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C O N T E N T S

Contributors

Bob Bergin is a former foreign service officer who has spent many years in Thailand. He has written on the history of aviation in Southeast Asia and China and on operations of the OSS in that region.

Nicholas Dujmovic is a CIA historian, veteran intelligence analyst, member of the Studies Editorial Board and a frequent contributor. He is the compiler and editor of *The Literary Spy*.

Hayden Peake is the curator of the CIA Historical Intelligence Collection. He served in the Directorate of Science and Technology and the Directorate of Operations.

David Robarge is the CIA's Chief Historian. He is a frequent reviewer of books and contributor to *Studies*. He is the author of a number of classified histories, including a biography of former Director of Central Intelligence John McCone.

Gerhardt Thamm served in both Army and Navy intelligence. He was an analyst and team leader in the Office of Naval Intelligence when he wrote the enclosed article. He is now retired.

In Memory of Thomas Francis Troy, CIA Teacher, Historian, 1919–2008

By Hayden Peake and Nicholas Dujmovic

Thomas F. Troy, a career CIA officer, teacher and lecturer, and pioneering historian of the CIA's origins, died on 30 July in Bethesda, Maryland.

Tom grew up and was educated in Massachusetts, graduating from the College of the Holy Cross in Worcester (class of 1941). He joined the Army and was sent to Princeton University to study Arabic. During the war he served in the Middle East monitoring communications. He returned to college after the war, taking advantage of the GI Bill to earn a masters degree in political philosophy at Fordham University. After trying his luck as a newscaster, freelance writer, and college teacher, he joined CIA in 1951 as an analyst in the Near East section of the Office of Current Intelligence (OCI) in the Directorate of Intelligence. He soon married Elizabeth Cashman; eventually they had a family of eight children, six daughters and two sons.

Tom's expertise was widely acknowledged, but he was famous for resenting the editing that analysts suffer, and he grew increasingly unhappy with OCI management. The feeling was mutual—Tom wasn't quite fired, but he was encouraged to seek a job elsewhere in the Agency. He found his niche in the Office of Training (later the Office of Training and Education), where from the outset he was recognized as an outstanding, even visionary, teacher. Tom helped create the area training program, including the courses on the Middle East and North Africa regions. During the mid-1960s, he developed the Vietnam Orientation Course, an effort the chief of the Far East Division of the Directorate of Plans, William Colby, particularly praised.

In 1969, while still teaching, he became interested in the Agency's history. The director of training, a former OSS officer, approved an unofficial project for Tom and worked out an arrangement that gave him time to conduct research—including money to travel—and write a history of the origins of OSS under William Donovan and its transformation into CIA. On this, Tom labored for five and a half years. His work came to the attention of senior Agency leaders, who supported and praised it, even though some in his office disapproved of it as a diversion from its training mission. The result, *Donovan and the CIA: A History of the Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency*, was initially published internally in two spiral-bound volumes classified SECRET. Most of the classified

material dealt with references to third-party material and personnel, which, once deleted, made possible an unclassified paperback edition in 1979.

After Tom retired in January 1982, he joined University Publications of America as editor of an intelligence book series. One of the first volumes he published was a hardbound edition of *Donovan and the CIA*. For cost reasons, the first printing did not have a dust jacket. But the demand was so great that one was subsequently printed and furnished on request and with new copies. The work remains the best source on the topic, a benchmark for scholarship and documentation. It was given an award by the National Intelligence Study Center in 1981 as the best non-fiction book of the year.

Tom later completed another historical study of the CIA's creation, *Wild Bill and Intrepid: Donovan, Stephenson and the Origins of the CIA*, which drew heavily on Tom's interviews with Sir William Stephenson. This volume was published by Yale University Press in 1996.

In his retirement, Tom started a bimonthly newsletter—the *Foreign Intelligence Literary Scene*. He originally thought to call the newsletter the *Foreign Intelligence Bulletin* (FIB), but he had trouble attracting authors to a journal with such an acronym and changed it before the first issue appeared. It dealt with books, personalities and events in the Intelligence Community. There was no competition and it proved a success for the next 10 years. In the early 1990s, it was published by Ray Cline's National Intelligence Study Center until the Internet made it obsolete.

Tom continued to write articles and book reviews for *Studies.* His work has also appeared in the *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* and in the journal *Intelligence and National Security.*

In 2000, a former Agency officer published a book suggesting that William Donovan's role in the creation of the CIA was significantly less important than Tom's work suggested. Tom attended a talk the author gave at the National Archives and raised questions that clearly annoyed the author because he couldn't answer them. Tom's approach in questioning the author was perfectly in character: he was smiling and friendly, yet persistent. He could make his point without giving permanent offense.

In the hours before his death, Tom told his family that he couldn't wait to resume work on his next book, a biography of Sir William Wiseman, the MI-6 head of station in America during World War I. Tom had finished 15 chapters.

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Commemoration of the Dead at CIA

Nicholas Dujmovic

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amnesia. *Loss of memory.*

anamnesis. *The recalling of things past; recollection; reminiscence.*

—*Oxford English Dictionary*, Online Edition.

> " *History—as it is learned and remembered—shapes identity.* "

Almost every federal agency has a history unit or staff, but, to a degree that is unique in government, CIA's History Staff exists not so much to help explain the Agency to the public—though we do that too in our external publications and appearances—but rather to explain CIA to ourselves. We do that by publishing classified histories, monographs, and articles in *Studies in Intelligence*; by giving briefings on historical topics or figures; by answering requests for historical context and information from the Agency's leadership; and by teaching in CIA's training facilities.[1]

History, however, is more than a product like an article, book, or briefing; it's even more than the myriad documents or oral histories that serve as primary sources. History also comprises transmitted memory, values, and culture, and therefore history—as it is learned and remembered—shapes identity. History as memory and identity helps define who we are, what we are doing, and where we are going. One of the most important aspects of organizational or institutional memory deals with remembering the dead—those of the organization who gave their lives for the organization and its mission.

Object, Action, and Content: The Essential Elements of Commemoration

Few things are more deeply human or older in human experience than commemoration of the dead. This is reflected in language and in the physical remnants of the past. For example, linguists note a pre-

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[1] This essay is based in part on the author's presentation to the 2005 conference of the Society for History in the Federal Government.

historic Indo-European link between ancient words for "remembering," for "witness," and for "martyr" (someone who gives his life for a cause greater than the individual).[2] In recent years, some British archeologists have concluded that Stonehenge, the ancient monument on Britain's Salisbury Plain, is primarily a memorial to the dead rather than a temple, observatory, or war monument.[3]

The various words we use today to express the central idea of calling to mind departed people and past events—commemoration, remembrance, or memorialization—are all based on the word "memory." For individuals, memory is both a natural and an elusive thing. While individual memory is natural, it fades over time and dies with the person.

For communities, institutions, and organizations, by contrast, memory is not natural—it has to be arranged and managed—but it can be made more lasting than the life of any single individual. Effective commemoration by an institution, to my mind, must have three essential elements that work together: *object, action*, and *content*. By *object* is meant the

physical thing or space (or both) that serves to represent or depict the collective memory and also serves as a focal point for the *action*, which is the gathering together of individuals for the express purpose of remembering. This *action* will be more effective the more it is repeated regularly, rising to the level of *ritual,* purposefully and uniformly connecting the past with the present. Finally, the *content* associated with the *object* and the *action*—who is being remembered, what they did, when and how, and why it remains important for the community—should be as specific as possible, or the commemoration will not be as effective as it could be.

CIA's Memorial Wall (shown below) represents the best example at the Agency of effec-

tive commemoration and probably is the best possible expression of it by an intelligence service, given the inherent tension between secrecy and specificity of identity: The wall is the *object;* the annual ceremony is the *action;* and *content* is provided by the Book of Honor at the wall and by the roll call of names read at every annual ceremony.[4]

By contrast, the Memorial Garden near the Headquarters Auditorium lacks two of these key features of commemoration. To be sure, as an *object* the garden with its pool and fish, stonework, and benches is a very pleasant place (shown on facing page). It was intended to

[4] See: https://www.cia.gov/about-cia/virtual-tour/virtual-tour-flash/index.html.

[2] See the *OED* entry for **memory**.
[3] John Noble Wilford, "Stonehenge was a monument to the dead from the start," *International Herald Tribune* (online edition), 30 May 2008. See also the Web site of the Stonehenge Riverside Project at http://www.shef.ac.uk/archaeology/research/stonehenge.

be pleasant, and thus it succeeds as a place of reflection. But it lacks both the *action* and *content* necessary for effective commemoration.

From the time of the garden's dedication in 1996, there has not been a single assembly of the Agency community at the site. Moreover, the Memorial Garden was dedicated broadly in memory of all people who died while working for or with the Agency—staff and contractors (thereby overlapping with the Memorial Wall), employees of proprietaries, and also foreign national employees and assets. There is little specificity, as the plaque in the garden reveals: "In remembrance of those whose unheralded efforts served a grateful nation." People who enjoy the site should be forgiven if its purpose eludes them.

Another commemorative effort is the memorial for two CIA officers slain on Route 123, the public road near the main CIA entrance. While there is an impressive commemorative *object* with specific *content*—twin benches with a marble inscription naming the men and honoring their sacrifice—it is so far from the orbit of everyday CIA community life that almost the only CIA employees who see it do so while driving into or out of the compound (or while jogging by). I understand that family members gather periodically at the site, but the lack of commemorative *action* by the institution would make it likely

the men would be forgotten except by family—if they were not already memorialized at the annual memorial ceremony.

For institutions, preserving memory is a challenge, not the least over who or what should be remembered. Historians who specialize in the relatively new field of "memory studies" point out that in recent centuries commemoration of the past has often been contentious, especially when the commemorative act or function deals with remembering the dead.[5] The idea that institutions and organizations *ought* to commemorate at least some of its deceased membership is usu-

[5] See, for example, Edward Lilenthal's *Sacred Ground: Americans and their Battlefields* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1991), and his *Preserving Memory: The Struggle to Create America's Holocaust Museum* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995).

ally not controversial—the issue is *how* to do it.

The potential points of disagreement and dispute are numerous: who is chosen for remembrance; by what criteria and process are the choices made; what enduring physical monument will be set up to help us remember the dead (the Vietnam Memorial was hugely contentious on this point); what kind of perennial ceremony, if any, will be conducted to focus collective memory; and even who is deciding on whom to invite to the commemoration.

People in a community or organization typically will have differing opinions on these matters. They are more likely than not to have passionate views about something as personal as honoring dead friends and colleagues, and, in most cases, they will speak out about how they think the dead should be remembered. After an open,

> *For CIA, the first issue has been not* how *but* whether *the dead of the Agency should be commemorated by that community.*

public, and possibly heated debate, the memorial will be constructed, tempers will subside, and gradually, over time, memories of the departed will dim, fewer and fewer members of the community will know their stories, and, in the end, perhaps only the physical memorial itself will be left as a testament to the fallen, with only a few inside specialists aware of just who is being remembered by it.

At the Central Intelligence Agency, however—as with so many things—the normal pattern, if not actually reversed, is at least very different. The primary difference is that, for CIA, the first issue has been not *how* but *whether* the dead of the Agency should be commemorated by that community, and then only secondarily what that commemoration would look like. Commemoration of CIA's dead over the past 60 years has evolved, in a very quiet and gradual way, from, at best, a very limited, ad hoc, and covert practice of insiders—with no lasting memorial to look at—to something regular, surprisingly open, and permanent that involves and informs the Agency community as a whole.

The Unique Nature of CIA Commemoration

For any organization, "commemoration" is the act or acts of remembrance that evoke unique attributes or past achievements of the organization and its members and by which the organization bolsters its sense of identity among its workforce. What is commemorated tends to be both historical and thematic: we remember something or someone in the past and use that remembrance for present purposes, such as to feel better about the work we do, to raise morale, to increase a sense of professionalism, or to remind the workforce about the sacrifice inherent in the work. We also connect with colleagues from the past so that, 50 years from now, our colleagues in the future will be more likely to remember us.

In the case of CIA, we commemorate to create a sense that we, the CIA workforce, have an important mission and one worth the inconveniences, oddities, and sacrifices characteristic of intelligence work. This is the "veneration" part of commemorating the dead; as one historian of memory studies has observed, commemorative acts such as speech making and monument building are designed "to ensure continued allegiance" and to provide a defense against attacks either

from within (heresy) or without (defilement).[6] Because of the apparent paradox of a secret intelligence service serving a democracy, we CIA officers are continually reminding ourselves that we are "honorable men," in Richard Helms's phrase that later was appropriated by William Colby for the title of his memoirs.[7]

Where We Are in Commemorating the Dead

Today at CIA, our major act of commemoration—the closest thing we have to a collective "vehicle of memory"—is the annual memorial ceremony at which we remember CIA employees who have died in the line of duty. In the current practice, we gather in the lobby of the Original Headquarters Building (OHB), usually in May or June, before the beautiful marble face of the Memorial Wall, on which there are carved, at this writing, 89 stars, one for each fallen CIA employee; this is in accordance with the ancient human tradition of remembering transient lives in the permanence of stone.[8]

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[6] Lilenthal, 5.
[7] "The nation must to a degree take it on faith that we too are honorable men devoted to her service." DCI Richard Helms, address to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Washington, D.C., 14 April 1971. This speech is reprinted in many places, including *Vital Speeches of the Day*; the original is found in ODCI job 80R01284A, box 1, folder 6.
[8] Two stars were added in late May 2008; they represent operations officers who lost their lives in the line of duty this year.

The families, whether their loved one died long ago or just that year, are invited, and many come year after year. The Agency workforce is well represented, with all seats taken and many people standing through the whole ceremony. CIA's closed circuit TV system transmits the event to CIA buildings and facilities in the Washington area and even around the world.

The ceremony is conducted and watched with sobriety and respect. After the guests have been seated and welcomed, an introductory event (variously, in recent years, a military honor guard's presentation of the colors, or the singing of the national anthem, or a benediction) precedes the main event: remarks by the director of CIA (or, infrequently, a suitable senior representative). The director speaks about the nature of CIA's work and the devotion to our country's security represented by the stars on the Memorial Wall.

If there have been CIA deaths in the line of duty since the previous annual ceremony, the director will talk about additional stars on the wall. Even if the names and their stories are classified, he will mention the names, give a summary of their sacrifice, and offer condolences and thanks to the families present. Sometimes he will dwell on the stories of two, three, or four historical cases thematically. George Tenet, when he was director, was gen-

uinely and obviously moved by the stories he was telling, and he often had to brush away tears. Invariably the director exhorts the Agency workforce to remember the stars on the wall and the sacrifices the people they represent made.

A wreath is then laid by the wall. Following is the solemn roll call, sometimes called the Roll of Honor: senior representatives of all four directorates (analytic, operational, science & technology, and support) read aloud the entire list of names of all the stars, even the ones whose association with the CIA are still classified, usually after the director tells everyone that we need to keep those names out of the public. In effect, everyone present is given a limited security clearance for this information. Finally, a bugler plays "Taps," often to the shedding of tears in the audience, and the ceremony is over. The Agency provides refreshments in a nearby hallway, and the families mingle among themselves and with Agency officers who knew their loved ones.

Another aspect of the Memorial Wall is worth noting, one that has been the subject of a book by the journalist Ted Gup, *The Book of Honor*. Gup wrote that "The FBI, DEA, State Department, and even Amtrak have memorial walls to those who died in service. But all of these identify their fallen and celebrate their sacrifices. CIA's is different, a memorial to men and women who are faceless."[9]

He's referring to the Book of Honor that is attached to the Memorial Wall, under the carved stars. This book lists most of the names of the fallen, alongside the year of their death. Of the 89 stars now listed in that book, 35 have blanks where their names should be next to the year of death. Members of the public who visit CIA Headquarters can view the open page of the book and read the names.[10] The name associated with the first star, Douglas Mackiernan, appears next to the year 1950, and his name was revealed only in 2006, 56 years after his death. Of the publicized names, perhaps the most well known are those of Richard Welch, the CIA station chief in Athens,

9 Ted Gup, *The Book of Honor: Covert Lives and Classified Deaths at the CIA* (New York: Doubleday, 2000), 3.
10 Until recently, CIA's public Web site included a picture of the Book of Honor with all the names legible, but in the picture of the book currently used only two names are visible.

who was gunned down at his home just before Christmas 1975, and Johnny Micheal Spann, a CIA paramilitary officer who, in November 2001, was the first US combat death in the Afghanistan campaign.

Despite CIA's unique missions and the unusual circumstances surrounding most of the cases of our fallen officers, the annual memorial ceremony in front of the Memorial Wall with its Book of Honor strikes one as a normal, natural, and appropriate thing to do. It is a permanent feature on the calendar, and the workforce looks forward to it and counts on it. They bring the Agency workforce together in grief, but more importantly, in a sense of purpose. The result of this commemorative activity is a workforce that identifies more closely with CIA service, that is more willing to sacrifice for its

mission, and that as a result arguably does its job better.

Where We've Been

But it was not always so. For most of its history the Agency either chose not to commemorate its dead or did it in a way that did not fulfill a commemorative function for the organization as a whole. Because of the dominant culture of the operations directorate and its tendency to keep so much of its work compartmented, commemoration, if it happened at all, was kept under wraps.[11] Remembrances of the dead were done individually and involved pre-

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[11] The "operations directorate" refers to what today is called the National Clandestine Service, which for more than 30 years was the Directorate of Operations and which old-timers and CIA historians sometimes still call the DDP (for Directorate of Plans).

senting the family, in a small, closed ceremony, with a posthumous award that usually had to stay at the Agency.

This limited commemoration, which sprung out of the cultural attributes of compartmentation and "need to know," resulted in a lack of institutional, corporate memory, so that the memory of departed colleagues was limited to a few insiders within a division or, in many cases, simply lost altogether. Take, for example, the case of Douglas Mackiernan, an operations officer who died in the line of duty very early in the Agency's history. This particularly adventuresome and resourceful CIA officer should have been remembered from his death in 1950 as a hero and inspiration to generations of CIA operations officers.

Instead, he was simply forgotten, even within Far East (later East Asia) division. His own division chief at the time of Mackiernan's death, in writing up a classified history of relevant operations 20 years later, mentions him only in passing—and gets both his name and his date of death wrong. Even worse is the case of Daniel Dennett (see box on next page), a well-regarded officer whose death on an intelligence mission has gone without any commemoration at all, simply through an accident of the calendar.

CIA's Failure of Memory: Daniel Dennett, the Forgotten First Star?

Consider two officers who died in strikingly similar circumstances. In 1989, a CIA officer was killed in the line of duty when the twin-engine aircraft he was traveling in crashed into a mountain in a remote part of the Horn of Africa. Forty-two years before, another officer lost his life, also in the line of duty, when his twin-engine aircraft crashed, also into a mountain in a remote area of the Horn of Africa. Both officers came from academia, both loved history and languages, and both were highly regarded even though both were relatively new to the world of intelligence. There are significant differences in the two cases, of course, but regarding commemoration none more important than this: the officer who died in 1989 is represented by a star on the Memorial Wall and is remembered in the annual memorial ceremony, but the officer who died in 1947 has no memorial at CIA and is not remembered by the institution. How could this be? The answer is as simple as the calendar.

Born in 1910, Daniel C. Dennett, Jr., was a college professor and Mideast specialist with a Harvard Ph.D., proficiency in the Arabic language (as well as in German and French), and experience traveling and studying abroad in Arab and African countries; in the early 1930s he had taught at the American University in Beirut. Contemporary scholars of the Mideast considered him unusually insightful, even brilliant. In 1943, both the Office of Strategic Services and the State Department sought his services, but he chose intelligence over diplomacy and entered OSS. In the spring of 1944, Dennett went to Beirut as the OSS chief of the X-2 (counterintelligence) mission, serving in that position through the war's end and continuing as the representative in Beirut of the Strategic Services Unit, the successor organization of OSS. In mid-1946, Dennett was made the head of operations in Beirut, and he remained in that position when the SSU organization in Beirut was reorganized under the new Central Intelligence Group, the immediate predecessor of CIA.

The plane crash that took Dennett's life occurred on 20 March 1947, six months before CIG swapped its initials for CIA as a result of the Agency's enabling legislation, the National Security Act of 1947. Because Dennett died before CIA legally came into being, his case was automatically disallowed in early 1974 when CIA's Honor and Merit Board considered death cases to be represented by the first stars to be carved onto the Memorial Wall. Although he had been an OSS officer, he died well after World War II ended. Daniel Dennett is represented neither on the OSS memorial on one side of the OHB lobby nor on the CIA Memorial Wall on the other—as a CIG officer he almost literally falls in between, and he has fallen therefore from institutional memory.

There is a compelling argument that this highly praised and deeply respected US intelligence officer should be considered CIA's forgotten first star and should be commemorated on CIA's Memorial Wall. Most aspects of CIG as an organization—leadership, personnel, facilities, files, directives, practices and procedures—remained unchanged when it became CIA. It could be said that the only thing noticeable that changed was the letterhead—except that CIG letterhead was often used until it ran out. Of all the organizational transitions in CIA's direct lineage—OSS to SSU, SSU to CIG, CIG to CIA—the last of these was truly seamless. Certainly the Agency's leadership considered that CIA was simply a continuation of CIG.[1] The most appropriate example of the proposition that a death during the CIG period should be considered a CIA death is the personnel action terminating Dennett's service due to his death: it was executed by CIA on 3 October 1947, 15 days after CIG became CIA.[2]

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[1] See documents on this period in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945-1950: The Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1996). Of special note is CIA general counsel Larry Houston's memo of 7 April 1948 in which he writes, "CIA began to function as CIG on 22 January 1946," i.e. when CIG was established by President Truman's executive order!

[2] At the risk of opening up another case of "failure of memory," I would point out that the airplane crash that killed Dennett also killed five others: one State Department employee and four US military personnel. One of the military men, John W. Creech, was an Army Signal Corps officer on extended assignment to CIG. Under today's practices, he would also be included on the Memorial Wall.

The blame for the lack of commemoration in CIA history must be laid at the door of the operations directorate, but it also gets the credit for the progress toward today's "normal" mode of commemoration.

The blame for the lack of commemoration in CIA history must be laid squarely at the door of the operations directorate, but it also gets all the credit for the progress made to get to today's "normal" mode of commemoration. There have been four major points of departure from CIA's original silence regarding its dead: in 1973, 1987, 1990, and 1995. Surprisingly, *in each case the impetus for change came from the operations directorate.*

Beginning to Open Up: 1973

1973 marks the first major change in how CIA remembered its fallen. It is no accident that, at that time, CIA was under siege. The public view of the Agency was shaped by revelations and exposes in the late 1960s regarding its subsidy of student and other nongovernmental groups as a way to fight the Cold War, and by reports that CIA had trained domestic police forces in apparent violation of its charter. This was a time when the public associated CIA with failures of the war in Southeast Asia and its perceived abuses, especially the Phoenix counterinsurgency program in South Vietnam. And far worse was to come.

The internal sense of being under siege may well have been exacerbated by President Nixon's peremptory firing of Director Helms—because Helms refused to involve CIA in the Watergate cover-up—and his replacement early in 1973 by James Schlesinger, who started a wave of forced retirements—about 7 percent of the workforce—earning him the nickname "Nixon's revenge." John Ranelagh—one of the better historians on CIA—has written of this period,

> *Bound firmly in the public's mind to the growing public disclosures of its secret activities, the CIA was a casualty of this mistrust, with few choices open to it. The agency pulled in its horns and sought a reputation for competence and professionalism in bureaucratic terms.*[12]

It is in this historical context—seeking an expression and an affirmation of professionalism while the Agency, its missions, and its people were under attack—that CIA operations officers in early 1973 proposed the establishment at CIA Headquarters of a memorial plaque to honor their colleagues who had died in the conflict in Southeast Asia.[13] At

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[12] John Ranelagh, *The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), 488.
[13] Horatio Aragon, "Stars on the Wall," *Studies in Intelligence* 35, no. 3 (Fall 1991).

that point, the Agency had, since 1965, lost 14 officers in the region, mostly in Laos and in Vietnam, with four lost in combat operations during the previous year.

At that point, no memorial to the fallen had ever existed at CIA, though at least one high-level officer had tried to create one years before. In 1956, when plans were underway for what would become the Original Headquarters Building, DDCI Pearre Cabell expressed his wish that the new building include a "Hall of Honor" to memorialize CIA employees who had died in the line of duty.[14] Cabell—a West Point graduate and Air Force general—came, of course, from outside of CIA, from a military culture in which such commemoration is taken very seriously, and he considered honoring the fallen in such a place "only fitting and proper." Cabell's initiative went nowhere in the Agency's culture at the time.

But by 1973, with the Agency under attack, there was a felt need for commemoration, and it came from the ranks of the institutional culture, the operations directorate. The Honor and Merit Board responsible for these decisions expanded the concept to include all CIA officers who had died in the line of duty and to make it enduring—

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[14] CIA Office of Personnel memo, "Hall of Honor in New Building," 27 March 1956; in Agency Record Center, DCI Job 80R01731R, box 13, folder 1.

Nathan Hale's statue does not represent progress in CIA's movement toward a more natural approach to commemoration.

a permanent memorial wall rather than a mere plaque that could be removed or lost.

The Nathan Hale Sideshow

At the same time, and presumably issuing from the same felt need, a replica of Yale University's statue of Nathan Hale was made and placed just outside the Agency's main entrance in the fall of 1973.[15] Acquisition of this statue, originally an initiative of Director Helms in 1972 and erected when William Colby was DCI, was the first memorial object at CIA meant for the entire CIA community.[16] Even so, the connection was abstract: Nathan Hale, a Revolutionary War spy hanged by the British, who regretted he had but one life to lose for his country, obviously never served in CIA, but his story and his statue were

meant to evoke among beleaguered intelligence officers a sense of sacrifice for country. In an internal memo, CIA employees were told that the statue "reminds us that American intelligence work began in the earliest days of the republic. [Nathan Hale's] memory is a tribute to the virtues of patriotism and valor to which we all aspire."[17]

The Nathan Hale statue is much beloved by the Agency community. It is a popular

meeting place for individuals and groups. There is an endearing custom associated with the statue: CIA Museum staff often find that quarters have been placed in the metal ropes binding Hale's hands, or in his shoes (Hale's case officer, of course, was George Washington, who is depicted on the face of the quarter). This statue, however, does not represent progress in CIA's movement toward a more natural approach to commemoration.

One would think the Agency leadership of the mid-1970s, given the opportunity to bolster morale while under siege, would have made the most of it with a dedication ceremony, but old habits die hard. The Nathan Hale statue was quietly installed with no ceremony at all, and there is no record of any Agency ceremony there at any time.[18] I once asked DCI Colby's special assistant why there was no such event, and he said, "Colby's fashion was not to have ceremony."[19] This is not a surprising stance for a career operations officer. It was proba-

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[15] In addition to the original Bela Pratt sculpture of Hale at Yale University, there are at least four copies: at Fort Nathan Hale in New Haven; in front of the Tribune Tower in Chicago; at FBI headquarters in Washington, D.C.; and at CIA. It is said that J. Edgar Hoover refused permission for CIA to copy the FBI's statue.

[16] I am not counting the bas-relief of Allen Dulles in the lobby of the Original Headquarters Building, as it was dedicated in 1968, some 10 months before Dulles passed away—from natural causes, not in the line of duty. I also do not count the Frank Wisner plaque that was unveiled at a closed CIA memorial ceremony comprising Wisner's friends and colleagues six years after Wisner's suicide; the plaque was to have been permanently hung in the office of the deputy director for operations but was lost and only recently was located in the holdings of the CIA Museum.

[17] Undated memorandum, "Nathan Hale statue," in Public Affairs Job 91-00782R, box 1, folder 4. For more on the statue's provenance see *Studies in Intelligence* 17, no. 3 in CIALink.

[18] Angus Thuermer, Assistant to the DCI for Public Affairs, letter of 23 October 1973, in Public Affairs Job 91-00782R, box 1, folder 5.

[19] Telephone conversation with Angus Thuermer, 4 March 2005.

> *As with the Nathan Hale statue, no ceremony was held to dedicate the Memorial Wall—it simply appeared one day.*

bly seen as more than enough just to have the physical object.

Wall But No Ceremony

The same lack of ceremony initially obtained for the Memorial Wall, which was approved in late 1973 and sculpted in 1974, originally with 31 stars. As with the Nathan Hale statue, no ceremony was held to dedicate it—it simply appeared one day.

Moreover, memorial ceremonies would not begin until 13 years later, in May 1987. Why a memorial wall but no memorial ceremony—particularly when the public and media and congressional attacks on CIA were only getting more serious, more vociferous and argued for some kind of gathering to assert a collective sense of mission and self-worth? Colby was DCI into 1976, and we know what he thought about ceremony at CIA. To the traditional, secretive, anti-commemoration prevailing culture at CIA, an Agency-wide memorial ceremony raised the danger that employees who were not in the operations directorate would learn too much and perhaps even talk out of school. Even the fact of a ceremony would receive media attention and subsequent inquiries, and many at CIA—particularly opera-

tions officers—did not want that.

Enduring Wall, Annual Ceremony

This changed in 1987 for two reasons. As in 1973, there was a request from the ranks of the operations directorate to do something. A counterintelligence officer submitted an employee suggestion for an annual ceremony in front of the wall in part, he said, because "the majority of our employees, particularly the younger generation, are barely aware of the existence or the significance of this memorial." He said this would result in "rising morale and pride in our achievements which, in turn, would greatly contribute to our continuing effort to achieve excellence."[20] As in 1973, this idea—quite obvious to most people—was endorsed by senior management. One can almost imagine them hitting their foreheads and saying, "Why didn't we think of that?"

As in 1973, it also had to do with context: the murder of William Buckley, CIA station chief in Beirut, by terrorists in 1985; the public scrutiny from the brewing Iran-Contra affair; and also, perhaps, by the inca-

pacitation and resignation several months previously of Director William Casey, an OSS veteran—an operator—who famously had said, "I want a no-profile agency."[21]

Casey, by the way, had openly criticized the Nathan Hale statue. He hadn't subscribed to the idea that the statue represented a patriotic, sacrificial sentiment; what he saw was the failure of a rank amateur who was caught and strung up. Casey initiated the commissioning of a statue of his intelligence hero, OSS director General William "Wild Bill" Donovan.[22] This was a pet project of Casey's, and he was immersed in its details in the months before he took ill in December 1986 with the brain tumor that would kill him.[23]

Among the many memos from Casey about the statue that I found in the protocol office's files, none mentioned having any kind of dedication ceremony—Casey just wanted the statue up. Donovan was Casey's idea of the proper icon of memory for CIA. In contrast to the Nathan Hale statue, which is passive, with a rope about the

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[20] Employee suggestion in Protocol job 03-00013R, box 1, folder 1.

[21] William Casey quoted in the *Washington Post*, 29 April 1983; cited in Charles Lathrop, *The Literary Spy: The Ultimate Source for Quotations on Espionage and Intelligence* (New Haven: Yale, 2004).
[22] *Newsweek*, 23 June 1986: 5. See also Joseph E. Persico, *Casey: From the OSS to the CIA* (New York: Viking, 1990), 214, 271, 518.
[23] See Protocol job 00-01351R, box 2, folder 26 "Dedication of Donovan Statue."

neck—the very picture of defeat—the Donovan statue (above) conveys vigor, action, and success, just as Casey intended. Casey, however, had resigned in January 1987, and he died May 6th. The first memorial ceremony was held later that month before the wall. It is open to doubt whether it would have happened had Casey still been DCI.

In May 1987 the Agency was in its 40th year, and there were 50 stars on the wall. Presiding at the ceremony was Deputy Director Robert Gates, who, not insignificantly, did not make his career in operations but in the analysis directorate. The new DCI, former FBI director Judge William Webster, had taken the oath of office the day before, but in subsequent years, he gave the remarks, and the ceremony became an annual event. In a sense, when William Casey died, the old way of non-commemoration at CIA died with him.

For the first two ceremonies, only *Agency employees were allowed to attend.*

Further Progress

In the years that followed, the annual ceremony gradually became more open. For the first two ceremonies, *only* Agency employees were allowed to attend. That changed in 1989, when Richard Welch's memory was highlighted and his widow and son were in attendance as honored guests of the operations directorate. After that, it was hard to argue for limiting attendance to CIA employees, and, starting in 1990, all surviving non-Agency family members who could be found were invited—the third major step in the Agency's opening up of its commemorative activity.[24]

The fourth great change in CIA commemoration occurred at the 1995 ceremony. With DCI John Deutch presiding, the names of all those remembered on the Memorial Wall—covert and overt—were read aloud at the ceremony for the first time. This was a huge development, given that uncleared family members had been attending the annual ceremony for years, and it had been proposed by operations officers.

The tenor of the times, even more so than in 1973 and 1987, may well have played a role in

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[24] See the individual folders for the annual memorial ceremonies in Protocol Job 00-01351R, boxes 1 and 3.

this felt need to express the identities of the dead. By the time of the 1995 ceremony, CIA was under its fourth director in four years, and Director Deutch was not exactly beloved by the operations directorate. The Agency at the time was publicly criticized for employing human rights violators, for the Aldrich Ames debacle, for allegedly biased analysis of Haiti, for not having a post–Cold War mission, even for insufficiently supporting the US military. CIA also was under scrutiny from Congress, which commissioned studies on intelligence reform. Since then, the annual reading of all the names, covert and overt, has continued to the present.[25]

DDCI Gates placing wreath at first formal commemoration in May 1987.

The "Stars," as we have come to call our commemorated dead at CIA, have become part of the symbolic vocabulary recognizable to all. One officer related to me that, while driving by the A-12 reconnaissance aircraft on display on the CIA compound recently, she saw the two large stars on the front of the exhibit wall and instantly knew—knowing nothing else about the aircraft or its history—that two CIA people had lost their lives in that program.

In order to provide the cleared CIA community with the opportunity to learn the stories of the men and women honored on the wall, the Center for the Study of Intelligence in 2003 created a virtual Hall of Honor, which is administered by the CIA Museum and available to authorized users of the Agency's intranet. It is similar to the FBI's Hall of Honor, which is available on the FBI's public site, though CIA's is classified.[26] Here, at last, the specific content of commemoration is preserved in a way that is more comprehensive and accessible than that provided by an annual ceremony.

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[25] The one exception is the 1998 ceremony—George Tenet's first as director—when the covert names were omitted from the roll call. I've not been able to find out why this happened, but the practice was resumed the following year.
[26] For its Hall of Honor, the bureau honors only special agents. The FBI also distinguishes between agents killed by an adversary—honored as "Service Martyrs"—and those agents who died in the performance of their duties, but not as the result of adversarial action.

The Primacy of the Past?

In 2004, DCI Tenet gave an unusually long and emotional speech at the annual memorial ceremony, in which he mentioned by name 27 of the Stars on the wall. Perhaps only Tenet knew it at the time, but he was presiding at his last memorial ceremony at CIA. Besides Tenet's always heartfelt exhortation to remember and to

derive inspiration from the memory of our fallen comrades, he said something quite remarkable, even startling:

> *When it comes right down to it, our work is all about them—not about what is in the* Washington Post, *not about what happened in the last congressional hearing—thank God—[and] not about what reorganization plan you do or don't like. It is about*

The Stars Through CIA History

never losing sight of the fact that everything we do, each and every day, must reflect their greatness and honor their memory.[27]

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[27] "Agency Honors Colleagues at Annual Memorial Ceremony," *What's News at CIA*, 24 May 2004. Emphasis added. Much of Tenet's speech was classified; this excerpt was not.

The typical hyperbole of a ceremonial speech notwithstanding, this is unusual in that Tenet seemed to be saying that CIA, after hiding the past for so long, now defined itself *by* its past—a mythic past, if you will, before the calls for reform that led to the creation of the Director of National Intelligence, a past in which an undiminished CIA really led US intelligence,

a past in which the "Central" in CIA meant something substantial. If so, the pendulum has swung completely, and one has to wonder if this is entirely a healthy thing.

If the pattern of the past holds, we may expect that, in the current climate of criticism of CIA, there may be an outpouring of sentiment to bolster

Stars by Directorate

The Agency at last does a good job of commemoration, probably as well as it can be done, given the constraints.

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our sense of mission and dedication to country by stepping up commemorative activities. Already, for example, there are individual memorial trees and stones appearing on the Agency compound, and there currently is a proposal to honor dead foreign assets with a permanent memorial in the main OHB lobby.[28]

In any case, I must note that the main venue for CIA commemoration, the Memorial Wall, has become something of a focal point or point of self-reference for the Agency more generally. President Bush's visits to CIA in 2001 and again in 2005, when he came to reassure Agency employees that CIA was still "central" despite the changes in the US Intelligence Community, were held not in the Headquarters auditorium, as has been the case for most presidential visits, but occurred at the Memorial Wall, which perhaps has become the ground zero for

how the Agency thinks of itself. Most recently, the unveiling of the official portrait of George Tenet revealed the image of the 18th DCI standing in front of the Memorial Wall—the only director's portrait with any reference at all to an identifiable Agency location.[29]

It took the Central Intelligence Agency most of its history—almost 50 years—to achieve a normal state of affairs (in terms of general human experience and expectations) regarding the remembrance of its honored dead. CIA came to commemoration late, but the Agency at last does a good job of it, probably as well as commemoration can be done, given the constraints. We've arrived at this place through the efforts of a few who challenged the dominant culture and when perceived hostility from the outside suggested the time was ripe for an assertion of identity in the service of memory.

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[28] Those who decide these matters need to consider whether, by memorializing all foreign assets—many of whom worked for us for noble reasons but many who didn't—in this way, we are placing their services on a par with that of the CIA and OSS officers also memorialized there.

[29] I am indebted to CIA Museum curator Toni Hiley for this observation.

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The ALFA SSN: Challenging Paradigms, Finding New Truths, 1969–79

Gerhardt Thamm

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> **We knew that the Soviets did not follow our practice in building submarines; they did not incorporate edge-of-technology items in series-production models.**
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Better is the enemy of good enough.

This Russian proverb incorporates a philosophy that is both wise and true to the Russian heart. Those who have learned to appreciate the Russian character will agree that most Russians instinctively adhere to and follow that philosophy. To build, to create things good enough to do what they are meant to do is wise; to make them better than necessary is a waste of energy and precious resources. The proverb reportedly was inscribed on a plaque in the office of Deputy Minister of Defense and Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Sergei Gorshkov, who had guided the development of his navy since 1956.

Those of us who watched the building of the Soviet Navy from its humble beginnings as a coastal defense force after World War II to a powerful bluewater navy noticed long ago that the old proverb was true, even when it came to building submarines.

We knew that the Soviets did not follow our practice in building submarines; they did not incorporate edge-of-technology items in series-production models. And we saw Soviets building double-hull submarines long after we had discovered that the modern single-hull design had many advantages over the double hull, among them an improved speed/horsepower ratio. While the US Navy leaped decades ahead in submarine design, the Soviets plodded along by improving tried technologies. Our submarines not only looked better, they were better.

Yet the Soviets seemed satisfied with evolutionary advances in submarine design. Many US intelligence analysts were sure that the Soviets were never going to "put all their eggs into one basket." Soviet society punishes failure; designing high-risk submarines does not enhance one's career.

It took infinite patience to fit this miscellany into the ALFA assessment. Although it was a difficult challenge, it was a task in which most intelligence analysts excel.

Phase One

This was the consensus of Western intelligence analysts, at least until one pleasant day in 1969 when strollers walking along the Neva River saw a modern-looking, small submarine tied up at the fitting-out quay at Leningrad's old Sudomekh Submarine Shipyard. It looked as if the submarine had just been launched from the old diesel submarine assembly shed. The assembly shed had seen little activity since the last Foxtrot-class diesel attack submarine had been launched there several years earlier. Naval analysts, following tradition and basing their analysis on previous launch histories, initially classified the submarine as a modern diesel-electric follow-on to a Foxtrot.

Further fitting-out activity, however, soon convinced at least one senior submarine analyst, Herb Lord, that this submarine was an SSN, a nuclear-powered attack submarine. It had a superbly streamlined hull and an overall length of about 79 meters.[1] Engineering calculations gave it a surfaced displacement of some 2,600 tons,[2] with a submerged displace-

ment of about 3,700 tons.[3] Aside from the exceptionally streamlined hull form, this submarine had several other highly unusual features:

- In 1969, it was the world's smallest SSN.

- It had, a rather high reserve buoyancy—a safety factor—of nearly 30 percent, in contrast to 8 to 11 percent for US SSNs.

The submarine received the NATO classification ALFA Class SSN. Lord, an experienced photointerpreter, alerted others to concentrate their efforts on the ALFA's construction and fitting-out pattern. The analysts noticed something they had never seen before, a "highly reflective" pressure hull section near the ALFA assembly area.

Lord then requested that he be point of contact for all reports that mentioned "highly reflective" or unusually colored submarine parts. During some eight years of examining photos of Soviet submarine construction yards, analysts assembled a construction history of a magnitude never before accomplished.

Periodically, and with ever increasing frequency, Lord received reports of "highly reflective" pressure hull sections associated with the ALFA fitting out at Sudomekh. Later, he also received reports of highly reflective pieces of hull sections, similar to those of the Sudomekh ALFA, at the Severodvinsk Submarine Construction Yard, far to the north of Leningrad.[4] He noted that these two yards were connected by an inland waterway, and he wondered whether both yards could be building this rather unusual class of attack submarine.

Lord subsequently conducted what is generally known as "look-back" analysis. All reports of "highly reflective" submarine hull sections at the two construction sites were collated, reviewed, and once again evaluated. It was a formidable, time consuming task. There were reports of changes to the external appearance of the assembly halls; reports dealing with unusual submarine parts at storage sites near the halls; and reports on unusual railroad cars, tank cars, and increased production of titanium sponge. All were scrutinized. It took infinite patience to fit this miscellany into the ALFA submarine assessment. Although it was a most difficult challenge, it was a task in which most intelligence analysts excel.

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[1] *Soviet Military Power*, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1985.

[2] *Understanding Soviet Naval Developments* NAVSO P-3560 (Rev. 1/81), 86.

[3] *Soviet Military Power*, 1990.

[4] Norman Polmar, *Naval Institute Proceedings*, October 1991: 122.

Lord tried to prove that the Soviets had moved from their usual submarine building methods, and that they had combined several advanced technologies in a single class of submarine.

After reviewing all the evidence and after long discussions with his fellow intelligence analysts, and with naval designers, engineers, and others in the Intelligence Community, Lord became even more convinced that the Soviets were indeed building a "special" type of super submarine, the first made of titanium alloy. Eventually, he concluded that he had to convince the US Navy that the Soviets were series-producing a highly modern, unusual SSN that, if fitted with advanced weapons, could seriously threaten US and allied naval operations.

Some analysts at CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) agreed. In fact. CIA had, as early as 1971, published analysis—*Use of Titanium by the Soviet Shipbuilding Industry*—that strongly supported the assessment that the otherwise conservative Soviets had conducted serious, long-time research on shaping and welding heavy titanium plates, and that they had in fact developed that capability.

Others were skeptical. They thought that the shaping and welding of heavy titanium hull sections, especially in the generally "dirty" shipyard atmosphere, was impractical, if not impossible. This, too, was a totally reasonable assessment, because titanium cannot be welded when exposed to air; welds have to be shielded, usually by argon gas. The consensus was that the Soviets could weld small parts of titanium, such as those for aircraft or missiles, in hermetically sealed chambers, but that it was impossible to weld huge submarine pressure hull sections.

Lord, however, could not be deterred. For nine years, he would be in the center of the battle over the "titanium submarine." During the early 1960s, little reliable, high-level scientific and technical information was available, and Lord had to rely heavily on photographic intelligence.

Lord remained certain that the collective evidence overwhelmingly supported his assessment of ALFA's titanium alloy pressure hull. He tried to convince the US Navy that the Soviets" research and development had advanced to such a degree that they were able to build submarines made of lightweight titanium alloy, and that their SSN would be able to dive deeper than any of our SSNs. In addition, a nonmagnetic titanium submarine would be most difficult to detect.

He tried to prove that the Soviets had moved from their usual submarine building methods, and that they had combined several advanced technologies in a single class of submarine:

- A highly advanced, and possibly risky, pressure hull material (titanium alloy).

- An as-yet unknown, high-density nuclear power plant (high power concentration in a small hull).

- Possible automation to reduce the size of the crew.

It was an entirely unbelievable story.

The assessment was critical for US ship, submarine, and underwater sensor and weapon designers. After almost eight years of debate with Navy decisionmakers, Lord retired. He died a few years later, his enormous research effort never properly recognized by Naval Intelligence.

Phase Two

In a functional reorganization in Naval Intelligence the analysis of foreign submarines was divided into ballistic and cruise missile submarines, and attack diesel and nuclear attack submarines. The attack submarines were my responsibility, and in 1978 I became the ALFA Project Officer.

I agreed completely with Lord's analysis. Now it became my mission to convince the US Navy that the Soviets were

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The US submarine community could not accept any possibility that the Soviets could series-produce such a sophisticated submarine.

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building high-threat submarines using advanced construction technology. Also in 1978, CIA sponsored a meeting of intelligence analysts, naval engineers, metallurgists, and submarine designers to discuss the "enigma" in Soviet submarine construction.

The great majority agreed that the "highly reflective" parts were submarine components. Most were certain that the components were not of conventional submarine steel. One expert presented several dozen formulae collected from published matter freely available to any serious researcher. He believed these open sources proved conclusively that titanium alloys dissolve in sea water. There were a few who suggested the whole "Sudomekh show" could have been a large-scale "disinformation" program, and that the highly reflective components were just parts covered with aluminum paint.

Many leading metallurgists still believed it probably was impossible for the Soviets to have developed the capability to bend, shape, and weld thick titanium plates in a shipyard environment. The US submarine community, "the Rickover people," was happy with this assessment. It could not accept any possibility that the Soviets

could series-produce such a sophisticated submarine.

These expert opinions made the ALFA submarine assessment inconclusive. On the one hand, I had the expert naysayers; on the other, I had some admirals asking, "What the hell are the Russians doing?"

Lord had rejected aluminum, stainless steel, and glass fibers. There remained the HY80, HY 100, or possibly HY130 steels, and titanium. Except for stainless steel—steel turns a dark, almost black color when exposed to the elements for extended periods. I still agreed with Lord's analysis that a titanium alloy was the most logical material suitable for submarine pressure hulls.

As analysis continued, I perceived five essential problem areas, which I called "enigmas." These made life difficult because they challenged traditional beliefs about the very nature of Soviet submarine construction.

• ***First Enigma***: An apparent change in Soviet design and construction methodology.

Advantage: Long-range gain.

Disadvantage: Large investment of resources.

Remarks: If successful, Soviet submarine designers and

builders were making a quantum leap into modern technology.

• ***Second Enigma***: Use of titanium alloy in pressure hull construction.

Advantage: Titanium is stronger and weighs 33 percent less than steel; the pressure hull can be stronger without increasing displacement; its use gives a submarine a stronger hull for greater diving depth and increases resistance to explosives at lesser depths; and the submarine is essentially nonmagnetic, thus decreasing the likelihood of magnetic anomaly detection (MAD).

Disadvantage: Titanium is three to five times more expensive than steel; it needs a totally different manufacturing process; shipyard workers must be retrained; construction halls must be reconfigured; and bending and shaping of heavy plates of titanium alloy are far more difficult compared to steel.

Remarks: Much evidence had been gathered that the Soviet Navy had ample research and development funds and that Soviet metallurgists had made remarkable advances in titanium manufacturing technology. Reports indicated that the Soviet Navy had conducted research in HY 100 steel, aluminum, glass fiber, and titanium alloys for use in

ship and submarine construction.

- **Third Enigma**: Apparent use of liquid metal reactor coolants.

  Advantage: Better horsepower to weight/volume ratio for higher speed.

  Disadvantage: The US Navy believed that a reactor cooled by liquid metal is less safe than the pressurized water reactor (PWR) in use by the US Navy.

  Remarks: The US Navy's safety record supported the PWR approach.

- **Fourth Enigma**: Seemingly large-scale use of automation and reduction of crew size.

  Advantage: Reduced the size of the boat and the size of its crew; lessened demand for electric power requirements; and relieved crew from mundane tasks, thus eliminating human errors caused by fatigue and boredom.

  Disadvantage: The US Navy believed automated controls to be less safe than hands-on control functions.

  Remarks: Only by automating many control functions could the Soviets reduce the size of the submarine. This increased the ALFA's survivability in combat, because it became a smaller active-sonar target. Furthermore, the low magnetic signature from a non-

> *I believed that different collection assets had to be activated to convince the US Navy of a serious threat to our submarines.*

magnetic titanium hull made localization of target by MAD difficult. Having unmanned engineering spaces also reduced personnel casualties should the liquid metal reactor malfunction.

- **Fifth Enigma**: Large rescue sphere in ALFA sail indicative of strong concern for crew survivability.

  Advantage: Provides safe exit for entire crew from maximum depth without external assistance. When the sphere is on the surface, it becomes a lifeboat; it protects the crew from the elements; and it has sufficient communications, emergency rations, and first aid on board.

  Disadvantage: Increases weight of the submarine.

  Remarks: The ALFA's high reserve buoyancy, as well as a sophisticated rescue system, implied Soviet Navy concern for crew survivability. There were other indicators: the Soviet Navy had one India class submarine rescue submarine each in Northern and Pacific fleet areas, had several "hard" compartments in submarines, and now had fitted a sophisticated survival system in the ALFA. This was another item that did not square with our view that the

Soviets had little concern for human life.

Turning to HUMINT

Since Lord's ALFA SSN approach had failed, I believed that different collection assets had to be activated to convince the US Navy of a serious threat to our submarines. Under the guidance of an able Navy captain, I used my extensive experience as a HUMINT collector to tap these new assets.

With continuing support from CIA analysts, as well as the Agency's collection managers and collectors, several thousand reports were screened for information about titanium. To keep that collection current, photointerpreters spent considerable time briefing their assets in the technique of precision photography. For three years, I followed the unfolding of this dramatic change in Soviet submarine construction.

A fair number of HUMINT reports dating from the time ALFA was under construction alluded to a new submarine with a small crew. Some reports cited a crew of 15, and others indicated a crew of 18 to 45. Admiral Rickover's team believed that it was impossible to operate a nuclear submarine with such a small crew, and that it was irresponsible to automate the many vital con-

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CIA also provided increasing evidence that appeared to confirm key parts of the analysis.

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trol functions of a submarine. As a result, this information was temporarily shelved.

But the subjects of small crew and automation would not die, partly because some Western navies had already automated their submarines with considerable success. With strong support from the CIA, I collected and assembled information that supported Lord's original assessment of ALFA's small crew.

Periodically, CIA reported that the Soviets maintained a high interest in automating submarine maneuvering, propulsion power train, weapons loading, and fire control functions. The goal: small crew, small boat. Eventually, the evidence that ALFA was extensively automated convinced even the most skeptical.

A Key Report

Evidence continued to confirm Soviet concern with crew survivability. By pure luck, in 1981 someone walking along the Neva River saw a sphere being lowered into the area where an ALFA was being fitted out. Based on the description, analysts determined that the sphere was lowered into the ALFA sail. The source was able to estimate the diameter of the sphere. With that information, and based on my familiarity

with West German submarines, I concluded that the Soviets had copied a submarine crew rescue sphere designed by Dr. Ulrich Gabler, the distinguished West German submarine designer.

By extrapolation, our submarine structures engineer calculated that 37 to 39 husky Russians would just fit into the rescue sphere. Careful examination of the sail revealed a continuous breakaway seam in the rubber antisonar coating of the ALFA sail. The assessment: the sphere, using part of the sail as a stabilizer and buoyancy tank, could be released to rise to the surface as a lifeboat. This report contributed significantly to solving the enigmas of crew size, automation, and crew survivability.

Accumulating Evidence

CIA also provided me with increasing evidence that appeared to confirm that:

• The Soviets had diverged from their pragmatic submarine construction modus operandi by combining at least three edge-of-technology items into a production-model submarine.

• Large, heavy, titanium alloy plates were shaped and welded at the Sudomekh and Severodvinsk shipyards.

Almost all reports alluded to the many difficulties encountered when welding titanium.

• Liquid metal coolant was used to increase the horsepower over weight/volume ratio and thus to increase speed.

In addition. CIA reported that the first ALFA had suffered a catastrophic failure during sea trials in the Barents Sea, when the liquid metal coolant spilled from the reactor containment vessel into the bilge. Indeed, as later reported in Jane's Defence Weekly, the "first ALFA suffered a reaction meltdown in 1970."[5] The submarine was towed to an isolated corner in Severodvinsk shipyard. Eventually, the bow and amidships sections appeared once again at Sudomekh. The pieces were left in open view on the quay for many years. Nevertheless, the ALFA prototype's trial run, even with its disastrous aftermath, must have produced some encouraging results because series construction continued.

Renewed Production

In mid-1974, one ALFA was launched from Sudomekh, and in early 1976 one was launched from Severodvinsk. The class was back in series production, and intelligence collection again went into high gear. After more than a year of collection, the

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[5] *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 18 April 1987, 715.

results were assembled and examined. The reports confirmed the previous assessments that the Soviets had encountered seemingly insurmountable problems when welding titanium. The first boat of the class had been on the ways for about seven or eight years, instead of the normal one to two years. Fitting-out periods were also much longer than those of other SSNs.

The old and new supporting evidence was presented to another panel of [outside] experts convened by CIA to assess whether the Soviets could weld heavy plates of titanium alloy in a shipyard atmosphere. Again, most of the experts opined that the Soviets most likely could not series-produce titanium pressure hulls for SSNs. But this time, Naval Intelligence, with support from CIA analysts, disagreed with the experts. The mutually supportive evidence from all assets had convinced the technical director of the Naval Intelligence Support Center that the Soviets had made a quantum leap in submarine technology by combining several high-risk options in one class of submarine.

Consequently, it was critical for US Navy decisionmakers to learn that:

- The Soviets were building submarines with hulls made of lightweight, nonmagnetic titanium.

> *This time, Naval Intelligence, with support from CIA analysts, disagreed with the [outside] experts.*

- The most streamlined hull shape ever produced by the Soviets was designed for speeds over 40 knots.[6]

- These high-technology submarines could dive below the effective range of US antisubmarine weapons.

- These units, probably fitted with advanced weapons, posed a serious threat to US and allied naval forces.

The Director of Naval Intelligence, confident that his analysts had made the correct assessment in the face of aggressive opposition, invited me to present the assessment to the Vice Chief of Naval Operations. The evidence convinced him, and he decided that the information had to be disseminated to the Navy as soon as possible. Naval Intelligence published the ALFA assessment in record time.

Postscript

In March 1979, technical assets detected the second ALFA making trial runs in the Barents Sea. An analysis of the data indicated that the ALFA had exceeded 40 knots while submerged in moderately deep water. In 1978,[7] after two

decades of effort, the ALFA class had reached initial operational capability and was in series production. (In 1985, the Soviets had at least six operational ALFAs.)

On 19 January 1979, the commander of the US Naval Sea Systems Command wrote Naval Intelligence that CIA'S extraordinary collection and Naval Intelligence's timely analysis of the ALFA Class SSN threat had saved the Navy $325 million in new torpedo designs. It was the first time in history that this type of intelligence collection and analysis had ever been officially credited with saving such a large sum of money.

Tenacity Pays Off

The R&D and manufacturing efforts for the ALFA SSN are difficult to estimate. Two construction sites were tied up for excessively long times with this project. The first sea trials far exceeded Moscow's expectations. Then, even with a catastrophic failure in the engineering spaces, the Soviets continued the ALFA project with tenacity unmatched by Western navies.

There is little doubt that the Soviets have incorporated these technological gains in follow-on nuclear powered submarines. After all, the Soviet R&D com-

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[6] *Soviet Military Power*, 1983.
[7] *Soviet Military Power*, 1985.

We had learned once again that nothing can be taken for granted.

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munity, submarine designers, and builders had, at almost prohibitive cost, accomplished what their Western counterparts thought impossible: the production of a titanium submarine that surpassed all others in speed and diving depth.

There was at least one commonalty between the Soviet ALFA construction program and the US Navy's intelligence effort against the submarine: in tenacity the Soviet Navy had been matched by that of one senior US Naval Intelligence analyst, Herb Lord. We had learned once again that nothing can be taken for granted. Most important, we learned that the Soviet Navy did not always follow old Russian proverbs. We also learned that US intelligence was "right on the money," and that the Soviets had indeed built a submarine that was "better than good enough."

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The Youngest Operative: A Tale of Initiative Behind Enemy Lines During WW II

Bob Bergin

Pridi Panomyong, the leader of World War II's anti-Japanese Free Thai Movement once said that the Free Thai were not only those formally inducted into the movement, but all Thai who helped in the effort against the Japanese occupiers. This is the story of one such Free Thai, perhaps the youngest of them all. Orachun Tanaphong was a 12-year old in 1944 when he became a courier and carried medicines and messages to Allied POWs held in a temple compound in Northern Thailand. This story of his adventures is based on his recollections of those events.

By mid-1943, Allied aircraft bombed targets in Thailand with regularity, striking at concentrations of Japanese troops. The city of Chiang Mai became a primary target. It was close to Burma, and the city's railroad station was the northern terminus of Thailand's railroad system that extended out from Bangkok and its port. The railroad became the primary means for the Japanese to move troops, weapons and supplies around Thailand, and most importantly, north to Chiang Mai to support the Japanese Army's campaign in Burma.

On 21 December 1943, Allied bombers hit Chiang Mai's railway station in a massive raid. The station and the neighborhoods around it were destroyed. More than 300 Thai civilians were killed. Among the dead and injured were Orachun's relatives. The city's hospitals were crowded with the injured, and Buddhist temples were used to treat the overflow. More bombings followed, and Orachun's father decided to move the family into the countryside, where they could live in relative safety until the situation improved.

It was almost a year before Orachun's family returned to Chiang Mai. They found their house damaged, its roof holed by strafing fighters. They also found that a neighboring building, a motor vehicle repair shop known as the best in town, was now regularly servicing Japanese Army vehicles.

When the Japanese appeared at the shop, they often brought with them POWs they used as drivers and mechanics. Most of the POWs were British, but there were also Dutch and Australians. From the start there was a communications problem. Neither the Japanese nor the POWs spoke much Thai, while the shop personnel spoke only Thai. Someone remembered that Orachun's father spoke English. He was a graduate of Prince Royal College, an American missionary

school. His father was pressed to serve as an interpreter between the POWs and the shop mechanics. Every time his father was called next door to the repair shop, Orachun went along.

As the interpreter, his father's job was to help the workers in the shop understand the problems of a particular truck. At first, when he spoke with the POWs, the Japanese soldiers watched closely, but after awhile—as they understood no English and little Thai—they became bored and paid little attention. As his father worked with the POWs and got to know them, he started sliding in questions about their situation and their treatment by the Japanese.

Orachun's father learned that life had become very spartan for the POWs. Each man had a single pair of shorts and a pair of sandals; none had shirts. He noted that one POW, an Englishman named Tom, had numerous small pits in the skin on his back. Asked about that, Tom said that he had been working in the POW camp's kitchen cooking rice, when he got in a quarrel with one of the Japanese. The Japanese settled the argument by pouring the boiling rice over his back. Many months later his skin was scarred like someone who had had small pox.

When some of the POWs who had regularly visited the shop dropped out of sight, Orachun's father learned that they were sick and were left behind in the camp. Malaria was rife in Chiang Mai at that time. It could be controlled with quinine, but the POWS were getting nothing to keep them healthy. Orachun's father decided to try to get medicine, some fruit, and even some cigarettes into the camp. It would have to be done secretly. The obvious choice of a courier was the 12-year-old Orachun.

It was known that the POW camp was located in a temple compound on the other side of town. There were actually two temples, down a small road from one another. One was used as the POW camp, the other continued to be used as a temple. The Japanese frequently used Thai schools and temples to house their installations, knowing that American aircraft would not target them. The area was a long way from Orachun's home. He would have to ride his bicycle almost an hour to get there.226

Orachun's mother prepared a small basket-like container. Inside was medicine, some fruit, and cigarettes hand-rolled by Orachun's father. There was already a basket fixed to the handlebars of Orachun's bicycle, and the container for the POWs was placed inside that. His father could not describe how the POW compound was laid out. Orachun would have to improvise once he got there.

Temples in Thailand are public places, and Orachun thought that once he got there, he would simply sneak into the area in which the POWs were kept. When he saw the temple camp, he realized that was not going to work. Japanese soldiers stood at the entrance and all along its perimeter. They seemed to be everywhere, and they all carried guns.

Orachun found a place to sit where he would be inconspicuous while he watched for a while. He could see the POWs easily enough, and among them he recognized visitors to the repair shop. When they noticed Orachun, it was evident to him that they knew who he was, and that seeing him there, they suspected he was up to some-

thing. That made it a bit easier. He could not get close enough to talk with them, but he gestured, to let them know that he recognized them. Then he continued to watch.

Soon, an opportunity materialized. He saw one of the POWs, apparently a designated water carrier, set off on a task. There was no water in the POW compound, but there was a well in the other temple down the street. As water carrier, this POW's job was to walk from the POW compound to the second temple, draw water from the well and carry it back to camp. It was a totally routine job that he had obviously been doing for some time. The guards watched as he walked from one temple to the other, but they were so used to his comings and goings that they did not watch very closely.

The water carrier had two cutoff gasoline cans suspended from the ends of a pole slung over his shoulder. When Orachun understood how the water carrier's job worked, he strolled into the second temple and placed his little container near the well. There, it remained hidden but close to where the water carrier would have to pass. As the water carrier approached him, he made little signs to make sure the man would notice the container. The POW then casually filled just one of his cans with water, leaving the other empty for Orachun's container, which he slipped in. He carried his load out through the temple gate and back to the POW compound, right past the Japanese guards, who noticed nothing amiss.

Orachun's mission was accomplished! He was elated. He mounted his bicycle and took off like he was piloting an airplane. When he reached home he felt like he had flown there. He had been afraid. He knew—as everyone did—how bad-tempered the Japanese could be, and what they did to people for even minor offenses. If they caught anyone stealing rice or sugar or gasoline, they would make him drink the gasoline or cram the sugar or rice in his mouth until he choked. Orachun knew that if he was going to do this again, he would not only have to be very careful, but work out a system that would keep him safe.

On the many visits that followed, Orachun refined the way he did things. He continued to ride his bicycle to the temples and kept the container in the basket on the handlebars. When he got to the two temples, he would take the bike into the one with the well and park it where it would not be noticed. He feared that sooner or later a Japanese soldier would wonder who he was and what he was doing here. But Orachun had found a way to disappear. There was usually a gang of local children who played in the area between the two temples, and Orachun would join them. If they did not let him join directly in their games, he could just hang around and watch. To any Japanese soldier he was just another kid, not worth any attention.

As seen today, the entrance to the temple grounds with the well from which the POWs drew their water and received Orachun's hidden messages.

Orachun knew that the POW water carrier tried to keep to a schedule and visit the well at the same time every day. So that his own arrival did not coincide with that, he would come early and hang around in front of the temple, watching the other children play. At times he would have to spend two or three hours there. His little basket-like container was so common an item that no one ever displayed the least bit of curiosity about it. Nor did the Japanese guards ever show the least bit of interest in what might be in the basket mounted on the bicycle's handlebars.

Orachun watched the kids play, and when everything was just right, he would stroll past the well, and leave the container concealed somewhere near it. He varied the places where he put it, so as not to establish a detectable pattern. Then he would go back and wait some more, until he saw the water carrier approaching. With small gestures he would guide the man until he knew where the container was. While doing this, Orachun often was afraid. Several times he was sure he would get caught, but it never happened.

As time went on and Orachun and his father became more confident about his ability to pass things to the POWs without being detected, they started putting messages in the basket. Most related to the development of the war, of which the POWs were kept in complete ignorance. Orachun had a Harvard-educated cousin who was surreptitiously listening to Allied radio broadcasts from outside the country. Summaries of these broadcasts were written on paper and placed in the container with the medicine, fruit and cigarettes.

Orachun's last visit to the temples was the most interesting of all. The container he delivered had the news that war was ending. After he saw the water carrier pick up the container, he waited until he was inside the POW camp. It did not take long before the camp erupted with shouts and cheers and happy people jumping up and down. The Japanese guards were completely taken aback. The POWs had news that their guards had not yet heard: the Japanese had lost the war.

Photo courtesy of the author.

A year after the war, Orachun's family was awarded a plaque by the British government. (In the picture to the right, the young Orachun is standing over his father's left shoulder, with his brother next to him.) Orachun finished his studies in Bangkok and won a scholarship to study in Madrid. He returned to Thailand, joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and went on to a distinguished career as a diplomat. He served as Thailand's ambassador to the People's Republic of China, North Korea, Portugal, Mexico, and Central America. Today he is an associate judge at the Central Intellectual Property and International Trade Court in Bangkok.

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Hostile Intent: U.S. Covert Operations in Chile, 1964-1974

Kristian Gustafson. Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2007. 317 pages, notes, bibliography, and index.

Reviewed by David Robarge

CIA's operation to attempt to affect a national election in Chile in 1970 and its consequences have engendered more persistent controversy, and more polemic and scholarship, than any of the more than one dozen covert actions with which the Agency has acknowledged involvement. Although some cost more and lasted longer (Tibet, Laos), entailed intervening in the domestic affairs of European allies (France, Italy), had greater long-term geopolitical impact (Iran, Afghanistan 1979–87), or were more acutely embarrassing in their execution and outcome (the Bay of Pigs), CIA's presidentially mandated effort to prevent Salvadore Allende de Gossens from becoming the first elected socialist president of a Western Hemispheric nation soon cast a shadow on the Agency's reputation that lingers nearly four decades later. A few years ago, then-Secretary of State Colin Powell spoke for many critics of US policy toward Chile when he said "It is not a part of American history that we're proud of."[1]

This stigma on CIA has endured largely because of the interplay of ideological romanticism, political disillusionment, and institutional energy on the part of detractors of the anti-Allende covert action, who have dominated the historiography on the subject. According to Peter Kornbluh, director of the Chile declassification project at the National Security Archive,

> *The* Via Chilena—*peaceful road to socialist reform—captured the imagination of progressive forces around the globe…. The sharp contrast between the peaceful nature of Allende's program for change, and the violent coup that left him dead and Chile's long-standing democratic institutions destroyed, truly shocked the world…. In the United States, Chile joined Vietnam on the front line of the national conflict over the corruption of American values in the making and exercise of US foreign policy.*[2]

There it has remained, principally because of to the efforts of a community of human rights activists, left-wing scholars and intellectuals, and antisecrecy advocates that emerged in the early 1970s while the Cold War consensus inside the United States was fracturing. The members of this subculture—the bound-

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[1] "Chile Cheers Powell Remarks on 1973 Coup," Reuters, a1147, 22 February 2003.
[2] Peter Kornbluh, *The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability* (New York: The New Press, 2003), xiii, xiv.

aries between them are often porous—are dedicated to uncovering evidence about the police-state tactics of Gen. Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, who succeeded Allende after a military coup in 1973, and to seeking justice for the victims of his often brutal 17-year dictatorship. The National Security Archive, for example, is up front about its motive for aggressively using the Freedom of Information Act and civil lawsuits to extract thousands of pages of documents from CIA and other US government agencies to "force more of the still-buried record into the public domain—providing evidence for future judicial and historical accountability."[3]

The Chilean operation galvanized CIA's congressional critics at the same time. In 1973, a Senate subcommittee on multinational corporations, led by Sen. Frank Church, investigated contacts between the Agency and the International Telephone and Telegraph Company, a prime target for nationalization under Allende. It was the first public hearing ever held on covert action and resulted in a critical report that provided the first official account of one aspect of the coup. Two years later, Church's select investigatory committee conducted more public hearings and produced another (unfavorable) survey of CIA's operations in Chile.[4]

Then in 1976, Chilean intelligence operatives murdered Allende's foreign minister, Orlando Letelier, and an associate in Washington, DC. To Pinochet's opponents, that brazen action demonstrated the bankruptcy of US policy toward Chile that CIA had helped implement. How could the United States support a regime so ruthless that it would commit terrorism in its largest patron's capital? More than ever in the minds of writers on this subject, the Agency became identified with the regime's origins and hence charged with some responsibility for its actions, including the deaths or "disappearances" of thousands of people in Chile and, through the notorious Condor program, in other Latin American countries.[5] The notion that CIA was at least partly to blame for whatever happened after its failed attempt to keep Allende out of power became a leitmotif of most historical treatments of US intelligence activities in the region.

The Reagan administration—partly because of the influence of UN Ambassador Jeanne Kirkpatrick's arguments about the reformability of authoritarian states—took a more benign view of the Pinochet regime and further inspired its critics to seek a full accounting of Agency involvement in Chile. They received a huge boon from the Clinton administration, which, having already authorized sizable releases of secret material on Central America and under pressure from Congress and the anti-Pinochet lobby, undertook the Chile Declassification

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[3] Kornbluh, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 8, "Chile and the United States: Declassified Documents Relating to the Military Coup, September 11, 1973," on National Security Archive Web site at <http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB8/nsaebb8i.htm>.

[4] L. Britt Snider, *The Agency and the Hill: CIA's Relationship with Congress, 1946-2004* (Washington, DC: CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2008), 271–73; US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, 93rd Congress, 1st Session, *The International Telephone and Telegraph Company and Chile, 1970–1971* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1973); *Hearings before the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities of the United States Senate, 94th Congress, 1st Session, Volume 7, Covert Action* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1976).

[5] On Condor—a Pinochet-initiated collaboration with neighboring governments' intelligence services to quell radical subversion throughout the region, often through violent means and occasionally abroad—see John Dinges, *The Condor Years: How Pinochet and His Allies Brought Terrorism to Three Continents* (New York: The New Press, 2004).

Project that eventually yielded around 24,000 never-before-seen documents from CIA, the White House and National Security Council, the Defense and State Departments, and the FBI.[6] In response to a congressional requirement in the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1999, CIA issued a white paper in September 2000 entitled *CIA Activities in Chile.*[7] The report concluded that the Agency was not involved in Allende's death during the 1973 coup, that it supported the military junta afterward but did not help Pinochet assume the presidency, and that it reported information about human rights abuses and admonished its Chilean assets against such behavior according to the guidance in effect at the time.

That scarcely settled the matter. The issue of US-Chilean relations and the legacy of CIA's intervention stayed prominent during the next several years through a succession of events that included the Chilean government's efforts to get Pinochet (then living in Europe) extradited and put on trial; the uncovering of his secret multi-million-dollar accounts in a Washington, DC, bank; a Chilean legislature investigation of CIA's role in the coup; huge lawsuits filed by Chilean citizens against Henry Kissinger (national security adviser and later secretary of state during 1969-77) and the US government for damages in connection with deaths and human rights abuses by the Pinochet regime; and a contretemps over Kissinger allegedly pressuring the Council on Foreign Relations to squelch a CFR fellow who wrote a favorable review of Kornbluh's book *The Pinochet File* in *Foreign Affairs.*[8]

Pinochet's death in December 2006 brought no closure to the long debate over CIA intervention in Chile and its legacy. The discussion essentially remains polarized between left and right,[9] and for some time an objective narrative of the facts and a fair-minded analysis of the critical and apologetic perspectives have been sorely missed. Such is the landmark contribution of Kristian Gustafson's *Hostile Intent: U.S. Covert Operations in Chile, 1964–1974*, which must be considered the indispensable study in the large bibliography on that seemingly intractable subject. A former student of Professor Christopher Andrew's at Cambridge University and now a lecturer at Brunel University in England, Gustafson previewed some of his findings in this journal in 2003.[10] In *Hostile Intent*, he demonstrates in an orderly and comprehensive way, with a good grasp of Chilean politics and full facility with the now substantial documentary record, how US administrations carried out their Chilean policy founded on the concern

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[6] *Pinochet File*, xvi–xvii.

[7] Available on the Agency's public Web site at <https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/chile/index.html>.

[8] "Pinochet Indicted on Human Rights Charges," <http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/americas/12/13/chile.pinochet.ap.index.html>, 13 December 2004; Terence O'Hara, "The General and His Banker," *Washington Post,* 21 March 2005: E1, 9; "CIA Activities in Chile to Be Investigated," Associated Press story on <http://www.nytimes.com>, 7 October 2004; Kenneth Maxwell, "The Other 9/11: The United States and Chile, 1973," *Foreign Affairs* 82:6 (Nov.–Dec. 2003): 147; Lynne Duke, "A Plot Thickens," *Washington Post*, 27 February 2005: D1, 6–7.

[9] At the other end of the spectrum from Kornbluh's *Pinochet File* are Mark Falcoff, *Modern Chile, 1970–1989: A Critical History* (London: Transaction Publishers, 1989) and idem, "Kissinger & Chile: The Myth That Will Not Die," *Commentary* 116:4 (Nov. 2003): 41–49.

[10] "CIA Machinations in Chile in 1970," *Studies in Intelligence* 47 no. 3 (2002): 35–49. The article received the Walter L. Pforzheimer Award given for the best undergraduate or graduate paper on an intelligence-related subject submitted to *Studies* during 2002.

stated as early as 1958 by the senior State Department official responsible for Latin America that "were Allende to win we would be faced with a pro-Soviet, anti-U.S. administration in one of the most important countries in the hemisphere."[11]

One of the strengths of Gustafson's book is that in the course of recounting the often-told story of how Washington tried to prevent that from happening, he takes on prevailing misconceptions and provides details that add meaning to familiar material.

- Instead of reflexively supporting the right wing as it had elsewhere in Latin America during the latter 1960s and well into 1970, Washington had CIA channel assistance to an increasingly marginalized group of centrists at a time when Chilean politics was growing more polarized—a development that US analysts missed.

- Notwithstanding recurrent rhetoric about Chile being a cornerstone of US policy in the region, White House oversight of covert action planning was strikingly haphazard, and CIA and the State Department went about their business operating under inconsistent premises, sometimes supporting the same parties and politicians, sometimes not, for different reasons.

- Besides State having previously opposed intervening in the 1970 election, another important reason why Richard Nixon kept the US ambassador, Edward M. Korry, out of the loop on the coup plotting in September and October 1970 (also known as Track II) was that he distrusted Korry's politics. The ambassador was a Kennedy Democrat and supporter of Chilean politicians who had benefited from the Kennedy administration's Alliance for Progress.

- Despite Kissinger's ominous admonition to Nixon in November 1970 that "your decision as to what to do about it [Allende's election] may be the most historic and difficult foreign affairs decision you will have to make this year," and the enunciation by the National Security Council of a "publicly cool and correct posture toward Chile,"[12] the administration's guidance on both covert and overt activities was slow and erratic during the next two years even as the Allende government fell deeper into economic and political trouble and became increasingly unstable.

- After the September 1973 coup that ousted Allende—in which CIA had no role and about which it knew little beforehand—Washington let the Agency continue supporting the center-left Christian Democratic Party, and the Agency's head of Latin American operations argued against the cutoff that went into effect at the end of the year. He and other CIA officers contended that the subsidy was needed to counter the left if the junta relinquished power and to

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[11] Roy Richard Rubottum, assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs, quoted in *Hostile Intent* on page 19. Prof. Andrew (with Vasily Mitrokhin) has described the KGB's relationship with Allende and its involvement in Chile during the 1960s and 1970s in *The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World* (New York: Basic Books, 2005), 69–88.

[12] Kissinger memorandum to Nixon, 6 November 1970, and National Security Decision Memorandum 93, 9 November 1970, quoted in *Hostile Intent*, 139, 145.

"maintain our capability for influencing the junta and molding public opinion" if it did not.[13]

Gustafson's study makes a crucial point about covert action that policymakers and intelligence practitioners would do well to learn: for political operations to succeed, they must have time to work and must be coordinated with the overt aspects of policy and all elements of the country team. Those conditions existed in the 1960s, and the Agency helped accomplish Washington's objective of keeping Chile in what it perceived as safe, center-right hands. In contrast, throughout most of 1970 "the United States was perpetually one move behind the political evolutions in Santiago."[14] By the time the Nixon administration suddenly took notice of events in Chile after the first round of elections in September and then went into panic mode, CIA had few resources and less time to stem the tide moving in the socialists' favor. Nixon and Kissinger ordered it to undertake a back-channel coup plot that failed disastrously and assured Allende's victory. As Gustafson concludes:

> *Rather than operating on their own, covert actions in 1964 were used to bolster overt plans such as the Alliance for Progress. Thus they acted as a force multiplier for U.S. foreign policy goals. In October 1970, covert action was separated from any strategic thinking and uselessly sent charging into the brick wall of immovable Chilean public opinion.*[15]

Thus another lesson from the Chilean covert action is that political operations will most likely work when they reinforce trends and do not try to create them or shift them in other directions.

Hostile Intent is marred by some minor errors of style and fact. Occasionally Gustafson's prose takes on a slightly turgid, dissertationesque quality; he misuses some words (disinterested for uninterested, reticent for reluctant); credits Rep. Otis Pike with the "rogue elephant" charge instead of Senator Church; mentions the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence several years before it was created; overlooks the fact that the 1980 Intelligence Oversight Act superseded the 1974 Hughes-Ryan Amendment's requirements for reporting covert actions to Congress; and misidentifies the State Department official in the first photograph of the insert section. More substantively, Gustafson uses material acquired from the KGB archives in the early 1990s in a way that suggests it was available to US officials at the time. But these small problems should not distract readers from realizing Gustafson's achievement after entering such a politically and emotionally charged environment. If it is true, as Kornbluh claims, that "after so many years, Chile remains the ultimate case study of morality—the lack of it—in the making of US foreign policy,"[16] then a scholarly and dispassionate contribution to the literature such as *Hostile Intent* is all the more to be valued.

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[13] Ibid., 233.

[14] Ibid., 111.

[15] Ibid., 133–34.

[16] *Pinochet File*, xv.

The Intelligence Officer's Bookshelf

Compiled and Reviewed by Hayden B. Peake

Current

Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, Obstacles, and Innovations, Roger Z. George and James B. Bruce

The Commission: The Uncensored History of the 9/11 Commission, Philip Shenon

Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century, Marc Sageman

The Search For WMD: Non-Proliferation, Intelligence and Pre-emption in the New Security Environment, Graham F. Walker (ed.)

Still Broken: A Recruit's Inside Account of Intelligence Failures, From Baghdad to the Pentagon, A. J. Rossmiller

Why Spy?: Espionage In An Age of Uncertainty, Frederick P. Hitz

General Intelligence

The Agency and The Hill: CIA's Relationship with Congress, 1946-2004, L. Britt Snider

Communicating with Intelligence: Writing and Briefing in the Intelligence and National Security Communities, James S. Major

Historical

The Hunt for Nazi Spies: Fighting Espionage in Vichy France, Simon Kitson

Military Intelligence and the Arab Revolt: The First Modern Intelligence War, Polly A. Mohs

Operation Freshman: The Hunt for Hitler's Heavy Water, Jostein Berglyd

Our Man in Mexico: Winston Scott and the Hidden History of the CIA, Jefferson Morley

RUSE: Undercover With FBI Counterintelligence, Robert Eringer

Seduced by Secrets: Inside the Stasi's Spy-Tech World, Kristie Macrakis

The Sixth Man: the extraordinary life of Paddy Costello, James McNeish

Spies in Arabia: The Great War and the Cultural Foundations of Britain's Covert Empire in the Middle East, Pryia Satia

Spies in the Empire: Victorian Military Intelligence, Stephen Wade

STASI Decorations and Memorabilia: A Collectors Guide, Ralph Pickard

Intelligence Abroad

My Years In a Pakistani Prison: The Untold Story of Kishorilal, alias Amaril Singh, alias Saleem, an Indian Spy in Pakistan, Kishorilal Sharma

Current

Roger Z. George and James B. Bruce, **Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, Obstacles, and Innovations** (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2008), 340 pp., end of chapter notes, glossary, index.

The definition of intelligence as the product of the collection, evaluation, and analysis of all available information occurs frequently in the literature of intelligence.[1] But does this mean that the secret document obtained by an operations officer from his agent is not intelligence since analysis has yet to occur? Not according to the authors of this important book. Drs. George and Bruce, who are both experienced Intelligence Community analysts suggest that both explanations make sense—intelligence is collected from agents (and other sources) and, when combined with other relevant information and knowledge, remains intelligence in an enhanced state after analysis, a process analogous to the desalinization of water—water in, refined water out.

This is not the first book on intelligence analysis but it differs from the others in several significant respects. The principal difference is the broad scope of the 18 chapters that describe the discipline, how it has evolved, and where it needs to go. The introduction gives a fine description of what analysis is, and it provides prospective analysts with a good feel for the skills required that make analysis exciting and demanding. Subsequent chapters discuss the analytic track record at CIA, techniques for improving reliability, and the dominant issues that affect performance. Prime examples of the latter are the policy-analyst relationship—three experts discuss this issue in detail—the analyst-collector relationship that is critical to success, and the dangers of politicization. Other contributions examine the links between strategy and intelligence, what analysts should know about denial and deception, the unique characteristics of military intelligence analysis, and the distinct demands of homeland security intelligence.

Each of the articles addresses the difficult subject of analytic failures. Especially interesting on this point is the contribution by veteran CIA analyst Jack Davis, "Why Bad Things Happen To Good Analysts." Producing accurate analysis is also examined from management's point of view.

Another area of concern is the future of analysis. This is described in terms of managing analysis in the information age as well as the new techniques available for doing so—the use of teams, networks and the scientific method. The

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[1] See for example: Martin T. Bimfort, "A Definition of Intelligence," *Studies in Intelligence* 2, no. 4 (Fall 1958): 78.

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articles on this point do not deal with mathematical details or complex models of unproven value, but rather consider the conceptual issues that promote critical analysis.

Finally, the question of whether intelligence analysis is even a discipline is explored. Here the elements of a discipline are enumerated and compared with the current state of the art. It also considers whether there is or should be a right of passage for analysts analogous to the lawyer's bar exam. In their conclusion, George and Bruce summarize what needs to be done to make analysis a profession, with emphasis on the analyst's role and the techniques and knowledge they must acquire.

In short, *Analyzing Intelligence* is the most comprehensive book on the subject to date—a really valuable treatment for those anticipating becoming an intelligence analyst, as well as for those who already are.

Philip Shenon, ***The Commission: The Uncensored History of the 9/11 Commission*** (New York: Twelve, 2008), 457 pp., bibliography, index.

This book gets off to an unusual start: no introduction, no summary or conclusions, and only narrative endnotes without specific citations. It begins with the story of Sandy Berger's surreptitious removal and destruction of classified documents from the National Archives and ends with descriptions of how various government officials reacted to the 9/11 report. In between, author Philip Shenon explains how the commission came about, describes the roles and contributions of its members, and, at much greater length, addresses the staff's work in assembling the facts and writing the report—including the often vicious bureaucratic and partisan battles that ensued.

Shenon covered the commission from the day it first met in January 2003 until it closed shop in August 2004. He describes the interviews he conducted, identifying those involved where he could and preserving anonymity when confidentiality necessitated.

Still, there is little new in the book. The controversies over the release of documents and the reasons for the decisions made have all been reported before. He does emphasize some key issues and provides continuity. For example, when discussing the reasons the report omitted mention of accountability he explains that the commissioners "wanted no 'finger pointing' in the final report" in order to achieve a unanimous outcome: "Unanimity would cement their place in history." (402–4)

In another of his judgments, Shenon notes that "George Tenet lost. Robert Mueller won." (402) He then explains that Commissioner Kean disagreed, rationalizing that they did not call for Tenet's resignation, they just recommended creating a Director of National Intelligence. One item, new to most, is an anecdote about former senior CIA officer and commission staff member Doug MacEachin, who briefed the commission on an NIE notionally written in 1997 that showed in great detail al-Qa'ida's intention to attack the United States.

After greatly alarming the commissioners, MacEachin revealed it was only an object lesson; the data were real, but, for reasons unknown, had never been used to write an NIE.

The commission members were very proud of the report. It was well written, and it sold more than a million copies. Shenon has provided an equally readable account of its history. But like the commissioners, he has avoided taking sides or commenting on the quality of the commission's recommendations, even in hindsight. He reports, we decide.

Marc Sageman, ***Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century*** (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 176 pp., endnotes, index.

In publishing *Leadersless Jihad,* Marc Sageman, the forensic psychiatrist, former intelligence officer, and current international security consultant, has sparked a polemic in the journal *Foreign Affairs* on a key question of the day: what after seven years of US and Allied effort is the state of al Qaeda today?[2] In an exchange, conducted over two issues of the journal, Bruce Hoffman—Georgetown University history professor and author of *Inside Terrorism*[3] —and Sageman have taken opposing views of al Qaeda's role in leading today's Islamic terrorist movement. In reviewing *Leaderless Jihad* in the May/June 2008 issue, Hoffman argued that al-Qaeda has reemerged and is again actively directing terrorist operations, and he took issue with what he took to be Sageman's judgment that "al Qaeda has ceased to exist as either an organizational or an operational entity." This, Sageman wrote in response, is a misrepresentation of his position. His book, he added, explicitly states that "al Qaeda Central is, of course, not dead, but it is still contained operationally…the surviving leaders…are undoubtedly still plotting to do harm to various countries and have the expertise to do so."

What *Leaderless Jihad* does argue, says Sageman, is that the al Qaeda can no longer exercise the direct leadership that resulted in 9/11. Instead, Osama bin Laden now serves as more of an inspiration for young Islamists who, when radicalized, will act on their own to continue his work in a "leaderless jihad." Sageman stresses that his conclusions follow from applying the scientific method—developing and testing hypotheses based on data from 500 terrorist histories.[4] A key element of the story is his characterization of the process by which young middle-class well-educated Muslims become Islamic extremists, seeking self–glorification through violence against Western societies. Sageman explains the basic parameters necessary for success, describes the links among the loose networks that are formed, and considers how they can result in terrorist acts in Europe and the United States. He devotes an insightful

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[2] Bruce Hoffman, "Review Essay: The Myth of Grass-Roots Terrorism," *Foreign Affairs,* May/June 2008, and Marc Sageman and Bruce Hoffman, "Debating the Containment of al Qaeda's Leadership," *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2008.
[3] Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, rev. ed., (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006).
[4] See also Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004) reviewed by Dwight P. Pinkley in *Studies in Intelligence* 49, no. 2 (2005)

chapter to the way networks communicate using the Internet to sustain their motivation and to plan operations. If ever there was an unintended consequence of a positive social development, this is a prime example.

Leaderless Jihad is not in complete conflict with Professor Hoffman's views of al-Qaeda's role; terrorist acts can be directed both from above and below. And even if al-Qaeda's capacity is diminished, Sageman stresses that the eventual success of the "bottom-up" variation of global terrorism is not inevitable. Toward that end, he offers suggestions to counter the threat, though he makes clear his view that promoting democracy is not part of the solution. The answer is dependent on the United States recapturing "the high moral ground" (171), avoiding strategic mistakes, and keeping up constant monitoring of and interference with terrorist operations. Meeting these conditions will cause the threat to fade away. In short, there is no simple solution, but the path Sageman prescribes makes sense and is deserving of serious attention.

Graham F. Walker (ed.), **The Search For WMD: Non-Proliferation, Intelligence and Pre-emption in the New Security Environment** (Halifax, Nova Scotia: Dalhousie University, 2006), 406 pp., end of chapter notes, appendices, no index.

The 25 articles in this volume were sponsored by the Center for Foreign Policy Studies at Dalhousie University in Nova Scotia, Canada. Most of the contributions deal with WMD and the Iraq war and with related proliferation issues, present and future. Six of the chapters address intelligence analysis and lessons learned from the WMD issue and Iraq. The analysis is generally fair and insightful. Prof. Robert Jervis (Columbia University), for example, cautions against asking "more of the intelligence community in both the narrow and general sense than is possible." (173) Terrorism expert Lawrence Freedman considers the impact of politicization on limiting the application of high standards of proof, or validation, on critical assumptions. Doug Giebel, an investigative journalist from Montana, does not distinguish himself with the undocumented comment that hindsight shows "how grossly the U.S. war-makers (from both political parties) have elevated lying and disinformation to a high art." (194) *The Search For WMD* is an interesting collection of viewpoints from outside the Intelligence Community about issues of crucial importance to intelligence analysts on the inside.

A. J. Rossmiller, **Still Broken: A Recruit's Inside Account of Intelligence Failures, From Baghdad to the Pentagon** (New York: Ballantine Books, 2008), 236 pp., appendix, no index.

After graduation from Middlebury College, A. J. Rossmiller joined the Defense Intelligence Agency in 2004. Within weeks he concluded the intelligence service was dysfunctional, badly managed, and generally crippled from top to bottom. Seeing little hope for improvement any time soon, he volunteered for duty as an analyst in Iraq. (xx)

Shockingly, he found the intelligence situation in Iraq little better. And when, after six months on the job, his suggestions for correcting things weren't implemented, he returned to the United States. Back home he was astonished to find management still had not made the necessary upgrades; the system persisted instead on its "go-along," stay "on-message" and be "a-member-of-the-team approach" to analysis. In short, after less than two years as an intelligence analyst, Rossmiller concluded that his only alternative was to leave government and make his incisive conclusions available to all in *Still Broken.* Thus, he rages about systemic incompetence and dysfunction while prescribing corrective measures, among them, for example, "intelligence professionals must go back to the basics." (220)*.*

The book is filled with similar insightful observations, some of which are on the mark and, curiously, have been noted by others: Hitz (below), Paul Pillar, Judge Richard Posner, to name three well-documented accounts that Rossmiller gives no indication of having read.[5] *Still Broken* might have acquired more traction had analyst Rossmiller used specific examples, cited sources, provided a bibliography, and included an index. As is, it is little more than the biased, sour-grapes rant of someone unwilling to pay his dues. It does not deserve serious professional attention.

Frederick P. Hitz, **Why Spy?: Espionage in an Age of Uncertainty** (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2008), 224 pp., index.

Answers to the straightforward question in the title to this book are likely to be a complex mix of at least five viewpoints: agent, intelligence officer, organizational, international, and the public. Author Fred Hitz, as a former CIA inspector general and now a professor at the University of Virginia, has first-hand experience with each. In the four parts of *Why Spy?* he proposes actions in the post 9/11 era to improve Intelligence Community performance from all perspectives.

Part one, "The Seven Motivations for Espionage," provides a brief history of American espionage, the reasons it is necessary, and why it can be successful. He outlines the classic methods of recruitment and potential agent motivations so they may be considered when thinking about the operations he describes later. In part two. "America's Spying Competence Today" he addresses lessons from failures, the evils of politicization, the evolution of the CIA's role, plus Congress and the recent intelligence reforms. Part three, "Spying in the Twenty-first Century," looks at legal issues, civilian and military intelligence organizations, the role of technology in collection and analysis, and liaison with foreign intelligence services. The final part raises two questions: Why Spy? Should We Do It? Neither is answered directly, though the response to both is implicit from the threats Hitz outlines in the beginning. This chapter also discusses the new demands on intelligence officers in the 21st century.

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[5] Richard A. Posner, *Preventing Surprise Attacks: Intelligence Reform in the Wake of 9/11* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, Publishers, Inc., 2005).

In his conclusion he addresses four conditions needed to "make espionage work." The first is improved HUMINT, with quality personnel, leadership, and resources, while eliminating stifling bureaucracy. The second is the requirement to separate partisanship and politics from objective collection and analysis. The third deals with the problems of domestic intelligence and law enforcement when dealing with Islamic terrorism. The fourth is the need to reinvigorate Congressional oversight.

In *Why Spy?* Hitz candidly assesses what should and should not be done, but he does not offer implementing details, which he leaves to the professionals. Examples include encouraging elitism—in the sense of esprit de corps—despite the "hideous reputation" it has in some quarters (181). He goes on to suggest less reliance on intelligence officers operating out of embassies and resolution of the legal constraints on using "dirty assets." (165) He also warns against the horrendous problems created by periodic downsizings that only create gaps in experienced officers.

With one exception the book provides some very practical guidance for improving intelligence performance and for understanding the intelligence profession. The exception is the criticism that today's analysts do not have ready access to the internet—Google, Wikipedia and the like. (155–56) If this was ever a practical limitation, it was corrected long ago.

For those concerned with the current and future practical value of espionage, *Why Spy?* is very worthwhile reading.

General Intelligence

L. Britt Snider, **The Agency and the Hill: CIA's Relationship with Congress, 1946-2004** (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, CIA, 2008), 389 pp., footnotes, bibliography, appendices, photos, index.

Two other important books have been written about congressional oversight of the Intelligence Community. The first, by Fred Smist, covers the period from 1947 to 1994. The second, by David Barrett, focuses on the period from 1947 to the Bay of Pigs in 1961.[6] *The Agency and the Hill* differs with both in two respects: it covers a broader timeframe—1946–2004—and it is written by an insider with unusual credentials. Author L. Britt Snider served as CIA inspector general and as general counsel of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

The book is divided into two parts, each with functional chapters. Part one addresses the nature of the relationship itself; intelligence sharing and the changes after the Church and Pike Committee hearings; and CIA organizational arrangements. Additional topics are: budgets, covert actions, charges of

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[6] Fred Smist, *Congress Oversees the United States Intelligence Community 1974-1994* (Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 1994, 2nd edition); David M. Barrett, *The CIA and Congress: The Untold Story* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005).

domestic spying, routine interactions, and dealing with leaks and whistle-blowers. The first two chapters of part two examine specific legislation plus program and budget issues. The final five chapters consider oversight of intelligence analysis, collection, cover action, security matters, and the confirmation process. Each chapter covers the entire period from 1946 to 2004. The appendices list key personnel and positions on both the committees and at the CIA.

At the end of each chapter, Snider adds background and meaning in often extensive and important "author's commentary" sections. For example, Chapter 3 outlines, *inter alia*, post-9/11 hearings and what was and was not done. Snider's assessments elucidate the who and why of what was done. Similarly, his description of "the ideal nominee" after the chapter on the Senate confirmation process is enlightening whether applied to the DCI, DNI, or D/CIA. Overall, these contributions are valuable, if not the most important parts of the book.

The Agency and the Hill adds new well-documented perspective to the legal requirements of congressional oversight and the political realities that bound their implementation. It will be the principal reference book on the topic for the foreseeable future.

James S. Major, ***Communicating with Intelligence: Writing and Briefing in the Intelligence and National Security Communities*** (Lanham, MD: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2008), 420 pp., bibliography, appendices, index.

With the introduction of the first American commercial typewriter in 1873 by the Remington Company, handwriting began its gradual demise and replacement by the personal computer. But while technological developments eased the mechanics of putting words on paper, the choice of the right words themselves remains a challenge for all who attempt the task. *Communicating with Intelligence* is intended to help intelligence writers master the process.

Author James Major taught a writing and briefing course at the National Defense Intelligence College for many years, and his book lays out the practices he developed to help his students acquire the skill that is so essential to success in the intelligence profession.

The book has two parts, the first devoted to "writing with intelligence." Here he covers the value of reading intelligence publications, the basic tools of writing, the critical drafting and polishing processes, and the techniques for reviewing analytical papers. Each chapter ends with practical exercises designed to reinforce to key points. The second part of the book deals with briefing techniques that lay out the elements of a good briefing and the manner in which it should be delivered. The appendices in the book include a glossary for writers, a briefing checklist, a sample briefing, and a self-evaluation form. *Communicating with Intelligence* is a welcome addition to intelligence literature and will be valuable to students and the teachers who must read their papers.

Historical

Simon Kitson, **The Hunt for Nazi Spies: Fighting Espionage in Vichy France** (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 208 pp., endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

> After the French surrendered to the Germans in 1940, the collaborationist government established at Vichy was permitted to rule the Southern half of France and maintain a security service. The Allied invasion of Africa in late 1942 ended that arrangement, and, as the Nazis occupied all of France, they seized the records of the Vichy government and shipped them to Germany. After the war, the Soviet Army sent them to Moscow. In the 1990s, they were returned to France. In 1997, while using the files to research anti-German counterespionage in France, scholar Simon Kitson discovered documentation of agent torture, not of French agents caught by the Gestapo, but of Nazi agents (French nationals) caught spying on the French by the Vichy counter-intelligence (CE) service.

> *The Hunt for Nazi Spies* tells the story of this unusual situation with emphasis on these issues: The fact that an occupied state was allowed to have a security service at all and that the CE service was permitted to arrest the occupier's spies and execute several dozen of them. Kitson examines French motivations, the character of CE recruits, and the organization, methods and operations of the CE. The book also describes what happened to the French CE officers—many escaped to England and joined DeGaulle—and the agents captured when the Nazis occupied all of France. Kitson has filled an unexpected gap in our knowledge and will cause historians to modify the standard image of French collaboration during WW II.

Polly A. Mohs, **Military Intelligence and the Arab Revolt: The First Modern Intelligence War** (New York: Routledge, 2007), 238 pp., endnotes, index.

> The Arab Revolt during WW I that reconfigured the Middle East brought fame to T. E. Lawrence and has been recorded in books and movies. The role of British intelligence and the Arab Bureau in the revolt, plus the details of Lawrence's contribution as an analyst and unofficial leader of guerrilla operations, were less well known until Polly Mohs wrote this precedent-setting book. After describing the geographical and political scene, she discusses how the traditional British policy of controlling the Empire from London failed to meet the intelligence and policy needs of the Middle East campaign in which Turkey had become an ally of the Germans. Mohs shows that the creation of the Arab Bureau—to "harmonize the various views and policies" from the British Foreign Office and the military—staffed with civilian and military experts, including Lawrence, was a major departure from standard practice in two ways. First, it ran its own field operations and analyzed the results without prior approval from London. Second, it "blurred" the distinction between intelligence and policymaking by "redefining the intelligence-policy dichotomy" and contributing directly to military-political decision making. (9)

Mohs shows how the policy issue worked in practice in her analysis of the Arab Revolt, which began in mid-1916. The British were faced with the question of whether or not to support the Arab attacks, and if so, whether ground forces should be used or whether guerrilla warfare tactics should be adopted. She describes how Lawrence's dual role as an unorthodox field operator and analyst influenced the adoption of the latter approach. His recommendation—supported by the Arab Bureau—that the Arabs be allowed to fight their own battles, with Allied support, was, in the end, key to the Turkish defeat.

In what becomes the central theme of the book, Mohs goes on to show just how intelligence contributed to the revolt's success. She argues that the relatively new techniques of aerial reconnaissance and signals interception, when combined with human sources—including POW interrogation—were more effective than in Europe because of local weather and military conditions. While possibly true with regard to aerial reconnaissance and communications intercepts—though no detailed examples are given in this otherwise extensively documented work—her comment that "conditions in German-occupied Europe made it impossible for Allied operatives to establish agent networks behind enemy lines" (4) is inaccurate as the White Lady network, to name one, illustrates.[7]

While Mohs does not neglect the often-deceitful Allied political decisions kept from the Arabs during the war, her focus is on the "intelligence-led policy for the campaign," (160) the development and application of the unorthodox military techniques, and the personalities that made it a success. Mohs does not suggest the success of an intelligence element advocating policy, as happened during the Arab Revolt, argues for abandoning the conventional intelligence-policy approach, but she does allow that it should be considered in the future when dealing with conflicts in the Middle East. Moh's book is a valuable contribution to the study of military intelligence.

Jostein Berglyd, ***Operation Freshman: The Hunt for Hitler's Heavy Water***
(Stockholm: Leander & Ekholm, 2006), 202 pp., footnotes, photos, map, no index.

In 1965, the movie *The Heroes of Telemark,* starring Kirk Douglas, told a story about the destruction of the heavy water plant at Telemark, Norway. Brave British commandos and Norwegian resistance fighters were sent to prevent Hitler from acquiring heavy water needed to produce the atom bomb. In what would today be labeled "Oliver Stone history," the movie departed from the truth in nearly every respect including the fact that Telemark was a region of Norway not the actual city, Vemork, where the plant located. Jostein Berglyd sets the record straight in this thoroughly documented and illustrated book. *Operation Freshman*, the SOE operation to sabotage the heavy water plant, was a failure. The aircraft carrying the sabotage team crashed in the Norwegian mountains, and the Nazis murdered the 14 commandos and three crewmen who survived the crash; in all, 37 men were lost. The plant was later damaged in a bombing raid and eventually destroyed by Norwegian sabo-

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[7] Captain Henry Landau, *Secrets of the White Lady* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1935).

teurs. Berglyd describes the planning for the operation, its faulty execution, how the Nazis tracked down the survivors, and the penalties collaborators received after the war. In the final chapter, Berglyd analyzes postwar books about these operations and points out their inaccuracies. *Operation Freshman* fills a gap in history and is a valuable contribution to the literature.

Jefferson Morley, ***Our Man in Mexico: Winston Scott and the Hidden History of the CIA*** (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2008), 374 pp., endnotes, photos, index.

Winston Mackinley Scott was born in 1909 in rural Jemison, Alabama. He spent his early years living in a converted box car, but he did well in mathematics and athletics in high school and earned a scholarship to a teachers college before getting his masters and then teaching at the University of Alabama. When one of his papers was published in the *Annals of Mathematics,* the FBI asked if he would be interested in a job.(17) He said he was, but when he heard nothing more he went to Scotland to study matrix theory. The FBI offer arrived when he returned after the war in Europe began. Following service in Cuba he was assigned to Cleveland. While in transit he visited Washington and was recruited by the OSS. In June 1944, he arrived in London becoming, after the war, chief of station, a position he retained after the OSS clandestine services became the Strategic Services Unit (SSU). In 1947, he joined the CIA. After nearly 10 years at Headquarters, Scott was sent to Mexico City as chief of station, a position he would hold until he retired in 1969. He remained in Mexico City, working as a consultant until his death of natural causes at age 62.

Jefferson Morley, a reporter for the *Washington Post*, decided to write a biography of Win Scott after a 1995 meeting with Scott's son, Michael, then a movie director. Michael told the story of his father on two levels. The first was that of a CIA officer and closet novelist and poet, whose career touched Lee Harvey Oswald and the Kennedy assassination, the Bay of Pigs invasion, secret CIA agents high in the Mexican government, and many of the most famous British and American intelligence officers—Kim Philby, James Angleton, Allen Dulles, Richard Helms, Bill Harvey, Howard Hunt, J. C. King, and David Phillips to name a few—and two presidents, JFK and Lyndon Johnson. Not much had reached the public about Scott's career, and his son wanted to know more.

The second level of the story was Scott's personal life, about which even Michael had spotty knowledge. What he knew—several marriages and numerous affairs—indicated it was a mess by any standard, curiously analogous to Philby's. Michael's queries disclosed some surprising detail, including the fact that he was adopted and had brothers.

Michael agreed to help Morley write the story, and he began by filing an FOIA request with the CIA for whatever documents it or the Agency had on his father. Of special interest was a copy of a fictionalized autobiography Scott had written but that disappeared—thanks, they suggest, to Jim Angleton and oth-

er senior CIA officers—soon after his death. Michael also went through his father's papers and began a series of interviews with family members and acquaintances. The result of their collaboration was *Our Man in Mexico*.

Most of the book describes Scott's 12-year service as COS in Mexico City. But there are interesting asides, for example, about Scott's relationship with Philby in the UK and the United States. Here, Morley is careless about Philby's background—he was never head of Section V in MI6, and he learned about suspicions of Maclean as a Soviet agent before a visit to the VENONA element at Arlington Hall. Moreover, Morley suggests Scott suspected Philby was also an agent at the same time it occurred to Bill Harvey, though he cites no source for this surprise.

Morley focuses on the high level agents—three presidents among them—Scott recruited in the Mexican government; Scott's trusted staff; the Bay of Pigs invasion; his relationship with David Phillips; and, most of all, his knowledge of Lee Harvey Oswald's time in Mexico City. It quickly becomes clear that Morley is something of a conspiracy theorist. He is convinced Scott withheld surveillance information about Oswald at the request of CIA Headquarters. When lawyers from the Warren Commission visited Mexico City, Scott gave them a story "that was both true and untrue." (234) Finally, Morley suggests that Scott too concluded that there was more to the CIA relationship with the assassination than the Warren Report allows, although he admits a lack of any compelling evidence.

Our Man in Mexico is a good title for an interesting book about a complex man dealing with sensitive issues in and out of government.

Robert Eringer, **Ruse: Undercover With FBI Counterintelligence** (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2008), 215 pp., photos, no index.

The late Edward Lee Howard, a CIA officer who defected to the KGB, wrote a forgettable and largely fantasy memoir called *Safe House.*[8] According to private "intelligence consultant," editor, and literary agent, Robert Eringer, the book proposal Howard submitted had serious weaknesses and the prospective publisher approached him with the idea of making it publishable. Eringer agreed but signed on only after securing assurance from the FBI that they would use the opportunity to capture Howard and return him for trial—hence the "ruse."

Eringer describes the operation's set up with the FBI and his meetings with Howard in Russia, Switzerland, Hungary and Cuba and goes on to explain why the plan ended in failure. He also adds some new detail to Howard's claims about making a secret trip to the United States in 1986, where the KGB arranged a meeting "with an authoritative American." Eringer says he was told that the American was Aldrich Ames. But Howard said it was not

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[8] Edward Lee Howard, *Safe House: The Compelling Memoirs of the Only CIA Spy to Seek Asylum in Russia* (Bethesda, MD: National Press Books, 1995).

Ames, and according to Eringer, this led the FBI to suspect another mole existed. (38) Later Eringer hints that Ames, like Hanssen, was caught because of a KGB informer, not CI analysis at CIA.[9] (210) But are these revelations true? Eringer provides no evidence at all to support them. Along this same line he alludes to contacts with an unidentified "spymaster," uses undocumented reconstructed dialogue with many fictitious names. The book falls squarely in the "trust me" category despite the inclusion of some 10-year-old photographs that tend to substantiate meetings with Howard and former KGB chairman, Vladimir Kryuchkov.

In a final curiosity, the Howard story ends at page 175 of the book. With the exception of the epilogue that attacks Vladimir Putin, the balance of the book deals with fugitive Ira Einhorn. It may serve as filler for the publisher, but it adds nothing of intelligence value. With these slender qualifications, *Ruse* struggles to attain mediocrity.

Kristie Macrakis, ***Seduced by Secrets: Inside the Stasi's Spy-Tech World*** (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 392 pp., endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

In 1972, East German Werner Stiller defected to the West. He had been an officer in the Science and Technology Division of the HVA (the German Democratic Republic's foreign intelligence service) and an agent of the West German foreign intelligence service, the BND. In 1986, Stiller published his memoir, *Im Zentrum der Spionage* (*In the Center of Espionage*)[10] and gave the West its first glimpse of the extensive HVA S&T espionage operations. History of science professor Kristie Macrakis has added to the Stiller story while providing a much broader look at Stasi scientific espionage organizations, functions and operations. *Seduced by Secrets* tells how the Stasi began—with KGB "assistance"—and shows how it gained fearsome proficiency in maintaining domestic security and grudging respect for its foreign espionage capabilities.

Professor Macrakis took a classic approach to writing her book while doing graduate work for her PhD at Harvard. After reading what was available in German and English, she went to the Stasi archives in Berlin and also interviewed former Stasi officers—including former HVA chief Markus Wolf. Her interviews with Werner Stiller add considerable detail to his story. (51ff) Part one of the book describes agent and technical operations. Several of the cases have not received much attention before, including one with an agent codenamed "Gorbachev"—named after a vodka, not the Soviet leader. (8ff) Where needed, she includes background on the often conflicting economic and political issues influencing priorities that resulted in inefficient use of resources. This is particularly apparent the story of "the computer fiasco." (94ff)

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[9] See Pete Earley, *Confessions of a Spy: The Real Story of Aldrich Ames* (New York: Putnam, 1997).
[10] Werner Stiller, *Im Zentrum der Spionage* (Mainz, Germany: Hase and Koehler, 1986). The English edition—*Beyond The Wall: Memoirs of an East and West German Spy* (Washington, DC: Brassey's, 1992)—was written with Jefferson Adams.

Part two of *Seduced by Secrets* concentrates on the hardware and techniques of Stasi clandestine operations. Well-illustrated chapters cover technical surveillance—electronic, chemical (smell science), optical, visual—secret writing, and agent-officer communications. As to the technical terms, Dr. Macrakis translates the awkward Stasi expression for agent or informant—*Inoffizieller Mitarbiter* (IM)—as "unofficial staff member" rather than unofficial collaborator as used elsewhere.[11] In several instances, her use of English tradecraft terms is inaccurate—for example dead drops are used synonymously with dead letter boxes—and readers are cautioned to check other sources.[12]

Dr. Macrakis concludes with a brief comparison of the "strikingly similar" Stasi and Western uses of technology "to solve social or intelligence problems" (314) but errs when she suggests "the CIA attempted to use science to control agents' minds." (315) *Seduced by Secrets* is nevertheless fine scholarship and a valuable and unique contribution to intelligence literature.

James McNeish, **The Sixth Man: The Extraordinary Life of Paddy Costello** (Auckland, NZ: Random House New Zealand, 2007), 414 pp., endnotes, bibliography, appendices, photos, glossary, index.

The "Cambridge Five" were not the only Soviet agents who attended that university during the 1930s. American Michael Straight, Canadian Herbert Norman, and New Zealander Paddy Costello share that distinction. Straight eventually admitted his recruitment, Norman and Costello only their communist party membership. In *The Sixth Man*, James McNeish portrays Costello as a gifted student, teacher, and military intelligence officer in WW II. After the war he served with the New Zealand foreign office in Moscow and Paris before entering academia in England. In between those years, as McNeish acknowledges with obvious irritation, several authors have alleged that Costello might have been or was in fact a Soviet agent.[13] McNeish strives mightily to dismiss the idea as fanciful speculation. In support of his position, he notes that even Christopher Andrew cannot say *absolutely* that Mitrokhin got it right. (16) But the arguments McNeish makes are mere speculation and ignore important facts reported by others. For example, in the chapter entitled, "The Passport Affair" that discusses the false New Zealand passports issued to Soviet illegal's Peter Cohen and his wife, McNeish neglects to mention that the hand writing on the passports was Costello's.[14]

James McNeish does justice to Paddy Costello's life story but does nothing to dilute his reputation as one of the "Cambridge Spies." Costello may indeed have been *The Sixth Man*.

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[11] See for example, John O. Koehler, *Stasi: The Untold Story of the East German Secret Police* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000). British author Anthony Glees designates IM as *Inoffizieller Mitarbeiter* which he translates as "unofficial collaborator."

[12] For example, Robert Wallace and Keith Melton, *Spycraft: The Secret History of the CIA's Spytechs from Communism to Al-Qaeda* (New York: Dutton, 2008).

[13] See: Chapmen Pincher, *Their Trade Is Treachery* (1981), Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, *The Mitrokhin Archive: The KGB in Europe and the West* (London: Penguin: 2000).

[14] For more detail on this episode, see Graeme Hunt, *Spies And Revolutionaries: A History of New Zealand Subversion* (Auckland, NZ: Reed Books Ltd., 2007).

Priya Satia, ***Spies in Arabia: The Great War and the Cultural Foundations of Britain's Covert Empire in the Middle East*** (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 472 pp., endnotes, index.

From biblical times to the early 20th century, Uz was an accepted reference to the Arabian Peninsula. The unofficial British intelligence agent, George Wyman Bury, wrote a book about his adventures in *The Land of Uz.*[15] In *Spies in Arabia*, Stanford history professor Priya Satia has written about intelligence in the same region during and after WW I from the perspective of the 21st century. She provides little new about the events already described by other historians—the functions and staff of the Arab Bureau, Lawrence of Arabia as intelligence analyst and field operator, the Arab Revolt, and the postwar political deceptions.[16] What she tries to do that is different is to explain the motivations behind "intelligence community" actions and consequences in psychological and epistemological terms. (23ff) Her principal theme is the development of Britain's "covert empire." Despite two chapters on the topic, the term is never defined and it doesn't project an intuitive meaning. Still, she attempts to show that intelligence agents—influenced by British culture, a need to spread democracy, spy fiction, and aerial reconnaissance—played an important role in building and maintaining the so-called covert empire.

In her words—that are typical of the narrative's pervasive semantic ambiguity—the book pieces together:

> the world of British intelligence in the Middle East…. I want to unpack the enduring fascination with Arabia as a spy-space which colored this British effort…. My focus is on the formation and fallout of the cultural imagination that shaped agents' approach and methods…on thinking about intelligence and agents' skills rather than on the agents' actual abilities. (4)

More specifically, she writes, "this book argues [that] in the influence of their tactical imagination and epistemological outlook…lies the explanation for the gradual transformation" of British informal intelligence gathering to "the paranoid preoccupation of a brutal aerial surveillance regime after the war." (5) Unfortunately, although Satia devotes a chapter to "Air Control," she does not substantiate the charge of brutality.

Likewise, her attempts to link British agent operations in the Middle East to the fiction of Erksine Childers, Joseph Conrad, John Buchan, Rudyard Kipling, and John Le Carré, among others, and then to the "uncanny connections between them and the Cambridge Five," (17, 334) are creative, even colorful, but they are not convincing.[17] She tries but fails to make the case that

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[15] Abdullah Mansur (Bury's pseudonym), *The Land of Uz* (London: Macmillan, 1911). A naturalist by training, Bury accepted intelligence tasks from the government when he traveled, though he was not paid.
[16] See for example, Jeremy Wilson, *Lawrence of Arabia: The Authorized Biogrpahy of T. E. Lawrence* (London: Heinemann, 1989), and James Barr, *Setting the Desert on Fire: T.E. Lawrence and Britain's Secret War in Arabia, 1916–1918* (London: Bloomsbury, 2006).

the real world of intelligence is inspired by espionage fiction. (96) Similar issues are raised in the chapter on "conspiracy theories," which explains the troubles in the occupied lands. Here, too, she only leaves readers wondering why it was included.

Spies in Arabia is filled with well-documented conjecture about the complex psychological motivations of British intelligence agents in the Middle East. But it provides no basis for determining whether the author got it right. Thus the more traditional explanations—patriotism, curiosity, duty, and professional competence—remain equally plausible. Professor Satia ends this self-inflicted standoff with a surprising though somewhat Delphic conclusion:

> *The United States is not repeating what…Britain did in Iraq decades ago* [that laid the groundwork] *for what is happening today. To this Marx might offer the correction, and I would agree, that those conditions of possibility were material and as much epistemological. (337)*

Spies in Arabia is a surprisingly confused and confusing book.

Stephen Wade, ***Spies in the Empire: Victorian Military Intelligence*** (New York: Anthem Press, 2007), 276 pp., end of chapter notes, bibliography, photos, chronology, index.

Military threats to the British Empire were a major concern of the government from Victorian to Edwardian times, and secret agents were routinely employed to determine what potential enemies were planning and what actions were required of the British Army. These are not new topics and they have been covered in more detail in other books.[18] *Spies in the Empire* gives, in a single source, a broad overview of how the needed intelligence was acquired, used, and misused throughout the British realm.

From the beginnings in northern India, spying on Russians in Afghanistan in the early 1800s, to WW I when the threat was German, author Stephen Wade reports how military and political officers—the "heroes of the Great Game" (29ff)—collected the needed strategic intelligence. Initially all were amateur intelligence officers, and they traveled as explorers and political representatives, or simply on holiday. This relatively relaxed pace came to an end with the Crimean War (1853–1856) when "a powerful lesson regarding the neglect of intelligence" (66-69) emerged in the disastrous charge of the Light Brigade. With the formation of the Intelligence Department in 1873, British military

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[17] There are also factual errors—Philby was the double-agent, Philby's father was a communist—that come from unreliable sourcing, in this case Anthony Cave Brown's book, *Treason in the Blood.*

[18] See for example, Peter Hopkirk, *The Great Game: On Secret Service in High Asia* (London: John Murray, 1990) and Thomas G. Fergusson, *British Military Intelligence, 1870-1914: The Development of a Modern Intelligence Organization* (Frederick, MD: University Press of America, 1984).

intelligence was on the path to professionalism. Wade describes the progress through the Zulu Wars, the Boer War, the operations against the Fenians, and the growing threat from the German Empire.

Wade departs briefly from the strictly military intelligence role in the empire in the final chapters, when he examines the foundations of what became a military intelligence department spinoff—the security service (MI5)—after WW I. At one point, he discusses what he terms "spy mania" and its influence on the press, playwrights and novelists in particular—Childers, Le Queux, and Conrad being well-known examples. But he does not make a strong case that MI5 was established because of these social pressures as opposed to operational need.[19]

Spies in the Empire concludes with the thought, not fleshed out, that "the Victorian years have much to teach us today." (245) The book is an interesting summary, but it has few original insights.

Ralph Pickard, **Stasi Decorations and Memorabilia: A Collector's Guide** Lorton, VA: Frontline Historical Publishing, 2007), 248 pp., bibliography, photos, index.

Heraldry has been described as "the shorthand of history" and "the floral border in the garden of history."[20] Although the term originally applied to military and familial coats of arms and related badges, the communist nations created a new form of heraldry, substituting political and industrial insignia for military symbols in badges and awards. Since the communist forms of heraldry cannot be found in standard reference works on the subject—though the topic has received new attention with the fall of communism—Ralph Pickard has taken a step in the direction of preserving a piece of the East German heraldic record with his new reference work, *Stasi Decorations and Memorabilia*. All the items in the book are in his private collection. As Ambassador Hugh Montgomery notes in his foreword to the book, Soviet heraldic influence prevailed and the Stasi "abandoned all efforts to retain any ties to German historical precedent."

After a short historical overview of the Stasi organization, the book contains high quality color photographs of most of the medals, awards, and commemorative coins—even document covers—issued by the Stasi. Detailed specifications are indicated for each item so one may in verify authenticity. An unusual aspect of Stasi heraldry are the coins honoring former spies and espionage networks even when the officers involved included Soviet agents. The Rote Kapelle network is an example; native German, but GRU agent, Richard Sorge and his radioman Max Clausen are another (238-44).

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[19] See Christopher Andrew, *Her Majesty's Secret Service* (London: Heinemann, 1995)

[20] See Arthur Charles Fox-Davies, *A Complete Guide to Heraldry* (London: Thomas Nelson, 1925) and John Pottinger and Sir Iain Moncreiffe, *Simple Heraldry* (London: Thomas Nelson, 1953).

The non-German reader will need a dictionary because the German terms on the items are not translated. Likewise, the table of contents is in German. Future editions of the book would do well to include translations.

Overall, this is a valuable and impressive reference work.

Intelligence Abroad

Kishorilal Sharma, **My Years in a Pakistani Prison: The Untold Story of Kishorilal, alias Amarik Singh, alias Saleem, an Indian Spy in Pakistan** (Olympia Fields, IL: Lancer Publishers, 2008), 224 pp., photos, maps, index.

A series of memoirs by retired senior Indian intelligence officers has provided top-down views of intelligence careers in India.[21] Kishorilal writes from a different perspective, as a junior military intelligence officer whose career lasted 10 years (1966–1976), seven of those in Pakistani jails.

The book doesn't reveal the details of Kishorilal's operations in Pakistan. It does describe in considerable detail his recruitment as a recent graduate of an automobile college in the Jullundur at age 19, his espionage training, his capture, and unpleasant treatment in several Pakistani prisons. These circumstances and the suspicions he endured from his own service after repatriation are still intense memories.

When finally discharged, Kishorilal was "encouraged" by his former service to remain silent about his experiences in prison and his handling when released. After 30 years in business he has chosen to share them because "the treatment of detainees held on charges of spying is…not known." But he adds a qualifying comment that despite "unspeakable interrogations" he found some "extraordinarily good human beings" among his jailers. (viii) As to his handling as a possible turncoat by his former colleagues, he is less forgiving.

Kishorilal's experiences will be of interest to anyone concerned with life in South Asia but especially to intelligence officers and those contemplating similar service. The professional similarities and differences they reveal are valuable benchmarks.

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[21] See for example, D. C. Pathak, *Intelligence: As Security Weapon* (New Delhi: Manas Publications, 2003); Maloy Krishna Dhar, *Open Secrets: India's Intelligence Unveiled* (New Delhi: Manas Publications: 2005); Maj. Gen. V. K. Singh, *India's External Intelligence: Secrets of Research and Analysis Wing (RAW)* (New Delhi: Manas Publications, 2007).