and an international relations expert. In this regard, political theory certainly forms the foundation of the modified hierarchy's various levels.

This thesis embraces the body of knowledge presented by the political science community to explain the motivation behind state behavior; however, it does not rely on a single dogma or view of the world. Rather, it suggests the modified hierarchy of needs makes various schools of political thought relevant depending on whether the observed subject is progressing, regressing, or remaining static within the hierarchy. Simply put, it embraces a common proverb that a person's view of the world depends on where he or she sits. Whether cooperation among states is possible in an anarchic system depends on whether the states are progressing or regressing through the hierarchy. Ultimately, the modified hierarchy defines the characteristics of a strong state just as Maslow defined the attributes of a strong individual. This hierarchy explains state behavior as attempts to attain a strong state identity or to regain a strong state identity after it was lost. Soviet and Russian history provide appropriate case studies to demonstrate this concept.¹³⁰

¹³⁰ This thesis considers the Russian Federation as the primary successor state of the former Soviet Union.

III. RUSSIA AS A CASE STUDY

A. SOVIET REGRESSION DOWN THE HIERARCHY

1. Introduction

At the end of World War II, the Soviet Union appeared unstoppable. It had rebounded from its initial losses during the early part of the war and strengthened to the point of defeating the brunt of Hitler's eastern army. By the end of 1949, it clearly sat at the fifth tier on the modified hierarchy of states' needs and had consolidated a strong state identity. It was one of two superpowers in the world and the leader of a worldwide ideological camp poised to form the international system in its own image.

Yet, the Soviet Union began to slip and eventually regressed all the way down the hierarchy. It bottomed out on the hierarchy trying to satisfy its first tier needs and ultimately failed to maintain its first tier internal legitimacy. This chapter examines Soviet regression down the hierarchy to its eventual dissolution in 1991 and documents the Russian Federation's eventual progression up the hierarchy as the primary successor state to the Soviet Union (Figure 3). A brief description of the Soviet zenith of power begins this examination of the Soviet Union's regression.

This thesis assesses the Soviet Union at the fifth tier of the modified hierarchy of states' needs by the end of 1949. It had unchallenged internal and external legitimacy satisfying its first tier needs. It had sufficiently satisfied its second tier domestic security needs through the purges and collectivization of the 1930s to eliminate any significant internal security threats. Additionally, its victory over the Nazis secured its third tier external security needs and ushered in a period of great prestige for the Soviet Union.

The Soviets had faced the brunt of the German war machine during World War II and had persevered to achieve total victory. It created an overland empire from the remnants of the defeated Axis Powers that extended beyond any empire created by Russia's tsars. By 1949, the Soviet Union was Communism's ideological leader, which

had created new Communist governments across Europe and Asia and included the establishment of the People's Republic of China. It had not only provided an alternative to capitalism and U.S. leadership in the international system, but it had provided a model to the rest of the world for rapid industrialization, a point underscored when the Soviet Union became only the second state in the world to detonate a nuclear weapon. Summarizing the zenith of Soviet power in 1949, Martin Malia concludes the following:

In 1949 Communism came to power in China, and there now existed a great Red bloc extending from the Elbe to the Pacific. At the same time, there were powerful Communist insurgencies in Vietnam, Malaya, and the Philippines. When Stalin celebrated his seventieth birthday in 1949 with greater pomp than ever before, he indeed appeared as the “father of the peoples” to about a third of humanity; and it seemed as if the worldwide triumph of Communism was at last possible, perhaps even imminent.¹³¹




Figure 3. Soviet/Russian Status in the Hierarchy 1945-2006

¹³¹ Martin E. Malia, *The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917-1991* (New York: Free Press; Toronto; New York: Maxwell Macmillan Canada; Maxwell Macmillan International, 1994), 274.

2. Regression from the Fifth Tier to the Fourth

States seeking to satisfy fourth tier needs focus on the pursuit of prestige. States enjoying high levels of prestige can act more autonomously and with less hesitation. State prestige encompasses internal as well as external aspects of prestige. Though a state's regression down the hierarchy is not necessarily linear in nature, there is evidence that the slow regression of the Soviet Union was in fact linear and sequential (Figure 4).




Figure 4. Soviet Regression from Fifth to Fourth Tier

From 1956 until 1989, several domestic and international events slowly whittled away at Soviet prestige initiating its regression from a fifth tier strong state identity to the fourth tier on the hierarchy. These events impacted the internal and external perception of Soviet prestige ultimately reducing its soft as well as hard power. The first major event impacting Soviet prestige was the initiation of Nikita Khrushchev's policy of de-Stalinization.

At the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956 and the first since Stalin's death in 1953, Nikita Khrushchev did what was once inconceivable during previous years in the Soviet Union. He openly criticized the legacy and policies of Joseph Stalin. His criticism began a period of de-Stalinization in the Soviet Union that ultimately had a destabilizing impact

on Soviet external and internal prestige. Subsequently, events of 1956 began the regression of the Soviet Union down the hierarchy of needs.¹³² The initial impact of de-Stalinization was on Soviet external prestige and its relations with its clients in Eastern Europe.

Soviet external prestige began to diminish with the policy of de-Stalinization. As senior Soviet leadership began to criticize Stalin's policies during his tenure as General Secretary of the Soviet Union, Eastern Europeans began to criticize local dictators installed by Stalin's policies. De-Stalinization initially removed much of the fear Eastern Europeans felt in expressing their dissatisfaction with Soviet rapid industrialization and collectivization.

The first challenge to the Soviet model of industrialization which impacted Soviet prestige was a labor revolt in Poznan, Poland in June 1956. Tension eventually escalated into full scale violence and an armed insurrection against Polish government forces.¹³³ The unstable domestic situation opened the door for Wladyslaw Gomulka, a Polish reformer, to become the First Secretary of the Polish Communist Party. The situation worried Moscow so much that Khrushchev himself flew to Poland in October 1956 to personally respond to escalating tensions between Poles and their Soviet occupiers. By the time Khrushchev returned to Moscow, the Soviet leadership had effectively acquiesced to Polish demands and removed the Soviet army general responsible for quelling peaceful protests with armed force. Though Yugoslavia's defection from the Soviet camp introduced the concept of "different roads to socialism" in 1948, this was the first time Soviet leadership begrudgingly accepted it as a legitimate policy.¹³⁴

This event alone did not signal Soviet regression from the fifth to the fourth tier of the hierarchy. Further events created more cracks in Soviet external prestige, yet

¹³² Malia, *The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917-1991*, 320-1.

¹³³ "Reasons for the Outbreak: Poznań June 1956 Uprising," City of Hall of Poznan, <http://www.poznan.pl/mim/public/czerwiec56/pages.html?co=list&id=3043&ch=3060&instance=1017&lang=en&lhs=czerwiec56> (accessed December 9, 2008).

¹³⁴ Marshall Tito of Yugoslavia established the concept of different roads to socialism. Stalin subsequently expelled him from the Socialist camp and never accepted the concept of diverging paths. Khrushchev was the first Soviet leader to accept this policy in his dealings with Poland during 1956. Malia, *The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917-1991*, 322.

acquiescence in the Poznan revolt was a major blow to Soviet international leadership and represents the first crack in the veneer of Soviet invincibility and prestige. It was the loss of prestige endured during this event that prompted the Soviets to take more decisive action when confronted with a similar crisis in Hungary.

The second event impacting Soviet external prestige and closely related to the Polish crisis was the Hungarian uprising of 1956. According to the United Nations inquiry into the uprising, the direct cause of the crisis was the admission of crimes and atrocities made by the Hungarian Communist government against its political opponents. The revelations were part of Khrushchev's policy of de-Stalinization and demonstrated the measures Communist leaders implemented to silence political rivals in the years following World War II.¹³⁵ Protests, riots, and demonstrations condemning the behavior of the Communist government escalated throughout the summer and fall of 1956 and resulted in the fall of three successive Hungarian governments and nation-wide violence. Finally on October 24th and again on November 4th, the Soviet Red Army employed infantry and armor units against the Hungarian people for the "re-conquest and military subjugation of Hungary."¹³⁶

This event marks regression of the Soviet Union from a fifth tier strong state identity to an identity where fourth tier prestige needs became prepotent. Soviet behavior resulted from a loss of prestige suffered during the previous Polish crisis. The situation in Hungary was quickly spinning out of control and the Soviets were unwilling to allow another defection from their sphere of influence. Thus, in much the same way Athens dealt with Melos to safeguard its prestige, the Soviets implemented force against the Hungarians. Martin Malia summarizes the situation with the following:

¹³⁵ Eleventh Session of the General Assembly, *Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary* (New York: United Nations, 1957), <http://mek.niif.hu/01200/01274/01274.pdf> (accessed November 24, 2008), 18.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, 67.

After...recognition of “different roads to socialism,” the East European empire still remained fragile because it now depended on the willing collaboration of the local populations; yet they accorded this only because they feared Moscow’s reprisals if they did not—a situation that could last only so long as Moscow retained the capacity to compel collaboration.¹³⁷

Soviet imperialism extended beyond just territorial control; the Soviets attempted to control the realm of ideas as well. Since Yugoslavia’s expulsion from the Cominform in 1948 over its divergent path towards full socialism, the Soviets sought to safeguard their prestige and position as leader of the Eastern Bloc. Yet, it was not until de-Stalinization in 1956 that a major rift opened up between Communism’s two strongest and most prestigious states.

The Sino-Soviet rift created two centers of gravity in the Communist world. The rift had long term consequences on Soviet leadership in the Eastern Bloc and its prestige around the world. Scholars do not trace the origins of the rift to any specific date, but many agree that Khrushchev’s 1956 speech at the Twentieth Party Congress and the subsequent policy of de-Stalinization were seminal events in the deteriorating relations between the two states.¹³⁸

The Sino-Soviet rift beginning in the 1950s and continuing through the 1960s extended beyond philosophical debates on the advancement of Communism. It resulted in actual armed conflict along the mutual Chinese-Soviet border in the Far East. By March 1969, the dispute over recognized borders escalated to the point where armed conflict broke out between the two states over the disputed Zhenbao/Damansky islands.¹³⁹ As a result of the violence, China became convinced that the Soviet Union posed an even bigger threat to their security than that posed by the U.S.¹⁴⁰ This

¹³⁷ Malia, *The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917-1991*, 323.

¹³⁸ Lorenz M. Luthi, *The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 4.

¹³⁹ Zhenbao is the Chinese name for the islands whereas Damansky reflects the Russian name for the same islands.

¹⁴⁰ Robert W. Strayer, *Why Did the Soviet Union Collapse?: Understanding Historical Change* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), 80.

development allowed the U.S. to exploit the rift and drive a wedge deeper between the world's two largest Communist powers.¹⁴¹ The rift shattered the image of a unitary Communist bloc leading the world towards a peaceful Socialist utopia.

These events demonstrate a loss of external prestige and mark the regression of the Soviet Union from a strong state identity to a state seeking to satisfy its fourth tier prestige needs. From the beginning of Soviet regression down the hierarchy in 1956, much of the world began to see the Soviet Union in a new light. China and Yugoslavia presented alternative paths towards socialism. Additionally, the events of the mid 1950s began to paint a picture of Eastern European discontent with the occupation of a foreign invader. Europeans no longer saw the Soviets as noble liberators of Nazi tyranny, but began to see them as merely Russian aggressors seeking to extend the reaches of a bygone empire. With severe blows to its external prestige, the Soviets began to reassess their policies.

Challenges to Soviet authority continued to mount throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Reflecting the loss of prestige from these events, the Soviets redefined their concept of counterrevolution in 1968 and "...identified a threat to traditional socialist norms anywhere in the bloc as a menace to its prestige and stability."¹⁴² As a result, the Soviets adopted what the West later dubbed as the Brezhnev Doctrine of limited sovereignty.

The Brezhnev Doctrine subordinated Eastern European state sovereignty to the concept of international interventionism and justified the invasion of any Eastern Bloc state to prevent deviation away from Soviet established norms of behavior.¹⁴³ It stemmed from a desire to prevent further defections from its camp and reverse the decline in its external prestige. This policy guided Soviet behavior for at least the next ten years.

¹⁴¹ Global Security.com, "Sino-Soviet Border Clashes," <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/prc-soviet.htm> (accessed June 9, 2008).

¹⁴² Matthew J. Ouimet, *The Rise and Fall of the Brezhnev Doctrine in Soviet Foreign Policy* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 65.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, 40.

The Brezhnev Doctrine became the foundation of Soviet foreign policy for the next decade and provided some unfortunate predictability in their behavior. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia was the first demonstrated behavior under this new policy. Though not carried out, the threat of Soviet invasion in 1980 hung over the heads of Poland's leaders and provided them an incentive to initiate martial law to control prodemocracy demonstrations.¹⁴⁴ In 1979, the invasion of Afghanistan became the first use of the Brezhnev Doctrine to justify the invasion of a non-Warsaw Pact state. In much the same way Athens sought to maintain its external prestige through brutality (i.e., negative prestige), the Soviets implemented the Brezhnev Doctrine. Yet, its behavior only facilitated the slow erosion of Soviet external prestige over time. Two main events began to erode Soviet internal prestige.

The first event to damage Soviet internal prestige was the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975. The Helsinki Final Act proved to be a historic change for many dissidents inside the Soviet Union. The Soviets initially saw the Helsinki Final Act as an enhancement for its external prestige, for the Soviets saw the agreement as a legitimization of post World War II borders and of Soviet satellites throughout Eastern Europe. Rather than enhancing Soviet external prestige, it became one of the main instruments that lowered its internal prestige. U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates says that the Helsinki Final Act was the:

...spark that kindled widespread resistance to communist authority and the organization of numerous independent groups throughout Eastern Europe and even in the Soviet Union determined to bring change.¹⁴⁵

At the end of his life in 1982, Brezhnev had left the Soviet Union in decline and regressing down the hierarchy of needs. The Soviet Union suffering from a loss of prestige had done little to stem the tide since 1956. Its invasion of Afghanistan and suppression of Polish prodemocracy groups only succeeded in diminishing its external prestige further. Meanwhile, dissidents within the Soviet Union used the Helsinki Final

¹⁴⁴ Ouimet, *The Rise and Fall of the Brezhnev Doctrine in Soviet Foreign Policy*, 131.

¹⁴⁵ Robert Michael Gates, *From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and how they Won the Cold War* (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 85-90.

Act to whittle away at Soviet internal prestige. Yet, these events merely demonstrate the stagnation of the Soviet Union at the fourth tier of the hierarchy. The advent of economic problems marks its regression further down the hierarchy.

3. Regression from the Fourth Tier to the Third

The third tier of the hierarchy addresses states' need for external security. The state seeks to protect its population from demonstrated or threatened outside aggression. Additionally, the state attempts to create a stable economic environment for its population. It is in this regard that the Soviet Union began to regress to the third tier on the modified hierarchy of states' needs (Figure 5).




Figure 5. Soviet Regression from Fourth to Third Tier

Economic decline was the first indication of Soviet regression to the third tier of the hierarchy. During the Soviet economic boom of the 1930s, grain exports became a primary means for financing Western imports. By the mid 1980s, the Soviet Union had gone from the world's largest grain exporter to its largest importer.¹⁴⁶ As a result, the Soviets became increasingly dependent on not only foreign sources of grain, but particularly on American supplied grain. Consequently, President Carter employed the

¹⁴⁶ The Soviet Union was the world's largest grain exporter in the years 1907-1913. E. T. Gaïdar, *Collapse of an Empire: Lessons for Modern Russia* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), 95-7.

U.S. grain embargo of 1980 essentially as a “food weapon” against the Soviets in retaliation for their invasion of Afghanistan.¹⁴⁷ Interestingly, the embargo exposed economic vulnerabilities in the Soviet’s security posture.

This one facet of the Soviet economy was emblematic of the deterioration and decline throughout its entire economic system. In fact, the Soviet economy experienced smaller growth in every year between 1971 and 1985 and had fallen technologically behind the West by eight to twelve years.¹⁴⁸ President Reagan exploited this development to its full capacity.

Recognizing Soviet economic vulnerabilities, the U.S. continued to up the ante on the Soviets. First, President Reagan embarked on a massive U.S. defense buildup. The increase in U.S. fielded forces and deployment of advanced weapons systems forced the Soviets to expend limited resources in an effort to keep parity with the U.S.. Secondly, Reagan sought to deprive the Soviets of crucial income from the sale of oil on the worldwide market. The U.S. restricted the export of vital technologies the Soviets needed to extract their domestic oil, and it coordinated with Saudi Arabia to keep international oil production high so the price per barrel would remain low.¹⁴⁹ The coordinated U.S. policy exacerbated preexisting Soviet economic vulnerabilities resulting in its regression to third tier external security needs. Malia summarizes this development by commenting:

...Reagan in his first term had become a figure of mythic aggressiveness to the Soviets. After the soothing practices of detente, Moscow was confronted with an unprecedented American military buildup that culminated in the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) of 1983 and was accompanied by alarming rhetoric about the “Evil Empire.” It is fair to

¹⁴⁷ Paige Bryan, “The Soviet Grain Embargo,” The Heritage Foundation, <http://www.heritage.org/research/tradeandeconomicfreedom/bg130.cfm> (accessed December 16, 2008).

¹⁴⁸ Council for Inter-American Security, *Gorbachev's Challenge: Detente II* (Washington, D.C.: United States Global Strategy Council, 1988).

¹⁴⁹ Peter Schweizer, *Victory: The Reagan Administration's Secret Strategy that Hastened the Collapse of the Soviet Union* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1994), 27.

say that under Andropov many in the Soviet leadership believed the United States actually sought war, a belief that reinforced all of the old doctrines about imperialism.¹⁵⁰

It was during this period of Soviet regression to third tier external security needs that Mikhail Gorbachev ascended to leadership of the Soviet Union in 1985. Gorbachev, deeply concerned about Soviet economic insecurity and international prestige, understood the need for change. In fact, he confided to his friend and colleague Edvard Shevardnadze, “Everything is rotten...it’s no longer possible to live this way.”¹⁵¹ Gorbachev, while working for his patron, Yuri Andropov, became acquainted with economic reforms recommended by the 1983 *Novosibirsk Report*. The report predicted a Soviet economic crisis within ten years unless the government enacted structural reforms, especially to its agricultural sector.¹⁵²

Consequently, the Soviet Union undertook a threefold plan to satisfy its third tier needs and renew its economy. First, the Soviet leadership called for *glasnost* (i.e., publicity) to initiate public discussion of Soviet economic problems of stagnation. Secondly, officials intended open discussion of the state’s problems to ignite public support for economic reforms and stimulate innovation. Thirdly and most observable by the West, the Soviet Union sought retrenchment of its overseas commitments to recoup needed capital for economic reform.¹⁵³

The Soviet Union began to look for ways to reapportion limited resources away from foreign commitments and back towards economic reform. In order to reduce military spending, the Soviets had to end the arms race with the United States. Initially, this meant a halt in the deployment of SS-20 intermediate range missiles.¹⁵⁴ Later, it

¹⁵⁰ Malia, *The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917-1991*, 414.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 411.

¹⁵² T. I. Zaslavskaja, *The Second Socialist Revolution: An Alternative Soviet Strategy* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1990), x-xv.

¹⁵³ Malia, *The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917-1991*, 412-3.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 415-6.

meant the withdrawal of the Soviet military from Afghanistan.¹⁵⁵ With these decisions, the Soviet Union began to disengage from the Cold War unilaterally and adopt behaviors to satisfy its third tier external security needs.

Additionally, the Soviet Union chose not to reassert its authority in August 1989 when Hungary opened up its border to Austria. East Germans followed suit nearly three months later and opened their borders to the West effectively ending forty-five years of Soviet domination in Eastern Europe. This paved the way for the removal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe including over 546,000 troops from Germany alone.¹⁵⁶ By 1990, retrenchment had erased all of the overseas commitments initiated during the Brezhnev era saving the Soviet Union billions of dollars in expenditures.

In the course of five years, the Soviet Union changed the apportionment of its resources away from foreign policy towards domestic reform. The Soviet Union greatly reduced its expenditures needed to supply this vast worldwide empire. The Soviets recouped an estimated \$43.2 billion per year spent to maintain its Eastern European satellites.¹⁵⁷ The Soviets hoped retrenching these commitments would relieve pressure on its economy and give the state breathing room vital for carrying out other domestic reforms.

Though Soviet external security needs appeared capable of withstanding the loss of the Eastern European buffer zone, the USSR was not prepared to withstand the rapid pace of German reunification and the potential resurgence of a dominant Germany in the middle of Europe. Many in the Soviet Union feared a revanchist Germany after reunification, which exacerbated unmet third tier needs exposed by economic instability.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁵ Michael Dobbs, "Oil's Skid Fuels Gorbachev's Reforms: Lagging Output in Siberia Stirs Soviet Economic Reappraisal Series," *Washington Post*, sec. Russia-Economy Series Number: 1/2, May 28, 1990, <http://www.proquest.com/> (accessed March 27, 2008).

¹⁵⁶ *Russia and Germany Reborn: Unification, the Soviet Collapse, and the New Europe* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999), 164.

¹⁵⁷ Estimate reflects the year 1981. Dobbs, *Oil's Skid Fuels Gorbachev's Reforms: Lagging Output in Siberia Stirs Soviet Economic Reappraisal Series*.

¹⁵⁸ Fredo Arias-King, "Gorbachev Steered Things in a Constructive Way," *Demokratizatsiya* 13, no. 2 (April 1, 2005): 286, www.proquest.com (accessed December 15, 2008).

Conservatives saw the loss of the Soviet Union's Eastern European client states as betraying the worldwide socialist revolution, and feared its impact on Soviet security. Yegor Ligachev, de facto leader of the conservative faction in the Kremlin, specifically expressed this concern and accused some "new thinkers" as selling out their comrades in Eastern Europe.¹⁵⁹ The Soviet Union had very real security concerns with a newly unified Germany becoming a member in NATO. Colonel General Nikolay Chervov summarized this viewpoint when he wrote,

...a united Germany in NATO would be definitely unacceptable...It would seriously upset the military balance of strength that has developed in Europe.¹⁶⁰

The external security needs represented by the statements above became very sharp for many in the Soviet Union. More importantly, the statements above reflect a serious rift forming between camps in the ruling elite. The rifts eventually became wide enough to endanger domestic stability of the state itself.

3. Regression from the Third Tier to the Second

States on the second tier of the hierarchy seek to maintain their internal security. As the state holds a monopoly on the legitimate use of force within a specific boundary, it must eliminate any challenges to its monopoly. Thus, the loss of the Soviet Union's Eastern European satellites, and especially the creation of a unified Germany within NATO, exposed numerous rifts within Soviet society. These developments fomented several challenges to the Soviet Union's political structure and eventually to its legitimate monopoly (Figure 6).

¹⁵⁹ Alexander Dallin and Gail Warshofsky Lapidus, *The Soviet System in Crisis: A Reader of Western and Soviet Views* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 526.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 544.




Figure 6. Regression from Third to Second Tier

Three factors contributed to the ultimate regression of the Soviet Union down to second tier internal security needs. It began with the political rift that opened up between reformers and conservatives over loss of the Soviet worldwide empire. Gorbachev's creation of parallel institutions and the direct election of government officials by the people exacerbated the rift caused by the Party's loss of power and prestige. While these internal political battles raged, the periphery was able to exploit the center's weakness and began moving towards independence.

The first rift to develop among Soviet elites was over Party privileges. *Glasnost* exposed them to public criticisms for abuses committed over seventy years of Communist Party domination. The *nomenklatura* (i.e., the inner Party elites controlling the outer Party rank and file) were the most resistant to reform since they had the most to lose. This set conservative elements of the Party seeking to maintain the status quo against those who attempted to reform it.

The fight for supremacy between reformers and conservatives eventually resulted in the creation of new governmental institutions. In March 1989, the Soviet Union held its first semi-competitive elections in almost seventy years to elect members to the new Congress of People's Deputies (CPD). The CPD was an elective body that ran parallel to

Communist Party institutions and sought to maneuver around the largesse of the Party.¹⁶¹ The election ended the Communist Party's stranglehold on state policy and made it compete with reform communists as well as non-communists in the market place of ideas. The historic election paved the way for the direct election of Boris Yeltsin as the chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet in 1990 making him the most trusted politician in the country. His reforms and popularity soon presented a direct challenge to the established Soviet leadership.¹⁶² As infighting among conservatives and reformers whittled away at Soviet domestic security from the inside, nationalism chipped away at it from periphery.

The second rift responsible for the regression of the Soviet Union to second tier of the hierarchy was the desire of Soviet republics on the periphery to gain more autonomy from the Soviet national leadership. Liberation of Eastern European states provoked a similar desire of the three Baltic republics to gain autonomy from Moscow. Baltic nationalists began demanding details on the secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939 from the Soviet government.¹⁶³ Consequently, Baltic calls for independence spread to other republics of the Soviet Union as well. By 1990, Georgia, Moldova, and Armenia all sought independence from the Soviet center.

By 1991, Yeltsin had begun to foment ethnic Russian nationalism in the small ruling elite of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (Russian SFSR). His intent was to undermine the authority of the Soviet Union, and thus, undermine Gorbachev's authority.¹⁶⁴ With these actions, Yeltsin's Russian nationalism effectively ended ethnic Russian support for maintaining the Soviet Empire. Russia was the largest of the republics with a preponderance of the natural and human resources. Once the

¹⁶¹ Malia, *The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917-1991*, 432.

¹⁶² Peter Reddaway and Dmitri Glinski, *The Tragedy of Russia's Reforms: Market Bolshevism Against Democracy* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001), 31.

¹⁶³ Malia, *The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917-1991*, 457.

¹⁶⁴ Astrid S. Tuminez, "Nationalism, Ethnic Pressures, and the Breakup of the Soviet Union - x5:4," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 5, no. 4 (Fall 2003): 127, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_cold_war_studies/v005/5.4tuminez.pdf (accessed December 13, 2007).

Russian SFSR lost enthusiasm for maintaining the Soviet grip on the periphery, it was inevitable for the Baltic Republics and the rest of the periphery to break away, and thus, end the viability of the Soviet state and its ruling elite.¹⁶⁵

As a result of these events and subsequent regression to the second tier of the hierarchy, Soviet behavior became predictable. National leaders once unwilling to use violence against their Eastern European satellites now embraced violence to mitigate increasing threats to its internal security. Several examples demonstrate the Soviet leadership's embrace of violence.

By 1990, Moscow had firmly embraced the use of violence against Soviet republics on the periphery to reassert its authority and maintain its monopoly on the use of force. Moscow authorized the KGB, military and police forces to use violence in the Baltic Republics as well as in Georgia, Moldova, and Armenia. Some of Moscow's actions were simply to quell pro-independence demonstrations while others specifically tried to remove locally elected leaders and replace them with puppet regimes.

One such episode took place in Lithuania. In January 1991, riot police and elements of the KGB attempted to remove the elected government of Lithuania and replace it with puppet regime. During this operation, Soviet forces killed over a dozen people and drew widespread criticism for its behavior from around the world.¹⁶⁶ Similar violence took place across the Soviet periphery as the center attempted to mitigate threats to its authority and safeguard the integrity of the Soviet state itself. These events set the stage for further regression down the hierarchy of needs.

4. Regression from the Second Tier to the First

States on the first tier of the hierarchy seek to satisfy needs of legitimacy. Other states and international institutions grant external legitimacy on states while its people

¹⁶⁵ Tuminez, "Nationalism, Ethnic Pressures, and the Breakup of the Soviet Union - x5:4," 125-8.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 108.

grant it internal legitimacy by conforming to its expected norms of behaviors. By 1991, the Soviet Union still enjoyed external legitimacy; however, its internal legitimacy was dissolving at a rapid rate.

By summer 1991, six of the Soviet Union's fifteen republics either sought autonomy within a loose confederation or outright independence from Moscow. In fact, the Soviet Union's largest and most influential republic (i.e., Russian SFSR) sought independence from the national leadership and began making bilateral agreements with other Soviet republics claiming sovereignty.¹⁶⁷ This predicament destabilized the regime to the point where only one of two things would happen. The regime would implode under the pressures exerted upon it and cease to exist, or conservative factions within the government would use force to reestablish a hold on power and secure the state's internal legitimacy. Both of these options transpired in the final days of the Soviet Union.

The defections of the constituent republics forced the Soviet leadership to renegotiate the distribution of state power with the remaining nine republics, which had not declared their intention to secede from the union¹⁶⁸. The Nine plus One Treaty was an attempt to save the Soviet Union in any form. This was the impetus resulting in a conservative coup attempting to scuttle the new union treaty and retain the union in its original form. The failed conservative coup against Gorbachev and other reformers in August 1991 was a behavior attempting to satisfy first tier legitimacy needs. Since the regime was unable or simply unwilling to reassert its control on the periphery, the regime turned on itself. The abortive coup ultimately hastened the dissolution of the union itself.

By December 1991, twelve constituent republics voted to dissolve the Soviet Union and form a loose confederation of independent states. The three Baltic Republics opted for full independence without participating in the confederation. After its dissolution, the newly independent Russian Federation became the successor state to the Soviet Union.¹⁶⁹ Boris Yeltsin became the first president of this new state and inherited

¹⁶⁷ Tuminez, "Nationalism, Ethnic Pressures, and the Breakup of the Soviet Union - x5:4," 127.

¹⁶⁸ Malia, *The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917-1991*, 483.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 489.

many of the resources left behind from the Soviet Union. He also inherited many of its problems, which continued to stagnate the new Russian Federation at the bottom of the hierarchy.

B. RUSSIA'S PROGRESSION UP THE HIERARCHY

1. Introduction

The Russian Federation faced numerous challenges forming a new state in place of the Soviet Union. Though dominant in the old union, the Russian Federation had to develop an independent identity from that of the discredited Soviet state. The process of forming an independent identity did not occur overnight and led to the stagnation of the Russian Federation at the bottom of the hierarchy for several years. It had to answer fundamental questions regarding the nature of the new state itself. Which territories of the former Soviet Union would gain sovereignty, and which would become constituent parts of other newly formed states? Would the Russian Federation adopt a true democratic government? If so, which model would a new Russian executive branch follow? To what degree would the Russians abandon the communist ideology, and how would Russia make the transition between the old and the new? Many of these questions plaguing Russia in January 1992 went unanswered until 2004 when Vladimir Putin began his second term as Russian Federation President. It was at this time that the Russian Federation sufficiently satisfied its lower level needs and was well on its way back up the hierarchy. To understand this assertion fully, it is necessary to examine Russian Federation stagnation at the lower levels of the hierarchy.

2. Stagnation at the Hierarchy's Lower Levels

The new Russian Federation President, Boris Yeltsin, and his reformers had to create a state and its institutions from scratch. They had to completely change Russia's economic system, form of government, and create a new political culture. Each of these was a monumental task requiring great political skill and an abundance of public support; however, Yeltsin did not command universal support. Just as violence accompanied the

regression of the Soviet Union down the hierarchy, the dissolution of the union did not sufficiently satisfy Russia's lower level needs or stem the tide of violence. Russia had to establish its legitimacy before progressing back up the hierarchy and would have to resolve two situations before gaining legitimacy and beginning its journey back up the hierarchy.

The Russian Federation's primary obstacle to progressing up the hierarchy was establishing its internal legitimacy; conversely, external legitimacy did not prove much of a problem for Russia. Before the official demise of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the U.S. and many other states in the international system recognized the Russian Federation as the successor state to the Soviet Union.¹⁷⁰ In fact, Russian assumption of Soviet treaty responsibilities and its permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council codified this status by early 1992.¹⁷¹ Attaining internal legitimacy, however, proved more elusive for the Russian Federation (Figure 7).




Figure 7. Russian Stagnation at the Bottom of the Hierarchy

¹⁷⁰ John E. Yang, "U.S. to Recognize Russia, 5 Other; Move Awaits Gorbachev Resignation," *The Washington Post*, December 24, 1991, www.proquest.com (accessed December 31, 2008).

¹⁷¹ Bardo Fassbender, *UN Security Council Reform and the Right of Veto: A Constitutional Perspective*, vol. 32 (Hague; Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1998), 185-89.

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation struggled with creating a new state identity. The Soviet Union did not disintegrate as a result of military loss on the battlefield. The state simply turned on itself and fell apart at the seams. As a result, the Russian Federation had to solve two problems related to legitimacy. First, it had to establish a government that Russian citizens would accept as legitimate. Secondly, it had to delineate the geographic boundaries of the state itself and define the relationship between the state's center and its hinterlands.¹⁷²

With regards to the first task, several different factions broke out along ideological lines and sought dominance over the others. Communists seeking to reconstitute the union allied with ultranationalist Russians and vied for power against Western leaning liberals.¹⁷³ Each camp splintered further with ultraliberals devotionally supportive of President Yeltsin while other liberals of the intelligentsia criticized him at every turn. Unlike opposition parties in Central Europe, which divided along socioeconomic lines, Russian opposition forces coalesced around the issue of Russian lost superpower status.¹⁷⁴

The resulting power struggles between Russian factions impeded basic state making decisions. The state flailed as different factions attempted to shape the Russian constitution, transition to market economy, and the tenor and orientation of Russia's relations with the outside world. The factions involved were less interested in creating lasting institutions and more interested in enhancing their personal powerbases. As a result, governance of the state relied on specific personalities, such as President Yeltsin or his nemesis Supreme Soviet Chairman Khasbulatov, and not on designated roles of state institutions. This situation kept the Russian Federation stagnant at first tier legitimacy needs and set the stage for increased violence during Yeltsin's first term. Russia also faced other issues regarding its legitimacy.

¹⁷² Lilia Shevtsova, "Russia's Post-Communist Politics: Revolution Or Continuity?" In *The New Russia: Troubled Transformation*, ed. Gail Warshofsky Lapidus (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), 11-2.

¹⁷³ Fawn, *Ideology and National Identity in Post-Communist Foreign Policies*, 44.

¹⁷⁴ Shevtsova, *Russia's Post-Communist Politics: Revolution Or Continuity?*, 10.

The Russian Federation faced questions concerning the composition of the state itself. In 1991, the de facto standard used to divide the Soviet Union into independent states was releasing its fifteen Soviet Socialist Republics (SSRs) for full self-determination. Thirty-eight Autonomous Socialist Republics (ASSR) throughout the Soviet Union and over eighty-six other smaller autonomous entities alone in the newly created Russian Federation simply remained constituent parts of their larger parent SSRs.¹⁷⁵ This was troubling to many nationalities within the Russian Federation, which became part of the fledgling state without much say in the matter. Chechnya was one such area where the population did not favor the method used to delineate independent states. Interestingly, Yeltsin had advised the Russian regions of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan in August 1990 to “take as much sovereignty as you can swallow” in an attempt to undermine Gorbachev’s authority and loosen his grip on the Soviet periphery.¹⁷⁶ These words soon came back to haunt Yeltsin as he attempted to establish the state’s internal legitimacy and maintain its territorial integrity after gaining independence in December 1991.

At the same time the Baltic Republics were pressuring Gorbachev for independence from the Soviet Union in 1990, the Checheno-Ingush ASSR of the Russian socialist republic pushed for similar demands. In fact, Chechnya proclaimed its autonomy from the Soviet Union on November 27, 1990 and went as far as claiming complete independence from the Russian SFSR by July 1991.¹⁷⁷ Consequently, Chechen behavior resulted in Russian declaration of a state of emergency. In spite of this declaration, the August 1991 coup, Yeltsin’s continued rivalry with Gorbachev, and a host of other problems soon put Chechnya at the bottom of Russia’s list of crises.¹⁷⁸ By the time Yeltsin became the president of the independent state known as the Russian

¹⁷⁵ Tracey C. German, *Russia's Chechen War* (London; New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 16-31; Gail Lapidus and Edward W. Walker, “Nationalism, Regionalism, and Federalism: Center-Periphery Relations in Post-Communist Russia,” in *The New Russia: Troubled Transformation*, ed. Gail Warshofsky Lapidus (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), 85.

¹⁷⁶ Dale R. Herspring, *Putin's Russia: Past Imperfect, Future Uncertain*, 3rd ed. (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), 77.

¹⁷⁷ Valerii Aleksandrovich Tishkov, *Chechnya: Life in a War-Torn Society*, vol. 6 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), 58, 60.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 68.

Federation in December 1991, Chechnya had declared its complete independence, elected a new president and parliament, and mobilized all able-bodied men to defend the new state.¹⁷⁹

The territorial integrity of the newly created Russian Federation was at stake. A modern interpretation of the “domino theory” confronted Russia’s leaders in the early part of 1992.¹⁸⁰ They feared the eventual disintegration of the state if they allowed Chechnya to pursue its independence. The resource rich regions of Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Tyva, and North Ossetia all sought independence and observed Moscow’s response closely. In fact, “broad regional coalitions,” such as a Caucasus Confederation, Volga-Urals Confederation, Finno-Ugric movement, Far East union, and a Siberian Agreement, had emerged in opposition to Moscow’s authority.¹⁸¹

Additionally, the internal strife between the Federation’s branches of government exacerbated Russia’s tensions on its periphery. The longer Russia’s constitutional issues remained unresolved, the longer Russia’s territorial integrity remained in jeopardy. As a result, Russia initiated several behaviors to satisfy its first tier needs of legitimacy.

The Russian government had squandered almost two years since the dissolution of the Soviet Union and had failed to create a government with universal internal legitimacy.¹⁸² The regime’s subsequent behavior came as no surprise. After months of infighting, the executive branch declared direct presidential rule and dissolved the legislative branch in September 1993. Ten days of conflict and the shelling of the Russian parliament building known as the White House resulted from the decision of direct presidential rule.¹⁸³ It led to a violent showdown between the executive and legislative branches of government with each vying for power over the other. Though the

¹⁷⁹ Tishkov, *Chechnya: Life in a War-Torn Society*, 68.

¹⁸⁰ Tracey C. German, *Russia's Chechen War* (London; New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 113.

¹⁸¹ Lapidus and Walker, *Nationalism, Regionalism, and Federalism: Center-Periphery Relations in Post-Communist Russia*, 92.

¹⁸² Shevtsova, *Russia's Post-Communist Politics: Revolution Or Continuity?*, 22.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*, 22-3.

executive branch eventually succeeded in asserting its dominance over the legislative, resolution of the constitutional crisis did not solve all of Russia's issues concerning its internal legitimacy.

After resolving the constitutional crisis in October 1993, Moscow turned its attention on consolidating its control over the Russian periphery. One of its first steps was to sign a bilateral treaty with Tatarstan in February 1994, which defined the limits of Tatar autonomy within the political structure of the Russian Federation. Moscow desired a similar resolution in its conflict with Chechnya; however, Chechen President Dzhokhar Dudayev was unwilling to entertain any arrangement short of full independence from Russia. Therefore, Moscow chose to send in Russian Federal troops in December 1994 for what it hoped would be a quick war. Russian leadership became convinced that Russian supported opposition groups in Chechnya had adequately weakened Dudayev's government making a quick victory possible.¹⁸⁴ Though Russian leadership did not intend to enter into a protracted quagmire in Chechnya, its invasion did accomplish two primary goals, which helped to satisfy its first tier internal legitimacy needs successfully.

Unlike the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation demonstrated its willingness to defend its own existence. The executive branch's use of force against the legislative branch allowed it to consolidate a political structure fully. The implementation of a new constitution and the resolution of the October constitutional crisis allowed Moscow to focus on defending Russian territorial integrity. Though a 1996 armistice with Chechnya was not the preferred outcome from the Kremlin's point of view, successful treaties with Tatarstan, Chechnya, and its other republics concluded Russia's internal fight for legitimacy.

3. Progression from the First Tier to the Second

Russia had adequately satisfied its first tier needs by establishing its internal legitimacy. In 1996, it began to transition from the first tier to the second tier of the hierarchy. It had demonstrated its desire to defend its own existence; however, it still

¹⁸⁴ German, *Russia's Chechen War*, 119.

retained a relatively weak state identity. It had to progress back up a significant portion of the hierarchy before it could approach the strong state identity it had in the years following its World War II victory. However, lawlessness and terrorism were two phenomena primarily responsible for preventing Russia from satisfying its second tier domestic security needs (Figure 8).




Figure 8. Progression from First to Second Tier

Observers of Russian politics during the 1990s used several different analogies to describe Russia’s economic and political climate during that time. Some used the American Wild West as an appropriate metaphor while others used references to Al Capone or U.S. Robber Barons of the nineteenth century to describe Russia after the fall of the Soviet Union.¹⁸⁵ Each of the metaphors comments on the nexus of entrepreneurship and political influence and its impact on Russian domestic security.

Russia after the dissolution of the Soviet Union failed to create lasting political institutions. The result was the increasing personalization of Russian politics where one’s proximity to the President became the primary factor for succeeding in business

¹⁸⁵ “A Russia of Yesteryear?” *Christian Science Monitor*, sec. Editorials, July 19, 2004; Stephen White, *Russia's New Politics: The Management of a Postcommunist Society* (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 166; Peter Baker and Susan Glasser, *Kremlin Rising: Vladimir Putin's Russia and the End of Revolution*, Updated. (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2007), 286.

and politics.¹⁸⁶ The oligarchs epitomized this phenomenon. They were Russia's six wealthiest entrepreneurs who controlled a majority of Russia's natural resources. They considered themselves the puppeteers of the Russian executive branch ensuring amenable government policy to their personal business interests.¹⁸⁷ The public increasingly lost confidence in Yeltsin's ability to create a true democratic government and saw the government existing to help its friends in business and not the Russian people. In fact, the media and the public began to refer to some of the oligarchs as modern-day Rasputins, a reference to the monk who helped bring down the Russian Empire in 1917.¹⁸⁸ While the oligarchs eroded the public's confidence in the government, organized crime also did much to impact Russian domestic security.

The Soviet Union did experience crime throughout its history albeit at much lower levels than western states. Most criminal acts centered on hooliganism, corruption, and robbery though criminals never gained the upper hand on Russian law enforcement.¹⁸⁹ However, the fall of the Soviet Union ushered in a "criminal revolution" in the Russian Federation with crimes such as kidnapping, drug smuggling, murder, and software piracy occurring at levels never seen before.¹⁹⁰ Organized groups were responsible for the largest increase in crime accounting for over twenty-six thousand offenses in 1996 when compared to only thirty-five hundred in 1990. In fact, the influence of organized crime had grown so much in Russia that a 1997 U.S. Congressional report warned that Russia was quickly becoming an "ungovernable and mafia-dominated nuclear superpower."¹⁹¹ Stephen White describes the situation as follows:

Russia was also distinctive in the extent to which organised crime – loosely described as the 'the mafia' – had permeated every pore of

¹⁸⁶ White, *Russia's New Politics: The Management of a Postcommunist Society*, 149-50.

¹⁸⁷ Baker and Glasser, *Kremlin Rising: Vladimir Putin's Russia and the End of Revolution*, 86.

¹⁸⁸ Paul Starobin and Catherine Belton, "Open Season on Russia's Oligarchs: Is Putin Behind the Drive to Rein in the Business Elite?" *Business Week* (2000): 160-62, http://www.businessweek.com/2000/00_28/b3689158.htm (accessed January 19, 2009).

¹⁸⁹ White, *Russia's New Politics: The Management of a Postcommunist Society*, 158.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 158-9.

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 162.

entrepreneurship and trade and was dominating both legitimate and illegitimate economic sectors simultaneously including half the banks and 80 percent of joint ventures with foreign capital, and perhaps 40 percent of the economy as a whole...¹⁹²

Also contributing to Russian stagnation at tier two domestic security needs was the increasing specter of terrorism. The 1996 armistice between the Russian Federation and Chechnya left the matter largely unresolved. Neither side had scored a complete victory over the other. Chechen separatist increasingly saw terrorism as a means of leverage to gain their complete independence from Moscow. Chechen militants launched several large scale terrorist operations in Russian cities throughout the 1990s. In June 1995, a Chechen warlord named Shamil Basayev took fifteen hundred Russians hostage in a hospital in the town of Budyonnovsk resulting in the deaths of one hundred sixty-six people. In January 1996, Chechen militants took two thousand people hostage in the Dagestani city of Kizlyar resulting in the deaths of between fifty and one hundred hostages and townspeople.¹⁹³ Though minor bombings took place throughout the federation, it was two bombings of Moscow apartment buildings in 1999 that shook public confidence in the government's ability to protect them.¹⁹⁴

The ultimate effect of these phenomena left Russia stagnating at tier two domestic security needs. Subsequent Russian behavior attempted to increase state power in order to decrease rampant chaos experienced throughout the country and increase public confidence in the state's ability to protect them. The first challenge tackled by the Russian government was stemming the tide of terrorism originating from Chechnya.

In October 1999, just weeks after becoming Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin launched a new war with Chechnya describing it as "operations to suppress terrorism."¹⁹⁵ Unfortunately for the Russian Federation, terrorist

¹⁹² White, *Russia's New Politics: The Management of a Postcommunist Society*, 121.

¹⁹³ "Russia: A Timeline of Terrorism since 1995," Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty, <http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1070937.html> (accessed January 19, 2009).

¹⁹⁴ Dmitri Trenin, "The Legacy of Vladimir Putin," *Current History* 106, no. 702 (October 1, 2007): 346, www.proquest.com (accessed January 19, 2009).

¹⁹⁵ Emil Pain, "The Second Chechen War: The Information Component," *Military Review* 80, no. 4 (July/August 2000): 59, www.proquest.com (accessed January 24, 2009).

attacks actually increased in ferocity from 1999 through 2005. Though officially declaring combat operations over in April 2002, Vladimir Putin ultimately succeeded in stemming the tide of Chechen terrorism with a policy of Chechenization of the conflict. By 2006, he had propped up Ramzan Kadyrov, a former rebel turned Moscow loyalist, as the President of Chechnya and essentially gave him carte blanche in suppressing Chechen separatism and terrorism.¹⁹⁶ Additionally, Russian Federal forces by 2006 had killed Shamil Basayev, the alleged mastermind of several high profile terrorist acts.¹⁹⁷ These behaviors began to stem the tide of terrorism inside the Russian Federation and marked a starting point for satisfying its domestic security needs. However, its success against terrorism did not fully satisfy Russian domestic security needs.

The state still had to consolidate its strength at expense of the oligarchs and organized crime before it sufficiently satisfied its second tier domestic security needs. One of the first behaviors initiated to achieve this goal was the re-emphasis on tax collection after Russia's financial crisis of 1998.¹⁹⁸ At that time, Russia began to target its rich and famous for tax evasion largely as a means to intimidate ordinary citizens into paying their taxes.¹⁹⁹ The policy had the added benefit of asserting the government's dominance over Russia's oligarchs as well. One by one, the oligarchs began to lose their power. Some, such as Mikhail Khodorkovsky, went to federal prison for tax evasion while others, such as Boris Berezovsky, chose self-initiated exile abroad. The oligarchs who remained willingly submitted to the authority of the state in deference to its ruling elite. The state took additional measures to consolidate its power and decrease the level of societal chaos present since the 1990s.

¹⁹⁶ John Russell, "Ramzan Kadyrov: The Indigenous Key to Success in Putin's Chechenization," *Nationalities Papers* 36, no. 4 (September 2008): 660, http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/101311_731325979_901650932.pdf (accessed January 24, 2009).

¹⁹⁷ *Russia: A Timeline of Terrorism since 1995*.

¹⁹⁸ Frank Gregory and Gerald Brooke, "Policing Economic Transition and Increasing Revenue: A Case Study of the Federal Tax Police Service of the Russian Federation," *Europe-Asia Studies* 52, no. 3 (May 1, 2000): 443, www.proquest.com (accessed January 24, 2009).

¹⁹⁹ Galina G. Preobragenskaya and Robert W. McGee, *Taxation and Public Finance in a Transition Economy: A Case Study of Russia*, (2004), 7, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID480862_code2139.pdf?abstractid=480862&mirid=5 (accessed January 24, 2009).

Shortly after Putin's inauguration in 2000, Russia initiated reforms in its federal structure. In the 1990s, Russia had direct popular elections of its regional governors. This federal structure enabled the governors to create a separate power base and ignore the mandates of the national government in Moscow. Some regions went as far as to declare autonomy from Moscow and negotiate their own international treaties.²⁰⁰ The regions were rife with corruption, which facilitated much of the existing crime. The state's initial attempt at reform in 2000 ejected regional governors from the Federal Council (i.e., the upper house of Parliament) and appointed national "super governors" to provide oversight of the regions.²⁰¹ In 2004, the state went further and implemented direct presidential appointments of all regional governors with approval of the regional legislatures. With this move, the national government brought the governors to heel and removed any source of their independent power base making them reliant on Moscow for support. The result of these reforms brought the regions into compliance with national norms of behavior and facilitated the collection of taxes that flowed into the coffers of the national government.²⁰²

After the adoption of these behaviors, Russia successfully satisfied its second tier domestic security needs. It had sufficiently quelled threats of separatism and terrorism from Chechen rebels with a policy of Chechenization. Additionally, Russia had consolidated state power through the collection of taxes. This policy reduced the influence of the oligarchs and regional governors and further stabilized the country with the imposition of standardized norms throughout the country. Russian ruling elites in February 2006 expressed their new found confidence with the term "sovereign democracy." Masha Lipman of the Carnegie Moscow Center explains two meanings the term conveys. The term and its two meanings mark Russia's transition from a domestic focus to a focus on its external security and its relations with other states.

²⁰⁰ Robert Orttung, "Putin's Federal Reform Package: A Recipe for Unchecked Kremlin Power," *Demokratizatsiya* (Summer 2001), 1, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3996/is_200107/ai_n8987514# (accessed January 24, 2009).

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 1-2.

²⁰² *Ibid.*, 3.

“Sovereign democracy” is a Kremlin coinage that conveys two messages: first, that Russia's regime is democratic and, second, that this claim must be accepted, period. Any attempt at verification will be regarded as unfriendly and as meddling in Russia's domestic affairs.²⁰³

4. Progression from the Second Tier to the Third

Though external security was extremely important to Russia since its birth as a sovereign state in 1991, establishing its legitimacy and domestic security had preoccupied Russian leaders for its first fifteen years of existence. By 2006, Russia was ready to concentrate on its relations with others states in the international system and its own external security needs. At the forefront of Russia’s external security needs is its influence in what it calls the “Near Abroad” or those independent states previously part of the Soviet Union. Russia sees two primary competitors for influence in its near abroad, which produces two different types of Russian responses. First, Russia has an interest in monitoring growing Chinese influence in Central Asia, and secondly, it is suspicious of U.S./NATO expansion into Eastern Europe and the Caucasus (Figure 9).




Figure 9. Russian Progression from Second to Third Tier

²⁰³ Masha Lipman, “Putin's Sovereign Democracy,” *The Washington Post*, July 15, 2006, www.proquest.com (accessed January 25, 2009).

The Russian Federation has increasingly adopted an Eastern orientation in its foreign policy since 2006.²⁰⁴ This shift is in stark contrast to Gorbachev, who aligned Soviet foreign policy with the West and Western values of political liberalism. Russia's orientation toward the east stems from three primary interests.

First, Russia has had a long and enduring interest in Central Asia. This relationship began as early as 1716 when Peter the Great attempted to conquer the Khanate of Khiva in modern day Uzbekistan. By the late nineteenth century, Alexander III had conquered much of the region formally making the area part of the Russian Empire. Stalin and Lenin incorporated the region into the Soviet Union as early as 1918 after the Bolshevik takeover of the Russian Provisional Government. As a result, millions of ethnic Russians migrated to the region over the years. Though many of them have returned to Russia since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, approximately 5.5 million ethnic Russians live in the region today as ethnic minorities.²⁰⁵ The Russia Federation has expressed interest in the welfare and status of these Russian minorities within the five former Soviet Republics in Central Asia.²⁰⁶ Yet, Russia has other issues justifying its interest in Central Asia.

Russia also has interest in decreasing the influence of Islamic fundamentalism and separatism in the region. In a 2003 speech in Malaysia, former Russian President Vladimir Putin declared Russia a Muslim power. His declaration reflects the changing demographics in Russia where Muslims constitute over ten percent of the Russian population or between 14-20 million people.²⁰⁷ Russia stays engaged in Central Asia

²⁰⁴ Nikolay Spasskiy, "Russia: Deputy Secretary of Security Council on Russia's Past and Future," *Voyenno-Promyshlenny Kuryer*, April 5, 2006, www.opensource.gov (accessed January 30, 2009).

²⁰⁵ Sebastien Peyrouse, *The Russian Minority in Central Asia: Migration, Politics, and Language* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2008), 4, <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/OP297.pdf> (accessed January 26, 2009).

²⁰⁶ Lena Jonson, *Vladimir Putin and Central Asia: The Shaping of Russian Foreign Policy*, vol. 1 (London; New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 165.

²⁰⁷ "Europe: A Benign Growth; Russia's Muslims," *The Economist*, April 7, 2007, 39, www.proquest.com (accessed January 25, 2009).

partly to monitor entities potentially influencing its growing Muslim population. While Muslim influence remains a valid interest for Russia, it is also concerned with growing Chinese expansion in the region.

China has increasing economic incentives to expand its influence in Central Asia. China has become an international economic powerhouse over the years making it the second largest importer of oil behind the U.S.. Rapid Chinese economic growth results in a nine percent increase in Chinese annual oil consumption with much of it imported from unstable regions such as the Middle East.²⁰⁸ Yet, vast oil and natural gas reserves in the Caspian Sea region of Central Asia offers China a reliable source of energy to fuel its growing economy.²⁰⁹ Consequently, some Russians view the expansion of Chinese influence in the region with suspicion.

Though they do not constitute a majority view in the Russian political elites, two primary factions advocate containment of growing Chinese influence in Central Asia. First, Russian “Westernizers” (e.g., Yegor Gaidar) want the state to embrace a Western oriented foreign policy while at the same time countering any potential Chinese threats to Russia’s Far East region.²¹⁰ A second faction is the ultranationalists (e.g., Vladimir Zhirinovskiy) who contend China is too Western oriented itself and an alliance with them subordinates Russian interests to a foreign power.²¹¹ Subsequent Russian behavior in Central Asia attempts to satisfy its external security needs while taking these factors into consideration.

Russia’s behavioral response has been threefold. First, it seeks to engage China and cooperate on issues of mutual interest in the Central Asian region. Economic trade

²⁰⁸ “China Oil Imports Recover on Stockpiling,” (January 11, 2009), <http://www.reuters.com/article/GCA-Oil/idUSTRE50B0V520090112> (accessed January 26, 2009).

²⁰⁹ Steven Woehrel, *Russian Energy Policy Toward Neighboring Countries* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2007), <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34261.pdf> (accessed January 28, 2007).

²¹⁰ Alexander Lukin, *Russia's Image of China and Russian-Chinese Relations*, The Brookings Institution, 2001), 8 of 22, http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/rc/papers/2001/05china_lukin/lukinwp_01.pdf (accessed January 26, 2009).

²¹¹ *Ibid.*, 8, 12 of 22.

and fighting terrorism are the most prominent issues of cooperation between the two states, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is the primary vehicle to pursue these mutual interests.²¹² The SCO provides a framework for its six member states to coordinate antiterrorism policies and conduct periodic combined exercises to demonstrate the effectiveness of these policies.²¹³ More importantly, the SCO provides a forum for its member states to conduct bilateral trade negotiations.²¹⁴ As a result, Chinese-Russian trade has grown over the years and reached \$43 billion in 2008. Both states expect a fourteen percent increase in 2009 putting China in the top five of Russia's trading partners.²¹⁵ Yet, Russia also seeks to create mechanisms outside of its Chinese engagement policy that protect its Central Asian interests.

Therefore, Russia has adopted a second response to protect its economic interests in Central Asia. Russia is a member of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF), which has the stated purpose of increasing coordination among its members for the production of gas resources throughout the world.²¹⁶ Russia's interests extend beyond simple coordination of these policies. It is attempting to create a gas cartel similar to the Organization of Oil Producing Countries (OPEC) that unifies oil production policies of its member states for sale on the world oil market.²¹⁷ In fact, it is particularly interested in creating a "gas troika" where Russia along with Iran and Qatar would control gas

²¹² Refer to the SCO's official website for more information regarding its function. <http://www.sectSCO.org/EN/> (accessed June 11, 2008).

²¹³ Shanghai Cooperation Organization, "Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism, and Extremism," <http://www.sectSCO.org/html/00093.html> (accessed June 11, 2008).

²¹⁴ Shanghai Cooperation Organization, "Brief Introduction to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation," <http://www.sectSCO.org/html/00026.html> (accessed June 11, 2008).

²¹⁵ "China's Trade Ties with Russia Buttressed," Xinhua China Daily, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2008-10/29/content_7152417.htm (accessed January 27, 2009); "Russian Federation Country Profile," World Trade Organization, http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfiles/RU_e.htm (accessed January 27, 2009).

²¹⁶ "Mission of GECF," Gas Exporting Countries Forum, <http://www.gecforum.org/> (accessed January 28, 2009).

²¹⁷ M. K. Bhadrakumar, "Russia Takes Control of Turkmen (World?) Gas," Asia Times Online, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/JG30Ag01.html (accessed January 28, 2009).

policies for approximately two-thirds of the world's gas reserves.²¹⁸ Additionally, Russia is seeking greater control over non-Russian gas production through bilateral trade deals. In 2008, Russia signed a twenty-year agreement to buy Turkmen gas at similar prices currently paid by Europeans. Though Russia will not make much money in the deal, it does give Russia's state owned gas company, Gazprom, control over Turkmenistan's gas production.²¹⁹ Similar agreements with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the other two gas producing states in Central Asia, would provide Moscow a strategic advantage over states currently reliant on Central Asian gas imports such as China and European states.²²⁰ While these actions protect its economic interests in Central Asia, Russia's uses a different mechanism to ensure its security interests in the region.

Russia's third and final behavioral response has been to strengthen the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Whereas the SCO is a forum for coordinating both security and economic issues between Russia and states not previously part of the Soviet Union, the CSTO focuses specifically on security issues. The organization stems from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and only comprises former republics of the Soviet Union though it has extended an invitation to Iran.²²¹ Russia has increasingly attempted over the years to forge a much closer military relationship with CSTO members than it has with SCO members.²²² In fact, the CSTO has created a permanent rapid reaction force for world-wide deployment.²²³ Additionally, Russia has provided advanced weapon systems to CSTO member states for domestic Russian

²¹⁸ Ariel Cohen, "Gas Exporting Countries Forum: The Russian-Iranian Gas Cartel," *Journal of Energy Security*, (December 2008), http://www.ensec.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=171:gas-exporting-countries-forum-the-russian-iranian-gas-cartel&catid=90:energysecuritydecember08&Itemid=334 (accessed January 28, 2009).

²¹⁹ Bhadrakumar, *Russia Takes Control of Turkmen (World?) Gas*.

²²⁰ Ibid.

²²¹ "Eurasia Security Watch - in House Bulletin no. 151," American Foreign Policy Council, http://www.afpc.org/publication_listings/viewBulletin/273/true (accessed January 28, 2009).

²²² In essence, this refers to Russia's desire to forge a closer relationship with the Central Asian states and not with China since China is the only SCO member that is not also in the CSTO. Additionally, India, Iran, Mongolia, and Pakistan are official observers of the SCO; however, they are not members or observers of the CSTO.

²²³ Arnur Rakhymbekov, "Russia Ratifies Agreement on CSTO Peacekeeping Activity," Kazakh National Information Agency, <http://www.rfca.kz/?nc468&version=en> (accessed January 28, 2009).

prices.²²⁴ This decision has led to significant integration of member state air defense forces, which “far surpasses the SCO’s activities in defense.”²²⁵ In fact, it is the CSTO that Russia sees as NATO’s equivalent and not the SCO.²²⁶ The statement below from President Medvedev’s official Kremlin website reinforces Moscow’s view of NATO/CSTO parity and demonstrates Russian concern over foreign influence in its Near Abroad.

Noting the serious potential for conflict that is building up in close proximity to the CSTO’s zone of responsibility, the organisation’s member states call on the NATO countries to weigh up all possible consequences of NATO’s eastward expansion and the deployment of new missile defence system components.²²⁷

Russia sees NATO member states, and specifically the U.S., as its other primary competitor. It is deeply concerned over the West’s growing influence in Eastern European and the Caucasus.²²⁸ Russia has many of the same concerns in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus as it does in Central Asia. Similarly, these include a longstanding relationship with Caucasians and Eastern Europeans, concern for 10.5 million ethnic

²²⁴ Pavel Felgenhauer, “Dushanbe Summits Follow Russian Agenda,” *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 4, no. 187 (2007), [http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews\[tt_news\]=33065](http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=33065) (accessed January 28, 2009).

²²⁵ Erica Murat, “Moscow’s Efforts to Strengthen Grip on CSTO and CIS Seek Greater Ideological Unity,” *Central Asia-Caucasus Institute* 10, no. 15 (2008), <http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/4907> (accessed January 28, 2009).

²²⁶ Roger McDermott, “Russia using CSTO to Counterbalance NATO,” *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 4, no. 45 (March 6, 2007), http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=32556 (accessed January 29, 2009); “Press Conferences, Meetings with the Press, Press Statements,” Kremlin-President of Russia, http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/09/05/2125_type82912type82914type82915_206180.shtml (accessed January 29, 2009); Jefferson E. Turner, “Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Paper Tiger or Regional Powerhouse.” Master’s Degree, Naval Postgraduate School, 72, http://bosun.nps.edu/uhtbin/cgiisirs.exe/Mon+Jun+09+15:31:41+2008+/SIRSI/0/520/05Sep_Turner.pdf (accessed June 3, 2008).

²²⁷ “The Collective Security Treaty Organisation Summit,” The Kremlin - President of Russia, <http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/events/chronicle/2008/09/206210.shtml> (accessed January 29, 2009).

²²⁸ “Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy,” The Kremlin - President of Russia, http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2007/02/10/0138_type82912type82914type82917type84779_118123.shtml (accessed January 30, 2009); “Meeting with NATO Secretary-General Jaap De Hoop Scheffer,” The Kremlin - President of Russia, http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2004/04/08/1806_type82914_63120.shtml (accessed January 30, 2009).

Russians living in the Near Abroad, securing Russia's economic interests in the region, and monitoring regional instability potentially impacting Russia's domestic populations.²²⁹ Yet, Russia sees a difference between the growing influences of its two competitors.

The U.S. and NATO have done something that the Chinese have not so far. NATO has facilitated the departure of former Soviet republics from the sphere of Russian influence and formally incorporated them into Western security arrangements. Russia now distrusts NATO and sees expansion into the Near Abroad as renegeing on assurances given to Gorbachev during the fall of the Berlin Wall.²³⁰ The row over U.S. plans to install components of a missile defense system in the former Warsaw Pact states of Poland and the Czech Republic is emblematic of Russia's general frustration over NATO expansion eastward. It is this difference that resulted in changes in Russian foreign policy behavior. Russia no longer focuses on engagement with NATO as it does with China but rather on competition with NATO. Russia sees the realm of international relations in a zero-sum game where increased security for the West comes at its own expense. Several examples illustrate Russia's current policy of competition with NATO states.

First, Russia is increasing the capability and use of its nuclear triad as a deterrent to further NATO expansion into the Near Abroad. In the years before 2005, Russia's Long Range Aviation (LRA) bomber force flew less than a dozen annual sorties outside of Russian controlled airspace. Between August 2007 and May 2008, the number of similar missions had increased to over 150 with each provoking a fighter intercept from six Euro-Atlantic states and Japan.²³¹ Russia's LRA forces now routinely fly in close proximity to Japanese and NATO territory without straying from internationally recognized airspace. Russian aircrews have performed missile drills while conducting

²²⁹ The term Near Abroad specifically relates to those states once part of the Soviet Union and does not encompass former Warsaw Pact states. Statistics on ethnic Russian populations in the Near Abroad were compiled from the individual country pages from: "The World Factbook," Central Intelligence Agency, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/> (accessed January 30, 2009).

²³⁰ *Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy.*

²³¹ "Russia to Conduct Military Exercises in Indian Ocean this Fall," RIA Novosti, <http://en.rian.ru/russia/20080805/115766637.html> (accessed August 27, 2008).

some of these missions.²³² Additionally, Russia has allocated more of its resources to upgrading its nuclear triad. It is fielding the Kh-102 advanced nuclear cruise missile that doubles the range of the AS-15/KENT.²³³ Russia also expects to field the BULAVA submarine-launched ballistic missile enabling it to defeat any proposed U.S. missile defense shield.²³⁴ Training and upgrading weapon systems of the nuclear triad is one way Russia demonstrates its competition with NATO; however, it is not the only method.

Russia is playing tit for tat with the U.S. by creating its own sphere of influence in South America and the Caribbean. This is in retaliation over increasing U.S. influence in Eastern Europe, the Baltics, and the Caucasus. Russia is increasingly forging closer relationships with anti-U.S. regimes in the Western hemisphere such as Cuba and Venezuela. For example, Russian officials are entertaining the idea of basing LRA bombers in Cuba while at the same time exporting \$4.4 billion of advanced weaponry to Venezuela.²³⁵ This is yet another way for Russia to exert pressure on the U.S. and to voice its displeasure over NATO expansion into its Near Abroad. Russia has additional methods as well.

Russian external security needs are most poignant with regards to the Caucasus. It is one thing for Eastern Europeans to leave Russia's sphere of influence; however, it is quite a different matter for states of the Caucasus to leave. Russia sees a very active role for itself in the Caucasus and is the self-proclaimed "...guarantor of security for peoples of the Caucasus."²³⁶ The August 2008 conflict involving Georgia, its breakaway provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and Russia demonstrate the extreme measures

²³² "Russian Bombers to Test-Fire Missiles in Bay of Biscay," The Times Online, <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article3230615.ece> (accessed February 2, 2009).

²³³ Michael Jasinski, "Russia: Heavy Bomber Force Overview," Nuclear Threat Initiative, <http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/weapons/bombers/lraovr.htm> (accessed February 1, 2009).

²³⁴ Sebastian Alison, "Russia to Start Producing New Bulava Ballistic Missiles in 2009," Bloomberg News, <http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601095&sid=aiO19AXblGL8> (accessed February 1, 2009).

²³⁵ "Russia Could Place Bombers in Latin America, N. Africa - Paper," Russian News and Information Agency, <http://en.rian.ru/russia/20080724/114821813-print.html> (accessed August 28, 2008); "Russia's Arms Sales to Venezuela for Defense Only - Lavrov," RIA Novosti, <http://en.rian.ru/russia/20081007/117523798.html> (accessed February 1, 2009).

²³⁶ Jim Nichol, *Russia-Georgia Conflict in South Ossetia: Context and Implications for U.S. Interests* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, (2008) (accessed October 27, 2008).

Russia is willing to take in protecting its interests and satisfying its external security needs.²³⁷ The conflict resulted in the Russian occupation of disputed and undisputed Georgian territory and the unilateral recognition of Abkhaz and South Ossetian independence. Some have argued that Russia's action during the conflict was a direct challenge to NATO over its policy of eastward expansion. Additionally, critics charge that Russia sought to "punish" the West for violence perpetrated against Serbia and subsequent recognition of Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence.²³⁸ Other's claim Russia initiated the conflict to gain control over non-Russia energy reserves.²³⁹ This view highlights the final behavior Russia has adopted to satisfy its external security needs in its competition with the West.

Russia uses energy as strategic leverage in its competition with the West. It attempts to coerce European states into adopting favorable policy positions towards Russia.²⁴⁰ Failure to do so results in Russia's suspension of energy supplies to the in-compliant state. It was a tactic first employed by Gorbachev in 1990 in an attempt to coerce compliance from the Baltic Republics over unilateral declarations of independence.²⁴¹ Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation has periodically used the tactic as well. A Pew Research polls indicates that European citizens are growing more concerned over Russia's use of "energy blackmail."²⁴² Even observers who acknowledge the legitimate business practices behind Russian decisions concerning its energy reserves question Russia's timing in the implementation of these decisions.²⁴³ For example, Russia increased the price of gas going to Georgia and Ukraine after popular elections defeated pro-Moscow candidates in those two countries.

²³⁷ Nichol, *Russia-Georgia Conflict in South Ossetia: Context and Implications for U.S. Interests*.

²³⁸ Ibid.

²³⁹ Ibid.

²⁴⁰ Keith C. Smith, "Gaz Promises: Russian Energy's Challenge for the West," *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs* 8, no. 1 (January 1, 2007): 54-5, www.proquest.com (accessed February 2, 2009).

²⁴¹ Ibid., 52.

²⁴² Erin Carriere-Kretschmer and Katie Holzgart, "European Worries about Reliance on Russian Energy were Already High," The Pew Research Center, <http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1083/europeans--worries-about-reliance-on-russian-energy-were-already-high> (accessed February 2, 2009); Woehrel, *Russian Energy Policy Toward Neighboring Countries*, 14.

²⁴³ Ibid.

Breakdown of subsequent negotiations between Ukraine and Russia over a fair market price of gas resulted in a temporary termination of the delivery of Russian gas to much of Western Europe in January 2006.²⁴⁴

C. SUMMARY

This chapter has traced Soviet and Russian state strength from its apogee at the conclusion of World War II and documented its decline down the hierarchy culminating in the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. After years of stagnation at the bottom of the hierarchy, the Russian Federation has begun to progress back up the hierarchy towards a strong state identity. It has successfully established its internal and external legitimacy, quelled its internal political challengers and established relative domestic security. Currently, Russia attempts to satisfy its third tier external security needs; however, it is here that Russia has begun to stagnate.

The Russian-Georgian conflict did not have its intended effect. Russia sought to intimidate Eastern European and Caucasian states into adopting pro-Russian policies, yet the opposite came true. In fact, the conflict probably did more to exacerbate Russian external security needs than to satisfy them. As evidence, a new spirit of cooperation exists among Baltic and Eastern European states, and Poland and the Czech Republic agreed to host U.S. missile defense components just days after the Russian invasion. Russia will not likely satisfy its external security needs until its competition with NATO ceases.

²⁴⁴ Smith, *Gas Promises: Russian Energy's Challenge for the West*, 55-6.

IV. CONCLUSION

A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

This thesis set forth an ambitious goal by using a theory prominent in the behavioral sciences and applying that theory to the study of international relations. In so doing, it sought to present an operational framework for ascertaining patterns in states' foreign policy pursuits and extend those patterns into the future as forecasts of their possible behaviors. This process is similar to a meteorologist observing indicators and making predictions on what the weather will be like at some point in the future. While the meteorologist attempts to predict Mother Nature, intelligence analysts attempt to predict human nature.

Overall, this thesis appears successful in developing a model explaining how the pursuit of legitimacy, internal security, external security, prestige, and strong state identity needs drive state behavior. Additionally, this model remains relevant in an intelligence professional's analysis of state behavior and the formulation of expected state courses of actions. However, several weaknesses became apparent while applying the model to the Soviet/Russian case study. These weaknesses necessitate some minor changes before using it operationally.

B. RECOMMENDED CHANGES

First, the limiting assumption of a unitary rational actor may be too restrictive for using the model operationally. The author made the decision to assume a unitary, rational actor to minimize the potential impact of logical fallacies on this thesis. However, this is an impractical assumption for intelligence professionals providing assessments to U.S. policy makers on real-world, dynamic situations. While it was a useful assumption to analyze the Soviet/Russian case study from a historical perspective, it discounts the friction between different decision making layers in the formulation of

states' foreign policies as outlined by Graham Allison.²⁴⁵ Often times, different bureaucratic layers within the process sit at different tiers on the hierarchy. Different perspectives from sitting at different tiers on the hierarchy are often the source of friction between them. President George W. Bush's farewell address in January 2009 demonstrates different perspectives that can develop between the constituent parts of a state and how those perspectives influence the state's foreign policy.

As the years passed, most Americans were able to return to life much as it had been before 9/11. But I never did. Every morning, I received a briefing on the threats to our nation, and I vowed to do everything in my power to keep us safe.²⁴⁶

Presumably, President Bush viewed the U.S. on the third tier of the hierarchy attempting to satisfy its external security needs through his entire second term until the end of his presidency. His statement above reflects the assessment of other politicians and a majority of the U.S. public as developing past external security needs and worrying more about U.S. prestige and its image abroad. The friction between these two views affected the outcome of the 2008 presidential election. Senator Barack Obama's campaign statements reflected an optimism that the U.S. was progressing beyond third tier external security needs. Consequently, he defeated Senator John McCain who a majority of the public viewed as closer to President Bush's assessment of U.S. development. On the surface, it appears that the election results will have an impact on U.S. foreign policy goals. The same type of friction was visible in the Soviet/Russian case study.

An example of this phenomenon in a Soviet/Russian context is the friction between Gorbachev and the hardliners over the retrenchment of Soviet commitments in Eastern Europe. While Gorbachev felt very comfortable with this decision seeing it as a benefit to reestablishing Soviet prestige, the decision worried the Kremlin and military conservatives. Intelligence analysts must understand these sources of friction as they

²⁴⁵ Allison, *Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 689-718.

²⁴⁶ George W. Bush, "Transcript of President's Farewell Address," CBS News, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/01/15/politics/bush_legacy/main4726092.shtml (accessed January 17, 2009).

develop between different layers in the decision making process. For example, U.S. policy makers could have offered assurances to appease conservatives' fears and strengthen Gorbachev's hand within his own government. Different assessments of a state's development among its constituent parts also provide certain opportunities for U.S. intelligence analysts and policy makers.

Identifying friction between government and societal factions allows U.S. analysts and policy makers to target specific layers in the decision making process. A good example of the opportunity friction presents to U.S. policy makers is the resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. On the surface and assuming a unitary rational actor, war appeared inevitable between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in 1962. However, it became clear to President Kennedy that Premier Khrushchev was at odds with other factions within his government and did not seek an altercation with the U.S.. Kennedy ultimately developed a successful strategy that considered frictions within the Soviet government. He remained resolute on the missile "quarantine" around Cuba, yet offered them a face saving measure of removing U.S. missiles from Turkey. This strategy attempted to deter hawks in the Soviet government while attempting to strengthen Khrushchev's hand. The strategy ultimately proved successful at de-escalating the situation where an assumption of a unitary, rational actor may have led to war. Therefore, an assumption of a unitary, rational actor facilitates the explanation of the model, but it is not practical in applying the model to real-world situations. One additional update is necessary as well.

Secondly, it is important to emphasize the non-linear nature of needs within the hierarchy. Maslow acknowledged that human beings pursue multiple needs simultaneously; however, he presented a linear model for the sake of offering a model of human behavior. Though the thesis presented a linear format for simplicity's sake, it is important to address the multiple needs states pursue in an operational environment. In fact, an "economy of force" might apply where states pursue courses of action that satisfy as many needs as possible. In this regard, Russian desire to participate in the SCO bolsters its prestige throughout Central Asia as a regional power, enhances its economic security through bilateral trade agreements with SCO members, and increases its

domestic security by coordinating regional anti-terrorism policies. With these changes in mind, the thesis will apply them in a forecast of general trends expected in Russian policy during 2009.

C. ANTICIPATED RUSSIAN BEHAVIORS IN 2009

The goal of this thesis is to present a model capable of forecasting general trends in state behavior. It seeks to provide a framework for categorizing state behavior as attempts to satisfy its legitimacy, domestic security, external security, prestige, and strong state identity needs. Conversely, the model is not capable of predicting specific or tactical level behavior since human and societal interactions are too complex to predict these events consistently and accurately. With this in mind, the thesis will make a few general characterizations about Russia's current needs and offer examples of how Russia may pursue these needs in the future.

Currently, a preponderance of Russian needs revolve around its external security interests while also pursuing policies to satisfy its prestige and domestic security needs as well. Countering NATO expansion and advancing Russia's interests in international energy markets are the two primary methods Russia uses to satisfy its external security needs at this time. Additionally, Russia sees its counter NATO policies as an avenue to regain great power status and simultaneously address its prestige needs. Prior to the Georgian invasion in 2008, these were the two primary sets of needs Russia addressed with most of its lower level needs sufficiently satisfied. In fact, Russia continued to progress up the hierarchy with the pursuit of prestige becoming as important as its pursuit of external security.

Recently, Russia began to regress after fallout from the Russian-Georgian conflict. The conflict actually pushed Eastern European states closer to the West when they began to adopt policies quickly counter to Russian security interests.²⁴⁷ In some ways, Russia feels victimized by the West as being portrayed as the aggressor in the August conflict. Conversely, Russia views itself as the defender of a helpless population

²⁴⁷ Poland and the Czech Republic signed NMD agreements with the U.S..

of innocent people in the two breakaway Georgian provinces.²⁴⁸ Nevertheless, Russia has experienced some significant setbacks to its external security aims. As a result, it now focuses primarily on external security and to a lesser degree on prestige. Additionally, the worldwide economic recession has had a significant impact on Russian economic security again exacerbating its external security needs.

The economic instability produced by the recession is increasingly affecting Russian domestic security as well. This marks a disparity between different segments of the Russian population. The ruling elites still focus on external security and prestige needs while the average Russian worker increasingly focuses on economic issues. As public discontent grows during the economic slowdown, internal groups within Russia may seize the opportunity to make political mischief within the country. Communists and ultranationalists are already taking advantage of the growing discontent, and minority ethnic groups in the Federation could press for more autonomy at the same time should the Medvedev/Putin government weaken. Though Russian officials have focused on external security and prestige needs over the last three years, they will increasingly have to address domestic security needs as well.²⁴⁹ Therefore, this thesis expects Russian behavior in 2009 oriented in large part to the satisfaction of its external security needs while addressing to a lesser extent its domestic security and prestige needs.

Behavioral trends indicate Russia will seek greater competition with the West in the coming months while increasing its engagement with the East. Increased competition with the West serves all three of its needs. First, Russia believes that its policy of competition is proving successful and will ultimately result in NATO concessions in its eastward expansion thus addressing Russia's external security needs. Secondly, Western concessions would constitute a loss for NATO in Russia's view and thus a win for itself in a zero-sum game environment. Russia will view NATO concessions as enhancing its own prestige around the world and thus contributing to its goal of great power status.

²⁴⁸ Mikhail Gorbachev, "Russia Never Wanted a War - Op Ed," Strategy Page, <http://www.strategypage.com/militaryforums/30-103171.aspx> (accessed February 5, 2009).

²⁴⁹ "Restive Russian Region Protests Kremlin Appointment," Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, http://www.rferl.org/Content/Restive_Russian_Region_Protests_Kremlin_Appointment/1467112.html (accessed February 16, 2009).

Thirdly, competition with NATO enhances Russian domestic security. Russian leadership could use its competition with NATO, especially the U.S., to fan Russian nationalism and divert the public's attention away from domestic frustrations. The following scenarios are only example behaviors Russia could adopt to satisfy its developmental needs.

Russia's drive to satisfy its external security needs through competition with NATO could develop in several ways. First, Georgia's future territorial integrity is in doubt with Russian "peacekeepers" occupying large parts of disputed Georgian territory. Russia continues to strengthen its military presence in Georgia with the possible establishment of Russian naval and airbases in the Georgian provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.²⁵⁰ In fact, integration of Russian, Abkhazian, and South Ossetian societies is likely to continue over the next year to such an extent that sovereignty of the two breakaway regions will be indistinguishable from Russian sovereignty. Russia could invoke its self-declared role as protector of the Caucasus should NATO begin to complain too loudly at the integration of the region.²⁵¹ Russia could simply annex the breakaway regions should NATO states take any concrete measures to counter this integration. Russian competition with NATO could spread to other areas of the Eastern Europe and the Near Abroad as well.

Ukraine may become the focus of Russian foreign policy over the next year. Stopping or at least slowing Ukrainian foreign policy orientation towards the West is a critical external security goal for Russia. Russia is not likely to use armed violence with Ukraine, as it did with Georgia, in the coming year; however, it will potentially apply coercive methods to influence the Ukrainian presidential election in January 2010. Facilitating the election of a Ukrainian president more amenable to Russia foreign policy goals helps to satisfy Russian external security needs, yet it is mindful that overt intimidation during the 2004 Ukrainian election backfired and resulted in the election of a

²⁵⁰ "White House: Candid with Russia when U.S. Disagrees | Ajc.Com," *Associated Press*, http://www.ajc.com/metro/content/shared-gen/ap/U.S._President_And_White_House_Advisers/U.S._Russia.html?cxntlid=inform_sr (accessed February 7, 2009).

²⁵¹ Nichol, *Russia-Georgia Conflict in South Ossetia: Context and Implications for U.S. Interests*, 5-6.

vehemently anti-Russian Ukrainian president. The January 2009 row between Russia and Ukraine over European gas distribution has largely marginalized Ukrainian President Yushchenko and elevated the status of his political competitors.²⁵² Russia wants to bring about Yushchenko's defeat and the election of a pro-Russian politician, such as Viktor Yanukovich, to counter Western influence in Ukraine. Yushchenko and his pro-Western government are especially vulnerable according to polls conducted in December 2008 indicating a majority of Ukrainians oppose NATO membership and seek neutrality between the region's powerful states.²⁵³

Meanwhile, Russia feeling the pinch of the worldwide economic slowdown is likely to attempt further consolidation of its control over worldwide natural gas reserves. Such a move addresses its external security needs and potentially helps Russia satisfy its domestic security and prestige needs as well. Russia has been very successful at consolidating its control over Eurasian gas reserves. Moscow views further consolidation as an important goal in its foreign policy pursuits for Russia uses gas less as a business commodity and more as strategic leverage. Russia has gained a great deal of control over Turkmen, Uzbek, and Kazakh gas; however, Azerbaijan is one state that stands well outside Moscow's energy sphere of influence.

Over the next year, Russia may focus on bringing Azerbaijan back into its sphere of influence. The Kremlin would like to sever Azerbaijan's good relationship with the West and gain greater control over Azerbaijani gas. Russia could try and ingratiate its way into the hearts of Azeri leaders by mediating talks with Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabakh, but it will conceivably use more coercive methods should Azerbaijan rebuff Russian overtures. Obstructing the Nabucco pipeline and promoting its own South and Nord stream pipelines would help Russia gain greater control of Central Asian natural gas. Additionally, other economic goals could help Russia satisfy its external security goals.

²⁵² Lucian Kim, "Putin Undermines Gazprom as Ukraine Pact Freezes out Yushchenko," Bloomberg Online, <http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601102&sid=aeVXFAtO5XI&refer=uk> (accessed February 8, 2009).

²⁵³ "Poll: Ukrainians Still Oppose NATO after Summit," *Kyiv Post*, <http://www.kyivpost.com/nation/31990> (accessed February 7, 2009).

Russia has interest in undermining the U.S.'s position as the dominant global economic power. One way to accomplish this is for Russia to promote other currencies at the expense of the dollar in international transactions. Again, Russia views a loss in U.S. prestige as a gain for Russia. This behavior could potentially help provide a convenient scapegoat for Kremlin leaders and deflect domestic criticism away from Russia's poor economic performance. The economic recession highlights the possibility of Russian developmental regression down the hierarchy in the coming months where the ruling elite may have to exert more effort in satisfying Russia's second tier domestic security needs.

The Medvedev/Putin government is coming under fire for their handling of the Russian economy. Mass protests over deteriorating economic conditions could further invigorate Russian communists and nationalists. Additionally, economic uncertainty and social unrest potentially reopens old ethnic wounds as Russians compete for a smaller pool of state resources. As a result, Medvedev and Putin may face the need to crackdown on the domestic unrest; consequently, edging further away from democratic norms. Domestic instability could grow and cause Russian regression to the point where domestic security needs become prepotent over external security needs. The possibility of these developments presents substantial challenges to the Obama Administration over the coming year.

D. RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION

President Obama and his administration must always remember two concerns regarding Russia. First, Russia sees the world as a zero-sum game. Russia will not interpret concessions made by the West as anything but the West's loss and Russia's gain, and Russians have not historically looked for win-win opportunities when formulating foreign policy. Secondly, Russia is very sensitive regarding respect and the loss of face in international relations. One of Russia's biggest complaints since the dissolution of the Soviet Union has been the West's treatment of Russia as a second rate power. As a result, Russians demand that the West give them the respect they feel they deserve. The following statements from former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and former Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov underscore this point.

Americans have a severe disease - worse than AIDS. It's called the winner's complex (Gorbachev). The practice of inter-state relations where Russia incurred substantial economic losses as *quid pro quo* for gaining the friendliness of the leaders of certain foreign countries is a thing of the past (Ivanov).²⁵⁴

Given that Russian needs focus largely on its external security and to a lesser extent on its domestic security and prestige needs, the Obama Administration can do several things to help Russia satisfy its needs in a more positive manner. This thesis advocates taking a dual track with regards to U.S.-Russian relations. In much the same way, President Kennedy crafted a policy focused at different levels of the Soviet decision making process during the Cuban Missile Crisis, the proposed dual track offered by this thesis seeks to deter some elements of the Russian government while encouraging engagement with more moderate Russian leaders. In fact, there is increasing evidence that declining economic security in the country is exacerbating a rift between a reportedly more moderate President Medvedev and more authoritarian Prime Minister Putin.²⁵⁵ The following recommendations seek to consider this development and the multiple perspectives within the Russian decision making progress.

One must remember that a threat to the U.S. is any state which has the intent and capability to do harm. First, U.S. officials should reengage with Russia in an attempt to improve relations, listen to their concerns, and find ways to work together on issues of mutual interest. The aim is to disincentivize Russian intent to do the U.S. harm. Secondly, the administration should take concrete steps towards thwarting Russia's capability to do the U.S. harm, namely, prevent Russia from seizing controlling interests of the world's natural gas supply and using energy as strategic leverage used to finance a counter NATO policy while blackmailing its neighbors into compliance with its foreign policy designs. How would such a policy look?

²⁵⁴ Vladimir Radyuhin, "Resurgent Russia," *Frontline*, August 11, 2006, <http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl2315/stories/20060811001704600.htm> (accessed February 8, 2009).

²⁵⁵ *Analysis: Medvedev Hints at Break with Putin Era*, Open Source Center, 2009, https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_0_5100_893_0_43/http%3B/apps.opensource.gov%3B7011/opensource.gov/content/Display/FEATURE/FEA20090217816639?printerFriendly=true (accessed February 18, 2009).

U.S. officials must be willing to sit down and listen to Russia while attempting to reengage with it on issues of mutual interest as well as on issues of dispute. U.S. officials should have no illusions, however, to how Russia will perceive this move. Russia will likely see this as affirmation of a successful policy of competition and will seek ways to press their advantage. However, this policy in the end could give more credibility to President Medvedev as the deliverer of something Prime Minister Putin could not. It could act as a catalyst for renewed U.S.-Russian cooperation should a rift between Putin and Medvedev truly exist. Ultimately, the administration should try to help Russia satisfy its needs in a more constructive manner. Several ideas come to mind to achieve this goal.

First, the Obama Administration should change the focus of Western expansion into Russia's Near Abroad. The closer NATO comes to Russian borders, the more it pushes against NATO. President Obama should instead encourage European Union (EU) enlargement vice rapid NATO expansion. Prime Minister Putin is on record as advocating a "common economic space" in Europe.²⁵⁶ While still the Russian President, Putin envisioned states of the former Soviet Union gaining membership in the EU, including Ukraine, and spoke of EU enlargement as a positive factor that would "help strengthen the system of international relations."²⁵⁷ Encouraging EU enlargement firmly anchors Eastern European and possibly Caucasian states in the West, but it does not exacerbate Russian sensitivities over stationing NATO military units in former Soviet states. EU enlargement also gives prospective NATO members the opportunity to slowly transition their militaries over to Western standards. NATO should not abandon its eastward expansion, but it should slow the process down. Essentially, EU enlargement vice NATO expansion could be a confidence building measure between Russia and the West.

Secondly, the Administration should try to reengage Russia in areas of mutual interest. Issues such as terrorism, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, reduction of

²⁵⁶ "Russia Takes a Negative View of NATO Expansion but Has Always Seen the European Union's Enlargement as a Positive Process," The Kremlin - Official Website of the President of Russia, http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/themes/2004/12/100000_81076.shtml (accessed February 8, 2009).

²⁵⁷ Ibid.

nuclear weapons stockpiles, and combating proliferation of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear states are as important to the West as they are to Russia. Additionally, the administration should reengage Russia in regards to NMD.

Russia does not, on the surface, object to the creation of a U.S. missile defense shield. In fact, Putin proposed the idea to the Clinton Administration in 2000.²⁵⁸ Russia, however, does object to the placement of U.S. military assets in former Eastern Bloc countries. Russia equates its sensitivities over such a development to U.S. sensitivities regarding Soviet missiles in Cuba during the Cuban Missile Crisis.²⁵⁹ Putin understands the U.S. desire to create a missile defense shield and indicated Russian acquiescence with its placement in “southern countries” such as Turkey or other NATO states.²⁶⁰ With this in mind, the Obama Administration should consider reviewing the deployment of NMD assets to installations in Eastern Europe. The administration could use this change in policy as a quid pro quo for Russian help in stopping the proliferation of nuclear and missile technology to Iran. NMD deployment to southern European countries could also provide the U.S. some tactical advantage from a closer proximity to threatening states, but it exposes the system to greater risk at the same time. Nonetheless, a review of the deployment would go a long way to improving U.S.-Russian relations.

Russia has also played a game of tit for tat with the U.S. over the last several years. Russia’s desire to create a sphere of influence in South America as a response to U.S. interest in the Near Abroad is evidence of this assertion. Though Russia would have to overcome substantial Cuban apprehension, Russia could seek to deploy missiles of its own in Latin American should the Obama Administration proceed with the placement of

²⁵⁸ Lorna Thomas, “U.S.-Russia Missile Defense Tensions and Russian Military Resurgence,” *Global Politician*, <http://www.globalpolitician.com/24770-russia-military> (accessed February 9, 2009).

²⁵⁹ Steven A. Hildreth and Carl Ek, *Long-Range Ballistic Missile Defense in Europe* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2008).

²⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

U.S. missiles in Eastern Europe.²⁶¹ Conversely, the Obama Administration should take concrete steps to minimize Russia's capability should a policy of reengagement not achieve the intended results.

Russia has a mixed capability to do harm to U.S. interests. On the one hand, it has a substantial nuclear capability. It possesses thousands of nuclear armaments and has the capability to deliver them across the globe. Moreover, it is still one of the few states on earth with the technological capability to project conventional land, air, and naval forces well beyond its borders and sell that technology to other nefarious states. On the other hand, Russian power projection rests on the foundation of a crumbling infrastructure and declining demographic trends. In fact, the Russian population could decline to under one-hundred million people by the middle of the century presenting severe problems in fielding a permanent military capable of defending its territorial boundaries.²⁶² Nonetheless, Russia has access to large energy reserves, which give it the capability to counter U.S. interests.

Considering Russia's use of its energy reserves as a method of financing its counter-NATO policies, the Obama Administration should strive to reduce the effectiveness of this weapon. First, the administration should maintain strong diplomatic and security ties with Azerbaijan as Russia attempts to gain greater control over Central Asian gas distribution. The government of Azerbaijan has been very deft in its tightrope walk between the region's powers. Despite this agility, the Obama Administration must maintain strong relations with Azerbaijan and render support to them should they need it.

Secondly, the administration should support European trade unity in the negotiation of energy deals. Russia has successfully undermined EU trade authority preferring to negotiate bilateral agreements with individual EU states. Russia has increased its control over production and distribution of Eurasian energy reserves in these

²⁶¹ Mikhail Zygar and Yuliya Taratuta, "Igor Sechin Tested a New Approach to Cuba - Kommersant Moscow," *Kommersant*, http://www.kommersant.com/p1007608/r_527/Russian_delegation_visited_Cuba/ (accessed February 26, 2009).

²⁶² "Russia's Birth, Mortality Rates to Equal by 2011 - Ministry," *Russian News and Information Agency*, <http://en.rian.ru/russia/20080123/97616414.html> (accessed February 9, 2009).

deals and has increased European dependency on Russian supplied energy at the same time. The U.S. should support Eastern European calls to negotiate energy agreements with Russia as a unified trade block without defections of individual EU member states.

Finally, the Administration should make alternative and diversified sources of energy a national security priority for the U.S.. The U.S. Department of Energy expects international consumption of natural gas to increase steadily through 2030.²⁶³ Natural gas produces less carbon dioxide than other sources of fossil fuels making it a favored source of energy as advanced industrial states try to limit carbon emissions and address climate change. In 2008, the U.S. was the largest consumer of natural gas and accounted for approximately twenty percent of international consumption or nearly 653 billion cubic meters of 3.2 trillion cubic meters of world demand.²⁶⁴ Currently, domestic and Canadian gas suppliers meet most U.S. demand; however, Russia is interested in entering the lucrative U.S. market and supplying up to twenty percent of U.S. demand in the next decade.²⁶⁵ Decreasing U.S. demand for natural gas makes it less dependent on foreign sources of energy and less susceptible to energy blackmail. Additionally, a decrease in U.S. demand decreases pressure on worldwide supply and expectedly drives international gas prices down minimizing a good source of Russian revenue for its anti-NATO policies. Yet, none of these measures constitutes a silver bullet for solving friction in U.S.-Russian relations.

In light of Russia's expected behaviors, the Obama Administration should expect a road of challenges ahead. U.S.-Russian relations did not deteriorate overnight, nor will they improve overnight. Administration officials will increasingly rely on intelligence analysts to evaluate Russia's current behavior for discernable trends. They will expect

²⁶³ Energy Information Administration, *International Energy Outlook 2008-Natural Gas* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy, 2008), <http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/index.html> (accessed February 11, 2009).

²⁶⁴ "Rank Order - Natural Gas - Consumption," U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2181rank.html> (accessed February 11, 2009).

²⁶⁵ Roman Kupchinsky, "Russia, LNG, and the U.S. Natural Gas Market," *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 5, no. 223 (2008), [http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews\[tt_news\]=34241](http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=34241) (accessed February 11, 2009).

analytical assessments extending those trends into the future to determine what behaviors Russia could adopt. The author hopes that this thesis provides analysts and decision makers a tool to make the job a little easier.

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