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Unfolding the Future of the Long War

Motivations, Prospects, and Implications for the U.S. Army

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Preface

This document explores how the “long war” might unfold in the coming years. It looks out to about the year 2020 and reports on the major trends, uncertainties, participants, and ways the long war might unfold through the use of eight specific trajectories.

This work will interest those involved in military training, force structure, policy, and how the confluence of governance, terrorism, and ideology might affect the U.S. military forces.

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Summary

The United States is currently engaged in what has been characterized as the “long war.” The long war has been described by some as an epic struggle against adversaries bent on forming a unified Islamic world to supplant Western dominance, while others characterize it more narrowly as an extension of the war on terror. But while policymakers, military leaders, and scholars have offered numerous definitions of the long war, no consensus has been reached about this term or its implications for the United States. To understand the effects that this long war will have on the U.S. Army and on U.S. forces in general, it is necessary to understand more precisely what the long war is and how it might unfold. To address this need, this study explores the concept of the long war and identifies potential ways in which it might unfold as well as the implications for the Army and the U.S. military more generally.

Framework for Understanding the Long War

As seen in Figure S.1, one way to think about the potential threats the United States faces in the long war is to consider the confluence of three problems raised by the war: those related to the ideologies espoused by key adversaries in the conflict, those related to the use of terrorism, and those related to governance (i.e., its absence or presence, its quality, and the predisposition of specific governing bodies to the United States and its interests). The goal of this report is not to determine which of these areas is the key problem. Instead, we take the stance that to ensure that this long war follows a favorable course, the United States will need to make a concerted effort across all three domains.
Also important for understanding the long war is a definition of the adversary. Because several of the adversaries that have attacked the United States have espoused an ideology laced with Islamic motifs and juridical justifications, this study examined groups operating within predominantly Muslim countries and organized them into categories based on an understanding of their motivating ideas and goals:¹

- Doctrinaire jihadists, whether global in orientation or internally focused, who adhere to a version of Islam known as Salafi-jihadism. This interpretation of Islam rejects modernism and emphasizes the concepts of *jihad* (holy struggle) and *takfir* (declaring another Muslim an infidel).
- Religious nationalist organizations such as Hezbollah and HAMAS that participate in the political process but that are also willing to

¹ For the purposes of this report, we use the term “Muslim world” to denote those states with predominantly or large Muslim populations. Many of these states are located in the Middle East and northern Africa, and others span south and southeast Asia through to Indonesia.
use violence, sometimes against their own people, to dominate a particular community, region, or nation.

- Other groups whose primary motivation is secular, such as communists, Arab nationalists, or Ba’athists.

In addition to these groups, other nonviolent organizations operating within predominantly Muslim nations can sometimes provide a “gateway” for entrance into more radical organizations.

This categorization scheme helps illustrate the diversity of groups plausibly involved in a long war with the United States and indicates the assortment of economic, social, and political factors and grievances that can motivate adversaries. Some groups in this scheme pose a greater or lesser relative threat than do others (e.g., doctrinaire jihadists with an external focus constitute the greatest threat) and thus require the United States to have a range of approaches available to deal with them.

**Alternative Trajectories**

The study identified eight alternative “trajectories,” or paths, that the long war might take. The trajectories emphasize not what the future looks like, but the ways in which it might unfold. The eight trajectories discussed in this report are listed and briefly defined in Table S.1.

**Strategies for Addressing the Trajectories**

In addressing the future of the long war, we identified a number of trends and uncertainties associated with the future combat environment. This analysis, combined with our understanding of the components of the long war, provided the basis for a set of seven strategy options for the United States in the long war.
Divide and Rule

*Divide and Rule focuses on exploiting fault lines between the various Salafi-jihadist groups to turn them against each other and dissipate their energy on internal conflicts.* This strategy relies heavily on covert action, information operations (IO), unconventional warfare, and support to indigenous security forces. Divide and Rule would be the obvious strategy choice for the “Narrowing of Threat” trajectory as the United States and its local allies could use the nationalist jihadists to launch proxy IO campaigns to discredit the transnational jihadists in the eyes of the local populace. In the “Holding Action” trajectory, Divide and Rule would be an inexpensive way of buying time for the United States and its allies until the United States can return its full attention to the long war. U.S. leaders could also choose to capitalize on the “Sustained Shia-Sunni Conflict” trajectory by taking the side of the conservative Sunni regimes against Shiite empowerment movements in the Muslim world.

Shrink the Swamp

*Shrink the Swamp tries to slowly reduce the space in the Muslim world in which Salafi-jihadist groups can operate.* It is an “outside-in” approach that seeks to stabilize the outer geographic edges of the Muslim world to the point where those countries are inoculated against Salafi-jihadist ideology. This strategy is particularly germane to the “Narrowing of Threat” trajectory. After isolating the transnational jihadists from the rest of the jihadist movement, the United States could work to eradicate the transnational jihadist presence from the outer geographic rings of the Muslim world—i.e., Indonesia, Malaysia, and Morocco—by working intensively with local security forces to eliminate the funding, educational, and recruitment mechanisms that support al-Qaeda and its affiliates in those countries. The strategy might also apply to the “Steady State” and “Sustained Sunni-Shia Conflict” trajectories.

Inside Out

*This strategy holds that the United States should use decisive conventional military force to change the regime in certain key Muslim countries and impose democracy in its place.* The theory here is that the geopolitical
### Table S.1
**Short Description of the Eight Trajectories Discussed in This Report**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th><strong>Trajectory</strong></th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Steady State</td>
<td>Baseline case largely reminiscent of current actions and environment. In this vision, the threat continues to be the broad universe of radical Salafi-jihadists, including both transnational and sometimes regional groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>War of Ideas</td>
<td>Shift to information-based campaign with the goal of isolating jihadists and their infrastructure from the broader global Muslim population. Plans to confront Iran militarily over its nuclear program are shelved for the time being.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Major Muslim Nation Goes Bad</td>
<td>Radical shift in a regime brought on when a critical state in the Muslim world is taken over by radical extremists. Two of the most plausible and most threatening scenarios to American interests would be a military coup in Pakistan or a successful fundamentalist insurgency in Saudi Arabia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Narrowing of Threat</td>
<td>Conflict arising between jihadists leads the U.S. to take a “divide and conquer” approach in order to exploit cleavages among transnational jihadists and local/regional jihadists. Consequently, the U.S. would adopt a more flexible position toward local and nationalist Islamist groups like HAMAS and Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the Philippines.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Expanding Scope</td>
<td>Expanded scope of the long war threat beyond a major terrorist attack against U.S. interests to include radical Shiism, the Iranian state, regional terrorists, and/or some non-Islamic terror groups. In this formulation, the long war would become a true global war on terror.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Holding Action</td>
<td>A series of geopolitical shocks (e.g., an attempt by China to shift the balance of power in the Western Pacific or a sudden, violent implosion of North Korea) would compel the U.S. to temporarily scale back its efforts against Salafi-jihadists in order to focus on more traditional threats that require a response involving conventional forces and diplomatic capital.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Sustained Sunni-Shia Conflict</td>
<td>Widespread violence between Shia and Sunni groups, resulting in deep fault lines between Shia and Sunni communities throughout the Muslim world. As a result, the U.S. is led to concentrate, in the short term, on shoring up the traditional Sunni regimes in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Pakistan as a way of containing Iranian power and influence in the Middle East and Persian Gulf.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Chronic Insurgencies/Instability</td>
<td>Serious insurgencies and unrest around the world that drain the resources of the U.S. and its allies and decrease regime legitimacy. The insurgencies are driven largely by dissatisfaction with inefficient and ineffective governmental structures, dilapidated infrastructure in terms of basic services, and questions of legitimacy of the current leaders.</td>
</tr>
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Earthquake caused by regime change will empower democratic forces throughout the Muslim world and force much of the Salafi-jihadist warrior community to come out into the open to fight U.S. conventional
forces, thus giving the United States a better chance of crushing them decisively. This strategy is part of the “Steady State” because of the continuing focus on building democracy at some level in Afghanistan and Iraq. Although the notion that the birth of democracy in those two countries would cause it to spread throughout the entire Middle East has long since been discredited, one can still argue that the existence of two democratic states in the middle of the Muslim world would create two likely security partners and potential allies for the United States over the long term. In the “Sustained Sunni-Shia Conflict” trajectory, the United States might take an aggressive stance by seeking to overthrow the Iranian regime and replacing it with a moderate one that does not rely on Shiite chauvinism for its legitimacy.

State-Centric
State-Centric aims to spread effective governance throughout the Muslim world by strengthening established regimes, giving them more resources, and making them less brittle. The theory here is that the main driver behind the Salafi-jihadist surge is the existence of ungoverned spaces (like the tribal areas of Pakistan) and public administrations that cannot deliver basic services to ordinary people. The State-Centric strategy applies across all eight trajectories. For example, in the “Steady State” trajectory, the United States would continue to bolster existing regimes against insurgencies, terrorism, and social instability while nudging them toward improvements in the provision of basic services to the population. In the “Sustained Sunni-Shia Conflict” trajectory, the United States would work to build the institutional capacities of at-risk Muslim states so that their security forces could contain sectarian violence effectively. In the “Chronic Insurgencies/Instability” trajectory, State-Centric would be useful in countries that have stabilized their domestic security situation to the point where the insurgents are not gaining territory or influence.

Contain and React
Contain and React is a fundamentally defensive strategy that seeks to hold a “perimeter” in the Muslim world and only act strongly if that perimeter is breached (i.e., a U.S. ally is threatened with collapse or overthrow).
As a predominantly defensive strategy, the threshold for U.S. involvement would be high and would be contingent on a good relationship between the United States and its ally in the region. At the point of intervention, the United States would react with general purpose forces from a geographic perimeter location. This contrasts with other strategies such as Inside Out, where proactive U.S. actions would entail more aggressive actions across a broader group of states in the region.

This strategy has applications for several trajectories. For example, in “Major Muslim Nation Goes Bad,” Contain and React would seek to position U.S. military forces in neighboring states to deter the newly radicalized state from threatening its neighbors. In “Expanding Scope,” this strategy could be used to try to fence off groups like Hezbollah in finite swaths of territory with stepped-up border enforcement as well as periodic strikes and raids. Contain and React would be the preferred choice for the “War of Ideas” because the ideational campaign would be an ideal, low-cost, low-visibility tool for containing al-Qaeda and Salafi-jihadist ideologues.

**Ink Blot (Seize, Clear, and Hold)**

*Ink Blot is a global counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy that aims to seize, clear, and hold strategically important areas throughout the Muslim world by working actively with local security forces.* Under this strategy, the United States would work with key allies like Algeria, Egypt, and Yemen to remove all Salafi-jihadist elements from certain areas through a classic COIN approach that concludes with infrastructure restoration and the formation of local self-defense militias. The hope here would be that over time the Salafi-jihadist groups would be relegated to the geographic margins of the Muslim world and cut off from one another. In the “Chronic Insurgencies/Instability” trajectory, Ink Blot would be reserved for those insurgencies and areas of instability in which the insurgents are gaining ground and influence. The approach might also be applicable to the “Steady State” and “Narrowing of the Threat” trajectories.
Underlying Causes

*Underlying Causes holds that the United States needs to attack the broad underlying socioeconomic problems of the Muslim world on a regional, rather than country-specific, basis.* The United States would work steadily to deal with the demographic, resource scarcity, labor market, and public health problems that create poor living conditions and social frustration in the Middle East, South Asia, and North Africa. Over time, the theory is that better basic socioeconomic conditions would reduce the appeal of radical Salafi-jihadist ideas and create support for free market openness. This strategy would entail only a small role for the U.S. military. Under the “Holding Action” trajectory, the United States might adopt a longer-term and less aggressive stance in the Middle East. Nonmilitary organizations such as the U.S. Agency for International Development, the State Department, the Peace Corps, the Department of Agriculture, and the Department of Justice would become the focus of the new U.S. strategy.

Implications for the U.S. Army

We now describe some implications for the Army arising from the trajectories.

**Steady State**

In the “Steady State” trajectory, the role of the Army would be dominated by any continuing commitment to Afghanistan and Iraq. The Army is unlikely to be stretched in this scenario unless the Afghanistan or Iraq deployments continue to be large. If the United States chooses to engage in more peacekeeping and enforcement roles to prevent the growth of Salafi-jihadism, the Army would require some different skill sets from those needed in major combat, and some specialized equipment might also be useful (e.g., nonlethal weapons). If the United States decides to provide support to governments in an attempt to reduce the number of insurgencies and instability in particular countries, such operations could involve large numbers of troops but not nearly as many as Iraq. The continued use of Army special operations
forces (SOF) for global operations against al-Qaeda could compel an increase in SOF force structure beyond that currently programmed.

**War of Ideas**  
There would be two implications for the Army here. First, the Army would need to improve all facets of its IO capabilities, including target audience analysis, message creation, and message delivery. The Army would also need to learn how to synchronize strategic and tactical IO lines of operation. Second, to make tangible progress in the “War of Ideas,” the Army would need to do its best to reduce collateral damage during kinetic operations. This implies the need for better systems for all-source intelligence fusion as well as weaponry to support the discriminatory nature of the IO campaigns and reduce unwanted collateral damage.

**Major Muslim Nation Goes Bad**  
If the United States were to decide on a strategy of containment, then intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) as well as human intelligence (HUMINT) assets would be required to detect and monitor the flow of weapons/WMD components and people across the border of the “bad nation.” Since it is unlikely that the United States would commit to long-term border patrols, these ultimately would need to be handled by the forces of the neighboring nations, and the Army might be required to take on training or monitoring roles.

At least three proactive strategy components can be envisioned, including the need for strike capabilities against WMD facilities to prevent them from falling into the hands of the incoming government (which would not involve the Army heavily) as well as SOF, seize-and-hold, or stabilization operations, which could require a larger Army role.

If the United States were to become directly involved in a counter-coup, Army units might be required to train the friendly forces or serve as advisers. A more direct confrontation between U.S. forces and the new governments might be seen as similar to the “regime change” operation in Iraq. Lessons from this operation are well known and will not be repeated here. A radicalized state without weapons of mass
destruction or effect (WMD/E) capabilities could require a less immediate response from U.S. forces, such as the stationing of a couple of U.S. Army brigades in neighboring or regional countries as a deterrent to aggressive moves. The Army might also expect to be involved in significant IO operations in neighboring states to help contain the fallout and reduce the influence of Salafi-jihadist propaganda.

**Narrowing of Threat**

Because of the nature of the nationalist terrorist groups, any assistance would be mainly covert and would imply advanced IO capabilities so that it could aid other government agencies and host nations in the effort to promote cleavages within the jihadist movement. Much of this work would not necessarily be done by the Army. However, a narrowing of the threat could also allow the U.S. forces to focus their efforts more broadly on COIN campaigns currently being bolstered by transnational terrorists. In these cases, the military, and the Army in particular, could see an expanded role for COIN to target the more subtle places those groups are providing aid.

**Expanding Scope**

It is likely, assuming that commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan have been reduced, that the U.S. Army would not be stretched by the addition of another long war enemy. However, if there is still a significant deployment in Iraq or Afghanistan, opening up a war on an additional front may stretch the Army in terms of personnel. One of the more significant capability needs would be for HUMINT capabilities able to penetrate the new non-Salafi-jihadist targets, although such capabilities are likely to be developed in conjunction with the intelligence community rather than solely in the Army. It would also be useful for the Army to accelerate its research on counter-rocket, artillery, mortar (CRAM) technologies.

**Holding Action**

In this trajectory, the United States faces a conventional foe, or other threat, that forces it to reduce its focus on the long war. The implications for the Army of this other threat are not discussed here. In regard
to the long war, the Army might revert to a training and advisory role in countries where it might prefer to have an active presence. It is unlikely that in the face of this new threat the United States will continue to have “boots on the ground” where they are not desperately needed, but if ground troops do remain fighting the long war, then they will have to make do with fewer resources and less equipment. Additionally, there might be an increased need to operate with allies who might be required to aid the United States in offsetting the diminished U.S. commitment in foreign internal defense (FID) and counterterrorism missions. Depending on the nature of the conventional conflict, this trajectory could be extremely stressful on the Army, but it would not be the long war causing this stress.

**Sustained Sunni-Shia Conflict**

If the United States attempts to exploit the conflict to avoid having to confront a united Islamic world (possibly a very unwise strategy), then there will be little role for the Army. The exception would be the FID missions to train host nation security forces with the possible insertion of advisers, but this might be handled by other agencies. The United States may also seek to end the conflict through peacekeeping operations. Here there would be a substantial role for the Army.

A third option would be to take sides in the conflict, possibly supporting authoritative Sunni governments against a continually hostile Iran. The level of U.S. involvement would dictate the type of operations requirement by the Army, which might, at the higher end, require the Army to provide troop lift, logistical support, and other types of aid, or direct involvement in the conflict, which may look partly like an insurgency and partly like conventional war. At the latter level, the U.S. Army would call upon rapid precision strike systems and would have to balance aggressive operations with an IO campaign.

**Chronic Insurgencies/Instability**

If the United States chooses to get involved in a large number of the insurgencies, then the Army could find itself stretched in terms of numbers of specialty capabilities such as Special Forces (SF), Civil Affairs (CA), and psychological operations (PSYOPS). As the numbers grow,
the insurgencies might become “core Army business.” In such a situation, the Army may consider a significant restructuring to focus its forces on fighting insurgencies rather than major combat operations.

The capabilities required to fight insurgencies are different from those required for conventional warfare and would cause the Army to change some of its training and equipment. The United States would also need a capability to rebuild foreign infrastructure that was damaged during the conflict. This role has traditionally been taken on by agencies other than the Army, but it has often been fulfilled by the Army.

Broad Observations
From the consideration of the implications of the proposed trajectories for the United States, we conclude with a number of broad observations.

As Appropriate, the Military Should Define and Set Appropriate Goals for Any Engagements Associated with the Long War in Terms of the Confluence of Governance, Terrorism, and Ideology
Rhetorical use of the term “long war” aside, the basic tenets of the governance, terrorism, and ideology (GTI) construct provide one means of ensuring a more systemwide view of any engagements in the Muslim world. Defining future engagements too narrowly may not provide the effects desired and may only exacerbate situations. For instance, in the case of the “Chronic Insurgencies” trajectory, viewing the problem as solely a peacekeeping mission may not directly address the governance issues underlying the insurgencies. Likewise, not tailoring responses to the variegated motivations behind individual groups and their respective ideologies may create short-term local effects that do not address the longer-term and chronic unrest. Articulating the overall objectives from a systems point of view will help to better construct individual military missions and understand the impacts of those missions across GTI.
The Army Should Plan and Prepare to Be Involved with Aspects from Across the GTI Construct

The fight against international terrorism implies some U.S. military action; however, the key role tends to fall upon Special Forces or agencies other than the U.S. Army. In any case, an overall strategy should be well established that deals with the near-term tactical problems of Salafi-jihadism without forgetting the more nascent and growing terror networks and influences. Acquisition of WMD is a pivotal unknown in dealing with terrorist capabilities, and thus counter-WMD activities remain paramount.

The role of U.S. forces in governance is clearer. Typically, any large-scale efforts associated with post-conflict situations will be the military’s responsibility. Reactive operations associated with restoration and improvement through SSTRO\(^2\) activities with a host nation are done with ground forces through Civil Affairs and other specialties. When considering the implications of nation building, SSTRO, and post-conflict border security, key issues concern the needed specialization for such activities and the overall capacity required. The U.S. Army in particular is implicated in such activities because of its size and experience in such operations. Some of these activities, especially reconstruction of civilian governance infrastructure, are not usually thought to require an Army role. However, the lack of large-scale, deployable units from other government agencies may mean this role is performed by the U.S. Department of Defense and at least in part by the Army. For instance, the Iraq Study Group Report (Baker and Hamilton, 2006) calls for the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) to manage the reconstruction of the courts and legal system in Iraq. However, if the DOJ is incapable of performing such tasks in areas lacking security, this role is to be left to the military.

A more immediate step is to better understand the implications of military actions on ideologies and ideologically driven groups across the full spectrum of operations and address gap issues as appropriate across DOTMLPF.\(^3\)

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\(^2\) Stability, support, transition, and reconstruction operations.

\(^3\) Doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities.
The Army Should Consider Mission Sets That Allow for a More Proactive Effect Across the GTI Construct

A potentially more significant implication of the long war concerns proactive operations to shape countries before they become significant security problems. Being able to address issues across GTI before conflict or immediate need for direct involvement is a pivotal capability in ensuring that the long war does not escalate.

Trajectories explored during this study—for example, “Major Muslim Nation Goes Bad” and “Expanding Scope”—escalate current conflicts to broader groups of actors. In the former case, the proliferation of an ideology garners enough support to bring down an established regime. The proactive forces here are the establishment clergy that counterweigh the radicalized ideologies. To date, U.S. involvement with these groups has been limited, and it may be difficult for the Army to develop and exercise appropriate mission sets and relationships to proactively engage faltering states. Similarly, “Expanding Scope” implies escalation of nonstate actor capabilities that increase risk to U.S. national security. The proactive mission here includes developing policing and internal security capabilities within a number of states.

These types of novel mission areas would allow the military to proactively get ahead of the problems and reduce the need to be reactive. Typically, these operations are largely contained under “Peace-time Military Engagement” operations, which entail military-to-military engagements, education and training programs, advisory roles, border enforcement, and long-term intelligence support. However, these should be considered more broadly in relation to the long war description in this report and understood in terms of how they interact with the governance, terrorism, and ideology.4 These programs

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4 One case for this expanding mission set includes the effects of early actions in Operation Unified Assistance (tsunami relief in the Indian Ocean). The swift military assistance program, while nominally included under “humanitarian assistance,” engendered sudden support for the United States in that part of the world, changing Indonesian public opinion the most (Pew, 2005, p. 2). The tsunami was also implicated in bringing the regional insurgent group GAM together with the government, and it fostered a more open dialogue between the United States and various Muslim states in the affected areas. The U.S. part of the relief could not have been successful if not for a few core capabilities of the U.S. military—logistics, operational planning, and the ability and capacity for swift, large-scale action.
would be conducted as part of an interagency approach to the situation, and may be very far removed from any warfighting.

The Enduring Missions of the Force Combined with the Evolving Responses to the Long War Imply an Agile and Flexible Military

As described in this study, the focus of the long war could expand to include a broader focus on nonstate actors (“Expanding Scope”), narrow to emphasize simpler or more specific threats (“Narrowing of Scope”), or be overcome entirely by conventional threats (“Holding Action”). Any actions taken to change the force based on the long war should weigh the effects they will have on longer-term planning horizons, and the enduring missions of the force. In these terms, maintaining flexibility in the force is critically important, both to prepare for the various ways in which the long war might evolve and to allow the Army to remain ready for other contingencies while it wages the long war. Flexibility is more important in the case of the long war than in the conventional arena, since the long war enemy is able to adapt much more quickly than potential conventional foes.

The Military Should Consider the Vulnerability of the Assumption That Major Combat Operations Will Be Their Most Pressing Issue in the Medium and Longer Term

The assumption that major combat operations (MCO) would remain the primary mission in the timeframes considered in the report may not continue to hold beyond those timeframes. If this assumption were to change in the future, then resources spent on MCO capabilities could be redirected toward those better suited for fighting the long war, however it has evolved. If the assumption about the predominance of conventional conflict changes, then the Army, and the rest of the Department of Defense, would need to restructure in order to fight the long war in the most optimal fashion.

Similarly, in the future the Army may be relieved of MCO requirements by the other services and those resources redeployed to focus on COIN and SSTRO. Some of the trajectories explored in this study, namely “Expanding Scope” and “Chronic Insurgencies,” might imply considerable size and capabilities from the Army that could be
strengthened with a focus on those missions instead of conventional conflicts.

The Military, and More Specifically the Army, Should Plan for Potential Involvement in Medium- to Large-Scale Stability Operations and Nation Building

Depending on the chosen strategy, medium- to large-scale stability operations and nation building are possibly part of the long war. Many of the trajectories require the Army to use substantial counterinsurgency operations and/or nation building capabilities. Counterinsurgency operations are increasingly being seen as an Army role, whereas nation building has predominantly been the domain of other agencies. In the wake of Iraq, however, it is clear these other agencies lack the capability to conduct these operations, especially in an insecure environment. It may be necessary for the Army to take on these roles if other solutions cannot be found. Thus the military needs to understand the tradeoffs and risks involved with any assumptions about its capacity to perform such duties as the long war unfolds.

The Army Should Continue to Identify and Adopt Niche Capabilities to Prosecute the Long War

A more detailed examination of the trajectories described in this monograph will undoubtedly uncover capabilities necessary for successful operations. Examples of niche capabilities across the trajectories described in this monograph and evident in small-scale, low-intensity operations that the U.S. military might consider increasing include specific high-value, low-density capabilities such as: various ISR platforms; soldier skills for diplomacy; theater- and longer-term specific knowledge of areas and cultures; language skills; unconventional warfare and counterterrorism capabilities; tactical to strategic IO integration and development; and FID advisers. More detailed scenario planning would be useful to determine the biggest operational needs and potentially missing capabilities. In any case, the trajectories seen here indicate a reliance on many special skill sets, and developing, integrating, and balancing those capabilities within the larger bevy of military capabilities will remain a challenge.
Acknowledgments

We wish to express our thanks to a number of Army officers, civil servants, and analysts for their assistance on this study. This work would not have been possible without the support of many individuals. We thank our action officers, LTC Ronald T. Millis (formerly of ARCIC) and LTC Mark Elfendahl (ARCIC), and various others for their comments and feedback along the way including (in alphabetical order): Robert Allen (DCSINT), George Conrad (ARCIC), Joe Green (G-2), Tony Huggar (ARCIC), and COL Robert Johnson (ARCIC).

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We also would like to thank Kristin Leuschner and Jerry Sollinger for important efforts in crafting the language and simplifying the message. Terri Perkins, Joanna Nelsen, and Paraag Shukla helped with the production of this monograph.
Glossary

9/11 The terrorist acts that occurred on September 11, 2001
ABP Assumption-Based Planning
ARCIC Army Capabilities Integration Center
ASG Abu Sayyaf Group
CBRN Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
COIN Counterinsurgency
CONUS Continental United States
CRAM Counter-Rocket, Artillery, Mortar
CT Counterterrorism
DIME Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic
DoD Department of Defense
DOJ Department of Justice
DOTMLPF Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities
EIG Egyptian Islamic Group
ETA Basque Fatherland and Liberty (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna)
EU European Union
FARC Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarios de Colombia
FATA Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Pakistan)
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FID Foreign Internal Defense
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GTI</td>
<td>Governance, Terrorism, and Ideology (Construct)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GSPC</td>
<td>Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat</td>
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<tr>
<td>HLS</td>
<td>Homeland Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>HQDA</td>
<td>Headquarters, Department of the Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICBM</td>
<td>Intercontinental Ballistic Missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>Improvised Explosive Device</td>
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<tr>
<td>IO</td>
<td>Information Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International relations</td>
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<td>JI</td>
<td>Jemaah Islamiyah</td>
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<tr>
<td>LTTE</td>
<td>Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam</td>
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<tr>
<td>LW</td>
<td>Long War</td>
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<tr>
<td>MANPADS</td>
<td>Man-Portable Air Defense System</td>
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<tr>
<td>MCO</td>
<td>Major Combat Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>MMO</td>
<td>Motives, Means, and Opportunities</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NCTC</td>
<td>National Counterterrorism Center</td>
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<td>NLWS</td>
<td>(Army-sponsored) Nature of the Long War Seminar</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSCT</td>
<td>National Strategy for Combating Terrorism</td>
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<td>NSA</td>
<td>Nonstate Actor</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSS</td>
<td>The National Security Strategy of the United States of America</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPTEMPO</td>
<td>Operational Tempo</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSC</td>
<td>Open Source Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>PKK</td>
<td>Kurdistan Worker’s Party</td>
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<td>PME</td>
<td>Peacetime Military Engagement</td>
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<tr>
<td>QDR</td>
<td>Quadrennial Defense Review</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSM</td>
<td>Rajah Solaiman Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>SJ</td>
<td>Salafi-Jihadism/Salafi-Jihadists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOF</td>
<td>Special Operations Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSTRO</td>
<td>Stability, Support, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>--------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
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<tr>
<td>UAV</td>
<td>Unmanned Aerial Vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UQ</td>
<td>Unified Quest</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>USCENTCOM</td>
<td>United States Central Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>USDS</td>
<td>United States Department of State</td>
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<tr>
<td>UW</td>
<td>Unconventional warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMD/E</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction or Effect</td>
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The United States is engaged in a military effort that some have characterized as the “long war.” The long war has been described by some as an epic struggle against adversaries bent on forming a unified Islamic world to supplant Western dominance. Others see it more narrowly as an extension of the war on terror. The long war has been posited as the central challenge to U.S. security that will influence and be shaped by all other U.S. international relations. Others have seen it as a conflict requiring specialized tactical groups of well-trained forces that roam the world in a hunt for terrorists. But while policymakers, military leaders, and scholars have offered numerous, and wildly differing, definitions of the long war, no consensus has been reached about this term or its implications for the United States.

To understand the effects that this long war will have on the U.S. Army and on U.S. forces in general, it is necessary to understand more precisely what the long war is and how it might unfold over the coming years. Therefore, the Army asked RAND Arroyo Center to explore the concept of the long war and to identify potential ways in which it might unfold and the resulting implications for the Army.

**Focus of This Study**

This study examines the long war in relation to what we see as its three main components: ideology, terrorism, and governance. As will be explained further in Chapter Two, one way of thinking about the potential future threats the United States faces in the long war is to
consider it as the confluence of three sets of problems: those related to the ideologies espoused by key adversaries in the conflict, those related to the use of terrorism, and those related to governance—its absence or presence, its quality, and the predisposition of specific governing bodies toward the United States and its interests. The goal of this report is not to determine which of these areas is the key problem. Instead, this report takes the stance that the United States will need to make a concerted effort across all three domains in order to ensure that this long war follows a favorable course.

This project focuses on exploring how the current long war might evolve and develop in the coming years. The study describes eight alternative “trajectories,” or paths that the long war might take, along with the specific implications of those trajectories for the U.S. military. The eight trajectories discussed in this report are listed in Table 1.1.

In addressing the future of the long war, we examine what the broader future will look like and what shape the long war might take within these futures. Our analysis of the future is not comprehensive but draws on a number of sources to address the issues that most directly affect the course of the long war. Through this analysis, we identify a number of trends and uncertainties germane to the trajectories. We then identify a range of strategies that might be used to

Table 1.1
Tagline Descriptions of the Eight Trajectories Discussed in This Report

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Tagline</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Steady State</td>
<td>Baseline case largely reminiscent of current actions and environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>War of Ideas</td>
<td>Shift to information-based campaign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Major Muslim Nation Goes Bad</td>
<td>Radical shift in a regime brought on by a powerful nonstate actor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Narrowing of Threat</td>
<td>Conflict arising between jihadists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Expanding Scope</td>
<td>Expanding nonstate capabilities and an enlarging of the current threat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Holding Action</td>
<td>External influences constraining the execution of the long war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Sustained Sunni-Shia Conflict</td>
<td>Widespread violence between Shia and Sunni groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Chronic Insurgencies/Instability</td>
<td>Uprisings around the world</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
address these alternate futures and identify the implications of these strategies for the Army.

**Organization of This Report**

The following five chapters answer five main questions, as shown in Figure 1.1.

In Chapter Two, we discuss current uses of the term “long war” and describe our synthesis definition of the long war to aid in further analysis.

In Chapter Three, we describe the participants in the long war to date and examine the nature of the current threat under the three areas of governance, terrorism, and ideology.

In Chapter Four, we present factors affecting how the long war will unfold. These factors are a combination of actions taken by the United States, actions taken by various actors involved in the long war, and ongoing environmental changes. The factors are briefly described in

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**Figure 1.1**

Five Main Questions Addressed in This Report

- What is the “long war”? (Chapter Two)
- Who is involved in the long war? (Chapter Three)
- What will affect the way the long war unfolds? (Chapter Four)
- How might the long war unfold? (Chapter Five)
- What does this mean to the Army? (Chapter Six)
two sections: those that are constant throughout all futures (“trends”), and those that can take on alternative values and ultimately define the alternative trajectories (“uncertainties”).

In Chapter Six, we describe various strategies the armed forces might adopt to address the alternative trajectories and what is implied by those strategies in terms of potential gap issues\(^1\) that might exist in carrying out those strategies.

Finally, in Chapter Seven, we identify broad observations about the long war and next steps and considerations for engaging in the long war.

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\(^1\) “Gap issues” are defined as broad areas for concern for the military arising from (1) needed capabilities that do not currently exist in either the military or civilian communities, (2) an emerging capability for which there exists no practical framework or authority for integration into joint operations, or (3) a capability or role that military units are currently performing on the ground out of necessity, but for which they are undertrained, underresourced, or lacking legal justification. In this report we will speak only broadly about gaps that might exist in the Army.
CHAPTER TWO

What Is the Long War?

To understand and describe how the current long war might unfold in the coming years, it is first necessary to understand what the long war actually is. Since no definition for the long war has been widely accepted, in this chapter we review recent uses of the term and propose our own definition of long war.

While we feel that our definition accurately characterizes the current long war in a fair and politically uncharged manner, we do not use it exclusively in the rest of the report. To broaden the applicability of this report to cover a range of potential future trajectories, we sometimes introduce modified definitions of long war that are appropriate to the future scenario described.

Background and Use of the Term “Long War”

General John Abizaid brought the term “long war” into prominence in 2004 while he was commander of USCENTCOM. “Long war” was solidified as a term of art through its inclusion in subsequent books (Carafano and Rosenzweig, 2005), the President’s January 2006 State of the Union address, and especially the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). In these documents, the term is used to refer to current U.S. actions against al-Qaeda and its manifestations.

The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review spoke at length about a long war the United States is currently engaged in, and opened with the line: “The United States is a nation engaged in what will be a long war” (DoD, 2006). In the QDR, the term “long war” emphasized the
war’s duration and was chiefly used in regard to the set of actors that the United States faces, who are often characterized as “violent extremists” or “terrorists.” Not much attention was paid to the connection, if any, between particular groups that may be involved in the long war. In the QDR, four main points are made regarding winning the long war. They are as follows:

- defeat terrorist networks
- defend the homeland in depth
- shape the choices of countries at strategic crossroads
- prevent hostile states and nonstate actors from acquiring or using WMD.

While each objective is clearly relevant for national security, the QDR does not explain how, or whether, these objectives are unique to the long war. Indeed, the reference to “countries at strategic crossroads” is historically used to denote well-known states such as China and Russia; however, despite the importance of these states within military planning, they are not directly linked to the long war. Also, in describing the strategy for winning the long war, the QDR says little about the theory of victory. The QDR provides little to go on in terms of “winning” in the long war, or “defeating decisively” the threat that the United States faces.

The description of the long war in the QDR provides little guidance on how this war might unfold into the future. To explore this issue, the Army, in cooperation with Joint Forces Command and Special Operations Command, held workshops in support of the Unified Quest 2007 wargame to describe what the long war is. One of the first workshops, held in late 2006—the Nature of the Long War Seminar or NLWS—provided multiple definitions from panel members to help spur discussion. One definition focused on “protracted conflicts involving episodes of intense armed violence interspersed with tense peace or low intensity conflict.”¹ Other definitions, specifically addressing indi-

¹ Any quotes taken from the NLWS are not for attribution, and thus names are withheld in this report.
individual components of the long war, aided in articulating the individual components that drove the nature of the long war in its many guises. However, while many definitions met with general approval, no single definition emerged that was broadly accepted.

Definitions of the long war often bear similarities or include concepts relevant to other U.S. national strategies, including the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT). The NSCT begins with a statement made by President Bush not long after 9/11:

No group or nation should mistake America’s intentions: We will not rest until terrorist groups of global reach have been found, have been stopped, and have been defeated. (President George W. Bush, November 6, 2001) (The White House, 2003, p. 1)

This statement specifically calls attention to the “global reach” of the terrorist groups that the United States is most interested in, thus implicitly making a distinction between these groups and local and regional terrorist organizations that do not have, and that in many cases do not even desire, global reach. The discussions of the long war in the QDR draw a similar distinction between groups with and without global reach.

Similarly, the U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) speaks of the global nature of terrorism and the importance of using a full suite of national power to combat it:

To defeat this threat we must make use of every tool in our arsenal—military power, better homeland defenses, law enforcement, intelligence, and vigorous efforts to cut off terrorist financing. (The White House, 2002, pp. iii–iv)

The NSS goes on to mention the temporal aspect of this set of challenges: “The war against terrorists of global reach is a global enterprise of uncertain duration.” This statement is in concert with the discussion in the QDR and indicates directly the difficulty in knowing the duration of the war, while also indirectly committing U.S. efforts to last longer than might be expected.
A growing dissatisfaction with the term “long war” itself has been evident in many discussions waged in political circles. A recent memo released by the House Armed Services Committee (Conaton, 2007; Maze, 2007) reiterates the colloquial understanding of the term long war when it asks that such terms be “removed” from future legislation. In March 2007, Admiral William Fallon, upon taking over command of CENTCOM from General Abizaid, asked that the term be dropped from the military lexicon to emphasize the U.S. military’s desire to reduce U.S. forces in the region over time, although the military would continue to conduct operations more broadly against the threat (Lardner, 2007).

Other terms have been suggested as potential replacements for the long war. In April 2007, General George Casey, after becoming Chief of Staff of the Army, offered the term “persistent conflict” as a potential descriptor for the types of operations the United States would be using to combat al-Qaeda and associated movements (Scarborough, 2007). This term is particularly pertinent to the time component of expected operations in Iraq and elsewhere—the term emphasizes how long U.S. operations in the region would be conducted, perhaps in preparation for longer-than-normal deployments.

Despite the controversy over the term “long war,” it still has supporters. Some in the joint community use the term to describe current operations. While discussing Iran’s contribution to current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan with the former Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Michael G. Mullen, General James T. Conway said the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are not single events, but part of a larger set of battles associated with the long war. He noted that the term long war “precisely describes what this nation is going to be engaged in, for probably the next couple of decades” (Grogan, 2007). Admiral Mullen has also used the term to denote both the duration and the breadth of actions that will be necessary to address current security issues in the Middle East.2

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2 Admiral Mullen was recently picked to be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and issued guidance to the Joint Staff to “develop a strategy to defend our National interests in the Middle East” (Mullen, 2007, p. 3). Additional objectives highlight the need to “reset, reconstitute, and revitalize our Armed forces” (p. 3) and “properly balance our global strategic risk” (p. 4).
While a clear and unambiguous definition of the long war has thus far been elusive, many have tried to define the term through analogy, often drawing upon historical examples. The long war has been considered as being somewhat akin to long-duration metaphorical wars such as the “war on drugs” and the “war on poverty,” albeit without significant consensus or expansion. While all of these terms are somewhat vague and politically charged, they nonetheless describe real-world threats to the United States, the existence of which few would dispute. Similarly, major works such as Samuel Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations” (Huntington, 1993), have also been cited as an overarching descriptor of the current long war. In many of these cases, the parallels with the long war have not been discussed beyond superficial anecdotes, and some may warrant further exploration.

Some argue that there will always be an ideology that confronts the dominant power of the time—from the anarchists in the early 20th century to Nazism and communism and now Islamic extremism. These ideologies attract individuals who are disaffected with the status quo even if they do not necessary subscribe to the ideology in full. The most frequently cited analogy used in reference to the long war is the “Cold War,” with the ideology of communism used as a parallel to some fanatical form of Islam.

Behind this understanding of the long war lies the belief that the collective thinking on communism pulled groups of people together much like the violent ideologies espoused by such groups as al-Qaeda.3 Once again, however, those who draw comparisons between the Cold War and the long war have typically not linked specific operations, policies, and mechanisms of the Cold War to the act of confronting al-Qaeda and its manifestations or to current unrest in the Middle East in general. It is also clear that communism, at its height, commanded a set of resources well beyond the scope of the current, or any plausible

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3 Another example of the “long war” that includes confrontation with communism but goes further back in history can be found in Philip Bobbitt’s (2002) articulation of the Peace of Paris, which culminated in parliamentary democracy’s triumph over communism and Fascism.
future, long war adversary. In sum, therefore, such comparisons must be made cautiously so as not to overstate the current threat.

Carafano and Rosenzweig (2005) provide an example of the kinds of parallels that may be drawn between the Cold War and the long war. In this book, the authors draw broad lessons for the current conflict from the Cold War, despite the differences in the actual threat. These lessons include the need for “sound security, economic growth, a strong civil society, and a willingness to engage in a public battle of ideas,” all hallmarks of Eisenhower’s policies during the Cold War. The authors note further that the long war, like the Cold War, “takes time,” and whether looking back on the 40 years of the Cold War, or further back to World War I (thus linking fascism and communism against democracy as did Bobbitt (2002)), the United States will have to prepare for a multiyear event. Finally, the authors emphasize that “Now is the time to get it right,” i.e., in both situations, a clear policy and strategy are needed to confront the threat and provide the guidance to generate the actions to be taken. Carafano and Rosenzweig rightly speak to the “systems view” of the problems currently being faced by the United States, an emphasis we will take up in this report.

Notwithstanding the thrust of this study, defining the struggle against terrorism is not within the Department of Defense’s exclusive competence, much less the U.S. Army’s. Any eventual and agreed-upon definition must reflect a national consensus of what the effort is and what it is not. The national definition must take into account the views of all who are involved in the struggle, to include other agencies of government, the legislative branch, the national security intellectual community, industry and corporate America, and the informed public. The multiparty discourse required to reach such a consensus definition has yet to occur.

A Synthesis Description of the Long War: The Confluence of Governance, Terrorism, and Ideology

This report is concerned with the attention given to three areas in describing the current situation facing U.S. forces, namely, those related to the ideologies espoused by key adversaries in the conflict, those related to the use of terrorism, and those related to governance
(i.e., its absence or presence, its quality, and the predisposition of specific governing bodies to the United States and its interests). How the U.S. forces and U.S. national means writ large address each of these issues is still largely to be determined. Thus, paraphrasing the Cold War analogy, getting the starting point “right” and setting the strategy for the long war are still largely unaddressed, if they are not contained in already articulated policies of combating terrorism and other national strategies.

Others have written about the shortcomings of using the Cold War analogy for describing current threats facing the United States. These include John Tirman at the MIT Center for International Studies. Air Force General Richard B. Myers has also distinguished between the current struggle and the long war:

> It’s not like the Cold War, where we knew what the enemy’s capabilities were; we kept pretty good track of that. Their intent was always the question mark. Now we are in the 21st century security environment, and we know what the intent is; that question mark has gone away. Capabilities is the issue.

The RAND Arroyo Center team has been engaged in various discussions, both internally and externally (with our sponsors and through Unified Quest), on the topic of the long war, all of which have highlighted the difficulty of producing a single term capable of describing the complex nature of the situation facing the United States. Indeed, so many terms have been bandied about, it is clear others are struggling with an overarching term as well. Nonetheless, even though the term “long war” is being supplanted and will possibly even be removed from formal military writing, we find it useful to study the construct in relation to the three key issues of governance, terrorism, and ideol-

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ogy, particularly to understand how these concepts coalesced to foster an attack such as 9/11.

The elements of the long war currently being discussed by policymakers, military leaders, and others are not without merit. Individual and group violence, the proliferation of dangerous and violent ideologies, and destabilization of government and government control—all are currently in play. However, the most common misconception of the long war has been the attribution of one of these as being more important than the others. Equating the long war to just terrorism or just an “ideological struggle” does not do it justice and can perhaps be counterproductive in the effort to define the strategies and operations necessary to meet national goals. Definitions that address one of the components over the others miss the impact that this long war has had, which is: the confluence of governance, terrorism, and ideology (GTI) makes this long war complex and difficult, and is what differentiates it from other struggles the United States might be involved in.

The goal of this report is not to determine which one of the three is the key problem. Indeed, much empirical research has focused on the particular drivers of conflict in an attempt to pinpoint specific underlying causes and prioritized effects. Instead, we take the stance that the biggest, and perhaps most likely, pitfall U.S. forces will encounter in preparing and considering the implications of the long war is to focus too much attention on one area without due consideration of the effects of the other two. While the United States may have many individual successes in tracking down terrorists abroad, shoring up individual governments, or discounting ideologies, a concerted effort across all three domains will be necessary to ensure that this long war follows a favorable course.

One means of thinking through the problems the United States faces is to consider the long war as the confluence of those three problems—those associated with terrorism, those associated with governance, and those associated with ideologies (see Figure 2.1). Each area has a long history of concern for the United States.6 Splitting up the

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6 It should be noted here that the confluence of these three factors—governance, terrorism, and ideology—could be seen across a host of historical struggles, from communist insurgen-
components and then recombining them to understand the overall issues involved helps to differentiate what is “in” and what is “out” of the long war.

As shown in Figure 2.1, there are regions where only two of the three factors overlap, such as the overlap of terrorism and governance, so that the resulting situation, while potentially important to U.S. national security, is not part of the long war, which, according to our construct, involves all three elements. Fighting Hezbollah, for instance, is related to governance and terrorism but does not involve an ideology that, at the moment, directly threatens the United States. Thus, actions against Hezbollah are not a primary element of the long war in our GTI construct. This is not to say the issue does not warrant attention; in fact, we will describe later that for various reasons the struggle against ideologically motivated groups like Hezbollah has important
cies to liberation movements, and does not constitute something necessarily unique to the circumstances the United States currently faces.
implications for the long war depending on actions taken by both Hezbollah and the United States. While Hezbollah is not included in our current construct since it does not fall into the GTI construct, it may eventually be, depending on how the future unfolds.

Table 2.1 breaks down the components of the long war in terms of the nature of the problem, primary adversary, potential goals, and challenges and drawbacks. The items refer to our thesis that the current set of problems in the long war represents a confluence of GTI issues. In some cases, such as when a country participates in nation building to foster good governance, there may not be a person, group, or state that constitutes the adversary. Rather, the “adversary” would be the underlying economic and governmental conditions that create societal disharmony.

It is possible that some of the broad definitions of the long war may end up looking narrow when strategies are actually implemented to address the problems. For example, a broad ideological definition could result in something akin to a very narrow counterterrorism campaign when implemented. In those cases, some of the benefits in the way that the war has been described may be garnered up front in the way the long war mobilizes domestic constituencies at home and provides a central idea to rally around. Some of these interpretations will most likely need additional strategies articulated to best address them; others may already be contained in current U.S. security strategies.7

In this report, we are interested in understanding the intersection of these three areas that construe our interpretation of the long war. As mentioned above, we propose in this report that the long war cannot be described in one simple tagline, but rather constitutes a collection of issues associated with GTI. The breakdown in Table 2.1 gives many references to other potential GTI problems that U.S. forces might be facing, and potential drawbacks to choosing one interpretation (versus a focus on all three problems) on which to base a U.S. strategy.

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7 To contrast with the top three approaches, the “civilizational war” definition is deconstructed in a similar way in Appendix B. When the goals and primary adversaries are examined, it can be seen that the civilizational construct is quite different from the GTI war we describe in the remainder of this report. This report does not support the civilizational construct as being a useful explanation for the current problems the United States faces.
Table 2.1
Breakdown of Different Interpretations of the Long War

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature of Problem</th>
<th>Specific War (examples)</th>
<th>Who Is the Primary Adversary?</th>
<th>Potential Goals</th>
<th>Challenges and Drawbacks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ideological</strong></td>
<td>Interpretations of Islam (al-Qaeda, Taliban, and allied groups)</td>
<td>Extremist Muslim groups</td>
<td>No support for adversary ideology</td>
<td>Expensive in relation to the threat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Anti-Western (N. Korea, Chavez-like movements, al-Qaeda and associated movements)</td>
<td>Nondemocratic governments and nonstate actors</td>
<td>Advancement of democracy</td>
<td>Legitimizes the adversary ideology and leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Governance</strong></td>
<td>Nation building</td>
<td>Social and economic conditions that lead to conflict</td>
<td>Stable, effective governments and regions</td>
<td>Expense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Market creation</td>
<td>Enormity of problem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Secure trade routes</td>
<td>Very complex problems and solutions (non-military)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Terror</strong></td>
<td>Insurgencies around the globe</td>
<td>Insurgency groups</td>
<td>Stable, effective governments and regions</td>
<td>Forced to tolerate authoritarian governments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Market creation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Secure trade routes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Muslim terrorists Narco-terrorists Marxist terrorists</td>
<td>Violent groups</td>
<td>Elimination of terror tactics</td>
<td>Many insurgencies not a direct threat to the U.S.; some may aid U.S. interests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Homeland security</td>
<td>Picking sides is risky</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Hard to define victory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Same as War on Terror</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Attempts to eliminate a tactic, not an adversary or cause</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Military force may invite more terror</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As an example, an ideological description designating “extremist” Muslim groups as the primary problem facing the United States might imply the goal of reducing or eliminating support for the ideology and advancement of democracy in its place. In this case, using ideology alone as the basis for action creates a number of challenges. First, many of what are often termed “extremist” groups are not actively engaged in anti-Western efforts. Thus, calls for fighting “extremist” Muslim groups
incur considerable expense relative to the threat those groups pose. The designation also creates problems of ascription. Limiting the ideological basis to only Muslim groups excludes any secular or nationalistic groups that may be more threatening. At the same time, aggregating all groups under an umbrella term “extremist” conceals the variegated goals of individual groups and nuances that any U.S. response will have to address. Examples of the challenges in simplifying the description of the long war to issues of governance or terrorism are also given.

Ideology in the Current Long War

The primary adversary in the current conflict begins with the one that attacked the United States on September 11, 2001, causing nearly 3,000 deaths. Usama bin Ladin and the terrorist organization al-Qaeda are enemies of the United States. However, there is more to this “long war” than simply fighting a particular terrorist group. If we start with the ideology espoused by al-Qaeda, to include those who believe as Usama bin Ladin does, we can start to discuss the anti-Western and violent ideology of al-Qaeda: Salafi-jihadism (SJ).9

In this hyphenated phrase, “Salafi” refers to Salafism, an Islamic revival movement that began in late 19th century Egypt,10 which has since come to function as an umbrella term for a number of fundamentalist groups—only a portion of which advocate violent activities. Early Salafism portrayed Muslims as having lost their way in the modern era, and holds that only through a return to the practices of the first generations of Muslims (the “Salaf”) could Islam renew itself and, at the same time, come to terms with modernity. Roughly half a century later, another group was to redirect the fundamentalist orientation of Salafism. Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood rejected Western liberal influences and injected a more extreme understanding of Islam into Salafism. This thread met with Wahhabism, an older movement that also rejected modernism

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8 For a general discussion of ideology, see Appendix C.
9 For a general discussion of the global jihadist movement, see Rabasa et al. (2006).
10 The main founders of this broad-based movement were Muhammad Abduh, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, and Rashid Rida of Egypt’s al-Azhar University.
and emphasized the tenets of *jihad* (holy struggle) and *takfir* (declaring another Muslim an infidel)\(^\text{11}\) in 20th century Saudi Arabia. In the 21st century, a number of self-declared “Salafi” groups exist, both violent and nonviolent, which argue with each other over who represents true Islamic practices. Thus Salafism is not well bounded in the sense that there is near-constant debate regarding who is truly Salafi and who is not. For instance, some groups describe others as “Qutbist,” an epithet in Islam because it suggests that the targeted practitioners worship a man, not the true religion.

Consequently, Salafi-jihadism is a hybrid of sorts, because it rejects traditional understandings of Islam along the lines of early Salafism, while accreting the innovations of Qutb and Wahhabism in disdaining the West and proclaiming the prominence and acceptability of *jihad* and *takfir*.\(^\text{12}\) Operationally, Salafi-jihadism sees American policies as especially implicated both in introducing foreign norms into Muslim culture and in creating a system that oppresses Muslims. The only way to confront the American threat is to take up arms, establish an Islamic emirate, and wage war against the West and its Muslim allies (not necessarily in that order).

It is not true that groups other than Salafi-jihadists do not threaten the United States.\(^\text{13}\) The focus of many groups on local issues rather than attacking the United States directly leaves them outside of having specific U.S. strategic importance. These local issues may sometimes

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\(^{11}\) The Arabic term *jihad* comes from the Arabic root “to strive” or “to fight.” The exact meaning depends on the context, but Salafi-jihadists tend to use the term to refer to legally sanctioned warfare. Many religious legal precepts guide the proper conduct of jihad, and one of those is *takfir*. Takfir refers to the process of declaring another individual an “unbeliever.” Under Islamic law, one can attack and kill unbelievers (*kafir*), justifying the use of jihad. For more information about these terms, see Esposito (2003).

\(^{12}\) Many scholars reject the use of the word “Salafi” to describe these groups, even when coupled with “jihadism,” since the term legitimizes their ideology, which hardly bears resemblance to the spirit of the original movement. These scholars would prefer to use the term “Qutbists” or “Takfiris,” which would have the effect of placing these actors outside the mainstream. A similar comment is made in the CTC publication, *Militant Ideology Atlas*, (McCants, 2006, p. 5).

\(^{13}\) An overview of concepts of jihad across all Islamic schools of thought is found in Peter (1996).
concern the United States, especially those affecting Middle East sta-

bility, but they are not directly justifying action. Nonetheless, some of

these groups may act to support the aims of the SJ groups at the center

of this long war, either directly or indirectly, and, over time, may even-

tually be implicated in direct U.S. action based on those actions.

**Governance in the Current Long War**

The concept of governance appears as a central component in the 2006

QDR. The QDR views good governance as a key influence in reducing

“the possibility of failed states or ungoverned spaces in which terrorist

extremists can more easily operate or take shelter” as well as “oppor-


tunities for terrorist organizations to acquire or harbor WMD.” To

understand how good governance creates such effects, it is useful to

know what governance means. According to the United Nations, gov-

ernance is the “process of decision-making and the process by which
decisions are implemented (or not implemented).”

When a group needs to accomplish certain ends, it develops a process
to decide how to reach that end, and then decides how to imple-
ment that decision. Governance therefore corresponds to some level of
social organization; a situation without any type of governance could
be seen as chaotic or anarchic. In some systems, governance is more
straightforward—a single individual, or small cadre of individuals,
decides, and the decision is carried out by whatever governing appara-
tus has been established. In other systems, particularly in open, demo-
cratic systems, governance can be messier and less predictable.

In the current situation, poor governance exists in a number of
places worldwide. This is the situation in much of the developing world,
such as the Middle East, Africa, South America, and parts of Asia.

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14 For a general discussion of governance, see Appendix A.

D.C., February 6, 2006, pp. 12, 32. As of July 11, 2007:
http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr

16 United Nations Economic and Social Commission of Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP),
“What Is Good Governance?” As of September 2008:
http://www.unescap.org/pdd/prs/ProjectActivities/Ongoing/gg/governance.asp
In the current context of the long war, and the particular ideology that is being fought against, only some areas are important, and so only these areas will be considered in relation to poor governance. These correspond to areas where SJ groups might establish safe havens. To meet this requirement, there would seem to be a minimum level of support from local Muslims. This requirement essentially sets the “theater of operation” on some level, but has implications for future spillover into less religiously connected areas.

Given the position of the United States as the world’s only superpower, and an aggressive prosecution of this long war, particularly in the destruction of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan as a demonstration of the perils of collaborating with SJ, it seems unlikely that any government with the ability to prevent the use of its territory by SJ would allow it. There are still areas of interest where the local government would not have the ability to stop SJ if they were to try to establish a safe base. (Additional discussion on state sponsorship is found in Chapter Four under the “Uncertainties” subsection.) Areas designated “ungoverned” are described in Table 2.2.

Terrorism in the Current Long War

Triggering the current emphasis on the long war was the terrorist attack on CONUS that occurred on September 11, 2001. While terrorism was not created on that date, the significance of the attacks caused a new understanding of the term. While many analysts, including those at the RAND Corporation, had been warning for some time that an attack like 9/11 was possible, the size and nature of the 9/11 attacks, as well as the following attacks in Bali, Spain, and London, changed the nature of the counterterrorist effort.

Policymakers recognized that terrorists could not only strike at U.S. interests overseas (such as the embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania) but also at targets on CONUS itself, and devastatingly so. This turned the counterterrorism effort into a more aggressive and proactive campaign: within one month of the attacks, the United States was attacking the recognized government of Afghanistan, which was

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17 For a general discussion of terrorism, see Appendix A.
Table 2.2  
**Descriptions of Some Ungoverned Areas with Large Muslim Populations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Makeup</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Significant Sunni populations</td>
<td>• Not currently deemed a “safe haven” by the U.S. State Department, though many internal groups are positioned.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Predominant Sunni</td>
<td>• Areas of Afghanistan, particularly the south and border with Pakistan, remain ungoverned by the Afghan government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>• Federally Administered Tribal Areas are considered safe havens as the government balances internal political stability with the need to enforce laws in border regions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Gaza Strip and the West Bank</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Currently in civil war; a continuing crisis might allow SJ to take hold. However, neither Fatah nor HAMAS has interests aligned directly with the SJ movement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Lebanon</td>
<td>Large Shia community</td>
<td>• The Lebanese government is unable to control much of Southern Lebanon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Some al-Qaeda–linked cells operating in Palestinian refugee camps.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Hezbollah, which is in control, is unlikely to support SJ objectives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern and Eastern Africa</td>
<td>Much of area has Islam as its main religion</td>
<td>• Many of these areas are poor and have governments that are unable to strictly enforce control over all their territory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Somalia’s political instability, porous borders, and proximity to Arabian peninsula.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sulu/Sulawesi Seas Littoral</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Ungoverned and geographically difficult archipelago.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Mixture of illicit activities among three countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Al-Qaeda–linked Jemaah Islamiyah, and Abu Sayyaf Group present.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Indonesia’s widespread archipelago and porous borders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tri-Border Area (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay)</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Loosely regulated region close to Muslim communities in Ciudad del Este, Paraguay, and Foz do Iguacu, Brazil.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Concern that Hezbollah and HAMAS, among others, use the region for fundraising and other illicit activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trans-Sahara</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Difficult to control borders between Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Algeria, and Chad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Recruiting and training in region.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Adapted from U.S. Department of State (2007). Other safe havens exist, such as the Colombian Border Region, that do not have significant ties to Muslim populations at the moment.
harboring the planners of the attacks. The term “War on Terror” was coined, later evolving into the “long war.”

Terrorists have also increased their capability. This has occurred for several reasons, which are also discussed at length in the literature. Among those reasons are the following:

- increased lethality of individual actions
- increased ability to organize through modern communications
- greater ability to publicize their message for motivation and to recruit.

These factors combine to mean that while, as discussed elsewhere in this report, the United States continues to face conventional threats, the relative risk of terrorism in terms of both the risk and hazard remains higher than it did during the Cold War. Further discussion and elucidation of terrorism and its relation to the long war is provided in Appendix A.

Toward Defining the Participants
The question thus remains: Who is the United States facing in this long war? Namely, when considering the current confluence of governance, terrorism, and ideology, who threatens the United States and who else, in addition to those, is involved? The next chapter describes a framework for considering the various nonstate groups implicated in the long war, and one way of envisioning the various other potential actors to be involved in the future long war.

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18 While the damage was significant and the loss of life tremendous, this was not as great as the potential damage from a conventional, let alone a nuclear, confrontation with the USSR during the Cold War. However, the end of the Cold War and the successful attacks on the U.S. homeland elevated the importance of combating terrorism.
CHAPTER THREE

Who Is Involved in the Long War?

In an attempt to define more precisely the long war that the United States now confronts, an effective description of the adversary is required. Attempts have been made in this direction. However, many of these definitions are not entirely satisfactory, resulting in either the exclusion of important actors or an obfuscation of the strategically important differences among these actors. We thus begin this chapter with a reflection on the definitions that have been set forth, particularly focusing on those from the QDR and NLWS as examples.

The chapter then details two sequential but separate ways of deconstructing the potential threats involved in the long war. The first part provides a framework to address shortcomings in previous definitions; it describes particular differences in scope, political motivation, and militarism of violent, nonstate groups in the long war. Because several of the adversaries that have attacked the United States have espoused an ideology laced with Islamic motifs and juridical justifications, the examination was of groups operating within predominantly Muslim countries, organized into categories based on an understanding of their motivating ideas and goals. This framework helps to distinguish the violent groups within the Muslim world,¹ their varying relevance to U.S. strategic aims, and implied U.S. responses based on characteristics of the groups. By distinguishing among the various actors, this framework provides depth to the GTI construct to guide

¹ In this report, the term “Muslim world” is used to denote those states with majority or large Muslim populations. Many of these states are located in the Middle East and northern Africa, and they span south and southeast Asia through to Indonesia.
potential U.S. responses and a foundation for articulating the current, most important ideology facing the United States.

The second part shows, through the use of influence diagrams, how threats deemed important within the framework can expand to include a number of enabling actors and influences. The influence diagrams help to pinpoint where actions can be taken and what affect those actions would have on the system of threats being faced in the long war. The influence diagrams are further described in Appendix C.

**Past Definitions of the Adversary**

In describing the long war, the 2006 QDR refers to “enemies . . . [that] are not nation-states but rather dispersed non-state networks.” The Nature of the Long War Seminar (NLWS) provided a more precise characterization of the enemy:

A transnational movement of extremist organizations, networks, and individuals—and their state and non-state sponsors—which have in common that they exploit Islam and use terrorism for ideological ends.

However, when these definitions are applied to actual groups and organizations, neither provides sufficient clarity for use in understanding the implications for U.S. forces. The QDR’s identification of “dispersed non-state networks” as the adversary is somewhat vague, since it is unclear what types of networks are being designated. For instance, terrorist networks, smuggling networks, and arms trafficking networks fall into this categorization. Such a definition may imply that these various networks are interconnected, but such an interpretation would still be unnecessarily broad and unfocused, in that the true threat of this long war may be closely related to the aims and actions of one particular network. Likewise, the NLWS definition focuses on groups that

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have “ideological ends” and specifically discusses Islam; however, both of these concepts do not apply to many of the groups implied by the first part of the QDR definition.

The NLWS panel’s definition clearly designates as adversary a “transnational movement” that contains several components: organizations, networks, and individuals. These organizations, networks, and individuals all exploit Islam to justify acts of terrorism to achieve goals dictated by their ideology. This definition provides more specificity than do others we have examined. However, its weakness might be that it does not distinguish the range of plausible actors. This is especially important when various possible future adversaries are considered. Additionally, under the NLWS definition, a group that does not exploit Islamic law or theology would not be part of the long war.

For instance, the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), which goes by several aliases, is designated a terrorist organization by the United States. The PKK started as a Marxist-Leninist organization and is focused on creating a free Kurdistan rather than bringing about an Islamic caliphate, despite the fact that the majority of Kurds are Muslim. But the PKK would not be considered a long war adversary, according to several of the definitions discussed in this report. If the PKK were to become involved in Iraqi violence in a significant way, however, or if a large number of Turkish troops were to invade Iraq in an attempt to crush the PKK and its manifestations, the United States might get involved with this nonstate actor. Such an action and its potential effects, namely the influence it would have on U.S. relations with an important ally in a region, the possibility that other nonstate actors might become involved, and the effect of Kurdish nationalism on several states in the region, warrant U.S. attention. Nonetheless, such a nonstate group is excluded under the NLWS definition because of the lack of ideological underpinnings that do not necessarily exploit Islam.

Additionally, the NLWS suggests that the various organizations, networks, and individuals encompassed by its definition of the adversary belong to a single transnational “movement.” However, a movement connecting these various and different actors remains elusive. For instance, a locally oriented group such as the PKK is concerned with a
viable, independent Kurdistan rather than with the creation of the bin Ladin caliphate. Another example would be HAMAS, the Palestinian organization that won elections for the Palestinian legislature. This organization has fought a long public relations battle with more radical Islamists over its involvement in the Palestinian political process.\(^4\) Similar to the PKK, HAMAS is more interested in local concerns, in this case creating a Palestinian state, than in pledging allegiance to al-Qaeda’s dreams of a caliphate. As viewed through the NLWS and QDR definitions mentioned above, HAMAS would not be part of the long war because it is not a transnational movement and rather adheres to local goals of self-rule.

However, despite its interest in “local” concerns, HAMAS is an Islamist party that advocates violent action and whose activities could have important implications for the United States. The organization was established by ‘Abdallah ‘Azzam, an ideologue who also provided the intellectual foundation for the Afghan resistance to the Soviet Union in the 1980s. The rhetoric of jihad espoused by hard-line HAMAS leaders is similar to that of other international jihadist leaders, even if the organization’s aims are more local. This distinction is important in terms of how the United States addresses groups like HAMAS, and it may mean that they remain within the conceptualization of the long war. There are many examples of other actors and groups that might or might not be included as adversaries in the long war, depending on the definition used.

Thus, the QDR definition of the long war is too broad to define participants effectively, while the NLWS definition is not helpful in terms of describing differences and similarities among the concerned participants in this long war. The GTI construct that is proposed in this report provides an overarching framework to consider adversaries; however, the challenge remains to describe these participants in a way that articulates their differences (political and military), anticipates how these actors might change, and specifies concrete actions the United States might take into the future to address the threat posed by

these adversaries. The next section proposes one framework to address these considerations.

A Framework for Understanding the Participants in the Long War

Taking a step back from the definitions above, this report assumes that the focus of the current long war is centered on the Muslim world. From there, we assessed the violent groups operating within this region and categorized them based on an understanding of their motivating ideas and goals. This is not an exact science, because what an organization says (for example, its propaganda or manifesto) and what it actually does may differ. For instance, while HAMAS might articulate Islamic concepts of land ownership similar to al-Qaeda, its aim is to justify a claim to Palestine, not a claim to a utopian global caliphate.\(^5\) The results of this survey are visually represented in Figure 3.1.

Violent groups in the Muslim world representing various nationalities, sects, ethnicities, linguistic groups, and tribal affiliations can be delineated into four useful categories. The first and second categories represent doctrinaire jihadists and can be considered global in orientation (Category 1) or internally focused (Category 2). The version of Islam known as Salafi-jihadism is primarily contained within these two groups.\(^6\) The SJ interpretation of Islam rejects modernism and places an inordinate emphasis on the concepts of jihad (holy struggle) and takfir (declaring another Muslim an infidel).\(^7\) Category 1 contains organizations that seek to target Western powers and other non-Muslim

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\(^5\) For a good analysis of Usama bin Ladin’s global grand strategy, see Paz (2003).

\(^6\) For a general review of the SJ ideology, see Oliveti (2001). An analysis of the extremely radical version of SJ advocated by the late al-Zarqawi can be found in Kazimi (2005).

\(^7\) The Arabic term *jihad* comes from the Arabic root “to strive” or “to fight.” The exact meaning depends on the context, but Salafi-jihadists tend to use the term to refer to legally sanctioned warfare. Many religious legal precepts guide the proper conduct of jihad, and one of those is *takfir*. Takfir refers to the process of declaring another individual an “unbeliever.” Under Islamic law, one can attack and kill unbelievers (*kafr*), justifying the use of jihad. For more information about these terms, see Esposito (2003).
governments and populations in their pursuit of a utopian vision of a global Islamic caliphate. Al-Qaeda and some of its manifestations belong to this group. Category 2 is similar to Category 1 in ideological orientation, but focuses more on local issues, governments, and populations. This category would contain such groups as Egypt’s al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya in the late 1980s and Afghanistan’s Hizb i-Islami.
Category 3 incorporates religious nationalists. These are groups like Hezbollah and HAMAS, who are willing to use violence, sometimes against their own people, to dominate a particular community, region, or nation. They can be differentiated from groups in Category 2, which also aims for dominion over a Muslim state, by the structure of their organizations and willingness to participate in the political process. These groups may espouse doctrines similar to those espoused by the Salafi-jihadists in Categories 1 and 2, but Category 3’s preoccupation with local interests and their engagement in social and political spheres sets them apart from groups in the first two categories.

It is worth noting that Category 3 contains a Sunni group like HAMAS and a Shia group like Hezbollah. While these groups do not adhere to the same sect within Islam, they show great similarity in terms of structure and aims. For instance, both HAMAS and Hezbollah are represented in the Palestinian and Lebanese governments, respectively. Both have a social services arm and a military arm. Both seek greater power within their respective states. Both were born out of liberation movements and have sought to remove an occupying power. And, even though they belong to different sects, both espouse theological justifications for their actions, presenting their actions within the narrative of their own particular version of fundamentalist Islam. This illustrates the notion that, even within this framework, there are important differences between members of the same category.

Category 4 brings together groups operating in the Muslim world espousing a variety of ideologies, such as communism or Arab nationalism or Ba’athism; groups in this category may pursue goals that differ from those of groups in other categories. These groups use some of the rhetoric associated with groups in other categories, especially as the profile of Islamic fundamentalism has risen. However, at root these groups are motivated not by religiosity but by secular ideologies. Examples of groups in this category include Fatah’s al-Aqsa Brigades, the PKK, and the United Liberation Front of Assam. Examples from all four groups are given in Table 3.1.
Encompassing these violent groups are other organizations within the civil society of Muslim states, representing Categories 5 and 6. These organizations are nonviolent, but some, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, may have ideological tendencies that are similar to more radical ideologies. Those who prefer the more extreme path will often find themselves stymied within the moderate organization and seek the more radical option. The framework places such “gateway” groups into Category 5, though it should be noted that groups like the Muslim Brotherhood do not actively promote the agendas of groups in the violent categories. All other civil society groups, such as trade unions or women’s organizations, can be found in Category 6.
The “gateway” nature of Category 5 underscores an important fact: individuals and groups can move from one category to another. The arrows on Figure 3.1 suggest the most plausible movement for these groups. Thus, it is plausible that an extremist Salafi-jihadist group in Category 2 could gain considerable grass-roots support and migrate into a more political role, which would resemble groups in Category 3. One can see this development in the transformation of the Egyptian group al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya, which turned toward a more political orientation after the crackdowns of the 1990s.8

It is also possible for groups to move between Categories 1 and 2. Algeria’s Groupe Salafist pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC) became another manifestation of al-Qaeda on September 11, 2006, the fifth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks on the United States. While there is some question about the GSPC’s reasons for making this change, it is fairly certain that the new al-Qaeda “brand name” indicates a new global strategy.9 Such a new orientation would move this group from Category 2 to Category 1. This move, from 2 to 1, is something that has been occurring more and more often, and it appears that Category 2 groups that are focused solely on local concerns are being recruited into the global framework. This can be seen from the statements of allegiance that the GSPC and a faction of al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya have made to a Category 1 group, al-Qaeda.10 It is unclear, however, how operational these pledges are. Questions remain whether these groups are making these statements to gain attention and access to funding or they truly embrace the global jihadist ideology of al-Qaeda. The actions of these groups will need to be evaluated to determine whether these changes are cosmetic or not and what appropriate military and other actions these distinctions imply.

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8 Author’s interview with Dia’a Rashwan, analyst at the al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Cairo, Egypt, February 13, 2007.

9 There are many commentaries on the change of the GSPC to al-Qaeda. An Australian report puts it most succinctly: “These statements made by the group and al Qaeda indicate the GSPC is evolving from a domestically focused group to one with a global Jihadist ideology.” See Office of the Australian Attorney-General (2007).

10 Katz and Devon (2006).
There are a number of reasons why this framework and these distinctions between categories of nonstate actors are important. First, the way that the United States military engages each of these categories of actors will be different. A kinetic military or policing approach is likely to be the dominating response to groups in Categories 1 and 2. Complementary approaches other than military or policing actions will be necessary to interdict the funding and recruitment mechanisms of groups in these two categories, but once individuals accept the ideology and are bent on violent terrorist actions, it is likely that an aggressive military or police response will be necessary to keep these groups at bay. Groups in Category 3 are political as much as military or terrorist organizations. They often have strong support within a particular population and sometimes win elections. They have far more legitimacy than those in Categories 1 and 2, and are often not fringe elements lurking on the outskirts of society. These nonstate actors cannot be easily overturned through military force. As can be seen by the recent Israeli-Hezbollah conflict, a military response may not be a suitable way of achieving political goals vis-à-vis these organizations. Category 4, the secular nationalists, may be engaged in a variety of ways, depending on the nature of the group.

Second, groups in different categories pose a greater or lesser threat to the security of the United States. This is a somewhat general statement that may not always hold true, because small actions can have large strategic consequences. However, groups in Category 1 generally pose the greatest threat since their goals are global. A group with very local objectives in Category 2 that seeks to overthrow a specific government poses a lesser threat to U.S. security than one with global aspirations that seeks to unleash chemical weapons in, say, Houston, Texas. It is most likely that a group seeking to do the latter would come from Category 1, global jihadists, while the group implicated in the former scenario would be more likely to come from Categories 2, 3, or 4. It is therefore worth noting when groups such as the GSPC either openly or surreptitiously adopt the attributes of groups in Category 1.

Third, this categorization schema helps to illustrate the diversity of groups plausibly involved in a long war with the United States. Describing the long war simply as an “ideological battle” or a struggle
against a single transnational movement ignores the structure and ideational variety present within the Muslim world. It also ignores the assortment of economic, social, and political factors and grievances that created these nonstate groups and continues to fuel recruitment. A simplistic view of the adversary may focus undue attention on a religion when religion may have less to do with a particular group’s goals or origins than local factors. Such an erroneous perception may encourage a unity of action when a more locally tailored approach would be more appropriate.

There are, therefore, many plausible ways for a long war to unfold, given the range of violent nonstate actors operating in the region. There is also a growing sense that these groups are connected in some fashion, a topic this report addresses under the “collaboration among actors” uncertainty described in the next chapter. While many of these groups differ in terms of structure, goals and concerns, and ideological basis, it is possible to delineate some similarities. Thus, while the groups fall into our GTI construct, the framework in Figure 3.1 allows distinguishing characteristics to help guide responses to these violent groups. Furthermore, it is also possible to suggest, based on the current situation, the category that will be of greatest concern going forward in the long war: Category 1.11

Expanding the Framework of Participants Through Influence Diagrams

Having considered the particular differences among the various violent, nonstate groups in the Muslim world, we now turn to the many enabling actors and factors that come together to create the threat. One way to consider the extent to which the center threat is expanded to include the overall capability of a group is through the use of influence

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11 Recall the example of Category 1 groups that have a particular ideology of Salafi-jihadism and a focus on establishing a caliphate. It is this ideology that is the basis for our discussion of the ideological component of the current long war.
diagrams. Figure 3.2 illustrates the first-order influences that increase the threat of SJ. These diagrams and others similar to it will be referred to as “influence diagrams.” (Note that in these diagrams and subsequent discussions, we refer to the center as being SJ based on our thesis developed heretofore; however, the framework developed in the previous section could just as easily afford alternative foci, albeit with a different systems view, and ultimately different U.S. aims and responses.) A more detailed description of the influence diagrams is provided in Appendix C to this report. An increase in one of the factors leads to an increase in the factors to which it points, eventually leading to an increased overall threat from SJ. The diagrams are meant for two purposes. One is to spur discussion on the broad factors that are associated with the threats this report is discussing, particularly those associated with our GTI construct. The second is to highlight the effects of particular actions

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**Figure 3.2**

**Factors Contributing to the Threat of Salafi-Jihadism: Initial Analysis**

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12 See Appendix C for a further explanation of the influence diagrams used in this report.
a player might take on the range of factors contributing to the threat. The flow diagrams are an easy way to record changes from actions, both positive and negative, and thus enable accounting of the important interactions.

Figure 3.2 shows seven key factors in determining the threat that SJ groups pose: safe havens; funds; leadership; recruits; lethal weapons; legitimacy of the group; and training and support mechanisms. An increase in any one of these leads directly to an increased SJ threat. This does not in any way imply that such changes are linear, or that all of the influences need to be addressed. However, starting with what we know to be a threat, and developing the influences that have created that threat, helps to encompass the wide variety of actors and participants that will eventually be confronted in this long war.

Figure 3.3 expands the influence diagram to look at factors that influence the first-order factors. For example, on the left near the top of the figure is the number of poor states_regions. If this number increases, then the number of failed states_regions will also increase. The latter increase in turn causes an increase in the number of safe havens. This could allow SJ groups to take hold in these areas, allowing them to establish bases and increase their threat to the United States.

Influences do not have to come from the extreme outside. For example, the availability of funds to SJ groups could increase independently of the four means identified in the diagram. These diagrams are meant to capture important ways in which the threat of SJ might increase, and do not purport to include all of them. And consistent with our thesis that the confluence of governance, terrorism, and ideology paint a more appropriate picture of the threat facing the United States, the diagram helps to illustrate how those factors manifest themselves in enabling a group like al-Qaeda.

The most important relationships at the current time are shown in Figure 3.4, which grays out the less important relationships in Figure 3.3. For example, since there is currently no overt, direct state sponsor of SJ, this box is grayed out. This diagram therefore shows the current important influences that might be countered in fighting the long war, while at the same time alluding to other potential influences that could be kept at bay to ensure they do not come into play. How these
Figure 3.3
Factors Contributing to the Threat of Salafi-Jihadism: Initial Analysis Expanded

factors change under various assumptions will be addressed in later discussions of how the current long war might unfold, and is explained in some of the trajectories.
Figure 3.4 also shows four U.S. operations and their influence on the factors. This is by no means a comprehensive list of U.S. operations or strategies, but it demonstrates how the United States is able to influence the factors both individually and in concert with other influences.
currently at work. For example, the operations in Iraq seek to reduce the number of failed states and terrorist safe havens, but they also contribute to a rise in the degree of anger felt by many Muslims towards the West.

One common way for other non-SJ organizations to be considered part of the long war is if they collaborate with SJ terrorists in the ways described by the top middle of the diagram. These organizations also have the potential to turn nations into failed states, which, as shown in the bottom portion of the diagram, can increase the threat of SJ. The presence of various other states is also implied through the bottom of the diagram, where state-sponsorship of nonstate entities is addressed. In this influence diagram, we show three main forms of state sponsorship: proliferation of weapons, supply of safe havens, and supply of funds.13

Figure 3.5
Examples of Some Current Actors and Threat Risks Being Faced in the Long War

![Diagram showing the relationship between various organizations and threat risks in the Long War.]

13 Funding from states may include training, logistics, and other direct support.
Thus, having described SJ as the core threat, we can examine the probability that actors will act in a way (including nonaction) that increases the threat of SJ. The other nonstate and state actors that might be implicated as part of the SJ threat to varying degrees are also characterized by the hazard that their actions might pose. The result of this is shown in Figure 3.5, which shows the overall risk (risk being the combination of probability and hazard) of a group engaging the United States under various assumptions of probability and hazard.

The figure shows the notional hazard and probability of acting against U.S. interests in terms of the SJ-defined long war. In this example, Iran is assessed as being of high potential hazard because it could provide significant support to nonstate SJ groups, but the probability of this is assessed as low since Iran is also the enemy of many SJ groups. This example might describe only a single way the future evolves, and would hence be contingent on a number of assumptions about Iran’s capacity and desires to engage in helping groups that the United States is currently battling.

Conclusions

Ideology is a vital motivating force in Salafi-jihadist and other extremist groups. Violent groups in the Muslim world may not share the same ideology, but an ideology is a key component of why these groups undertake violent action and can be a motivating factor across many influences that ultimately increase the capabilities of an SJ group. These groups function and thrive in the absence or weakness of governments. They are able to operate in ungoverned territories and take advantage of weak states to smuggle weapons, money, and other resources. Many groups and ideologies themselves were founded in the absence of politically legitimate processes to address real political, social, and economic conditions. Unable to compete in a direct confrontation, these groups use asymmetric tactics such as terrorism to engage their enemies and further their ideologies.

Exploring the influence diagrams, centered on a given ideology or group of people, we see that many factors can ultimately be incor-
porated into the overall systems view of the threat, leading to a clearer picture of the ultimate problems facing the United States in this long war. The influences contained in the diagrams grow and wane, driven by changes to ideologies, governance, and capacities for violence. This study started narrowly with an articulation of a threat based on groups adhering to the SJ ideology. Through the use of a systems view of the problem illustrated through the influence diagrams, however, we note a number of external variables that ultimately will affect the way this group develops as a concern for U.S. national security.

The major underlying factors that will affect the way this long war will unfold are described in the following chapter. The trends and uncertainties that define the future are a combination of actions that might be taken by the United States, actions taken by the many other actors involved with the long war, and environmental factors outside the direct control of any parties involved. Combining these factors, and challenging the ways the uncertainties play out into the future, aids in tracing how the long war might ultimately unfold.
In this chapter we identify the major factors that we believe are likely to have a significant influence in determining which of the future trajectories, if any, comes to pass. A number of factors describe what a future scenario might look like. Some of these are highly strategic (or global), others are more regional. The factors chosen here are the ones that would seem to have the greatest influence on the type of long war that might be fought. They were developed through examination of the literature.

Trends and Drivers of the Long War

All planning documents make assumptions about the future. Methodologies have been developed to assist in understanding the risks inherent in those assumptions.\(^1\) Those tests are typically performed before, during, and after strategy development to prepare for potential unforeseen contingencies and to update the strategy based on changing environmental concerns. In the case of this report, we surveyed a number of trends evident in discussions of the future to help form the basis for our discussion on the long war. These trends and drivers are listed in Table 4.1.

\(^1\) See Dewar et al. (1993) for a discussion on methodologies to test vulnerable assumptions contained in training documents. Also see Dewar et al. (1997) for an example of the methodology applied to Army Force XXI strategy.
Table 4.1
Trends and Drivers Forming the Basis for This Report

| Demographic       | • Population growth  
|                   | • Urbanization       
|                   | • Mass migrations/immigrations  
| Ideological       | • Rise of nonstate actors  
|                   | • Competing ideologies  
|                   | • Bifurcations  
| Natural resource  | • Oil, fossil fuels  
|                   | • Ecological deterioration  
|                   | • Water shortages  
|                   | • Climate change  
|                   | • Natural disasters, chronic and acute  
| Geopolitical      | • State of nation-states  
|                   | • Political borders and economic barriers  
|                   | • Multi-tier system of states  
|                   | • Failed/ungoverned/failing/stable states  
|                   | • U.S. policies in the Middle East  
| Technological     | • WMD/E proliferation  
|                   | • Transportation and communication revolutions  
|                   | • Information-based economies  
| Governance        | • Reformation of political systems  
|                   | • Degree of western investments  
|                   | • Building of civil societies  
|                   | • Rule of law, justice systems  

NOTE: Items in bold are discussed further in this chapter in the “Uncertainties” subsection. Items in italics are contained in Appendixes E, F, and G.

Some trends, such as the increasing importance of global trade and the intertwining of the world’s economies, are treated as assumptions for the purposes of developing the trajectories in this report. These assumptions are based on our analysis of what trends and drivers are least vulnerable to being incorrect and most amenable to being constant across all trajectories.

Some of the trends surveyed during this project are less certain, and thus more prone to entertaining widely disparate values in the
future. For the purposes of this report, we have used a number of these “uncertainties” to describe alternative ways the future might unfold. In this report, we have resisted the temptation to talk broadly about the future in every possible aspect. Instead, we have focused only on a few of the uncertainties that are key to the development of the long war. While outside the scope of this current project, a future analysis should challenge the vulnerability of the embedded assumptions in this report to assess risks and create strategies that will be robust if assumptions identified as vulnerable turn out to be incorrect.

Some of the trends listed in Table 4.1 are further explained in the appendixes to this report. Below are explanations of some of the others that constitute important uncertainties driving the future.

Uncertainties: The Variables That Drive Alternative Trajectories

In this project, we identified the major uncertainties driving our interpretation of how the long war might unfold over the coming decade or so. Major areas of uncertainty include weapons proliferation and capabilities of nonstate actors, the prevalence of weak or failed states as safe havens, political stability in the Middle East, international support for the United States, domestic support for the long war, and the draw of conventional war. We describe each of these areas below.

Weapons Proliferation and Capabilities of Nonstate Actors

As technology continues to advance and then propagates throughout the world, so does the potential for nonstate actors to use this technology for military means. Low-end proliferation of small arms, proliferation of nuclear weapons, and exploitation of communication technologies all play a role.

Small arms, land mines, and the like are easily purchased by states and widely available to nonstate actors through their state supporters or the black market. Particularly destructive weapons, such as the explosively formed projectiles currently being used in Iraq, will also be available, but not as widely as other, low-tech items. Equipment like the
aircraft recently acquired by the Tamil Tigers could be available only to groups with genuine safe havens and international support.²

The proliferation of nuclear weapons to nonstate actors would seem unlikely without the support of a nuclear government or the extreme negligence of one. Although there has been discussion concerning the proliferation of nuclear weapons among states, as Table 4.2 shows, there has been very little proliferation since the development of the world’s most powerful weapons in the 1950s (Walsh, 2005).

This does not imply that further proliferation of nuclear weapons to states will not occur, nor that counterproliferation efforts are being wasted. States most likely to buck the trend are those that feel threatened by their neighbors or by the world’s only superpower. Increasing energy prices has made nuclear fission a more attractive energy source for many states,³ although this does not imply there must be an associated nuclear weapons program.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decade</th>
<th>Increase In Number of Nuclear Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1940s</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950s</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960s</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970s</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980s</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990s</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000s</td>
<td>Up to 2 (North Korea and possibly Iran)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: Walsh (2005). This does not include the loss of South Africa as a nuclear state.

² Recent reports of an air force capability within the LTTE are still being developed, though news stories have confirmed some extant capability. See Dikshit (2007) for some information on the LTTE’s air capability.

Of more concern is the more likely and potentially equally devastating proliferation of smaller and conveniently acquired conventional, chemical, and biological agents. At the lower end of this spectrum are small incendiary devices and homemade bombs which have long been available and used. Most improvised explosive devices (IEDs) being used in Iraq would fall into this category. More serious are devices such as truck chlorine bombs. It should be noted, however, that while Iraq has seen limited use of chemical weapons in the cases of a handful of chlorine-containing attacks in Baghdad and surrounding areas (Cave and Fadam, 2007; Garrels, 2007), none were particularly effective and there is no support for more widespread use. More serious still are the true WMD-type chemical and biological weapons, which tend to have higher theoretical casualty rates although they are considerably more difficult to procure.

The ability of people to use phones, cell phones, and the Internet to communicate globally increases the capabilities of nonstate actors. Indeed, these communications vehicles have become part of everyday life. The growth of communications media, especially relating to websites, user groups, chat rooms, and email, also allows technologies and tactics to be transferred between otherwise disparate organizations.\(^4\) When the raw materials are available, these sorts of weapons will be available to long war foes who will be able to use them to carry out both spectacular and chronic violent campaigns like those in Iraq. These attacks will be more difficult to reproduce away from their safe havens, in CONUS for instance, but will remain possible.

Terrorists exploit media and are increasingly able to bring “breaking news” that publicizes the achievements of the groups in ways that amplify their effectiveness far beyond anything achievable before the advent of the Information Age. They may also use the “Web 2.0” revolution to bring their messages directly to those who might be inter-

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\(^4\) See Forest (2006) for a compendium of material regarding learning in terrorist organizations. Also see Cragin et al. (2007) on how 11 terrorist groups in three areas (Mindanao, the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and southwest Colombia) have attempted to exchange technologies.
Unfolding the Future of the Long War

ested. The communication of their message is a key aim of the long war foes, and their ability to deliver it will only increase with time.

As the world increasingly relies on communications networks for business and governments, the networks themselves become targets to those wanting to take aggressive actions. Computer viruses are an example of how the networks themselves can be attacked for a relatively small cost with a large damage potential. Internet fraud is also likely to continue and grow, especially in poorly governed areas. This fraud is a potential source of revenue for terrorists and organized crime. The Internet is used for a variety of activities within Islamic groups, including propaganda, recruiting and training, and fundraising.

While the ability of nonstate actors to strike may be high, their ability to defend themselves is limited. Access to sophisticated weapons will depend on some level of state support. For example, a rising Shia with its support mechanisms (“axis of resistance” bolstered by Iran and Syria (Peterson, 2007)) could increase the likelihood that several of the trajectories might occur, including “Shia-Sunni Conflict” and “Major Muslim Nation Goes Bad.”

Recent studies in the terrorist literature (Cragin et al., 2007) have also reported the importance of shared objectives in nonstate groups’ willingness to collaborate on technology exchanges between groups with different overarching ideologies. The proliferation of WMD agents such as anthrax to nongovernmental individuals occurred in the United States, leading to the 2001 anthrax attacks that killed five people. Limited amounts of such materials are almost certainly going to become available to nonstate groups in other countries, although not necessarily those involved in the long war. The degree to which such proliferation occurs, and hence the risk of an attack, is uncertain. However, given al-Qaeda’s attempts to obtain such materials in the past (Daly, Parachini, and Rosenau, 2005), and the difficulty in navigating the black market proliferation

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5 For an example see Krebs (2007), which details a UK terrorist plot’s link to Internet fraud.

6 For examples of PIRA/FARC and Hezbollah/Palestinian exchanges, among others, see Cragin et al. (2007).
cultures, it still would seem likely that some groups would attempt to use them if they were able to obtain them.

The Prevalence of Weak/Failed States as Safe Havens

Even a concerted effort by the West and other industrialized nations would be insufficient to completely eradicate the existence of ungoverned spaces. The existence of failing and failed states is assumed even in a world that has high levels of economic growth, since such growth will not be distributed evenly throughout the world. Many states will continue to struggle to govern their regions and support their populations. Even a developed world that was fully supportive of these states will be unable to overcome the severity of the problem and the unwillingness of some governments to accept the help that is offered. The states most affected may change, but states will continue to fall into the category of “failed” and “failing.” The degree to which this occurs is, however, more uncertain.7

The prevalence of these spaces is described below as an uncertainty, but a basic assumption is that some such spaces exist and, moreover, that they will exist in the Muslim world. Various methods of assessing state stability have been floated. One such assessment was developed by Foreign Policy magazine and the Fund for Peace.8 Their Failed States Index rates states on a number of different criteria, including the following:

- mounting demographic pressures
- massive movement of refugees and internal displacement
- chronic and sustained human flight
- uneven economic development along group lines
- sharp and/or severe economic decline
- deterioration of public services

7 Nonetheless, there will be places, such as Zimbabwe currently, where governance has failed but the West is reluctant to become involved for a number of supportable reasons.

8 See the Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy Magazine (2007) for information on the Failed States Index. For additional information on ungoverned territories with detailed case studies, see Rabasa et al. (2007).
• widespread violation of human rights
• criminalization or delegitimization of the state
• security apparatus as “a state within a state.”

Nations with Muslim majorities make up 23 of the top 50 states in this index, which highlights the troubling issues faced by many societies in this region. Sixteen of the subsequent 50 states are Muslim majorities, and only two are outside of the top 100.

The details of the methods developed in the Failed State Index and other indices notwithstanding, the general contents of the lists developed, in terms of prevalence of Muslim states near the top and scattered throughout, are similar. While the top-most states in most indices are obvious areas of concern—e.g., Iraq, Sudan, and Pakistan—there is a large middle ground where violent, nonstate actors exist. The correlation between failed (and failing) states and nonstate actors is somewhat difficult to determine and relies upon a range of different factors. Moreover, indices are developed and published for many years without update, so there is no way to determine how different trends affect a state’s tactical stability. Thus, while the stability of states is a difficult issue to define, there is a rich literature on the subject and applicable to a broad look across governance in the Muslim world. For the purposes of this report, the stability of the state is an important factor in influencing how many of the trajectories evolve, and understanding and tracking the indicators of stability is important.

**Middle Eastern Political Stability**

Indeed, assuming the Middle East is of continuing importance, the general stability of the region is a key uncertainty. The resolution of the Iraq war is by no means certain, nor is the international response to and affects of Iranian nuclear ambitions. Additionally, there are several wild cards that could occur in this region.

A significant improvement or deterioration in the Israel/Palestine-Middle East situation has the potential to calm or enflame Muslim passions. Many events are possible, considering the long and checkered history of Israel’s relations with others in the region; however, only an
What Will Affect the Way the Long War Unfolds?

An extreme change in either direction would create stability or make matters significantly worse.

An example of an extreme version of the change described above would be the creation of new Islamic states that impose Sharia Law with outright support to terrorism. A powerful Sunni Islamic state may prove even more troublesome than Iran, especially in its support for SJ. The more militarily and economically powerful the state, the more potentially dangerous the situation would be. Among the most undesirable states to undergo such a revolution would be Turkey, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, and Egypt.

Proliferation of nuclear and other WMD among Arab and other Gulf states may also exacerbate tensions and lead to instability in the region. The tensions could lead to alliances forming along sectarian or other lines, and create escalation among the few actors with potential access.

International Support for U.S. Actions

Support from international partners may change in the coming years. It is uncertain how Europe and the UN will respond to continued aggressive actions by the United States, especially in the wake of the war in Iraq. While there is still significant support from governments, the populations of few states favor the U.S.-led war against terror. As well, U.S. legitimacy in the Middle East will bolster the United States’ ability to foster relationships with key players, including both state and nonstate groups. This will be particularly important in situations where it is necessary to encourage peace negotiations among groups, exploit fissures and rifts among organizations, and induce state support within the region for U.S. goals. Pressure for such changes could come from the adoption of vastly differing policies, resulting from changing demographics and public support for U.S. actions.

The effect of reduced international support may mean that additional U.S. resources would be required to prosecute the long war and, perhaps more significantly, that access to bases may be limited and thus preclude particular U.S. military strategies.

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9 For example, see Pew (2007).
Domestic Support for the Long War

Effects of individual attacks on the United States or its interests. Resources for the long war are likely to be constrained by budgetary pressures for domestic programs and further constrained if any of the many wild card events come to pass. Figure 4.1 provides an influence diagram showing some of the factors influencing U.S. effectiveness in prosecuting the long war, of which funding is a part.

New terror attacks in the United States would almost certainly increase funding directed at long war activities. Such funding would not necessarily result in more vigorous prosecution of the current policy, as a change in policy could also occur. The increase in support could be magnified if the attack involved mass casualties beyond the scale of 9/11 or involved WMD materials. Similarly, the overthrow of

Figure 4.1
Influence Diagram Showing Factors Affecting the U.S. Ability to Prosecute the Long War
a U.S. ally government might also cause an increase in support for the long war within the United States.

Conversely, a continuing lack of significant domestic terrorist events could bolster support for current policies in conducting the long war, and provide the metrics necessary to support continuing operations. However, the lack of any “reminders” of the threats associated with the long war is more likely to be associated with a decrease in funding.¹⁰

Available Funding. Funding for operations in Iraq (as manifested in both core and supplemental funding) limits funding for operations elsewhere, and a prolonged effort into the future will similarly do so. If operations in Iraq reduce, a number of other factors will dominate the availability of future funding.

A U.S. confrontation with China over Taiwan, or some other unforeseen cause, would seem to be the most likely source of conflict between major powers in the near future. Even an escalation of tensions surrounding a confrontation would divert funds away from the long war toward major combat operations. U.S. conflicts with other states could also occur, and these would all have similar effects from a long war point of view. The reverse is also possible: successful prosecution of the long war could lead to reduced funding due to the perception of reduced threat. Compared to the funding for conventional forces, most operations associated with the long war as described are small, with the few exceptions of larger-scale rebuilding or peacekeeping efforts. Nonetheless, small changes in funding of key long war assets could alter the military’s response across all operations, and thus funding will remain a key determinant of the extent to which the United States can be involved in long war affairs.

Funding to support the long war can be bolstered or at least sustained in the wake of such events as successful apprehension of al-Qaeda leaders, declining sectarian violence in Iraq and the region, continuing successful homeland security (HLS), and increases in the ability of the governments in Iraq and Afghanistan to thwart new trou-

¹⁰ This issue is raised in the “Steady State” trajectory, which assumes no, or moderate, success on the U.S. side, but no major new terrorist instances.
bles. The trajectory similar to the current situation, and enhanced by moderate successes and lack of significant drawbacks, is contained in the “Steady State” trajectory.

**Availability of U.S. Capabilities.** Another U.S. operation on the scale of Iraq or greater would strain U.S. capabilities. It would draw the focus of the military away from operations such as the long war, and preparation for a MCO would redirect it toward dealing with the current crisis. In addition, a second “Iraq war” could create areas of ungoverned space like those that arose in parts of Iraq at various times during that conflict.

Similarly, other wild cards could affect attention and funding for the long war. The death of Fidel Castro has the potential to change the dynamics between the United States and Cuba in many ways. It may become a new focus of U.S. attention at the expense of the long war.

A conflict between other major powers such as Japan and China may arise. While such a conflict would not necessarily involve the United States, it would be likely to cause a division in world opinion. Such a division may interact with the religious basis of the long war in various unpredictable ways.

A state such as North Korea has the potential to draw U.S. resources away from the long war. A non-test nuclear detonation, the first since the end of World War II, would drastically change the international landscape. States and nonstate actors may clamor to obtain nuclear weapons, and the United States would most likely be involved in some form of intervention against a nuclear-armed foe.

A conflict between India and Pakistan would have particular significance for the long war. Not only would both states have nuclear arms, thus raising fears of nuclear warfare, but the Muslim/Hindu divide might exacerbate tensions between Muslims and the rest of the world. Such a conflict could expand the long war into a global conflict with the nature of a MCO.

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11 Conversely, funding can go down in the absence of these events, which may pull U.S. capabilities to other efforts.

Attention of the United States. U.S. elections will continue to affect the prosecution of the long war in terms of both funding and strategy. While current Democratic and Republican policies surrounding the long war are similar, it is possible that other policies may become dominant. A change of strategy at some time in the future will cause a corresponding change in the dynamics of the long war.

The U.S. focus might also change because of other circumstances outside the scope of the long war. Hostile actions by states that threaten the balance of power, perhaps even taking advantage of U.S. preoccupation in other areas of the world, might shift attention to other matters that would require putting much of the focus of the long war on hold.

The Draw of Conventional War
The U.S. armed forces will continue to perceive a significant conventional threat. The economic and military might of the United States seems unassailable in the timeframes discussed in this report. However, while an elimination of the conventional threat such that the U.S. military strategy is no longer focused on major combat operations is unlikely to occur, it is uncertain to what degree the United States will ultimately balance its conventional and nonconventional resourcing.

While the United States will continue to act as the sole superpower, new major powers might emerge and increase in importance. With regard to planning, the often discussed rise of China and India produces the most likely contenders driving the U.S. conventional capabilities. Other concerns include the potential for a resurgent Russia. These nations seem the only ones capable of sparking an arms race with the United States or challenging the United States on an economic basis.

It is also possible, although unlikely unless the long war becomes much larger, that the opportunistic nature of some powers may seek to take advantage of the U.S. engagement in it. This might be seen as more likely if continuing operations in Iraq stretch the United States over a long period of time. This in turn would result in a reduction of the priority of the long war, as described in the “Holding Action” trajectory.
Summary

This chapter has identified a number of uncertainties that were used to explore aspects of the long war. With each uncertainty, we identified a number of factors important to how that uncertainty may look in the future. In Table 4.3 we show a summary of how the individual uncertainties might be further extrapolated based on the previous discussion.

The individual levels (1 through 4) indicate values that those uncertainties can hold. In each case, the values are discrete to simplify the discussion and provide a launching point for additional expansion. For instance, there is currently “little proliferation” of nuclear materials into the hands of nonstate actors. In some future, this uncertainty can stay the same or change to an alternative level which, in this case, would imply an increase in weapons proliferation. Example levels are

Table 4.3
Example Levels of Uncertainties Contained in This Report

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capabilities of Nonstate Actors</th>
<th>Safe Havens</th>
<th>Middle Eastern Political Stability</th>
<th>International Support</th>
<th>Domestic Support</th>
<th>Conventional War</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Weapons proliferation</td>
<td>Collaboration Among Actors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Little</td>
<td>Actors do not aid each other</td>
<td>No safe havens</td>
<td>Middle East is highly volatile</td>
<td>Significant support provided</td>
<td>Funding provided above current levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Some</td>
<td>There is tactical collaboration between groups</td>
<td>Few, temporary safe havens</td>
<td>Situation is dangerous</td>
<td>Limited support provided</td>
<td>No additional funding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 High</td>
<td>There is widespread collaboration and sharing of goals</td>
<td>Few, permanent safe havens</td>
<td>Situation is unresolved but relatively calm</td>
<td>No support provided</td>
<td>Reduction in funding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Safe havens are widespread</td>
<td>A widely supported settlement is reached</td>
<td>Support provided to opposing forces</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
summarized for all the uncertainties discussed in this chapter. How these uncertainties are combined to produce alternative trajectories is described in the next chapter.
This project is focused on exploring how the current long war might evolve and develop in the coming years. The development of individual trajectories is an offshoot of the generation of alternative futures.

With alternative futures, the researcher probes a large number of potential strategic drivers and uncertainties for a breadth of plausible situations the world might find itself in well into the future. The creation of “trajectories” takes a more narrow view. With trajectories, more importance is placed on how the futures are unfolding and less on what the future looks like. Thus, the time period of this discussion is crafted both in the current situation and in varying, deliberately vague, timelines out to 2022. The driver behind this project, which started with discussions of what the long war is and might be, leads us to believe that trajectories are more appropriate than alternative futures as a mechanism for discussion, since an alternative future may fall outside of the current construct being used to describe the long war.

In past work, we developed broad alternative futures that described the uncertainties crossing a full range of national security issues. In this report, we define more narrowly how some of the uncertainties may play out. For instance, a world of increased asymmetric, nonstate contingencies such as the “Transnational Web” future1 (as described

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1 “Transnational Web” describes a future wherein the most serious threats to national security are posed not by states but by nonstate actors such as transnational, globally distributed entities, e.g., multinational corporations, transnational criminal organizations, and terrorist networks that have usurped power and are exerting increased influence through collaboration driven by advanced communication technologies.
in Nichiporuk (2005)) might look like specific, racially or ideologically motivated insurgencies spurred on by changes in technology (the “Expanding Scope” trajectory in this report). The use of the alternative futures, and parts and extensions from them, helped to develop the current set of trajectories.

**Generating Alternative Trajectories**

The trajectories described below were generated within the RAND Arroyo Center team based on the various uncertainties and assumptions described in the previous chapter. The trajectories were developed through a series of internal sessions exploring what different values each of the uncertainties might take and what events might best describe those values.

Each uncertainty is addressed by elucidating a plausible, representative, and risk-averse example of an event that best describes it. For example, after exploring the many ways that weapons can proliferate to nonstate actors, we determined that a plausible representation of a particularly challenging event for the U.S. military would be for an entire state’s arsenal to change hands through a strategic realignment of a state with an SJ group. This example event is thus contained in the “Major Muslim Nation Goes Bad” trajectory, with particular example states used as representative Muslim states realigning.

Each of the major uncertainties is addressed in one or more of the trajectories. The association of specific uncertainties being exercised in particular trajectories is summarized in Table 5.1. Some of the trajectories address multiple uncertainties explicitly in the text. The uncertainties not explicitly described in the trajectory are either deemed unimportant to the development of that trajectory or take on values that are inconsequential to the implications to the force. That is, this exercise hopes to address each uncertainty with a worst-case or near-worst-case value for the variable, to aid in planning. Extremely low-probability events, however, are not considered.
Table 5.1
Association of Particular Uncertainties Being Tested (Columns) with the
Eight Trajectories (Rows)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Capabilities of Nonstate Actors</th>
<th>Safe Havens</th>
<th>Middle East Political Stability</th>
<th>Support and Legitimacy</th>
<th>Domestic Support</th>
<th>Draw of Conventional War</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Steady State</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War of Ideas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Muslim Nation Goes Bad</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narrowing of Threat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expanding Scope</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holding Action</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustained Sunni-Shia Conflict</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chronic Insurgencies/Instability</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition, some of the uncertainties are addressed in multiple trajectories, though not always with the same specific events or in a specific direction of influence. For instance, “Middle East Political Stability” is explicitly addressed in three trajectories: “War of Ideas,” “Narrowing of Threat,” and “Sustained Sunni-Shia Conflict.” In the first two trajectories, the Middle Eastern political situation would need to be stable and improving to allow for the trajectory to develop, whereas in the latter trajectory, a tense and unstable political situation (potentially manifested in a number of events occurring in the region) drives that trajectory.

Using Chapter Two and subsequent chapters as the basis for our understanding of the long war, we have excluded from the trajectories a focus on some external issues above and beyond how they might directly involve themselves with the unfolding of the long war or U.S. involvement in prosecuting its strategy. That is, we have incorporated how, for example, uncertainties in peer competition might affect the way U.S. actions in the long war might unfold, but have not focused on alternatives of peer competition in detail. Table 5.2 gives a very short description of each trajectory. The next section provides more detailed descriptions.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Trajectory</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Steady State</td>
<td>Baseline case largely reminiscent of current actions and environment. In this vision, the threat continues to be the broad universe of radical Salafi-jihadists, including both transnational and sometimes regional groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>War of Ideas</td>
<td>Shift to information-based campaign with the goal of isolating jihadists and their infrastructure from the broader global Muslim population. Plans to confront Iran militarily over its nuclear program are shelved for the time being.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Major Muslim Nation Goes Bad</td>
<td>Radical shift in a regime brought on when a critical state in the Muslim world is taken over by radical extremists. a Two of the most plausible and most threatening scenarios to American interests would be a military coup in Pakistan or a successful fundamentalist insurgency in Saudi Arabia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Narrowing of Threat</td>
<td>Conflict arising between jihadists leads the U.S. to take a “divide and conquer” approach in order to exploit cleavages among transnational jihadists and local/regional jihadists. Consequently, the U.S. would adopt a more flexible position toward local and nationalist Islamist groups like HAMAS and Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the Philippines.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Expanding Scope</td>
<td>Expanded scope of the long war threat beyond a major terrorist attack against U.S. interests to include radical Shiism, the Iranian state, regional terrorists, and/or some non-Islamic terror groups. In this formulation, the long war would become a true global war on terror.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Holding Action</td>
<td>A series of geopolitical shocks (e.g., an attempt by China to shift the balance of power in the Western Pacific or a sudden, violent implosion of North Korea) would compel the U.S. to temporarily scale back its efforts against Salafi-jihadists in order to focus on more traditional threats that require a response involving conventional forces and diplomatic capital.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Sustained Sunni-Shia Conflict</td>
<td>Widespread violence between Shia and Sunni groups results in deep fault lines between Shia and Sunni communities throughout the Muslim world. As a result, the U.S. is led to concentrate, in the short term, on shoring up the traditional Sunni regimes in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Pakistan as a way of containing Iranian power and influence in the Middle East and Persian Gulf.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Chronic Insurgencies/Instability</td>
<td>Serious insurgencies and unrest around the world drain the resources of the U.S. and its allies and decrease regime legitimacy. The insurgencies are driven largely by dissatisfaction with inefficient and ineffective governmental structures, dilapidated infrastructure in terms of basic services, and questions of legitimacy of the current leaders.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a This trajectory can also be thought of as a variant of a “catastrophic terrorism” trajectory where the intersection of technology and radical ideology greatly increases the capabilities of a nonstate group.
The Eight Trajectories

The trajectories developed in this report are presented below. As the strategy for U.S. actions in this long war is still unspecified, we have grouped the trajectories into two main bins. The few contains those trajectories largely reflecting a U.S. choice in strategy. The trajectories in this bin include “Steady State,” “The War of Ideas,” and “Narrowing of Threat.” In these cases, the environment has allowed the U.S. strategy to dominate how the future unfolds.

In the second set, the trajectories largely unfold as a response to some external shock or environmental change. This set includes “Major Muslim Nation Goes Bad,” “Holding Action,” “Sustained Sunni-Shia Conflict,” “Chronic Insurgency/Instability,” and “Expanding Scope.” In these cases, while the United States may have strategic choices and exercise them accordingly, the predominant implications to the force are largely a result of an external factor. For these trajectories (except “Holding Action”), the major change concerns the actors involved directly in the long war. To highlight those changes, we present a shorthand description of the motives, means, and opportunities (MMO) for the participants in those trajectories at the end of each section. These MMO tables can be used to see across the alternative trajectories to illustrate specific differences among them.

In each of the descriptions, we highlight the main uncertainties (taken from the previous chapter) that are addressed and how they were envisioned as leading to the specific trajectory.

Steady State

The “Steady State” trajectory assumes that the long war moves forward without any major shifts in U.S. strategy or major strategic surprises. In this vision, the threat in the long war continues to be the broad universe of radical Salafi-jihadists, including both transnational and sometimes regional groups. No state is directly targeted by the United States in this long war, and the U.S.-led coalition that we have today largely holds together.

In this trajectory, the United States slowly moves toward an advisory and quick-reaction role in Iraq and focuses its energies mainly on
attacking al-Qaeda and associated movements and their most hardcore supporters. The counterinsurgency (COIN) mission in Afghanistan continues at the present level of effort with modest success, and Washington continues to use SOF to fight a covert global campaign against the strategic leadership of al-Qaeda. Small-footprint foreign internal defense (FID) missions operate in a dozen or so moderate Muslim countries that have ungoverned zones that could become terrorist havens.

In the area of ideology, the “Steady State” trajectory would be supported by polling data and other evidence showing that the appeal of Salafi-jihadism and the al-Qaeda organization among Sunni Muslims was declining somewhat, at least in some Muslim countries. This fall in support for SJ would not need to be accompanied by a concomitant increase in good feelings toward the United States and the West.

In the “Steady State” future, where the United States continues to be involved in FID missions across the Muslim world to combat violent terrorist groups, governance is a key component in limiting long-term American involvement. Creating effective governance structures to combat terrorist groups is a vital component in these missions, whether it is generating some manner of government for an ungoverned zone or reforming a broken governance structure in an area of conflict.

Uncertainties Addressed. This trajectory addresses two variables more explicitly: the prevalence of weak or failed states as safe havens and domestic support for the long war.

The “Steady State” trajectory assumes that there are no significant new SJ safe havens where the SJ groups can establish bases and training camps. Nonetheless, SJ groups continue to operate in various regions and are able to have small safe havens but unable to establish bases or training camps. From these havens they are able to launch limited strikes against U.S. interests.

If the United States continues to aggressively prosecute the long war, it is likely that no state will choose to give safe havens to SJ groups. In this trajectory it is expected that the United States (and coalition) would take action against wherever SJ groups seek safe haven with or without the support of the host nation.

It also assumes that safe havens and bases are not allowed to become established before there is a response and no major new strate-
gic offensives\(^2\) by the United States and its allies are needed. It means that U.S. military actions are isolated against small, poorly defended targets.

The “Steady State” trajectory assumes the United States devotes roughly the same amount of federal funding to the long war as it does today, minus some supplemental funding for the war in Iraq as U.S. forces there are reduced to a long-term steady state level. Any major cut in federal funding for long war activities and operations by Congress would make this trajectory largely untenable, since it depends on a robust set of CT/COIN/FID activities around the world.

The broader international security environment would have to be stable or slightly improving for this trajectory to happen. No major new gains by radical Islamists would be occurring and, outside the scope of the long war, no new conventional threats to U.S. interests would be emerging. At the same time, on the Blue side of the ledger, the pro-U.S. coalition of Western states that has been conducting the long war would have to be holding together. Key U.S. allies like Britain, Australia, Canada, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan would be holding fast in their commitment to fight alongside U.S. forces in the various theaters of the long war. Intelligence-sharing among these coalition partners would continue to be extensive and frequent. World opinion may remain somewhat divided, but the overall support would be for U.S. action.

No additional conventional threats or “hot spots” arise that would divert funding away from the long war toward preparing for or executing operations in these regions.

**War of Ideas\(^3\)**

The “War of Ideas” vision assumes that U.S. strategy for the long war shifts to the employment of largely nonkinetic means. U.S. leaders decide that

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\(^2\) For instance, major actions in Somalia, Mali, or Indonesia, would increase pressure on the administration in power to take rapid action, even if only by supporting local proxies. Such action would open a major new theater in the long war, thus vitiating Steady State.

\(^3\) For an additional discussion of a “war of ideas” and associated ideological counterstrategy, see Rosenau (2006).
the long war should be mainly an IO effort to increasingly isolate the jihadists and their infrastructure from the broader global Muslim population.\textsuperscript{4} As a result, U.S. leaders work to avoid direct military actions in the Middle East and Persian Gulf that might inflame moderate Muslims in the region. Plans to confront Iran militarily over its nuclear program are shelved for the time being. Without the cover that is provided by sympathetic elements within the population, so the theory goes, al-Qaeda would probably wither away over time.

Public diplomacy, humanitarian assistance operations, targeted foreign aid, and strategic communications are the main tools used. Special operations forces (SOF) direct action activities against al-Qaeda around the Muslim world are scaled back. The United States continues to maintain a military presence in Iraq but it is quite small. Washington's strategy here also includes a massive diplomatic push to achieve a comprehensive Israeli-Palestinian peace deal.

This trajectory might reflect a lack of willingness of part of the U.S. population to become involved in further armed conflict and perhaps parallel a belief among American leaders that a direct action approach to the long war is not yielding the kind of results that were expected, alongside emerging evidence that a number of governments in the Muslim world are improving their competence and raising their image in the eyes of their citizens.

In the “War of Ideas” future, ideology constitutes the main battleground. In this future, the United States does not engage in large-scale military combat, but instead focuses on limiting the dissemination and spread of a radical ideology. It is clear that the most virulent and destructive ideology facing the United States at present is Salafi-jihadism. This ideology drives the insurgencies in a portion of Iraq and Afghanistan, and its antagonistic interaction with militant Shiism in Iraq has the potential to instigate further conflict.

\textsuperscript{4} The issue of improving U.S. strategic communications has already attracted much high-level attention. The Defense Science Board devoted a major study effort to this issue. See DSB (2004). A hint of the challenges that would be faced in a full-fledged “War of Ideas” can be found in Kepel (2004).
In the “War of Ideas” future, the United States faces the serious task of reducing the appeal of this ideology, marginalizing it so that it can no longer pose a threat to it or its allies. This task will require more than a sophisticated IO or public diplomacy campaign. To defeat this ideology, the United States must make some difficult decisions about how it interacts with both traditional allies and enemies in the Muslim world.

The possibility of this trajectory is also promoted by concrete evidence that demonstrates that the SJ ideology favored by al-Qaeda is losing traction with the global Muslim population. This evidence would probably have to come from reliable polling in the Muslim world as well as other scattered metrics (e.g., declining number of visitors to jihadist websites). Another indicator that the “War of Ideas” might be appropriate would be the occurrence of 1–2 major elections in the Muslim world in which Islamist parties lose by significant margins to secular or liberal parties. The increasing popularity of moderate non-Salafi preachers on Arab satellite television would be one more sign that the SJ ideology is becoming vulnerable to an all-out ideational assault by the United States.

In the “War of Ideas” future, strong and effective governance, as seen by better delivery of basic services and declining levels of unemployment, becomes a key tool in combating a radical and diffuse ideology. Governments with political legitimacy and popular support are much more capable of marginalizing a radical ideology and providing incentives for a population to reject such ideas. In addition, an ideational assault on the Salafi-jihadists across the Muslim world would stand a better chance of working if the citizens of key Arab and Muslim states are beginning to see their governments as a source of hope rather than frustration and broken promises. This can be seen in counterinsurgency models and doctrine: increasing the effectiveness and civil support/protection functions of the government is a primary concern in these types of low-intensity conflict situations.

Improved governance would give the centrists on the political spectrum a genuine place to go with their support as they turn decisively away from political Islam and especially its virulent SJ variant. Support for existing regimes based on coercion and patronage could be
replaced with inspired loyalty. This would have to start to change if the “War of Ideas” is to have a credible chance of succeeding.

Uncertainties Addressed. Two main uncertainties are addressed in the “War of Ideas” trajectory—Middle Eastern political stability and international support and legitimacy.

The Middle Eastern political situation would have to be favorable for U.S. interests in order for a concerted “War of Ideas” trajectory to come about. The trajectory would have to be pursued in an environment where the risk of a major interstate war in the region was low. In other words, the United States and Iran would need to reduce bilateral tensions to manageable levels, and Hezbollah, Syria, and HAMAS would scale back their military buildups along the borders of Israel and halt provocative acts like attempted kidnappings of Israeli soldiers. The trajectory would become untenable if the United States were drawn into a shooting war in the Middle East or Persian Gulf, even if our involvement were limited to providing military assistance to Israel; the almost certain backlash that any kinetic operations would cause in much of the Arab media would preclude an effective ideational campaign by the United States and its allies.

Although much of the “War of Ideas” would be conducted through proxies, there is no way that the United States could conceal its own involvement. Thus, in order for the ideational approach to make some progress, the United States would have to be seen in the Muslim world as having a fairly high level of international legitimacy. This could be accomplished by success in building a democratic government and free society in Afghanistan, the brokering of a lasting Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement, or leadership somewhere in the Muslim world of a successful humanitarian aid effort that parallels the Indonesian tsunami model, but with continuing effect.

Narrowing of Threat

In “Narrowing of Threat,” the United States decides that its strategy for the long war should be “divide and conquer” in that it will work actively to exploit cleavages among the transnational jihadists and the local/regional jihadists. Rather than trying to isolate the jihadists from the broader Muslim population, this approach focuses more on turning parts of
the jihadist community against each other. Consequently, the United States would adopt a more flexible position toward local and nationalist Islamist groups like HAMAS and Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the Philippines, which might include face-to-face diplomatic interactions. This approach would be based on the dual premises that (1) the transnational jihadist movement, enforced by changes in al-Qaeda’s technical capabilities, organizational capacity, and stature, poses the central and most coherent threat to U.S. security, and (2) there are splits within the jihadist movement that can be exploited in order to decrease terrorism and increase stability in the Muslim world.

This strategy would entail the pursuit of some basic political negotiations with local jihadist groups with the goal of alleviating some of their grievances without harming the interests of the American allies that they have been fighting (e.g., Israel, the Philippines, Egypt). It also assumes that the use of information operations (IO) on the Muslim populace writ large will be more effective if IO are used specifically to spotlight the abuses and atrocities of the transnational jihadists like al-Qaeda, who are already losing credibility in the Muslim world according to some early polling data.

If the United States can successfully exploit some of these cleavages, this would pave the way for a concentration of SOF assets against purely transnational jihadist targets. Since many of these groups have significant infrastructure in Europe, cooperation with European authorities would become critical.

Ideology would affect the potential for the “Narrowing of Threat” trajectory as well. This is because clear ideological splits would have to be emerging between the transnational and national jihadist movements for this trajectory to occur. These splits would be becoming increasingly public and vociferous; they would exist on a number of key issues, including treatment of Shiites, the legitimacy of targeting civilians, the legitimacy of suicide operations, the utility of targeting oilfields in the Muslim world, and the best way to win the hearts and minds of the Muslim population at large. These splits could even become violent in some cases, resembling the current fighting in Iraq between al-Qaeda and the major tribal groupings.
Uncertainties Addressed. The “Narrowing of Threat” trajectory addresses three main uncertainties: Middle Eastern political stability, international support and legitimacy, and capabilities of nonstate actors.

The Middle Eastern political situation is a major factor driving the “Narrowing of Threat” trajectory. If regional Arab governments are strengthening their institutions and delivering better services to their citizens, this approach would be more feasible because the national jihadists might sense that time was not on their side and that cutting a deal with the United States to sever all links with transnational jihadists might be their best chance of retaining some influence.

By the same reasoning, this trajectory would also become more feasible if public opinion in the Arab and Muslim worlds were to swing heavily against violent jihad. Here too the national jihadists might sense time turning against them and begin to contemplate policies that would move them away from the transnational jihadists.

“Narrowing of Threat” would become easier for the United States to execute if its legitimacy were high in both the Muslim world and the wider international arena. This is because the United States as an actor with genuine political capital to draw on would be seen by many of the national jihadist groups as a powerful force that could deliver some benefits to those groups in exchange for reductions, or perhaps cessation, of terrorist activity in their respective countries. In some cases, U.S. diplomacy could secure amnesty for former jihadists; in others it could work to bring former jihadists into their national political processes as a peaceful political party. Without much legitimacy, the United States would find it difficult to move into the trajectory.

In this trajectory, the decision to focus on the transnational jihadists would be the result of evidence that al-Qaeda and its affiliates pose a much greater threat to international security than the sum of that posed by local jihadist groups. This could be driven by their moves to acquire WMD, their increasing ability to mount insurgencies against friendly regimes in the Middle East and South Asia, and their skill at exploiting fault lines between Shia and Sunni in order to stimulate mass sectarian violence. For this trajectory to occur, al-Qaeda and its affiliates would likely have to become a stronger, more resilient orga-
nization than it is today—for example, al-Qaeda would probably have seized control of most of the insurgent movement in Iraq in this future and could also be mounting a credible insurgency in Pakistan. The impact would spill over into how other local jihadist movements and affiliated groups viewed al-Qaeda and could facilitate splitting of the most extremist ideologies from the mainstream movements.

**Major Muslim Nation Goes Bad**

The “Major Muslim Nation Goes Bad” trajectory for the long war describes a situation in which a critical state in the Muslim world is taken over by extremists who are sympathetic to al-Qaeda and its affiliates. There are a number of specific scenarios for this; two of the most plausible and most threatening to American interests are a military coup in Pakistan and a successful fundamentalist insurgency in Saudi Arabia. Uncertainties tested in this trajectory include technological proliferation and collaboration among actors.

In this vision, the United States could face a long war with a significant conventional component. If the United States deems a large-scale military involvement as necessary, significant forces could be devoted to containing the new jihadist state and/or neutralizing any WMD it might possess. The global SOF campaign against al-Qaeda might suffer, as would the ongoing COIN efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Similarly, outside of the WMD arena, any access to state support from a large Muslim nation could bolster nonstate access to conventional weaponry from various well-developed arms industries within these countries.

In addition to access to weaponry, the existence of U.S. strategic energy assets in a state such as Saudi Arabia and the opportunity for mismanagement of or refusal to sell oil becomes important and would elevate any strategic shift there, perhaps regardless of weapon proliferation.

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5 A third important potential problem could be Algeria. With its uranium deposits, fuel manufacturing plant, and alleged reprocessing capability, any realignment of Algeria could create medium- to longer-term problems regarding WMD proliferation. See Albright and Hinderstein (2001) for a more complete discussion.
For this trajectory and others that entail major change in the participants or environment that drives it, we provide a breakdown of the MMO. In this case, they are summarized in Table 5.3 for the aggressor that has instigated the strategic shift in the major Muslim state. For instance, motivated by ineffective government, the group might use paramilitary activity to exploit sanctuary within that state to lead a coup to take over the government. As detailed in subsequent sections of this report, the implications to the Army can then be gleaned from their ability to affect the motives, counter the means, and reduce the opportunities in these trajectories.

The ultimate effectiveness of ideology in driving the long war toward this particular trajectory will depend on how skillfully radical clerics and scholars are able to disseminate their message and mobilize significant sectors of society against the regime in power. In particular, the ability of the ideology to appeal to important loci of power within the authoritarian states of the Muslim world will have a great influence over the plausibility of the “Major Muslim Nation Goes Bad” trajectory. The military and security apparatus is a significant locus of power

Table 5.3
Motives, Means, and Opportunities for the “Major Muslim Nation Goes Bad” Trajectory

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Motive</th>
<th>Means</th>
<th>Opportunity</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poor, ineffective government at home</td>
<td>Paramilitary activity leading to coup</td>
<td>Inability of governments to exercise sovereignty over own territory (internal police, security, military)</td>
<td>Worst case: Pakistan for WMD capabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment woes; demographic changes</td>
<td>Individual acts of violence leading to destruction of government sovereignty</td>
<td>Mismanaged borders</td>
<td>Bad cases: Saudi Arabia for conventional capabilities and some WMD; Egypt for conventional weaponry; Algeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological motivation</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sanctuary within Muslim nation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instability and unease in Middle East</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ideologically motivated foot soldiers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>External support to extremists</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lack of external support to Muslim nation</td>
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and should be monitored for Salafi-jihadist leanings. A lack of professionalism in these two entities, combined with the infiltration of Salafi-jihadist thinking, could lead to a government takeover. Additional loci of power include student organizations and trade unions. Both have the potential to mobilize large numbers of people and could create a climate where security forces are unwilling or unable to act to preserve the power of the authoritarian ruler.

There are also loci of power that would act against an ideology and make this trajectory less likely. In some major Muslim states, the establishment clergy (which is paid by the regime) can serve as a counterweight to radical Islamist ideologies. In Saudi Arabia, for example, the establishment clergy have been very active in fighting an information war against jihadist clerics who support al-Qaeda. Although many Saudis see the establishment clerics as being tainted by virtue of their financial ties to the regime, many analysts believe that they have enjoyed some success in keeping public support for the SJ ideology at a manageable level.

The primary drivers for the “Major Muslim Nation Goes Bad” trajectory are governance and ideology, with demography also playing a role. Weak governance would be critical in almost any scenario for a SJ-sympathetic takeover of a major state. Many of the current regimes in the Middle East, South Asia, and Muslim parts of Africa are not able to effectively deliver basic services to their populations, nor are they able to maintain and expand their national infrastructures to the extent necessary. Corruption and nepotism are seen by many ordinary people in these states as being rampant and, indeed, as being the only real path to wealth and power. Public bureaucracies in these states are often seen as bloated and inefficient.

This example also highlights the quality aspect of governance—it is not simply about whether a territory is governed or ungoverned. Rather, the type and characteristics of governance in particular countries need to be examined, so the United States can avoid or respond to this eventuality.

Uncertainties Addressed. The “Major Muslim Nation Goes Bad” trajectory addresses two uncertainties explicitly: weapons prolifera-
tion and capabilities of nonstate actors, and the proliferation of safe havens.

The threat that this trajectory presents to U.S. interests will be largely determined by the specific kind of proliferation dynamics involved. The severity of the threat depends upon both the level of WMD proliferation that has occurred in the country that “goes bad” and the willingness of the new leadership to allow that technology or associated knowledge to leak to unsavory actors. The worst case would be a nation gone bad with an indigenously developed nuclear arsenal and reliable means of delivery that is taken over by a radical leadership that is willing to transfer weapons, production technology, and/or expertise to other bad actors.

For this trajectory to pose a dire threat to core U.S. interests, both uncertainties have to be resolved in an unfavorable manner. A high level of domestic proliferation without any collaboration with outside actors would not allow WMD to fall into the hands of terrorist groups that could use them against the United States anonymously. It is possible that the newly hostile state in this case could use its WMD against U.S. interests in a direct attack, but in so doing it would enable the United States to retaliate massively, so this scenario is rated as relatively unlikely by most experts. Conversely, a low level of domestic proliferation coupled with active collaboration with terrorist groups would limit the risk to the United States because the technologies transferred would not be capable of causing catastrophic damage to either the U.S. homeland or U.S. interests abroad.

Pakistan is the state that would test these two uncertainties most severely, should the current regime there be replaced by a pro-jihadist leadership. This is because (1) Pakistan has a relatively large nuclear arsenal with reliable weapons and effective means of delivery and (2) the exposure of the A.Q. Khan network in 2004 shows that elements

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6 The logic here assumes a rational actor.

7 The U.S. intelligence community was actively worrying about the short-term security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal in the late summer of 2007 as internal opposition to President Musharraf increased. See Barbara Starr, “Sources: U.S. Assessing Pakistan Nukes If Musharraf Falls,” posted on CNN.com on August 10, 2007.
within the Pakistani defense industrial establishment are willing to market their expertise to others abroad. If Pakistan were taken over by a radical Islamist government, the risk to U.S. interests from the state’s WMD arsenal would be great. The risks are somewhat lower in the case of other candidates for “going bad” in the long war. Saudi Arabia, for example, most likely has a very limited WMD arsenal (probably restricted to chemical weapons) and only a modest indigenous technical capability to produce more advanced WMD. A new, radical Saudi government could certainly draw upon the state’s large foreign exchange reserves to purchase WMD materials and expertise on the black market, but the black market for WMD is very treacherous and murky and the sheer possession of large amounts of money does not guarantee success there, as al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations have found out on repeated occasions.\(^8\)

A significant strategic shift in a major Muslim state would also create potential safe havens for a number of nonstate groups. A government sympathetic to al-Qaeda and its affiliates, and holding considerable military capabilities and perhaps popular support, would be less concerned with potential fallout from external action, such as what occurred with the fall of the Taliban.

Figure 5.1 shows how the actors change in terms of probability of acting and the hazard of their acting in the case of “Pakistan going bad.”

The nation going bad, in this case shown as Pakistan, is much more probable to act contrary to U.S. objectives. We see that the hazard from al-Qaeda and its affiliates grows as they obtain access to advanced capabilities. It is likely that other state-supported actors, ranging from Islamic schools to paramilitary organizations, would follow the trend of becoming more dangerous and more likely to act against U.S. interests.

Figure 5.2 shows how factors that influence the threat of SJ change when a major Muslim nation “goes bad.” We can see from this that there would be an increased source of funding, arms, and safe havens to the SJ. All of these factors increase the threat posed by SJ.

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\(^8\) See Daly et al. (2005) for accounts of Aum Shinrikyo and al-Qaeda attempts to acquire nuclear WMD.
Direct state support through funding, training, weapons procurement, and recruiting mechanisms can greatly increase a nonstate actor’s capabilities to act on its motives. Advanced and up-to-date military technologies, including small arms, anti-tank weaponry, and sophisticated knowledge of explosives, are often available. The acquisition can occur through various means, including black and gray market activities, illicit trading regimes, and back-channeled, state-supported lines.

The effects of collaboration in the area of expanding support for radical SJ terrorism around the world is tested in the “Major Muslim Nation Goes Bad” trajectory. If a major Muslim state were seized by a pro-jihadist group, one of the largest non-WMD risks to U.S. and Western interests would be that the new leadership would provide money and training to a wide range of SJ groups throughout the world, including al-Qaeda, and would work to use these groups to destabilize other Muslim states.
For example, a radical Pakistani government could be expected to overtly support the Taliban in its efforts to overthrow the demo-
ocratic government of Afghanistan. Such a regime could also redouble its efforts to weaken India's control of Kashmir by funding transnational jihadist groups that have been fighting against Indian security forces in that province (e.g., the Lashkar-e-Toiba organization). A pro-jihadist Pakistan might also cast a wider net and offer support to SJ terror groups in Europe and the Middle East.

Even a Muslim state that has gone “a little bit bad” might offer support where none existed before. Before state sponsorship or normative proxy wars could be executed, however, the state sponsor would have to make two assumptions regarding the ramifications of that support.

First, it would have to be convinced that its leverage over its proxy was so strong that the proxy would have to obey its commands to attack the Americans. This condition is not as easily met as many may believe. Most terrorist/insurgent groups are more independently minded than many Western analysts give them credit for. For instance, although Hezbollah is often portrayed in the U.S. press as a mindless extension of Iran, most Middle East experts agree that Hezbollah is first and foremost a Lebanese organization with its own identity, aspirations, and plans. It does indeed receive much military aid from Iran, but it does not feel bound to accede to every request or directive from Tehran.

Second, and equally important, the state sponsor would have to be sanguine about its ability not to leave its “fingerprints” on any attack on U.S. interests by its proxy. Having solid deniability would be a necessary insurance policy against the prospect of a sudden and large-scale American counterattack. If either one of these conditions fails to hold, it is likely that the state sponsor would be deterred from urging its proxy to strike at the United States.

State support is not limited to ideologically equivalent networks. Ideologies may transcend religious support to advance higher-order objectives, as was thought to be occurring as Hezbollah vied for power during the confrontations in Lebanon in the summer of 2006:

For Hizbullah, and even for Iran, [the] play for power in the region serves an ideological aim. Their influence over the Palestinians does not mean they want to spread Shiite Islam in Pales-
tine. It’s to confront Israel and the U.S. It’s to spread resistance; that is the religion they want to spread. (Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, as quoted in Peterson (2007))

**Expanding Scope**

_The “Expanding Scope” trajectory is the reverse of “Narrowing of Threat.” Here a decision is made that radical Shiism, the Iranian state itself, regional terrorists, and other non-Islamic terror groups are part of the long war._ The long war here is expanded beyond Salafi-jihadism. The catalyst for this turn of events could be either a major terrorist attack against U.S. interests or a substantial increase in state support for nonstate organizations. The long war, in this formulation, would become a true global war on terror if it were to include an expanded set of groups using terrorist tactics.

Based on continuing support and association of state actors with the SJ threat, a long-term confrontation with Iran could become a key part of American foreign and military policy. The U.S. military footprint around Iran (including in Iraq and Afghanistan) would expand.

The SOF force structure would likely grow if this trajectory happened because SOF would have to conduct global operations against al-Qaeda and its affiliates, Hezbollah, the Iranian intelligence services, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarios de Colombia (FARC), and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The motives, means and opportunities for these groups as described in the trajectory are shown in Table 5.4.

In the “Expanding Scope” trajectory, the anti-American, anti-globalization ideologies of the present have gained strength and credibility and have created a larger consort. In a more threatening case, disparate ideologies have set aside differences to unite in a common cause: the usual Shia-Sunni divide is less defined and violent groups of Muslims begin cooperating. In this future, the United States faces a grave threat to the status quo in the Muslim world and potentially severe threats to its own security, including its economic security.
### Table 5.4
Motives, Means, and Opportunities for the “Expanding Scope” Trajectory

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Motive</th>
<th>Means</th>
<th>Opportunity</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Western mistreatment</td>
<td>Individual acts of violence</td>
<td>Many disaffected groups within states</td>
<td>Increasing U.S. confrontation with violent groups (Hezbollah, FARC, LTTE in addition to al-Qaeda and its affiliates) and state supporters (Iran); caution with many grey area countries (Syria, Philippines)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Globalization</td>
<td>Paramilitary activities</td>
<td>Net-enabled virtual proximity of nonstate groups</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Eastern politics</td>
<td>Levée en masse</td>
<td>Sharing and exchange of technological knowledge; potential enabled transfer of WMD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Substantial access to outside state support</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ideological attenuation fostering groups’ cohesion; singularity of objectives</td>
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The coalescence of violent ideologies in the Muslim world, or the operational cooperation of disparate anti-Western ideologies across the world, is certainly a worst case and probably a highly unlikely future scenario. However, if such a worst case were to unfold, the United States would likely face a highly diffuse yet organized network of foes, whose ability to project power and create crises in various parts of the globe would seriously tax American military and political prowess. In fact, a conflict on this scale would likely become an international issue, with international cooperation and mobilization required on a scale not seen since the last world war.

For the United States to expand the scope of the long war to the extent portrayed in this trajectory, there would have to be a shift in the ideology of at least one or more major non-SJ terrorist groups that would transform the United States from simply being an antagonistic force that supports Israel and other enemy governments into an active enemy that needs to be confronted. This kind of transformation took place within al-Qaeda in 1996 after bin Ladin moved to Afghanistan and before the organization proclaimed its “jihad” against the United States with the bombing of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Hezbollah, which launched several attacks against the United States in Lebanon in the 1980s, could undergo such a transformation if its lead-
ership were to change or if it were to suffer a sudden reversal of fortune in Lebanese politics. In these cases, a Category 3 religious nationalist group (see Chapter Three, Figure 3.1 for definitions of the categories) would reduce its political efforts and expand its military interests outside of the immediate region, thus planting itself into Category 1.

Uncertainties Addressed. This trajectory addresses three uncertainties explicitly: domestic support for the long war, capabilities of nonstate actors, and the draw of conventional war.

One type of trigger for the “Expanding Scope” trajectory would be a major terrorist attack on U.S. interests either inside or outside the United States by a non-SJ group such as Hezbollah or the Colombian FARC. Examples of such an event include the bombing of an American embassy, an attack on a group of U.S. tourists abroad, the bombing of a major American military base overseas, or a bombing attack in a large American city (perhaps involving weapons of mass effect). This sort of attack, using Hezbollah as the example, would cause a shift in actors as shown in Figure 5.3. In the figure, the probability of Iran and Syria acting in support of Hezbollah increases, but in fact the opposite might occur if they feel they need to disassociate themselves from Hezbollah.

Another kind of trigger would be a scenario in which a non-SJ extremist group is on the verge of overthrowing a pro-U.S. regime in a strategically important country. The most obvious example of this kind of scenario would be a Hezbollah push to remove the democratically elected government of Lebanon through a combination of popular protests and terrorism. Another possibility would be a serious effort by the FARC to take down the Colombian government.

This sort of attack would not only cause the long war to be expanded to include the perpetrators of the attack and their allies, but would also result in a significant increase in support for the long war within the United States. This would likely result in increased funding for the long war, possibly at the expense of other programs.

9 A U.S. choice to support Israel in going after Hezbollah without a marked change in Hezbollah’s political or military stance might also occur, but it would not be a part of the long war as constructed in this document.
Figure 5.3
Target Diagram for the “Expanding Scope” Trajectory Where Hezbollah Attacks the West

The level of challenge posed to the United States in “Expanding Scope” would be dependent upon uncertainties in the rate of technology proliferation to the non-SJ terrorist insurgent groups. If these groups are receiving current generation anti-tank weaponry, man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS), improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and mortars, the risks to U.S. personnel and their local partners would increase substantially. Any spread of nuclear technology to these groups would, needless to say, raise the risks involved by orders of magnitude.10 Most likely, this proliferation would in some way be aided by state sponsorship, and the extent to which states would become involved in arms transfers and facilitating new and advanced weaponry remains uncertain. One deterrent to expanded collaboration from a state to a nonstate SJ entity would be the ensuing geopolitical repercussions.

10 The spread of chemical, biological, and radiological weaponry would not be as dramatic a change.
In the case of the “Expanding Scope” trajectory, the shift of a non-SJ terror group to a posture of direct confrontation with the United States could, under certain conditions, be driven by the preferences and demands of the group’s state sponsor(s), if it has them. If, for example, Iran were to face serious economic sanctions coordinated by the United States, it could pressure Hezbollah to strike against U.S. interests in response. Using a proxy to harm the United States would allow a state sponsor to defend its interests without risking a full-scale confrontation with the United States and its Western allies. The two assumptions stated above that Iran would have to make hold in this case.

The existence of conventional war is important to mention here because in this trajectory the aggressive new U.S. posture against radical Shiite groups like Hezbollah raises the possibility that the United States could be drawn, either wittingly or unwittingly, into a conventional conflict with Iran. An escalation spiral could be touched off, for instance, if a U.S. military strike in Lebanon against Hezbollah were to kill a number of Iranian advisers. If a conventional conflict with Iran were to commence, the whole nature of this trajectory would change—it would become a very high intensity scenario.

Holding Action

“Holding Action” would be a response to series of geopolitical shocks that would compel the United States to temporarily scale back its efforts in the long war against the worldwide constellation of SJ groups. These shocks would divert U.S. attention to more traditional kinds of threats that would require a response with large amounts of conventional forces and diplomatic capital. There are several plausible examples of these kinds of shocks.

Perhaps the most likely trigger for this trajectory would be a sudden Chinese push to overturn the balance of power in the Western Pacific, possibly by blockading or invading Taiwan. There are, however, other scenarios that could come to pass instead. A sudden, violent implosion of North Korea, a North Korean deployment of nuclear-capable ICBMs, an Iranian campaign to close the Straits of Hormuz, the declaration of a Russian-Iranian military alliance, a major Indo-Pakistani war, and a Venezuelan-sponsored destabilization of the Andes region
are all shocks that would require serious focus by American political and military leaders to the extent that the long war would have to be deemphasized.

In the case of an event like these, the United States might seek to counter the Salafi-jihadist movement by trying to use just the minimum level of military resources necessary to keep the jihadist movement from spreading. In this vision, the United States might turn to some of its allies to conduct a significant portion of the global direct action effort against al-Qaeda and its affiliates. The inclusion of these allies might be facilitated by a growth in an anterior threat that would necessitate U.S. actions elsewhere for the good of others. The United States might try to bring significant contingents of European SOF (British, French, etc.) into its global anti–al-Qaeda campaign in order to free up capabilities to combat the conventional threat.

**Uncertainties Addressed.** The “Holding Action” trajectory addresses two main uncertainties: the draw of conventional war and domestic support.

As might be expected, the main driver for the “Holding Action” trajectory is a changing geopolitical landscape that increases the draw of conventional war. Geopolitical fault lines and changes in the balance of power, development of advanced weaponry, hostile actions against strategic throughways, or advanced alliances being formed would be the root causes of this trajectory. Most of the crises that would lead to a “Holding Action” trajectory would be caused by a hostile state’s perception that there was a window of opportunity for great gains that it could take advantage of without major risks. Windows of opportunity are particularly tempting if a state believes that long-term trends favor its adversary.11

Internal crises, like a North Korean implosion, would, on the other hand, be caused by strong external pressures on a weak, unstable state. These pressures would probably be caused by economic sanctions and aid restrictions or, alternatively, by Western support for local opposition groups.

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11 One of the reasons why Germany entered World War I in 1914, for example, was a belief among German leaders that Russia’s economic and population growth would make Russia virtually unbeatable in war in another decade.
If the new crisis involves a conventional conflict, e.g., a war with China in the Taiwan Straits, then the chances that the “Holding Action” trajectory will last for a long time grow larger. But if the new crisis does not require that the United States actually fight a conventional war, but only deter a new adversary or stabilize an imploded state, then the chances decrease that the “Holding Action” trajectory will go on for several years.

Funding for the long war is also a critical variable in the “Holding Action” trajectory. If the U.S. leadership is able to address the new geopolitical crises without severely cutting funds for the war against the SJ forces, then the “Holding Action” trajectory would be relatively short and perhaps even insignificant from the strategic perspective. If, however, funding for the long war has to be reduced by a significant percentage to pay for the cost of dealing with a major new geopolitical crisis, then the “Holding Action” trajectory might last for several years and require the United States to depend on key allies to press much of the fight against al-Qaeda and its affiliates. The funding uncertainty is complicated because it does not depend just on strategic calculations about the distribution of military resources, but also on the growth rate of the U.S. economy at the moment, the size of the federal budget deficit, and the percent of GDP currently devoted to defense expenditures, among other things.

The U.S. domestic political environment is also important here. If the Congress feels it has some fiscal leeway, it might be willing to increase defense spending to the point where the United States could both fight the long war at full speed and also deal with the new geopolitical crisis posited here.

Figure 5.4 shows which factors are likely to cause a change in the U.S. strategy, thus resulting in the “Holding Action” trajectory as described above. The figure also indicates that an increased conventional threat (i.e., a decrease in the waning of conventional threats) would lead to a loss of funding and require the training/equipping of forces for other tasks. Additionally, the loss of support for the long war in the face of this other threat could also influence domestic politics and public opinion.
Figure 5.4
Influence Diagram Showing Factors Affecting the U.S. Ability to Prosecute the Long War

Sustained Sunni-Shia Conflict

The “Sustained Sunni-Shia Conflict” trajectory posits that the combination of memories of the intensive sectarian violence in Iraq during 2006–07 and the emergence of a largely Shiite regime in that country produces deep fault lines between Shia and Sunni communities throughout the Muslim world.

These fault lines are manifested by an upsurge in political instability and violent conflict in those Middle Eastern and South Asian countries that contain mixed Sunni-Shiite populations. In this vision of the future long war, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Lebanon are all plagued by sectarian fighting, while disenfranchised and poor Shiite communities lash out at their Sunni-dominated governments. Local government security forces respond in every case with heavy force. Many Shiite clerics are arrested and held without charge.
In Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, Shiite uprisings elicit vicious reprisals against Shia noncombatants from radical Salafi-jihadist militias and street gangs. The televised scenes of bloodletting from these countries spur the Iranian government to action. The clerical regime in Tehran could set about to provide covert financial assistance and military training to Shiite militias and self-defense forces throughout the Muslim world, including those in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia. Similarly, the expanding Sunni-Shia conflicts could be accelerated by the overt inclusion of Sunni supporters from Saudi Arabia and Jordan meddling across state borders, increasing international attention.

U.S. leaders are very concerned about these developments and decide to concentrate, in the short term, on shoring up the traditional Sunni regimes in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Pakistan as a way of containing Iranian power and influence in the Middle East and Persian Gulf. U.S. economic aid and security assistance to these governments increases rapidly as the sectarian violence worsens in the region.

Washington also provides specialized counterterrorism (CT) assistance to the beleaguered governments of Bahrain and Lebanon so that these regimes can control the Iranian-sponsored Shiite terrorist groups on their soil that are now growing in size and sophistication (i.e., Bahraini Hezbollah and Lebanese Hezbollah).

This trajectory compels the United States to walk a diplomatic tightrope in that it would have to maintain a strong strategic relationship with the Iraqi Shiite government while at the same time buttressing the conservative Sunni regimes in the Middle East that view the Iraqi regime as a challenge to the established order. U.S. diplomacy would have to work to maximize the influence of moderate Shiites in the Iraqi regime at the expense of hard-line Iranian-supported fundamentalists.

One of the oddities of this long war trajectory is that it may actually reduce the al-Qaeda threat to U.S. interests in the short term. The upsurge in Shia identity and confidence seen here would certainly cause serious concern in the Salafi-jihadist community in the Muslim world, including the senior leadership of al-Qaeda. As a result, it is very likely that al-Qaeda might focus its efforts on targeting Iranian interests throughout the Middle East and Persian Gulf while simulta-
neously cutting back on anti-American and anti-Western operations. Al-Qaeda would probably intensify its efforts to destabilize the Iraqi government and might also undertake a terror campaign against Hezbollah’s social services infrastructure in southern Lebanon. In this vision of the long war, it is conceivable that al-Qaeda might attempt to execute a “spectacular” attack inside Iran itself. The MMO for this trajectory are shown in Table 5.5.

This trajectory is driven by a combination of ideology and governance shortcomings. Ideology plays an obvious role in this trajectory because the core issue in the Shia-Sunni split involves different views on the legitimate leadership of the Muslim polity. These disagreements cut to the heart of identity in the Muslim world and have created major fault lines in the Muslim community for many centuries.

Moreover, while these fault lines have been blurred for decades by colonial intrusion and various types of nationalism, the Salafi-jihadist ideology takes direct aim at any competing ideological framework,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Motive</th>
<th>Means</th>
<th>Opportunity</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religious solidarity</td>
<td>Individual acts of violence</td>
<td>Swath of sectarian counterparts across many</td>
<td>Violent conflict in areas of mixed Sunni-Shia population from Middle East to South Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional underrepresentation</td>
<td>Paramilitary activities</td>
<td>countries</td>
<td>Small-scale escalation of state lines being drawn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger over Middle Eastern policies and actions</td>
<td>Proxy state wars</td>
<td>Virtual proximity and kinship</td>
<td>Nonstate-on-state attacks across sectarian lines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sharing and exchange of technological knowledge; potential enabled transfer of weaponry, funds from state supporters</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Specific access to religiously affiliated state support</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Religious, ideological</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

12 Indeed, one of the most prominent SJ clerics in the Persian Gulf region, Hamed al-Ali, is already openly calling for radical Sunnis to fight Iran and the Shiites with as much vigor as they devote to fighting the United States and its Western allies.
attempting to delegitimize other concepts as “un-Islamic.” Hence, the disintegration of secular ideologies and proper governance (which could smooth relations between competing groups) would provide openings for this type of trajectory to occur.

Poor governance exacerbates the ideological tension in that many of the conservative Sunni regimes in the Muslim world have discriminated systematically against Shiites for years. In Saddam’s Iraq, for example, all of the top positions in the Ba’ath Party, the military, and the intelligence services were reserved for Sunnis even though Shiites are more than 50 percent of the total Iraqi population. Sunni areas of Iraq received more modern hospitals, schools, and roads than did Shia districts, where the infrastructure was usually allowed to decay. In Saudi Arabia, Shiites have long faced restrictions on their celebration of religious festivals and have often been forbidden to construct new mosques. Schools in Shiite areas are run by Sunni administrators and teach students that Shiism is illegitimate. Finally, the establishment Sunni clerics in Saudi Arabia relentlessly attack Shiism in the press, referring to Shiites as apostates or worse. This systematic discrimination has created a deep resentment toward the government in many Shiite communities that can easily be ignited into street violence given the right political spark.

Uncertainties Addressed. The “Sustained Sunni-Shia Conflict” trajectory addresses two main uncertainties: Middle East political stability and international support and legitimacy of U.S. actions.

Stability in the Middle East, particularly in the political situation, plays a large role in the creation of the “Sustained Sunni-Shia Conflict” trajectory. If the region is tense and unstable, as it was during the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war when Hezbollah was seen as stealing the mantle of anti-Israeli resistance from Sunni rejectionist forces, sectarian passions would be high and more difficult to control. Conversely, a period of relative calm, similar to the mid-1990s when there were hopes that the Oslo accords would succeed, would reinforce those forces and actors seeking sectarian peace in the Arab world.
Middle Eastern political stability can be affected to a large part by the eventual outcome of the Iraq war. For instance, the full institutionalization of a Shiite-dominated government in Iraq could facilitate this trajectory. If it became clear that the Sunnis in Iraq would be permanently consigned to a second-tier political status, there would be considerable anxiety among many Sunni populations and clerics in the Arab world, who would fear spreading Shiite influence in their own countries. States where Shiites outnumber Sunnis, like Bahrain and Lebanon, would be especially vulnerable to this trigger. At the same time, disenfranchised Shiite populations in countries like Saudi Arabia and Pakistan would be emboldened by the symbol of Iraq, home of the ancient caliphate, being ruled by Shiites. This could cause them to consider using street violence against local Sunnis to achieve their own objectives.

Another potential trigger for this trajectory would be, obviously, the continuation of intense Sunni-Shia sectarian violence in Iraq. The specter of mass bloodletting going on for several years could inflame already tense communal relations in mixed Shia-Sunni parts of the Muslim world.

Aggressive Iranian foreign policy in the Persian Gulf could also spark a more widespread conflict among Sunni and Shia. If Tehran were to continue on its current path of developing nuclear weapons and seeking to expand its military presence and influence in the Persian Gulf, the conservative Arab Sunni states might feel compelled to use the rhetoric of Sunni solidarity and superiority to rally their populations behind them against Iran. This could spark spontaneous violence against the Shiite minorities in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan, and Yemen.

The level of U.S. political legitimacy in the Middle East and Persian Gulf also plays a role in the “Sustained Sunni-Shia Conflict” tra-

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13 The specific topic of alternative outcomes of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars and their importance to the futures discussed will be covered in a future publication.

14 Predicting the direction of Iranian foreign policy in the middle to long term is difficult because of the fragmented nature of the Iranian national security decisionmaking process. See Kamrava (2007). On the growing power of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps in the Iranian state, see Khalaji (2007).
jectory. If the United States is perceived as weak and/or lacking credibility as an honest actor in the region, Washington will probably not have the diplomatic capability to induce local governments to undertake the actions necessary to halt mass sectarian violence, nor will it be able to consistently deter Iranian expansionism in the region. A scenario in which America is politically weak in the Middle East would be relatively more likely to move toward the Shia-Sunni conflict trajectory. On the other hand, if America is able to regain its reputation and standing in the region, this trajectory would become less likely because U.S. diplomatic pressure would be more powerful and could force local regimes to use the necessary mixes of carrots and sticks to stop sectarian conflict.

**Chronic Insurgencies/Instability**

The “Chronic Insurgencies/Instability” trajectory, unlike “Major Muslim Nation Goes Bad,” does not posit the successful overthrow of a major allied Muslim government, but instead paints a picture in which several U.S. allies and friends face serious insurgencies and unrest that drain their resources and decrease regime legitimacy. The insurgencies are driven in large part by similar grievances incurred in many of the trajectories being described, namely, internally generated issues with inefficient and ineffective governmental structures, dilapidated infrastructure in terms of basic services, and questions of legitimacy of the current leaders.

In this trajectory, Pakistan would face major revolts in both the federally administered tribal areas (FATA) and Baluchistan. Saudi Arabia would be contending with an al-Qaeda–led fundamentalist insurgency in the conservative Wahhabi heartland areas to the north of Riyadh. Egypt would be dealing with a resurgence of the once-defunct Egyptian Islamic Group (EIG), while the still maturing Iraqi government would have its hands full with both radical Sunni tribes and al-Qaeda fighters operating in Al Anbar province. Jordan and Lebanon could also face major internal security threats here. The Lebanese government would be challenged by an ever more assertive Hezbollah, while Jordan might have to contend with those tentacles of al-Qaeda in Iraq that stretch into the conservative Sunni towns south of Amman.
None of these insurgencies would be strong enough to topple an existing regime. However, the sum of all of them would create an atmosphere of instability and chaos in the Middle East that would complicate American long war efforts and strategy. There would likely be an increased number of ungoverned zones in which terrorists and organized crime syndicates could operate with impunity. This would hold down economic growth in the region and increase unemployment in countries that already face very large youth bulges. If insurgent elements in Saudi Arabia were to start targeting oil pipelines on a regular basis, the resulting spike in global oil prices would adversely affect the global economy as well.

Undoubtedly, the United States would respond to this trajectory with a stepped-up program of COIN/FID assistance to the affected countries. U.S. advisers might go into the field with some local security forces, but U.S. combat units would probably not be deployed into any of the affected states with the exception of Iraq, where some U.S. combat units might remain for the long term. Intensive intelligence sharing with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Pakistan would also occur here. The United States would generally want to keep its footprint in the region small.

Finally, the security assistance would be accompanied by a diplomatic effort to promote a series of slow political and organizational reforms in the affected states—reforms that would increase government legitimacy (by, for example, streamlining bureaucracies and improving the delivery of basic services), thereby reducing support for insurgent groups. These reforms would be most likely to work in Egypt and Iraq; they would be less probable to work in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. The MMO for this trajectory are shown in Table 5.6.

Defective governance helps drive “Chronic Insurgencies/Instability” because it furnishes many of the original grievances that are at the root of instability in the Muslim world. Corruption, nepotism, inefficiencies, dilapidated infrastructure, and poor delivery of basic services like electricity all reduce the legitimacy of ruling regimes in much of the Muslim world. This problem is particularly acute in the Arab world, where Egypt has served as a prototypical example of ineffective governance, but these kinds of governance shortcomings can be seen
Table 5.6
Motives, Means, and Opportunities for the “Chronic Insurgencies/Instability” Trajectory

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Motive</th>
<th>Means</th>
<th>Opportunity</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poor, ineffective government at home</td>
<td>Individual acts of violence</td>
<td>Ungoverned zones, safe havens</td>
<td>Major revolts in PAK tribal areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment woes; demographic changes</td>
<td>Paramilitary activities</td>
<td>Inability of state to internally govern</td>
<td>Al-Qaeda–led insurgency in Saudi Arabia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>External funds, weapons, recruits, advanced</td>
<td>EIG in Egypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>military technologies</td>
<td>Internal threats in</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Jordan, Lebanon</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

in countries like Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Uzbekistan as well. When corruption and poor service delivery are combined with stagnant economies, inflexible labor markets that produce high levels of youth unemployment, and political repression, great opportunities are created for extremist Islamist groups and ambitious tribal leaders to present themselves as an alternative to the regime and mobilize followers for violence against the authorities.

**Uncertainties Addressed.** The “Chronic Insurgencies/Instability” trajectory addresses two main uncertainties: prevalence of safe havens and capabilities of nonstate actors.

Whether or not safe havens are established is another factor that will determine how seriously this trajectory could affect the security environment in parts of the Muslim world. If several insurgent/terrorist groups are able to seize control of undergoverned zones and use them as sanctuaries where they can train, plan, and recruit in peace, the threat posed by “Chronic Insurgencies/Instability” will grow. Safe havens are a real force multiplier for insurgent groups, and their existence is often a key indicator of the probability of success of an insurgency. In the 1960s, the existence of safe havens in Laos and Cambodia helped the Viet Cong to control the tempo of the guerrilla war in South Vietnam. In more contemporary times, the creation of a government-approved safe haven for the FARC in southern Colombia in the 1990s paved the way for an upsurge in FARC activity that threw more and more of Colombia into chaos. It was only when government forces reoccupied the safe haven zone that the FARC’s fortunes on the battlefield began
to decline. Indeed, if North Waziristan were to become a long-term safe haven for al-Qaeda and its affiliates and the Taliban in Pakistan, it is virtually certain that the insurgency in Afghanistan would become harder for NATO and Afghan government forces to control.

Figure 5.5
Influence Diagram for the “Chronic Insurgencies/Instability” Trajectory
Figure 5.5 shows the relationship between poor states, failed states, safe havens, and the threat level. It also shows how the unity of terrorist organizations, possible in this trajectory, might fuel an increased threat. Additionally, the insurgencies themselves are likely to fuel local anger and unemployment, leading to an increased number of recruits.

In addition to the safe havens necessary, outside state and nonstate actors providing support in terms of funds, weapons, and recruits to at least some of the insurgent and terrorist groups could drive “Chronic Insurgencies/Instability” in the Muslim world and beyond. Although it is clear that external support is usually not the root cause of the instability and insurgencies, it most certainly exacerbates conflicts, often transforming them from minor nuisances into large, persistent conflagrations that either tie down large numbers of government soldiers or create undergoverned zones that can breed transnational terrorism. This trajectory anticipates that, based on past behavior, Iran would be a major state sponsor of the Hezbollah insurgency in southern Lebanon and the radical Shiite groups opposing Iraqi government authority in southern Iraq. Tehran could also conceivably provide covert assistance to elements of the Taliban fighting in eastern and southern Afghanistan. Although the Taliban are ideologically incompatible with Iran, Tehran might see some advantage to be gained from bleeding American and NATO forces in Afghanistan so that they have no opportunity to pose a threat to eastern Iran or to the growing Iranian political and economic interests in western Afghanistan. Instability in the tribal areas of Pakistan could well be fueled by financial contributions to rebellious tribes and al-Qaeda elements from wealthy Persian Gulf donors and charities with a Wahhabist bent.

Modern military technologies enable many insurgent groups to withstand the onslaught of government security forces better than their predecessors could. If the spread of advanced military technology to insurgent and terrorist groups accelerates, the security implications of this trajectory would become more serious for the United States in that local military and security forces may become unable to deal with the security threats without significant military intervention by the United States and its allies. New communications technologies allow insurgent and terrorist groups to operate seamlessly as networked architec-
tures made up of a large set of compartmentalized cells that are only loosely linked to the senior leadership. These architectures ensure that no single wave of arrests and subsequent interrogations can lead to the unraveling of the whole organization.

Advances in kinetic technologies have also benefited the cause of insurgent groups. New versions of hand-held rocket weapons like the RPG family and portable anti-tank missiles like the Kornet allow small cells of insurgents to pack a potent punch against the more lightly armored vehicles of a conventional army or security force. Advanced triggering mechanisms for IEDs allow these groups to hold major roads and highways at risk for long periods even against an army with sophisticated electronic countermeasures. Finally, MANPADS have become more capable over time and have also widely proliferated on international black markets. The latest generation of these systems can legitimately threaten even advanced attack helicopters as well as slow-moving transport aircraft.

By the same token, a rapid increase in collaboration between powerful outside actors, like Iran and some insurgent groups, would worsen the picture for this trajectory. An increased flow of funds and weapons and a larger pipeline for the training of insurgent and terrorist recruits in foreign training camps sponsored by outside actors could increase the potency of an insurgent group very quickly. Indeed, if the level of collaboration rises above a certain point, the “Chronic Insurgencies/Instability” trajectory could change into the “Major Muslim Nation Goes Bad” trajectory as the threat expands to the point where the regime’s survival could be in jeopardy without a large infusion of military aid from the West. The case of the Mahdi Army in Iraq is instructive here. This force evolved rapidly from a ragtag militia into a fairly disciplined paramilitary entity that exerts control over large parts of southern Iraq and can openly challenge both the Iraqi army and al-Qaeda in Iraq when it is on its home turf.
CHAPTER SIX
What Does This Mean for the Army?

Introduction

This study’s assessment of the assumptions and uncertainties associated with the future combat environment, combined with an understanding of the unique components of the long war, provides a basis for determining a set of specific strategies for the United States in the long war, and hence a greater understanding of the implications of these trajectories for the military. The potential strategies for the long war help the military to better assess the range of force sizes and structures that it may need to develop to fight it.

Our list of strategies was formulated by drawing on official sources, including the Quadrennial Defense Review, the National Security Strategy of the United States of America, the National Military Strategy for Combating Terrorism, the Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept, the SSTRO Joint Operating Concept, and the new Army COIN manual. We also drew heavily on the discussions that took place during the NLWS in December 2006. Finally, we referred to the academic area studies literature on the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and South Asia to round out our thinking on this subject. Through iterations among our team members, we winnowed down the broad list to those that covered the space of strategic options without unnecessary overlap.
Seven Strategies for the Long War

Our list includes seven strategies for the United States: Divide and Rule, Shrink the Swamp, Inside Out, State-Centric, Contain and React, Ink Blot, and Underlying Causes. It is important for the reader to remember that these are pure options; in the real world these strategies will probably not be mutually exclusive, and actual U.S. strategy for the long war will almost certainly turn out to be some kind of hybrid approach. In fact, the strategies in general are likely to change as administrations and Congresses change.

Nonetheless, descriptions of the pure strategies can be instructive for force planners. These example strategies will frame interpretations, and implications for the force, of individual uncertainties, trends, and drivers. This provides consistency through the study.

Some elements of the strategies and how they relate to the factors affecting SJ are shown in Figure 6.1. This diagram is not meant to be comprehensive, but is designed to illustrate how a strategy can draw on numerous elements to affect the system as a whole.

What follows is a short description of each of the seven strategies. After the seven descriptions, we discuss the application of those strategies to the trajectories, along with the implications of each trajectory for the U.S. armed forces.

Shrink the Swamp

*Shrink the Swamp is a strategy that tries to slowly reduce the space in the Muslim world in which SJ groups can operate.* It is an “outside-in” approach that seeks to stabilize the outer edges of the Muslim world to the point where those countries are inoculated against SJ ideology. States like Indonesia, Malaysia, and Morocco, which have long had ties to the West through trade, would be the first targets of this campaign. Once they are “inoculated,” the United States and its allies could move forward to try to stabilize the next ring of Muslim countries (Algeria, Tunisia, and Bangladesh, for example). This strategy involves many FID missions as well as some COIN work. The military burden is handled by Army Special Forces, but general purpose forces are needed to periodically help with COIN.
In contrast to Divide and Rule (described below), governance would be the primary GTI factor at work here. The inoculation process in the outer ring of Muslim countries would be dominated by efforts
to reform and streamline governing institutions down to the local grass-roots level so that they are more responsive to the basic needs of the population. Both terrorism and ideology would be secondary lines of operation here; they would be of equal importance to Shrink the Swamp. U.S. Special Forces would work with local security forces to improve their effectiveness against insurgents and terrorists. At the same time, the U.S. government would have to devote some moderate level of resources to IO to counter the messages of SJ groups working in the outer ring of the Muslim world. In Shrink the Swamp, IO efforts would probably be the most intensive in Indonesia, where the SJ ideology has found some traction.

Inside Out

*This strategy holds that the United States should use decisive conventional military force to change the regime in certain key Muslim countries and impose democracy in its place.* The theory is that the geopolitical earthquake caused by this will empower democratic forces throughout the Muslim world. Also, these bold actions will force much of the SJ warrior community to come out into the open to fight U.S. conventional forces, giving the United States a better chance of crushing them decisively. The Inside Out strategy corresponds closely to the Bush Doctrine of 2002–03, and as a result of current frustration in Iraq, may not be a strategy easily adopted for many years.

Inside Out is primarily about using military force to defeat terrorist and insurgent elements. The assumption in this strategy is that the forceful use of military power against jihadist groups will unleash political forces that will stabilize the Muslim world for the long term. This strategy might reduce some problems with governance, but would do less to address the ideological center of gravity.

State-Centric

*State-Centric aims to spread effective governance throughout the Muslim world by strengthening established regimes, giving them more resources, and making them less brittle.* The theory here is that the main driver behind the SJ surge is the existence of ungoverned spaces (like the tribal areas of Pakistan) and public administrations that cannot deliver
basic services to ordinary people. Once Muslim state structures are rebuilt, both these problems can be ameliorated and the appeal of SJ ideology will decline. This strategy would be built on foreign aid, FID, and some unconventional warfare capabilities.

As in the case of Shrink the Swamp, this strategy would be driven by governance considerations. By increasing the penetration and responsiveness of regime governance, the hope is that the appeal of SJ will decline. Counterterrorism and ideology would both be strong secondary lines of operation here. U.S. advice to local security forces would be necessary in order to contain local jihadists until governance reform could take hold. Some IO to discredit SJ in countries where it has appeal would also be conducted.

**Contain and React (Defensive)**

Contain and React is a fundamentally defensive strategy that seeks to hold the current “perimeter” in the Muslim world and only act strongly if that perimeter is breached (i.e., a major U.S. ally is threatened with collapse or overthrow). At that point, the United States would intervene massively with general purpose forces. Under this strategy, U.S. interventions in a Saudi insurgency or Pakistani coup scenario would be mandated.

Contain and React would give equal roles to all three parts of our GTI framework. Each would have to be conducted at a moderate level of intensity in order for the U.S. defensive perimeter to hold. Counterterrorist efforts would be necessary to prevent SJ groups from seeping out of ungoverned zones and into the territory of U.S. allies and partners. Ideological campaigns would likewise be required to reduce the appeal of SJ in Muslim states that face problems with youth bulges, poor delivery of basic services, and high unemployment. Finally, limited programs aimed at improving governance in the most strategically important U.S. allies in the Muslim world (for example, Egypt and Pakistan) would be useful as reinforcement for the IO efforts.

**Ink Blot (Seize, Clear, and Hold)**

Ink Blot is a global COIN strategy that aims to seize, clear, and hold strategically important areas throughout the Muslim world by working actively with local security forces. Most of the U.S. commitment would likely be
conducted with SOF, but the involvement of some general purpose forces in some areas would be almost inevitable. Compared to State-Centric, the Ink Blot strategy would be more reactive and aggressive and focus initially on direct U.S. action and secondarily on preparing the host nation for action. As distinct from Inside Out, however, this strategy would likely find U.S. actions supported by the host nation, and thus any larger attempt for regime change or strategic realignment within the host nation would not occur. The Ink Blot might hold in cases where immediate action, supported by the host nation, is allowable.

Ink Blot would be driven mainly by the counterterrorism line of operation. The emphasis is on using American SOF to guide regional pacification operations. The governance and ideological lines of operation would be fairly minor for the United States, as they would be carried out mainly by the local regimes.

Under this strategy, the United States would work with key allies like Algeria, Egypt, and Yemen to remove all SJ elements from certain areas through a classic COIN approach that concludes with infrastructure restoration and the formation of local self-defense militias. The hope here would be that over time, the SJ groups would be relegated to the geographic margins of the Muslim world and would be cut off from one another.

Ink Blot differs from Contain and React in its scope and tenor of operations. The size of the operations in Ink Blot would tend to be smaller in scale based on a proactive and forward-leaning policy of working with local forces before escalation to full-blown destabilization.

**Underlying Causes**

*The Underlying Causes approach holds that the United States needs to attack the broad underlying socioeconomic problems of the Muslim world on a regional rather than country-specific basis.* The United States would work steadily to deal with the demographic, resource scarcity, labor market, and public health problems that create poor living conditions and social frustration in the Middle East, South Asia, and North Africa. Over time, better basic socioeconomic conditions reduce the appeal of radical SJ ideas and create support for free market openness.
This is the most indirect strategy of our seven and would entail a very small role for the U.S. military. This indirect strategy would also entail a close look at U.S. policies in the region, especially in regard to Israel-Palestine and Iran, and necessitate confronting those policies in conflict with broader systemic problems.

In the ideal case, governance considerations would be paramount here, while counterterrorism and ideological operations would be minor parts of the strategy. Governance would have to be defined very broadly here, as it would include a broad spectrum of actions across the labor, public health, transportation, education, and civil society sectors of the countries in the Middle East and South Asia. One of the salient features of this strategy is that it would probably require extensive cooperation between the U.S. government and local/international nongovernmental organizations and private volunteer organizations. If SJ violence were to surge before the governance initiatives began to have an effect, the counterterrorist line of operation could become the primary focus in this strategy for a short period of time. Once order was restored, the governance line of operation would resume its leading position in Underlying Causes.

**Divide and Rule**

*Divide and Rule is a strategy that focuses on exploiting fault lines between the various SJ groups to turn them against each other and dissipate their energy on internal conflicts.* For example, the United States could conceivably exploit the tensions that exist between local SJ groups that wish to concentrate on overthrowing their national government and al-Qaeda, which aims to fight a transnational jihad. In such a strategy as Divide and Rule, the inevitable choosing of sides may inadvertently empower future adversaries in the pursuit of immediate gains.

This strategy would rely heavily on covert action, IO, unconventional warfare, and support to indigenous security forces to achieve its goals. U.S. SOF would be critical in this strategy, and the role of U.S. general purpose forces would be quite limited.¹

¹ A specific example of the type of fissures contained in this strategy comes from the case of HAMAS. The decision by HAMAS to pursue political power in democratic elections led
If we place Divide and Rule in the context of the project’s broader GTI framework, we find that this strategy is dominated by the ideological component because it focuses on fault lines and contradictions in SJ ideology to turn the various jihadist groups against one another. In order to execute this strategy, U.S. policymakers and intelligence analysts would need to develop a keen understanding of the nuances of SJ ideology as well as its historical evolution.

This strategy would also entail some focus on kinetic action against the most virulent SJ groups and leaders. A Divide and Rule strategy discounts the role of governance, since the focus is on creating dissension among jihadists and not on building more effective governing patterns in the Muslim world.

Responses to and Implications of the Trajectories

The strategies for the long war will drive how the United States responds to the trajectories. However, as discussed above, the strategies presented are pure strategies, and there has been some necessary mixing and matching when discussing the trajectories. To that end, Table 6.1 summarizes the ways in which different long war strategies might be considered in relation to the various trajectories. Alternative strategies to strong negative reactions from transnational ideologues, such as al-Qaeda’s Ayman al-Zawahiri (see Ulph, 2006) and Kuwaiti SJ cleric Hamid al-‘Ali. These ideologues stated that HAMAS had succumbed to parochial interests and would find democracy incompatible with its aims. Moreover, there was recognition that HAMAS’s acceptance of the electoral system posed a threat to the SJ transnational project; popular participation would focus HAMAS’s efforts on the real exigencies of the Palestinian population rather than the overarching goal of a caliphate. Such divisions in the movement show how local concerns can trump ideology and how these splits and fissures can be useful in U.S. efforts to isolate, contain, or combat these groups.

2 For example, in the case of “Major Muslim Nation Goes Bad,” it is unlikely that the U.S. government would choose a pure strategy to respond to this trajectory. Instead, past history suggests that a mixed solution involving elements of both State-Centric and Contain and React would be used. The exact composition of the strategy mix would depend on the domestic U.S. political environment at the time, the nature of U.S. security commitments in other parts of the world, and the number and type of coalition partners the United States would be able to assemble to help deal with the crisis.
Table 6.1
Existence of the Seven Long War Strategies (Across the Top) in the Eight Trajectories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trajectories</th>
<th>Divide and Rule</th>
<th>Shrink the Swamp</th>
<th>Inside Out</th>
<th>State-Centric</th>
<th>Contain and React</th>
<th>Ink Blot</th>
<th>Underlying Causes</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Steady State</td>
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<td>Major Muslim Nation Goes Bad</td>
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<td>Narrowing of Threat</td>
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<td>Holding Action</td>
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<td>Sustained Sunni-Shia Conflict</td>
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<td>Chronic Insurgencies/Instability</td>
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NOTE: XX = most likely; X = less likely though plausible; blank = not analyzed or not appropriate.

are possible, and any additional association of specific strategies above to the particular trajectories is left as additional work. In some of the trajectories described, notably “Steady State,” “War of Ideas,” and “Narrowing of Threat,” the choice of U.S. strategy drives the way that trajectory unfolds. In the others, the trajectories largely unfold as a response to some external shock or environmental change. Nonetheless, associating U.S. strategies with the trajectories provides structure to the plausible actions the United States might take.

The strategies as applied to each trajectory are described below. For each trajectory, the implications for U.S. forces are described in terms of what potential challenges or future capability seams might exist resulting from the application of the strategies. For the implications, care has been given to not recommending a particular strategy as being best for the military to adopt, and thus implications narrowly defined for that strategy being applied to that trajectory. The adjudication of best strategies is left to further analysis. Nonetheless, we highlight one to three strategies that would seem amenable to being applied in each trajectory and base any implications to the force on a mixture
of those strategies. Thus, the implications are across potential responses and not narrowly attached to a specific strategy.

**Narrowing of Threat**

*Divide and Rule* would be the obvious strategy choice for the “Narrowing of Threat” trajectory. As various nationalist jihadist groups turned against al-Qaeda and its affiliates, the United States and its local allies could use the nationalist jihadists to launch proxy IO campaigns to discredit the transnational jihadists in the eyes of the local populace. In some instances, the United States and the host nation could even help the nationalist jihadists execute a military campaign to stamp out al-Qaeda elements that are present locally. In the framework of participants developed in Chapter Three, this would entail splitting Category 1 off from Categories 2 and 3, thus allowing more targeted action against the global jihadists bolstered by various local groups. As mentioned earlier, while choosing sides with some of the Category 2 and 3 groups may provide short-term successes, their success could create longer-term issues.

*Shrink the Swamp* would likely be germane here. After isolating the transnational jihadists from the rest of the jihadist movement, the United States could work to eradicate the transnational jihadist presence from the outer rings of the Muslim world, i.e., Indonesia, Malaysia, Morocco, by working intensively with local security forces to eliminate the funding, educational, and recruitment mechanisms that support al-Qaeda and its affiliates in those countries.

*Contain and React* is also an option for this trajectory. The United States could deploy ISR perimeters around areas where there are concentrations of transnational jihadists and periodically launch air/missile strikes against high-value targets. Host nation security forces would have more freedom to help in this mission, since they would no longer have to be concerned about national jihadist forces. If the transnational jihadists were ever to attempt to expand their area of sanctuary, the United States could respond with additional increments of long-range, standoff firepower and SOF.

**Implications.** Perhaps the best case for the United States, this trajectory sees the nationalist jihadists fighting the internationally focused
ones. Even in this case, because of the nature of the nationalist terrorist groups, *any assistance would be mainly covert and would imply advanced IO capabilities* so that it could aid other government agencies and host nations in the effort to promote cleavages within the jihadist movement. Much of this work would not necessarily be done by the Army.

However, a narrowing of the threat could also allow the U.S. forces to focus their efforts more broadly on counterinsurgency campaigns currently being bolstered by transnational terrorists—something that is perhaps currently out of the scope of U.S. operations. *In these cases, the military could see an expanded role for COIN to target the more subtle places those groups are providing aid.*

**Steady State**

A combination of *Inside Out* and *State-Centric* (discussed below) is what the United States is pursuing today, and this approach would be applicable to the “Steady State” trajectory. The Inside Out strategy is included here because of the continuing focus on building democracy at some level in the middle of the Muslim world in Afghanistan and Iraq. Although the notion that the birth of democracy in those two countries would cause it to spread throughout the entire Middle East has long since been discredited, one can still argue that the existence of two democratic states in the middle of the Muslim world would create two likely security partners and potential allies for the United States over the long term.

The State-Centric strategy would apply for the United States in the rest of the Muslim world, i.e., bolstering existing regimes against insurgencies, terrorism, and social instability while nudging them toward making improvements in the provision of basic services to the population.

**Implications.** As the name suggests, the “Steady State” trajectory is quite similar to the current situation. *In this case, the role of the Army will be dominated by any continuing commitment to Afghanistan and Iraq.* Other efforts would be similar to before the long war, with the exception that preparation could be performed for the various other trajectories that might occur, some of which are described in this report.
In this trajectory, the United States continues to withdraw troops from Europe and traditional Cold War bases and, at some rate, withdraws from Iraq and Afghanistan. *The Army is unlikely to be stretched in this scenario, unless the Afghanistan and/or Iraq deployments continue to be large.* The Army would probably use this time to recover and reset from the Iraq war, possibly a difficult and time-consuming feat. The Army might also use this time to refocus its efforts to fighting the next war.

The United States might choose to engage in more peacekeeping and enforcement roles to prevent the growth of Salafi-jihadism in various areas and suppress other terrorist groups. *These would require some different skill sets for the Army compared to those of major combat operations, and some specialized equipment might also be useful (nonlethal weapons, for example).*

At a higher level, the United States could support various governments around the world in an attempt to reduce the number of insurgencies and instability in particular countries. *Such operations could involve larger numbers of troops, but not nearly as many as in Iraq.*

In both of the above, there may be an emphasis on tactical actions against SJ groups in complex terrain as opposed to conventional warfare. The continued use of Army SOF for global operations against al-Qaeda and its affiliates could compel an increase in SOF force structure over and above the expansions that are programmed for today. *In this trajectory, the high priority afforded to direct action against al-Qaeda and its affiliates could imply that special mission units (SMUs) would require larger proportional increases in size than the SOF force.*

**Sustained Sunni-Shia Conflict**

In this trajectory, an *Inside Out* strategy would seek to attack one of the roots of the problem. The “Sustained Sunni-Shia Conflict” has multiple triggers, one of which is the inclusion of large amounts of Iranian support in the Gulf region. Under this strategy, the United States might take an aggressive stance by seeking to overthrow the Iranian regime and replacing it with a moderate one that does not rely on Shiite chauvinism for its legitimacy. This would tamp down the forces of radical
Shiism in the Middle East and Persian Gulf, but the costs and risk of this strategy would be huge.

The more likely strategy for the “Sustained Sunni-Shia Conflict” would be State-Centric, where the United States would work to build the institutional capacities of at-risk Muslim states so that their security forces could contain sectarian violence effectively.

Divide and Rule is also a possible strategy the United States could adopt for this trajectory. Here U.S. leaders could choose to capitalize on the Shia-Sunni conflict by taking the side of the conservative Sunni regimes in a decisive fashion and working with them against all Shiite empowerment movements in the Muslim world. This would allow the United States to split the jihadist movement between Shiites and Sunnis and to gain political capital with orthodox Sunni clerics, politicians, and scholars. The risks to this strategy are that it might spread sectarian conflict instead of containing it. It could also put the United States on a collision course with Iran that could culminate in a full-scale war or ultimately backfire when empowered Sunni regimes turn against the United States.

Implications. If the United States attempts to exploit the conflict to avoid having to confront a united Islamic world (possibly a very unwise strategy), then there will be little role for the Army. The exception to this would be the FID missions to train host nation security forces with the possible insertion of advisers, but this might be handled by other agencies. Any U.S. involvement in the region during times of sectarian violence would challenge IO capabilities to aid in discrediting arguments and propaganda of radical elements on either side without exacerbating divides from a U.S. presence.

The United States may also seek to end the conflict through peacekeeping operations. Here there would be a substantial role for the Army, as the size of the area of operations would be large, as would the number of potential combatants within it. Such a huge peacekeeping operation may be beyond the scope of the current Army and span geographic

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3 It bears reminding that the strategies and trajectories are not orthogonal and the “Divide and Rule” strategy in this case presupposes an existing divide among the Sunni and Shia that the U.S. exploits.
boundaries much wider than previously encountered. The tasks that the Army would need to perform would also be different from major combat operations and the counterinsurgency operations in Iraq from which many would have experience. Increased training for peacekeeping operations and nonlethal weapons would both be useful in such an operation. However, the sheer scope of this task, and the difficulty in achieving it, might suggest that such a strategy is unlikely to be chosen.

A third option would be to take sides in the conflict, possibly supporting authoritative Sunni governments against a continuingly hostile Iran. The level of U.S. involvement would dictate the type of operations requirement by the Army. At a lower level, the United States might provide air cover and air strikes. These would not be the role of the Army in the first instance. At a higher level, the U.S. Army might provide lift, logistical support, and other types of aid that the Army is capable of providing (implying it would not provide capabilities it had to develop). At the highest level, the Army would be involved directly in the conflict, which may look partly like an insurgency and partly like conventional war. At this level, the Army would call upon rapid precision strike systems, and it would have to balance aggressive operations with an IO campaign against the extremist rhetoric so as not to exacerbate tensions.

**Major Muslim Nation Goes Bad**

State-Centric is a defensive and lower-profile approach that would try to ameliorate the threat by building up the capacity of neighboring states to resist any covert or overt aggression by the newly radicalized state. Large-unit U.S. military forces are not required in this approach; instead, small teams of American trainers and advisers would work to build up host nation security forces in adjacent states, while personnel from non-DoD agencies like AID, DOJ, the FBI, and Treasury would work to bolster the nonmilitary institutions in the adjacent states.

An alternative strategy of Contain and React would seek to position U.S. military forces in neighboring states to deter the newly radicalized state from threatening its neighbors. This strategy would demand that the United States aggressively patrol the borders of the radical state to make sure that WMD and WMD materials are not transported
out of that state to other bad actors; this border interdiction mission would also involve efforts to prevent the radical state from sending weapons and recruits to SJ insurgents/terrorists in neighboring countries. Depending on the particular situation on the ground, Contain and React might also include operations by U.S. and allied SOF aimed at removing or neutralizing stockpiles of WMD in the radical state.

An Inside Out strategy that would put the United States in a position of opening a full-scale MCO with the realigned state is not supported for multiple reasons. For one, the scope of any full-scale invasion and occupation of the Muslim states that top the list is large by both population and geographic standards. Ongoing operations, whether continuing deployments in Iraq or elsewhere, may not leave sufficient forces to undertake such an operation. Also, the realignment may not pose an imminent danger that could rally support sufficiently from domestic and international sources. For these reasons, the MCO-style invasion is not considered a likely response.4

Implications. If the United States decided on a strategy of containment, then significant efforts to control the spread of influence of that state would be required. ISR, on both air and ground platforms, and HUMINT assets would be required to detect and monitor the flow of weapons/WMD components and people across the border of the “bad nation.” Given the recent experience on the Iraq/Syria and Iraq/Iran borders, such a strategy might prove extremely difficult. Since it is unlikely that the United States would commit to long-term border patrols, these ultimately would need to be handled by the forces of the neighboring states. These forces may subsequently require training, equipment, and supervision to mount effective operations. These indigenous border guards might be from the military or the police force of the neighboring country, each bringing its own challenges. Either way, the training role, as well as ongoing monitoring of effectiveness, could fall to the U.S. Army. Much of the intelligence effort might be appropriately handled by agencies other than the Army.

4 Any support to indigenous forces in opposition to the new government would be considered under a State-Centric strategy.
At least three proactive strategy components can be envisioned. First, the United States could proactively strike the WMD facilities to prevent them from falling into the hands of the incoming government. Such an effort would require strike capabilities, possibly at short notice, and might be a component of the *Contain and React* strategy that aggressively addresses immediate concerns. The location of the WMD facilities would be identified beforehand so as to reduce time pressures at execution. Both the ISR and striking of these targets would probably be done from the air and not involve the Army heavily. Some targets, however, are likely to require some degree of SOF operations, which may involve the Army. It is also possible that there might be a seize-and-hold operation at some sites while material is collected or destroyed. The fallout, in terms of stabilizing and resecuring any area after strikes or seizure, could be substantial.

Another possible response is that the United States would become directly involved in trying to conduct a countercoup. This might be through covert support to an insurgent group through unconventional warfare methods. More overt support might involve using Army units to train the friendly forces or even having Army advisers in country. This approach would require the United States to choose sides.

Lastly, a more direct confrontation between U.S. forces and the new governments could also occur. This type of operation might be seen as similar to the “regime change” operation in Iraq. Lessons from this operation are well known and will not be repeated here. It should be noted, however, that larger states would tend to require more effort than smaller states.

A radicalized state without WMD/E capabilities could require a less immediate response from the United States. *A Contain and React strategy that seeks to prevent a newly radical Muslim nation from invading one of its neighbors might involve the stationing of a couple of U.S. Army brigades in neighboring or regional countries as a deterrence to aggressive moves*. The acceptance of brigade-sized forces in many of the countries in the region would be tentative.

Whether or not the country has WMD/E capabilities, a takeover of a major state by an SJ group would constitute a major public relations coup for this ideology. *The Army may expect to be involved in sig-
significant IO operations in neighboring states to help contain the fallout and reduce the influence of SJ propaganda flowing from this state.

**Expanding Scope**

*State-Centric* would be the more conservative option for this trajectory, as it would seek to build up the institutions of those states that are threatened by the non-SJ groups. A State-Centric approach against Hezbollah would, for example, focus on strengthening the institutions of the democratically elected Lebanese government as well as those of other Shia majority countries like Bahrain and Azerbaijan. FID missions would be mounted to all these countries to improve their security forces.

*Contain and React* could be used to try to fence off groups like Hezbollah and the FARC in finite swaths of territory with stepped-up border enforcement as well as periodic strikes and raids. If these groups were to try to breach this American perimeter, the United States would respond with significant conventional forces.

**Implications.** The requirements and strategic options in this case are most similar to “Steady State.” *It is likely, assuming that commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan have been reduced, that the U.S. Army would not be stretched by the addition of another long war enemy.* If there is still a significant deployment in Iraq and/or Afghanistan, opening up a war on an additional front may stretch the Army in terms of personnel. However, given the expected reduction of troops in Iraq over the coming years, this situation should not arise.

If in the midst of conducting peacekeeping and insurgency control operations, U.S. forces may need to scale back those operations to address any new threat; however, this shouldn’t pose an immediate strategic threat. *One of the more significant capability needs would be for HUMINT capabilities capable of penetrating the new non-SJ targets. These capabilities are more likely to be developed in conjunction with the intelligence community rather than solely in the Army.*

Also, in view of the fact that both Hezbollah and the FARC have used rockets and mortars innovatively in their operations, *it would be useful for the Army to accelerate its research on CRAM (counter-rocket, artillery, mortar) technologies if it were to get involved in a confrontation*
with these groups, or others positioned to acquire these capabilities. Other asymmetric technological hurdles would need to be addressed, including the IED problem.

**Holding Action**

The “Holding Action” trajectory posits a migration away from the current SJ threat due largely from overwhelming concern for other national security missions. These include state-on-state conflict that draws U.S. attention, sudden increases in state WMD acquisition and testing, or alliances being built to counter status quo. At the same time, the expectation for diverting attention to these matters assumes that many events directly related to the long war do not come to pass.\(^5\) That is, no new sophisticated weaponry or WMD technologies have been acquired by al-Qaeda and its affiliates, the ideology has not gained widespread international support on any level, and the effects of any nonstate actions do not challenge state control. In this trajectory, with regard to the challenges surrounding the long war, the United States might adopt a longer-term and less aggressive stance in the Middle East.

If the United States wishes to be extremely cautious regarding its use of proactive and forward-leaning operations in the Muslim world while its focus is elsewhere, it could use *Underlying Causes*. Underlying Causes would minimize the military part of DIME\(^6\) and engage non-DoD government agencies to work on addressing the underlying social and economic problems causing instability in the Muslim world. USAID, the State Department, the Peace Corps, the Department of Agriculture, and DOJ would become the focus of the new U.S. strategy. Underlying Causes would be a viable option if the jihadist threat in the Muslim world was at a manageable level at the time when the new geopolitical crisis erupted.

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\(^5\) The inclusion of a growing, international SJ threat as well as state conflicts as described would probably be the worst case of all, perhaps motivating national resources in line with past world security efforts. This future, which would combine “Expanding Scope” with some of the tenets of “Holding Action,” is left to additional analysis.

\(^6\) Diplomatic, information, military, and economic.
On the other hand, *State-Centric* would require only that the United States provide basic FID support to friendly Muslim governments that are battling SJ insurgents and terrorists. Even if the U.S. special operations force was heavily engaged in the new crisis, the United States could still undertake a limited form of the State-Centric strategy by drawing on allied special forces to pick up some of the FID mission. British, French, and German SOF, for example, could pick up some of the slack; in the case of a geopolitical crisis that drew other states into the fold, the likelihood increases that other forces would be needed.

*Divide and Rule* at the strategic level would be an inexpensive way of buying time for the United States and its allies until the United States can return its attention fully to the long war. In order to compensate for the diversion of resources to the new geopolitical crises unfolding elsewhere in the world, the United States could choose to use diplomacy and economic incentives to attempt to create divisions in the jihadist camp. Today in Iraq such a strategy is being used at the tactical level, as the United States now forms temporary alliances with nationalist insurgent groups that it has been fighting for four years by exploiting the common threat that al-Qaeda now poses to both parties and providing carrots in the form of weapons and cash. In the past, these nationalists have cooperated with al-Qaeda against U.S. forces. The Divide and Rule strategy may not provide quick results, but could provide enough room for U.S. forces to reduce their effort in one region to focus on another.

**Implications.** In this trajectory, the United States faces a conventional foe, or other threat, that forces it to reduce its focus on the long war. The implications for the Army of this other threat are not discussed here.

*In such a situation the Army might revert to a training and advisory role in countries where it might prefer to have an active presence.* It might even turn exclusively to the “train the trainer” model, which would require even fewer resources.

It is unlikely that in the face of this new threat the United States will continue to have “boots on the ground” where they are not desperately needed, but *if ground troops do remain fighting the long war,*
then they will have to make do with fewer resources and less equipment. In such cases, troops may have to be adaptable and rely on local forces for many functions usually provided by the United States, such as possibly logistical support and even ISR support in the case where high-value, low-density ISR assets are being used elsewhere.

Additionally, there might be an increased need to operate with allies who might be required to aid in picking up the slack in FID and counterterrorism missions as the United States addresses the emergent threat. These alliances might be based on the larger conflict and not the long war itself and would probably include a mix of traditional and non-traditional allies. It might be that in the face of a severe threat, the United States may not lead the coalition in some of the smaller theaters and would instead be under the command of another state. Such an arrangement would require new command and control arrangements to be developed and implemented, especially in the case where SOF forces are integrated into allied units.

The implications for the Air Force and Navy might be different, as they are able to more quickly move forces from one theater to another. Depending on the nature of the conventional conflict, this trajectory could be extremely stressful on the Army, but it would not be the long war causing this stress.

**Chronic Insurgencies/Instability**

*State-Centric* would be useful in those countries that have stabilized their domestic security situation to the point where the insurgents are not gaining territory or influence. The United States would simply work to build up the state’s security and political institutions to a level where the government could go on the strategic offensive against the insurgents.

In this trajectory, *Ink Blot* would be reserved for those insurgencies and areas of instability around the globe where the insurgents are gaining ground and influence; here the United States would provide wide-area support mechanisms to host nations so as to facilitate aggressive pacification campaigns. American advisers would actively guide host nations on a clear, hold, and build strategy that would work to eject the insurgents from certain key areas, weed out their civilian sup-
porters, and provide enough infrastructure assistance to win the hearts and minds of the civilian populace.

Implications. In this trajectory, the United States finds itself with the option of intervening in a large number of insurgencies worldwide. If it chooses very limited intervention, it risks the creation of states that are more unfriendly to the United States and its interests and may increase the possibility of the “Major Muslim Nation Goes Bad” trajectory.

If the United States chooses to get involved in a large number of the insurgencies, then the Army could find itself stretched in terms of numbers of specialty capabilities such as SF, CA, PSYOP, Intelligence, Engineers, Military Police, Logistics, Medical, Signal, and Aviation. As the numbers grow, the insurgency may require the Army to take additional risk in core mission essential tasks (from full spectrum operations) to focus more exclusively on the directed mission essential tasks (COIN mission). In such a situation, the Army may consider a significant restructuring to focus its forces on fighting insurgencies rather than major combat operations.

We do not attempt to calculate the point at which this transition might occur. In fact, there is likely to be a smooth transition from one priority to another such that the Army works across multiple mission sets. This is consistent with the concept of “full spectrum” operations, and a future such as this would require the breadth and agility envisioned.

Missions expected in fighting insurgencies and other irregular warfare are different from those expected for conventional warfare and would cause the Army to refocus some of its training and equipping.

The United States would also need a capability to rebuild the state’s infrastructure that was damaged during the conflict. This role has traditionally been assigned to agencies other than the Army, but is often fulfilled by the Army. Given the failure of the other agencies to be able to operate effectively in Iraq, this role might move within the Department of Defense, especially for high-threat environments. This would be a new role for the Army, albeit one that it has been asked to fill in the past. Nation building on this scale could require vastly new capabilities and training.
War of Ideas

*Contain and React* would be the preferred choice for the “War of Ideas” trajectory because the ideational campaign would be an ideal, low-cost, low-visibility tool for containing al-Qaeda and SJ ideologues. Containment here would be more in the informational realm than in the physical space where military operations are normally conducted. However, should al-Qaeda break through the information containment ring, the United States could quickly use traditional kinetic power to resume direct action against al-Qaeda’s senior leadership and their key training and assembly areas in the Muslim world.

*State-Centric* would be a secondary option for this trajectory (after *Contain and React*). It would seek to leverage the ideational campaign to bolster the credibility and appeal of existing regimes in the Muslim world as opposed to focusing on the ideational offensive against al-Qaeda and its affiliates. State-Centric would seek to accelerate development projects throughout the Middle East and South Asia while also working to build the foundation for democratic civil societies in key countries like Jordan, Egypt, and Pakistan.

**Implications.** There would be two implications for the Army here. *First, the Army would need to improve all facets of its IO capabilities—including target audience analysis, message creation, and message delivery. The Army would also need to learn how to synchronize strategic and tactical IO lines of operation,* although much of the strategic IO required would not be handled by the Army.

*Second, in order to make tangible progress in the “War of Ideas,” the Army would need to do its best to reduce collateral damage during kinetic operations* that target al-Qaeda and its affiliates. This implies a need for better systems for all-source intelligence fusion as well as weaponry to support the discriminatory nature of the IO campaigns and reduce unwanted collateral damage.
shown in Table 7.1 are the breakdowns of the various trajectories as
they have been interpreted in the study. These “ratings” are open for
further debate, and are generated from the interpretations detailed in
the previous chapter.

Based on the implications from specific trajectories, broad obser-
vations about the effect the long war will have on the U.S. military
can be generated. This chapter lists some broad observations about this
overall exercise.

Broad Observations

As Appropriate, the Military Should Define and Set Appropriate
Goals for Any Engagements Associated with the Long War in Terms
of the Confluence of Governance, Terrorism, and Ideology

Rhetorical use of the term “long war” aside, the basic tenets of the GTI
construct provide one means of ensuring a more systemwide view of
any engagements in the Muslim world. Defining future engagements
too narrowly may not provide the effects desired and may only exacer-
bate situations. For instance, in the case of the “Chronic Insurgencies”
trajectory, viewing the problem as solely a peacekeeping mission may
not directly address the governance issues underlying the insurgencies.
Likewise, not tailoring responses to the variegated motivations behind
individual groups and their respective ideologies may create short-term
local effects that do not address the longer-term and chronic unrest.
### Table 7.1
How Certain Operations Might Manifest Themselves in the Individual Trajectories

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<th>Steady State</th>
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<th>War of Ideas</th>
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**NOTES:** These are for illustrative purposes, and are based on discussions contained in this report.

In each cell, “Main” = focus of operations; “Some” = some operations; “Rare” = rare or no operations of that type.

IW = irregular warfare; MCO = major combat operation; FID = foreign internal defense; IO = information operations; CT = counterterrorism; COIN = counterinsurgency; UW = unconventional warfare; SSTRO = stability, support, transition, and reconstruction operations; PME = peacetime military engagement; LI = limited interdiction.
Articulating the overall objectives from a systems point of view will help to better construct individual military missions and gain understanding of the impacts of those missions across GTI.

**The Army Should Plan and Prepare to Be Involved with Aspects from Across the GTI Construct**

The fight against international terrorism implies some U.S. military action; however, the key role tends to fall upon Special Forces or agencies other than the U.S. Army. In any case, an overall strategy should be well established that deals with the near-term tactical problems of SJ without forgetting the more nascent and growing terror networks and influences. Acquisition of WMD is a pivotal unknown in dealing with terrorist capabilities, and thus counter-WMD activities remain paramount.

The U.S. forces role in governance is clearer. Typically, any large-scale efforts associated with post-conflict situations will be the military’s responsibility. Reactive operations associated with restoration and improvement through SSTRO activities with a host nation are done with ground forces through civil affairs and other specialties. When considering the implications of nation building, SSTRO, and post-conflict border security, key issues concern the needed specialization for such activities and the overall capacity required.

The U.S. Army in particular is implicated in such activities because of its size and experience in such operations. Some of these activities, especially the reconstruction of civilian governance infrastructure, are not usually thought to require an Army role. However, the lack of large-scale, deployable units from other government agencies may mean that this role is performed by the U.S. Department of Defense and at least in part by the Army. For instance, the Iraq Study Group Report (Baker and Hamilton et al., 2006) calls for the U.S. Department of Justice to manage the reconstruction of the courts and legal system in Iraq. However, if the DOJ is incapable of performing such tasks in areas lacking security, this role will be left to the military.

Another immediate step is to determine the role of the U.S. forces in ideologically generated struggles, taking into consideration which specific ideologies are in play and the effects their actions will have on
those ideologies. This will incur scoping of potential changes to the force to better reflect the effects of ideology across the entire DOTMLPF.

**The Army Should Consider Mission Sets That Allow for a More Proactive Effect Across the GTI Construct**

A potentially more significant implication of the long war concerns proactive operations to shape countries before they become significant security problems. Being able to address issues across GTI before conflict or immediate need for direct involvement is a pivotal capability in ensuring that the long war does not escalate.

Trajectories explored during this study—for example, “Major Muslim Nation Goes Bad” and “Expanding Scope”—escalate current conflicts to broader groups of actors. In the former case, the proliferation of an ideology garners enough support to bring down an established regime. The proactive forces here are the establishment clergy who counterweigh the radicalized ideologies. To date, U.S. involvement with these groups has been limited, and it may be difficult for the Army to develop and exercise appropriate mission sets and relationships to engage faltering states proactively. Similarly, “Expanding Scope” implies escalation of nonstate actor capabilities that increase risk to U.S. national security. The proactive mission here includes the development of policing and internal security capabilities within a number of states.

These types of novel mission areas would allow the military to proactively get ahead of the problems and reduce the need to be reactive. Typically, these operations are largely contained under “Peacetime Military Engagement” operations, which entail military-to-military engagements, education and training programs, advisory roles, border enforcement, and long-term intelligence support. However, these should be considered more broadly in relation to the long war description in this report and understood in terms of how they interact with the governance, terrorism and ideology construct.¹ These programs would be

¹ One case for this expanding mission set includes the effects of early actions in Operation Unified Assistance (tsunami relief in the Indian Ocean). The swift military assistance program, while nominally included under “humanitarian assistance,” engendered sudden support for the United States in that part of the world, changing Indonesian public opinion the...
conducted as part of an interagency approach to the situation, and may be very far removed from any warfighting.

Thus, there is a need to determine what enhanced access to peacetime military engagement might be in the Muslim world. Specifically, it will be necessary to detail what PME is, how it is different from previous efforts (if at all), and how best to build the longer-term relationships fostering capability building vice historically exercise-driven relationships.\(^2\)

**The Enduring Missions of the Force Combined with the Evolving Responses to the Long War Imply an Agile and Flexible Military**

As described in this study, the focus of the long war could expand to include a broader focus on non-state actors (“Expanding Scope”), narrow to emphasize simpler or more-specific threats (“Narrowing of Scope”), or be overcome entirely by conventional threats (“Holding Action”). Any actions taken to change the force based on the long war should weigh the effects they will have on longer-term planning horizons, and the enduring missions of the force. In these terms, maintaining flexibility in the force is critically important, both in order to prepare for the various ways in which the long war might evolve and so the Army will remain prepared for other contingencies while it wages the long war. Flexibility is more important in the case of the long war than in the conventional arena since the long war enemy is able to adapt much more quickly than potential conventional foes.

**The Military Should Consider the Vulnerability of the Assumption That Major Combat Operations Will Be Their Most Pressing Issue in the Medium and Longer Term**

The assumption that MCO would remain the primary mission in the timeframes considered in the report may not continue to hold beyond

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2 See Donnelly (2007) for further discussion.
those timeframes. If this assumption were to change in the future, then resources spent on MCO capabilities could be redirected toward those better suited for fighting the long war, however it has evolved. If the assumption about the predominance of conventional conflict changes, then the Army, and the rest of the Department of Defense, would need to restructure in order to fight the long war in the most optimal fashion.

Similarly, in the future the Army may be relieved of MCO requirements by the other services and those resources redeployed to focus on COIN and SSTRO. Some of the trajectories explored in this study, namely “Expanding Scope” and “Chronic Insurgencies,” might imply considerable size and capabilities from the Army that could be strengthened with a focus on those missions instead of conventional conflicts.

The Military, and More Specifically the Army, Should Plan for Potential Involvement in Medium- to Large-Scale Stability Operations and Nation Building

Depending on the chosen strategy, medium- to large-scale stability operations and nation building are possibly part of the long war. Many of the trajectories require the Army to use substantial counter-insurgency operations and/or nation-building capabilities. Counter-insurgency operations are increasingly being seen as an Army role, whereas nation building has predominantly been the domain of other agencies. In the wake of Iraq, however, it is clear these other agencies lack the capability to conduct these operations, especially in an insecure environment. It may be necessary for the Army to take on these roles if other solutions cannot be found. Thus, the military needs to understand the tradeoffs and risks involved with any assumptions about its capacity to perform such duties as the long war unfolds.

Thus, there is a need to determine whether medium- and large-scale stability operations, post-conflict reconstruction, and nation-building operations are what the military will plan and prepare for, and what the implications are to the force. This will rely on the development of an interagency approach that specifies the Department of Defense’s, and hence the Army’s, role in these operations. The Army’s
role will need to be determined both in ideal and worst-case security situations. New roles for the general purpose forces in non-combat-related governance and peacetime military engagement are possible and should be explored and understood in terms of the GTI framework presented in this report.

**The Army Should Continue to Identify and Adopt Niche Capabilities to Prosecute the Long War**

A more detailed examination of the trajectories described in this monograph will undoubtedly uncover capabilities necessary for successful operations. Examples of niche capabilities across the trajectories described in this monograph and evident in small-scale, low-intensity operations that the U.S. military might consider increasing include specific high-value, low-density capabilities such as various ISR platforms; soldier skills for diplomacy; theater and longer-term specific knowledge of areas and cultures; language skills; UW and CT capabilities; tactical to strategic IO integration and development; and FID advisers. More detailed scenario planning would be useful to determine the biggest operational needs and potentially missing capabilities. In any case, the trajectories seen here indicate a reliance on many special skill sets, and developing, integrating, and balancing those capabilities within the larger bevy of military capabilities will remain a challenge.
APPENDIX A

Short Descriptions of Ideology, Governance, and Terrorism

Ideology

An ideology is a framework of ideas that describes a view of reality and a set of social and political actions that should be undertaken to change and improve the situation of a particular group. In the American political system, conservative and liberal ideologies vie for power through a democratic system of elections; the group that wins these elections can then apply the policies dictated by its understanding of reality and its particular sociopolitical program. Other ideologies encourage violence against different parties or groups; these are the ideologies with which this study is concerned.

Ideologies are also changeable and evolving. For instance, Leninism and Stalinism built upon and added to Marxism. Both early leaders of the Soviet Union developed and implemented Marxist ideals in different ways to create and shape the communist state. It is not always clear how and when a framework of ideas will change and develop, as well as which ideologies will be most prevalent and decisive over a given time.

Still, ideology appears to be a central component of the long war. In fact, it may define the long war on some level by making it long; whereas a physical target can be destroyed, a way of conceiving of the world is much harder to eradicate or disprove. In addition, the ideologies in question can include very strong motivators for action, as noted in this comment about Lebanese militant groups:
Hezbollah leaders and Lebanese village militias proved far more committed to the fight than the Arab armies of 1967 or 1973: Revolutionary Islam is a motivator far more potent than old pan-Arab nationalism or Ba’ath-style socialism. (Donnelly, 2007)

Ideologies are thus difficult to combat using military forces, because ideas are extremely difficult to contain or destroy. Moreover, certain ideologies are more “virulent” than others, in that they can appeal to more people and encourage and motivate more extreme actions.

With the requisite caveats on the uncertainty of plotting the course of a given ideology, it is still useful to discuss the ideological movements of the post–Cold War era that potentially pose a threat to America or its allies. These ideologies range from peculiarly local varieties, such as the ethnic nationalism of the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) or Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), to transnational movements such as al-Qaeda. While local groups with particular ideologies can have strategic influence, transnational movements generally have the potential for greater impact on American security interests and are therefore more likely to be implicated in the long war.¹

There are four transnational ideologies that currently have this potential. In South America, there is neo-Bolivarism, mainly espoused by Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez and also finding traction in Nicaragua, Ecuador, and Bolivia. Neo-Bolivarism is a populist ideology that is explicitly anti-American but has not in practice generated violence against American targets.² In South Asia there is Maoism,

¹ These transnational ideologies can also absorb, co-opt, or subvert the local goals of a particular group, making them all the more dangerous and difficult to contain. The U.S. Department of State publication, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2006*, comments on this situation, “[Al-Qaeda] and its core leadership group represent a global action network that . . . links and exploits a wider, more nebulous community of regional, national, and local actors who share some of its objectives, but also pursue their own local agendas.”

² Neo-Bolivarism is a new term to describe a relatively new phenomenon. According to a Google search, its first appearance on the web is in 2005, with the publication of a University of Miami occasional paper by Hernán Yanes, “The Cuba-Venezuela Alliance: ‘Emancipatory Neo-Bolivarismo’ or Totalitarian Expansion.” The term is used to describe the rise of socialist leaders in several Latin American countries in recent years: Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, Evo
which has fueled violence in Nepal, Bangladesh, and parts of India. Maoist groups are mainly concerned with local social and political issues, though many advocate armed struggle.

The main proponents of the aforementioned ideologies have never directly attacked the United States and, therefore, depending on how the long war is interpreted, may not be included in this framework. However, American troops have directly confronted transnational ideologies in the Muslim world. The first is Salafi-jihadism, and coalition troops fight its adherents in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. In Iraq, the United States has also confronted militant Shiism in the form of Muqtada al-Sadr’s Jaysh al-Mahdi and other groups. Israel has also struggled against a militant Shia group for over two decades in the form of Lebanon’s Hezbollah. Both of these ideologies use aspects of Islamic theology, which they alter to justify violent attacks against the United States, its allies, and other Muslims. Nonetheless, it should be noted that these groups still remain firmly in Category 3 (locally oriented, religious nationalist) of our framework, and would only escalate to the forefront of U.S. interests with significant changes to the organizations that put them closer to Category 1 (militant, global jihadist).

How these ideologies develop and interact will have a distinct influence on the course of the long war. While specific changes in leadership and the tenets of an ideology cannot be predicted, the assumptions that this study makes about the future can be used to postulate how these ideologies might manifest themselves in the future. The following sections will discuss how globalization, failing and failed states, and demographic changes could interact with ideology, as well as the implications of these interactions for the long war.

Globalization and the Generation of Grievances

This study assumes that globalization will continue. That is, the world will witness greater economic and informational interconnectedness—the flow of goods and ideas will increase in both frequency and speed,

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Morales in Bolivia, Rafael Correa in Ecuador, and Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua. Chavez in particular has used the name of Simon Bolivar, the 19th century Venezuelan leader of Latin American independence movements, to justify and legitimize his social programs.
and will penetrate areas that have heretofore been less influenced by this phenomenon.

As with any transformational economic process, globalization will create winners and losers. Some regions, nations, societies, and individuals will fare better than others. Overall, it appears that globalization has been a benefit to many nations and peoples, and many regions of the world, particularly in parts of South America and Asia, have seen a rise in their standard of living. However, because globalization has not influenced all parts of the globe in a uniform way, there will be a sense in some corners of the world that increasing globalization is not beneficial and that the wealth being generated is directly or indirectly exploitative. Grievances of this sort are not unheard of—conflicts throughout modern history have stemmed partially or primarily from the control or disposition of economic wealth, either within a society, such as in pre-Revolutionary France, or between nations, as can be seen in the 1948 war over Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal.

The ideologies we have noted—neo-Bolivarism, Maoism, Salafi-jihadism, and militant Shiism—generally profess an anti-globalization stance. Globalization is an evil within their conception of reality. Moreover, these ideologies provide their adherents with a tangible perpetrator, a focus for their anger against the rather amorphous economic process: Western countries that appear to benefit most from this economic process. As globalization increases, it is likely then that the “grievance-generating” effects of dislocation and wealth discrepancies will also increase, despite the positive effects felt by others. In fact, as recent experience in combating Salafi-jihadism suggests, the vast majority of a population may benefit from globalization; it only takes a small number of adherents to generate large effects.

An important point to make here, however, is that globalization is certainly not the only “grievance-generating” factor in the development of these ideologies. There are many others, including military occupation, oppression of a minority (or majority), poor governance, etc.

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3 Ayman al-Zawahiri has made comments about economic systems in several of his communiqués. Hugo Chavez consistently rails against the Western economic system.
Moreover, even though these ideologies can be considered in part to be a reaction against globalization, their adherents will not hesitate to utilize the structures and components of globalization to proliferate the ideologies. What is most troubling is that this proliferation need not be significant (in terms of numbers) to have an effect—a minority can have a large impact. The expanding reach of easily obtained and reliable communication, together with the internationalization of business and media, which allows for the swift transmission of money and events around the globe, has given these minorities expanded reach and influence. For example, jihadist training manuals and propaganda are easily found on the Internet, and the 24-hour news cycle beams images and information about terrorist attacks across the globe in a matter of minutes. For groups seeking to influence the public through their acts of violence, the globalization of media and information is a particularly effective way to “advertise” their presence and their ideology.

The Role of Failed and Failing States in Propagating Ideologies

Failed states can play an important role in propagating ideologies. A number of different factors contribute to state failure. The Failed States Index takes into account 12 factors, ranging from the loss of control over territory to the collapse of the rule of law.4 The Failed States Index has divided states into three categories, with the highest scores deemed “Critical” and the next highest “In Danger.” This study refers to the nations in the “Critical” category as “failed states.” The list includes Iraq, the Sudan, Afghanistan, Somalia, and Haiti. Of the twelve indi-

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4 The twelve factors include social, economic, and political indicators.

- **Social indicators**: mounting demographic pressures; massive movement of refugees or internally displaced persons creating complex humanitarian emergencies; legacy of vengeance-seeking group grievance or group paranoia; chronic and sustained human flight.
- **Economic indicators**: uneven economic development along group lines; sharp and/or severe economic decline.
- **Political indicators**: criminalization and/or delegitimization of the state; progressive deterioration of public services; suspension or arbitrary application of the rule of law and widespread violation of human rights; security apparatus operates as a “state within a state”; rise of factionalized elites; intervention of other states or external political actors.
icators, these states rank close to the bottom in at least nine. Those on the next tier, “In Danger,” are considered failing—this list includes Nepal, Sierra Leone, Lebanon, Yemen, and Egypt. These states are certainly not in good shape, but they are not experiencing the same level of failure as those in the first set.

The phenomena of ideology and state failure interact in a variety of ways, but as this discussion will illustrate, it is difficult to characterize the precise nature of these interactions. For instance, it stands to reason that states unable to effectively govern their own territories are hardly able to act against a fast-spreading or malignant ideology. On the other hand, some states may propagate or co-opt an ideology in order to bolster their own credibility or gain further control over some part of their territory. Furthermore, there is the danger that failed or failing states may produce the conditions under which a violent ideology can find recruits and grow more radical.

This study assumes that failed or failing states will exist (and perhaps grow in number), but it is not entirely clear how different ideologies will be influenced by this fact. Failing states may still have the ability to resist violent ideologies, as in the case of Egypt, while failed states may not become hotbeds of ideological fervor, as in the case of Zimbabwe.

Still, it may be useful to examine the case of two states, one failing and the other failed, as examples of how state failure may interact with ideology. Egypt and Afghanistan provide different examples of how the ideology of Salafi-jihadism formed and spread in two states that have been characterized as failing, in the case of Egypt, or failed, in the case of Afghanistan. In Egypt in the 1960s and 1970s, the state faced an internal revolt fed by political, social, and economic discontent. Within this milieu, Salafi-jihadism emerged intellectually through the writings of Sayyid Qutb and the preaching of clerics ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Rahman and Ayman al-Zawahiri and others. While Egypt was able to

5 For a full list of all the states rated by the Failed States Index, visit the Fund for Peace website.

6 One of the best studies of the development of violent extremism in Egypt is Kepel (1986).
quell the violence through a widespread crackdown on militant and Islamic groups, the result was that many of the ideologues and their ideology left Egypt for another, less capable state: Afghanistan.

The Egyptian roots of many of the “Afghan Arabs” and their struggle against the Soviet Union are relatively well documented. These Afghan Arabs took advantage of Cold War politics and the power vacuum that existed in Afghanistan after the Soviet invasion to build an effective organization. Afghanistan was essentially a war zone at this time, with the Soviet Army fighting a guerilla war against CIA-armed and trained militants. Within this milieu, the ideology of Salafi-jihadism was able to spread through the guerilla foot soldiers; the ideology found a cause where the actions prescribed by its sociopolitical program could be implemented. In the 1990s, when the Taliban consolidated its power over Afghanistan, they established a relatively functional government, at least in comparison to the warlordism and civil war of the previous period. However, the fundamentalism of the Taliban was not incompatible with the sociopolitical program of al-Qaeda, and thus the organization produced by the Afghan Arabs, a physical manifestation of the Salafi-jihadist creed, remained and flourished. Through the failed state of Afghanistan, which for most of the past three decades lacked a responsible government and the rule of law, a violent ideology was able to propagate.

These two cases show how both failing and failed states can contribute to the development and actualization of an ideology. In the first case, a failing state facing an internal revolt managed to suppress internal dissent—only to play a role in generating a militant ideology and exporting it. The next state where this ideology appears in force is a failed state, where an invasion and the subsequent chaos provide room for the propagation of the violent ideology. The chaos also eventually


8 For a more nuanced view on “warlordism” and the history of Afghanistan’s violent groups, see Schetter et al. (2007).
brings to power a government that, while hardly effective from a Western standpoint, harbors that ideology and provides a base from which it can operate.

These cases describe one relationship between failed and failing states with regard to ideology—that is, instances where an ideology is formed in the failing state prior to its transmission to the failed state. Egypt, the failing state, was suffering significant socioeconomic and governance problems, but provided the milieu for the generation of a violent ideology. Thus, when combating an ideology, a focus only on failed states is inappropriate; an effective response to the ideology must also target its centers of generation and propagation, and these loci of ideological thought and communication may very well exist in countries that this taxonomy would consider functional or failing.

Demographic Changes in the Muslim World and the Growth of Ideology

A study of militants in Egypt conducted by sociologist Saad Eddin Ibrahim in the mid-1990s revealed a particularly salient point about Islamic activists and demography: Islamic activists are getting younger. The current demographic trend in the Muslim world is a growing youth bulge; the correlation between these two factors is evident and worrisome. If Muslims are becoming politicized earlier in their lives and a particular ideology seems to have resonance with younger Muslims, the number of recruits available to a mobilizing ideology will increase. There is no reason to think that other violent ideologies will not also seek to prey upon the most impressionable members of society. Moreover, the Muslim world is not the only region experiencing a youth bulge.

Major ideologues already recognize that targeting young people is a useful recruitment technique. Islamic schools or madaris (plural of

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9 This has occurred in other states in the region as well. For instance, Saudi Arabia is a relatively stable entity, but its Wahhabist ideology has strongly influenced Salafi-jihadism.


madrasa) are typical recruiting grounds for Salafi-jihadist ideologues.\textsuperscript{12} Mosques are also places of organization and recruitment by virtue of their ability to serve as socially accepted public venues for quasi-religious discourse; in the 1970s, the mosques of Upper Egypt were closed by the Egyptian government in an attempt to quell anti-government Salafi-jihadists. “Virtual” recruiting is also possible in the technological age, and it is likely that the online presence of these ideologies will grow more prevalent and sophisticated.\textsuperscript{13}

Moreover, as there is evidence to suggest that some level of dissatisfaction with economic and political realities feeds recruitment and provides justification to violent groups, the economic and political ramifications of the youth bulge must not be ignored.\textsuperscript{14} As young people move toward employment age, scant economic opportunities and a sclerotic political establishment in many developing nations will present significant problems and possibly result in troubling social convulsions that could provide opportunities for radical groups.

The Geography of Ideology
As the previous discussion illustrates, several assumptions about the future indicate that Salafi-jihadist ideologies will be of greater, not lesser, appeal. Globalization will fuel grievances and help disseminate an ideology, while failing and failed states may play a role in fostering


\textsuperscript{13} Army Brigadier General John Custer commented in a CBS interview, “Without a doubt, the Internet is the single most important venue for the radicalization of Islamic youth.” See Pelley (2007) and Awan (2007).

\textsuperscript{14} Carrie Rosefsky Wickham makes an excellent point about what she terms “grievance-based” explanations of Islamic activism. While acknowledging that such explanations have some weight, she also brings up a salient point about the other important aspect of these organizations—mobilization. She writes, “Grievance-based explanations of Islamic activism are not wrong, but they are incomplete. Even under the most extreme conditions of human misery and exploitation, the emergence of collective protest is not assured . . . to mobilize citizens into politics, it is not sufficient for movement leaders to tap into preexisting discontents; they must also generate motivations, resources, and opportunities for collective action.” See Rosefsky Wickham (2002), pp. 6–8.
or harboring an ideology and its followers, and demographics suggest that some ideologies will have an expanding pool of potential recruits.

These assumptions help delineate the factors involved in the potential growth of these hostile ideologies. The next part of this inquiry will describe how these ideologies are situated geographically. Since it may be necessary for the military, as part of a wide range of plausible operations, to destroy, interrupt, disprove, lessen the appeal of, modify, or silence an ideology, the questions of where and how the ideology operates become vital. Hence, the “space” that an ideology occupies is of particular concern. Because the focus of our geographical inquiry is essentially a framework of ideas, we use the term “space” in the broadest possible sense. In the following discussion, this study will address four types of space in which an ideology exists: physical space, intellectual space, sociopolitical space, and virtual space.

Physical space is by far the easiest to understand and influence. The physical space occupied by an ideology includes its adherents (the minds and bodies of its followers), its physical points of dissemination (schools, religious buildings, trade union offices, government agencies, etc.), and, if applicable, its geographic territory (the former Soviet Union or Taliban-controlled Afghanistan would be examples of ideologically motivated states). Physical space can be influenced in a number of ways. One can kill adherents, destroy buildings, and capture territory to gain control of particular kinds of physical space.

Intellectual space and sociopolitical space are more opaque, and consequently more difficult to influence and control. Intellectual space involves the presence of ideas, the individuals involved in generating and directing these ideas (the ideologues), and the applicability of these ideas to various situations. Sociopolitical space is the political, cultural, and historical milieu in which these ideas exist. Sociopolitical space includes religion, ethnicity, nationality, etc. Different societies can be more or less susceptible to particular ideologies, depending on their makeup.

Finally, there is virtual space, the space of modern communication. While virtual space could be considered a subset of intellectual or sociopolitical space (the Internet still being a realm of language), its increasing importance as a vehicle for transmission, as well as the influ-
ence it may have in networking individuals and ideas, requires virtual space to constitute a separate, if related, category.

A successful modern ideology needs some level of functionality in at least the first three spaces. It cannot simply exist on the physical plane—just the presence of a school or mosque does not give life to ideas. An ideology will not have much influence if it exists only on the intellectual level; i.e., a manifesto is only effective if someone reads and acts upon it. An ideology exists to convince, to organize and mobilize individuals and institutions. While a virtual presence may not be necessary, it is possible that, in this modern age, an ideology may be compelled to generate some kind of an electronic presence or footprint, either on the web or in the media.

If the military seeks to address the ideological component of the long war, it cannot focus on just one type of space. Schools can be closed and adherents jailed or killed, but a strategy that ignores the intellectual production or social factors involved is likely to fail.¹⁵ Likewise, a campaign to discredit ideologues or alter cultural mores while ceding territory and resources to adherents is also likely to fail.¹⁶

To illustrate how these different types of space manifest themselves, let us examine the geography of the ideology of Salafi-jihadism. While it is difficult to comprehensively describe the physical space occupied by Salafi-jihadism, we do know that groups of adherents can be found in several countries across the world, mainly in the Muslim world, but also in Europe and North America.¹⁷ Schools and mosques in various parts

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¹⁵ This can be seen in the case of Salafi-jihadism, where Egypt’s crackdown in the 1960s and 1970s drove leaders of Salafi-jihadist cells out of the country. This may have reduced violence in Egypt, but it did not destroy the ideology. These individuals moved their operations to Afghanistan, and after the end of the Afghanistan war, they returned to Egypt in the 1990s and a new round of violence ensued. Again, Egypt responded with a crackdown and jailed many leaders of the Salafi-jihadist groups Egyptian Islamic Jihad and al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya. These actions reduced the level of violence in Egypt but did little to rid the region of the ideology.

¹⁶ Creating a safe physical base from which to expand has been a key component of several expansionist ideologies.

¹⁷ The London underground attacks on July 7, 2005, and the murder of Theo van Gogh in Amsterdam on November 2, 2004, point to a Salafi-jihadist penetration of Muslim communities in Europe. The letter left behind by van Gogh’s murderer, Muhammad Bouyeri, clearly
of the Muslim world have been implicated as centers of Salafi-jihadist indoctrination. The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan under the Taliban harbored a Salafi-jihadist organization, and parts of Iraq are now havens for Salafi-jihadist adherents.

Because Salafi-jihadism is essentially a religious ideology, it manipulates Islamic theology and law for its own ends, and is thus clearly trying to appeal to Muslim intellectual and cultural tradition. This, of course, creates impediments for non-Muslims who attempt to influence the intellectual and social milieu that Salafi-jihadists inhabit.

Another component of the intellectual space of Salafi-jihadism is the ideologues: the individuals and institutions that generate and direct the ideology’s conception of reality and its sociopolitical program. In Salafi-jihadism, these ideologues are known from their various communiqués, and many will seem familiar. This group includes:

- Usama bin Ladin
- Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi
- Ayman al-Zawahiri
- Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi (deceased)
- Yusuf al-Ayyiri (deceased)
- Nasr al-Fahd
- ‘Ali bin al-Khudayr
- Abu Basir al-Tartusi
- Abu Qatada al-Falistani
- Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri
- Hamid al-‘Ali
- and others.

These ideologues include a number of nationalities and can be found in many countries. This list includes a Saudi living in Kuwait, an Egyptian in Pakistan, and a Palestinian in the United Kingdom. Moreover, these ideologues do not exist in a political or philosophical vacuum. Other Muslim clerics, such as Safar al-Hawali and Yusuf al-

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Qaradawi, are not necessarily Salafi-jihadist, but some of their interpretations of Islamic law and theology fall in line with Salafi-jihadist ideologues. Thus, the ideology can draw support from other thinkers within its intellectual and social sphere.

In a similar vein, ideologies can draw support from particular social conditions. Historical, ethnic, religious, or cultural factors (among others) can predispose or create an affinity for a particular ideology among a given population. In Salafi-jihadism, this can be seen in some of the philosophical similarities between it and the Wahhabism of Saudi Arabia. Many of the major ideologues and adherents of Salafi-jihadism are Saudi. While Saudi Arabia may not suffer from as many terrorist incidents as Algeria or Egypt, it has been a major center for ideological production. This fact suggests that the number of attacks or the number of adherents is not the only metric of interest in assessing the strategic importance of a particular region or society vis-à-vis an ideological struggle. Other social conditions, such as economic dislocation or civil strife, may prove conducive to the promulgation of an ideology. As Middle East security expert Daniel Byman noted:

> Because al-Qaida can tap into these insurgencies for recruits and its logistics network, it is able to conduct operations far beyond where its narrow core is located and can replenish cadre as they are lost. Insurgencies also add legitimacy to al-Qaida as Muslims around the world support many of these struggles, even though they might otherwise oppose al-Qaida’s ideological agenda and use of terrorism. (Byman, 2006)

Byman’s commentary illustrates how an ideology can exploit various proclivities, loyalties, and needs within the sociopolitical sphere to promote its views and pursue its goals. This concept includes the notion of “passive enablers,” meaning those individuals who will passively support an ideological agenda but not take an active part. These passive enablers are vital to a cause because they generate an attitude of legitimacy (or at the very least, not hostility) for an ideology. In this way, the sociopolitical sphere becomes another space that needs to be addressed in combatting an ideology.
The virtual space occupied by an ideology may also be a realm of concern for the military. The Internet offers a new and unparalleled opportunity to disseminate ideological material. Technology also offers new and more efficient ways to network individuals and share ideas. While the effect of these materials may be no different from a traditional audio recording, the speed and ready access of online materials is unprecedented. For any type of counterideology campaign to be effective, this modern technological component must be considered. In terms of Salafi-jihadism, the propaganda utility of the Internet is significant. Various Salafi-jihadist groups publish online newsletters and magazines and maintain websites. Tawhed.ws, a Salafi-jihadist library, provides a broad collection of ideological treatises, *fatawa*, and articles. Chatrooms and blogs offer new means for individuals and groups to link to one another. All of these new tools are being used to discuss and disseminate the Salafi-jihadist program.

Because ideology occupies all of these spheres—physical, intellectual, sociopolitical, and virtual—it cannot be combated by direct, physical means alone. Rather, a collection of tactics that address the physical, intellectual, sociopolitical, and virtual manifestations of the ideology will be necessary. For instance, an IO campaign might target Saudi Arabia’s ideologues, while a FID mission restores effective governance to a region. The first type of mission addresses the intellectual space of the ideology, while the second type tackles the sociopolitical space. If the United States cedes one sphere to ideological actors, then its efforts to engage them in other spheres are unlikely to produce the desired results, particularly in the long term.

**Terrorism**

For the purposes of this report, a review of the significant literature on terrorists and terrorism would be unnecessarily redundant. Rather, this section will explain why terrorism will be an important aspect of

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the long war, and suggest some trends in the use of terrorism in the future.

Terrorism is defined as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets,” according to the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). The status of “noncombatant” excludes “military, paramilitary, militia, and police under military command and control, in specific areas or regions where war zones or war-like settings exist.”\(^{19}\) This distinction between combatant and noncombatant is important. The goal of terrorists is not to destroy another nation’s military capability; instead, the terrorist seeks to advertise his presence and his cause.\(^{20}\) Moreover, except in rare cases, terrorist organizations do not have the capacity to obliterate a well-armed and trained military. Because they cannot fight head-to-head, they view the tactic of terrorism as a viable way to challenge the authority, system, etc. that they seek to change or destroy. In addition, since one of the military’s most important missions is to safeguard the government, population, and territory of a given polity, terrorist attacks are an effective asymmetrical challenge to a nation’s security and military apparatus. Since it is unlikely that nonstate actors will develop the capacity to directly attack the United States with conventional military power, terrorism and guerilla tactics are likely to be their methods of choice, making terrorism a significant aspect of the long war.

**The Future Development of Terrorism**

During the 1990s, the world saw fewer incidents of terrorism year to year, but this decrease was offset by greater lethality.\(^{21}\) While counting terrorist acts and casualties is notoriously problematic, the number of attacks currently ongoing in Iraq and Afghanistan is unprecedented in both number and lethality. The future use of terrorism will, of course, depend on a great number of factors, and the end of the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts may result in less terrorism. However, it is clear that terrorists can now accomplish more with less, and there is little to

\(^{19}\) National Counterterrorism Center (2006a, 2006b).

\(^{20}\) Kellen (1982).

\(^{21}\) Hoffman (1999), pp. 7–38.
suggest that this will change in the future. Instead, this study suggests that there is a high likelihood that a nonstate actor will gain access to biological or chemical weapons. Such weapons can cause vast numbers of casualties and create significant chaos. Other technological advancements or a creative application of current materials may also increase the lethality of terrorist attacks.

State sponsorship is a key factor in the capacity of organizations to undertake attacks. A state can be the vehicle for proliferating arms, training terrorists, and sharing more lethal technologies. Moreover, the same kind of asymmetric logic that leads terrorist organizations to use terrorism can also apply to states. A nation that feels threatened by more capable neighbors may seek to encourage and arm nonstate groups as proxies. So great is the capacity of states to influence and enhance an organization’s capabilities that state sponsorship should be considered a “force multiplier” that provides a nonstate actor with a range of different capabilities.22

It is unlikely that state sponsorship of terrorist groups will disappear because it is in the interest of many states to use proxies to harass a stronger foe. In addition, because of precedents set by both Persian Gulf wars, where international coalitions reversed an invasion and took preemptive action against a suspected threat, in the future states may decide to utilize proxies more often. These groups serve to obfuscate responsibility, allowing the sponsoring state to easily disassociate itself from the group’s actions.

There has also been an increase in collaboration among nonstate actors. While some of this may simply be a matter of access to resources rather than actual strategic and operational collaboration, there is evidence of the sharing of technology and tactics.23 Several factors might

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22 Hoffman (1999), pp. 7–38.

23 The change of the Algerian organization Groupe Salafist pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC) into a manifestation of al-Qaeda under the new name “The Organization of al Qaeda in the Land of the Islamic Maghreb” (AQIM) has received a great deal of attention. This shift can be viewed as a change in strategy, but many analysts view the change as originating more out of desperation for funds and resources than a real affinity for al-Qaeda’s goals and mission. It remains to be seen whether this shift will result in greatly increased coordination between groups in various parts of the world. For a good review of this change,
push these groups closer together: greater connectedness driven by technological advances; the rise of a charismatic leader; a perception of shared enemies, fortunes, or goals; an increased acceptability of a particular ideology, etc. An increased level of collaboration would likely herald more frequent and more significant attacks; such attacks could be coordinated to cause the most disruption possible. Examples of this could include a coordinated strike against energy or financial facilities in several countries.

**Terror and the Long War**

Understanding the way in which terrorism is used and how it interacts with other factors, most importantly ideology and governance, is key to the management of the long war.

The United States has formulated a counterterrorism strategy that acknowledges that the tactic itself is only part of the equation. This strategy asserts that the United States must confront terrorist leaders, their safe havens, and the underlying conditions encouraging extremism. Yet, while recognizing the various means and ends that drive terrorist behavior, there is still a tendency in the military literature to describe the phenomenon of terrorism as a component that can be separated somehow from the overall security situation in the world. In other words, the focus on stopping the “phenomenon” of terrorism ignores the extensive social, economic, and political system in which state and nonstate actors exist. However, as part of a broader web of processes, terrorism becomes more than a dangerous tactic used by a few extreme groups and their state sponsors. It becomes a manifestation of the system and, as such, can have significant strategic impact; it becomes a method for influencing and altering regional and even global frameworks. For that reason, terrorism appears in a variety of different contexts.

Terrorism functions as a technique in state-on-state competition, as can be seen in Syria’s struggle with Israel vis-à-vis Hezbollah. Ter-

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see Kennedy Boudali (2007). For a view on migration of tactics and techniques, see Jane’s Terrorism and Security Monitor (2007).

rorism has the potential to directly affect the global economic system, as can be seen in the U.S. economic downturn post–September 11 and the increase in energy prices after attacks on Nigerian and Saudi Arabian oil production. Terrorist groups are funded by, and therefore provide customers for, drug traffickers and other smugglers. This can be seen in Afghanistan and the Tri-Border Area of South America.

Hence, the long war as a concept functions as recognition that these connections may require a different, more comprehensive strategy than the one articulated specifically for countering terrorism. It also recognizes that any strategy may take time to fully implement and register success. Moreover, because of the nature of terrorism and its effect on real and perceived security, this strategy may require the military to bring to bear capabilities that it once left solely to civilian agencies.

Terrorist tactics can be expected to be present, no matter which trajectory ultimately plays out. In some cases terrorism will be used against the U.S. forces or the U.S. homeland. In others the target will be other states, or even other nonstate actors. The strategic nature of the trajectories does not specify the exact type of terrorist attacks that will occur, but they may be widespread or isolated, low-tech or high-tech, or anonymous or claimed depending on the exact situation. The increase in technology, the availability of materials, and the spread of knowledge create the potential for more numerous and more deadly attacks.

**Governance**

The QDR is concerned with several aspects of governance:

- its presence or nonpresence
- its quality
- the predisposition of governing bodies toward the United States and its interests.²⁵

In terms of presence, the QDR recognizes that ungoverned zones constitute an environment where violent nonstate groups can establish sanctuaries. Ungoverned areas are also areas where authority and accountability are unpredictable and fluid. From a military standpoint, such regions can be difficult to manage, as actions taken to influence such an environment could have unforeseen consequences.

Quality refers to two aspects: the structure of governance found in a particular locale and its capabilities. For instance, the territory of Lebanon is controlled partially by that state’s government and partially by an independent nonstate organization. The territory is governed—just not entirely by one structure, i.e., a central, officially recognized, democratic government. The capabilities of that government, whatever it might be, are an important aspect in discussing the quality of governance. There is evidence to suggest that poor governance fuels, on some level, the discontent and the grievances that drive violent conflict.²⁶ Thus, one could have a state with a central government that controls its territory, but the way this government functions gives rise to problems of consequence. This state could be massively corrupt, exploitative, or incompetent. The state could apply repressive techniques or prefer one ethnic or religious group over another. The rise of radicalism in places like Egypt in the 1990s or Pakistan at the present time are partially linked to issues of the quality of governance.²⁷

The final component of governance with which the QDR is concerned is the disposition of governing bodies toward the United

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²⁶ Carol Lancaster, a professor at Georgetown and former administrator at USAID, argues that “Terrorist grievances are often over land, assets, or other resources—in essence, who should control them. Grievances can also be over values—for example, the perception that an ethnic, religious, or political organization is encroaching on others’ rights or that a society is flawed in some fundamental way and must be reformed.” The control and disposition of resources and the organization of society are essentially under the purview of governance. See Lancaster (2003).

States and its interests. At first glance, this component seems relatively straightforward: the United States would obviously prefer governments that support American policies and interests. However, a deeper examination of this issue suggests that this priority may, in fact, contradict other goals regarding governance. States that are poorly governed, or incapable of governing their entire territory, may be allies of the United States. Governments that enact unwise or counterproductive policies with the potential to create conflict may be vital to the protection of American interests. The opposite may also apply. Well-governed, democratic states may not accede to U.S. wishes—Turkey in the recent Iraq war is an example of an American ally with strong and capable governance that refused to support U.S. aims. Thus, the need to encourage better, more effective, more widespread governance may in fact be counter to America’s interests—any discussion of promoting reform or other changes in governance should take this into account.

Table 2.2, introduced in Chapter Two, contains many of the ungoverned or poorly governed regions of the world that would be of concern to the United States. This list includes ungoverned areas that provide safe havens, such as parts of Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as areas that suffer from poor governance, such as the Tri-Border Area of Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay, or southern Lebanon. These poorly governed areas may or may not contain safe havens threatening non-state actors, but the problem of governance there can encourage illicit activities and recruitment.

**Governance and the Long War**

As noted in the QDR, the concept of governance—its presence, quality, and disposition—will play a major role in driving future conflicts in the long war. The way that governance interacts with and influences violent nonstate actors is of great importance to determining possible future developments in the long war.

However, governance is not an easy concept to unpack. For instance, poor governance can come about in many different ways. In a discussion of Somalia as a failed state, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Walter Kansteiner noted that:
Some so-called “failed states” have been torn asunder by civil war, others by external aggression. Some have foundered on unresolved conflicts based on clan or ethnicity; drought and grinding poverty have claimed still more. All have potential for destabilizing their neighbors.28

Since there are many different causes for poor or nonexistent governance, addressing these causes is equally multifaceted. It is not simply a matter of “good” or “bad” governance, but of how these different aspects of governance—presence, quality, and disposition—interact with violent nonstate actors, their ideology, and their actions.29

The issue of presence is perhaps the simplest to comprehend. When governance structures are nonexistent, a nonstate group may be left to pursue its own agenda. For instance, when Afghanistan descended into chaos after the 1988 Soviet withdrawal, a nascent al-Qaeda, made up of Arab and other non-Afghan extremists, was not interested in governing that state. Instead, the organization used this period of chaos to fortify its bases and to organize and train its fighters there. When a Pakistan-supported Taliban came to power, al-Qaeda maneuvered into alliance with and accommodation of the new government of Afghanistan.30 Other regions suffer from problems of virtually nonexistent governance, including parts of the trans-Sahara and the Tri-Border Area in South America.

Another possibility is that the vacuum left by nonexistent governance may be filled by a nonstate group ready to exert its own authority. These nonstate groups can become de facto “states within a state,” as has occurred with Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, the Palestinian territories, and the northern region of Somalia, Somaliland. Thus, the

28 Kansteiner (2002).
29 The State Department’s publication, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2006*, designates ungoverned, undergoverned, and ill-governed territories as “terrorist safe havens.” While this designation clearly implicates governance as a component of any struggle against terrorist organizations, there is no attempt to further define these terms. See U.S. Department of State (2007).
30 For a review of Afghanistan’s past and present, see Rubin (2007).
governance structure of the state becomes bifurcated, with a nonstate actor governing some part of the state’s territory and population.

These types of states have particular implications for the military and pose problems in reconstituting an effective governance structure. Take, for instance, the most famous of “states within a state,” Hezbollah. Not only did this guerilla group fight the modern, well-equipped Israeli army in the summer of 2006, preventing it from achieving its goals, but it has also maintained alliances and built a social services organization that allowed it to rebuild some of the infrastructure destroyed by Israeli bombing. When the nonstate group is more effective and responsive as a governing body than the central government, it can be difficult to amputate from the body politic. Thus, rather than destroying this entity, a strategy of co-optation, of generating and supporting alternatives, of targeting its popularity and appeal may be the best strategy to combat such a group.

Finally, poor governance has implications for the security of weapons of mass destruction. If a government in possession of WMD cannot maintain adequate control of its territory and does not have a monopoly on the legitimate use of force within its boundaries, a nonstate group with a particular agenda may take advantage of easy prey. In these cases, the military may need to take quick and decisive action when these groups pose a threat.

Kinetic operations of this type may be more difficult if a viable governance structure does exist in a country. The quality of governance is the issue in this scenario; these states may be thought of as undergoverned or ill-governed. They may also be termed “failed” or “failing,” depending on the interlocutor. A government may control its territory and its population through a viable security or military apparatus, but when it comes to providing effective governance, it may be weak and even widely viewed by its citizens as illegitimate.

For instance, in two of the countries mentioned earlier, Egypt and Pakistan, the central government is widely viewed as corrupt and incapable, and there are regions of the country where its power is not strongly felt. At the same time, the Pakistani and Egyptian military and security apparatuses are relatively functional and have been able
either to resist the violence of nonstate actors or infiltrate their ranks.31 These states may not take kindly to foreign intervention, and if they do cooperate with American intelligence or military, there may be serious domestic repercussions. In these situations, where a government relies mainly on coercion to maintain power and its governance structures are weak or failing, there is a danger of collapse.

Thus, the implication for military action in a country with a weak and/or unstable government is different from that in a region with no governance at all. Instead of taking direct action, the United States may need to find ways to work through that state’s military and government. These methods could include typical efforts such as training, arms sales, and exchanges. However, the Army may also need to intervene by bolstering the host nation’s fighting strength or inserting military forces for discreet operations against a nonstate actor. Meanwhile, the military might also be prepared to intervene in the case of the collapse of that state’s government, particularly if there are nonstate actors present to take advantage of the situation.

Lastly, there is the question of disposition, or how a particular governance structure responds to and views American interests. From this perspective, a nonstate actor that effectively governs its territory, harbors no extreme elements, and poses no threat to American interests could be a perfectly suitable arrangement. This, in some ways, debunks the focus on “failed states” that is found in the QDR and other documents. An effective national government may not be plausible in some regions. Instead, the idea would be to find and support methods of governance that are stable, functional, and nonthreatening. Thus, the military may need to involve itself with several different types of govern-

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31 A review of the military and security services in Pakistan and Egypt by Daniel L. Byman in his book, *Going to War With the Allies You Have: Allies, Counterinsurgency, and the War on Terrorism*, suggests that these institutions are badly in need of reform, suffering from corruption, poor training, and insufficient equipment. At the same time, both have managed to fend off threats to the governing regime. In Egypt, this occurred in the 1990s, when Egyptian security services eventually prevailed over two Egyptian terrorist organizations, Egyptian Islamic Jihad and al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya. In Pakistan, the Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has rounded up a number of al-Qaeda agents over the past few years. See Byman (2005, p. 16), Gerges (2000, pp. 592–612), and Belokrenitsky (2003, pp. 5–7).
nance structures and find ways to empower those structures that pose no threat to American interests.

**Drivers of Governance**

Some of the major assumptions of this study pose significant challenges for governance: globalization, access to limited WMD, and demographics in the developing world. Assuming that globalization continues apace, more societies and cultures will be touched by this transformative phenomenon, resulting in all of the associated economic and technological negatives and positives.\(^{32}\) Governments will face hard decisions on how to manage these changes, and will often not have control over the influences of globalization. Moreover, governments that make poor decisions, thus exacerbating the effects of economic and cultural dislocation and changing traditional structures, will face strong resistance from elements of their populations. The world has already witnessed such convulsions in Latin America and Asia, where anti-globalization governments in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Afghanistan have at times controlled the instruments of state. While these governments may provide suitable governance, they tend to reject the current international system and resist international norms. They often couple their anti-globalization to anti-Americanism, both undesirable to the United States. At the same time, in resisting the international economic system, these governments run the risk of causing significant economic damage to their populations.

There are some factors in globalization that may help provide better governance. As globalization can have the effect of helping states develop, increasing standards of living and generating revenue for the government, some states may find it possible to do more. Technological advances and the free flow of information may provide tools and opportunities for more effective and efficient governance.

Governance clearly plays a role in the access nonstate actors may gain to weapons of mass destruction. Governments must make policies and resources available for the protection of weapons caches. However,

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\(^{32}\) For a general discussion of the consequences of globalization and its effects on national security, see Kirshner (2006).
this does not always occur; governance in parts of a country may break down, a government may not have the resources to provide the necessary security, or a state might willfully allow nonstate actors access to these destructive weapons.

Demographics in the developing world will also pose issues for governance structures. Developing nations are growing rapidly, with large youth bulges. As these young people reach employment age, providing jobs and services will become increasingly more difficult. Governments will find their choices limited and civil unrest will likely increase in frequency, a situation that will only make societies more difficult to govern.

The prevalence of communications technology will allow the vast majority of the world’s population to see “how the other half is living.” This might happen despite the wishes of their governments. The censorship regimes of China and some other states are key to observe in this regard. This global perspective will make it harder for authoritarian regimes to convince their poor citizens that they should do without. This has the potential to create a great deal of civil unrest in authoritarian regimes, both good and bad. An example of this is the very recent fuel riots in Iran in response to fuel rationing by the regime.33

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33 See BBC News (2007) and associated stories.
The topic of civilizational conflict, both globally and within specific regions of the world, is often used when discussing current events in the Middle East and describing the long war. Samuel Huntington’s 1993 article, originally published in *Foreign Affairs*, describes his post–Cold War view of the world that revolves around cultural clashes rather than ideological tensions:

> It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be battle lines of the future. (Huntington, 1993)

The civilizations at work in his view of the world, and in subsequent extensions of the framework to other potential interpretations, have formed the bases for arguments both in support of and against the existence and emergence of larger, escalatory conflicts among disparate groups. Huntington’s discussion forms around eight (plus a possible ninth) civilizations that he describes as defining the predominant unifiers of people: Western, Latin American, Islamic, Sinic, Hindu, Orthodox, Buddhist and Japanese, and the possible ninth, African. In
his formulation, cultural organization of groups replaces the classical
notion of states as the locus of war.1

The assumptions surrounding the arguments rely on a coalescence
of motivations that solidify otherwise previously differently oriented
groups of people. Examples include not only those espoused by Hun-
tington, but various forms of Christian versus Muslim, Arab versus
Persian, and other religious and ideological interpretations of civiliza-
tions. The debate still rages on whether the construct, as ill-defined as
it may be, really is something new or just a rehash of old international
relations theories (Rubenstein and Crocker, 1994).

Considerable work has gone into deconstructing the monolithic
nature of Huntington’s argument. As examples, discussants have pur-
sued intra-Islamic cooperation and conflict to show the variety of
players, motives, and reactions that makes a high-order civilizational
coalescence not possible. Dyads such as Iran and Saudi Arabia and
Iraq and Turkey (Hunter, 1998) have been used to explain the cultural
mosaic of Islamic countries (Said, 2001).

Empirical testing of the hypothesis has also had difficulty iden-
tifying increasing conflicts between Islam and democracy (Midlarsky,
1998) and deconflicting increases between Western and Islamic civi-
lizations and civilizational forms of conflict or Islamic involvement in
civilizational ethnic conflict since the end of the Cold War (Fox, 2001).
Along similar lines, Russett, Oneal, and Cox (2000) found historically
well-known realist and liberal variables of conflict, and not civiliza-
tions, as the determinants of cooperation and conflict.

Others have argued forcefully that the civilizational construct is
neither an accurate nor a useful description of the future and that the
utility of the concept for planning purposes is inappropriate and useless
and, perhaps, only provides “justification for ugly thoughts and uglier
deeds” (Ikenberry et al., 1997). The events of 9/11 have been linked to
the resurrection of the warm debates concerning Huntington’s argu-

1 Various other authors in the international relations literature have debated the dissolu-
tion of the state systems and the validity of claims of escalation of fragmentation of the state
system. See, for example, Gurr (1994).
ment (Abrahamian, 2002), since Islam was the practiced religion of the attackers on that day.

In the description presented elsewhere in this report of the various groups and objectives within Islamic entities, we ran into similar problems of uncovering some unifying ideology to link them. Nonetheless, the alignment along sectarian, nationalistic, ethnic, and other lines is a theme within the construct of the long war, and there are many events that might precipitate that alignment. Despite this, it might fall short of a civilizational struggle and perhaps be more akin to opportunistic objective sharing than ideologically or civilizationally motivated coherence. One recent example of a spark that garnered widespread support within the Muslim world was the now infamous Danish cartoons.

In late 2005 the Danish daily *Jyllands-Posten* published 12 cartoons depicting interpretations of Mohammad. The eventual reproduction of the cartoons in papers around the world sparked reaction and violence in multiple countries. This event motivated Islamic groups around the world to protest through rallies in diverse countries and boycotts of Danish products. The individual acts escalated to the country level—Iran and Saudi Arabia issued bans on consumer goods imported from Denmark. On the economic side, the unrest caused by the cartoons was implicated in many large-scale deals between countries, and there was estimated a 7.5 billion kroner damage (approximately US$1.4 billion) to the country (Allagui, 2006).

The eventual effect of the Danish cartoons in rallying people around the world for some cause is an example of an event that might precipitate a more collective movement among extremist elements. For example, a call to arms from a charismatic religious leader or polarizing stance from a non-Islamic leader, such as the Catholic Pope, could provide the impetus for a similar grass-roots upheaval within the Islamic world. As well, political events within the Middle East could also exacerbate ideological, racial, and ethnic divisions. An increasingly significant Iranian involvement in Iraq or other states could provide the motivation for escalating sectarian violence in other parts of the region.
Civilizational Conflict and the Long War

From the standpoint of this project, futures of large-scale or wholly coalesced civilizational clashes being borne out of the current threats are of extremely low probability. Alignment of disparate ideologies, fomented by poor governance and other motives, is an extrapolation of current events, even though a great many other factors would need to come about for the straight-line projection to be realized. Nonetheless, the tenets of ideology, governance, and individual and group acts of violence entail at least recognition of the similarity between the civilizational construct and the confluence of GTI. Table B.1 has the breakdown of specific wars, primary adversaries, potential goals, and challenges and drawbacks for the civilizational construct. (See Table 2.1 for a similar breakdown for governance, terrorism, and ideology as developed within this report.)

While trajectories in this report have similarities to a larger, more concerted civilizational-style conflict, the expectation for a civilizational conflict is quite low and perhaps more opportunistic than the pure case. For instance, the “Sustained Sunni-Shia Conflict” trajectory has some of the higher-order features of a civilizational conflict. Sectarian violence and escalation of tensions within the Middle East have been well studied as events in Iraq have unfolded. Violence between

Table B.1
Civilizational Construct for the Long War

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature of Problem</th>
<th>Specific War (examples)</th>
<th>Who Is the Primary Adversary?</th>
<th>Potential Goals</th>
<th>Challenges and Drawbacks</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civilizational</td>
<td>Islamic world</td>
<td>Expansionist non-Western</td>
<td>Containment</td>
<td>Alienates large parts</td>
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<td>China (?)</td>
<td>civilizations</td>
<td>Advancement of</td>
<td>of the world</td>
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<td>Incites conflict</td>
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<td>civilization</td>
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<td>May exclude non-</td>
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<td>Islamic threats (?)</td>
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<td>unending</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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different sects of Islam, most notably the Sunni and Shia brands, has been watched closely in relation to other conflicts within the region. The trajectory, however, falls short of the theoretical “civil war” within Islam.

An escalation of the Sunni-Shia conflict across borders would assume that sectarian identification becomes more fundamental and persistent to identification over regional, ethnic, or nationalistic identifiers (Gurr, 1994). The opposite claim can be made as well, and might rely on historical or practical interpretations of opportunism:

The risk of a regional Shiite-Sunni war is modest. The region has endured many civil wars: Algeria, Lebanon, Oman, Oakuistan, Yemen. While some have drawn in outsiders, none has led to war among those outsiders. Such meddlers tend to seek advantage in their neighbors’ civil wars, not to spread them, which is why they rely on proxies to do their fighting. (Simon and Takeyh, 2007)

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For the purposes of this report, the probability and potentiality of some full-scale or concerted Sunni-Shia civil war is left to future debate and analysis. Rather, the “Sustained Sunni-Shia Conflict” trajectory addresses the escalation of the current sectarian violence to other areas of the Muslim world, but certainly short of a civilizational conflict.

There are many problems inherent in viewing the current situation as on a path to a civilizational conflict, even beyond the lack of empirical data to support such an assertion. Indeed, policies adopted to “combat” an assumed civilizational conflict could end up creating that very situation. In the wake of U.S. operations in the Middle East, already-existing tensions could be exacerbated by official rhetoric on the subject that would provide the motivation for leaders to prey upon. In addition, if the civilizational conflict construct had not coalesced to date, the use of the term by some authority could legitimize an otherwise fringe element.

While we might suspend disbelief that some far-off future holds a more coalesced “Us versus Them” (Kalin, 2001) alignment, the emergence of a civilizational conflict remains unimportant in terms of discussing the long war in the timeline we are interested in. Thus, we do not consider it a major component of current or future states of the long war.
In this section the influence diagram shown in Figures C.1 and C.2 is developed more slowly. A description of the boxes added in each step is given to describe in more detail the relationships that are covered by the diagram.

**Figure C.1**  
Influence Diagram: Stage 1
Stage 1, illustrated in Figure C.1, shows the seven direct influences on the threat of the Salafi-jihadists that were identified. We now describe each, starting at about one o’clock and moving clockwise.

The effectiveness of the leadership of the Salafi-jihadist groups is the first factor. These people need to be able to maintain some degree of control, aid in recruitment, set goals, and be a key part of the organization’s external image. The effectiveness of the leadership group is also a key influence on the number of recruits available. Within this concept is the group’s ability to adapt to change and learn from its mistakes and successes.

The number of recruits available to the group is important in conducting tasks/missions. These may range from single-person operations, suicide bombings, or IED attacks to guerilla attacks to conventional attacks. All of these tasks require people to perform them.

The availability of funds allows organizations to purchase equipment, pay/bribe officials, conduct training, and carry out a host of other activities. The more funds the organization has, the more operations and the more threatening operations it is likely to be able to fund, and hence the greater its threat.

As the lethality of the terrorists grows, the threat from individual attacks increases. Even if the number of attacks can be controlled, the widely expected increase in lethality of individuals adds to the threat posed by the group.

To conduct training, organize recruiting, and manage operations, a group requires bases, often referred to as safe havens. These bases are most effective if they are not under constant threat of attack from U.S. or other forces. The al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan prior to the U.S.-led toppling of the Taliban were a significant factor. This training includes both externally supported and driven training, and internally driven lessons learned and growth within the organization. The latter is a subject of increasing interest within the research community.

International legitimacy is a key component of the threat of Salafi-jihadism. A group that has international legitimacy has a great many more strategies available to it and is less vulnerable to missteps. Addi-
tionally, U.S. action against such a group is likely to have at least some negative consequences.

Finally, the training, logistical, tactical, and other information a group is able to receive from other terrorist organizations is important. Whether this is the construction of more effective IEDs or the development of effective terror tactics, these relationships are important. Organizations need not share common ideologies, as they may have other incentives to cooperate. This sort of exchange of information could be especially important in developing effective leadership.

Beyond these seven initial factors is an ever-increasing set of new influencers. Figure C.2 illustrates some of these second-order factors.

Starting at the same point as on the previous diagram, we see that the “number of students in radical Islamic schools” is a key factor in determining both the effectiveness of the leadership, since this is a likely source of leaders, and the general number of recruits.

The number of recruits is also affected by the degree of anger felt by people against the West, the number of unemployed, and the number of people severely angered by local issues. These sorts of people probably do not (at least initially) share the Salafi-jihadist ideology but make up many of the available recruits.

Additionally, the number of recruits is driven by the seen level of illegitimacy of the governments of Muslim countries such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

The final, and important, driver for the number of recruits is the number of people who don’t belong to Salafi-jihadist organizations, but who are willing to turn a blind eye to activities or provide passive support. In the illustration these people are termed passive supporters. These people can also provide safe havens.

The funds provided to the groups are sourced from a large number of areas, including criminal activities and donations by individuals and states, as well as existing, often abundant, funds. Passive supports aid in gaining donations, especially from individuals, by either donating themselves or seeking others to donate through questionable charities. Technically this link is a third-order linkage, but this only refers to its distance from the center, not its level of importance.
The lethality of the terrorists depends on their ability to obtain nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons and also the general level of proliferation of other weapons. The threat posed by nuclear weapons has been separated from other WMD because of the perceptions associated with the use of this type of weapon and the increased difficulties in obtaining them.

Figure C.3 illustrates the remaining second-order influences.
Safe havens may be provided by state sponsors, who must be powerful enough to resist international pressure to remove them. They may also occur in lawless regions of states where the central authority has
very little power or where the cost of acting is greater than the benefits (such as potentially in Pakistan). Additionally, failed states that have no effective government are potential safe havens. This is in addition to the smaller types of safe havens likely to be provided by passive supporters. If these passive supporters form a large enough community, then the community may be able to provide limited safe havens against the wishes of weak governments.

The level of international legitimacy of the threat organizations is driven by their political involvement in various processes. The inclusion of groups in peace talks can be a double-edged sword in this regard, and so for the purposes of this diagram only non-peace political interactions have been included.

The illegitimate actions by the United States can also be seen as legitimizing the organizations.

The ability of the Salafi-jihadists to benefit from support from other terrorist organizations relies on their ability to communicate with these organizations. Additionally, there must be some shared benefit in the collaboration represented by the unity of terror groups worldwide. The other terror groups must also have the resources and capability to be of assistance.

Further expanding the analysis yields additional factors, illustrated in Figure C.4.

First, we note that the number of these passive supporters is driven in part by the effectiveness of the leadership and the level of legitimacy of the organizations. The elements “closest to” passive supporters capture much of the ideological aspect of the issue.

Related to this is the support provided by wealthy Muslims and states (such as Saudi Arabia and some of its citizens) to radical Islamic schools, which they rely upon for their survival. These donations are often motivated by religious convictions and the degree of anger/frustration with the West.

In the bottom right, groups with the potential to overthrow governments and establish governments that are likely to pose a threat should themselves be considered a threat.

Extra linkages are developed between the power of state sponsors and the proliferation of weapons, both of mass destruction and not.
Additionally, a link between state sponsors and donations by state sponsors is an obvious connection.
Nonstate sponsors who might choose to proliferate WMD, such as North Korea, are also important factors in the potential for these groups to obtain these sorts of weapons. While these states might not support the goals of the Salafi-jihadists, their willingness to export WMD increases the risk of such groups obtaining them.

The existence of anti-U.S./anti-Western governments that might in turn support states that support terrorism is a significant factor in the power of these states. Should a new superpower develop, its relationship with the state supporters/sponsors would be crucial.

Finally, the number of failing states directly leads to the number of failed states.

Such an analysis can be expanded further. The one presented here is not meant as a complete analysis and has been artificially limited by the size of PowerPoint slides.

A more complex representation could also be developed by allowing for feedback loops, as in traditional influence diagrams. However, this representation captures many of the main issues in a relatively simple format.
Grand Strategies

An important consideration for the use and implications of the various long war strategies shown above is how these different strategies could fit into a larger grand strategy that the U.S. military might have to accommodate. For the purposes of this report, we use the term “grand strategy” to be the integrating guidance for the use of DIME means to pursue a state’s ultimate objectives in an international system.\(^1\) The descriptions of these grand strategies relate to overall foreign policies adopted throughout history within the United States, with a focus more on the military implications of those policies. The distinction between foreign policies and grand strategies has been discussed elsewhere.\(^2\)

Grand strategies for the U.S. military are set at the national level. While the Army does not control this policy, the effects of a choice in grand strategy should be understood in terms of the environment in which it works. Therefore, the choices the Army does make, whether they involve force readiness, capabilities, personnel, or other choices under its belt, should include some consideration of the alignment and applicability to overall grand strategies it expects to be working under. To that end, comparing potential future U.S. grand strategies with potential U.S. strategies for prosecuting the long war will be important.

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\(^1\) For example, see Kennedy (1991) for a general discussion of the topic among various authors, and Biddle (2005) for a discussion of post–9/11 American grand strategies.

\(^2\) Luttwak (1987).
In this appendix, we describe six potential grand strategies as gleaned from the literature. We also consider their consistency with the long war strategies described elsewhere in this report.

**Neo-Isolationism**
This grand strategy entails a focus on homeland security and a major reduction in our overseas military commitments and alliance obligations. The United States would pursue security relationships with friendly states on a largely ad hoc basis. Quick strikes against major terror targets would be launched periodically through the use of temporary access to foreign bases.

The United States would largely rely on its economic, diplomatic, and ideational power to influence the international environment—much as it did during the 1920s. The Navy would become the most important and well-funded service; the United States would also work hard to ensure its continued preeminence in space.

**Offshore Balancing**
This is the first of the two classical realist options. It holds that the United States would seek to preserve rough balances of power in the two or three most critical regions of the world (e.g., Europe, the Persian Gulf, Northeast Asia) by using standoff measures (aircraft carriers, long-range air power), arms sales, and loose alliance structures to support status quo states against aspiring hegemons. Certain regional allies would be used as proxies in the long war. The Nixon Doctrine of the early 1970s is a good analogue to this option.

**Selective Engagement.**
This is another realist option. It is more ambitious than offshore balancing. Here the United States elects to become deeply engaged in the critical regions chosen in the option above. This engagement includes the forward positioning of significant ground and air forces and the formation of tight alliance structures.
Cooperative Security
This is the liberal internationalist option. It holds that the United States should work with other Western states to enforce a set of liberal norms for international behavior (i.e., genocide will not be permitted anywhere, etc.) Humanitarian relief and peacekeeping missions would become commonplace for the United States and relations with the UN would deepen. Strategic interests would take a back seat to efforts to “do good” in the world. Under this grand strategy a U.S. military intervention in Darfur would be far more likely than an Operation Iraqi Freedom–style regime change operation against a rogue state. Efforts to stop WMD proliferation everywhere would be intense in this world but would be conducted largely through multilateral diplomacy, sanctions, and short sets of precision air strikes, rather than through massive applications of military power.

Pursue Primacy
This is the strategy of preventing any conceivable peer competitor from rising anywhere in the world. It also aims to project American power throughout all regions of the world with the assertive use of military and diplomatic power and the enforcement of free trade agreements. This is essentially a Pax Americana strategy.

Primacy Plus
This is a strategy of pursuing primacy and having a declared policy of military preemption against any perceived threat to the United States, from terrorist groups to rogue states to potential near peer competitors. Accompanying the preemption policy would be an effort to impose Western democracy throughout the world.

Consistency Among Long War Strategies and Grand Strategies
Each of the pure long war strategies described above can be more or less compatible with each of the grand strategies. That is, since the long war is only part of the U.S. national strategy, any long war strategy
pertaining to U.S. actions will need to be in line with or at least not in conflict with any particular overall policy doctrine set forth at the national level. For the purposes of this section, we do not provide any rigorous analysis of consistency; rather, we look on the surface and note that some grand strategies are “consistent,” others are “somewhat consistent,” and still others “not consistent.”

There are uses for such an exercise. First, the strategy has not been explicitly set on how the military will combat this long war as it unfolds. Past and current operations, as well as previous policy statements (such as those in the QDR, NSS, and other official documents) may not stand, and new strategies will not be crafted in isolation from other aspects of national concern. Thus, as events unfold and changes are made in what the military needs to consider and prepare for, an articulation of potential strategies based on other strategies is necessary.

Also, actions associated with this long war need to fit into higher-order U.S. policies, or at least not be in conflict with what the United States stands for. A broad look across the grand strategies possible may help facilitate discussions on how individual actions within the military might play out on larger overall goals of the United States. It should be noted that inconsistency among grand and long war strategies may not preclude actions being taken.

Table D.1 shows how each strategy fared against the others. Some of the long war strategies are more compatible across the grand strategies. For instance, “Divide and Rule,” which selectively exploits fault lines among disparate groups, is consistent across most grand strategies. Likewise, certain grand strategies, such as “Selective Engagement,” are consistent across a larger number of the long war strategies we developed earlier.

The color coding in Table D.1 is open for interpretation, and while we have justification for these values, a more lengthy discussion may uncover nuances or rationale for alternative codings. To the extent that this type of critical thinking advances how the U.S. leadership might envision the larger efforts ongoing in U.S. foreign policy, or how U.S. Army leadership might envision their role as part of the larger U.S. foreign policy system, the framework is useful.
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<th>Divide and Rule</th>
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<th>Inside Out</th>
<th>State-Centric</th>
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KEY: White = consistent, medium gray = somewhat consistent, black = not consistent.
In the near future, and throughout the timeline considered by this project, the economies of the industrialized states will continue to rely heavily on oil, thus making it a strategically important resource. The United States, as well as other industrialized states, therefore has an interest in maintaining stability and good relations with countries that produce oil. Much of this oil is, and will continue to be, produced in the Middle East and the former Soviet Republics. The United States and other states therefore have motive for maintaining stability in and good relations with Middle Eastern states.

Nearly 62 percent of proven oil reserves are located in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia accounts for the largest portion of that (about 36 percent) along with Iran, Iraq, and Kuwait making up about 15 percent of the proven reserves in the region. Kazakhstan and Russia account for a combined 10 percent of world proven reserves. Figure E.1 shows the breakdown by percentage across both natural gas and oil reserves. The natural gas proven reserves follow similar to the oil, with the exception that the largest region of natural gas development is in Russia.

The geographic area of proven oil reserves coincides with the power base of much of the Salafi-jihadist network. This creates a linkage between oil supplies and the long war that is not easily broken or simply characterized. Oil sales will continue to finance much of what occurs in the Middle East—be it good, bad, or somewhere in between.

1 Numbers taken from British Petroleum (2007). “Proven” reserves entail geologic or engineering support for the sources to be extractable under existing economic and operating conditions.
Of the alternative sources of energy, none can currently compete with oil on a cost basis. Although the development of new technology may help change this in the future, such a breakthrough does not appear to be within the time horizon of this study. The use of alternative fuel sources and increased efficiency of use may somewhat alleviate the U.S. dependence on oil, but it will not remove (and may not even reduce) it in the short or medium term. Thus, the United States will continue to benefit from a stable and nonhostile Middle East.

Disruptions from internal unrest, market forces, and individual incidents associated with oil and gas infrastructure are known (see Figure E.2) and will continue to be applicable to future planning for contingencies.
Figure E.2
Disruptions in Oil Production

NOTE: Scale is shown in millions of barrels per day per total world production, normalized to “Nigeria Unrest” = 1. The numbers to the right of the bars are the total duration (in months) of the disruption. (Energy Information Administration, 2007)
For the foreseeable future, world oil production growth and total output will be dominated by Persian Gulf resources (see Figure E.3). The region will therefore remain a strategic priority, and this priority will interact strongly with that of prosecuting the long war.

**Figure E.3**
World Oil Production Projections Shown in Millions of Barrels per Day

NOTE: The breakdown is mature market economies (purple: United States is about half of this category, with Western Europe, Canada, Mexico, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand comprising the remainder), transitional (red: former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe), emerging (yellow: China is about 25 percent, also includes Asia, Middle East, Africa, South America, and Central America), and OPEC (light blue). The breakdown between Persian Gulf (PG) and other OPEC is for the 2025 projection only. (Energy Information Administration, 2007)
Demographic trends and factors—including low fertility rates in Europe, migrant and refugee flows from the Middle East, an increase in the percentage of youth in Middle Eastern countries, the changing ethnic and sectarian composition of some regions of the Middle East, natural resource constraints, and the spread of radical Islam—will play an important role in the long war as it unfolds. It is useful to understand how demography will shape the course of this struggle and what the implications of demographic trends and factors are for Army operations, doctrine, and acquisition strategy. This short section will try to frame the issue of demography in the long war, albeit at a very high level.

**European Demographics**

One of the more important demographic trends affecting the long war lies not in the Middle East, but in Europe. Virtually all of America’s key NATO allies have low fertility rates, stagnant or declining total populations, and rapidly growing numbers of elderly citizens. Great Britain’s fertility rate\(^1\) is 1.7, France’s is 1.9, and Germany’s is a stunningly low

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\(^1\) Total fertility rates (TFR) are based on the average number of children born to a woman during her lifetime. For comparison, U.S. fertility rates are 2.0 versus a world fertility rate of 2.7. In a country like the United States, a TFR of 2.1 produces replacement-level fertility; values less than 2.1 indicate a shrinking population. In a country with high mortality such as Sierra Leone, replacement-level fertility would require a TFR greater than 3 (McFalls, 2003).
1.3. Germany’s current population of 82 million will decline to 75 million in 2050. These low fertility profiles in Europe may affect U.S. allies’ ability and willingness to deploy military forces alongside those of the United States in expeditionary operations in the long war.

This decline is not unique to Europe and will occur in some countries such as Japan. Immigration to the United States from Mexico and Central America may limit these effects on the U.S. population, although it will change the demographics of the United States in its own way.

Europe faces a similar decline in population growth in its traditional ethnic groups. In Europe’s case, most immigration is from Islamic countries. This has the potential to change the ethnic/religious nature of Europe, which may affect its role in prosecuting the long war in the longer term.

Migration

Migrant and refugee flows also impact the stability of the Middle East. Some of the flows originating in the Middle East move into Europe and East Asia, where they have security implications as well. The longest standing migration factor in the long war is the presence of about 4.3 million Palestinian refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, other Middle Eastern countries, and Europe. These are people who fled Mandate Palestine after the Israeli victories in the 1948 and 1967 Middle Eastern wars. The living conditions of these refugees vary across countries. In Jordan, the Palestinians are well integrated into society and some have high income levels. On the other hand, in Lebanon the Palestinian refugee population of 400,000 is kept in refugee camps and is

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4 Specifically, there are 2.7 million Palestinians in Jordan, 400,000 in Lebanon, 400,000 in Syria, 500,000 spread across the rest of the Middle East, and 300,000 in Europe and other Western countries. See McCarthy and Nichiporuk (2005, p. 76).
barred from entering Lebanese society. The right of return for this large Palestinian diaspora is a complicating factor in the Middle East peace process.

Another trend affecting security is the flow of migrants from the Middle East, Persian Gulf, South Asia, and North Africa into other regions. Long-standing immigration flows from North Africa, Turkey, and Pakistan into Western Europe have created a large Muslim diaspora within which radical terrorist groups can find a haven as well as some sympathy. Close to 10 percent of France’s population is Muslim, and about 1.5–2 million Muslims reside in the United Kingdom. The Muslim community in France is largely composed of Algerians and Moroccans, while that in the United Kingdom is made up mainly of Pakistani and Bangladeshi immigrants and their children. Recent public opinion polling indicates that some European Muslim populations sympathize at least somewhat with the plight of the terrorists in their use of terrorism against the West and its interests.5

**Youth Bulges in the Middle East**

Youth bulges in the Arab world and Pakistan are significant at many levels. In Saudi Arabia, fully 40 percent of the population is under 15, while in the Palestinian Territories that figure rises to an astonishing 46 percent. Similar youth bulges exist in Yemen, Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq. Figure F.1 shows the population pyramid for Saudi Arabia. These countries still maintain high fertility rates at a time when improving public health measures like clean drinking water and vaccinations for children are reducing infant mortality. Fertility rates are starting to decline in much of the Middle East and Persian Gulf. Iran, for example, has substantially decreased its fertility rate over the past decade with an ambitious national family planning program. As a result, it is

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5 An ICM poll prepared for the *Sunday Telegraph* found that 20 percent of those polled felt “sympathy with the feelings and motives” of the terrorists from the July 7, 2005 London bombings. See “Sunday Telegraph Muslims Poll—February 2006,” Table 10, p. 11. Available through the ICM Research website, http://www.icmresearch.co.uk/.
fair to say that by 2025, the youth bulge problem in the Middle East will begin to ease.

The Middle Eastern youth bulge puts pressure on conservative Sunni regimes like Egypt and Saudi Arabia that are allies of the United States in the long war. These regimes, which are not efficient providers of services in the first place, have to contend with great demand for primary and secondary education, children’s health care, transportation infrastructure, and entry-level jobs. In general, they are not able to meet these demands, and the result is a high level of social frustration that can be exploited by radical Islamists. The security forces of these regimes have been effective in preventing real insurgencies from developing in these countries, but the regimes have been unable to keep...
radical Islamists from gaining significant social and ideological power in these states.

This youth bulge problem also confronts Iran. Iran’s large youth population also strains the country’s resources and, by all accounts, favors political reform and social liberalization. However, the hard-line Islamists associated with the Ahmadinejad regime have so far been able to deter Iran’s liberal youth from taking to the streets in large numbers to demand change.6

Sectarian Composition

Ethnic/sectarian composition is also a major demographic issue in parts of the Middle East. Israel and the Palestinian Territories is a particular case. Palestinian fertility rates are higher than Jewish ones and, absent any major new migration of Jews into Israel from other countries, the demographic balance between Israel and the Palestinians will shift in favor of the Palestinians over time. Today, the best estimates are that there are 6.8 million people in Israel while the Palestinian Territories host around 3.5 million. However, at least 1 million residents of Israel are Palestinians, so the current balance between Jews and Palestinians in Mandate Palestine is roughly about 5.8 million to 4.5 million.

Lebanon is another flashpoint in terms of sectarian composition. The Shiite population is growing more rapidly than the Christian and Sunni Muslim populations, which is straining Lebanon’s sectarian apportionment political system, a system that has been in place since the 1930s. Increasing Shiite political aspirations are heavily driven by

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6 It should be noted that 2–3 years of high oil prices have provided the Iranian economy with a major influx of export revenue; however, this inflow has not helped to pacify those elements of the Iranian youth population that are unhappy with clerical rule. This is because the regime of President Ahmadinejad has largely mismanaged the Iranian economy to the point where the high levels of oil export revenue are not having much effect at all on the lives of ordinary Iranians. Worsening inflation and increasing unemployment rates have added to the concerns of the population. Despite the increases in oil revenue, the Iranian economy remains a cause of frustration and discontent among the country’s liberal youth elements, and this fact is one of the reasons why the regime is now using overtly repressive measures against these elements.
the changing demographic realities of Lebanon, and they have helped support the rise of Hezbollah as a force in national politics.

Additionally, the sectarian violence in Iraq has exacerbated tensions specifically along the Shiite-Sunni fault lines that exist in many Muslim countries.\textsuperscript{7} Tensions have risen noticeably in Muslim countries where the Shiites comprise 10 percent or more of the total population. These include Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Lebanon, Qatar, Syria, and Bahrain.\textsuperscript{8} In the last country mentioned, Shiites are a strong majority of the total population.

**Radicalization Spreading**

The flow of former guest workers in the Persian Gulf countries back to their home states of the Philippines, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India, and Pakistan is not well understood. There is some anecdotal evidence that small percentages of these returning guest workers embraced radical Islam during their time in the Persian Gulf and are eager to spread violent jihad in their home countries once they get settled and have the time to establish networks of like-minded individuals.

A small percentage of these guest workers come to embrace radical Wahhabism while employed in Saudi Arabia or the Gulf states and, when they return to their home countries, they either attempt to spread the message of radical Islam or attempt to use violence against their home governments in the name of jihad. In the Philippines, for example, one of the more violent jihadist groups operating today, the Rajah Solaiman Movement (RSM), is a small group of former guest workers in Saudi Arabia who have vowed to launch a jihad in their home country similar to that being conducted by the Abu Sayyaf Group (International Crisis Group, 2005b).

\textsuperscript{7} For a discussion of the rising sectarian tensions, see Nasr (2006, pp. 58–74).

\textsuperscript{8} The current position and developing attitudes of the Shiite minority in Saudi Arabia is discussed in International Crisis Group (2005a).
Fresh water shortages in the Middle East are one particular example of natural resource constraints that, in conjunction with demographic changes, may be important into the future and eventually shape the long war. Increasing populations and the effects of creeping desertification are reducing per capita water availability to dangerously low levels in Iran, Egypt, the West Bank, and the whole of the Arabian Peninsula. Sustainable development is difficult to accomplish when water scarcity exists. Water shortages raise the prospect that water might be used as a weapon in future conflicts.

Upstream countries on the region’s major rivers have already built large dams that would allow them to restrict the flow of water to downstream countries during a crisis or war. Most of these downstream states are water-scarce countries (see Figure G.1) that would suffer greatly if their flow of fresh river water were to be shut off for any length of time. The two conflict dyads to watch in this area are Sudan versus Egypt and Turkey versus Syria/Iraq. Both Sudan and Turkey are upstream countries that control the flow of the Nile and Euphrates Rivers respectively. Egypt, Syria, and Iraq are downstream countries that are becoming increasingly water scarce as their populations grow.
Figure G.1
Per Capita Fresh Water Availability Projections for 1995, 2025, and 2050

NOTE: More than 1,700 cubic meters per person is considered adequate, between 1,000 and 1,700 is considered “water stressed” and below 1,000 is considered “water scarce” (data from Gardner-Outlaw and Engelman, 1997; Falkenmark and Widstrand, 1992).

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