

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

VEILED NORMALIZATION: THE IMPLICATIONS OF JAPANESE MISSILE DEFENSE

by

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September 2008

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188		
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sour ces, gathering and maintaining the da ta needed, and completing and r eviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.						
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave	<i>blank</i>) 2. REPORT September		3. REI		ND DATES COVERED	
Missile Defense	UBTITLE Veiled Normalization: The Implications of Japanese 5. FUNDING NUMBERS		IUMBERS			
 6. AUTHOR(S) Timothy L. Clarke 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000 				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER		
				ING/MONITORING EPORT NUMBER		
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE or position of the Department of D		hesis are tho	se of the	author and do no	ot reflect the official policy	
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 12b. DISTRIBUTION		UTION CODE				
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) Japan's development of a missile defense system has been accompanied by the acquisition of potentially offensive military assets , an in creased co mmand and con trol cap ability, sig nificant restru cturing of the collective d efense establishment, and doctrinal changes that allow pre-emption should an attack be deemed imminent. Regardless of the long-standing Japanese deb ate on the constitutionality of the u se of force, the introduction of m issile d efense has institutionalized k ey stru ctural elements with in the d efense establishment marking a clear milestone in an ongoing trend towards security normalization. Under the broad rubric of missile defense, Japan has had to re-evaluate its position on the military use of space, the export of weapons technology, collective security, command authority, and the conditions under which pre-emption may be wa rranted. T hese changes ha ve m anifested them selves i n many way s, t o i nclude st atutory changes, restructuring and elevation of the former Defense Agency, an increased emphasis on joint service interoperability, and the acquisition o f a bro ad range of adv anced technologies. It is u ndeniable that the trend to wards security normalization began with the inception of the National Police Reserve in 1950, but it can also be asserted that missile defense has provided an umbrella under which the trend has been significantly advanced.						
14. SUBJECT TERMS Japan, Se	lf Defense Forces, missile defen	se, normaliz	ation		15. NUMBER OF PAGES 127	
		-			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THE PAGE Unclassified	IS CI	BSTRAC	CATION OF T lassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU	
NSN 7540-01-280-5500				Stand	lard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)	

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VEILED NORMALIZATION: THE IMPLICATIONS OF JAPANESE MISSILE DEFENSE

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES (FAR EAST, SOUTHEAST ASIA, PACIFIC)

from the

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ABSTRACT

Japan's development of a m issile defense system has been accom panied by the acquisition of potentially of fensive military assets, an inc reased command and control capability, significant restructuring of the coll ective defense establishment, and doctrinal changes that allow pre-emption should an attack be deemed imminent. Regardless of the long-standing Japanese debate on the constitutionality of the use of force, the introduction of m issile defense has institutional lized key structural elem ents within the defense establishment marking a clear m ilestone in an on going trend towards security normalization.

Under the broad rubric of m issile defe nse, Japan has had to re-evaluate its position on the m ilitary use of space, the export of weapons techno logy, collectiv e security, command aut hority, and the condi tions under which pre-emption m ay be warranted. These changes have m anifested them selves in m any ways, to include statutory changes, restruct uring an d elevation of the form er Defense Agency, an increased emphasis on joint service interoperability, and the acquisition of a broad range of advanced technologies. It is undeniable that the trend towards security normalization the National Police Reserve in 1950, but it can also be began with the inception of asserted that m issile defense has provided an umbrella under which the trend has been significantly advanced.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

With foremost appreciation to the wisdom and tutelage of my mentors and the patience and understanding of my family.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. RESEARCH QUESTION

Japan's development of a m issile defense system has been accom panied by the acquisition of potentially of fensive military assets, an inc reased command and control capability, significant restructuring of the coll ective defense establishment, and doctrinal changes that allow pre-emption should an attack be deemed imminent. Regardless of the long-standing Japanese debate on the constitutionality of the use of force, the introduction of m issile defense has institutional lized key structural elements within the defense establishment marking a clear m ilestone in an on going trend towards security normalization. This thesis will a rgue that the a ttendant policy changes and acquisitions associated with m issile defense constitute a significant and enduring step toward s the normalization of Japan's Self Defense Forces (JSDF).

B. IMPORTANCE

The security environment in East Asia is in the midst of considerable change, and it is irrational to assume that the defense arrangements of past decades will remain viable indefinitely. China is taking its new found na tional wealth and is undertaking significant military modernization efforts, North Korea has steadily continued its pursuit of nuclear weapons, and the U.S. has become heavily committed in other parts of the world. Considered from a Japanese perspective, these factors would collectively suggest a relative reduction in the type of security that it experienced throughout the Cold War. The presumed solution to such a dilemm a lies in reducting extern al reliance and developing the means to protect one's self.

In the case of Japan, this tends to be more com plicated as Article 9 of the Japanese C onstitution asserts that "the Ja panese people forever ren ounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as m eans of settling international disputes. In order to accom plish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as oth er war potential, will never be maintained. The right of

belligerency of the state will not be recognized." This places the existence of any type of Japanese military force at the heart of an ongoing debate. Externally, Japanese military advancements prom pt historical anim osity fr om regional neighbors who still h arbor resentment from World War II. Japanese military advancements invariably foment some degree of regional resistance with or without resolution of in ternal constitutional issues. Internally, however, there are other implications.

If progress towards security norm alization can be demonstrated then the constitutional debate becom es a less significant factor in s ecurity discussions than the military reality. As security normalization is approached, the true nature of the internal constitutional debate shifts from whether or not to pursue it a nd towards acknowledging its inevitable achievement. This implies that a demonstrated, advancing trend might also influence the constitutional debate in support of security normalization. In this context, an examination of security trends w ithin J apan speaks to and potentially influences an issue long at the center of Japanese politics.

While the d iscussion thus far has b een limited to East Asia, the importance of regional stability clearly extends well beyond the region itself. More specifically, the U.S. has direct economic interests that flow from a peaceful and secure East Asia. If this security can be achieved through improved Japanese capabilities and a greater willingness to engage in regional crises, the U.S. gains a significant adv antage. If Japan is fully able to provide for its own d efense, new regional security options are generated. The U.S. could potentially reduce or eliminate its forces in the region or, should the need arise, ally with a militarily stronger Japan to preserve regional stability and protect national interests. In both cases an openly nor malized Japanese military lends itself to greater military economy for the U.S.

Beyond the practical m atter of national security, there is al so an underlying theoretical component related to the secur ity dilemma. Specifically, how should one view military acquisition in an env ironment in which the m argin between of fense and defense is increasingly narrow ? T o amplify, the detection, tracking, and disabling of inbound missiles is decidedly defensive. However, by acquiring the requisite capabilities to achieve these functions, one may also gain the capacity to observe potential threats,

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exercise a com plex command and control sy stem, and employ the apparatu s in an offensive manner despite the purported defensive role it was developed under. This line of reasoning offers som e insight into external criticisms of Japanese m issile defense and highlights a key challenge in associating a capability with intent.

Security arrangements are built under a certain set of conditions. Conditions change, and East Asia is no exception. The resulting ques tion for Japan is what type of security arrangement will best preserve national security, and the answer may be found in a m ore norm alized m ilitary c apability of m eeting contem porary security cha llenges. Moreover, the adoption of missile defense marks a significant step towards normalization without openly asserting it. Ar ticle 82-2 of the Self-Defense Forces Law, Measures for the Destruction of Ballistic Missiles, the Prime Minister is afforded the powers to m ake military decisions without consultation of the Diet. Further, under certain conditions this authority may be passed to the Defense Mi nister. W hile these pow ers are argu ably limited in that their ap plicability exists with in the conf ine of missile defense, they are noteworthy in that they place the authority for military decision making in the hands of a single executive. Of greater sign ificance is the scope of what such a decision entails, as the m issile defense in itiative enc ompasses e lements of each bran ch of the JSDF. issile de fense has provided a Considered through this lens, m galvanizing force consolidating the command authority of the JS DF and improving lateral coordination, both vestiges of a mature force.

C. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES

The primary method for illus trating that normalization has been achieved will be through comparative analysis of the JSDF against the militaries of other states. This will be supported through open source documents on military ressources, spending, organizational structure, and doctrine available through the Japanese Ministry of Defense. Similar documents from other governments will be used as a means to compare Japan's defense forces against other militaries. The intent in doing so is to demonstrate that, in terms of capability, Japan has met the stand ard of military normalization held by states without constitutional restrictions on the use of force. In addition to the force com parison, this thesis will also be supported by a post-World W ar II historical analysis of addressing the evolution of the J SDF. This is intended to demonstrate a steady increase in J apanese military capability, us age, and prominence in government affairs and capture the impacts of key exogenous events. This will be supported by historical documents that capture elements the key debates that have occurred regarding the roles and m issions of the JSDF. By doing so, it can be demonstrated that there is an increasing tr end towards military no rmalization within Japan that culminates with missile defense.

The final su pporting element will be an an alysis of perception polls ad dressing current J apanese op inions on the u se of military force, the role of the JSDF, and the overall threat environment. By illustra ting that public opinion supports the use of military force under certain conditions and pr oving the p resence of a credible m ilitary capability, the case for norm alization is s ignificantly strengthened. Additionally, the potential impact of a direct security crisis on popular opinion will also be analyzed. This will be accomplished through the use of existing opinion polls.

D. ORGANIZATION

This thes is will beg in by tracing the origins of Japan's current security posture, beginning with how post-W orld War II Japan was re-forged as a pacifist nation and has steadily returned to a normalized state. This will be accompanied by a brief examination of Japan's current security c ontext and what it m ay perceive to b e p otential thre ats. Together, these two elements establish the framework for why security normalization has been such a content tious issue with in Japan and why m odern circum stance seems to demand a more pragmatic assessment of national security.

The following section will exam ine the evo lution of Japan's Self Defense Force (JSDF) from its origins to its current state and offer a force comparison against what are viewed as n ormalized states. Th is will de monstrate a su stained upward trend in JS DF roles and ca pabilities since its in ception and that when contras ted against other states, Japan's defense apparatus is quite nor mal despite any claim s to the contrary. The

purpose of this is to establish that a trend to normalization exists and that missile defense ushers in a set of changes that significantly advances it.

The evolution of the JSDF will be f ollowed by an exam ination of what m issile defense means in the broader context of a trend towards normalization. The capabilities, policy changes, and def ense restructuring that a companied the deve lopment of missile defense will each be considered in term s of their broade r implications. These changes formalize the new face of the Japan ese defense establishment to such a degree that it is unlikely to rever t to its p revious incarn ation, and colle ctively con stitute a set of advancements that significantly increase Japan's military apparatus.

Having considered the m ore em pirical as pects of Japanese defense, the next chapter exam ines internal and external perceptions of J apanese s ecurity. W hile the previous chapters have assessed capability, at this point the intent is to develop a general assessment of perceptions and intent. If Japa n is externally perceived to have already achieved security normalization, then from an external perspec tive the issue is resolved. If internally Japan ha s yet to formally asse rt security norm alization, then internal polls and opinions of the broader popul ation and specific subsets m ay offer insight into future behavior. This will be followed by the final chapter, which will summarize key elements of the argum ent and offer som e observations as to what the im plications of sec urity normalization may be for Japan and the United States.

E. LITERATURE REVIEW

This review has been developed to support three lines of argument which taken collectively illus trate J apan's steady advance towards security normalization. While normalization is a somewhat elusive term of or the purpoeses of this thesis it will be considered as the capacity and willingness to employ military force in pursuit of national objectives. This will be dementated by comparing the JSDF with an accepted, normalized force. The literature review develops this premise by considering the evolution of the JSDF, domestic and international perceptions of the JSDF, and the impact that missile defense has had in advancing Japans security posture.

The first section consists of selected works supporting the assertion that the JSDF has steadily increased in terms of size, capability, and its role in national security. By demonstrating the sustained expansion of the force, a clear trend becomes apparent. The second section consists of works that capture the scope of the changes associated with Japan's missile defense program. These advances are considered separately as they introduce both qualitative and structural advancements that represent a considerable leap in terms of Japan's military resources.

The next section focuses on works t hat speak to the possible internal and external perceptions of Japan increa sing its m ilitary posture. T his sec tion exam ines legal interpretations of Japan's defense policy, popular and political elite opin ions on military matters, and external perceptions of Japanese militarization with the intent of identifying potential outcomes. The intent in exploring these facets is to identify the degree to which they have impacted the expansion of the JSDF and thus ascertain which remaining issues may impede continued progress towards security normalization.

To be sure, not all literature suggests the at the growth of Japan's security force implies an increasing trend towards norm alization. The final section presents some opposing views that suggest that the orientation of the JSDF is not indicative of a movement towards normalization. Moreover, the introduction of the changes attributable to missile defense is viewed by some as being strictly defensive in nature. In ord er to craft a balanced argument and provide logical counters, some dissenting literature is explored.

1. Status, Capabilities, and Trends of the JSDF

From its origins in the early 1950s, the JSDF has experienced steady growth and prompted heated debate. By identifying ke y milestones throughout its developm ent, it becomes possible to c learly illustrate a tre nd to wards an increas ing military cap ability. Buck (1967) contributes to this by effec tively capturing the m indset, capabilities, and vision for the force as it was coming into maturity. Buck's article highlights the regional perspective during a point in Japanese history in which it w as regaining standing in the international community and gaining economic power. These insights are useful to this thesis in that they establish a point of departure from which to assess the expanding roles and missions that the JSDF has assumed and shifts in regional conditions that may have prompted a need for a more robust military apparatus.

While Buck offers insights into elem ents underpinning perceptions surrounding the JSDF in the 1960s, there is also a m ore mechanistic component of building a force. This manifests itself in more clearly observable features, such as the size of the force and numbers of weapons system s. In t he case of the JSDF, this presents som e irony as its growth has occasion ally com e through less direct m eans than m ight be exp ected. Samuels (2007) illu strates how Japan has grown a capable n avy under the auspices of a coast guard.

The author dem onstrates how the deve lopment of a coast guard has provided Japan with a m eans to bypass legal, econom ic, and norm ative restrictions against force growth. This article underscores both the expansion of Japan's aggregate military power and a circuitous route to achieve it. In this regard, there are som e parallels to m issile defense as it crosses into both technology sectors and space exploration. Given that Japan has previously exploined alternative routes of force generation, it is not unreasonable to consider missile defense as serving a similar purpose.

While the preceding works speak to elem ents of history and a lternative means of force generation, a m ore comprehensive and direct approach is taken by author Jennifer Lind. In developing her argum ents, Lind (2004) employs several alternative m ethods to assess the relative strength of the JSDF. She effectively establishes that Japanese military spending and the breadth of its capabilities ch aracterize it as one of the m ore advanced militaries in the world. Her article presents strong evidence illustrating what the JSDF has steadily m atured into. Establishing th at Japan has steadily acquired one of the world's leading military forces offers strong evidence to support a trend towards security normalization.

Force com parisons offer a v ery m echanistic m eans of asses sing respec tive militaries, but what is o ften m ore telling is the organization, doctrine and policies that

they em ploy. The steady growth and expans ion of the JSDF ha s resulted in an organization that is largely ind istinguishable from a standing m ilitary. W hile the distinction between an arm y and a defense force has often been a m atter of perception, author Nich olas Szechenyi advances the argum ent that Jap an's in terests m ay lay well beyond its dom estic borders and that the current er a requires a m ore proactive defense policy.

Szechenyi (2006) examines the in ternal discussions, political challeng es, and strategic rea lities that h ave collectively sh aped what he believes to be a significant juncture for the future of Japanese defense policy. His argument is relevant to this thesis in that as a result of a changing global and regional security concerns Japan has crossed a significant political th reshold indicating support for a continuing trend towards security normalization.

Taken collectively, these works provide a basis for considering key elem ents of the JSDF's evolution. There is evidence of the early perceptions of what the force was intended to achieve and the issues surrounding it in the 1960's, alternative means of force generation ostensibly intended to curtail constitutional debate, force comparisons, and an assessment of the reign ing secur ity clim ate. Using this f ramework it is po ssible to illustrate the steady expansion of the JSDF in terms of capability and political acceptance.

2. The Nature and Capabilities of Missile Defense

While the preceding section addresses broad trends in the JSDF, the key argument of this the sis is that the adoption of m issile def ense c onstitutes a m ilestone that significantly advances the trend towards security normalization. This is p remised on the aggregate capabilities that effectiv e m issile d efense enta ils. More precise ly, the acquisition of missile defense carries with it the need for increased surveillan ce, command a nd control capabilities, acquisition of hardware that can track and destroy high speed projec tiles, a degree of force projection for maritime based elements, and an organizational structure that enables swift decision m aking. When m issile defense is decomposed, the constituent pieces are sim ilar to what one would expect fro m a normalized state. This thesis is clearly not the first exploration of Japan's advance towards security normalization. Oberle (2005) develops the pos ition that m issile defense is a key step towards norm alization. The author reache s the conclusion that the trend towards normalization is clear, but has not yet been r eached. Oberle's line of reasoning is useful in the development of this thesis as it employs much of the same information to illustrate the steady growth of Japan's arm ed forces. However, since the com pletion of Oberle's thesis there have been addition all security policy changes and restructuring of Japan's defense forces, both of which can be traced to missile defense. In this regard, this thesis expands on Oberle's line of reasoning an d e xtends it to incorpo rate new evid ence supporting his claim.

Security normalization carries with it a presumption of the ability to project force, and m issile defense provides a som ewhat surre ptitious of developing this. This is addressed by both Urayam a (2000) and Xueto ng (1999). The latter author offers an assessment of the technological capabilities that accompany m issile defense and concludes that "future achievements in research and development of missile defense will thus have the potential to im prove offensive missile technology." Relative to this thesis, his conclusion supports the assertion that Ja pan's forces have illus trated a steady trend towards more offensive hardware while also underscoring the narrowing margin between offensive and defensive military capabilities.

In considering the offensive and defensive e characteristics of a m issile defense program, it is useful to identify m ilestones in its development. This evolution is de tailed in the Monterey Institute of International Studies 2003 publication, *Ballistic Missile Defense in Northeast Asia: An Annotated Chronology 1990 – present.* Although slightly dated, this reference work offers a synops is of the significant events triggering contemporary interest in missile defense and the key capabilities emerging with it. This study is useful to this thesis in that it serves as a key reference for assessing the technological advancements in troduced to Japanese forces as part of the overarching rubric of missile defense.

Missile d efense is far more com plex than "po int and sho ot." I t invo lves the acquisition of myriad high tech equipment, streamlined command and control, and rapid

decision making. These capabilities represent a significant advancement for the JSDF and underscore the trend towards normalization. The works introduced in this section offer a means of identifying the components of missile defense that advance this trend.

3. Perceptions of Security Normalization

Perception is a key element in considering security normalization. If an adversary perceives a state as ha ving a capa ble military, then the r isk f or a security sp iral is heightened. For this reason, external perceptions of Japanese militarization bear scrutiny. Note that this exists exclusive of any in ternal perceptions and should be considered separately. The essence of the security spiral is a potential adversary's perception of the second party's actions. Thus, regardless of Japan's intent its actions will ultimately be judged by the beholder. Insom uch as external perception matters, the government of Japan faces an addition al burd en in ensuring that the broader polity, which generally favors the "peace constitution," is accepting of security actions. If security measures are viewed as too of fensive, political risk is heightened. Colle ctively, Japan has to balance internal and external perceptions su ch that it presents both a credib le, deterrent military force and an otherwise benign dom estic defender. Balancing these perceptions weighs heavily in Japans force development and employment.

Perhaps one of the m ost objective w ays of assessing defens e policy is through a legal interpretation. Som e aspects of this can be found in Arm strong's (2006) examination of Japan's *Law Concerning Measures to Ensure National Independence and Security in a Situation of Armed Attack*. The law considers situations in which an armed attack again st Japan from the outside has occur rred and in stances in which an arm ed attack is de emed imminent. Expr essed dif ferently, the law consider s actual m ilitary attacks and the expectation of attacks.

To this end, som e Japanese officials have been quoted as asserting that attacking North Korean m issile bases should legally be considered as self-defense. Notwithstanding saber- rattling tac tics, the f act that Japan has set lega l condition s that encompass military pre-emption is a marked departure from the renunciation of force and stands as strong evidence that Japan ha s advanced the trend towards security normalization.

Another indicator of internal p erceptions of the military is the degr ee to which military heritage is em braced. Ryu (2007) sets surveys the opinions of Japanese elites regarding state visits to the Yasukuni Shri ne. The shrine, comme morating Japan's war dead, exists at the center of a longstanding regional controversy involving Japan's imperial past. Within the PRC and Korea, Japanese state visits to the shrine tend to spark remembrances of past transgressions. In this regard, the Yasukuni Controversy is linked to security normalization. Expressed differently, state visits to the shrine prompt regional concerns over Japan em bracing its martial heritage and re-militarizing. In this regard, elements of the debate mirror regional concerns about Japanese security normalization.

Ryu's work is based on a 2006 survey he conducted of members of the House of Representatives in the National Diet of Japan. Using his survey and press releases of official statem ents regarding the Y asukuni Shrine m ade by the Chinese, Korean, and Japanese governm ents, the au thor argues that the Yasukuni controversy is a relevant gauge of regional and domestic acceptance of a normalized Japan. This work is relevant to this thesis in that his study offers an indirect view on prevailing sentim ent regarding Japanese security normalization.

A more direct indicator of national will lingness to employ its military can be found in public responses to the use of military force. Is hibashi (2007) examines the relationship between opinion regarding deployment of the JS DF and its relationship to political action. The author presents evidence indicating that popular opinion has not played a significant role in political decisions regarding force deployments. In essence, this would seem to delink popular opinion from security normalization discussions and suggest that the more telling indicator is the opinion of political elites, addressed more fully by Ryu.

Ishibashi's work is relevant to this thesis in that it offers insight to where the locus of military willingness resides and whether it is relevant. Thus, if security norm alization

is eschewed by the masses but embraced by a minority of political e lites, his a rticle would suggest that normalization is not predicated on public acceptance. This fram es an argument in which pop ular opinion polls can be considered in a less definitive fashion, and more focused polls of rele vant actors can be weighted appropriately. If it can be illustrated that the de cision for security no rmalization is g enerally resistant to pu blic opinion, then a key argument against it has been negated.

An opposing view is provide d by Paul Midford, who su ggests that Japanese public opinion is highly relevant to secur ity policy. Midford's arguments build on several of his previous works. Midford (2002) considers Japanese public opinion in contrast to that of its regional neighbors and Midford (2003) examines Japanese opinion in response to the deploym ent of the JSDF to the Arabian Sea in 2001. Midford (2004) notes a pattern found in the Maritim e Self De fense Force (MSDF) in which a plan for operations is put forth, controversy unfolds, the mission is accepted, the MSDF performs well, and the controversy fade s into obscurity. This tren d suggests that the tangible impact of public opinion has been to slow the rate of policy change. W hile this has allowed for an expansion of the JSDF in to an expanding array of defensive or supporting roles, a m uch harder line is found in rega rd to an offensive vice defensive m ilitary orientation, where staunch public opinion has consisten tly sta lled sign ificant advancement.

Midford also notes that the Japanese public has steadily adopted a defensive realist s tance that recog nizes the utility of military power in hom eland defense, but is particularly resistant to embracing offensive military power. Midford traces thes e views to the Japa nese public 's reac tion to the U.S. invasion of Afgha nistan and Iraq, respectively. Whereas the former was understood, the latter was opposed. Placed in the context of Ryu and Ishibashi, Midford's ar ticle presents strong evidence that not only does opinion m atter in Japanese security policy, but that public opinion plays as important a role as elite opinion. The dive rsity of m ethods and conclusions found by these three authors p rovide f or sig nificant d iversity in evaluating the role of popular opinion in Japan.

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Perception matters, but it is also highly subjective. The readings of this section offer perspectives from a legal in terpretation, from the vantage point of Japan's political elite, and from Japan's broader public. These opinions constitute part of a broader array of considerations that, over time, may expedite or hinder the normalization trend. The polls also of fer some insight into why missile defense presents such an a ttractive option to more hawkish polic y advocates, as it retains the defensive character that the public is willing to a ccept while also allows for an increase in offensive capace ity. W hile it is beneficial to consider the empirical aspects of the evolution of the JSDF, developments of this type are driven by political will which is often a manifestation of public acceptance. The trend towards nor malization will ultim ately advance at the degree to which such forces will allow.

4. Dissenting Views

As might be expected, however, not all are of the evidence fir mly supports the claim that Japan's path constitutes a trend to wards normalization. Further, there are also contrasting views on the im plications of missile defense in regards to the direction of Japanese security. Hu ghes (2004) acknowled ges that Japan is increasing its military capabilities, but offers a competing explanation in terms of its rationale. Hughes suggests that the nature of Japan's acquisitions do not indicate a departure from a strictly defensive policy, nor do they imply a more autonomous security posture.

The author argues that the motivations for such capabilities are intended to reinforce its role in UN security motivations and that Japan's motivations initiative retains U.S. dependencies. As an outcome of this, Japan's defense doctrine is becoming increasingly intertwined with the U.S., to the point that it would be unable to defend itself absent U.S. assistance, let alon e engage in acts of aggression. Taken collectively, this would imply that although the JSDF has increased its capabilities, the balance of the force is such that it does not facilitate independent action. Give not these limitations, the alternative explanation would be less of a trend towards nor malization and more towards restructuring what remains a defensive security force.

While Hughes's argument has merit, the counter is found in the ambiguous nature of m odern defense technology which carries with it both offensive and defensive potential. The technologies through m issile defense enable sweep ing changes in the command and control and employment of forces, permitting an operational synergy that belies its size. The technological ambiguity coupled with more permissive changes towards Japanese security policy implies, at the least, a trend towards a Japanese e force capable of independent action.

Another argument against a norm alizing trend is found in the internal Japanese debate on Article 9. As Artic le 9 resid es at the center of security discussions, its existence as written would seem to pose a barrier to norm alization. Difilippo (2 002) considers Japanese public op inion regard ing security matters and of fers evidence suggesting significant contradict ions in public sentiment and security practice. The opinion polls cited indicates considerable misgivings regarding alliance with the U.S. and consistently strong support for Article 9. However, although the public view s the alliance with the U.S. as being a key source as being a key source of East Asian friction, this has not precluded increasing security ties most notably in the realm of missile defense. Article 9 presents a far different case.

Citing Japanese opinio n polls fro m 1997 and 2001, Difilippo presen ts evidence suggesting sustained and overwhelming support for retaining Article 9. Moreover, while it may be politically feasible for Japanese policymakers to support the practical matters of defense strategy, constitutional issues carry m uch greater political consequence. This does not directly refute a growing trend to wards normalization, what it does suggest is that if such trend exists it will be arrested at the point of constitutional change. Expressed differently, if it is accepted that normalization is achieved at the point of rescinding or altering Article 9, this article offers evidence that this will not easily be achieved.

Difilippo's argument implies that norm alization is centered on Article 9, which may not be accurate. As noted by the auth or, Japanes e security policy has often advanced in a direction inconsistent with public opinion. This would suggest that defense capabilities and policy can m ature independently, and with les s politic al r isk, than constitutional change. By delinking Article 9 from normalization, it is possible to more empirically consider the growth of the JS DF and the implications of policy changes associated with missile defense. Ultimately, Article 9 may become irrelevant in the face of aggregate capability and external perceptions of Japan's military capability.

Other analysis indicates that Japan is following a highly contra dictory path with an uncertain outcome. Mulgan (2000) observes that by engaging in missile defense with the U.S., Japan has seem ingly stepped away from an autonom ous path and positioned itself as a 'strategic sa tellite' of the U.S. In contras t, Japan ese defense policy has a lso become oriented towards the assumption of a regional security role, extending beyond the confines of its own borders. To som e degree, Sa muels (2006) makes a similar observation by noting that Japan tends to hedge on security matters in search of a security strategy that balances its regional and global interests.

Whereas Samuels considers broader securi ty strategy, the contradiction Mulgan refers to is found the simultaneous pursuit of increased security dependency while also increasing the capacity for au tonomous operation. She c oncludes that while these changes are underway, Japan is positioned to pur sue either path and no clearly definitive trend can be ascertained. W hile elements of this argum ent remain valid, the body of evidence that has become available since 200 0 lends itself to a cleare r interpretation of long term strategy.

5. Summary of Literature

Taken colle ctively, the re is a sufficient body of work to advance the key arguments of this thesis. Several authors have developed the argument that the JSDF has evolved significantly since its inception. There are also numerous works on missile defense, exploring it from political, economic, military, and technological angles. Together, these works suggest that missile defense is a far more nuanced issue than shooting down inbound missiles, opening the possibility that one of the nuances is security normalization. In addition to the more empirical discussions on military hardware, the dimension of in ternational and Japanese perceptions regarding its martial heritage and the future of the JSDF are also examined in severa l works. Alterna tive views have also been considered, and arguments have been introduced to counter their

efficacy. While there is merit in each of the dissenting works, collectively the literature reviewed lends itself to the argument that Japanese security normalization has continued and is becoming increasingly entrenched.

II. THE EVOLUTION OF JAPAN'S SELF DEFENSE FORCES

A. THE ORIGINS OF "ABNORMALIZATION"

Japan has constitutionally eschewed the use of force to resolve issues since World War II. Further, it has largely placed its security interests in the hands of the U.S. While this has been advantageous for the past six decades, it cannot be taken for granted that U.S. security interests will remain constant in the face of i ncreased economic interest in China and increas ing military commitments in other parts of the world. This presents Japan with a som ewhat unique dilemma in that it is faced with a future that in which it may very well have to assum e greater re sponsibility f or its own security while constrained internally by constitutionality and e xternally by regional perceptions of remilitarization. The foremost m eans of achiev ing this security is found in Japan 's Self Defense Forces (JSDF). The inten t of this chapter is to characterize the stra tegic factors that have shaped Japan's perception of what the JSDF should be and trace its evolution from a National Police Reserve to a world class military.

B. JAPAN'S STRATEGIC ROLE

Prior to making a de termination of the n ecessary se curity appa ratus an examination of Japan's perceived strategic role needs to be considered. A state th at is pursuing a strictly defensive position will cultivate military, political, and econo mic strategy emphasizing defensive principles. Si milarly, a s tate that is intent on regional hegemony or aggressive expansion will shap e its forces and policies accordingly. In this regard, even in the absence of an overtly stated strategic role, indicators of intent become apparent. However, there remains the r isk that these indicators m ay be misinterpreted. This presents a unique set of challenges for Japan as there is a general regional bias against Japanese militarization stemming from events preceding and during W orld W ar II.

As alluded to, the re re mains significant historical anim osity regarding Japan's aggressive expansion in the first half of the twentieth century. Thus, any actions taken to

indicate a Japanese desire to expand be yond its borders prom pt significant regional concern. Further, for the latter half of the twentieth century much of Japan's strategic role was imposed upon it by the U.S. This has led som e scholars to surm ise that Japan ma y not as be well-pos itioned to def ine a stra tegic role when com pared to other modern nations. T his lack of experience has the potential to inadve rtently send the wrong strategic signal to other regional actors.

This leaves the question of Japan's strategic role unanswered. W ith the rise of China and a nuclear No rth Korea, the statu s quo does not seem to present itself as a tenable option. Further, within the past d ecade Japan has dispatched destroyers to the Indian Ocean, fired on a North Korean spy boat, and hosted the Afghan reconstruction conference.¹ This would seem to indicate a s tate that is increasingly capable and willing of assuming responsibility for its own security, acting as a full participant in international crisis, and behaving in an otherwise "normalized" fashion.

While this does not answer the question of Japan's strategic role, it do es illustrate that Japan is now stepping beyond its borders and is willing to em ploy both force and threat of force despite constitutional limitations that would seem to prohibit such actions. Collectively, this fram es at leas t o ne elem ent of Japan' s security challenge. By not participating in crisis response, Japan is assigned the unfavor able moniker of "free rider." By participating in crisis response, Japan risks being construed as aggressive. This frames the competing external pressure in defining Japan's strategic role; it is too engaged for some and not enough for others.

Ultimately, in cons idering Japan's strategic intent there is no def initive answer. This discussion can be reduced to two direct ly opposing views. A m ore skeptical view holds that J apan is stea dily acquiring the military capabilities and strategic reach to complement its econo mic strength and set condition s to achieve regiona l power aspirations. This is su pported by noting Japan's expanding peace k eeping activities, ongoing pressure to revise the constitution, a nd extensive military cooperation with the U.S. in missile defense and the procurement of offensive hardware. The alternative view

¹ Mindy Kotler and Daisuke Okuyama. "Japan's Global Ambivalence." *Foreign Policy*, no. 130, (2002): 96-97.

holds that Japan's use and development of its military forces is wholly defensive in nature and simply another step towards a more "normalized" Japan that is capable and willing to bear a m ore equitable share of the global responsibilities associated with being a powerful state.² In either case, a clearly emerging trend towards a more capable military has emerged.

C. JAPAN'S REGIONAL SECURITY CONTEXT

Just as a state' s vision o f its future de fines how it em ploys its resources, so too does the current security environment. In the case of Japan, t here are several factors that have a significant im pact on its imm ediate security. The com bined factors of a rising China, a "miscreant regime in North Korea,"³ the possibility of eventual abandonment by the U.S., and the relative decline of the Ja panese economy have had a significant and adverse impact on the security outlook. ⁴ Further, Japan's high degree of dependence on external sources for energy is a recurring challen ge. As a consequence of the emergence of China and the m odernization of both Sout h Korea and Taiwan, there exists a strong regional competition for these resources.

While one scenario could envision these changes as being completely benign, it is manifesting itself as a case st udy of the security dilemm a. North Korea is gripped by existential fear as an outcome e of being branded a pariah by the world' s rem aining superpower. As an outcome, it moves towards nuclear armament as a means to secure its survival. W ith its ex pansive bo rders and steadf ast em phasis on territorial in tegrity, China has p roceeded do wn a path of extensive military modernization and reform . In response to these activities, Japan proceeds dow n a path of extensive missile defense and increased force projection. The outcom e of th is is that as each country takes action to increase its own security, it reduces the security of other regional actors.⁵

² Alan Dupont, *Unsheathing the Samurai Sword: Japan's Changing Security Policy*. The Lowy Institute for International Policy. Lowy Institute Paper 03. New South Wales, Australia: Longueville Media. (2004): 10 - 15.

³ Richard Samuels. "Japan's Goldilocks Strategy," The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, *The Washington Quarterly* 29, no. 4 (2006): 111–127.

⁴Ministry of Defense, Japan. Korean Peninsula. <www.mod.go.jp>. Accessed 21 April 2008.

⁵ Richard Samuels, "Japan's Goldilocks Strategy," The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, *The Washington Quarterly* 29, no. 4 (2006): 111–127.

Perhaps even more worrisome is the degree to which the increased militarization is accompanied by increased nationalism throughout the region. In the case of China, this appears to be associated with generational change. A point has been reached in which the political leadership did not directly experience W orld W ar II (the Pac ific W ar) or the postwar party struggles. Having enjoyed both peace and prosperity, China seems to have achieved a degree of ideological vindication n resulting in conditions that allow nationalism to thrive. In the case of Japan, the collapse of the Japan Socialist party has facilitated a shift to the right and the increasing power of China has galvanized the reality that regional economic primacy may very well be fleeting. The anxiety stemm ing from these factors are generally supported more nationalistic policies.⁶

The combined factors of a more challenging security environment and a degree of generational change have resulted in a Japan that is increasingly more likely to em brace the use of force to protect its interests.⁷ This is not meant to imply that Japan has adopted a more hegemonic view of the region, but rather to suggest that the m ost probable future for Japanese security entails the use of defense forces in a far m ore visible regional and global role. These activities would potentially entail missile defense, maritime security, humanitarian relief, and other opera tions consistent with the use of m ilitary force as a responsible member of the international community.⁸

Perhaps the most telling indicator of Japan's shifting attitude towards its security environment is the statem ents publicly avai lable through the Ministry of Defense. Whereas Article 9 of the Japanese constitution renounces war and the threat or use of force as means of settling disputes, the Ministry openly asserts that "In situations where an arm ed attack is an ticipated, any and all measures must be taken so as to avoid the occurrence of such an attack." ⁹ Not only does this statement imply a willing acceptance

⁶ Francis Fukuyama, "The New Nationalism and the Strategic Architecture of Northeast Asia," *Asia Policy* 3 (January 2007): 38-41.

⁷ Alan Dupont, *Unsheathing the Samurai Sword: Japan's Changing Security Policy*. The Lowy Institute for International Policy. Lowy Institute Paper 03. New South Wales, Australia: Longueville Media. (2004): 13.

⁸ Nicholas Szechenyi, "A Turning Point for Japan's Self-Defense Forces," The Center for Strategic and International Studies, *The Washington Quarterly* 29, no. 4 (2006): 139-150.

⁹ Ministry of Defense, Japan. *Operations of Self-Defense Forces for Defense of Japan, Disaster Relief and Civil Protection.* < www.mod.go.jp >. Accessed 21 April 2008.

of the use of force in settling disputes, it also carries with it a h int of preem ption. Further, the very existence of a defense for rce is in its own right a deterrent measure through the presence of military force. In response to an increasingly complex security environment, Japan h as stead ily crafted a deterrent military force and a pre-emption strategy within the constraints of constitutional pacifism. Two of the questions that emerge from this are how was Japan able to generate a force within such constitutional constraints and what capabilities h as it been able to develop? The answer to these questions is found in an examination of the origins and steady expansion of the JSDF.

D. JAPAN'S SELF DEFENSE FORCES

1. From Humble Origins

The JSDF of today bear s little re semblance the National Police Res erve it wa s initially conceived as in 1950. Moreover, its very formation was a st ark contrast to the tenets of the 1947 peace constitu tion. The i mpetus for this force was not borne of a Japanese desire to rem ilitarize, but rather th e U.S. involvem ent in Kor ea. In 1950, as conflict emerged on the Korean Peninsula, G eneral Douglas MacArthur was both the supreme commander of the allied p owers in Japan and the commander of United Nations (UN) forces in Korea. The swift collapse of South Korean forces prompted an immediate need for U.S. assistance. To that end, occupation forces stationed in Japan were quickly committed to Korea. T his presented a new ch allenge in that Japan was now lef t with minimal protection and thus highly vulnerable to Soviet invasion. MacArthur's solution was found in an expanded police force.¹⁰

On July 8, 1950, MacArthur "authorized" the establishment of the National Police Reserve. Notably, the authorization is more aptly characterized as an order, as the Japanese government did not request the form ation of such a force. Moreover, the U.S. and Japanese interpretation of what such a force would consist of differed significantly. While the Japanese initially viewed this as a requirement to increase the size of existing

¹⁰ Tetsuo Maeda. *The Hidden Army: The Untold Story of Japan's Military Forces*. Chicago: Edition q, 1995.

police forces, the occup ying U.S. forces were oriented towards Japanese rearm ament. The dispa rity was quic kly re solved with the publica tion of the "Framework of the National Police Reserve," which, am ong othe r requirem ents, established a national command a nd divided the country into four regional districts, each with a regional division. Not coincidentally, these regional d istrict divisions filled the v oid left by U.S. divisions which had deployed to Korea. ¹¹ Despite being designated as a police force, its role was clear.

This placed the Japanese government in a politically precarious position. The peace constitution, which renounced the u se of force, remained very popular with the Japanese citizenry which had long suffered through years of war. The government found itself politically constrained from rewriting the constitution to allow for rearmament. As a result of this, im plementation took pl ace under the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration, which required that government orders based on directives from the General Headquarters (GHQ) of the occupying force be treated as law, regardless of public support or Diet approval. ¹² This offers a glim pse into thre e trends that t will be visible throughout the developm ent of the now JSDF: a heavy U.S. influence, a capacity to develop the force despite constitutional constr aints, and an advancem ent of the security agenda absent strong public support.

2. Growing the Force

Under the clear direction of GHQ, coupled with MacArt hur's personal i mpetus, the core of the Police Reserve began to form in October of 1950. Despite its widely recognized military nature, it was clearly not a re-iteration of the form er Imperial Army. The new inductees were volunteers vice conscripts, they were loyal to the constitution vice the emperor, and headed by a civilian commandant rather than a former military officer. Initial recruitment was heavily in centivized through comparatively high pay and benefits with opportunity for advancement. These incentives were quite clearly

¹¹ Tetsuo Maeda. *The Hidden Army: The Untold Story of Japan's Military Forces*. Chicago: Edition q, 1995.

¹² Ibid.

successful, as nearly 400,000 applicants submitted for 75,000 positions. Initially trained under American drill instructors on Am erican bases, equipped with Am erican weapons, and led by Am erican officers the early force was i mbued with decidedly Am erican qualities and was generally indis cernible from an Am erican unit. ¹³ For all inten ts and purposes, the Police Reserve could more aptly be considered as a reserve for U.S. forces deployed to Korea.

The end state of this in itiative was, of course, an arm y, replete with artillery and tanks provided by the U.S. Additionally, the organizational structure mirrored the U.S. Army, with regimental equivalents, companies, and platoons. Training entailed attacking fortified positions with artille ry and incendia ry rockets, eup hemistically referred to as 'special instruments' and 'special firing devices.' Perhaps the most telling indicator of its military role was the re- assimilation of former Japanese m ilitary officers into the force. While they had originally been excluded, the practical realities of leading a large military force coupled with the urgency U.S. troops departing to the escalating Korean War prompted a new appreciation of military experience.¹⁴ Ulti mately, the governm ent and the public were all aw are of the Police Rese rve's true function, but it was a lie that everyone accepted.

While the developm ent of the Poli ce Reserve prom pted s ome exa mination of constitutionality, the d evelopment of the m aritime arm proved f ar less controver sial. Naval rearmament occurred in such a transp arent manner largely becaus e the Im perial Navy was not fully dissolved following W orld W ar II. The need to r epatriate soldiers and colonists in f ormer territories as well as remove m ines in the Japanese archipelago created a need for a functioning n avy.¹⁵ So, while clearly reduced from its previous stature, the Japanese navy experien ced a sh ift in f unction rather than being completely dismantled.

¹³ Tetsuo Maeda. *The Hidden Army: The Untold Story of Japan's Military Forces*. Chicago: Edition q, 1995.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

Notably, the m ine clearing experience ga ined by the re-designated Japanese Maritime Safety Agency would be employed during the Korean W ar. In October 1950, the U.S. was contemplating a land attack at Wonsan and had signi ficant concerns about North Korean mines. Absent sufficient m inesweeping capabilities, the U.S. Navy called upon Japan to offer assistance, w hich was provided. This is significant for several reasons. The f irst is that Japanese n aval assets directly participated in the Korean W ar and greatly assisted the U.S. e ffort; the second is that one of the Japanese ships struck a mine killing one sailor and injur ing eighteen o thers. Perh aps m ost importantly, the Japanese government kept all news of the operation and casualties from the Japanese people. These positive contri butions reflected well on the service, and strengthened the case for its continued existence. B y 1952, se veral restrictions on the Maritim e Safety Agency were rescinded and the Maritime Security Force was established.¹⁶

1952 also m arked another m ilestone in the developm ent of the JSD F. As an outcome of the U.S. – Japan Security Treaty, Japan was required to play an increasing role in its own defense. As a result, a bill was introduced into Japan's lower house proposing the integration of the Police Reserv e and the Maritim e Security Force. Other proposed measures included increasing the capab ilities of land and sea forces to provide for the defense of Japan. Article 9 was def tly avoided by the assertion that such a force fell short of war potential and was thus cons titutional. The Security Board bill was subsequently passed and in October of 1952 Japan's de-facto army and navy became the Security Forces. This represented far m ore than a name change, however, as force size, the number of ships, and weapons were all dram atically increased.¹⁷ This increase soon prompted a U.S. re-evaluation of security arrangements.

Given the increased Japanese capabilities and formalization of its Security Force, in 1953 the U.S. proposed that Japan increas e its size and participate in a m ilitary assistance system based on the Mutual Secur ity Assurance (MSA) act. Under the MSA, Japan would receive financial as sistance, but would also be expected to contribute to the

¹⁶ Tetsuo Maeda. *The Hidden Army: The Untold Story of Japan's Military Forces*. Chicago: Edition q, 1995.

¹⁷ Ibid.

collective d efense of other states. Add itionally, countries accep ting MSA assistance would be required to increase defense spen ding. The U.S. presented a proposal to increase Japan's defenses, which Japan viewed as wholly u nrealistic. Citing Artic le 9, pacifist values, econom ic restriction, and manpower limitation, Japan resisted the U.S. push towards a m ore capable force. The fi nal com promise consisted of a Ja panese ground force of approxim ately 180,000 troops, 17,000 m aritime personnel, and an air force of 600 fighting aircraft and 20,000 personnel. ¹⁸ The size of the force was ultimately b ased less o n f orce r atios and con stitutionality, but ref lected an inter nal political assessment of an acceptable number.

The Security Forces were thus re-fashi oned as the Self-Defense Force under the Defense Agency in 195 4 which was accompanied by the Basic National Defense Policy shortly ther eafter. No tably, the policy was written with a degree of bureaucratic ambiguity that has permitted a high degree of flexibility and government reinterpretation. The policy allowed f or "developing progress ively the effective defensive capabilities necessary for self-defense" and a capacity "to deal with external aggression on the basis of U.S. – Japan security arrangem ents pending more effective functioning of the UN." ¹⁹ The somewhat open interpretation of "necessary" has allowed for a practical upper limit defined by what the prevailing political situation would allow.

Just four years after its original conception, the JSDF had b ecome an entrenched element of J apanese society, but a m ilitary consists of far more than force structure. In addition to manpower, equipment is also required. While originally outfitted by the U.S., the 1950's ushered in the rebirth of the Ja panese defense industry. In March of 1952, GHQ rescinded earlier prohibitions on the Japanese production of weapons and aircraft. This was swiftly followed by Japan's passing of the Law for Production of W eapons in 1953 and the Aircraft Production Enterprises Act in 1954. These laws provided the basis for continued Japanese re-arm ament, and allowed for equipping a 180,000 m an army, 120,000 tons of ships, and an air force of 1,300 planes. From the late 1950s to the early

¹⁸ Tetsuo Maeda. *The Hidden Army: The Untold Story of Japan's Military Forces*. Chicago: Edition q, 1995.

¹⁹ Ibid.

1970s Japan's Defense Buildup Program s played a significant role in stim ulating production to the extent that by the late 1960s over 90% of Japan's defense orders were domestic.²⁰

The importance of establishing a defense industry cannot be understated. While it does not speak directly to combat power, it does address a much broader set of factors pertaining to defense norm alization. A domestic defense production base allows for Japan to not just produce, but also sustain its assets. Dependence on foreign sources for logistical support and training is reduced. Perhaps m ost importantly, it creates an economic incentive for m aintaining defense production. To assert that a defense industrial base is critical to norm alized security m ay be an overstatem ent, but its existence is consistent from what one might expect to see in a normalized state.

By the end of the 1950's, the basic for ce structure of the JS DF and a supporting defense industrial base had been established. While this establishes that a credible force was raised, it does not speak to either concep t of e mployment or doctrine. One of the more telling indicators of this is found in the Mitsuya exercises of 1963. These exercises were intended to deter mine what defensive measures would be required in the event of renewed conflict on the Korean peninsula. These exercises had a significant im pact in that they re vealed a significant rift between civilian and military d efense plan ners. Further, they also displayed a decidedly a ggressive approach which included bringing nuclear weapons into Japan and using them.²¹

It was reaso ned that in the even t of renewed K orean conflict the Soviet Union would enter and Jap an would face a full scale assault. The use of nuclear weapons was considered as a m eans of defending Japan. ²² W hile this proved shocking to som e and created significant public and political angst, it highlights the point that Japan does not interpret the constitution as prohibiting nuclear weapons. As the JSDF is allowed to maintain the minimum force required for self-defense, there are circum stances in which

²⁰ Tetsuo Maeda. *The Hidden Army: The Untold Story of Japan's Military Forces*. Chicago: Edition q, 1995.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid.

nuclear weapons m ay be perm issible. This interpretation was initially voiced by Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi in 1958, and again in the 1970's when the Tanaka adm inistration asserted that the use of nuclear warheads on defensive weapons would be constitutional.²³

It bears mention that Japan's three Non-Nuclear Principles, stating that Japan will not "possess no r m anufacture nuclear weapons, nor shall it perm it their introduction into Japanese territory" is not a constitutional interpretation, but rather a policy choice.²⁴ While a nuclear Japan would un doubtedly generate an adverse public response, the salient factor is that Japan has delinked nuclear weapons from the constitutional debate. Further, as its regional neighbors are quick to point out, Japan's domestic H-2 rocket can readily be adapted to launch nu clear warhea ds, Japa n is able to obtain large amounts of plu tonium from its domestic nu clear power plants, and the majority of the JSDF's weaponry can be used as a nuclear or n on-nuclear delivery m eans.²⁵ If we consider this in the context of a securit y normalization trend, within the first twenty years of its existen ce Japan has set the phy sical and legal conditions to become a nuclear power.

While the Mitsu ya exercises were highly controversial in t he 1960 s, by the 197 0s similar evolutions opera ted publicly and prompted no significant opposition. Japanese concerns over the Soviet Union led to the reali zation that security issues were better served by reality than ideology. This attitude is perhaps best reflected in a public statement made by Defense Agency director general Shin Kanemaru, "Some say the Self-Defense Forces must not present any threat to foreign nations, but what kind of defense is it if it does not threaten enemies?"²⁶ This was echoed by Gro und SDF general Hiroom i Kurisu, who noted that "…the history of war shows that only offen se can win. We cannot effectively respond to offensive actions that po se a threat fro m outside Japan's sphere through defensive m easures alone."²⁷ Collectively, the voices of the director and at least one senior officer suggest a far more bellicose tone than is found in the peace constitution.

²³ Tetsuo Maeda. *The Hidden Army: The Untold Story of Japan's Military Forces*. Chicago: Edition q, 1995.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid.

As the 1970s cam e to an end, the hawkish views of that era's leadership were bolstered from abroad. The Soviet Union' s 1979 invasion of Afghani stan coupled with Ronald Reagan's declaration of an evil em pire and Japan's econom ic growth served to expand the scale of JSDF exercises and the res ources available to it. Further, the JSDF found a strong advocate in Prim e Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, who famously referred to Japan as "an unsinkable aircraft carrier," strongly implying support to U.S. forces in case of conflict with the Soviet Union. Under Nakasone's lead ership, Japan em barked on a defense buildup that quickly exceeded the nom inal 1% of GNP lim it that had previously constrained defense spending. Japan participated regularly with U.S. forces in com bined exercises and technological exchanges with the U.S. occurred regularly.²⁸ As the eighties ended, however, the Cold War came to an end and new questions emerged.

With the swift decline of Soviet military forces in the 1990s, a moment of peace emerged in which the r ationale for the JSDF was challenged at a point in tim e when it had grown into a military with the third la rgest defense budget in the world. The JSDF collectively had almost as many tanks as Great Britain, a world-class coastal navy, more Patriot missiles than I srael, and a f ormidable number of F-15 strike a ircraft and AEGIS cruisers. Moreover, Japan's defense industry was able to produce the m ajority of this hardware domestically.²⁹ The challenge, though, was what to do with it. In the search for a new direction, two new fut ures were considered. The first involved increased participation in UN pea cekeeping a ctivities and the othe r was to f ocus on the thr eat potential of a nuclear North Korea, both of which are consistent with observable trends in the JSDF today.³⁰

The first fifty years of the JSDF's existence provide considerable insight into how the Japan ese have his torically considered the force. This is no teworthy in that it establishes a broad trend of past behaviors that may portend future actions. Based on the evidence presented in the preceding paragraphs, the following are key events that support

²⁸ Tetsuo Maeda. *The Hidden Army: The Untold Story of Japan's Military Forces*. Chicago: Edition q, 1995.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid.

the view of the JSDF as a having the type of offensive potential that may be observed in a normalized force:

a) MacArthur's edict to create the force was predicated on the vacuum left by U.S. forces deployed to Korea. From the outset Japan's defense force was envisioned as a military organization.

b) Japan's deployment of naval assets in support of U.S. actions in Korea absent public knowledge indicate an early willingness to deploy forces when deem ed necessary and without open discussion.

c) The establishm ent of a dom estic de fense industry capable of designing and producing advanced weaponry would seem to indicate a state seeking eventual defense autonomy and a qualitative advantage over all contenders.

d) The size of the force, while small in comparison to regional neighbors, is offset by the destructive potential facilitated through adva nced weapons technology. Size lim itations, while politically palatable, cannot be considered as the most significant variable in assessing force ratios.

e) The resp ective pub lic statem ents of senior officers, defense directors, and Prime Ministers imply an internal perception of the JSDF has filling an offensive role should circumstance dictate.

e) W hile the three non-nuclear principles are intentionally re-assuring, they ar e equally non -binding. The early willingne ss to conduct exercises the at involve nuclear options, the nuclear potential resident within Japan, and the asserted legality of nuclear weapons should defense potential warrant it necessary im ply a much greater official acceptance of nuclear options than would be expected from a pacifist state.

f) The force build-up during the Nakasone regime was consistent with a force that was preparing for open conflict with the So viet Union. In order to do so, the JSDF would have to possess offensive poten tial. This implies the creation of an offensive force restricted only by policy and not capability. Collectively, these factors suggest that the intended role of the JSDF has always been that of a regular military. From the out set, it has been structured and trained as a military force. Moreover, the Japanese government has demonstrated a consistent ability to de-link key advancements in the force away from the constitution. Given the build-up during the Nakasone era, the offensive potential of the force cannot credibly be denied. It can reasona bly be concluded that J apan has built an of fensive appar atus capable of projecting force, em ploying combined arms, and directly engaging with enem ies. The only evidence to the contrary is that Japan has retained the moniker of defense for ces. The following section examines the curren t JSDF, which offers more evidence of a seemingly normalized force.

3. The Contemporary JSDF

The origins of the JSDF have set condition s f or the f orce that exis ts today. Recognizing that the security environment of the Cold W ar has long since ended, the JSDF has been resh aped to m eet new defense requirements. One aspect of this is the development of a Central Readiness Force (CRF), which w as established in 2007 as a "mixture of special forces, aerial transpor tation, anti-NBC warfare and military training units" intended to support operations on a m ore global scale.³¹ This shift, reflecting the changes set forth in the 2005 National Defense Program guidelines, m ark an ongoing trend towards a higher level of m ore direct military involvement in global crises. This shift in focus has b een further reinforced by recent s tatements from current Prim e Minister Yasuo Fakuda, who stated in March 2008 that he intends to introduce a bill that will allow the JSDF to m ore deploy troops abroad. ³² Japan currently has to pass temporary laws for each proposed overseas mission.

In addition to revised roles, there have also been significant structural changes within the Defense Agency, most notable its promotion to a full ministry. The 2006 Law

³¹ Jane's Information Group. "Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - China and Northeast Asia." (19 June 2008). <<u>http://www8.janes.com.libproxy.nps.edu/Search/document View.do?docId=/content1</u>/janesdata/sent/cnasu/japns100.htm@current&pageSelected=allJanes&keyword=Armed%20Forces%2C%2 0Japan&backPath=http://search.janes.com/Search&Prod Name=CNAS&>. Accessed 3 August 2008.

³² Ibid.

on the Establishm ent of the Defense Agency passed by a wide m argin and promptly elevated its status. The newly established position Minister for Defens e carries with it the authority to subm it bills and convene cab inet meetings, assuming roles previously held by the prime minister. Also of note, this change allows the Ministry of Defense to present its own budget. ³³ This final point bears m ention as it rem oves the long withstanding, and seemingly arbitrary, 1% of GNP cap that has long constrained defense spending. Conceptually, this allows the Minister for Defense to submit budgets based on requirements and not a highly politicized and self-imposed cap.

The Ground Self De fense Force (GSDF) has al so been restructured to m eet more contemporary security concerns. Manpower le vels have stabilized at approximately 155,000 personnel, but there have been considerab le changes in term s of force structure and equipment reflecting an increased emphasis on terrorist response, peacekeeping, and non-conventional warfare. The m ost notable m anifestations of this are the reduction of two infantry divisions, reducing the number of main battle tanks from 900 to 600, and the refinement of the aforementioned Central Readiness Force.³⁴

The Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF) remains the most prominent element of the JSDF. Its current strength of 43,000 sail ors, nearly three times its original size, reflects its increasing importance in Japanese security. Its primary mission, to defend Japan from maritime invasion and secure the safety of maritime traffic around Japan, is virtually unchanged since its inception. Additionally, though, are a host of expanded missions emphasizing "effective response to ne w threats and diverse situations," and meeting "significant changes in the security environment resulting from the incre ased proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles and the activities of international terrorist organizations."³⁵

Expressed a bit more explicitly, the MSDF is in the m idst of preparing itself for five specific challenge s: ballis tic m issile attacks, attacks by special operations units,

³³ Janes Information Group. "Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - China and Northeast Asia."

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid.

invasion of the Japanese islands, warning and surveillance in maritime areas and airspace surrounding Japan, and a response to large, extr aordinary disasters. Also e mphasized is the need to participate in "co-operative activities to maintain international peace," such as minesweeping operations. Regarding this latter emphasis, in 2006 the MSDF deployed to Iraq where it conducted hum anitarian and reconstruction operations, with over 300 MSDF personnel being employed in theatre.³⁶

The modern Air Self Defense Force (A SDF), over 40,000 strong, is tasked with the "air def ense of Japan and support of la nd and naval forces as required." T hese intended roles are centered on the ability to provide early warning surveillance and rapid reaction, which manifests itself in an array of interceptor aircraft, multi-purpose fighters, early warning aircraft, and a significant air defense network. In addition to this, there has been a recent em phasis on i mproving air suppor t to land forces. Also of note is the prominent role that Japanese Airborne W arning and Control System (AWACS) capabilities play in coordinating missile defense activity.³⁷

When collectively considered, the JSDF has all of the trappings of what one might expect to find in any modern m ilitary. It m aintains three branches of service and by all outward appearances is what one would consider to be a normal military. Despite this, its defensive character is repeatedly emphasized. The ensuing problem is that if the JSDF is not discernibly defensive and if the assets it is comprised of harbor an offensive potential, can it objectively be considered a defensiv e force? T o reso lve this question, the following section will consider the JSDF in comparison to a recognized, normal military.

4. The JSDF in Comparison

As stated previously, normalization is an elusive term which, f or the purpose of this thesis, is considered as the capac ity and willingness to employ military force in pursuit of national objectives. Arguably, one of the more effective ways of

³⁶ Jane's Information Group. "Jane's Defence Budgets - Japan." 28 May 2008.

<http://www8.janes.com.libproxy.nps.edu/Search/documentView.do?docId=/content1/janesdata/budgets/jd b_101.htm@current&pageSelected=allJanes&keyword=defence%20spending%2C%20Japan&backPath=ht tp://search.janes.com/Search&Prod_Name=JDB_&>. Accessed 3 August 2008.

³⁷ Ibid.

demonstrating the degree to which the JSDF ha s normalized is to con sider it aga inst a normal force. To achie ve this, the JSDF will be compared against the United King dom (UK), which by all popular accounts, functions in a manner one would expect of a normalized military. While it is recognized that both countries h ave sign ificantly different security concerns, the intent is to d emonstrate the degre e to which Japan resembles a normalized force. The basis f or comparison will encompass defense spending, organization, force structure, the respective branches of the service, and force deployments.

With m ilitary spend ing at \$53 (US) bi llion in 2008, Japan is the fifth larg est spender in the world. ³⁸ In contrast, the UK spent \$79(US) billion in 2008, and has the second highest defense budget in the world. ³⁹ Of course, as single figures they offer little insight into the m eaningful, qualitative aspects of the respective forces. W hat they do provide, however, is a means of expressing Japan's defense spending. More specifically, as a country with an espoused defensive posture it spent ~65% as much on military forces as did a state with a norm alized force. This figure shifts to ~70% when Japan's Coast Guard, which has adop ted some military roles, is also considered. Suffice it to s ay that while Japan's defense spending is considerab ly less than th e UK, it can be considered comparable.

The intuitive question that f ollows defense spending is how it is spen t. In the broadest of term s, this fiscal po sture afford the UK a force of nearly 190,000 m ilitary personnel, 386 tanks, 319 fighter aircraft, 3 aircraft carriers, and 8 destroyers. In contrast, Japan fields a force of 240,000 personnel, 980 tanks, 338 fighter aircraft, and 43 destroyers.⁴⁰ While it is recognized that this is far from a comprehensive comparison of the respective forces, it should be rem embered that it is not intended to be. The purpose of this very superficial treatment is sim ply to illustrate that absent any other data to the

³⁸ Jane's Information Group. "Jane's Defence Budgets – Japan."

³⁹ Jane's Information Group. "Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - Western Europe." (1 August 2008). <http://www8.janes.com.libproxy.nps.edu/Search/ documentView. do?docId= /content1/janesdata/sent/weursu/units090.htm @current&pageSelected=allJanes&keyword =defence %20spending%2C%20United%20Kingdom&backPath=http://search.janes.com/Search&Prod_Name=WE UR&>. Accessed 3 August 2008.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

contrary the JSDF bears a strik ing quantita tive resem blance to one of the world's foremost militaries. This will be an alyzed in more scrutiny as this section is developed, but for now it is reasonable to assert that a partial comparison of the UK's military forces and the JSDF are comparable.

To develop this line of reasonin g f urther, the com parative o rganizational structures need to be investigated. In the case of the UK the Ministry of Defense constitutes the highest level military headquarters. The Ministry of Defense is run by the Secretary of State for Defense who, in a ddition to exercising political control over military operations, is responsible for Defense policy. In addition to his junior ministers, they are als o three serv ice commanders, each of whom exercise command over their respective s ervices. Given the complexity of joint oper ations, a p ermanent joint headquarters consisting of all branches of service was established to provide early warning assessments and m onitor crisis areas that may be of interest to the UK. The following figure depicts the top-level structure of the UK's Ministry of Defense.⁴¹




Figure 1. Organization of the UK Ministry of Defense (From: 39)

⁴¹ Janes Information Group. "Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - China and Northeast Asia."

When we com pare the organization of the UK Minis try of Defense against the JSDF, there are again noteworthy similarities. In this case the Minister of Defense is supported by three chiefs of staff, each of whom have responsibility for the gro und, maritime, and air self defense forces. The respective service chiefs collectively comprise a Joint Staff Council which is chaired by a se nior officer. The joint staff counsel was restructured in the early 80s to establish strong lines of comm unications between the respective services. Also of note is that prior to 2007 the Ministry of Defense had been a Defense Agency, subordinated as a Cabinet office with considerably less influence in the Japanese government.⁴² Elevating the status of the Defe nse Agency to a full m inistry is consistent with the theory that the JSDF ha s experienced a steady grow th trend, in this case manifesting itself as a significantly in creased degree of governm ent prominence. The following figure depicts the top-level st ructure of the Japanese Ministry of Defense.43




Figure 2. Organization of Japan's Ministry of Defense (From: 43)

⁴² Janes Information Group. "Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - China and Northeast Asia."

⁴³ Global Security. "On January 7, 2007, the Japan Defense Agency was Upgraded to Ministry of Defense, a Cabinet-Level Ministry." http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/japan/jda.htm. Accessed 5 August 2008.

What becom es abunda ntly apparent is the striking sim ilarity between their respective structures, which for all intents and purposes are mirror images of each other. While it m ay be tem pting to asser t that the s imilarity is clear p roof of a norm alized Japanese force, there are som e very obvious counters. F rom the outset the JSDF was established along functional lines, meaning that it had a respective ground maritime and air force. T he aggregating of like capabilities is an in tuitively logical way to struc ture any organization. Succinctly, the comparable structures of the UK's m ilitary and the JSDF prove nothing while still serving as a positive indicator that the Japanese military is, by all outward appearances, a normal force.

As might be expected, the sim ilarities do not stop the re. Beginning with the respective ground forces, the UK has 105,000 regular personnel organized into infantry battalions, arm or regiments, arm ored reconnais sance regiments, artillery regiments, air defense regiments, engineer regiments, aviation regiments, signals regiments, and special forces. The policy gu idance for the ground force is represents the UK's strategic reality. In a post-Cold War era, the UK views itself as having a greater range of m issions than in past times. W hile national survival is less of an issue, modern threats tend to be more complex and varied. This reflected in UK defense policy which is centered on the following p rinciples: e nsuring the security of the UK and its c itizens in peace time, ensuring the security of dependent territori es, providing defense support to the country' s wider interests, supporting international order and hum anitarian principles under UN auspices, being prepared for regional conflict outside North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and being prepared for a NATO regional crisis and a general war.⁴⁴

Japan's Ground Self-Defense Force cons ists of 155,000 regular personnel. The force is organized into armor and infantry divisions, airborne brigades, artillery brigades, air def ense brigades, heliborne brigades, engineer brigades, a ntitank he licopter squadrons, and special operations forces. The force is guided by overarching defense policy. The prim ary objective is to prevent any threat from reaching Japan and in the event that it does repel it a nd minimize damage. The second objective is to contribute to

⁴⁴ Janes Information Group. "Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - Western Europe."

the improvement of the global security environment to reduce the likelihood of a threat reaching Japan. This will be done through cooperation with the U.S. and the broader international community. Japan will suppore t UN activities supporting global stability. One of the notable differences is that Japa n makes it very clear point of asserting the defensive nature of its force highlighting its "modest" nature and civilian control.⁴⁵

When placed side-by-side, the numbers are ag ain com parable. Moreo ver, the functional capabilities retained with in both the UK and Japan are highly sim ilar, with differences that are arguably best explained by regional security concerns. However, it should be noted that despite sim ilar functional elements the type units are very and unique to their respective countriles. What is meant by this is that a Japanese artillery regiment is not a direct mirror of a UK artillery Regiment. What is established is that Japan's strictly defensive force as essentially the same functional capabilities as the UK's normalized force. The follo wing figure presents a side-by-side comparison of the functional capabilities of the respective forces.

	United Kingdom	Japan
Force Size	105,000	155,000
Main Battle Tanks	386	980
Self-Propelled Howitzer	179	250
Towed Howitzer	119	480
MLRS	63	1000
Attack Helicopter	0	4
Combat Helicopter	127	83

Figure 3. Comparison of UK and Japanese Ground Forces (From: 31,39)

What is f ar m ore illu minating is the relative lack of c ontrast be tween their respective defense policies. In both cases in the primary reason for existence is to defend the homeland. Further, both have indicated that they will support operations in support of global stability working in concert with the UN. The two distinct differences are that the UK's policy reflects its NAT O commitment and that Jap an has asserted its defensive

⁴⁵ Jane's Information Group. "Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - China and Northeast Asia."

nature. W hile the former difference is readily explained as a state s pecific regional security issue, the latter is a far more dubious claim . When considered against the evidence presented thus far what we see is that Japan is organized very similarly to the UK, its ground force is 30% larger, and th e overarching defense policy is virtually identical with the exception of the Japanese assertion that their force is defensive. In the context of the evidence presented thus far this is not fully convincing.

The comparisons of the respective air for ces bear out this em erging trend. The UK m aintains an air force of nearly 46,000 pe rsonnel. T hese personnel collectively operate a fleet of aircraft consisting of multi -role fighters, air defe nse fighters, striking ground attack fighters, m aritime patrol, airbor ne early warning and control, and tanker transport functions. These aircraft are or ganized into three broad groups, under which our squadrons typically consisting of three to four subordinate units referred to as flights. Additionally, the Royal Air Force (RAF) is al so able to organize and expeditionary air wings to b etter facilitate swift dep loyment. As m ight be expected, the RAF has been highly involved in operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan.⁴⁶

The Japanese Air Self -Defense Force (ASDF) is com parable in s ize with approximately 45,000 airmen. It also possesses multi-role fighters, interceptors, airborne early warning and control, reconnaissance airc raft, and tanker transport platforms. These personnel in assets are organized into ei ght aircraft control m orning groups, nine interceptor squadrons, three fighter squa drons, one reconnaissance squadron, three transport squadrons. The ASDF also contains surface to air m issile groups. While a bit less am bitious in scope then the R AF, the ASDF has recently supported operation s in Cambodia, Mozam bique, Rwanda, Kuwait, and Iraq. ⁴⁷ The ASDF has adapted tactical doctrine from the U.S. Air Force to fit in Ja pan's vision of a defensive force. Also of note is the high degree of cooperation and trai ning that the ASDF conducts with the U.S. Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy.

As we exam ine the RAF and ASDF the tren d continues. Both air forces are comparable in size and possess aircraft with a high degree of functional similarity. In

⁴⁶ Janes Jane's Information Group. "Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - Western Europe."

⁴⁷ Jane's Information Group. "Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - China and Northeast Asia."

addition to this both have been rather extensively involved in operations across the globe. The degree of training that ASDF conducts with U.S. forces also bears em phasis. Accepting that Jap an has adapted U.S. doctrin e for strictly d efensive purposes, by v irtue of having trained fairly routinely with the U.S. in a variety of venues it can reasonably be expected that the ASDF has been exposed to num erous offensive roles. Moreover, a distinction between offense and defense in aerial com bat and close air support is somewhat of a dubious claim. These are competencies that one would find to expect in either an aggressive air force or a purely defensive one.

A final point for consideration between the respective air forces is the num ber of fighter aircraft owned by each of the forces as depicted in the following figure. On a purely quantitative basis Japan possesses a significantly larger number of combat aircraft. Considered in aggregate, both the n ormalized and defensive force are com parable in size and function, both have recently deployed in albeit in different capacities, and the defense to f orce m aintains a lar ger quantity of f ighter aircraft and the norm alized one. Our examination of the air f orces again suggests that the two are com parable to the degree that there is no discernible difference.

	United Kingdom	Japan
Force Size	45,550	44,775
Fighter - Multirole	33	78
Fighter - Interceptor / Air Defense	75	260
Fighter - Ground Attack / Strike	211	0
Reconnaissance / Surveillance	0	26
Transport	53	47
Signals Intelligence	10	6
Trainer	357	311

Figure 4. Comparison of UK and Japanese Air Forces (From: 31, 39)

The final branches of service to be considered are the two navies of the respective countries. As island nations is not surprising that both would place a prem ium on a strong naval force. In the case of the UK's Royal Navy, there are nearly 40,000 regular personnel m anning som e thirteen subm arines, three aircraft carr iers, one helicopter

carrier, to assault ships, seventeen frigates, eight destroyers, and sixteen m ine warfare vessels. The Royal Na vy also encom passes the Royal Marines of which there is one brigade. A dditionally there are twelve na val aviation squadrons. Following the Cold War, the R oyal Navy saw significant shift in o perational roles wh ich now consists of eight primary defense missions. It is charg ed with peacetime security functions such as fisheries protection and the security of o il and gas platform s, supporting operations in overseas po ssessions, security and confidence building program s, pe ace support an d humanitarian operations, and regional conflicts within and external to the NATO alliance. The Royal Navy m aintains a reasonably high deployment profile, having conducted recent operations in the Mediterranean, No rth Atlantic, South Atlantic, Iraq, and Afghanistan.⁴⁸

The Japan Maritim e Self-Defense Force (MSDF) has 43,000 sailors who operate and maintain a fleet of 20 subm arines, 43 destroyers, 12 frigates, and 35 m ine warfare ships. Of all of Japan's forces it is consid ered to be the m ost important and powerful, charged with the protection of Japanese wate rs and in providing m aritime security. To achieve these functions the MSDF has deve loped a high degree of competency and antisubmarine warfare, an ti-air warfare, anti-s urface warfare, m ine warfare, electronic warfare, surveillance, transport, and search and rescue. These skills have been d eemed necessary to support an expanded role agains t "new threats and di verse situations." These new threats have focused MSDF effort s on been prepared to respond to ballistic missile attacks, attacks by guerrillas, an inva sion of the Japanese islands, intrusion upon Japanese maritime areas or airspace, and res ponding to natural disasters. MSDF sailors recently deployed to Iraq and chip s of regularly been dispa tched to the Indian Ocean in support of counterterrorism operations.⁴⁹

The two navies present both high degree of similarity and a few points of stark contrast. B oth are comparable in size a nd possess similar types of naval assets in significantly different numbers. The glaring difference is that the Royal Navy maintains aircraft carriers and the MSDF has considerably more destroyers and mine warfare ships.

⁴⁸ Jane's Information Group. "Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - Western Europe."

⁴⁹ Jane's Information Group. "Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - China and Northeast Asia."

That Japan maintains such a large num ber of destroyers and minesweepers intuitively reflect the practical reality of assembling a force that will enable freedom of navigation in the region given multiple chokepoints. Interpreting Japan's lack of a ircraft carriers is a bit more difficult.

Aircraft carriers clearly provide a means of projecting force well off one 's own shores. Given this it is reasonable to construe the existence of a carrier as being offensive in nature. In the case of Jap an the absence of a carrier may limit global power projection, but this is regionally offset by the large quantity of destroyers. Expressed in a regional context, Japan constitutes what form er Japanese Prim e Minister Nakasone referred to as " an unsinkable aircraft carrier" protected by this large quantity of destroyers. This would suggest that the Japanese absence of aircraft c arriers may be of limited relevance in projecting force within the region. While it would be difficult to argue that the existence of Japanese aircraft carriers would be for any thing other than offense of purposes, the lack thereof has little bearing in considering the degree of normalization in the existing force. In the final analysis, although the Roy al Na vy and the MSDF do have som e disparate capabilities they are outweighed by the num ber of sim ilarities. The following figure highlights the pri mary disparities between the two.

	United Kingdom	Japan
Force Size	38,550	43,300
Submarines - Strategic Missile	4	0
Submarines - Attack	8	18
Aircraft Carrier	3	0
Destroyer	8	43
Frigate	17	8
Minesweeper	17	35

Figure 5. Comparison of UK and Japanese Naval Forces (From: 31, 39)

The preceding paragraphs have provided evidenc e that Japan's Self-Defense Forces are virtually indiscernible from the forces of a normalized state that is widely acknowledged as having a competent and skilled military. The organizational structures, the num ber of personnel, war fighting functions, and types of assets are each highly comparable. While this constitutes a reasonable am ount of d ata to support claim s that Japan's forces are tren ding towards normalization one other aspect will be considered. One of the forem ost domestic

and external issues surrounding the JSDF is their deployment beyond Japan's borders. This tends to represent one of two points of view, the first is that deploy ing troops abro ad constitutes an act of aggression in the second is that today's security context may require action abroad to defend Japan. In continuing our comparative analysis the question becomes to what extent are elements of the JSDF deployed and is this consistent with what we might see in a nor malized force such as found in the UK. The following figure s depict recent UK and Japanese force deployment profiles.⁵⁰,⁵¹




Figure 6. Recent UK Force Deployments (From: 50)

⁵⁰ Ministry of Defense, Japan. *Overview of Japan's Defense Policy*. http://www.mod.go.jp /e/d policy/pdf/english.pdf>. Accessed 2 August 2008.

⁵¹ BBC News. "Where are British Troops and Why?" http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4094818.stm>. Accessed 5 August 2008.

Japanese International

Peace Cooperation Activities

Approx. 20 Operations in Asia, ME, Africa, Central America, etc.






Figure 7. Recent JSDF Deployments (From: 51) The preceding the figures illus trate som e surprising sim ilarities. The UK has nearly 41,000 personnel deployed in vari ous locations. Japa n has nearly 30,000 personnel deployed in a very sim ilar fashion. This gap shrinks c onsiderably when you extricate the UK's 21,000 personnel who are permanently stationed in G ermany. This is an im portant distinction as this r effects basing strategy rather than an operational deployment. W hen viewed through this lens , Japan has one and a half tim es as m any forces deployed as the UK. Considered on a strictly numerical basis, Japan's operational commitments appear quite comparable to that of the normalized UK.

Another significant difference that bears mention is the number of forces that the UK has deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan. While Japan has forces deployed to these areas, they are in significantly smaller quantity. The debate over the role in which they are serving is certainly relevant, and while Japan may not be committing frontline combat troops, it is undeniable that they have esta blished a significant gl obal footprint well beyond Japan's dom estic borders. Further, the distinction betw een com batant and noncombatant is increasingly narrow in m any conflict areas. JS DF personnel deployed overseas in any capacity coul d easily find them selves under a ttack and very quickly become the front line. The relevant point re mains that for a force developed strictly for the defense of Japan, the JSDF has cultivated a significant global presence.

To be clear, the intent of this an alysis has not been to determ ine whether or not UK forces are superior to JSDF, but rath er to demonstrate that the latter bears a strik ing resemblance to an accepted, normalized force. Based on the factors of organization, size, capability, and deployments it becom es apparent that the s imilarities heavily outw eigh the differences. The most recurrin g contrast is the degree to which the JSDF asser ts its defensive nature. This contra st is significantly reduced wh en the roles and m issions of the respective forces are cons idered. The UK has very clearly established that the eprimary purpose of its f orces is to protect UK property a nd citiz enry, which inf ers a heavily defensive role without characterizing it self as a defensive force. By continually asserting its defensive role in the f ace of these similarities, Japan draws a great deal of attention to the offensive potential of the JSDF.

Note that while this cha pter has emphasized the relative similarities between the JSDF and UK forces, a broader analysis furt her reinforces Japan's normalization trend. Considered along the dim ensions of defense spending, air p ower, and n aval capabilities Japan compares favorably on an in ternational scale.⁵² The f ollowing figures illus trate Japan's relative military standing from a broader perspective:




Figure 1. Leading Defense Spenders, Excluding the United States (U.S.\$ billion, 2000)

Figure 8. Comparative Defense Spending (From: 52)

⁵² Jennifer M. Lind "Pacifism or Passing the Buck?: Testing Theories of Japanese Security Policy," *International Security* 29, no. 1 (2004): 92-121.

Country	Current-Generation Combat Aircraft	Airborne Early Warning Aircraft	Pilot Flying Hours per Year
United States	2,267	102	205
Russia	1,569	16	20
Great Britain	400	7	188
France	242	18	180
Germany	193	0	150
Ítaly	185	0	_
Japan	180	37	150
China	100	4	80

Table 1. Relative Air Capabilities of the Major Powers

Figure 9.

Relative Air Capabilities (From: 52)

Country	Major Surface Combatants	Fleet Air Defense Capabilities (nautical miles)	Aircraft Carriers (> 20,000)	Total Tonnage, Major Surface Combatants
United States	131	high (to 90 nm)	12	2,971,671
China	62	low (13 nm)	0	169,480
Japan	54	high (90 nm)	0	224,110
France	36	moderate (20 nm)	1	157,250
Great Britain	35	moderate (25 nm)	3	201,158
Russia	34	moderate (48 nm)	1	332,800
ltaly	22	moderate (20 nm)	0	88,550
Germany	14	moderate (20 nm)	0	57,360

E. CONCLUSIONS

The preceding analysis has allowed us to consider multiple facets of the JSDF, from which certa in conclusions can be drawn. If the path towards a modern military is considered as a trend line with a starting point of pacifism and an endpoint of an integrated sea, air, and land force capable of quickly deploying to multiple locations, it becomes apparent that the JSDF has steadily advanced alo ng this axis. If this path is characterized as security norm alization, it is still apparent that the JSDF has progressed significantly since its inception as a police reserve. The emerging question becomes one of what will be the enext sign if icant m ilestone on this assumed path to wards normalization. The answer to this is found in part under the broad rubric of m issile defense.

The introduction of missile defense entails far more than sim ply shooting down missiles. To such an initiative a viable counter, significant changes have had to be made to Japan 's defense app aratus. The ese changes span legal, technical, and operational domains. The f ollowing chapter will iden tify the scope of the changes associated with missile defense and articulate why they have enhanced the trend towards normalization.

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III. ENTER MISSILE DEFENSE

A. THE EVOLUTION OF JAPANESE MISSILE DEFENSE

In the previous chapter a trend line towards Japanese security normalization was developed. From its origins as a police reserve to a capable military force serving in a global capacity, the JSDF has quite clea rly moved well beyond its origin. The subsequent question is what direction Japanese security will take from this point on. The answer to this is found in part in Japan's missile defense initiative. While it is simple to conceive of missile defense is simply a "point and shoot" system, the reality is far more complex. To implement missile defense Japan had to introduce a significant number of security milestones that when taken collect tively advance the normalization trend. This chapter will delineate key milestones in the development of Japanese missile defense and identify specific elements that have broader implications.

From the Japanese point of view, the "BMD system is the only and purely defensive measure, with out alternatives, to protect life and property of the citiz ens of Japan again st ballistic missile attacks, and meets the principle of exclusively defense-oriented national defense policy." ⁵³ Others take a far dimmer view, suggesting that the capabilities associated with missile defense provide may in fact provide Japan with an offensive capacity. Ultimentely, the issue of all of fensive or defensive capability is relegated to perception. However, what can be treated as fact is that Japan is clearly pursuing missile defense.

The Japanese m issile defense program has steadily progressed since the concept was introduced in the m id-1980s. From its inception, it has gained budgetary support, overcome technical hurdles, and has experienced several successful test events. This is not meant to imply that it has developed with out incident. Cost, technical risk, and

⁵³ Ministry of Defense, Japan. *Overview of Japan's Defense Policy*. <www.mod.go.jp >. Accessed 12 May 2008.

impacts on the regional balance of power have each p rompted some degree of internal and external dissent. None of these factor s, however, have proven substantive enough to halt development.

The Japanese commitment to missile defense can largely be attributed to its longstanding security relationship with the U.S. and the potential missile threat from both the People's Republic of China and, more prom inently, North Korea. In the context of the U.S., Japanese interest in missile defense programs dates from the mid-1980s, when the Department of Defense solicited participation by allied countries in the Strategic Defense Initiative (S DI). Japan declined to participate but did part ly relax arm s export bans to facilitate sharing technology with the U.S. Subsequently, Japan shared technology with the U.S. for several weapons system s, including surface to air missile systems, ship construction, rocket engines, and fighter aircraft.⁵⁴

This collaboration proved highly frustratin g to all parties as technology transfer issues had become entwined in the U.S.-Japan trade deficit issues. While this resulted in an inc reased Japanes e aversion to join t deve lopment with the U.S., m issile defense studies continued through the early 1990's. To this end, Japan and the U.S. initiated a missile defense system study under the SDI in itiative entitled W estern Pacific Basin Architecture Study. Following the com pletion of the study in October 1994, a "Bilateral Study on BMD" was conducted to better understand the ballis tic missile threat and to study alternative architectures.⁵⁵

Despite pre-existing missile threats, North Korea's test firing of its Taepo Dong ballistic missile in August 1998 prompted a m uch more concerted effort by the U.S. and Japan. This event clearly illustrated Japan's vulnerability to North Korea's missile threat and drew public concern about the country's vulnerability to m issile attacks. In December 1998, the Japanese governm ent made an internal decision to engage with the U.S. in cooperative research and development of a ballistic missile defense system.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ Richard P. Cronin. "Japan-U.S. Cooperation on Ballistic Missile Defense: Issues and Prospects. CRS Report for Congress." Order Code RL31337. Washington, D.C.; Silver Spring, MD: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. (March 2002).

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

Today, all indications a re that Jap an is committed to this c ourse of action and is doing quite well in achieving it. T he following is a brief synopsis illustrating Japanese progress and commitment towards missile defense:^{57,58}

1990: North Korea test launches ballistic missile into the Sea of Japan

1992: Bush administration proposes Japanese TMD deployment 1993: Started consultations with the U.S. on BMD 1993: Japan purchases Aegis combat systems 1993: North Korea test launches for ballistic missiles into the Sea of Japan 1994: Japan and South Korea agreed to cooperate on North Korean missile threat 1995: JDA commenced BMD feasibility study 1998: Japan-U.S. Cooperative Research Project approved by the Security Council of Japan and the Cabinet. 1998: North Korea test launches ballistic missile over Japan 2002: Japan-U.S. Defense Summit meeting 2003: Japan launches IGS satellites 2003: Japan-U.S. Defense Summit meeting 2003: JDA requested BMD budget for FY 2004 2003: GOJ decision to introduce BMD system 2004: Japan and the U.S. signed BMD Framework MOU 2005: Japanese Diet concluded legislation for response to ballistic missile. 2005: GOJ decision to start SM-3 Joint Cooperative Development 2006: SM–3 Block IIA Cooperative Development Project started 2007: Transition from Defense Agency to Ministry of Defense 2007: PATRIOT PAC-3 deployed at Iruma Air Base - Japan's first

interceptor

⁵⁷ Ministry of Defense, Japan. Overview of Japan's Defense Policy. <www.mod.go.jp >. Accessed 12 May 2008.

⁵⁸ East Asia Nonproliferation Program, Center for Nonproliferation Studies. *Ballistic Missile Defense in Northeast Asia: An Annotated Chronology 1990 – Present.* Monterey Institute of International Studies. (2003).

2007: Successful completion of the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) intercept flight test in Hawaii

This tim eline illustrate s the d egree of Japane se comm itment to the program. What is perhaps less explicit are the security milestones that have been entrenched in the pursuit of missile defense. The following section will elaborate on what has had to occur to make missile defense a potential reality.

B. THE ATTENDANT FEATURES OF MISSILE DEFENSE

1. Command and Control

Missile defense is an in herently complex activity. In order for it to be effective, there needs to be a high degree of coordination between multiple entities. Expr essed differently, missile defense requires a fast and accurate comm and-and-control (C2) system. In considering Japan's post-Cold W ar C2 structure it quickly becom es apparent that far les s com plex m echanisms were sufficient. As might be expected, the JSDF developed along service lines oriented towards com plementing U.S. for ces. During the Cold War era the U.S. was the deterrent ag ainst potential Soviet aggression, with Japan playing a secondary role. W hile the JSDF did participate in combined exercises with the U.S., it was still within the confines of a single service channels. As a result of this there was never an im petus to develop a trul y joint C2 structure e within the JSDF. ⁵⁹ Wh en considering the demands of an effective missile defense system, the shortcomings of this approach become readily apparent.

Effective missile defense presents a far more substantial C2 challeng e. The decision to deploy a m issile defense capability is alm ost invariably predicated on the detection and dissemination of early warning information. In practical terms any asset detecting an indication of launch must be able to pass that in formation to a platform that is capable of acting upon it. This entails space-based systems, ground-based systems,

⁵⁹ Masahiro Matsumura. "Redesigning Japan's Command and Control System for Theater Missile Defense." *Defense Analysis* 16, no. 2 (2000): 151-164.

aerial systems, and sea-based system s. Moreove r, given the benefits of interoperability with U.S. resources, there is a need to ensure that the C2 ap paratus can also function in a multi-national capacity.⁶⁰

This reality is reflected in Japanese defense planning. Japan's National Defense Program Guidelines have placed in increased emphasis on effective jo int operations and increased command-and-control capabilities. In defining the critical elements of defense Japan has established the enhancem ent of joint operation capabilities as a num ber on e priority. The following extracts from Japa n's 2007 Defense Planning Guidance illustrate the importance of the Japan places on these two elements:

In order to have thr ee services of the self-defense forces work integ rally and to enable them to execute the ir missions swiftly and effectively, we will employ them jointly whenever possible. We will c reate a cen tral organization to facilitate joint operations, and establish infrastructure for training and education as well as in telligence and communications. In doing so, we will re-examine existing organizations so as to enhance the ir efficiency.⁶¹

...in particu lar we will develop the comm and-and-control system s and agile intelligence sharing system s that are indispens able for joint operations, and to inform ation and communication technologies available at hom e and overseas. In additio n, will cre ate advanced system s f or command and communications in a network for infor mation and communications, with sufficient protection against possible cyber attacks, to enhance operational and organizational efficiency.⁶²

It is arguable that improved "jointness" and C2 systems could simply be attributed to the desire to be able to conduct m ore effective defense operations and that m issile defense was not a significant driver. The count er to this is found in the sa me planning

⁶⁰ Masahiro Matsumura. "Redesigning Japan's Command and Control System for Theater Missile Defense." *Defense Analysis* 16, no. 2 (2000): 151-164.

⁶¹ Ministry of Defense, Japan. *Defense of Japan 2007*. http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/index.html>. Accessed 12 August 2008.

⁶² Ibid.

guidance which addresses the m eans by which improvements will be implemented. The document highlights the close coordination between comm and-and-control system s as critical to effective m issile-defense. Placed in the contex t of com bined Japanese-U.S. missile defense, Japan's Air Defens e Command was designated for co-location with the U.S. Fifth Air Force at Yokoda air base in order to strengthen coordination between missile def ense C2 ele ments and f acilitate th e shar ing o f relevant s ensor da ta.⁶³ In addition to this, the s tructure of Japan's missile defense encompasses space, air, sea, and ground assets so it is somewhat intuitive that they would need to effectively communicate across serv ice channels. W hile this reali zation m ay have occurred absent a m issile defense initiative, it is missile defense that made it imperative.

When this evidence is p laced on the norm alization trend line, two factors stand out. The first is that C2 im provements have manifested themselves as a post-cold war adaptation to a regional threat. The fact that the shift towards greater interoperability has occurred in response to a local concern im plies that Japan is increasing its ability to provide for its own defense which is a significant departure from complete reliance on the U.S. security umbrella. The second factor is that the nature of the threat is missile attack from North Korea. Given that the exogenous th reat is of a specific type, nam ely missile attack, the actions taken by Japan can be interpreted as steps to increase its organic ability to deter and defeat said attack.

2. Decision-making Authority

Command-and-control is not strictly a m atter of having the right hardware. Effective C2 rests in part on well-established lines of authority. In the case of Japan, missile defense has again proven to be the impetus to change long-standing policies. The speed with which m issile attacks can occur coupled with their de structive potential prompt a requirement for swift decision-making. To facilitate this, in 2005 the Japanese Diet revised the Self-D efense Forces Law through the add ition of Article 82 -2. The following is the applicable excerpt:

⁶³ Ministry of Defense, Japan. *Defense of Japan 2007*. http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/index.html. Accessed 12 August 2008.

... in case that a ballistic m issile, etc. is flying toward the land of Japan without suf ficient time to obtain aut horization stipulat ed in the same paragraph from the Prime Minister due to urgent changes of the situation, the Defense Minister m ay order the units of the Self-Defense Forces of Japan to take m easures stipulated in the same paragraph in advance in order to prevent the dam ages on the lives and/or propert ies of citizens within the territory of Japan f ollowing Emergency Response Guidelines that are prepared by the Defense Minister and authorized by the Prime Minister. In this case the Defense Minister shall set the period during which the ordered measures are to be implemented.⁶⁴

Despite the intuitive necessity and exceed ingly cautious wording, Article 82-2 is noteworthy in that it allows the Defense Minister to respond to the immediate threat absent a governm ent order for defensive action. To expand the context, this is the first time since World War II that such authority has been delegated.⁶⁵

While the establishment of a Defense Minister and the delegation of this degree of authority are som ewhat profound in their own ri ght, it is of limited utility in conditions are not o therwise set for swift execution of his order. As alluded to in the preceding section, to defend against ballistic missiles all branches of the JSDF must cycle through a complex set of procedures. It is necessary to detect, track, classify, and identify targets. It is necessary to make a decision on whether to intercept or not and if so to execute the interception. It is necessary to assess the results and make a subsequent determination on interception. It is necessary to confine damage from debris in case of a successful intercept and for m issile impact in the case of an interce pt f ailure. These ac tivities collectively require that all branches of the JSDF work in concert.

To facilitate the des ired synergy, at the same time Japan add ed Article 82 - 2 to the Self-Defense Forces law, a revision was also m ade to the Defense Agency Establishment Law. This revision allowed for the establishment of the Joint Staff Office

⁶⁴ Ministry of Defense, Japan. *Defense of Japan 2007.* http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_policy/pdf/english.pdf>. Accessed 12 August 2008.

⁶⁵ Christopher W. Hughes and Ellis S. Krauss. "Japan's New Security Agenda." *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy* 49, no. 2 (Summer 2007):161-162.

to facilitate the unified, joint operational structure necessary for missile defense. Further joint task units consisting of elements of each branch of service are form ed as required under the command of the ASDF.⁶⁶ New guidelines were established in 2007 authorizing the Defense Minister to give commanders in the field the discretion to fire interceptors at incoming missiles in situations where there has been a clear sign of a missile attack.⁶⁷

Japan's de cision to delegate th is autho rity ref lects b oth pragm atism and resignation. It is p ragmatic in the s ense that a missile defense initiative that is wholly reliant on a single decision -maker is alm ost invariably doom ed t o failure. The resignation is found in the accep tance that high ideals of fer little defense again st an incoming missile. Considered against the no rmalization trend lin e, this is f ar f rom "loosing the dogs of war," but does represent a loosening of the reins that was not present a decade ago.

Given that the author ity granted to the De fense Minister is restricted to m issile defense, we can reasonably infer that missile defense necessitated a shift in policy. Given that this reflects a relaxation of security policy it can further be inferred that the trend line has advanced as a result of missile defense.

3. Partial Repeal of Weapons Export Ban

As a testim ony to the degree to which m issile defense has challenged the status quo in Japanese defense policy, one need only consider its im pact on long-standing principles regarding weapons export. The issue of arms sales has long been controversial in Japanese politics. In 1967 the Sato Ca binet adopted a broad policy banning weapons exports to comm unist nations, nations subject to various U N resolutions, and nations involved in international conflict. This was reinforced in 1976 when the Miki Cabinet called for restraint in weapons exports to those nations not covered under the 1967 policy. This position was softened som ewhat in 1983 when the Nakasone Cabinet

⁶⁶ Hideaki Kaneda, Kazumasa Kobayashi, Hiroshi Tajima, Hirofumi Tosaki. *Japan's Missile Defense* – *Diplomatic and Security Policies in a Changing Strategic Environment*. Tokyo: The Japan Institute of International Affairs, 2007.

⁶⁷ "Japan amends Emergency Missile Defence guidelines." *BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific*, 24 December 2007, 2007, sec. Political. http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?doc. Accessed 11 August 2008.

permitted the export of weapons technology to U.S., but reaffir med a long-standing ban on the export and joint production of weapons.⁶⁸

These policies remained unchanged for the next 20 years. Ho wever, in 2004 the Koizumi Ca binet m ade substantial changes to these long-standing policies. The most notable exception is that the joint developm ent and production of missile defense system between Japan and the U.S. was deem ed permissible. The change als o allowed for the consideration of defense projects in support of counterterrori sm and anti-piracy operations. The repeal of the ban on weapons exports subsequently m ade it possible to proceed with the developm ent of a missile defense initia tive. Expressed differently, Japan's commit ment to missile defense was sufficient enough to revisit nearly four decades of standing policy on weapons export and development.⁶⁹

In this instance, the relationship between the policy change and missile defense is quite explicit, but what bears further extrapol ation is the degree to which this advances the security normalization trend. While the primary objective was to advance the missile defense initiative, there are two other facets that set conditions for the future expansion of the Japanese weapons industry. The first is that the decision allows the government to consider other defense projects, not necessarily associated with missile defense, with the U.S. Further, the Japanese government can also consider exports to other nations in support of counterterrorism and anti-piracy operations. In principle, the types of weapons and the nations to which they can be exported to is quite broad.⁷⁰

The nature of modern weapons development entails a great deal of technical risk, which can quite often be quantified as a dollar amount. Considered from this perspective, partnering with the U.S. reduces this risk and is quite pragmatic. Moreover, the dual us e nature of many techno logies a llows for increased competitive advantage in the p rivate sector. So while it could be argued that the decision to modify long-standing policy on

⁶⁸ "Good Ally of U.S.: 40-Year Arms Ban Eased for Missile Defense." *The Asahi Shimbun*, 11 December 2004, 2004, sec. Politics. http://www.asahi.com/english/politics/TKY200412110179.html. Accessed 12 August 2008.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

arms exports could be attri buted to financial motives, m issile defense served as the galvanizing impetus to make such changes a reality.

4. Use of Space for Military Purposes

In 1969, the Japanese Diet bann ed the use of space for m ilitary purposes. Considered in a lite ral and very strict sense, this ban conceptually p recluded the use of space based assets for such seemingly mundane functions as communications. However, as with m any facets of Japanes e s ecurity, a lternative interpretations h ave allowed for much wider spread use. In this instance, the Defense Agency has been authorized to employ space capabilities that are otherwise commercially available. This dual-use caveat has effectively allowed for the use of virtually any space based capability that is not uniquely military. Since the 1 980s, the Japanese Defense Agency has been able to make use of a wide varie ty of commercial satellite app lications, to include communications and imagery.⁷¹ This interpretation has also served to set conditions for more expansive use of space-based systems, which are inextricably related to Japanese missile defense.

To place this in a m ore specific c ontext, in August of 1998 Nor th Korea conducted a test launch of a Taepodong m issile over Japan. This event served as the impetus for Japan to begin the development of reconnaissance satellites and adopt a more expansive view of what constituted an acceptable use of space-based systems. By March of 2003, Japan had launched two reconnaissance satellites. W hile officially designated with the som ewhat vague title of Information Gathering S atellites (IG S), this pro gram effectively enabled Japan to watch for similar North Korean launches.⁷²

At the tim e of the 1998 North Korean test , Japan's sole indicator of the launch with advance notice provided by the U.S. Depa rtment of Defense. The depths of this dependency proved to be very unsettling to the Japanese Diet and the P rime Minister's office. W hile Japane se politic al en tities cla imed surprise a nd drew significant public criticism, the Japanese Defense Agency had been the beneficiary of the U.S. advance

⁷¹ Joan Johnson-Freese and Lance Gatling. "Security Implications of Japan's Information Gathering Satellite (IGS) System." *Intelligence and National Security* 19, no. 3 (Autumn 2004): 538-552.

⁷² Ibid.

notice. As evidence of this, a J apanese AEGIS destroyer was positioned near the flight path and collected substantial data on the launch. The combined i mpacts of political embarrassment, a credible missile threat, public support, and an obvious schism between agencies provided the immediate impetus for the IGS system.

By November of 1998, just three months after North Korea's m issile test, Japan had committed to the development of a national capability to provide advance warning of launch indications. W ithin the year, funds were appropriat ed for a system designed to "collect im agery information neces sary to ensu re the nation al security of Japan." The IGS system would significan tly reduce Japan's dependency on the U.S. to provide for advance warning and allow Japan to indigenously monitor for such threats. The collective system would consist of two optical sensor satellites, two synt hetic aperture radar satellites, and the necessary ground stations for satellite control, data collection, analysis, and dissemination.⁷³ For the system to work as conceived, the Japanese government also established the Cabinet Satellite Intellig ence Center (CSIC), an organiza tion manned by 320 person of which nearly one third are im agery analysts. By th e end of 2003, all four satellites were in orbit.⁷⁴

While the previous paragraphs illustrate a shift in Japan's views on the use of space, recent legislation is even m ore explicit. In July of 2 008, Japan passed th e Basic Space Bill, which provides the J SDF direct control of the J apan's reconnais sance satellites and increase the level state of technology employed by the satellite programs.⁷⁵ Notably, Article 14 of the bill requires the government to take "necessary measures to promote space development and use that would promote both national and international security," marking a clear depart ure from previous legislation. ⁷⁶ More specifically, the JSDF can now "manufacture, possess and operate its own satelline to support its

⁷³ Joan Johnson-Freese and Lance Gatling. "Security Implications of Japan's Information Gathering Satellite (IGS) System." *Intelligence and National Security* 19, no. 3 (Autumn 2004): 538-552.

⁷⁴ Choi, Sung-jae. "The North Korean Factor in the Improvement of Japanese Intelligence Capability." *The Pacific Review* 17, no. 3 (2004): 369-397.

⁷⁵ Manuel Manriquez. "Japan's Space Law Revision: The Next Step Toward Re-Militarization?" *NTI Issue Brief* (January 2008). http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_japan_remilitarization0108.html. Accessed 12 August 2008.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

terrestrial m ilitary op erations, in cluding ba llistic m issile def ense (BMD). Imm ediate candidates for SDF procurem ent would be sa tellites for reconnaissa nce, early warning and tracking and communications - all to enhance BMD capabilities."⁷⁷

One of the first steps for a success ful missile defense initiative is the ability to effectively forecas t or d etect a laun ch even t. In the case of Japan, the IGS program provides the m eans to observe for threats wh ile associated m issile defense capabilities would provide a means to effectively respond. Although Japan has always benefited by a fairly liberal interpretation of security legislation, there are two elements of this program that warrant distinction. The first is that the system was conceived and employed with the specific purpose of national security. This is a significant step beyond the long accepted practice of dual-use sp ace applications, and can readily be construed as an advancement of the normalization trend. The second is that IGS was developed in direct response to a perceived missile threat and in the context of a broader m issile defense initiative. Detection of a launch event m ay facilitate some protective m easures, but is insufficient to eliminate the threat. Used in concert with a missile defense capability, IGS becomes an integral component a much more comprehensive system.

5. Pursuit of Offensive Capability

The debate over whether a weapons system is of offensive or defensive is clouded between intent, perception, and cap ability. As a result, a conclusive an swer is not easily reached. However, when planned Japanese procurements are placed in the context of the role they would play in a missile-defense scenario a clearer pictur e can be derived. In this instance, the platform in question is the planned Japanese acquisition of the F-22 raptor from the U.S.

The F-22 is arguably the world's m ost advanced com bat aircraft. It was developed primarily to defeat the Soviet advers ary in air to air com bat. This is ach ieved through the utilization of st ealth technology, increased mane uverability, and avionics integrated with sensors into a sin gle display. Because of the advanced nature of the

⁷⁷ Setsuko Aoki. "Japan Enters a New Space Age." *Asia Times Online*, 3 July 2008. http://www.atimes.com>. Acessed 12 August 2008.

technology, the U.S. was som ewhat noncommittal in regards to whether or not it sho uld be exported. W ithin Japan one of the unresolve d issues is whether or not the F -22 is in fact an offensive weapon. In the U.S. it's a far clearer issue, as the Departm ent of Defense justified the F- 22 on the b asis of its o ffensive capabilities.⁷⁸ W hile this issue remains open to discussion, it is not unreasonable to characterize the F-22 as an offensive platform as that served as the basis for its original funding.

The counter to this offensive characteri zation would be found in Japan's planned use of the aircr aft. The intuitive ra tionale for purchasing a fighter aircraft with these capabilities is to fill a critical gap in missile defense, specifically the ability to "penetrate enemy air defenses and strike m issiles before they can be launched." ⁷⁹ Expressed differently, Japan has recently pursued the acquisition of an airc raft defined by the state which designed it as offensive with the pr esumed purpose of striking m issiles prior to launch.

The broad justification of missile defense makes it possible for Japan to justify the purchase of offensive aircraft. It m akes it possible to conceive a preventive attack of an adversaries launch capability. While these are eminently practical measures for a missile defense program, they are also another advance on the security norm alization trend line. When placed in the context of a constitution that eschews war as a right of the state, these features of missile defense stand on the edge of aggressive posturing.

6. Collective Security

One aspect of m issile defense that offers a direct challenge to the Japanese interpretation of their Constitution is the degree to which it almost inextricably links the defense of Japan and the defense of the U. S. This stem s from Ja pan's long-held interpretation of Article 9 which asser ts that Japan is not allowed to participa te in

⁷⁸ Christopher Bolkcom and Emma Chanlett-Avery. *Potential F-22 Raptor Export to Japan*. Federation of American Scientists, 2007. <<hr/>http://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/ RS22684.pdf>. Accessed 14 August 2008.

⁷⁹ David Fulghum and Bradley Perrett. "Offense for Japan: Japan Chooses an Offense : A deeper game emerges that links an F-22 sale to missile defense." *Aviation Week & Space Technology* 6 August. 2007: 24-25. http://www.proquest.com>. Accessed 12 August 2008.

collective defense as such an initiative would go beyond the m inimal force necessary to defend the country. T he following is an excerpt from the Japa nese Diet's 1981 interpretation of the right of collective self-defense.

It is self-evident that Japan has the right of collective self-defense under international law since it is a sove reign state, but that the exercise of the right of collective self-defense is not permissible under the Constitution, since the exercise of the right of self-defense is authorized under Article 9 of the Constitution is confined to the minimum necessary level for the defense of the country and the exercise of the right of collective self defense exceeds the limit.⁸⁰

This interpretation presents itself as a significant challenge to the missile defense initiative. Japan is currently not bound to support the U.S. in the event of conflict, although the opposite does not hold true. The issue that presents itself is that in the event of a missile attack flying toward U.S. troops operating outside of Japan or towards U.S. positions in the Pacific, Japan cannot legally use its intercept capabilities to shoot down said missile. Further, there is some question as to whether or not Japan would provide the U.S. with any tactic al information on such a missile attack. W hile this cour se of action m ay exist within the legal constraints Japan is imposed upon itself, such a sequence of events would certainly do irrepa rable dam age to the security relation ship with the U.S.⁸¹

This interpretation goes a bit beyond the hypothetical. During Abe's tenure as Prime Minister he established a review panel to consider the collective defense is sue. One of the scenarios reviewed involved a North Korean missile attack which was predicted to pass over Japan and strike Guam or Honolulu. The review panel determined that the existing government interpretation would not legally allow the shoot down of the

⁸⁰ Ministry of Defense, Japan. *Defense of Japan 2007*. http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2007/44Reference_1_63.pdf>. Accessed 12 August 2008.

⁸¹ Umemoto Tetsuya. *Japan-U.S. Cooperation in Ballistic Missile Defense*. Washington D.C.: U.S.-Japan Track II Meeting on Arms Control, Disarmament, Nonproliferation and Verification, 2002. http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/dc/track2/2nd/tet.pdf>. Accessed 12 August 2008.

missile. One of the m ore ironic aspects of this scenario is that Guam and Honolulu both have U.S. bases that contribute to the defense of Japan.⁸²

This has proven to be a highly controve rsial issue in Japa n, where much of the population is concerned that if the country becom es fully e ngaged in collective defense the JSDF would become f ar more actively engaged in U.S. m ilitary operations. W hile previous Prim e Ministers Koizum i and Abe we re staunch supporters of revisiting the constitutional interpretation, current Prim e Minister Fukuda has adopted a m uch more conservative stance. Further, recent polls have indicated that a m ajority of the Japanese population support the current constitutional interpretation thereby adding a degree of political liability to any opposing actions.⁸³

While the current Prime Minister has adopted a more centrist view on the issue it is worth noting that Defense Minister Shiger u Ishiba has openly encouraged and open debate on collective defense.⁸⁴ This is relevant in that reflects a new element in Japanese security dynam ics. The Prim e Minister can adopt a very centrist view and thereby mitigate so me political risk, whereas the Defense M inister can adopt a selightly more hawkish dem eanor and thereby advance secure ity concerns. This reflects one of the second order effects of the elevation of the Defense Agency to a Defense Ministry. By virtue of being imbued with m ore power, the Defense Ministry is be tter positioned to advance security concerns a bit more autonomously.

Whether or not Japan will a lter its in terpretation in the near term rem ains uncertain. Although the curren t adm inistration does not seem inclined to press for constitutional change, it is faced with new challenges in the for m of U.S. pressure on the domestic defense industry. The U.S. very clearly has a vested interest in Japan coming to its assistance in the case of missile attack and Japanese weapons manufacturers have a

⁸² Hisahiko Okazaki. "Fukuda must Take Firm Stance on Defense." *The Yomiuri Shimbun*, 17 February 2008. http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true &risb=21_T4370163754&format=GNBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T437 0163757&cisb=22_T4370163756&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=145202&docNo=4>. Accessed 11 August 2008.

⁸³ "62% OK with Japan's Ban on Collective Defense." *The Japan Times Online*, 14 May 2007, sec. National News. http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20070514a2.html. Accessed 12 August 2008.

⁸⁴ "Japan's New Defence Minister Wants to Debate 'Collective Defence'." *Agence France Presse*, 26 Sept 2007. http://www.lexisnexis.com>. Accessed 14 August 2008.

very clear interest in ensuring that defense funds continue to flow. What can be said with some certainty though is that the issue of missile defense has prompted serious constitutional debate and while it has not y et yielded a constitutional reinterpretation it remains at the center of the issue.

7. Preemptive Self-Defense

There is another aspect of missil e defense has been alluded to in several of the preceding sections, specifically developing the capacity to prevent a missile attack by destroying it prior to launch. Not surprisingly, a new legal p recedent has emerged that would allow Japan to conduct such an attack should t here be an "i mminent and illegal invasion of Japanese territory." In 2003, Japan passed the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure National Independence and Security in the Situation of Ar med Attack. This law addresses various situations under which an attack might occur and defines one su ch situation as one wh ere "an armed attack against Japan from the outside (including a case where an armed attack is imminent) has occurred or one where an armed attack is anti cipated a s te nsions rise." This law e ffectively encom passes both actual military attacks and the expectation of attacks.⁸⁵

From a tactical perspective, this is perfectly logical. However, placed in the context of the peace constitution it appears to be far more aggressive. Public comments made by then chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe offered at lease one interpretation of how a pree mption scenario may unfold:

If we accept that there is no other option to prevent a m issile at tack," he told reporters, "there is an argument that attacking the m issile bases would be within the legal right of self-defense.

Mr. Abe 's comments came a day after the hea d of the De fense Agency, Fukushiro Nukaga, said Japan should consider pre-emptive strikes "if an enemy country definitely has a way of att acking Japan and has its finger on the trigger.⁸⁶

⁸⁵ Michael Reisman and Andrea Armstrong. "The Past and Future of the Claim of Preemptive Self-Defense." *The American Journal of International Law* 100, no. 3 (Jul. 2006): 525-550.

⁸⁶ Martin Fackler. "Japan Finds Still Sterner Words for North Korea's Missile Tests." *The New York Times*, 11 July 2006, sec. World. http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B02E5DB1130F932A25754C0A9609C8B63. Accessed 14 August 2008.

To be certain, the scenario was exam ined in a purely hypothetical light and the statements were quite probably intended to offer a deterrent in their own right. The more relevant feature though, is the degree to which certain segments of elite political tho ught within Japan have m igrated away from the presumed intent of the still popular peace constitution. Viewed through this lens, P earl Harbor could be construed as existing within the bounds of contemporary Japanese law.

Specific to this the sis, the two m ost rele vant features are the role of m issile defense and advancem ent of the norm alization trend line. Regarding the form er, the discussion of preem ption is fram ed around potential missile attacks and as such resides under the overarching umbrella of missile defense. This argument gains additional merit when considered in the context of Japan's keen interest in, and presumed plans for, the F-22. Regar ding the latter, this clearly c onstitutes another step towards security normalization. W hen high-rank ing Japanes e p ublic figu res accep t wh at can only be construed as preem ption than the threshold of first s trike has been b reached. Th is is clearly not a position that would have been palpable when the Japanese Constitution was adopted.

8. From Agency to Ministry

One recent action that dem onstrates a reci procal benefit in Japanese security advancements is the elevation of the Japane se Defense Agency (JDA) to the Japanese Ministry of Defense (MOD). This advancem ent came about due in part to a perceived need for a more effective defense apparatu s fueled by fears of North Korean m issiles. Considered as such, the need for a more effective defense against missiles set conditions for elevating the agency. Once elevated, the MOD became better positioned to advocate security concerns.

Executed in 2007, this elevation in status marked a considerable increase in the role of Japan's defense organization. During the Cold War, Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) played a leading role in matters of security policy. In contrast, the JDA was relegated primarily to the management of the JSDF and coordinating basing issues. The nature of their r espective duties illustrates the gap in r elative power. W hereas the

MOFA served as a policy agency, the JDA was largely a management agency. The post-Cold War era introduced new challenges that could not readily be accommodated by this system.⁸⁷ One of Japan's adaptations to contem porary security considerations has been the elevation of the JDA.

In 2006, then Prim e Minister Koizu mi introduced a bill to expand the prim ary duties of the JSDF and elevate the JDA to a ministry. Later that y ear, Koizu mi's successor, Shinzo Abe, m ade the def ense bill one of his top prioritie s and pushed the legislation through. Prominent features of the revised laws are that they allow the MOD to convene cabinet m eetings and s ubmit bills to the Japanese Diet. ⁸⁸ W hile there is certainly a symbolic undertone to the increase in status, more practically it cedes a great deal m ore power to the long suborned JDAA. Further, while the bill calls for an "expansion of the primary duties" of the JSDF, it is far less explicit in fully characterizing said duties thus setting conditions for a fairly broad loophole should the need arise.

While the e levation of the JDA is cons istent with the observed trend towards normalization, its relation to missile defense warrants further explanation. There are two notable aspects that illustrate the degree to which m issile defense has impacted and benefited from the recent legislation. Fore most is the "Jap anese public's growing desire for a sturdier national-defense system, especially amid North Korea's nuclear and missile activities."⁸⁹ The like lihood of a defense reform bill such as this passing absent som e type of compelling threat is substantially reduced. The public's desire for security, borne of fears of North Korean missile attacks, reduced the political liability of what at one time would have appeared to be overly hawkish behavior.

The second, less direct correlation is found in the impacts on the budgeting process. By allowing the Defense Ministry to submit its own budget to the Diet rather

⁸⁷ Hisane Masaki. "Japan Inches Toward a Full-Fledged Military." *Asia Times Online*, 1 December 2006, 2006, sec. Japan. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/HL01Dh01.html. Accessed 12 August 2008.

⁸⁸ Anthony Faiola. "Japan Upgrades its Defense Agency." *Washington Post*, 16 December 2006, sec. World. http://www.washingtonpost.com. Accessed 12 August 2008.

⁸⁹ Hisane Masaki. "Japan Inches Toward a Full-Fledged Military." *Asia Times Online*, 1 December 2006, sec. Japan. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/HL01Dh01.html. Accessed 12 August 2008.

than submit via the Prim e Minister, the defense budget is delinked from the political mainstream. Condition s are set to advocate for defense spending with f ar less political liability. D espite recent declines in defense spending, the cumulative costs of missile defense, standard procurement of weapons systems, Japan's increased role in UN missions, and the long-suffering Japanese economy, it can be expected that ministry endorsed budget increases will be forthcoming.

9. Permanence

Several actions had to take place to m ake m issile defense a viable Japanese security option. However, ac tions that are taken can of ten be readily undone. What confers a degree of perm anence on the actions taken to facilitate missile defense is the degree to w hich they are now entrenched in J apanese law. Precedin g sections have referenced changes to various Japanese po licies and laws precip itated by a desir e for missile defense capability. Considered indivi dually, these appear to be a sim ple le gal necessity required to support a given initiative. However, when the changes to law and policy are considered collectively the depth of the structural chang e associated with missile defense becom es far m ore apparent. The following is a syno psis of laws and policy changes enacted under the broader rubric of missile defense.

(2003) Measures to Ensure Na tional Independence and Security : In 2003, the Japanese parliament the Japanese parliam ent passed a law concerning measures to ensure national independence and security in a situation of armed attack. The following is an excerpt from Article 76 of the law:

When there is an armed attack to our nation from the outside our windows considered that there is an infinite and clear danger of an armed attack the prime minister, and he or she considers it necessary from the standpoint of defending the nation, he or she m ay order the whole or part of the self-defense forces in operation.⁹⁰

⁹⁰ Ministry of Defense, Japan. *Defense of Japan 2007*. http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2007/45Reference_64_76.pdf>. Accessed 12 August 2008.

What prompts concern about this law is the ill-defined n ature of "imminent." While this is generally construed as meaning some type of preventive action in the event of detected missile launch activity, it is not restrict ed to this interpretation. The tren d in the growth of the JSDF has been one of liberal interpretation when convenient, and restrictive when not. Considere d in this context, it is not unreasonable that this stipulation may prompt regional concern.

(2004) Repeal of W eapons Export Ban : On Decem ber 10, 2004 the Japanese Cabinet approved revisions to the National Defense Program outline loos ening arm s export restrictions. This change has generated a wide variety of options in terms of international weapons developm ent, production, and exportation. W hile it is focused on m issile defense, this is not a s trict limitation. This represents the most significant policy shift regarding Japanese arms exports since 1983.⁹¹

Beyond missile defense, the m odification has also m ade it possible to consider a litany of products desig ned for use against te rrorist attacks. Hel mets, body arm or, and other forms of personal protective equipment are all viable candi dates for government approval. While a case-by-case ex amination will take place for any proposed export the overall criterion remains vague. In addition to missile defense, Japan is also engaged in joint development with U.S. electronic equipment for patrol aircraft.⁹²

The aforementioned rep resent the o verall in tent of the m odification. However, the degree of a mbiguity in term s of what c onstitutes an acceptable item sets conditions for considerable controversy. To that end, seve ral countries in the region have expressed interest in buying used naval assets from the Maritim e Self-Defense Force or the Japanese Coast Guard. The intended use of the ese assets would be to prevent terrorist action and piracy in the Straits of Malacca. The challenge of exports such as these is that from the mom ent the weapon is sold, Japa n loses positive control and has relatively

⁹¹ "Arms Exports Need New Rules." *The Nikkei Weekly*, 20 December 2004. http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/search/homesubmitForm.do. Accessed 14 August 2008.

⁹² Ibid.

limited means to ensure that the exported arms do not fall into the hands of less than reputable states. While some legal assurances can be provided, this is a perpetual risk in entering the arms market.⁹³

(2006) Self Defense Law 82-2 : In 2006, a significant m ilestone was made in regards to the delegation of authority to military commanders. Notably, the air defense command or would be granted the authority to order the laun ch of interceptors in the event of missile attack. This m easure was undertaken to finalize an effective comm and structure to support the missile defense system. The Air Defense Commander will also be appointed to the commander of missile defense task forces. In this capacity, he will receive direct support from Japanese naval assets. In the event that the commander is not available, launch authority is def erred to the commanders of Japan's Ae gis destroyers. This is notable in that reflects a significant degree of delegation pr eviously unseen in Japanese forces.⁹⁴

(2007) Defense Agency Establishment Law: In December 2007, Japan's Defense Agency was formerly re-designated as a Def ense Ministry. As a result, m ilitary officials put a much m ore significant role in Jap anese stra tegic planning. Prior to this chang e, the Defense Agency was subordinated under the Cabinet office. The security threat presented by North Korea over the past decade has steadily g iven rise to increased Japanese concerns about defense. Concer ns about security st eadily elevated the prominence of Japanese defense officials in terms of engaging with the U.S. Department of Defense and negotiating viab le security a rrangements. As an outcome of its newly elevated position, Japan's Defense Ministry will be m uch m ore heavily involved in policy planning and defense budgeting than pr evious eras. The failure of previous attempts to upgrade the Defense Agency has been attributed to resid ual anti-m ilitary

^{93 &}quot;Arms Exports Need New Rules." The Nikkei Weekly, 20 December 2004.

⁹⁴"ASDF General to have Keys to Interceptors." *The Yomiuri Shimbun*, 8 May 2005. <http://www.lexisnexis.com.libproxy.nps.edu/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true &risb=21_T4374093269&format=GNBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T437 4093274&cisb=22_T4374093273&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=145202&docNo=1>. Accessed 14 August 2008.

sentiment among the Japanese public. This sentiment shifted with North Korea's 2006 test launches. As a result over 90% of the lawmakers in the Diet backed the promotion of the former Defense Agency.⁹⁵

(2008) Basic Space Bill : In 2008 Japanese parliam ent m ade substantial changes to acceptable uses of space established in 1969. The Basic Space Bill elim inated the long-standing principle of the nonmilitary uses of space and set conditions for the further us e of space-based defensive systems, to include s py satellites. The most notable shift is the change from nonm ilitary to nonaggression wh ich gives th e government m uch broader leeway in the employment of space-based systems.⁹⁶

To be sure, with effort and tim e laws can be changed. However, in the case of Japanese security change has consistently manifested itself as an inc rease in the relative prominence, capabilities, and latitude of the JSDF. Expressed differently, the direction of security legislation has clearly tren ded towards a higher degree of freedom in Japanese security actions. Even prior to the advent of missile defense Japa n's security app aratus experience substantial growth. With a missile defense there has been an added i mpetus to overcome a multitude of restrictive laws and policy. Given that the post-World War II trend has c onsistently moved towards a nor malized Japanese m ilitary and tha t Japan invested a legislative tim e and effort to enact sweeping changes and defense policy and law is reasonable to conclude that these changes will remain in effect.

⁹⁵ "Defense Ministry Launched, Upgraded from Agency After Half Century." *Japan Economic Newswire*, 9 January 2007, sec. International News. . Accessed 14 August 2008.

⁹⁶ "Japan Enacts 1st Law Allowing Space use for Defense Purposes." *Japan Economic Newswire*, 21 May 2008, sec. International News. . Accessed 14 August 2008.

C. CONCLUSIONS

Missile defense is far m ore than "point and shoot." To m ake it work, Japan has had to undertake several signif icant changes to its defense establishment. Collectively, these chang es have len t them selves to a burgeoning m issile defense capability, but perhaps m ore im portantly th ey ha ve signif icantly advan ced Japan' s position on the security normalization trend line. These ch anges have encompassed the elevation of the Japanese Defense Agency to a full m inistry, a technical orientation intended to heighten the degree of coordination betw een the respective services, the repeal of weapons export bans, the launching of satellites, the acquisition of less ambiguous offensive hardware, the delegation of comm and authority, and a re-v isitation of m ultilateral se curity cooperation.

Perhaps m ost signif icantly, the majority of the changes to Japanese defense posture have been accompanied by law. While it is possible that so me or all of these laws can be changed, this is a time intens ive, laborious, and uncertain process. This would imply that these changes are of an enduring nature. Based on the observations in the preceding chapter, the Japanese governm ent has become quite adept at making defense modifications strictly through reinterpretation. Given that the effort was made to capture this latest round of changes in law it can be inferred that they were intended to be permanent. Further, each of these changes ei ther resides under the missile defense rubric or is directly related to it.

The Japanes e peace constitution aspires to the highest idea ls and still reta ins a high degree of public support. Further, the residual anim osity in the region stem ming from Japan's wartime atrocities still lingers. As a result, Japanese security issues foment a high degree of domestic debate and regional concern. This chapter has illustrated that the pursuit of m issile defense has significantly advanced Japan's security norm alization posture. This observation and these conclusions are also easily reached by Japan's neighbors. As a state, Japan has every right to arm itself, but to maintain such a capable force and not acknowledge why it means a be perceived as threatening do es little to invite cordial relations.

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IV. PERCEPTIONS AND OBSTACLES

A. IMPEDIMENTS TO THE TREND

The preceding chapters have identified what would seemingly appear to be unstoppable trend towards norm alization. This is by no m eans a certainty. Any a ction taken to improve Japan's security posture i nvariably car ries with it bo th internal and external criticism. Internally, resou rces committed to defense com e at the expense of other prog rams. Exter nally, any s hift in def ense postur e alters the m ilitary options available to other states. Resistance to change of this type may eventually manifest itself as political action tak en either in support of or in opposition to a planned action. As the outcomes of these political actions speak di rectly to the success of a given se curity measure, any political action thu s warrant s careful con sideration. Adding to the complexity is that t is sues are nev er truly reso lved. In th is sense, any g iven military or political action sets conditions for the nex t round of m ilitary and political m oves. Moreover, actions taken on one front have the potential to impact on another.

As a case in point, Chinese opposition to Japanese m issile defense may manifest itself in various types of econom ic sanctions and thereby reduce the degree of econom ic interdependence. Reduction of missile defense may tend to limit the degree of Japanese-U.S. military interaction and weaken the security alliance. A weakened security alliance and a lack of missile defense may serve to embolden North Korea. Succinctly, no action can be taken in isolation. While this hypothetical exam ple has focused on external concerns, the sam e set of cons iderations is pre sent when ex amining internal p ressures. This chapter will exam ine sever al of the f actors that m ay serve to impede continued progress toward full security normalization.

1. The Regional Repercussions of U.S. Entanglement

In examining any Japanese alliance with the U.S., the issues surrounding China and Taiwan must also be considered. As a key component of U.S. and Japanese security cooperation is missile defense, another exacerb ating factor is put into play. Although it would seem that Japanese missile defense would be viewed as benign in that it does not present an offensive threat, it is not the case in the view of other regional actors. So, while Japan's alliance with the U.S. offers some reassurance from attack, it also entwines Japan in a set of broader regional concerns.⁹⁷

Two of the factors that shape China's vi ew of security are aggress ive Japanese actions prior to and during W orld War II and the "Taiwan issue." Regarding the for mer, there rem ains an enduring concern about how a re-m ilitarized Japan m ay behave. Regarding the latter, C hina views Taiwan as its sovereign territory and takes strong objection to any overtures towards independenc e and any parties that otherwise support it.⁹⁸ The nature of these issues shapes a set of Chinese views that, not surprisingly, are concerned with Japan's security apparatus and alliances.

Expressed differently, U.S. relations with Taiwan limit China's freedom of action regarding how it behaves towards Taiwan. U.S. relations with Japan have a similar effect which is further exacerbated in the event that Japan is able to maintain an active missile defense. This would serve as a significant counter to one of Chin a's primary deterrent measures, specifically missile forces. The nature of a security alliance of this type brings to the forefront China's concerns rega rding potential for support for Taiwan's independence and Japan's autonomy within the region.⁹⁹

Accepting China's con cerns over Taiwan and Japan's history of aggression, a framework has been established to more broa dly consider the political consequence of Japan's sec urity alliance with the U.S. In the event of significant cross strait te nsion between China and Taiwan the U.S. would almo st certainly request Jap anese assistance in establishing missile defense. W ere Japan to decline this request, it would invar iably have a negative im pact on the existing security alliance. In contrast however, if Japan were to support the U.S. request and position its forces to actively defend Taiwa n it would be construed by China as a Japanese ac t of aggression in regards to a sovereign territorial matter and risk escalation.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁷ Thomas J. Christensen. "China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia." *International Security* 23.4 (1999): 51-52.

⁹⁸ Ibid., 52-53.

⁹⁹ Ibid., 64-69.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 67-69.

Viewed through this lens, while there are undoubtedly benefits to m aintaining a security alliance with the U.S., there are also significan t risk s. One of the mos t contentious friction points in the region, Taiwan, has the potential to draw in Japan given that m issile defense constitutes a key component of security cooperation between the U.S. and Japan. Any Japanese action taken in support of Taiwan, defensive or otherwise, taps a degree of historical animosity that has never truly subsided. While it is reasonable to assert that access to U.S. m ilitary capabilities is to J apan's benefit, it is a lso worth noting that an alliance with the U.S. has the potential to height en the likelihood of conflict.

The high priority Japan places on m issile defense is pred icated on the potential missile threat present in North Kore a and Chin a. Initiatives of this type have produced strong responses from other regional actors. N otwithstanding lingering anim osity over past Japanese aggression, other reasons have em erged for actively opposing Japanese missile defense. Notably, China has voiced strong opposition based on the possibility that the m issile defense initiative would extend to encom pass Taiwan and that it w ould serve to undermine China's deterrence capability.¹⁰¹

China's concerns carry with them a basi s of validity. Man y Chinese o fficials reject the Japanese position that its m issile defense is focused towards North Korea, as they view the North Korean threat as being highly exaggerated. In contrast, China tends to view Japanese missile defense as having the potential to protect Taiwan in the event of a direct military confrontation. If missile defense were to be extended to Taiwan, Japan would effectively nullify one of the prim ary deterrence measures available to China to preclude Taiwanese declarations of independence. China also has a s et of secon dary concerns in that the transf er of theater m issile defense technology to Taiwan m ay set conditions to integra te it into U.S. led command and control sys tems. This would constitute an independent and de f acto military alliance of sorts, which is prec isely the kind of behavior China seeks to preclude from Taiwan.¹⁰²

¹⁰¹ Kori J. Urayama. "Chinese Perspectives on Theater Missile Defense: Policy Implications for Japan." *Asian Survey* 40, no. 4 (Jul. - Aug. 2000): 600-602.

¹⁰² Ibid., 601-605.

The extension of m issile defense to include Taiwan is not China's only concern. China also worries that the m odernization of its m issile forces would be rendered obsolete in the face of an effective Japanese missile defense. While this may imply that Japan is being targeted by China, this is a highly plau sible scenario. In the event of Chinese-American conflict, Japan would alm ost certainly com e under attack. As the Taiwan Relations Act implies U.S. support to Taiwan in the face of Chi nese aggression, and as Japan hosts significant numbers of U.S. forces on its territory, it is not im probable to consider a scenario in which Japan would face a m issile attack from China due to its military ties with the U.S., regardless of any offensive actions.¹⁰³

Missile defense for Japan does not necessarily equate to strictly Japanese security. If extended to cover Taiwan, it serves to strengthen Japan's position as a regional military actor while also undermining wh at China views to be its s overeign territory. Further, while it is in part the U.S. security alliance that enables a missile defense, it is the U.S. presence in Japan that increases its target potential in the ev ent of Sino-Am erican conflict. Collectively, Japane se missile defense touches u pon domestic political issues within China, domestic political issues within Taiwan, reg ional security issues between Japan and China, the security alliance be tween the U.S. and Japan, and Japanese domestic politics regarding the presence of U.S. forces.

One of the more vehem ent detractors of Japan's m issile defense initiatives is China. The essence of their concern stem s from the possibility that, if successful, the defensive shield could be extended to cover Taiwan. As China's missile forces constitute a critical component of their military and could conceivably play a significant role in a forcible s eizure of Taiwan, a capa bility of this type has the potential to lim it policy options.¹⁰⁴ This position is, of course, predic ated on a suc cessful m issile defense capability, and given the sheer num bers of Chinese missiles, some doubt its efficacy and thus refute China on this point. As m ight be expected then, this is n ot China's sole objection.

¹⁰³ Kori J. Urayama. "Chinese Perspectives on Theater Missile Defense: Policy Implications for Japan." *Asian Survey* 40, no. 4 (Jul. - Aug. 2000): 608.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 600-602.

In a similar vein, China has estab lished its objections on the further basis that its own deterrence capability m ight be underm ined, concerns over the threat of Japanese remilitarization, further streng thening of the U.S. - Japan alliance, and the poten tially negative impact it would have on the global arm s control process. ¹⁰⁵ Underm ining deterrence is not dissimilar from the objections surrounding Taiwan, except with a broader, regional consideration. The other three, however, carry with them some degree of further validity.

In order to achieve the desired missile defense capabilities, Japan has had to reorganize k ey aspects of its m ilitary to res pond m ore quickly and in tegrate with U.S. command and control system s. Further, Japan has had to acquire a ssets that, despite a purported defensive role, also carry with them an offensive potential. ¹⁰⁶ Collectiv ely, these actions suggest that Japan is taking a step towards re-militarization and is becoming more aligned with the U.S. in the military domain. While not speak ing to intent, on the surface this would seem to support China's interpretation of events.

As to China's final objection, that m issile defense would have a negative im pact on the global arm s control process, som e exploration of the logi c is warranted. The potential le thality of a single warh ead is su ch that in ord er to be successful m issile defense has to have a consistently high s hoot-down rate. Absent this, even a sm all percentage of total m issiles launched can have disastrous consequences. Therefore, it becomes beneficial to create more missiles as a means to defeat a missile defense system. While certain logic is present in this argum ent, it seem s to speak m ore to China itself rather than global arms control.

Given the regional focus of Japan's effort, the o nly regional actor with sufficient resources to pursue this course of action is Ch ina. This has been consid ered external to China where it has been suggested that m issile defense will antagonize China, "whose relatively few nuclear m issiles would be rend ered impotent were an anti-m issile shield ever to work. The m ere threat of deploym ent would therefore encourage China to build

¹⁰⁵ Kori J. Urayama. "Chinese Perspectives on Theater Missile Defense: Policy Implications for Japan." *Asian Survey* 40, no. 4 (Jul. - Aug. 2000): 600-602.

¹⁰⁶ David Fulghum and Bradley Perrett. "Japan Chooses an Offense." *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, 5 August 2007. http://www.awgnews.com. Accessed 16 May 2008.

more missiles, setting off an arms race in Asia, and this will play into the hands of those within Beijing's leadership that are looking for 'an American enemy' to solidify their own domestic political positions on the basis of uncompromising nationalism."¹⁰⁷

This ultimately leads to a single point: China does not approve of Japan's missile defense efforts. This invites the question of what actions, if any, will China take to impede Japans efforts. At this point, the answer seems to be very little. Other than expressing their concerns, China and Japan continue their economic engagement and while China's military modernization efforts remain underway, they have been underway for quite so me time. Over the longer term, as missile defense capabilities mature, this may become more of a concern. F or the interim, it seems to be a recurring catalyst for arms control debates and a reasonable Japa nese rationale for ta king a more cautious approach towards continued normalization activities.

These concerns may serve to slow the tr end, but certainly no m ore than Japanese domestic politics. W hile interna tional c oncerns m ay infor m the decision on security normalization, it is ultim ately grounded in what is politically viable to the Japanese polity. Fur ther, giv en the volum e of m issiles possessed by China and the aggre ssive tendencies of North Korea, Japan has adopt ed a very pragm atic approach tow ards defending itself should the need arise. Given the nature of this potential threat, m issile defense is the required counter. The only state with the technol ogy and resources to assist in this developm ent is the U.S. Alt hough there are som e associated risks in such alignment, these inv ariably have to be weighed against the aforem entioned regional factors. Expressed differently, the risks associated with two neighbors each possessing a credible missile forces have to be weighed against those of taking no defensive action and basing national security on the generosity of others. In this instance, missile defense was determined to be preferable and the security trend line was advanced.

¹⁰⁷ Sharif Shuja. "Japan's Changing Security Posture and its Implications." *Contemporary Review*. 1 Oct. 2004: 206-212. Research Library. ProQuest. Dudley Knox Library, Monterey, CA. Accessed 16 May 2008.

2. Internal Political Economy

Not all con siderations r egarding se curity a re external. In a post-W orld W ar II environment, the concept of militarization quickly evolved into a highly politicized issue within Japan. Following W orld War II, Ja pan adopted the Yoshida Doctrine which served as the basis for much of Japan's subs equent foreign-policy. This approach relies primarily on the U.S. for defense and focu sed on rapid econom ic growth in order to reintegrate Japan into the international community. Over the next five decades, J apan steadily became portrayed as a "free rider", as it bore little of its security costs. Du ring the first Gulf War this cam e to a head as Japan provided financial support rather than troops. This type of checkbook diplom acy drew significant criticism and prom pted a significant reevaluation of the Japanese approach toward security.

The first Gulf War had a signif icant impact on the politics of Japan. This event brought to light question s of constitutional interpretation, approaches to Japanese – U.S. relations, and the need to better define the position of the self-defense forces. The most significant, however, were the debilities at the constitution? Changes to the constitution invariably speak to the basic principles of political structure, which in turn has the potential to in troduce sweeping change into a state. While this issue was prominent during the 1950s, for the nexistical economic development and sustained economic growth tended to dominate the political agenda. ¹⁰⁸ Following the end of the Cold W ar and the emission of new conflict in the Mi ddle East questions were again asked.

For those opposing the fundamental principles of the existing system the basis for dissent stems from the means by which the Ja panese constitution was adopted. W hile it is comprised primarily of the standard feat ures of Western de mocracy, it contains two very unique provisions. The first is the sym bolic role of the emperor and the second is a renunciation of war. Al though this was notionally a revision of the Meiji Constitution

¹⁰⁸ Jiro Yamaguchi. "The Gulf War and the Transformation of Japanese Constitutional Politics." *Journal of Japanese Studies* 18, no. 1 (Winter 1992): 155-157.

and with the broad sup port of the Japanese p eople, oppo sition parties hold that the constitution was in f act forced upon Japan by the Allied p owers and thus question its legality.¹⁰⁹

The conservative pow ers that originally pursued this agenda did so without coming to term s with a consequenc e of prewar militarism. As they pur sued revision to Article 9, which renounces the use of force, they also sought to transform the emperor from a figurehead to a sovereign ruler. As Article 1 of the Constitution asserts that the position of the emperor is derived from the will of the people, this type of sweeping change ran directly counter to the basic principle of the system, specifically pop ular sovereignty. ¹¹⁰ In this regard the issue of Japanese rearmament became closely linked to the larger principles of the political system.

Throughout the 1950s, f ears of being em broiled in U.S. - S oviet armed conflict resulted in a strong peace m ovement which staunchly advocated ne utrality. Further, by the time of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1960, the Japanese peace m ovement had sufficiently broad appeal to force the wit hdrawal of the Kishi government. Kishi's successor, Ikeda Hayato, was a bit m ore attuned to the times. He tended to steer awa y from larger constitutional issues and focus on rapid economic growth. Ikeda lim ited the constitutional controversy by simply asserting that it was acceptable for Japan to possess a m inimal force neces sary for defense. Moreover, by allowing the U.S. to burden security costs, Japan was free to focus its national income on economic development.¹¹¹

As the Japanese economy grew, the U.S. began to m ore closely consider the expansion of Japan's organic defenses. To counter this, Japan would occasionally invoke Article 9 as a political to ol to minimize defense spending. This resulted in a m ainstream policy "of light arm aments plus rapid econom ic development." This continued until the oil crises of the 1970s prom pted the U.S. to consider its own securi ty strategy. T o this end, the U.S. effectively increased the pressu re on Japan to increase its share of the defense burden. Under the Nakasone governm ent in the 1980s, defense spending

¹⁰⁹ Jiro Yamaguchi. "The Gulf War and the Transformation of Japanese Constitutional Politics." *Journal of Japanese Studies* 18, no. 1 (Winter 1992): 157-158.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 158.

¹¹¹ Ibid., 159.

increased significantly, implying that Japan had turned a corner in which the preservation of good relations with the U.S. were m ore important than a strict interpretation of the Japanese Constitution.¹¹² Of note, the actions taken during this era were done within the bounds of the constitution and effectively de-li nked from the more contentious issue of the overall political structure.

Japanese defense spending continued to increase throughout the 1980s, eventually reaching a point where its m ilitary expenditu res were th ird larges t in the world. Constitutionality was p reserved by charac terizing all f orces as pu rely defensive. So while Japanese forces were significantly increased, the debate s surrounding the self-defense forces and the constitution remained generally unto uched. A re-visitation of the issue was forced by the end of the Cold W ar and the beginning of the 1991 Persian Gulf War.¹¹³

The end of the Cold War dram atically altered the underpinnings of U.S. -Japanese security. Further, the outbreak of the Gulf War clearly illustrated that regional disputes were far from over. The constitution was ill-suited to address what actions Japan should take to contribute to the preservation of international society given the presence of an aggressor. The government chose to stress the universal ideals implicit within Article 9, specifically "an international peace base d on justice and order" and sought to deploy self Defense forces abroad. ¹¹⁴ In this regard, the Japanese government found its justification within the language of the constitution rather than dramatically altering it.

In practice, this in terpretation drew harsh criticism from Japanese oppo sition as they viewed deployment of forces as unconstitutional. Further, the legislation allowing for the deployment of forces was introduced at a point in time where the opposition comprised the majority in the upper house, significantly reducing the possibility that the bill would be passed without significant compromise. As the Japanese political drama unfolded, the Gulf W ar began and quickly ended. The swift conclusion of the war

¹¹² Jiro Yamaguchi. "The Gulf War and the Transformation of Japanese Constitutional Politics." *Journal of Japanese Studies* 18, no. 1 (Winter 1992): 161-163.

¹¹³ Ibid., 163-164.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., 164-166.

ameliorated much of the discussion regarding the use of self defense assets in the region. Following the close of hostilities, Japan was able to deploy m inesweepers to the M iddle East on the basis that minesweeping was a peaceful activity.¹¹⁵ In this regard, there w as some modest expansion of the role of Japanese forces, but largely after the fact and in a much less controversial role.

In contrast, following the events of 11 September 2001, Japan quickly employed non-combat forces in support of opera tions in both Afghanistan and Iraq. ¹¹⁶ One of the primary drivers behind this change was Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro. From 2001 to 2006 he significantly altered Ja panese foreign policy and displayed a significantly less recalcitrant attitude regarding the events of World War II than did his p redecessors. In addition to the disp atching of troo ps abro ad, during his tenure, the U.S. and Japan completed a def ense policy review initiative to strengthen the bila teral alliance, Japan assumed a more assertive role in regards to North Korean missile testing and abduction of Japanese citizens, and much to the chagrin of neighboring countriles Koizumi made a highly publicized visit to the Yasukuni Sh rine comme morating Japanese war dead. ¹¹⁷ These unprecedented actions rep resent a si gnificant d omestic transfor mation in addressing security issues through the Japanese political system.

Prior to Koizum i becoming prime minister, the position had significantly limited power.¹¹⁸ The long dominant Liberal Democratic Party was characterized by a significant number of factions. Thus, any potential prime minister had to develop coalitions in order to come to power. In order to achieve this , many political concessions had to be made which diluted the power one m ight expect to find in the office of the prime minister. In addition to concession s of this typ e, the Jap anese political apparatus also m aintains the

¹¹⁵ Jiro Yamaguchi. "The Gulf War and the Transformation of Japanese Constitutional Politics." *Journal of Japanese Studies* 18, no. 1 (Winter 1992): 164-166.

¹¹⁶ Christopher W. Hughes and Ellis S. Krauss. "Japan's New Security Agenda." *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy* 49, no. 2 (Summer 2007): 157–160.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 157–160.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., 158.

zoku, which serves as a filtering mechanism prior to policy reaching the cabinet.¹¹⁹ In this regard, the *zoku* wields significant power in that they can modulate what policies are presented.

Given this set of circum stance, it is difficult to envision a singular leader achieving the relative prominence that Koizum i enjoyed. H owever, prior to Koizu mi coming to power, electoral reform dissipated some of the factional power. Further, mass media became more prominent in crafting a personal image allowing for individuals to achieve greater popularity a mong voters. Koiz umi would deftly m anage these resources to his advantage. His position was significanely strengthened as an outcome of postal reform initiatives, which collectively encompassed not only m ail, but also banking and insurance. As his reform s were stalled by the *zoku*, Koizumi capitalized on the use of media, public support for the issue and swift political action to effectively oust opposition and centralize the party. In doing so, the power of the *zoku* was diminished and the party gained significant unity.¹²⁰ This combination and sequence of political action not on ly cemented Koizum i's dom estic popularity, bu t also set conditions for m uch greater political autonomy.

In the context of security, these political actions have significant ramifications. In order for substantive change to be made in security policy, some mechanism for breaking through the political gridlock has to occur. The actions of Koizumi did precisely this and set conditions for subsequent security changes. Koizum i's penchant f or swift and bold policy making based on the support of both th e public and the party enabled a range of options that his successors sim ply did not enjoy. The actions taken during his tenure clearly reflect a distinct transformation in Japanese foreign-policy.

Immediately following the events of 11 Se ptember, the Japanese Diet passed an Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law which dispatched self-defense forces to the Indian Ocean in support of coalition operations in Afghanistan. The speed with which this law was enacted is unp recedented in recent Japan ese history. Whereas previous security

¹¹⁹ Christopher W. Hughes and Ellis S. Krauss. "Japan's New Security Agenda." *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy* 49, no. 2 (Summer 2007): 159.

¹²⁰ Ibid: 159-161.

legislation required months of deliberation, this law was passe d within four weeks. On the basis of this law, Japan would proceed to dispatch forces in support of non-com bat operations in Iraq.¹²¹

Koizumi's actions did not stop there. He made two visits to North Korea in order to seek resolution on the issu e of abduction of Japanese ci tizens and contribute to the resolution of the North Korean nuclear arm ament. Further, he was actively engaged in the realignment of U.S. bases in Japan, fostered political debate regarding Article 9 of the Japanese constitution, and committed Japan to the pursuit o f ballistic missile defense. ¹²² The introduction of the latter broug ht about significant changes in the com position and capability of the Japanese Self Defense Force.

In order to achieve the technically ch allenging objective of m issile defense, significant military capabilities would be required. Given the com plexity of the system, an extensiv e command-and-con trol apparatu s would need to be developed. This prompted a need for a r estructuring and in creased emphasis on joint capabilitie s within Japan's Self Defense Force. The nature of these changes also included the introduction of legislation to m ore specifically address civilian control over the m ilitary. T hese changes were significant in that for the first time since W orld W ar II, both the Prime Minister and m ilitary commanders have been af forded the latitude to m ake real-time military decisions without the oversight of the cabinet and the Diet.¹²³

Taken collectively, it is difficult to envision such a substantial shift in Japanese security policy absent the actions of Prime Minister Koizumi. Notwithstanding historical animosity and the constitutional issues surrounding the Japanese use of force, his political acumen and judgm ent enabled him to m aneuver through significant impedim ents and facilitate change on a scale not of ten seen in Ja panese politics, particularly in matters of national security. While this is an impressive political feat, it should be noted that these actions did not garner unanimous support and continue to face opposition from numerous fronts.

¹²¹ Christopher W. Hughes and Ellis S. Krauss. "Japan's New Security Agenda." *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy* 49, no. 2 (Summer 2007): 161-162.

¹²² Ibid., 161-162.

¹²³ Ibid.

While there are num erous obstacles to cu rrent Japanese security initiatives, the domestic challenges tend to center on the issu es of defense spending, legal barriers, and public acceptance. The issue of defense spending is a challenge faced by all states. As Japan limits defense spending at 1% of its gross domestic product, a significant portion will invariably be tied to m issile defense. This in turn limits the amount of money that can be committed to other def ense initiatives, specifically the expansion of the SDF on other fronts. Additional financ ial considerations come into play as Jap an has agreed to provide approximately \$6 billion to facilitate the transfer of U.S. forces from Okinawa to Guam.¹²⁴ Given these defense commit ments and financial lim itations, Japan has assumed a path characterized by high technical risk along a single threat axis, specifically missile defense. The investm ent in m issile defense precludes its capacity for developments on o ther fronts. The intuitive means of add ressing a b roader range of operations invariably entail additional defense spending, which comes at the expense of other government initiatives.

The legal fram ework for defense actions is also under constant scrutiny. As recently as 2005, the Japanese government interpreted that "the use of armed force is permissible as a means to exercise the right of self-defense under Article 9 of the Constitution only when there is an imminent and illegitimate act of aggression against Japan; there is no appropriate means to deal with such an act of aggression other than by resorting to the right of self defense; and the use of armed strength is confined to the minimum necessary level." ¹²⁵ This interpretation significantly limits Japanese participation in any capacity and in some instances creates an addition al burden for the forces of other states. As a case in point, Japanese forces engage d in reconstruction efforts in Iraq had to be provided security by Australian forces. This set of conditions limits the conditions in which Japanese forces means ay be employed to such a degree that their participation may not be welcome.¹²⁶

¹²⁴ Nicholas Szechenyi, "A Turning Point for Japan's Self-Defense Forces," The Center for Strategic and International Studies, *The Washington Quarterly* 29, no. 4 (2006): 139-150.

¹²⁵ Ibid., 144-145.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

Also lack ing in regard to s ecurity is clear p ublic consensus. W hile a s lim majority favor constitutional revision, of t hose that do 70% hold that the constitution should clarify the existence of the SDF. Nearly half of the respondents hold that the constitution cannot adequately address new issues, 27% view that more explicit language is required to address collec tive s elf-defense, 23% hold that the existing language is sufficient, and 44% are of the opinion that government policy towards collective defense should not change. ¹²⁷ These som ewhat ambiguous results tend to reflect a very diverse set of public opinions. While constitutional revision could clarify both the mission of the SDF and Japanese security policy, dram atic changes to Japan's p acifist trad ition also introduces the risk of public outcry and da mage regional perceptions of Japan, both of which constitute political risk.

Japanese se curity, to include m issile def ense, is a politically cha rged arena. While polling data in dicates a d esire for security, pop ular support for the p eace constitution tends to s tall aggressive advances in security measures. Further, the m ost recent Prim e Min ister did not pu rsue as ag gressive of a security agenda as his predecessors. Absent this top level advocacy, itself a partial reflection of public opinion, it is not like ly that the next decade will s ee the degree of norm alization progress made during Koizumi's tenure. However, while the trend may slow, it is not likely that it will reverse. The pursuit of missile defense speaks directly to public concerns over N orth Korea, and therefore presents little political liability increasing the potential for program s, the attendant featur es identified in the success. As long as this initiative continue previous chapter will rem ain in place as a matter of necessity. Sub sequent system ic shocks, such as a dynam ic political leader with an aggres sive defense agenda, sustained aggressive behavior by North Korea, or focused pursuit of a perm anent seat on the UN Security Council, would each have the potential to advance the trend line further.

¹²⁷ Nicholas Szechenyi, "A Turning Point for Japan's Self-Defense Forces," The Center for Strategic and International Studies, *The Washington Quarterly* 29, no. 4 (2006): 145-146.

3. Technical Risk

The discussion thus far has centered on the various political elem ents of the missile defense initiative while ignoring th e underlying technical feasibility. The development of "high tech, low density" sy stems are expensive, risky, and require a sustained commitment. Given this set of circ umstances, Japan has invested heavily in an initiative that m ay or m ay not achieve al 1 its purported objectives . As a result, the technical feasibility of missile defense systems and the typ e of architecture required to adequately meet the conceiva ble missiles threats confrontin g Japan remain a subject of considerable debate.¹²⁸

There is also a secondary consequence asso ciated with technical risk, specifically the costs as sociated with mitigation. As m issile defense is absorbing a d isproportionate amount of t he Japanese defense budget, othe r initiatives suffer. Collectively, the high cost of m issile defense and the cap of 1% defense spending significantly constrain Japan's investment options.¹²⁹ This has a significant im pact on Japans army and navy as the cabinet significantly cut account levels in order to afford missile defense.¹³⁰

The changes have begun to m anifest themselves in several ways. The Maritim e Self Defense Forces has had to reprioritize operations and cut its num bers of escort ships and fixed wing aircraft. The Air Se If Defense Force's acquisition of the PAC-3 missile defense system has come at the exp ense of reducing its numbers of tactical interceptor aircraft. The Ground Self Defens e Forces (GSDF) procurements will have also been cut at a tim e where it is facing increas ed pressure to restructure to deal with low inten sity

¹²⁸ Michael Swaine, Rachel Swanger, and Takashi Kawakami. *Japan and Ballistic Missile Defense*. Center for Asia-Pacific Policy. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2001.

¹²⁹ Nicholas Szechenyi, "A Turning Point for Japan's Self-Defense Forces," The Center for Strategic and International Studies, *The Washington Quarterly* 29, no. 4 (2006): 139-150.

¹³⁰ Eiichiro Sekigawa. "Arms and Japan." *Aviation Week & Space Technology.* 6 Dec. 2004: 30-31. ABI/INFORM Global. ProQuest. Dudley Knox Library, Monterey, CA. http://www.proquest.com/. Accessed 16 May 2008.

threats such as insurgency and terrorism .¹³¹ This collectively reinforces the single point that Japan has invested heavily in something that may not work well at the direct expense of other security priorities.

While this im pediment has been heav ily voiced by those opposed to m issile defense, there are a few key elements that stand to refute it. The first is that the technical hurdles have steadily been overcome, culminating in a well publicized test event in which Japanese naval assets w ere able to successfully shoot down a missile in flight. Further, although Japan's procurem ent of missile defense is coming at the expense of other programs, the sunk cost already invested is of such magnitude that cancelling the program would require a significant reversal of course. Give n the promising test results to date, as well as the potential for future profit given the partial repeal of the export ban, there are sufficient reasons to suggest that this perceived barrier is steadily becoming less relevant.

B. CONCLUSIONS

The progress that Japan has m ade in regards to its secur ity initia tives is not a guarantor of further advancements. There are several attendant risks surrounding missiledefense, any one of which could prompt a re-v isitation of the program. Further, there is significant amount of public support for the peace constitution that present a dom estic political concern for elected officials. While Prime Minister Koizumi was able to a rush through security advances with relative ease, his short-lived successor Shinzo Abe did not occupy office long enough to continue this agenda. The most recent administration, under Prim e Minister Fukuda, ha s tended to favor a m ore c onservative approach in security matters, opting to maintain the status quo rather than proceed with modifications to the Constitution. C onsidered c ollectively, however, there a re equ ally com pelling circumstances under which the trend line could advance. What can be treated for fact, however, is that the initiatives undertaken in conjunction with m issile defense rem ain unchanged, are grounded in legal revisions, and show no signs of receding.

¹³¹ "JAPAN: Missile defence could spark arms race." *OxResearch* 10 Feb. 2004: 1. ProQuest. Dudley Knox Library, Monterey, CA. http://www.proquest.com/. Accessed 16 May 2008.

V. CONCLUSIONS

A. CONSIDERING THE TREND

1. Assessing the Trend

The preceding chapters have identified key events in the evolution of Japan's Self Defense Forces (JSDF) with the intent of illustrating that a trend towar ds normalization exists and that the m issile defense initiative h as contributed significantly toward s its advancement. W hile these events have been identified, they have not been placed in a context that clear ly illustrates the relative d egree to which missile defense has im pacted Japanese defense. In order to better assess these impacts, the following methodology has been developed using the event characterizations of force expansion, organizational shift, capability increases, statutory m ilestones, and forward deploym ents. Each of these events is assigned an associated weighting value reflecting the degree to which they have lent them selves to the advancem ent of th e norm alization trend. Specific m ilestones falling in to these agg regations are subse quently evaluated in term s of individual significance and then plotted in tim e. The e nd result is a norm alization trend line that graphically portrays a steady advancement in Japan's defense posture.

To be sure, this reflects one of many possible ways to consider Japanese security. The intent in employing this assessment mechanism is not to provide an incontrovertible framework from which all secur ity evolutions can be considered, but rather to capture a distinct subset of events relevant to Ja pan and introduce additional context from which more informed conclusions can be reached. Certa inly additional aggregations could be employed to capture a b roader range of event types, greater f idelity could be applied to the weighting and ranking structure, and events that have stalled or retarded the trend could also be considered. However, for the purpose of illustrating a normalization trend and that m issile defense has advanced it, a to p level characterization is sufficient. The following tables provide a m ore detailed breakout of the event aggregations and events identified for inclusion in the trend line.

Security Event Aggregations and Weighting					
Type Event	Rationale for Event Inclusion	Weighting Factor (0 - 1)	Rationale for Weighting		
Force Expansion/Reduction	A commonly used metric for comparing the military forces of respective states is their size. While this does not account for any technological asymmetry that may exist, it does reflect the degree of manpower commitment that a given state has made to its defense establishment.	0.5	Shifts in manpower commitments equate directly to enlarging or reducing a force. Force ratios can, however, be overcome through technological advantage. For this reason, it is weighted at the median.		
Significant Capability Increases	Similar to force expansion, the introduction of new capabilities generates options that would not otherwise be available. Further, a states decision to invest significant amounts of capital in a given direction can be considered as an indicator of its defense priorities.	0.7	Technology often enables a relatively smaller force to achieve greater effects with less manpower. Given the premium that Japan has placed on incorporating advanced technology in its forces, it is weighted higher than the median.		
Organizational Shift	Shifts in organizational structure tend to reflect a shift in organizational focus. As this can be interpreted as a necessary precursor to redefining the perceived function of the organization, they warrant consideration.	0.6	The manner in which a force is organized is a significant factor in harnessing the potential of its manpower and capabilities. Given the synergy that organizational structure can enable, it is weighted slightly higher than the median.		
Statutory Milestone	Establishing shifts in defense policy as a matter of law reflects a degree of formality, state legitimacy, and permanence. Legislation regarding military matters tend to reflect how a state views military roles and functions, thus warranting consideration.	0.8	Defense law reflects a significantly higher degree of state commitment to a course of action than a ministry policy or generally accepted practice. With such commitment, it becomes possible to impact force size, capability and deployment. Given the broader impacts of legislation, it is weighted substantially higher than the median.		
Forward Deployment	The deployment of forces indicates a states willingness to employ its military and either project power abroad or intervene in regional crises. This aspect of willingness speaks to the overall credibility of the force and bears consideration.	0.4	In the case of Japan, individual force deployments tend to be smaller in scope, occasionally a response to external pressure, an under the auspices of the UN. This is considerably different than large scale unilateral military action and is weighted lower than the median.		

Figure 11. Security Event Aggregations and Weighting

Figure (8) establishes the baseline for general evaluation. Figures (9) through (11) will identify significant events occurring under these aggregations. ¹³² Each event will be ass igned a numeric value based on its relative significance. Again, there is an admittedly subjective quality to the scoring mechanism as a matter of necessity. As a

¹³² Ministry of Defense, Japan. *Defense Chronology*. < http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2007/46Defence% 20Chronology.pdf>. Accessed 5 September 2008.

crude case in point, a decision to incr ease force structure by 10,000 or by 100,000 both reflect force expansion, but quite clearly of a different scale. W hile numeric examples are fairly intuitive, less clear examples are found in legislation. To clarify, a law passed with the ex press purpose of permitting a single deployment, while relevant in trend mapping, has a less far reach ing and enduring impact than a decision to permit the military uses of space. W hile both statu tory milestones, they require ad ditional context which for the purposes of this thesis will be found by assigning a quantitative value to each event.

To be sure, both the identification of key events and the respective values assigned could easily be contested on an indivi dual basis. The intent, however, is not to create an in controvertible value ranking of the evolution of the JSDF, but rather to identify sufficient data points to allow f or a more empirical interpretation of the trend. While each event and value could be debated, what quickly becomes apparent is that the overall trend of the JSDF is one of advancement.

	Security Event Ranking: 1950 - 1960					
Year	Event	Event Type	Weighting Factor	Magnitude of Event (1 - 5)	Event Score	
1950	Establishment of National Police Reserve authorized	Force Expansion	0.5	5	2.5	
1950	National Police Reserve Ordinance promulgated	Statutory Milestone	0.8	3	2.4	
1952	Maritime Guard established within Japanese Coast Guard	Force Expansion	0.5	3	1.5	
1954	Defense Agency Establishment Law promulgated	Statutory Milestone	0.8	5	4	
1954	Self Defense Forces Law Promulgated	Statutory Milestone	0.8	5	4	
1954	Defense Agency established	Organizational Shift	0.6	5	3	
1956	First domestically produced F-86 fighter delivered	Capability Increase	0.7	4	2.8	
1957	First Defense Build-up Plan adopted	Statutory Milestone	0.8	4	3.2	
1958	ASDF begins measures to protect territorial airspace	Capability Increase	0.7	4	2.8	
	Aggregate Score: 1950 - 1960					

Figure 12. Security Event Ranking: 1950 – 1960 (From: 132)

	Sec	urity Event Ranking: 19	960 - 2000		
Year	Event	Event Type	Weighting Factor	Magnitude of Event (1 - 5)	Event Score
1961	Second Defense Build-up Plan adopted	Statutory Milestone	0.8	4	3.2
1962	Defense Facilities Administration Agency established	Organizational Shift	0.6	3	1.8
1965	Icebreaker Fuji dispatched to assist Antarctic observation	Forward Deployment	0.4	3	1.2
1966	Third Defense Build-up Plan adopted	Statutory Milestone	0.8	4	3.2
1969	Domestic production of F-4E approved	Capability Increase	0.7	4	2.8
		egate Score: 1960 - 1970	1	1	12.2
1972	Fourth Defense Build-up Plan adopted	Statutory Milestone	0.8	4	3.2
1973	ASDF air defense mission on Okinawa commences	Capability Increase	0.7	3	2.1
1977	Introduction of F-15 and P-3s approved	Capability Increase	0.7	4	2.8
1978	First ASDF/USAF joint training exercises	Capability Increase	0.7	5	3.5
1979	Introduction of E-2C approved	Capability Increase	0.7	4	2.8
4000		egate Score: 1970 - 1980			14.4
1980	MSDF/USN joint exercises GSDF/US joint communications	Capability Increase	0.7	3	2.1
1981	exercise	Capability Increase	0.7	3	2.1
1982	US/Japan combined command post exercise Transfer of military technology to	Capability Increase	0.7	3	2.1
1983	US initiated Security Council Establishment	Statutory Milestone	0.8	4	3.2
1986	Law enacted	Statutory Milestone	0.8	4	3.2
1988	conjunction with US	Capability Increase	0.7	3	2.1
	Aggr	egate Score: 1980 - 1990			14.8
1991	Deployment of MSDF vessels to the Persian Gulf	Forward Deployment	0.4	5	2
1991	JSDF personnel assist in inspections of Iraqi chemical weapons	Forward Deployment	0.4	4	1.6
1992	JSDF units deployed to Cambodia in support of UN operations	Forward Deployment	0.4	3	1.2
1994	JSDF personnel deployed to Zaire to assist Rwandan refugees	Forward Deployment	0.4	3	1.2
1996	JSDF support to UN observer force	Forward Deployment	0.4	3	1.2
1997	Establishment of Defense Intelligence Headquarters	Capability Increase	0.7	4	2.8
1998	Establishment of JSDF ready reserve	Force Expansion	0.5	3	1.5
1998	JSDF deployed to Honduras to support disaster relief	Forward Deployment	0.4	3	1.2
1998	First JSDF joint exercise	Capability Increase	0.7	5	3.5
1998	Japan - US cooperative research on missile defense approved	Capability Increase	0.7	4	2.8
1999	JSDF personnel deployed to Turkey for disaster relief	Forward Deployment	0.4	2	0.8
	JSDF personnel deployed to	Forward Deployment	0.4	2	0.8

Figure 13. Security Event Ranking: 1960 – 2000 (From: 132)

	Secur	ity Event Ranking: 200	00 - present		
Year	Event	Event Type	Weighting Factor	Magnitude of Event (1 - 5)	Event Score
2001	JSDF personnel deployed to India for disaster relief	Forward Deployment	0.4	2	0.8
2001	JSDF personnel deployed to UNMOVIC	Forward Deployment	0.4	2	0.8
2001	Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law promulgated	Statutory Milestone	0.8	5	4
2001	Self-Defense Forces Law promulgated	Statutory Milestone	0.8	5	4
2001	MSDF vessels begin "cooperation and support" activities with US in the Indian Ocean	Forward Deployment	0.4	5	2
2001	MSDF vessels begin information gathering operations in the Indian Ocean	Forward Deployment	0.4	5	2
2002	MSDF vessels begin "cooperation and support" activities with UK in the Indian Ocean	Forward Deployment	0.4	5	2
2002	JSDF personnel deployed to East Timor	Forward Deployment	0.4	2	0.8
2003	JSDF research group deployed to Iraq	Forward Deployment	0.4	2	0.8
2003	Government introduces ballistic missile defense system	Statutory Milestone	0.8	5	4
2003	JSDF personnel deployed to Kuwait	Forward Deployment	0.4	4	1.6
2004	JSDF advance team deployed to Irag	Forward Deployment	0.4	4	1.6
2004	JSDF deployed to Thailand to assist in disaster relief	Forward Deployment	0.4	2	0.8
2005	JSDF deployed to Indonesia to assist in disaster relief	Forward Deployment	0.4	2	0.8
2005	JSDF deployed to Pakistan to assist in disaster relief	Forward Deployment	0.4	2	0.8
2005	Security Council approves joint US development of interceptor missiles	Statutory Milestone	0.8	4	3.2
2006	JSDF deployed to Golan Heights	Forward Deployment	0.4	2	0.8
2006	Defense Agency Establishment law is modified to allow for destruction of ballistic missiles	Statutory Milestone	0.8	5	4
2006	JSDF deployed to Indonesia to assist in disaster relief	Forward Deployment	0.4	2	0.8
2007	Defense Agency transitioned to Ministry of Defense	Organizational Shift	0.6	5	3

Figure 14. Security Event Ranking: 2000 – present (From: 132)

2. Plotting the Trend

The preced ing section s have introdu ced a m ethodology for assessing k ey milestones in the evolution of Japanese secu rity and have identified significant events over the past sixty years. When placed in the context of relative time and magnitude, the trend becomes more readily apparent. The following figures illustrate how the normalization trend line has advanced over time based on the data points introduced in the preceding section:




Figure 15. Security Normalization Trendline




Figure 16. Security Advancements by Decade

What becomes readily apparent after even a cursory examination of the tables is that following the initial spike attributable to the introduction of the JSDF precursor organizations and legislation in the 1950s, there was a significant lull in activity followed by a steady increase through the 1980s a nd a m arked increase from the 1990s and beyond. Notably, the data is a rranged relative to tim e in order to fram e the degree of advancement in a given context. In practice, ho wever, the events tend to be cum ulative. Expressed differently, the security gains achie ved in the 1960s could justifiably be added to those of the 1950s. Even though progress v aries between decades, it is consistently advancing.

3. Forecasting the Trend

The preceding section h as provided a graphic depiction of the Japanese security trend to date, begging the quest tion of what will o ccur n ext. The future cannot be predicted with high reliability, but based on what has occurred to date and what would ostensibly be required to further advance the trend some reasonable assumptions can be made. The following are facet s of what a continuation of the norm alization trend line

may entail and the con ditions that m ay preced e their ad option. Note th at in som e instances, these advancements may be exclus ive of missile defense and represent other facets of the normalization trend.

a) <u>"Routine" force deployments</u>: while Japan m aintains a considerable deployed footprint in support of UN operations, each evolution is considered separately and requires its own legisl ation. Given the regulari ty with which Japan has committed forces to UN operations since the early 1990s, it is reasonab le to expect some type of blanket legislation allowing for forces to be deployed as a matter of course rather than by exception. Legislation such as this has been discussed previously and has a reasonable y high probability of being adopted within the next decade sime ply because it eliments in the second s

Note that th is is n ot linked to m issile defense per se. The motivator f or such an action is most probably found in Japan's desire to shed its "free-rider" image and streng then its position in r egards to the UN Security Co uncil. Notably, the latter would bolster Japan's position in regards to cham pioning missile defense efforts thus adding ju stification to its recent actions and potentially setting conditions for the future sale of missile defense technology.

b) <u>Increased arms exports</u>: by positioning itself as a st rong U.S. partner in the development of m issile defense system s, Japan is positioned to becom e a world leader in this niche security industry. Given the ostensibly defensive nature of the system, the partial repeals on weapons export currently enacted, and the financial incentives to spread load the costs of the defense industry by gaining larger econom ies of scale it is not unreasonable to expect that Japan will both sell m ore weapons and modify legislation to m ake it eas ier. The

conditions under which this is likely to occur are characterized by continued successful testing of Japanese m issile defense and increased proliferation of missiles.

One of the fundamental motivations for Japan's partial repeal of the export ban was to spread load developm ent costs of m issile defense. Clearly, the more costs are sp read, the m ore cost effective the sys tem. Having already taken the s tance that m issile defense is "pure ly" defensive in nature, th ere is an embedded justification for the sale of missile defense technology to other parties. Given the combined factors of missile proliferation, improved missile defense technology, and Japan's relative positioning as an industry leader, within the d ecade m ore substantial exports of Japanese weapons technology can be expected.

c) Proportionately increased defense spending: in recent times, Japan has made a concerted effort to lim it defense spending to 1% of the GNP. W hile this has generally been met, it is not inviolate. As modern defense systems generally involve high technology and a commensurately high risk, costs can easily mount. Considered in this context, the prim ary factor driving the need for a larger defense budget is the cost of missile defense. For Japan to remain at the forefront of increasingly prolific de fense technology, it can be expected to both partner in defense developm ent as well as comm it additional funds as required. In practice, this has very likely occurred but under the auspices of separate budget authority. So, while defense spending may be restricted to the 1% cap, the Ministry of Defense may reap the benefits of funds allocated to the Space Agency or Coast Guard. This is not an uncommon practice for any government, and the lines blur even fu rther given the fungible nature of technologic breakthroughs.

In all likelihood, efforts will continue to keep defense spending beneath the limit but there are conditions under which this could change. By investing heavily in m issile defense, Japan ha s less working capital to support the operations and maintenance of the JSDF. However, it is necessary for Japan to sustain the existing force to support current UN comm itments and better position itself for a seat on the UN S ecurity Council. G iven the relative prestige and com parative power of this positio n, it is not unreasonab le to expect Japan to increase proportional defense spending as required to remain a viable candidate. Given the ever growing crisis locations, this change could also be expected within a decade.

d) Shifts to offensive doctrine: the challenge of a defensive force is that it has to absorb the f irst blow. This is particul arly problematic when the leth ality of the first strike is sufficiently overwhe lming s o as to preclude retaliation. While existing Japanese security policy speaks to both prevention and preemption, what is necessary to make such policy effective is a capacity to deliver the first blow. While the hardware within the Japanese arsenal has the potential, the accompanying doctrine tends to be defensive in tone. In an era where offensive and defensive charact erization of a weapons system is increasingly less meaningful, the advantage is gained in how it is used. Given the lim ited utility of a def ensive characterization and a steady increase in multi-national exercises with the U.S. in support of m issile defense, it is not unreasonable to expect a Japanese sh ift to a m ore of fensive doctrine, beginning with the ASDF and steadily permeating the broader force.

Missile defense is again a factor in this scenario. The ideal of preemption was introduced as part of the funda mental premise that missiles are easiest to destroy before they leave the groun d. To accomplish that, tactics need to be modified to allow f or the su rreptitious entry of forces, typically aircraft, through threat defenses and fire before being fired upon. This is a marked departure from the tactics associated with a defensive com bat air patrol, and a favorable option for effective missile defense.

- e) Constitutional m odification: this is ostens ibly the pinnacle of Japanese security normalization. By modifying the constitution to accept that the use of force is som etimes ne cessary would be a clear dom estic and international signal that Japan has taken a m ajor step towards norm alization. Given the popular appeal of the "peace constitution," this is unlikely to occur without some type of exogenous shock and cannot readily be placed on a timeline. Were another Koizumi-like Prime Minister to em erge it is possible that this threshold could be crossed. The cond ition under which this becom es more probable, though, is a North Korean act of aggression, intentional or otherwise. Should a North Korean m issile test fall short and strike Japan, public sentiment would presum ably turn more hawkish and m ore critical of the governm ent's failure to protect it s citizenry. This would reduce the political liability of advocating constitutional change, and potentially increase the like lihood of enacting it. Note that while this is no t envisioned as an outgrowth of m issile defense, per se, it is a potential outcome of the missile threat.
- f) Employment of m ilitary forces in support of national objectives : the employment of Japanese military force to secure a national objective would be a clear ind icator of normalization regardless of constitutional debate. To be sure, this is not a proba ble event, but as an island nation with limited natural resources, to include high energy dependencies, there are conceivably conditions in which J apan would be tem pted to em ploy its m ilitary. Conceptually, these conditions include territorial disputes, preemption against North Korea, freedom of navigatio n, and access to oil rese rves in Central Asia. The main point, however, is that should Japan use its military in such a capacity, it will have advanced the nor malization trend. T his scenario does

reside outside the m issile defense rubric, as it envisions the use of for ce to seize an objective of som e type rather than preclude or prevent dam age to Japan itself.

The preceding paragraphs have identified events that would advance the security normalization trend line establ ished throughout this thesis. While some events are more probable than others, they share a common thread in that any one of them constitutes a change from the status quo. Japan has come to realize that modern security cannot be achieved through the methods of the previous generation, and has steadily adapted to this reality. However, these changes do not occur in isolation. As Japan modifies its security posture, there are also ramifications for the U.S.

B. U.S. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

Japan's current security situation is evolving. Over the past few years adaptations have occurred that would have been unthinka ble in the early 1950s. As Japan m aps out its future security apparatus, the U. S. is a lso affected. The resultant question becomes one of how the U.S. should engage Japan relative to its own interests. The following are policy recommendations that consider Japanese security in the context of U.S. concerns.

1. Sustained Pursuit of Japanese Constitutional Revision

The U.S. is investing a considerable am ount of time and effort assisting Japan develop a m issile defense capability. Furthe r, while not as pronounced as the very proximal threat that North Korea presents to Japan, the U.S. also has m issile vulnerabilities. Given the ranges and traject ories that m ay be involved with a potential missile attack against the U.S., there exists a very real possibility that Japan may be best positioned to destroy the missile. Under the current interpretation of the Constitution Japan would not legally be bound to do so. Th is presents itself as a largely one-sided arrangement which does not best represent U.S. interests.

The impediment at this point is Japan's interpretation of the Constitution. As this interpretation is the impediment to enhance missile security for the U.S., it stands to reason that the U.S. should take some action to facilitate Japanese changes to either the

interpretation or to the Constitution its elf. This is perhaps best achieved through sustained and gentle coercion, as a more direct approach may prompt much stauncher nationalism and defeat the overall purpose. While this appears to be a very in trusive means of achieving U.S. interests, it is a far more palatable option than not addressing an issue at the heart of a security matter.

Japan ultimately has to consider two political scenarios. The first is one in which domestic political concerns preclude constitutional change. Advocates for said change place at risk their political careers and are otherwise unsuccessful in ushering in a modified constitution. The second is the international political consequence of willfully allowing a missile to strike the U.S. despite having had the capability to stop it. While both of these are unattractive propositions, the latter impacts far more than careers. A scenario such as this, if widely known, could reasonably be expected to prompt a scathing rebuke from the broader U.S. population. In the is context, a new set of U.S. domestic pressures emerge that can reasonably be expected to have a se vere and immediate adverse impact on Japanese relations.

2. Inextricable System Linkages and Redundancy

The preceding section addressed an element of legality, but there are alternative means to address the challenge. Accepting that the current interpretation of the Japanese Constitution would prec lude assisting the U.S. in the even t of a m issile attack another way of solving the problem would be through engineering the m issile defense system such that the sensors are so inextricably linked all parties share a common picture. With sufficient ad vance warning and characterizati on of the trajectory the legally acceptable firing unit could be notified without prompting undue legal drama.

While the sharing of sensor inform ation could itself be interpreted as an encroachment upon the Japanese constitu tion, it is more practically a system ic feature and limitation. This could be construed as a feature in that for Japan's own security to be achieved it derives very direct benefit from U.S. sensors. The operating picture cannot be complete unless reciprocating data from Japan's own sensors are provided and correlated.

For the practical m atter of tr acking and shootin g, this is a positive attribute. From the matter of constitutional interpretation, it is a limitation.

What this suggests is that an alternative way for the U.S. to derive benefit from Japanese elements of missile defense is to engin eer it in such a manner that the ben effts are transparent. While this has a tinge of s ubterfuge about it, it is practical and arguably far less intrusive than advocating for Japan to change its constitution

3. Press for Overt Normalization

The preceding sections have considered possible options for the U.S. to extract greater benefit from Japan's missile defense assets. Notably, the proposed U.S. advocacy of constitutional modification was restricated to the very narrow confines of missile defense. While this would offer benefit to the U.S., it fails to add ress a more overt Japanese declaration of nor malization. One of the fundamental issues surrounding Japan's current security ideology is that it is masked despite its transparency. As contradictory as this may sound, it captures the irony of a state that is constitutionally prohibited from having a military maintaining one of the world's most technologically advanced military forces. The issue is the consequence that is associated with this irony.

To frame this a little bit more broadly, c onsider one possible interpretation of the existence of the JSDF. A state that t is constitutionally prohibited from maintaining a military develops a national police reserve originally trained by the U.S. Army. Over the years it comes to be equipped with tanks and arm ored personnel carriers and artillery. The maritime and air forces are among the best equipped and trained in the world. The defense budget is consistently among the top five in the world. While Japan is very open about what is procuring it has closed its equipped is to the perception that accompanies the existence of such a formidable military capability.

By continually asserting the def ensive nature of the JSDF, Japan sim ply draws attention to its of fensive potential. This mask of defense in troduces a degree of ambiguity that is other wise inconsistent and appears to be a ladder of escalation. By asserting that it has become a normalized state that fully asserts the right of war far les s ambiguous signals can be sent and a far clearer interpretation of Japan's planned use of force under certain circum stance can be provided. The existing circum stance in which Japan's military behaves much like a normal military while asserting that it is not present itself as a type of hypocrisy and proves as an impediment in signaling between states.

No state views itself a s a blatan t aggresso r. In this rega rd, all m ilitaries a re defensive in nature and so m uch as they def end the inter ests of the state. That t these interests are defended through the seizure of territory or the destruction of an adversary does not refute the fundam ental rationale for such actions. For Japan to acknowledge such a standpoint, the U.S. could conceivable y reduce or further spread load security responsibilities in the Pacific theater. Sustained diplom atic pressure over time offers the best chance of success in prompting Japan to further increase its security role.

C. FUTURE RESEARCH

The preceding pages have dem onstrated that the JSDF has s teadily evolved and that missile defense has played a significant role in that evolution. While the body of evidence presented supports this case, there are areas in which addition al research would prove beneficial. The following are specific topics for future research which would expand this thesis and invariably highlight other topics of interest.

1. Trend Mapping

For the purposes of this thesis, elem ents of the evolution of Japan's defense apparatus were highligh ted. Adm ittedly, this history is f ar richer than the subset of events explored in this document. A m ore extensive review and a ssessment of this history would be of some value in assessing the relative magnitude of subsequent security events. W hile the basic m ethodology presented is reasonably sound, it could easily be expanded upon.

2. Trend Projection

While the preceding paragraph speaks to characterizing what has occurred, it is also possible and beneficial to m ake a m ore concerted effort towards identifying what will occur n ext. This thesis has id entified a set of events that could b e interpreted as

advancing the security trend without conducting a detailed study of their probability. By examining these events m ore closely, it m ay be possible to better assess their relative likelihood. Depending on the event being ex amined, this could conceivably entail a closer look at dom estic politics and prevailing political sentiment within Japan, or the degree of political rhetoric and actions being taken by North Korea. In all cases, however, each event could be scrutinized and assessed more closely.

3. Economic Motivations of the Japanese Defense Industry

For the most part, this thesis has assumed that security advancement has been the driving impetus behind missile defense. However, the Japanese defense industry also has the potential to ben efit from this initiative . Largely lim ited to a dom estic market, the Japanese defense industry has often assum ed significant risk and has not benefitted from the econom ies of scale found in other states. Viewed from this vantage point, a new stakeholder emerges. Given the ingrained nature of Japane se business and its political system, it is not unreasonable to assum e that the defense industry played som e part in advancing the m issile defense initiative. It would be of som e benefit to identify the degree to which economic motivations influence the Japanese security dialogue.

4. Technical Feasibility of Missile Defense

Detractors of missile defense initiatives f requently asserted that it is simply not technically viable. However, over the past few years se veral promising tests have indicated that in time it may achieve the potential originally envisioned for it. In addition to assessing the technical feasib ility of Ja panese m issile defense, it would also be worthwhile to assess the potential regional impacts should Japan develop a robust means to defend itself from the potential missile threat found in both North Korea and China.

D. CONCLUSION

Following World W ar II, Japan has had to steadily redefine its position in the international system. One aspect of this is the evolution of the JSDF. From its initial inception as an elem ent of the National Police Reserve to its current in carnation as a

world class m ilitary, the JSDF has f ollowed a consistent trend which in dicates a p ath towards security normalization. While this trend finds its or igins in the early 1950s, the Japanese pursuit of missile defense has pl ayed a s ignificant role in its continued advancement.

Under the broad rubric of m issile defense, Japan has had to re-evaluate its position on the m ilitary use of space, the export of weapons technology, collective security, command aut hority, and the conditions under which pre-emption m ay be warranted. These changes have m anifested them selves in m any ways, to include statutory changes, restruct uring an d elevation of the form er Defense Agency, an increased emphasis on joint service interoperability, and the acquisition of a broad range of advanced technologies. It is undeniable that the trend towards security normalization began with the inception of the police reserve, but it can also be as serted that m issile defense has provided an umbrella under which the trend has been significantly advanced.

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