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Conqueror and Administrator: Civil and Military Actions of Marshall Louis-
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
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
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Executive Summary

Title: Conqueror and Administrator: Civil and Military Actions of Marshall Louis-Gabriel Suchet in the Spanish Province of Aragon, 1808-1813.

Author: Major Jean-Philippe Rollet, French "Troupes de Marine".

Thesis: During the Peninsular War in Spain from 1808 to 1813, Marshall Suchet not only successfully fought the Spanish "Guerillas" but he also skilfully administrated the province of Aragon. He made it a relatively safe and prosperous place for his troops, while the rest of Spain became a nightmarish quagmire for the French occupiers.

Discussion: In early 1808, Napoleon, under the pretext of a dispute between the Spanish King Charles IV and his son Ferdinand, invaded Spain. His troops were at first greeted as liberators by the populace, who wanted to be rid of King Charles' Prime Minister Manuel de Godoy. As it became clearer that Napoleon's intentions were to take control of the Spanish kingdom and to crown his own brother, Joseph, as King, the people of Spain revolted. This marked the nascence of the "guerrillas" which would become, in addition to the British expeditionary corps of Lord Wellington, the French army's worst enemy. Nationalistic and religious fanaticism from the Spanish insurgents responded to the cultural misunderstanding and the violent repression by the French.

Appointed the governor of the insurgency-troubled province of Aragon after he had seized its main cities, Marshall Suchet skilfully adopted a balanced policy mixing strong military action and economic reforms to regenerate the local economy. He also adopted political measures aimed at restoring the appearance of a Spanish sovereignty. At the operational level, Suchet restored the discipline of III Corps and developed a network of strong places that ensured a French armed presence throughout the region while relying on highly mobile autonomous units to chase the guerrillas in their strongholds. An astute economist, he succeeded in developing the local economy, while also establishing a mutual beneficial relationship between his troops and the populace. Politically and culturally aware of the Spanish situation, he utilized the specificities of the Aragonese people to thwart the influence of the guerrilla leaders. He eventually established a flexible policy based on a mix of benevolence and coercion. During his administration, Aragon remained a relatively safe place, with a sustainable economy and, above all, one where the French soldiers and the population could mix and establish contacts.

Conclusion: In the overall French defeat of the war in Spain, Louis Gabriel Suchet set the example of an open-minded military leader. Although the Peninsular War remains one of the worst episodes of the Napoleonic era, his administration of Aragon was a success amidst overall failure. Given the recent experiences in both Iraq and Afghanistan, it is of high importance for military leaders to read about Marshall Suchet. A precursor in stabilization operations, he faced conditions mostly similar to the ones NATO troops are, and will be, facing in the coming years. He responded to this form of conflict with an open mind and the diverse elements of national power.

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PREFACE

At a time when stabilization operations have arguably become the most problematic part of 21st century conflicts, many western armies look for answers in their recent past experiences. In that regard, the decolonization wars offer interesting paradigms which are all the more appealing as they offer tactical procedures applicable to contemporary “small wars”. However, seldom do military leaders look back at conflicts of other eras, which often are more similar to what our armed forces are facing today.

Similarly, inter-agency cooperation has now become a recurring theme. It is looked at as a kind of “holly Grail”, insofar as everybody foresees the alleged miracles it is likely to achieve. A caveat, however, should be noted: most military actors on the ground doubt it will ever be found. This poses the question of how to concentrate the benefits of interagency effects with only military agents being on the ground.

Guerilla warfare has often been despised by professional soldiers who, by trade, are more inclined to fight conventional conflicts. The French Peninsular War in Spain, from 1808 to 1814, was no exception. Facing an elusive Spanish guerilla foe, the majority of the French officers responded to ideologically inspired violence by violent retaliatory actions. Misunderstanding the mix of religious and nationalistic hatred inspiring the Spanish people, they often applied purely military and coercive solutions. Such an approach turned out to be inefficient and often escalated the opposition against them. Some officers, however, had a better understanding of the dynamics of the “guerilla.” They intuitively understood that, for the occupying force, the only way to maintain a fragile peace was to interact with the populace in a long term effort to “win the hearts, or at least the minds.”

One of them, an atypical officer in many regards, obtained outstanding results by using every instruments of governmental power at his own level of responsibility. Marshall Louis Gabriel Suchet was simultaneously an imaginative warfighter, a skillful administrator, and a cunning politician. He knew he could not expect any other support from his government, hence he had to develop a policy based on his personal expertise and assessment of the situation. This study intends to show how Marshall Suchet built a comprehensive understanding of the insurgency, and how he responded to it as a “military administrator” rather than as a pure military operational leader. This paper is, therefore, a modest contribution to the debate on interagency operations. The conclusion is that properly trained military leaders can be self sufficient when it comes to fighting insurgencies using the entire scope of instruments of power, not just the military option of force.

Available sources consist for the most part of primary sources, among which are Suchet and Wellington’s own memoirs. Understandably, these sources often present the risk of being driven by the desire of their authors to justify their own action or to discredit their enemy’s achievements. However, there seems to be a consensus on the efficiency of Suchet’s administration of Aragon. The secondary sources fall into the contemporary writers, who analyzed the Spanish campaign in the late 19th century, and modern authors who reviewed the campaign with an attempt to draw conclusions applicable to the current conflicts. Finally, I gratefully acknowledge the patient and benevolent guidance provided by Doctor Donald Bittner, who mentored me throughout the work and provided critical instructions. I am also indebted to Mrs. Louella O’Herlihy-Yorke, who had the patience to correct my written English and who made it intelligible. Finally, I would like to thank my wife, Maud, and my children, Jean-Baptiste, Anne-Gaëlle, Pierre-Antoine and François-Xavier, for letting me take on already restricted family time to write this paper.

SETTING THE SCENE:

An overview of the Spanish War. The genesis of the Peninsular War lies in the Napoleonic decree of Berlin, signed on 21 November 1806, aimed at blockading the United Kingdom. On 30 November 1807, the French seized Lisbon. After Portugal, Napoleon sought to control the coasts of Spain. He was then helped by Spanish internal political circumstances. Indeed, King Charles IV and his Prime Minister, Manuel de Godoy, were opposed by Prince Ferdinand, heir to the Spanish throne, who wanted to overthrow his father. Charles previously had publicly stated he wanted to sue his son, whom he accused of attempted coup. In addition, Napoleon had little confidence in his Spanish ally who, he felt, could easily fall on the British side.¹ On 13 November, the II Corps d'Observation de la Gironde,² under General Pierre Dupont de l'Etang, had already penetrated into Spain, taking advantage of the political confusion. On 9 January 1808, the Corps d'Observation des côtes de l'Océan, under General Bon Adrien Jeannot de Moncey, joined it. One month later the Corps d'Observation des Pyrénées Orientales of General Prince Joachim Murat followed. Eventually, Murat became commander in chief of the French troops.³

On 17 March, a crowd of protesters led by supporters of Prince Ferdinand reached the Aranjuez castle, seeking to prevent the royal family from fleeing Madrid to Andalusia. They specifically denounced the perceived mismanagement of state affairs by Prime Minister Godoy. The movement soon grew and the protesters attacked the royal residency. Two days later, under direct pressure, King Charles abdicated, relinquished sovereignty to his son, and he and his family then sought refuge among the French troops on 23 March. The next day, the newly crowned Ferdinand VII made a triumphal entry in Madrid.

Until that point, the presence of French troops was regarded with rather sympathetic eyes by the Spaniards. But soon, it became apparent that Napoleon, who held the Spanish people in low esteem, wanted to seize power in Spain. On 20 April, he reunited the royal family in Bayonne and forced Ferdinand to cede back the Crown to his father.⁴ As a result, on 2 May, in what Spanish history would call the “Dos de Mayo”, the people of Madrid, whose vast majority supported Ferdinand, rose up against the French, now clearly considered to be occupying troops. Valencia, Cadiz, Grenada, and Valladolid soon followed. The French responded with a violent repression. In reaction, Napoleon decided to neutralize Ferdinand. On 5 May, Charles IV was forced to place his crown in Napoleon’s hands.. On 6 June, a group of Spanish officers and notables, called “junta”, refused to recognize the abdication and in Sevilla declared war against the French. The following day, on 7 June 1808, the French Emperor appointed his brother Joseph as the new king of Spain. In Napoleon’s eyes, the “Spanish affair” was closed. In reality, a six year bloody insurgency had only just begun.

Initial situation in Aragon. In 1808, the Spanish regular troops numbered nearly 100,000 men, equipped with artillery but lacking an efficient cavalry. The enthusiasm was high enough to compensate for the lack of training and experience, and these soldiers were eager to fight the French. However, this army suffered from a structural weakness which was related to the political state of Spain: it had no central command and depended on the provincial “juntas.” This prevented an efficient coordinated defensive strategy, but also prefigured the organization of the guerillas. As a result, these regular troops initially disbanded in front of the French. In Aragon, Marshall Charles Lefebvre-Desnouettes marched towards Saragossa, meeting little resistance by the troops of General Jose de Palafox y Melzi. In mid-July, he started to besiege the capital of the province, which was defended by its fanaticized inhabitants (see Appendix B, map 2).

Everywhere in Spain, the French lines of communication were overstretched, and the population and the isolated Spanish regular units started to attack French rear units. The surrender of General Pierre Dupont, with 9,000 men to General Francisco Javier Castanos and his force of 17,000 in Bailen on 22 July 1808, caused the evacuation of Madrid by King Joseph and the withdrawal of all French troops towards the Pyrenees Mountains. In Saragossa, where the forces of Lefebvre were close to storming the city, Aragonese soon interpreted this withdrawal as a victory of the armed people against the invaders. They thus celebrated General Palafox as a hero. In addition, a British expeditionary corps under Sir Arthur Wellesley, the future Duke of Wellington, had landed in Portugal on 1 August.

However, on 9 November 1808, Napoleon decided to handle the situation personally and moved the main body of the "Grande Armée" to Spain. In less than ten days, the situation completely turned. On 30 November, Saragossa was besieged again. This siege would last until the 21 February 1809. It was significant because of the nature of the combatants: it was no longer a conventional fight between regulars, but the French Imperial Army opposed to the entire population of Saragossa under the command of General Jose Palafox, determined and fanaticized.⁵

At the same time, the lines of communication of the French began to be harassed by the partisans led by the Marquis of Lazan, Palafox's brother, who had the peasants of Aragon attack French convoys, depots, and hospital. More French troops were thus diverted to protect the logistic lines, which in turn extended the fight for the city. On 20 February, the local Junta offered its surrender to the French. But the fall of Saragossa did not mean the conquest of Aragon, and the heroic fight and fanatical resistance of the inhabitants had set an example of what an irregular and popular-based struggle could achieve. The battle of Saragossa would continue to inspire the guerrillas of Aragon and beyond.⁶ The III Corps, which suffered great attrition and had been

deprived of its artillery, was now trapped in Saragossa while the insurgents groups developed and the V Corps was being moved to Portugal. Although victorious, the French Army of Aragon was now besieged by the “guerilleros”. In this context, General Suchet was ordered to take command in Aragon.⁷

At that particular time, Spanish General Joachim Blake⁸ decided to march against the French in Aragon, taking advantage of the current weakness and isolation of III Corps. Blake's move had created expectations among the population in Aragon, especially in Saragossa. Everywhere the Aragonese rose to support the Spanish troops. However, they soon were disillusioned, as Suchet boldly decided to conduct a spoiling attack at Maria. There, he unexpectedly beat the overconfident Blake on 14 June 1809, and then drove that defeated army back to Belchite where he inflicted a second defeat on the Spanish four days later. After these defeats, and as the 30.000 British reinforcement sent by London were still fighting in Portugal and Cadiz, the escaped Spanish regulars began to reorganize in small bands, under the command of their former officers. They rapidly were reinforced by a diverse body of civilians. Suchet correctly realized that this threat was more dangerous than the remaining conventional Spanish troops,⁹ which were now unable to challenge him in a conventional way. After the siege of Saragossa, Suchet noted that:

Numerous partisans were organised on both banks of the Ebro, and commenced a petty warfare which unceasingly annoyed the 3rd corps in all its operations, and especially whilst it was engaged in any siege. General Suchet, therefore, though he afterwards succeeded in conquering far more formidable obstacles, had always to make head against those partial but annoying attacks, the origin of which dates from this period, and has its rise in the impulse then given to the nation at large.¹⁰

The rise of the Guerrilla in Aragon. Although the word “guerilla” or “small war” was borrowed from the Spanish language and history, this insurgency was not an unprecedented form of warfare. Suchet, as with many French officers, had experienced insurgencies in the Vendée, early

in the French Revolution, as well as in Tyrol, Italy and in the French Alps.¹¹ Nevertheless, the Spanish insurrection was not one of mere factions or criminal bands. Rather, it was the uprising of a whole people with a nascent nationalistic feeling, reacting to the imposition of a foreign government. The insurgency became a national movement, although not united, fueled both by the disbanded Spanish regulars and by the British government. The latter provided the insurgents with funds and weapons. Everywhere, the “cuadrillas”, or squadrons, were formed by former regulars, joined by peasants, who had been abused; by priests, who preached against the “unholy” French revolutionaries; and by adventurers, thieves, and smugglers. Most French officers mistakenly believed that the defeat of the Spanish regular forces meant the submission of the country. As one of them noted: “We thought, [...] that we just had to seize Madrid to complete the submission of Spain...The wars we had fought previously had led us to apprehend only the military power of a nation, and to disregard the national spirit that animated its citizens.”¹²

Soon, the exiled Spanish government tried to organize those scattered insurgencies. The central Junta decreed on 28 December 1808 that the “partidas” or “cuadrillas” must not be formed with former regulars. They must remain subordinate to the Spanish generals and avoid recruiting young men who could have been enlisted in the regular army. In addition, the decree intended to impose an organization chart, with regular ranks, to the leader of the guerrillas. However, the exiled government was never able to enforce this decree, a weakness of which was trying to set rules on irregular forces. Finally, the Junta in Seville backed off and then decreed on 7 April 1809 that the “partidas” should be allowed to operate by themselves.¹³

The French rapidly established control in central Aragon, around the capital city of Saragossa. However, all around the province different bands of insurgents appeared which progressively became bolder and more numerous. Renoyalés, a former Spanish officer who

escaped after the battle of Lerida, established his troops in the Jaca Valley, south of the Pyrenees Mountains, in the monastery of Saint Jean de la Pena. In the neighboring province of Navarre, a nineteen year old student named Mina commanded a "partida" of a couple of hundred partisans and regularly cut the main logistical line of the Army of Aragon between Pamplona and Saragossa. In the South of Aragon, Villacampa, another former regular officer, had regrouped the remnants of two regiments, reinforced by fanaticized peasants, and controlled the outskirts of the city of Calatayud. He was able to coordinate his actions with Colonel Ramon-Gayan, a guerilla leader himself, whose 3,000 men stationed at the convent of Notre Dame del Aguila, and with another guerilla leader, nicknamed "El Empecinado", who regularly intercepted the communication from Saragossa to Madrid. Finally, 2,500 men operating around Tortosa, on the Ebro River under the command of Garcia Navarro, constituted the lock that isolated central Aragon from the rest of Spain.¹⁴ Indeed, these men knew the terrain and the population. Moreover, when facing the French they remained in small units, either called "partidas" or "cuadrillas", about 50 men strong, and could easily break contact by using the terrain or melting in the population.

The Spanish guerillas were often portrayed in a partisan way. For some they were admirable patriots in rags, fighting victoriously the French regulars in the open. For others, they were a mix of peasants, bandits, and contraband smugglers, who seized the occasion of the war to break out of their miserable condition.¹⁵ It is still debated whether the guerilla was the most important factor of the French defeat in Spain, or if they just supported the Anglo-Spanish-Portuguese conventional forces. Suchet, for his part, estimated that this type of warfare accounted more for the Spanish resistance than the conventional operations by the Spanish-British coalition. He based his opinion on the character of the Spanish people and on the geography of Spain itself:

Blake's army had disappeared; his materiel and magazines had fallen into our hands ... and the insurrection, profiting by the losses of the regular army, soon became far more

dangerous to the enemy. ... There it was that this new system of resistance was brought into action in the north of Spain, which was afterwards so skillfully wielded by some of its chiefs, and which defended the country in a far more effectual manner than the regular war carried on by disciplined armies, because it was more consistent with the nature of the country and the character of its inhabitants.¹⁶

However, the opinion was widespread among the French officers that the guerrilla accounted in first place for the final defeat.¹⁷ In fact, the defeat of the French forces was caused by a mix between conventional operations and the guerilla actions. The guerilla mostly accounted for the disruption of French logistics.¹⁸

HOW SUCHET MADE USE OF ALL INSTRUMENTS OF POWER:

The situation in Aragon was one of destruction of the main economic and administrative centers. The population remained deeply hostile, but it was also exhausted as a result of the fierce resistance it had demonstrated. The siege of Saragossa had resulted in heavy civilian casualties, disrupted trade and industries, and one year of conventional war had ruined agriculture. Above all, the new governor of Aragon was facing a new challenge. On 9 February 1810 he received a letter from France, informing him that he would not receive anymore subsidies from France and had to sustain entirely his army from the occupied Aragon province. Until then, Suchet only had to get food and forage from the local economy for his III Corps. This order then signified he had to dress, pay, feed, equip, and generally support his soldiers without any help from France. His force would have to live off the land in a hostile environment while threatened with the enduring pressure of the Spanish-British conventional forces now closing on Saragossa again.

In his memoirs, Suchet described in detail his immediate initiatives following the end of the conventional fight. Although this testimony naturally offers the risk of partiality and of self celebration, the abundant literature on the subject generally agrees on the efficiency of these

measures.¹⁹ The British author and retired officer Sir Francis Napier, who personally served in Spain and could not be suspected of any particular sympathy for the French, perfectly summed up Suchet's policy:

He called the notables and heads of the clergy in Aragon to his headquarters, and with their advice reorganized his internal administration. He removed many absurd restrictions upon industry and trade, placed the municipal power and police entirely with the natives, and thus obtained greater supplies with less discontent. And he was well served and obeyed, both in matters of administration and police, by the Aragonese, whose feeling he was careful to soothe, showing himself in all things a shrewd governor and an able commander.²⁰

Analyzing the insurgency and its causes. Suchet's first concern was to assess the socio-economic state of the province. Here, the background of Suchet (see Appendix A) undoubtedly influenced his analysis. He described the agriculture, which was once based on the production of cereals and olive oil, as "exhausted by two years of repeated requisitions and destructions by both national and foreign armies".²¹ He noted the local breed of sheep had almost disappeared and that only one linen factory remained in Albarracin. In addition, the costs of the rare leather products of the province were absolutely prohibitive and not competitive with the neighboring regions.

Exploiting his skills in economics, Suchet focused on the finances and discovered that the wealthiest families had moved to more quiet areas. This implied that the resources for rebuilding a tax system were gone. In addition, he learned that the Spanish Superintendent of Aragon had removed to Seville a three million Francs reserve from the local treasury. Suchet perfectly understood that although the notoriously bankrupt Spanish central government was indebted to the governor of Aragon, the latter would not receive a single Real. He also calculated that no less than eight million Francs would be necessary to pay his troops when the province was only able to raise four million before the war. Finally he comprehended that the whole administration had been disrupted by the conflict, which indeed included the tax collection system.

In early February 1810, a decree by Napoleon I officially appointed General Suchet as Governor of Aragon (see appendix E). In the meantime, he remained the commanding officer of the III Corps.²² As a political appraisal, Suchet assumed that his administration would be long term. Hence, he refused to resort to a mere requisition system, which he believed would inevitably create more anger and resentment.²³ He decided that long term profitable development was wiser than short time pillage. Moreover, he also understood that it required a mutually trusting relationship with the population.

The political initiatives. As a military leader and an astute politician, Suchet believed that his control of Aragon could only be achieved with the minimal compliance of its inhabitants. He was aware that the fierce combat, including the siege of Saragossa, had forced the inhabitants to fight with the most desperate resolution. In response, the French troops had used force, sometimes with excessive violence.²⁴ Having conducted a thorough examination of the situation, he first decided to use the independent character of the Aragonese to his advantage. He remarked:

The Arragonese are proud, obstinate, jealous of their liberty, and take it for granted that their country surpasses every other in the world ... The rivalries between one province and another subsist, perhaps, in a greater degree in Spain than in any other country. The Arragonese fancy that they possess more physical strength, and spring from nobler blood, than the Castillians, because they are less inclined to bend to their superiors.²⁵

Not only did Suchet make the decision to keep the administrative agents and structures in place, but he emphasized the necessity to handover the local affairs to the Aragonese themselves. Before the French invasion, the royal government relied heavily on functionaries sent from Madrid to administrate the provinces. This reality had created a huge frustration in the provinces, especially in Aragon where the people felt deprived of their rights. Suchet intended to break the people's will to fight by combining benevolence and demonstrations of force. Appealing to Aragon's independent spirit was a clear sign of accommodation. It was also a sensible way to

prepare the Spanish administration to collect taxes on behalf of the French occupant, without exposing the few French administrators he had. Right from the start, he stated: "To get satisfying results, we need to be supported by enlightened locals. Sadly, only a few of them are likely to accept."²⁶

However, his well balanced actions began to reassure the Aragonese about the French intentions. As a priority, General Suchet made great efforts to ensure the good behavior of the troops under his command. He knew that in a war-stricken country, the temptation of pillage and looting was high; he was also aware that this type of behavior was more often than not inspired by the misbehavior of the higher ranking officers. Consequently, acting both as the III Corps commander and as the Governor of Aragon, he began investigating every abuse. Several officers were relieved from duty,²⁷ while others were summoned to hand over what was unduly earned or seized. Following the same goal, he ensured the payment of the troops. The soldiers, now paid regularly, had no rightful reasons for looting. These new standards of conduct played a role in the populace's acceptance of the troops. According to Suchet: "It was no sooner perceived, after the defeat of General Blake, that the governor was endeavouring to establish a regular system of administration and discipline, than confidence revived, and a disposition to submit again became manifest."²⁸

Suchet then sought support among the local elites. He wanted them to be major actors in tax collection, police, and economy. As noted previously, most of the leading citizens had fled the province after the siege of Saragossa. Nevertheless, owing to the moderation of the new administration, and especially because of the respect he showed towards the customs and tradition of the province, some key leaders started to show their willingness to cooperate in order to reestablish normality in Aragon. The first personality to approach the French administration was

an influential cleric, the Bishop of Saragossa, Miguel De Santander, Although not deeply religious, Suchet, whose education had been related to religion, identified the significant influence of the clergy. Acknowledging Suchet's respect for the religious institutions, Bishop Santander agreed to collaborate with the French administration, trading his commitment for protection of the Church in Aragon. According to their agreement, Suchet recommended the most prominent clergymen in Aragon,²⁹ which Santander would approve. Suchet also decided the number of priests in the province. Santander, on his part, guaranteed the moderation of the designated priests, and ensured the Catholic clergy made no anti-French rhetoric in their sermons. In return, Suchet offered protection to the clergy, ensured its incomes, and ordered the reconstruction of the destroyed churches. As he wrote, "The titular bishop of Saragossa ..., the truly venerable father Santander, whose persuasive eloquence instilled a peaceful and conciliatory disposition into his flock. This prelate pointed out the means to be adopted with the view of securing to the clergy a portion of their revenues, and the protection to which they were entitled."³⁰ Nonetheless, the clerics who refused to adopt a neutral line and preached against the French were arrested and often sent to a French prison north of the Pyrenees Mountains.

Similarly, Suchet strove to put law and order in Spanish hands. Interestingly, he kept several heads of the former Spanish government in charge. The French general kept close links with the former commissariat officer of the Spanish General Palafox, Don Mariano Dominguez, because he had displayed outstanding qualities during the siege of Saragossa and knew every resource within the province. He also confirmed the president of the Royal Court of Justice, Villa Y Torre, who had been appointed by former King Charles VII, as the chief of Justice for the province. he also succeeded in establishing collaboration with a most respected attorney, Don Augustin de Aquino, in order to restore the judicial system. Tax collection was enforced by the

former tax officer in chief, who had the required experience. Finally, a French Secretary General assisted Governor Suchet in supervising that administration, backed by a cadre of French civilians. Here again, the choice of this supervisor was a sensible one, as François Larreguy was a French citizen from Spanish roots who could speak Spanish.³¹

In all that he did, his actions were on the basis of mutual gain. He relied on different groups of influence to administer the province, while simultaneously they defended their own interests. The advantage of this policy was to keep the troops and staff focused on their duties, which preserved his freedom of action. This ensured the main administrative tasks, among which was tax collection that financed the support of his III Corps were accomplished. Indeed, the result was the occupied paid for the occupiers. Suchet, in his memoirs, acknowledged the role of these Spaniards in the following terms:

To the enlightened councils of those meritorious men, the governor is indebted for his having conquered public opinion in the very exercise of the rigorous measures which he was directed to carry into effect. Fully considering the situation of the country, they accepted the honorable mission of interposing moderation and justice, in the intercourse between the inhabitants and the soldiery, and watched the interests of their fellow countrymen with a perseverance which never relaxed in the pursuit of that object.³²

Symbolically, Suchet's first action as an administrator was to prevent the displacement to Madrid of the silver objects of worship from the Church of Notre Dame du Pilar in Saragossa.³³ By doing so, he showed his perfect awareness of two distinctive characteristics of the Aragonese: their profound sense of religious feeling and respect for the Catholic Church, and their aversion for the central power in Madrid. This apparently benevolent action was indeed a skilful information operation, directed at the population of Aragon and aiming at sending a message of accord. As Suchet later wrote:

In consequence of the repeated orders of M. Cabarrus, the minister of finance the plate of Nuestra-Senora del Pilar was to be sent off to Madrid. ... The people of Saragossa set a

great value on their being preserved; and the commander-in-chief took upon himself not to allow of their removal. This first feature of an administration which indicated a respect for property was duly appreciated by the Aragonese. The commander in-chief's conduct, on this occasion was not thrown away upon them; it greatly contributed to calm the excitement of a province agitated by political convulsions ...³⁴

His understanding of the Aragonese specificity allowed Suchet to conduct very effective information campaigns. The above mentioned protection of the Church properties in Saragossa was a clear appeal to both the clergy and the religious minded people of Aragon. Similarly, Suchet made a large use of the independent character of this people, which otherwise could have been an obstacle to the control of the province. Once appointed the Governor of Aragon, Suchet refused to nominate any civil officer who did not originate from Aragon.³⁵ In so doing, he showed more tact than the former Spanish government itself, and thereby let the Aragonese know that he intended to preserve both their interests and those of the French.

Besides this use of the Aragonese penchant for autonomy, he also respected the cultural heritage of this people. As soon as possible, he cleared the stigmata of war, especially in Saragossa, where he took measures to clear the rubbles and repair the damaged buildings.³⁶ He reestablished the "Academy of the Friends of the Province of Aragon", an institute in charge of promoting its culture, literature, and traditions. He naturally became the Director of the institute, thus indicating his admiration for the local culture. He took great care to invest in symbolic reconstruction, thus improving the rich cultural heritage of Aragon and flattering the Aragonese pride. For instance, he created a foundation for the preservation of the graves and memorial of the Kings of Aragon, who in the Aragonese psyche were the very symbol of their independence.

In addition to this, Suchet cunningly communicated on the harmful acts of the guerillas. He highlighted every one of their atrocities, be these looting or retaliatory acts against the population. In contrast, he restrained his troops from acting like this, although he ordered every civilian

convicted of collaboration with the guerilla to be punished with utmost severity. Rather than escalating the level of violence, he succeeded in turning a significant part of the population against the insurgents by contrasting the benefits brought by the occupying force against the misdemeanors of the "guerillas". Suchet explained very well his method:

The appearance of our troops, their deportment and discipline, their language and acts of authority filled the inhabitants with astonishment, and made them curse Villacampa and the juntas who drove them into a war, and were unable to afford any assistance in the struggle. ... In this manner we secured by degrees the neutrality, and eventually the obedience of the inhabitants. Their proud spirit, which could neither bend to arbitrary conduct nor brook an insult, was not insensible to the value of a government in which power was tempered by justice, and they resigned themselves with a good grace to the burdens entailed by a state of things which it was not in their power to avert.³⁷

The military operations. The success of Suchet in fighting an insurgency really lay in his ability to understand that this new "guerilla" warfare could not to be fought via traditional military means. Nevertheless, far from neglecting the military tool, he used it as soon as he was able to locate the "guerilleros." To keep the province under control, he capitalized on highly mobile units and police-type operations.

There is no denying that the successive requests by Napoleon for Suchet to support and conduct the operations in the neighboring provinces of Valencia and Catalonia heavily undermined the III Corps commander's efforts to militarily control Aragon. Nevertheless, Suchet's military action met with success because it was part of his wider counterinsurgency policy and it successfully ensured security in support of the pacification effort. Unlike most of his French counterparts, he understood that an all repressive solution was a non-winning endeavor. Still, he did not hesitate to be merciless when the guerillas were caught and found guilty of atrocities. Although Suchet did not mention in detail the repression against the insurgents, it was clearly part of his policy, even if not explicitly ordered by the commander. As David Bell relates it:

Marshall Suchet, for instance, managed for a time to impose something close to peace and order in areas of the north. He did so in part through co-opting nobles and other large landowners and in part through terror. His mobile columns shot captured guerillas and priests found with weapons out of hand ... Suchet took hostages, and tried to recruit local auxiliaries.³⁸

Most importantly, Suchet acknowledged that his force was insufficient, his troops were scattered, and his lines of communication were overstretched and vulnerable. Finally he realized that he was almost totally without intelligence.³⁹ Subsequently, Suchet organized his force into the same mobile columns he used in Italy between 1798 and 1801. He intensified the training of his troops, and especially emphasized the instruction of the new coming conscripts who had no previous experience of war. He noted:

The III corps had suffered considerably at the siege of Saragossa. ... the newly formed regiments in particular were in a deplorable condition, owing to the defects necessarily attendant upon a recent and hasty organization, and the inexperience of the soldiers who were young in the profession ... The general, however, was fully rewarded for his exertions and penetrating foresight by the improvement which took place in the moral character of the soldiery. Surprised at finding themselves the object of such assiduous attentions, at the frequency of the reviews, at the exercises at firing and the maneuvers on an extensive scale, which now engaged the greater portion of their time ... they felt at once the improvement of their condition, and the revival of their expiring sense of valor and self-importance. Their being recalled to discipline and good order, had the effect of restoring their confidence in each other and in their chiefs.⁴⁰

He especially chose his commanders carefully, and dismissed the ones he thought incapable of enough initiative. Suchet believed that success would come from company or platoon size units' actions, and from the combination of swift movement guided by reliable intelligence reinforced by cavalry and light artillery. Suchet thus decided to defeat his adversaries one by one. The Marshal later stated he:

Was aware that in endeavouring to act with vigour in one direction, he would be compelled to diminish his forces in another; it would be necessary to attack the insurgent bands one after another, notwithstanding the disadvantage of such a kind of warfare. Being unable, however, to augment the number of his soldiers, he resolved multiply them by the rapidity of their movements; and their activity and courage thus supplied the place of the reinforcements of which he stood in need.⁴¹

This strategy brought some quick results. General Harispe, whom Suchet had tasked to march against Mina's partida, captured the latter. The young *guerillero* was subsequently sent in exile to France.⁴²

Despite such successes, the "partidas" did not totally disappear. As soon as they were dispersed, they reformed in the neighboring provinces of Valencia and Navarre and returned to their previous areas of operation in Aragon. In addition to his mobile columns, General Suchet started to build a network of strong points in the main cities all over Aragon. He established autonomous garrisons in Saragossa, Alcaniz, Huesca, Calatayud, and Fraga. The first effect of this strategy was to increase the ability to respond and support the mobile columns. More importantly, it secured the lines of communications between the Army of Aragon and France, as the convoys could now be protected by the garrisons. Finally, Suchet's policy was to have the troops housed among the civilians. Although it worked as a requisition, this proximity created links between the soldiers and the population, both economic and social, and in turn brought more and more information to the French on the guerillas. Besides this, Suchet also built a strong intelligence network, covering not only his own area of operation but also the neighboring provinces.⁴³

Until that point, the *guerilleros* fought inside their strongholds. However, with the increasing effectiveness of Suchet's mobile columns, they were forced to move and subsequently lost the advantage of the knowledge of the terrain and population. Suchet then applied a methodic strategy, which Marshal Lyautey would later described as the "oil spot," aimed at earning the trust of the people. After a military victory, he brought the troops among the populace to show their strength and discipline. Then the population's attitude began to split, balancing between the will to resist and resignation. The following step was to emphasize the atrocities and exactions of the guerillas, and then hopefully enable the locals to be responsible for their own protection. Thus

some Aragonese began to take arms to protect their own property and at least stopped their overt support of the insurgents. In a balanced and insightful letter to the Major General of the Army, Suchet noted: "Despite our successes and our righteous conduct, we did not succeed in turning the whole people into submission. However, at least we gained enough supporters to divide the opinion and to break this amazing secrecy that prevented us to know their least intention."⁴⁴

In addition, Suchet had the intuition that he could use the Aragonese to fight on his side. He urged the creation of four companies of light infantry, two of which were organized on the model of the French "gendarmerie" and serve as auxiliary troops against the "partidas." As he commented on this:

With a view to give the Aragonese a more direct interest in the success of our operations, and to find employment for those Spanish officers who had attached themselves to our cause, the commander-in-chief formed four companies of fusileers, and two of gendarmes; they were soon clothed, equipped, and armed for service; the soldiers were all able-bodied men, indefatigable, and excellent guides. They were paid and subsisted like the rest of the army, and claimed our warmest praise by the zeal and valour they displayed on several occasions.⁴⁵

The economic renaissance of Aragon: Without a doubt, the most impressive achievement of Suchet was certainly his economic reorganization of Aragon. Unlike most of his contemporaries, he realized that he could neither sustain his troops, who had to be self-sufficient since 1810, nor pacify the province without strong action on the economy. Once again, the background of Suchet in business in Lyon must have influenced his policy.

The exhaustion of the province after the siege of Saragossa has been described above. In February 1810, Suchet was warned that he had to draw his resources from the newly conquered province. Additional taxes in kind were required by the French government in order to sustain the army and resupply the seized fortresses in Aragon (see appendix D):

On the 9th of February, 1810, the commander-in-chief received from the prince major-general the following letter: General Suchet, The emperor desires me to make known to you his intention that you should employ the revenues of the country, and even impose extraordinary contributions, if necessary, with a view to provide for the pay and subsistence of your corps d'armée, it being no longer in the power of France to defray these expenses. France is impoverished by the removal of the enormous sums of money which the public treasury is constantly sending to Spain - the country which you occupy, and which is possessed of abundant resources, must henceforth supply the wants of your troops.⁴⁶

The first measures taken by the French governor were to reorganize the tax collection structure. As usual, Suchet intended to use the existing system, but also improving it. In his memoirs, he described the actions taken. Two French administrators from the Imperial treasure were installed in Saragossa, and were in charge of centralizing the incomes and expenses.

However, at the same time he kept the existing and people-trusted "Contadoria":

The old contadoria was a kind of office of accounts, and justly enjoyed the confidence of the inhabitants. It was however divided in such a manner that each administrator had his separate accountant. With a view to concentrate the mode of superintendence, and simplify the machinery of that useful establishment, all the private accountants were united under the direction of the accountant of the province, and this functionary, in virtue of fresh powers, was invested with the right of deciding upon every difficult question, of investigating the abuses which might obstruct the progress of the collection of the revenue, and of securing a more effectual assessment of the public burdens. Monopoly, which exercises an arbitrary control over the wants or tastes of the people at large, and checks the natural tendency of commerce to satisfy them, had secured to itself every channel of public consumption and closed all the avenues to industry ; it was partly suppressed.⁴⁷

The governor restored morality in public affairs, where it used to be arbitrary. He kept the money going to the province's account and ensured its transparent utilization. Suchet made it clear that the part taken by the French was devoted to the support of the III Corps and that the rest of the money was used to improve the economy of Aragon or contributed to the central government. In summary, Suchet had taxes collected by Spaniards to the benefit of both the French occupying forces and the local government. This prudent arrangement, which was the hallmark of Suchet, allowed him to acquire enough contributions not only to sustain his own corps, but also to provide

the new Spanish government under King Joseph with 10 million Francs. He also supported the adjacent armies of the Valencia and Catalonia regions.

Suchet had the clear perception that a strong economy could at the same time stabilize the province and better support the French occupation. He subsequently reorganized it on the basis of a common benefit. Accordingly, he committed himself to the reopening of the Imperial Canal, the locks of which had been destroyed during the initial stage of the war. From his initial assessment, supported by his counselors, he knew the canal would enable the province to export its main products. The canal also provided the peasants with irrigation, and subsequently the local government with taxes paid by the users. From a military standpoint, it was also a major logistics line of communication.

Suchet always strove to make local and military interests concur. Similarly, he ordered the construction of a road between Jaca in Aragon and Oloron in France, and reestablished manufactures based on local production of wool and fabrics. Most importantly, he insisted on the interrelation between the troops and the population. As he later commented:

But it was not sufficient to impose fresh taxes, and to compel the people to pay them. It was of importance that the money with which they were obliged to part should return to them, and that a constant circulation should prevent any stagnation ... The commander-in-chief ordered that the pay of the troops should be issued every five days: soldiers are not slow in disbursing the money they receive. The inhabitants were soon convinced that the tax levied upon them was no more than an advance, which would shortly revert to their hands by their bringing supplies to our cities and camps. Upon the same principle, every article manufactured in the country for the clothing or equipment of troops, was carefully sought and paid for to the furnishers in ready money.⁴⁸

THE RELEVANCY OF SUCHET'S ACTION TO TODAY'S WARFIGHTERS

The action of Suchet, and of some other commanders such as General Thiebaud, although locally successful did not spread to the whole Spanish theatre. The point of this essay is not to elaborate on the causes of the overall French defeat. However, the lack of interest of the French leadership, as well as Spanish religious fanaticism, ruthless actions by a majority of French military commanders, and above all the mix of Spanish insurgents and regular British army, collectively led to the defeat of 1814 and the subsequent invasion of France from Spain. Here is maybe the first and foremost legacy of General Suchet: without a resolute and coordinated action at the operational level, which implies an elaborated and adaptive doctrine, no long term success should be expected in fighting a counterinsurgency. The other aspect of Suchet's operational method, which is especially relevant today, is the idea that no other campaign should be started without having won the previous one and pacified the seized ground. This applied to Napoleon strategic bulimia, as well as to the campaign of Catalonia, that Suchet was reluctant to undertake before he totally pacified Aragon.

Commanders have to be “inter-agency” by training. The example of Suchet highlights the need for the counterinsurgency warfighter to follow diverse and complementary lines of operations. It is a given fact that the interagency process remains at the very beginning of its edification. The military leaders, of the coming generation will have to react and adapt themselves according to their own resources. Marshall Suchet had the clear vision of the multiple requirements of a counterinsurgency, but there was no such thing as an interagency process. Hence, all the initiatives were up to him. This paradigm should invite us to redefine the recruiting and the training of our military leaders. It is of utmost importance to train leaders in the realm of civilian administration, for it has become apparent that they will generally have to rely on their

own intellectual, professional, and physical resources. Incorporating people with as diverse educational backgrounds as possible is another way to build that resource capability, which in time of crisis will provide the commander with the necessary skills to rebuild a basic administrative organization, ensure civil security, and restart the economy at its most essential level. If it is difficult to acquire officers with a previous professional background, then changing professional curricula of schools must be considered, as well as a more effective use of the reserve officer's corps, **which offers a more diverse civilian expertise.**

The "cultural weapon." One of the most remarkable lessons from Suchet in Aragon is the understanding and use of the local culture as a warfighting function. A thorough understanding of the environment, in the broadest sense of the term, provides the commander with a powerful weapon which would allow him to commit the locals to their own defense. This requires the study of foreign languages as well as the cultural character of a people. The active use of the population in the administration and for security matters presupposes a delicate gamble because it can prove a double edged weapon if the loyalty of those forces cannot be monitored and controlled. However, this has proved to be a major necessary step, especially when the final objective is the reestablishment of national sovereignty. At that stage, counterinsurgency turns into a real art, where the commander's intuition and charisma are prominent.

The microeconomic weapon. Suchet understood the necessity to focus as early as possible on the basic economic needs of the population. Once again, this will probably have to be achieved by the commander himself with his available assets and, most importantly, his own understanding of the economic network of his area of operations. Military officers all too often ignore this, either because they are dealing with more urgent security matters or simply because they are unaware of

their responsibility in this realm. This is absolutely different from a humanitarian focus, but directly meets the operational requirements of the counterinsurgency.

Civil-military units are a powerful weapon, as long as they are integrated into a reconstruction effort supported by the local population and involve the traditional microeconomic dynamics. Without this, every use of the civil-military tool would prove illusory; at best, it would only support the immediate tactical effort without long term operational or strategic effects. This integration requires for the military commander a basic understanding of the microeconomic interactions and a thorough assessment of the needs of the population. In addition, the use of the troops to inject wealth at all levels of a postwar society is often one of the most important contribution of the military to the stabilization effort. This, in turn, provides security for the force, as the people find direct interest in the troops being there.

Conclusion. The study of Marshall Suchet is still relevant to modern military leaders. In a posthumous response to the usual critics of modern stabilization doctrine, he displayed with equal success the skills of a warfighter, an administrator, a diplomat, and an economist. Although the circumstances of the legitimacy of the operations and the rules of engagement are largely different, the parallel of the French action in Spain and the coalition forces operation in Iraq is surprising. How not to compare the continuance of the Spanish administration with the “debaathification” policy in Iraq? Is it relevant to compare Suchet’s care of the Aragonese culture as a means of influence on the population, with the lack of protection of the Iraqi cultural institutions?

Every insurgency is unique and situation dependant. However, some enduring patterns remain. Beyond the likely bias in Suchet’ memoirs, the example of the administration of Aragon should invite every professional soldier to think, if not of the “utility of force”, at least of its part within the whole scope of counterinsurgency practice. In addition, Suchet reminds modern officers

that insurgencies, which are to be called by some "guerilla warfare", are anything but new to the conventional military. Suchet's story reminds political leaders that a successful military counterinsurgency is still irrelevant without a viable long term political settlement. For all these reasons, the memoirs of Marshall Suchet should be read and understood by anyone likely to be involved in a counterinsurgency.

Notes:

1. David Gates, *The Spanish Ulcer: A History of the Peninsular War*, (Cambridge: Da Capo Press, 1986), 8-11.
2. The « Corps d'observation », literally surveillance corps, were units tasked to monitor the French borders, especially in south western France.
3. André Corvisier, *Histoire Militaire de la France : De 1715 à 1871*, (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1992), 128.
4. Ibid.
5. Jean-Louis Reynaud, *Contre-guerilla en Espagne (1808-1814)*, (Paris: Economica, 1992), 135-136.
6. Gates, *The Spanish Ulcer*, 124-128.
7. Reynaud, *Contre-guerilla en Espagne*, 56 and 75.
8. Although a true Spaniard, Joachim Blake was of Irish descent. One should not be confused by his name: he actually was a Spanish officer, fighting for Spain.
9. "[...] and the insurgency, which benefited from the losses [of the regular army] became more dangerous than this latter." *Louis-Gabriel Suchet, Mémoires du Maréchal Suchet, Duc d'Albufera sur ses campagnes en Espagne, de 1808 à 1814, vol 1*, (Paris: Firmin Didot, 1828), 40.
10. Suchet, *Mémoires du Maréchal Suchet*, 41.
11. Corvisier, *Histoire Militaire de la France*, 267-273.
12. Albert de Rocca, *Mémoires sur la guerre des Français en Espagne*. Genève : imprimerie Jules Guillaume Fick, 1840), 22.
13. Reynaud, *Contre-guerilla en Espagne*, 33.
14. Adolphe Thiers, *Histoire du Consulat et de l'Empire, tome XII*, (Paulin éditeur, Paris, 1855), 217-223.
15. Charles J. Esdaile, *Fighting Napoleon: Guerillas, Bandits and Adventurers in Spain, 1808-1814*, (Yale University Press, 2004), 1-4.
16. Suchet, *Mémoires du Maréchal Suchet*, 41.
17. Jean le Mièvre de Corvey, a French officer who also had fought the counterrevolutionary insurgents in Vendée, noted: "One hundred and fifty guerilla bands scattered all over Spain had sworn to kill thirty or forty Frenchmen a month each: that made six to eight thousand men

a month for all the guerilla bands together...As there are twelve months in the year, we were losing about 80,000 men a year, without [counting] any pitched battles. The war in Spain lasted seven years [sic], so over 500,000 men were killed." Cit. Charles J. Esdaile, *Fighting Napoleon*, 131.

18. Don W. Alexander, *Rod of Iron*, (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1985), xvii
19. With the notable exception of W. Alexander, *Rod of Iron*.
20. Major-General, Sir William Francis Napier, *History of the War in the Peninsula and in the South of France, from the year 1807 to the year 1814*, (Kansas City: Hudson-Kimberly publishing Co, 1904), 825-826.
21. Suchet, *Mémoires du Maréchal Suchet*, 275-277.
22. Suchet, *Mémoires du Maréchal Suchet*, 274.
23. Reynaud, *Contre-guerilla en Espagne*, 135-136.
24. Suchet, *Mémoires du Maréchal Suchet*, 275-277.
25. Suchet, *Mémoires du Maréchal Suchet*, 288-289.
26. Letter from General Suchet to the Minister of War. Cit. Jean-Louis Reynaud, *Contre-guerilla en Espagne*, 135-136.
27. Reynaud, *Contre-guerilla en Espagne*, 78-80.
28. Suchet, *Mémoires du Maréchal Suchet*, 289.
29. Jean-Louis Reynaud notes that Suchet proposed the appointment of the bishops of Lerida, Teruel, Barbastro, and Albaracin. Those appointments received the agreement and were confirmed by Bishop Santander. Reynaud, *Contre-guerilla en Espagne*, 137-138.
30. Suchet, *Mémoires du Maréchal Suchet* 289.
31. Suchet, *Mémoires du Maréchal Suchet*, 287.
32. Suchet, *Mémoires du Maréchal Suchet*, 290.
33. Thiers, *Histoire du Consulat et de l'Empire*, 217-218.
34. Suchet, *Mémoires du Maréchal Suchet*, 278.
35. Reynaud, *Contre-guerilla en Espagne*, 142. The author quotes the 3rd article of the imperial nomination decree, which stated that "the appointed governor would appoint to every public charges and edict as many laws as needed".
36. "I had the police Comissioner clear the rubles which obstrued more than a quarter of the city, demolish the mined and destroyed buildings which could not be fixed, build public squares and

alleys, and replace the destroyed trees. Most importantly, he fought idleness and all its harmful consequences, in a large and recently subdued population.” General Suchet, Letter to the Minister of War, 9 December 1810. Cit. Jean-Louis Reynaud, *Contre-guerilla en Espagne*, 141.

37. Suchet, *Mémoires du Maréchal Suchet*, 7.
38. David A. Bell, *The First Total War*, (Boston: Houtton Mifflin, 2007), 288.
39. Suchet noted: “It is impossible here to get any information or to know anything but what you actually see”. Suchet, *Mémoires du Maréchal Suchet*, 25.
40. Suchet, *Mémoires du Maréchal Suchet*, 22 and 23.
41. Suchet, *Mémoires du Maréchal Suchet*, 51.
42. Suchet actually refused to execute Mina, as first ordered by Paris.
43. Reynaud, *Contre-guerilla en Espagne*, 101.
44. Cit. Reynaud, *Contre-guerilla en Espagne*, 101.
45. Suchet, *Mémoires du Maréchal Suchet*, 22 and 23.
46. Suchet, *Mémoires du Maréchal Suchet*, 274.
47. Suchet, *Mémoires du Maréchal Suchet*, 292.
48. Suchet, *Mémoires du Maréchal Suchet*, 294.

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APPENDIX A: Marshal Suchet's personal background.

Source: Colonel Jean-Louis Reynaud, *Contre-Guerilla en Espagne (1808-1814): Suchet pacifie l'Aragon*, (Paris : Economica, 1992).

Louis-Gabriel Suchet was in many regards an atypical officer. An assessment of his personal background suggests that his own education provided a foundation for his wartime administration. Indeed, Suchet was not expected to be a military officer, for he was educated in business. This experience would be significant for him in Aragon.

A significant civilian background. Louis-Gabriel Suchet was born on 2 March 1770 in Lyon, the son of Jean-Pierre Suchet, a wealthy silk merchant, and Anne-Marie Jacquier. His mother died four years later. His father was deeply involved in the community life of the city. In 1787, after completing his studies in trade and economics, he joined his father's business and he subsequently worked for two years as an apprentice. When the latter died on 14 January 1789, Louis-Gabriel at 19 remained in charge of the family business. With his brother, Gabriel-Catherine, he decided to expand the family enterprise, under the title "Maison Suchet frères". However, the ongoing Revolution disrupted the French economy. Despite this, the revolutionary ideals appealed to Louis-Gabriel and he eventually decided to join the Garde Nationale¹ in 1791

A Comprehensive Military Experience. Suchet's military background is no less significant to explain his understanding of insurgency. With the 20 August 1793 Law on the "Levée en masse", he was elected as a lieutenant-colonel in an infantry regiment. Fighting in an environment of quasi civil war, he fought against the British troops in Toulon. He earned a citation when he captured British General O'Hara during a supporting mission. In 1794, Suchet with 250 troops of the 4th Ardèche Battalion was ordered to march against the village

of Bedouin in southeastern France, after locals had arisen in revolt against the revolutionary government in Paris. In the aftermath of the military action, 63 persons were sentenced to death. This most likely durably impressed the young commander, insofar as he understood the harsh reality of insurgencies as well as the effect of such violent and forceful actions on the populace's opinion. In 1795, Suchet's battalion was designated to take part in the first Italian campaign, where they fought at the battle of Loano. After the regular battles Suchet witnessed the misbehavior of a victorious but badly sustained and ill-disciplined army stationed in a conquered land. There is little doubt that this experience also provided him with some reflections about the consequences of such a conduct on the population.

However the most valuable experience in Suchet's precocious career occurred during the second campaign of Italy, this one under the command of General Napoléon Bonaparte. The numerous battles in which he took part constituted useful military experiences, but the most relevant to his future experience in Spain was his defense of the Var region in southern France fighting the Austrians in the Alps from January to May 1800. Here, he relied on light infantry elements to oppose the Austrian regulars, and developed tactics based on maneuver and surprise. Furthermore, during the retreat preceding the offensive by General Bonaparte, just returned from Egypt, he had to cope with irregular actions led by the Italian peasants. He confronted a popular revolt in Savoie by historical insurgents, called "Barbets", who took advantage of the Austrian advance to rise against the French central power. There are few records of these experiences, and even Suchet did not write much on it. Nevertheless, this first contact with guerilla warfare doubtlessly gave Suchet a unique understanding of how to cope with this type of conflict. Later, his short experience as the governor of Padua, from January to May 1801, gave him an overview of the difficulty in administrating a conquered country.

After a two years break as the inspector of the French infantry, he returned to line units and participated in campaigns of Germany, Prussia, and Poland. He actively took part to

the battles of Ulm, Hollabrunn, Austerlitz, Saalfeld and Jena. In spite of his brilliance, he did not receive quick promotion. Unlike many of his peers, he was of a rather cool temperament and cautious commander, which could have been interpreted as a lack of charisma by the Emperor However², in 1804 he was awarded the Légion d'honneur, and in 1808 he married Honorine d'Anthoine de Saint Joseph, the niece of Joseph Bonaparte, Napoleon's brother and future King of Spain.

Suchet earned recognition in Spain. After his successes of Lerida (1810), he successively seized Mequinenza, Tortosa, and Tarragona and occupied Mount-Serrat, that he had seized in spite of the formidable defensive position and the opposition of the British navy. Suchet had seized more than 30.000 prisoners and a huge amount of supplies. As a recognition of his actions, he was awarded the title of Maréchal de France in July 1811. After his victory against Blake, he entered the province of Valencia, seized the eponymous city and the city of Albufera. In less than two months, applying similar methods as in Aragon, he subdued the whole province. He then was made Duke of Albufera, along with the corresponding domain, on 24 January 1812.


The post-Napoleonic era. Suchet fought until the end of the war in Spain, successfully covering the retreat of the French Army. He then ensured the return of Ferdinand VII on the throne of Spain, and pledged allegiance to Louis XVIII, who kept him in charge of a division. However, during the failed attempt of Napoleon to return, known as the Cent Jours, he rallied to Napoleon again, which would earn him disgrace during the Restoration. He even lost his title of Peer of France until 1819. He finally died in Marseille on 3 January 1826.

¹ The « Garde Nationale » units were local units recruited among the middle class citizen, according to their capabilities and, at that time, social status.


² <http://www.histoire-empire.org/persos/suchet/suchet.htm>

APPENDIX B : Maps of Spain and Aragon


Source for all the following maps: Gates, David. *The Spanish Ulcer: A History of the Peninsular War*, (Da Capo Press, 1986).




Map 1 : regional organization of Spain




Map 2 : Saragossa and Gerona, the Theatre of Operations.




Map 3: The General Strategic Situation, mid-May 1809




Map 4: The General Strategic Situation Oct. 1810-March 1811



Map 5: The General Strategic Situation May 1811



Map 6: The General Strategic Situation July 1812



Map 7: The General Strategic Situation early June 1813

APPENDIX C : Decree of Appointment of the Governor of Arragon. Order to sustain III
Corps locally

Source: Marshall Louis-Gabriel Suchet, . *Memoirs of the War in Spain, from 1808 to 1814*, by
Marshall Suchet, Duke d'Albufera, (London: Henry Colburn, 1829.)

ARTICLE I.

*(Extract from the Emperor's Decree, dated at the Palace of the Tuileries,
the 8th of February, 1810.)*

Of the government of Arragon (2nd government.)

" Arragon shall form a separate government, under the title of
government of Arragon.

ARTICLE II.

" General Suchet is appointed governor ; he will unite in his person
the civil and military powers.

ARTICLE III.

"The governor is entrusted with the administration of the police, of
justice, and of the finances. He will nominate to official situations
and employments, and issue all the regulations he may deem requisite.

ARTICLE IV.

" All the revenues of Arragon, whether arising from ordinary or ex-
traordinary contributions, shall be lodged in the chest of the French
paymaster, with a view to meet the pay of the troops, and the expenses
of their maintenance ; accordingly, from the 1st of March next, the
public treasury shall no longer send any funds for the service of the
troops stationed within the limits of that government."

A true copy.

Signed, **ALEXANDER.**

*(Letter from the Major-General to General Suchet, dated Rambouillet,
the 22nd of February, 1811.)*

“ General Suchet—I have sent you the emperor’s orders, in virtue of which you are appointed governor of Arragon, which is placed in a state of siege. This act invests you with all the necessary powers, whether for the command of the province, or for its administration ; and you are only to correspond with me on this subject. The intercourse you had to keep up with the general staff of the army of Spain, merely relates to the movements of troops and to military matters. In conformity with what I have already communicated to you, all the resources of the province must be applied to pay the troops, to keep them properly supplied with provisions and clothing, taking care, at the same time, that the utmost order and economy be introduced in the administration of the province while in a state of siege.

Signed, **ALEXANDER.**

The first document is a translation of the imperial decree nominating Suchet the Governor of Aragon. These documents clearly show the extent of the powers given to Suchet. They are both civilian and military in nature. They actually institute an integrated civil-military command, under the authority of Suchet.

APPENDIX D: Chronology of the Peninsular War

(source: <http://digital.library.mcgill.ca/napoleon/english/timeline-peninsular.htm>)

Note: Only the most significant operations have been noted. In bold characters are the events directly linked to Marshall Suchet.

1807:

4 November 1807. Battle of Pancorbo. France (Lefebvre) vs. Spain (Blake). French.

1808 :

16 February 1808. Fall of Pamplona. France (Darmagnac) vs. Spain. French victory.

29 February. Fall of Barcelona. France (Lecchi) vs. Spain. French victory.

17-24 March. Protests against King Charles IV. He abdicates; Ferdinand VII crowned.

20 April. Napoleon forces Ferdinand to return the crown to Charles

2 May: "Dos de Mayo". Popular revolt in Madrid.

20 June. First Siege of Gerona. France (Duhesme) vs. Spain (Junta composed by delRey/Bolívar). Spanish victory.

7 June. Joseph Bonaparte is crowned King of Spain by his brother Napoleon.

15 June – 15 August. First Siege of Saragossa. France (Lefebvre) vs. Spain (a Junta / de Lazan). Spanish victory.

26 June – 28 June. First Battle of Valencia. France (Moncey) vs. Spain (Saint-Marq). Spanish victory.

22 July. Battle of Bailén. France (Dupont) vs. Spain (Castaños). Spanish victory.

27 July – 20 August. Second Siege of Gerona. France (Duhesme) vs. Spain (Del Palaccio). Spanish victory.

6 November – 5 December. Siege of Rosas. France (Saint-Cyr) vs. Spain (Reding). French victory.

9 November. Napoleon takes over operations in Spain.

10 November. Battle of Gamonal. France (Bessières/Soult) vs. Spain (Belvedere) French victory.

23 November. Battle of Tudela. France (Lannes) vs. Spain (Castaños). French victory.

30 November. Battle of Somosierra. France (Napoleon) vs. Spain (San Juan). French victory.

24 November. Fall of Madrid. France (Napoleon) vs. Spain (Castelar). French victory.

16 December. Battle of Cardadeu. France (Saint-Cyr) vs. Spain (Reding). French victory.

20 December. First Battle of Saragossa. France (Moncey) vs. Spain (Palafox). French victory.

20 December – 20 February 1809. Second Siege of Saragossa. France (Moncey/Lannes) vs. Spain (Palafox). French victory.

21 December. (Cavalry) Combat of Sahagun. France (Debelle) vs. Britain (Page/Henry). British victory.

1809:

16 January. Battle of Coruña (Battle of La Corogne, Battle of Elvián). France (Soult) vs. Britain (Moore). French victory. Death of Moore.

20 February. Second Battle of Saragossa. France (Lannes) vs. Spain (Palafox). French victory.

29 March. Battle of Medellín. France (Victor) vs. Spain (Cuesta). French victory.

29 March. First Battle of Oporto. France (Soult) vs. Portugal (Parreiras/Vittoria). French victory.

24 May – 11 December. Third Siege of Gerona. France (Verdier/Augereau) vs. Spain (Alvarez). French victory.

5-19 May. Battle of Monzon. France (Habert) vs. Spain (Perena). Spanish victory.

12 May. Second Battle of Oporto. France (Soult) vs. Britain (Wellington). British victory.

14 May. Battle of Alcantara. France (Victor) vs. Portugal (Mayne). Undecided.

19 May. Suchet takes command of III Corps.

21 May. Battle of Alcaniz. France (Suchet) vs. Spain (Blake). Spanish victory.

8 June. Battle of River Oitaben (Battle of Ponte Sampaio). France (Ney) vs. Spain (Norona). Spanish victory.

15 June. Battle of Maria. France (Suchet) vs. Spain (Blake). French victory.

18 June. Battle of Belchite. France (Suchet) vs. Spain (Blake). French victory.

27 June. Combat of Casa de Salinas. France (Lapisse) vs. Britain (Wellington). Undecided. (Wellington was almost captured).

28-29 July. Battle of Talavera. France (Joseph/Victor) vs. Britain/Spain (Wellington/Cuesta). British/Spanish victory.

1810 :

8 February. Suchet appointed Governor of Aragon

21 March – 21 April. Siege of Astorga. France (Junot) vs. Spain (Santocildes). French victory.

25 March. Battle of El Ronquillo. France (Gazan) vs. Spain (Ballesteros). French victory.

13 April – 13 May. Siege of Lerida. France (Suchet) vs. Spain (Conde). French victory.

15 April. Battle of Zalamena. France (Mortier) vs. Spain (Ballesteros). French victory.

16-24 May. Siege of Mequinenza. France (Suchet) vs. Spain (Carbon). French victory.

26 May. Battle of Arecena. France (Mortier) vs. Spain (Ballesteros). French victory.

20 May – 10 July. Siege of Ciudad Rodrigo. France (Ney>Masséna) vs. Spain (Herrasi) French victory.

15-27 August. Siege of Almeida. France (Ney) vs. Portugal (Cox). French victory.

27 September. Battle of Bussaco (Buçaco). France (Masséna) vs. Britain/Portugal (Wellington). British/Portuguese victory. (Wellington able to repel assaults of Ney's and Reynier's corps. But was forced nevertheless to withdraw).

13 October. Siege of Fuengirola. France (Sebastiani) vs. Britain (Blayney). French victory. (The British besieging the French).

16 December 1810 – 2 January 1811. Siege of Tortosa. France (Suchet) vs. Spain (Lilli).

11 November 1810 – 23 January 1811. First Siege of Olivenza. France (Soult) vs. Spain (Herck). French victory.

1811 :

26 January – 10 March. First Siege of Badajoz. France (Soult) vs. Spain (Imaz). Spanish victory.

14-21 March. Siege of Campo Mayor. France (Mortier) vs. Portugal (Talaya). French victory.

15-16 March. «Siege of Albuquerque» France (Latour-Maubourg) vs. Spain (Cagigal). French victory.

19 March. Battle of Monjuch. France (Mathieu) vs. Spain (Campoverde). French victory.

9-14 April. Second Siege of Olivenza. France vs. Britain (Beresford). British victory.

10-19 April. Siege of Figueras. France (MacDonald) vs Spain (Martinez). French victory.

12 April – 10 May. Blockade of Almeida. France (Brennier) vs. Britain (Campbell) French escaped.

22 April – 12 May. Second Siege of Badajoz. France (Phillipon) vs. Britain (Beresford). The French are the besieged. French victory.

3 May – 28 July. France (Suchet) vs. Spain (Contreras). French victory.

16 May. Battle of Albuera. France (Soult) vs. Britain/Portugal/Spain (Beresford). British/Portuguese/Spanish victory.

19 May – 10 June. Third Siege of Badajoz. France (Phillipon) vs. Britain (Wellington). French victory.

25 July. Battle of Monserrat. France (Suchet) vs. Spain. French victory.

15 September – 25 October. Siege of Saguntum. France (Suchet) vs. Spain (Blake). French victory.

25 October. Battle of Saguntum. France (Suchet). Spain (Blake). French victory.

29 October – 2 February 1812. Spanish Raid into France (Valleys of Cerdagne). France vs. Spain (Eroles). Spanish victory.

8 December – 4 January 1812. Siege of Tarifa. France (Victor) vs. Britain (Skerrett). British victory.

24 December. Battle of Murviedro. France vs. Spain (Hill). French.

25 December 1811 – 8 January 1812. Siege of Valencia. France (Suchet) vs. Spain (Blake). French victory.

29 December. Combat of Membrillo. France (Neveux) vs. Britain (Hill). French victory.

1812 :

9 January 1812. Battle of Valencia. France (Suchet) vs. Spain (Blake). French victory.

8-19 January. Siege of Ciudad Rodrigo. France (Barrie) vs. Britain/Portugal (Wellington). British/Portuguese victory. The French are the besieged. Wellington storms the city on 19 January 1812.

20 January – 2 February. Siege of Peniscola. France (Severolli) vs. Spain (Navarro). French victory.

19 April. Fourth Siege of Badajoz. France (Phillipon) vs. Britain/Portugal (Wellington). British/Portuguese victory. Somewhat unclear. Apparently there was also a Siege of Badajoz from 17 March-6 April 1812 ending with the storming of the fortress.

15 June – 18 August. Siege of Astorga. France vs. Spain (Santoclides). Spanish victory.

17-27 June. Siege of the Salamanca Forts. France (Duchemin) vs. Britain (Wellington). British victory.

22 July. Battle of Salamanca. France (Marmont) vs. Britain/Portugal/Spain (Wellington). British/Portuguese/Spanish victory. Marmont wounded.

22 July – 2 August. Siege of Santander. France (Dupreton) vs. Britain (Popham). British victory.

13 August. Capture of Bilbao. France vs. Spain (Mendizabal). Spanish victory.

14 August. Capture of Valladolid. France (Clausel) vs. Spain (Santclides). French victory.

27-29 August. Capture of Bilbao. France (Caffarelli) vs. Spain (Mendizabal). French victory.

19 September – 21 October. Siege of Burgos. France (Dubreton) vs. Britain/Portugal (Wellington). French victory. The French are the besieged. Wellington abandons the siege.

1813 :

[?]-11 February 1813. Siege of Tafalla. France vs. Spain (Mina). Spanish victory. The French are the besieged.

11-12 April. Siege of Villena. France (Suchet) vs. Spain. French victory.

12 April. Combat of Biar. France (Suchet) vs. Britain (Adam). British victory.

12-13 April. Battle of Castalla. France (Suchet) vs. Britain (Murray). British victory.

29 April – 12 May. Siege of Castro-Urdiales. France (Foy) vs. Spain (Alvarez). French victory.

3-15 June. Siege of Tarragona. France (Bertoletti) vs. Britain (Murray). French victory.

13 June. Combat of Carcagente. France (Suchet) vs. Spain (Del Parque). French victory.

21 June. Battle of Vittoria. France (Joseph/Jourdan) vs. Britain/Portugal/Spain (Wellington). British/Portuguese/Spanish victory.

25 June – 31 October. Blockade of Pamplona. France (Casson) vs. Spain (de España). Spanish victory.

26 June. Combat of Tolosa. France (Foy) vs. Britain (Graham). British victory.

11 July. Capture of Saragossa. France (Paris) vs. Spain (Mina). Spanish victory.

7 July – 8 September. Siege of San Sebastian. France (Rey) vs. Britain (Wellington). British victory.

25 July. Battle of Roncesvalles. France (Reille) vs. Britain/Portugal (Cole). French victory.

25 July. Battle of Maya. France (D'Erlon) vs. Britain/Portugal (Stewart). French victory.

26 July – 31 August. Siege of San Sebastian. France (Rey) vs. Britain/Portugal (Graham). British/Portuguese victory.

30 July – 15 August. Blockade of Tarragona. France (Suchet) vs. Britain (Bentinck). French.

31 August. Battle of San Marcial. France (Soult) vs. Britain/Spain (Wellington). British/Spanish victory.

13 September. Combat of Ordal. France (Suchet) vs. Britain (Adam). French victory.

14 September. Second Combat of Villafranca. France (Suchet) vs. Britain (Bentinck). French victory.

7 October. Passage of the Bidassoa. France (Soult) vs. Britain (Wellington). British victory.

1814 :

23 February – 26 April. Siege of Bayonne. France (Thouvenot) vs. Britain (Hope). French victory.

25 February. Storm of Saint Etienne. France vs. Britain (Hope). British victory.

27 February. Battle of Orthez. France (Soult) vs. Britain (Wellington). British victory.

2 March. Combat of Aire. France (Clausel) vs. Britain (Hill). British victory.

20 March. Combat of Tarbes. France (D'Erlon) vs. Britain (Wellington). British victory.

6 April. Napoleon's abdication.

10 April. Battle of Toulouse. France (Soult) vs. Britain/Spain (Wellington).
British/Spanish victory.

14 April. Battle of Bayonne. France (Thouvenot) vs. Britain (Hope). Undecided.

16 April. Battle of Barcelona. France (Habert) vs. Spain (Sarsfield). Spanish victory.

APPENDIX E : Biographical Details of Personalities of the Peninsular War

Source: David Gates. *The Spanish Ulcer*, (Da Capo Press, 1986)

FRENCH PERSONALITIES

- Augereau**, Marshal Pierre Francois Charles, Duke of Castiglione (1757–1816): Enlisted 1747; divisional general 1793; marshal 1804; 1805–7, distinguished service in Austria, Prussia and Poland. Replaced St Cyr as VII Corps' commander in 1809, capturing Gerona. Military Governor of Catalonia until April 1810.
- Bessières**, Marshal Jean-Baptiste, Duke of Istria (1768–1813): Distinguished commander of Napoleon's Guard cavalry. Corps commander (1st) 'Army of Spain'; victorious at Medina de Rio Seco (July 1808). Initially II Corps' commander, (2nd) 'Army of Spain', but transferred to cavalry and replaced by Soult. After Wagram (1809), commander of new 'Army of North'. In Russia, 1812; killed in action, 1813.
- Bonaparte**, Joseph (1768–1844): King of Naples 1806; King of Spain 1808; Lieutenant General of France 1814.
- Bonaparte**, Napoleon (1769–1821): First Consul 1799; First Consul for Life 1802; Emperor of the French 1804; King of Elba 1814; Emperor of the French March-June 1815; defeated at Waterloo and exiled to St Helena.
- Caffarelli Du Falga**, General Marie Francois Auguste, Count (1766–1849): Divisional general 1805; sent to Spain 1809. Replaced Dorsenne as commander of 'Army of the North' during May 1812; recalled January 1813.
- Clarke**, Henri Jacques Guilleme, Duke of Feltre (1776–1818): Napoleon's Minister of War.
- Clausel**, General Bertrand, Count (1772–1842): Brigade general 1799; took command of 'Army of Portugal' during Salamanca; commander of 'Army of the North' under Soult after Vitoria; marshal 1831.
- Decaen**, Charles Mathieu Isidore (1769–1832): Governor of Catalonia 1811–14.
- D'Erlon**, General Jean-Baptiste, Count (1765–1844): Commissioned 1782; brigade general 1799; divisional general 1803; marshal 1843. A distinguished officer, d'Erlon was posted to Spain in 1810 as commander of the improvised IX Corps. After service with Massena, he moved to Andalusia where he remained until mid 1812. He then led the 'Army of the Centre' in the recapture of Madrid before replacing Souham as commander of the 'Army of Portugal'. Restored to the 'Army of the Centre', he fought at Vitoria and, for the rest of the war, played a major role in Soult's campaigns as a corps commander – a part he again fulfilled at Waterloo.
- Dorsenne**, General Jean Marie (?–1812): A lieutenant-colonel in the Imperial Guard, he became Governor of Burgos (1810–11) and commander of the 'Army of the North' (1811–12).
- Dupont De L'Etang**, General Pierre, Count (1765–1840): Commissioned 1784; brigadier 1795; divisional general 1797; distinguished service in Austria, Prussia

- and Russia, 1805-7; count, 4 July 1808. Defeated and captured at Baylen; repatriated and disgraced.
- Gazan**, General Honoré Theodore Maxime, Count de la Peyrière (1765-1845): Brigadier 1799; wounded leading division at Albuera, 1811; commander, 'Army of South', 1813; Soult's Chief-of-Staff 1813-14.
- Jourdan**, Marshal Jean Baptiste, Count (1762-1833): Celebrated general of Revolutionary Wars (victor of Fleurus, 1794); marshal 1804; Chief-of-Staff to King Joseph 1809 and 1812-13.
- Junot**, General Jean Andoche, Duke of Abrantes (1771-1813): A distinguished general, Junot was entrusted with the first invasion of Portugal. Defeated at Vimiero, he signed the Cintra Convention; leaving Portugal to the British. Returned to the Peninsula as commander of VIII Corps and then III Corps, fighting at Saragossa. Commanded VIII Corps in Massena's invasion of Portugal, but left the Peninsula after Fuentes de Oñoro (May 1811). Served in Russia and Germany; went insane and committed suicide.
- Kellermann**, General Francois Etienne, Count, later Duke, of Valmy (1770-1835): Son of Marshal Kellermann; commissioned 1785; brigadier 1797; divisional general 1800. Commander of Junot's cavalry in Portugal; negotiated Cintra Convention; Governor of Leon 1809-11; recalled, May 1811; served in Russia, Germany, France and at Waterloo.
- Macdonald**, Marshal Jacques Etienne, Duke of Tarentum (1765-1840): Brigadier 1793; divisional general 1794; duke and marshal 1809; commanded VII Corps in Catalonia 1810-11; served in Russia, Germany and France 1812-14.
- Marmont**, Marshal Auguste Frederic Louis Viesse de, Duke of Ragusa (1774-1852): Commissioned 1792; brigadier 1798; divisional general 1800; marshal 1809. Replaced Massena as commander 'Army of Portugal', May 1811. Defeated at Salamanca (July 1812). Served in Germany and France 1813-14.
- Massena**, Marshal André, Duke of Rivoli, Prince of Essling (1758-1817): One of Napoleon's most talented subordinates. Divisional general 1793; marshal 1804; prominent in 1809 war with Austria. Commander of 'Army of Portugal' 1810-11.
- Mortier**, Marshal Edouard Adolphe, Duke of Treviso (1768-1835): Brigadier and divisional general 1799; marshal 1804; duke 1808; commanded V Corps in Spain 1808-11 (victor on the Gebora, February 1811). Served in Russia, Germany and France 1812-14.
- Moncey**, Marshal Bon Adrien Jannot de, Duke of Conegliano (1754-1852): Enlisted 1769; brigadier 1794; divisional commander 1794; marshal 1804; commanded III Corps, 'Army of Spain', 1808; duke, July 1808; recalled 1809.
- Murat**, Marshal Joachim, Prince and King of Naples (1767-1815): Enlisted 1787; brigadier 1796; divisional general 1799; marshal 1804; prince 1805; Duke of Berg and Cleves, 1806; outstanding cavalry commander. Appointed Napoleon's Lieutenant in Spain (February 1808), he suppressed the Madrid Rising before retiring on health grounds. Replaced Joseph Bonaparte as King of Naples.
- Ney**, Marshal Michel, Prince of the Moskwa, Duke of Elchingen (1769-1815): Enlisted 1787; brigadier 1796; divisional general 1799; marshal 1804; VI Corps commander 1805-11. An exceptionally famous officer, Ney - 'Bravest of the Brave' - commanded the VI Corps throughout the campaigns in Spain and Portugal until being dismissed by Massena for insubordination. Served in Russia, Germany, France and at Waterloo.
- Reille**, General Honoré Charles, Count (1775-1860): Volunteer 1791; brigadier

Sebastiani, General Horace Francois Bastien de la Porta, Count (1772–1851): Commissioned 1789; brigadier 1803; *général de division* 1805. Replaced Marshal Lefebvre as IV Corps' commander in February 1809, fighting at Talavera. Count, December 1809. Served in Granada 1810–11; Russia, Germany and France 1812–14. Prominent politician after 1819; marshal 1840.

Souham, General Joseph, Count (1760–1837): A distinguished general of the Revolutionary Wars, Souham did lengthy service as a division commander in the VII Corps in Catalonia. Wounded at Vich (1810), he returned to Spain the following year and, as commander of the 'Army of Portugal' in 1812, drove Wellington from Burgos. Thereafter he served in the east, fighting at Leipzig and Paris.

Soult, Marshal Nicolas Jean de Dieu, Duke of Dalmatia (1769–1851): An immensely distinguished officer by 1807, this vain and ambitious son of a Gascon noble was given command of the II Corps (2nd) 'Army of Spain', with which he completed the pursuit of Moore to Corunna. His (1809) invasion of Portugal was thwarted by Wellesley at Oporto, but, given control of three corps, he subsequently swept into the Allies' rear during the Talavera campaign and drove them south of the Tagus. A period as King Joseph's Chief-of-Staff followed, culminating in Ocaña and the invasion of southern Spain; the theatre in which Soult was to remain for 2½ years. Badajoz's fall and Salamanca eventually compelled him to evacuate his domain, but, joining with Joseph, he retook Madrid and hustled Wellington back into Portugal.

Recalled to France in early 1813, Soult fought in Germany. However, Vitoria led to his return as Commander-in-Chief. Although eventually pushed back into France, he maintained the western front against awesome odds and, in 1815, served as Napoleon's Chief-of-Staff. Banished by the Bourbons, he returned to France in 1820. He subsequently became a peer (1827); Minister of War (1830–34); Foreign Minister (1839); President of the Council of Ministers (1832–34 and 1840–47) and Marshal General of France (1847). His brother, General Pierre Benoit (1770–1843), also saw extensive service in the Peninsula as a cavalry commander, often fighting under his distinguished sibling.

Suchet, Marshal Louis Gabriel, Duke of Albufera (1770–1826): Probably Napoleon's most able Peninsular commander. Commissioned 1791; brigadier 1798; divisional general 1799; division commander, V Corps, 1805–9, serving in Austria, Prussia, Poland and Spain; count, 1808. Replaced Junot as III Corps' commander in April 1809. His series of victories in Aragon, Catalonia and Valencia led to him being made a marshal (1811) and duke (1812), but he was repulsed at Castalla (1813) by Murray and subsequently evacuated Catalonia.

Victor, Marshal Claude Victor-Perrin, Duke of Bellune (1764–1841): Enlisted 1781; brigadier 1795; divisional general 1797; marshal 1807; duke 1808. Commanded I Corps in Spain, 1808–December 1811. Victorious at Espinosa and Medellín, but repulsed at Talavera and Barrosa. Served in Russia, Germany and France, 1812–14.

British and Spanish Personalities

- Areizaga**, General Carlos (?–1816): Served as a division commander in Blake's 'Army of the Right' (1809). After Belchite he was given command of the new 'Army of La Mancha', but was decisively defeated at Ocaña. Ousted from the passes about Baylen, he failed to prevent the French overrunning Andalusia and most of his remaining forces were dispersed at Jaen (January, 1810). His command then passed to General Freire.
- Ballesteros**, General Francisco (1770–1832): Asturian general. After being routed at Bilbao in 1809, he became pre-eminent in the war in southern Spain. However, he rebelled over Wellington's selection as Generalissimo (1812) and was dismissed by the *Cortes*.
- Bathurst**, Henry, 3rd Earl (1762–1834): Liverpool's Secretary for War and the Colonies.
- Beresford**, General William Carr, Viscount (1764–1854): After serving at Corunna, Beresford was entrusted with the training of the Portuguese Army; being created a Portuguese marshal in March 1809. A brief period of independent command ended with his hard won victory at Albuera, but Wellington regularly entrusted him with important strategic roles during the campaigns of 1813–14.
- Blake**, General Joachim (1759–1827): Of Irish extraction, Blake commanded the 'Army of Galicia' in 1808. After Espinosa he was replaced by La Romana and made commander of the forces of the Coronilla. He fought throughout the years 1809–11 in the south and east of the Peninsula; conducting several major campaigns and battles. He was eventually captured at Valencia (January 1812).
- Canning**, George (1770–1827): Foreign Secretary 1807–9; wounded in duel with Castlereagh, 1809.
- Castaños**, General Francisco Xavier, Duke of Baylen (1756–1852): Victor at Baylen; defeated at Tudela. Held various administrative posts – served on Council of Regency – and minor field commands, 1809–13. Dismissed by *Cortes* in command reshuffle of 1813, but remained prominent in politics.
- Castlereagh**, Robert Stewart, Viscount (1760–1822): Secretary for War and Colonies from 1805; consistently supported Wellington in Peninsula. Foreign Secretary 1812–22; Marquis Londonderry 1821; committed suicide.
- Clinton**, Lieutenant-General Sir Henry (1771–1829): Clinton served at Corunna and, in 1811, assumed command of the Sixth Division – a post he retained until 1814. His brother, William, succeeded Bentinck as Allied commander in Catalonia (1813).
- Cole**, General Sir Galbraith Lowry (1772–1842): Posted to the Peninsula in 1808. Cole served as the Fourth Division's commander for most of the period 1810–14. Wounded at Albuera and Salamanca.
- Craufurd**, Major-General Sir Robert (1764–1812): The martinet 'Black Bob' Craufurd served in the Corunna campaign and was given command of the Light Division on its formation in 1810. Probably Wellington's best divisional commander, he was mortally wounded at Ciudad Rodrigo (1812).
- Cuesta**, General Gregorio Garcia de la (1740–1812): Obstinate and cantankerous. Captain General of Old Castile, 1808; defeated at Medina. Commanded 'Army of Estremadura', 1809; defeated at Medellin. Joined Wellesley in Talavera campaign; paralysed by a stroke shortly after.

- Freire**, General Manuel (1765–1834): Active in Murcia and Granada, 1810–12. Replaced Giron as commander of 'Army of Galicia' in 1813; victor of San Marcial.
- Giron**, General Pedro Augustin, Duke of Ahumada (1788–1842): Nephew of Castaños. Commander of 'Army of Galicia' in Vitoria campaign; replaced H. O'Donnell as commander of 'Army of Reserve of Andalusia' after the Nivelle; fought at Bayonne.
- Graham**, General Sir Thomas, Lord Lynedoch (1748–1843): Moore's ADC at Corunna; Walcheren, 1809; Peninsula from 1810; Commander of British garrison of Cadiz, defeating Victor at Barrosa (March 1811). Thereafter served with Wellington's main army as commander of First Division and, often, of the whole left wing. Besieged San Sebastian (1813). Increasingly troubled by an eye complaint, he retired after the Bidassoa.
- Hill**, General Sir Rowland, Viscount (1772–1842): The immensely popular 'Daddy' Hill took part in all the campaigns of 1808–9, but fell ill during 1810. He returned as commander of the army's southern wing and operated in an independent capacity for much of 1811–12. After Salamanca he assumed command of Wellington's right wing, playing crucial roles in every ensuing campaign. Baron 1814; viscount 1842; Commander-in-Chief 1825–39.
- Hope**, Lieutenant-General Sir John, 4th Earl of Hopetoun (1765–1823): A division commander at Corunna, Hope returned to the Peninsula in 1813; replacing the ailing Graham as head of the army's left wing. Captured at Bayonne.
- La Romana**, General Pedro Caro y Sureda, Marquis of (1761–1811): Commanded Baltic 'hostage' corps, 1807–8. Replaced Blake as head of the Galician forces. Assisted Moore in the Corunna campaign and remained active in the north until November 1809 when he replaced Del Parque as head of the 'Army of the Left'. Failed to save Seville in January 1810, but operated effectively in Portugal and Estremadura until his death, from a heart condition, whilst attempting to relieve Badajoz.
- Liverpool**, Robert Banks Jenkinson, 2nd Earl of (1770–1828): Foreign Secretary 1801–3; Home Secretary 1804–6 and 1807–9; Secretary for War and Colonies 1809–12; Prime Minister 1812–27.
- Longa**, General Francisco (1770–1831): Initially a highly successful guerilla leader, his forces steadily grew and he was given commands in the regular army, fighting with distinction at San Marcial.
- Mina**, General Francisco Espoz y (1781–1836): Celebrated Navarrese guerilla leader, made a general in 1813. His nephew, Xavier (1789–1817), was also a prominent guerilla commander, but was captured in 1810 by Suchet's troops.
- Moore**, Lieutenant-General Sir John (1761–1809): Commissioned 1776; major-general 1798; knighted 1804; lieutenant-general 1805. An extremely distinguished soldier, he replaced Burrard as commander of the British forces in Portugal (1808). Mortally wounded at Corunna.
- O'Donnell**, General Henry Joseph, Count of La Bispa (1769–1834): Of Irish descent, O'Donnell played a leading role fighting the French in Catalonia. From 1812 he commanded the 'Reserve Army of Andalusia', serving at Pamplona and Sorrauren. His brother, José, briefly commanded the 'Army of Murcia', but was dismissed after his disastrous defeat at Castalla (July 1812).
- Pakenham**, Edward (1778–1815): Deputy Adjutant-General in the Peninsula 1810–12; Third Division commander 1812; Sixth Division commander 1813. Killed in action, New Orleans.
- Palafox Y Melzi**, General José, Duke of Saragossa (1780–1847): Commanded the defenders of Saragossa 1808–9; prisoner until 1814. His brother, Francisco, was a minor guerilla leader.

Picton, Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas (1758-1815): Course, moody and impetuous, Picton took command of the Third Division in 1810. Badly wounded at Badajoz, he next served at Vitoria. His headstrong nature often got him into difficulties, but he was undoubtedly one of Wellington's ablest subordinates. Killed at Waterloo.

Sanchez, General Don Julian (?): Retired soldier whose mounted guerillas fought throughout Leon and Old Castile, becoming regular cavalry in 1813.

Stewart, Lieutenant-General Sir William (1774-1827): Commissioned 1786; commanded Second Division 1811-14.

Venegas, General Francisco Xavier (?-1838): Brigadier 1808; defeated at Uclés and Almonacid. Served in Latin America until 1811, when he returned to Spain and took up a post in the Galician corps.

Wellesley, Field Marshal Sir Arthur, Duke of Wellington, Viscount Douro (1769-1852): Commissioned 1787; Lieutenant-colonel 1793; India 1797-1805; Copenhagen 1807; Lieutenant-general and commander of the forces in Portugal 1808; 'Commander of the Forces' in the Peninsula 1809-14; victor at Waterloo; Prime Minister 1828-30.

Wellesley, Richard Colley, Marquis (1760-1842): Wellington's brother; marquis 1799; Ambassador to Spain 1809; Foreign Secretary 1809-12.