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DOES CHINA WANT WAR

By

HERBERT L. DUNCAN

Colonel, Ordnance Corps

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USAWC RESEARCH ELEMENT
(Essay)

Does China Want War

by

Colonel Herbert L. Duncan
Ordnance Corps

US Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania
22 April 1966

SUMMARY

Present U. S. policy of containment of Communist China is based on the assumption that China is an aggressive power with expansionist aims. This policy is basic to U.S. support of South Vietnam, Thailand, Laos and South Korea. Dissenters from this policy deny that China is expansionist and explain her behavior as nationistic, seeking influence, trying to become a model communist state, and maintaining her security.

Historians have pointed out that China, when unified has always been expansionist, and that every great Chinese empire from the Han through the Manchu has endeavored to move south in what is known as the "march to the tropics." The present regime is following this historic pattern by conquering Tibet, invading India's northern frontier, and supporting insurgency throughout Southeast Asia. She is developing atomic weapons and her behavior appears designed to make her a major world power, anxious to export a Chinese model of organization and cultural values.

China's foremost foreign policy objective is to achieve big power status and concomitantly expel the U.S. from Asia, and thereby to exercise hegemony over those Asian nations now pro-western. She also desired to transform the nations of the earth into communist states according to the Chinese model. She desires to regain territory in Asia which at one time belonged to China. These objectives bring her into conflict with both the U.S. and Soviet Russia.

Vietnam has become a test case for both the Chinese and the U.S. and as such the war is always in danger of escalating into a major conflict. Because of weakness in air and naval forces, and no deployable atomic weapons China at present cannot challenge the U.S. in an all out war. She does have the capability of supporting "wars of national liberation" in Asia and is sponsoring and supporting insurgency in Vietnam, Thailand, and Malaysia. Mao sees the U.S. as overextended and thinks the U.S. can be defeated by a series of Vietnam type wars. Also the Russians have accused the Chinese of trying to bring about a U.S.-USSR war so that China may emerge as the foremost world power.

China's aging leaders have reached their positions through guerrilla warfare and likely will continue to employ guerrilla warfare to attain political objectives. No change in policy is likely until the third generation of leaders come to power. Then China may be ready to abandon present revolutionary policies for more moderate and rational ones if current policies continue to be unsuccessful as they have been in Africa and Asia, and if the war in Vietnam does not achieve Chinese objectives. However the pressures on the Chinese leaders brought on by a rapidly expanding population with a scarcity of resources, the nationalistic aspirations of the people fostered by the Chinese Communist indoctrination during Mao's regime, the

achievement of nuclear capability, may encourage Chinese expansionism toward the rice bowl of Southeast Asia, and a hegemonic relationship with Japan and her industrial capability. Thus the collision course of war with the U.S. may continue.

DOES CHINA WANT WAR

The China watchers in Hong Kong, the Asian scholars in universities, and government officials at the highest level are preoccupied these days in trying to determine the intentions of the Chinese communist government toward other nations, but particularly its intention relative to South Vietnam and the nations of Asia. Current United States policy is based on the assumption that Communist China is an aggressive power with expansionist aims that must be contained within her present boundaries. This assumption is one of the fundamentals in U.S. support of the South Vietnamese, Laotian and Thailand governments against insurgent groups which are being sponsored and assisted by the Peking government. The dissenting groups who oppose current U.S. policy challenge the validity of the assumption that China is aggressive and expansionist. These groups view China's behavior as more nationalistic than Communistic, more frustrated than expansionist, seeking leadership and influence more than territory, and finding communist theory useful in explaining imperialist destruction of China's rightful preeminence in the world. China is avoiding war, not seeking war, but only maintaining its own security and looking after the long run interests of her people, according to this view.

China is Aggressive and Expansionist - Fact or Myth.

Long time students of Chinese history, e.g. O. Edmund Clubb in his book, 20th Century China, have pointed to the fact that China unified, and therefore politically strong, has always been

expansionist.¹ The urge to establish a revolutionary empire is fostered by the doctrine, drilled into all Chinese, that all territory included in the vast Manchu Empire belongs rightfully to China. Since Korea and part of Burma were once vassals of China, Peking doubtless intends that eventually they will be brought under Chinese aegis. Since Bhutan, Sikkim, and Nepal had close ties to Tibet, and their people are related to the Tibetians, Peking also undoubtedly assumes that these territories should be included in the territory of China. Similar claims are held on Western Turkestan and Outer Mongolia.

Professor Frank N. Trager of New York University, stated in a New York Times article on March 13, 1966 that since the first century B.C. and under every great Chinese empire--Han, Mongol, Ming, and Manchu the Chinese have moved steadily south in what has been called "the march to the tropics."² The present Communist regime is following this historic pattern by conquering Tibet, invading India's northern frontier, and supporting insurgency throughout Southeast Asia including major contributions of materiel to the Viet Cong insurgents in Vietnam.

U.S. officials have cited the article by Lin Piao published on 2 September 1965 titled "Long Live the Victory of the Peoples' War"

¹O. Edmund Clubb, 20th Century China, p. 423.

²The New York Times Magazine, 13 Mar. 1966, p. 12B.

as a Chinese policy declaration of promoting "peoples wars" throughout the Asian, African and American continents. U.S. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara has testified before a Joint Congressional Committee that statements in the Lin Piao article reflect a policy of aggressive intent and not just belligerent words.³

The fact that Communist China is willing to devote scarce resources to the development and production of atomic weapons is conclusive evidence, according to some analysts, that Peking intends to back up its strong words with actions. Recent estimates by Mr. McNamara indicate that the Chinese arsenal of atomic weapons is growing faster than previously expected.⁴

Americans in some policy-making positions and other China experts subscribe to the "falling domino" theory and argue that Chinese aggression will enable Chinese hegemony to be established over southeast Asia unless governments along the rim of Asia such as South Vietnam and Thailand are supported by noncommunist nations. Even Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore's anti-American Prime Minister, frankly concedes: "We know that if the Communists are able to advance their frontiers to envelop South Vietnam it will be only a matter of time before the same process of emasculation by military and political techniques will overtake the neighboring countries. . . . As Democratic Socialists we must insist that the South Vietnamese have the right not to be pressured through armed might and organized

³New York Times, 8 Mar. 1966, p. 1.

⁴Ibid.

terror and finally overwhelmed by Communism."⁵ Chinese sponsorship and support of insurgent groups throughout southeast Asia confirm unmistakably this belief.

Some Asian scholars see Chinese aggressive behavior as an effort to reestablish China as a world power with world status, anxious to export a Chinese model of social organization and cultural values, and as the dominant power in Asia to exert an influence over contiguous areas, i.e. to exercise a "sphere of influence" relationship over neighboring small states in Asia, rather than a direct quest for more territory. From the point of view of U.S. self interest, this subtle and indirect form of conquest seems to be as undesirable as more direct open warfare.

Also some students of geopolitics view the U.S. attempt to contain China in her present borders as an impossible task, based on an unrealistic policy. Such a policy, they hold, ignores geography since a power the size of China with its vast population and cultural heritage as well as its militant Communist ideology will inevitably dominate the nations on its periphery despite U.S. efforts to maintain pro-western and neutralist regimes on the Asian mainland. This, so the argument goes, is more a factor of geography and politics than of pure aggression by China against other nations of Asia, and the U.S. should understand this point of view since it is no different from United States' intolerance of a Communist regime in Central or

⁵C.L. Sulzberger "Foreign Affairs: Cold and Hot War in Asia," The New York Times, 3 Apr. 1966, p. 12 B.

South America. The containment of China policy, its opponents allege will result in wars around the periphery of China until the United States becomes exhausted in trying to maintain this policy.

Chinese effort to export revolution to Africa is cited as another indication of the aggressive character of the regime. During 1965 their representatives were requested to leave Burundi, Dahomey, and the Central African Republic because of interference with domestic politics. Also, their relations with other African countries, i.e. Algeria, Cameroun, Ghana, Kenya, Niger, and Upper Volta are severely strained.

In the purported letter of the Soviet Communist Party to other Communist parties regarding the split with China, published by the Hamburg newspaper, Die Welt, and republished by The New York Times on March 24, 1966, the Soviets charge the Chinese with provoking border disputes and with spreading allegations that the Soviet Union unlawfully holds Chinese territory in the Far East.⁶ The Chinese representative at the consultations on border questions threatened that the Chinese authorities would consider "other ways" of settling the territorial question and stated "It is not out of the question that we will try to restore historical right."⁷

In this same letter the Soviets indicate their belief in the nationalistic, expansionist character of the Chinese government by

⁶The New York Times, 24 Mar. 1966, p. 14 C.

⁷Ibid.

stating that "New facts constantly prove the readiness of the Chinese leaders to sacrifice the interests of the national liberation movement to their chauvinist big power plans."⁸

Professor Hans J. Morganthau of the University of Chicago has succinctly described communist China in these terms: "I'd say China is a traditional imperialist power, a great power with great inner strength and a natural expansionist tendency. It is a seat of a secular religion - Communism - which believes it is the wave of the future. China is also a great civilization, a great culture which has an enormous attraction all over Asia."⁹

The foregoing summary of current views on the expansionist character of Communist China points to the conclusion that China's behavior toward other nations is motivated by her desire to become a major world power. Historically China has been expansionist and her current actions in Southeast Asia are consistent with this historical pattern. As the dominant power in Asia, she will endeavor to establish hegemony over the smaller nations adjacent or near her borders. She will be intolerant of pro-western regimes near her. Whether the attempt of the United States to contain China within her present borders and to support pro-western governments in South Vietnam, Thailand, Formosa, and South Korea will lead to war between the United States and China depends on the Chinese leadership's assessment of the world and the US, China's military

⁸Ibid.

⁹The New York Times Magazine, 13 Mar. 1966, p. 29.

and economic strength, and the resolution with which the United States maintains and enforces the containment policy. Until China acquires a sizable stockpile of atomic weapons and a delivery vehicle, the forecast is for further strife or proxy wars in the nations near her borders.

Communist China's Objectives

China's foremost foreign policy objective is to achieve big power status and concomitantly to expell the United States from Asia, thereby achieving Chinese hegemony over those Asian nations now considered pro-western. To realize this objective she is furnishing materiel and technical assistance to the North Vietnamese in support of the war against South Vietnam, is supporting insurgent groups in Thailand and Malaya, and has exerted political influence and economic pressure to support and maintain neutralist governments in Cambodia and Burma.

China also aspires to become the leader of the communist world, to become the model communist state, and to transform the nations of the earth into communist states according to the Chinese model. This objective brings her into conflict not only with the capitalist countries but also Russia and the communist states which follow the Russian model. She also hopes ultimately to regain territory from Russia which once belonged to China.

The Risk of War

The struggle in Vietnam is of extraordinary importance to Communist China and the United States because it has become a test

case which each side feels it cannot afford to lose. The war is a test of the United States' willingness to use its power and resources to protect the nations of Asia against Communist aggression; a test of U.S. military, political, and economic strategy and tactics against the revolutionary strategy of Mao Tse-Tung and Ho Chi Minh; a test of the U.S. policy of containing China; a test for leadership and influence among the communist and neutralist nations between China and the U.S.S.R., and therefore a focus of power politics.

Because of the symbolism and political ramifications of the outcome of the struggle in Vietnam, this war has become a key in China's drive for power in Asia and for a coalition of Asian communist parties. And it is a key in China's effort to swing the "third world" to China's side. Therefore the danger of escalation of the war increases the longer it goes on. Each side will be motivated to escalate in an effort to win because of the influence on other nations victory or defeat will have. China may intervene directly in the war if she feels that her intervention will win it. She may also intervene if such intervention is necessary to prevent a North Vietnamese defeat. However, she undoubtedly prefers not to intervene and risk destruction of her industries and other facilities produced since the Communist came to power, most importantly, her atomic bomb production facilities, and perhaps even her present Communist government.

The Washington Post on March 25, 1966 quoted a Filipino woman senator, Maria Kalaw Katigbak, home in Manila after a visit to Peking,

as saying that Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi warned during a meeting that China considers Haiphong the gateway to the Chinese Mainland and would be justified in entering the Vietnamese war if the United States bombs Haiphong or Hanoi.¹⁰ This is the latest in a series of statements over the past year by Chinese officials threatening intervention in the war in Vietnam. A year ago in March 1965 Chen Yi said that China would "intervene beyond any doubt if the existence of North Vietnam were threatened." Throughout 1965 Peking leaders made public pronouncements emphasizing the likelihood of an eventual war between communist China and the United States." China reportedly has disposed of much of her sterling balances and has bought gold and platinum ostensibly to withdraw assets that could be frozen in the event of war. Part or all of the six million tons of grain imported in 1965 is being held in reserve in case future shipments are cut off because of war with the U.S. according to Chinese informants.

Premier Chou En-lai, speaking at a Peking reception on 20 December 1965 marking the fifth anniversary of the founding of South Vietnam's National Liberation Front, the political organization of the Viet Cong said: "Should the United States insist on going along the road of war expansion and on having another trial of strength with the Chinese people, the Chinese will resolutely take up the challenge and fight to the end. Come what may, the Chinese

¹⁰The Washington Post, 25 Mar. 1966, p. A 20.

people will unswervingly side with the fraternal Vietnamese people and contribute all of our efforts to the defeat of the United States imperialism until final victory."¹¹

Mr. C. L. Sulzberger, The New York Times roving correspondent in a dispatch on 2 January 1966 wrote:

"Communist China is supremely disinterested in all efforts to find a peaceful solution to the Vietnamese war on any basis other than total U.S. surrender. The Peking regime made this entirely plain to responsible interlocutors shortly before the start of President Johnson's peace offensive. . . . As far as it can control the situation Peking wants war at any price. Should current peace efforts fail, the conflict may well be escalated, involving first Laos and Cambodia, then Thailand, and ultimately perhaps China itself. China is prepared to accept the risk even though it acknowledges extended war might destroy all the revolution's accomplishments. . . . Peking sees the Vietnamese war as only the first battle in its own long range struggle to achieve a form of global hegemony and therefore as a battle that must be won."¹²

Roger Hilsman, former Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, testified on 1 February 1966 before the House Foreign Affairs Far Eastern subcommittee that the United States and Communist China are on a collision course that can only result in war.

¹¹"Chou Asserts U.S. May Extend War," New York Times, 21 Dec. 1965, p. 1.

¹²"Foreign Affairs: China - War at Any Price," C. L. Sulzberger, New York Times, 2 Jan. 66.

As long as China maintains its policy of support to "wars of national liberation" and as long as the United States comes to the assistance of those governments that resist the Chinese, the danger of escalation of these conflicts into a war between China and the United States is an ever present danger. If present antagonistic policies are maintained, war can be considered likely when Chinese military strength has increased to the point that it can challenge the U.S.

China's Capability for War

The threats of the Chinese communists are backed up by the military forces and economic resources of a second rate power. China's leaders are still in the process of trying to convert an almost medieval economy into a modern industrial state. On September 30, 1965 Chou En-lai said that China needed at least another 20 years to become really strong.¹³

Because she lacks a modern navy and air force, China can exert significant military power only on the Asian mainland. Here she can field a formidable force composed of the largest army in the world - 2,500,000 troops backed by 12 million militiamen. This army is trained both in conventional and guerrilla warfare. The infantry is armed with Chinese made copies of Russian World War II burp guns, and is supported by light and medium mortars, rocket launchers,

¹³Berger, Virgil "Years Needed for Strong China, Chou Says" Washington Post, 1 Oct. 1965.

recoilless rifles and artillery. About 4,000 Russian T-34 tanks are on hand but are obsolete compared to U.S. types. This army is dispersed and suffers from weakness in transportation equipment and strategic mobility. Nevertheless, because of its enormous manpower and mass, its discipline and loyalty, China's army is a powerful force when employed in Asian conflicts.

China's Air Force of 3,000 planes consists mostly of obsolete Russian models, of which only about 300 are bombers with the remainder being predominately MIG-15 and MIG-17 fighters. She has a few modern MIG-21's. Of her approximately 30 submarines, all are obsolete by U.S. standards. Her surface navy which consists of a few destroyers, 250 patrol craft and 700 armed junks, can offer little opposition to the U.S. Navy.

Communications in China are primitive and her transportation system and industrial complexes are vulnerable to U.S. air attacks. Until these weaknesses are overcome China's military strategy will follow Mao Tse-Tung's dictum "the decisive factor is man, not materiel." Mao counts on drowning any opponent in an ocean of people.

Despite Mao's often expressed faith in the Chinese people to overcome any adversary, he recognizes the importance of nuclear weapons and a means to deliver them on his enemies. Mr. Robert S. McNamara, U.S. Secretary of Defense, in his address to the NATO Ministers on 15 December 1965, said that China could have a medium range ballistic missile with a nuclear warhead operational as early as 1967. Launchers for these missiles could be deployed by 1969.

Deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles which could hit Europe or the United States is possible by 1975. China will produce enough fissionable material in the next two years to start a small stockpile of atomic weapons, Mr. McNamara predicted.¹⁴ China's third test of an atomic bomb will probably take place in 1966.

The immediate significance of China's nuclear weapons program is that she will be able to threaten the nations of Asia including Formosa and Japan with destruction, i.e. to engage in nuclear blackmail. In approximately ten years when she will have thermonuclear weapons and a means to deliver them on the United States and Europe, the pro-western nations of Asia may lose faith in the ability and willingness of the United States to protect them. Some of the now pro-western nations will likely take a neutralist position at that time or perhaps seek to develop or purchase their own nuclear weapons. Anticipation of this situation could cause the Chinese to tolerate for a time pro-western regimes in Asia.

The acquisition of nuclear weapons is an important step for China in her quest for big power status. A war with the United States now would risk destruction of Chinese industry and the facilities for atomic weapons production; therefore such a war appears to be one which should be avoided from the Chinese point of view. For this reason most students of Communist China do not believe that she will

¹⁴Braestrup, Peter "McNamara Warns NATO of Chinese Atomic Threat" New York Times, 16 Dec. 1965, p. 1.

intervene in the war in Vietnam unless it escalates to such an extent that China feels that her security is threatened. Even so, U. S. News and World Report states that intelligence analyses indicate that China and North Vietnam together could sustain no more than four or five divisions, fewer than 100,000 men including supporting elements, in the unlikely event that China decided to intervene.¹⁵ This estimate is considered too conservative by others who maintain that between 15 and 20 divisions could be supported. Regardless of which estimate is more nearly correct, the Chinese lines of communication would be vulnerable to air attack and the U.S. has the strength to handle the higher estimate.

The Wars That China Wants

Some Asian scholars have indicated that one can easily be led astray trying to divine Chinese intentions. Instead, they advocate the study of Chinese capabilities as a more valid basis on which to plan American strategy. Therefore because of her weaknesses in naval and air forces, and her lack of deployable atomic weapons, China is in no position for a direct confrontation with the United States in an all out war. These weaknesses have led China to turn to guerrilla war as an alternative strategy.

Chinese military capability to support wars of national liberation in countries in Asia, her activities with respect to

¹⁵U.S. News and World Report, 4 Apr. 1966, p. 30.

North Vietnam, Thailand, and Malaya in supporting insurgent groups, are indications that she intends to achieve hegemony over Southeast Asia by this strategy. Mao sees the United States as having weakened herself by occupying many places in the world, overreaching herself, stretching her fingers out wide and dispersing her strength. He thinks that the fingers of the American hand can be chopped off one by one with Vietnam the place for the chopping to begin.

The site for the next chop is likely to be Thailand. In 1965 Foreign Minister Chen Yi stated that "we hope to have a guerrilla war in Thailand before the year is out."¹⁶ In December Peking announced the formation of the Patriotic Front of Thailand, an insurgent group headed by former Thailand personnel now operating from China, who have the objective of overthrowing the present Thai government and establishing a "peoples democracy." Guerrilla bands are active in both the northeast region and the Kra Isthmus in the south. Over twenty political assassinations have been reported during the last year and agitators are active among the 60,000 Vietnamese refugees who have fled to Thailand's northeast territory. In the south Chin Peng and 500 guerrillas who fled Malaya in 1960 after the failure of their twelve year insurrection against the British form a communist nucleus which is recruiting Moslem Malays to form an insurgent force.¹⁷

¹⁶Newsweek, Vol. LVII, No. 5, 31 Jan. 1966, pp. 35-41.

¹⁷"Thailand, The Anatomy of a Domino". Newsweek, 31 Jan. 1966, pp. 35-41.

Brigadier General Samuel B. Griffith, USMC, Ret., a long time student of China, has been quoted as seeing "a good potential" for a Vietnam type in India's northeast area, possibly starting in 1967. This view is shared by other authorities and there is substantial evidence that this area is receiving attention in Peking. In a January 1966 article published in the Washington Post, its New Delhi correspondent Warren Unna quoted Indian officials as fearing that China has begun a long term harassment of the eastern border with the specific objective of penetrating India's tribally unstable Northeast Frontier Agency.¹⁸ This would permit China to break loose from the geographical confines of the Himalayas and begin to mix with the peoples of the subcontinent. The Chinese would then infiltrate and subvert in the revolutionary manner.

On January 1966 the Chinese official press agency Hsinhua reported that China had warned India that if intrusions and provocations continue along their Himalayan border "the Chinese side will resolutely strike back." This warning was contained in a Foreign Ministry note handed the Indian Embassy on 6 January 1966. Chinese support of Pakistan against India is also part of this threat. The course of the war in Vietnam likely will influence the course of Chinese aggression against India.

On 13 January 1966 Hunhua announced that China was giving assistance to a new clandestine organization dedicated to

¹⁸"A Chinese Plot" Warren Unna, The Washington Post, 2 Jan. 1966.

the overthrow of the Government of Malaysia. The announcement said that a mission of the National Liberation Army of Malaya headed by P. V. Sarma had been welcomed to Peking. Mr. Sarma asserted that his organization would utilize Chinese Communist revolutionary tactics in seeking dismemberment of Malaysia.¹⁹

In addition to inciting, sponsoring, and supporting wars throughout Southeast Asia, the Chinese, according to the Russians, are trying to provoke a war between the U. S. and the Soviet Union so as to leave China as the dominant world power. In the letter to other communist parties published in The New York Times on 24 March 1966, the Soviets describe Peking's strategy in these words: "It is evident that the Chinese leaders require a long-lasting war in Vietnam in order to maintain international tensions, in order to portray China as a besieged fortress! There is every reason to insist that one of the aims of the Chinese leadership's policy is to bring about a military conflict between the USSR and the U. S. They desire a clash of the USSR with the United States so that they may, as they say themselves, 'sit on the mountain and watch the fight of the tigers.'"²⁰ The evidence, for example, hindering Soviet shipments of materiel to South Vietnam, seems to support the Soviet charge.

¹⁹Topping, Seymour "Red China Helps Malaysia Rebels," New York Times, 14 Jan. 1966, p. 1.

²⁰The New York Times, 24 Mar. 1966, p. 14 C.

Chinese Strategy

Mao sees guerrilla warfare as the inevitable path for communist victory:

"Apart from armed struggle, apart from guerrilla warfare, it is impossible to understand our political line and, consequently, to understand our party building . . . We know that in China there would be no place for the communist party and no victory for the revolution without armed struggle. For eighteen years the development, consolidation, and Bolshevization of our party have been undertaken in the midst of revolutionary wars and have been inseparable from guerrilla warfare."²¹

Lin Piao in his Chinese treatise for dealing with the United States and the capitalist countries titled "Long Live the Victory of the Peoples War" declares that unlike Soviet leaders "revolutionary people never take a gloomy view of war." Lin also says: "In the final analysis, the whole cause of world revolution hinges on the revolutionary struggles of the Asian, African, and Latin American peoples who make up the overwhelming majority of the world's population. The socialist countries should regard it as their international duty to support the people's revolutionary struggles in Asia, Africa, and Latin America."²²

²¹Schram, Stuart R., The Political Thought of Mao Tse-Tung, New York, Praeger, 1963, p. 257.

²²Piao, Lin, "Long Live the Victory of the Peoples War", Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 3 Sept. 1965, p

Despite the use of communist rhetoric in vilifying both the United States and the Soviet Union, Chinese foreign policy objectives seem to be essentially nationalistic and her behavior is logically explained in terms of a nationalistic, expansionistic power trying to become a major world power and especially to dominate Asia. Because of lack of military strength and because of the experience of her leaders in successfully utilizing guerrilla warfare to achieve political objectives, she is continuing to use guerrilla tactics to expel Western influence from Southeast Asia. This may take many years but at the same time China is developing atomic weapons and delivery means to enhance her stature as a world power and to be able to project that power on areas presently beyond her reach.

The Prospect for Change in Communist China's Policy

There is almost no prospect for change in China's foreign policy objectives as long as Mao Tse-Tung, or his heir apparent Liu Shao-Chi, are in power. Mao is 72 years of age and reportedly is in poor health; Liu is 68. Some experts foresee a change when the third generation of leaders come to power. Professor Donald S. Zagoria of the Columbia Research Institute on Communist Affairs said: "Some of the contending leaders in Communist China may already have come to believe that Mao's foreign policy has been a disaster and they may be looking for alternatives."²³

²³Austin C. Wehrwein, "Two China Experts Question Mao's Leadership," The New York Times, 24 Mar. 1966.

A. Doak Barnett of Columbia's East Asian Institute who testified before a Senate Committee on March 8, 1966 believes that successors to Mao eventually will start feeling pressures and criticism from the administrators and technical bureaucrats, who can be expected to argue that more moderate and rational policies are the only ones that will work.²⁴

Dr. Morton H. Halperin of Harvard predicts: "The third generation of Chinese leaders may come to abandon their faith in revolutionary power as it becomes clearer and clearer it is doomed to failure."²⁵

The experts quoted above apparently base these observations on the assumption that the communists will be defeated in Vietnam and other areas of Southeast Asia. Success in Vietnam or in other places will doubtless perpetuate present policies. The Chinese, being pragmatists, are likely to change unsuccessful policies after a suitable trial period. However, since present policies are designed to achieve objectives that are nationalistic and are long standing and historic in character the change may be a long time in coming. The pattern of gradual mellowing in Soviet Russia may very well be repeated in China when the technicians and bureaucrats eventually occupy positions of power and emphasis becomes focused on improvement in living standards. The pressures of her rapidly

²⁴"How Dangerous is Red China," U.S. News and World Report, 4 Apr. 1966, pp. 29-31.

²⁵Ibid.

increasing population and her scarcity of resources, the extreme nationalism being indoctrinated into all Chinese, together with achievement of atomic weapons capability may foster the continuation of her expansionist policies and the concomitant danger of war. The rice bowl of Southeast Asia may be a necessary target area to feed China's people. A hegemonic relationship with Japan would provide badly needed industrial capability to raise living standards and to challenge the U. S. if war comes.

Herbert L. Duncan
HERBERT L. DUNCAN
Colonel, Ordnance Corps

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12. "Thailand: The Anatomy of a Domino." Newsweek, Vol. LXVII, No. 5, 31 Jan. 1966, pp. 35-41.

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13. The New York Times Magazine, 13 Mar 1966, p. 29.

(Professor Frank N. Trager of New York University is quoted on the history of Chinese expansionist tendencies. Professor Hans Morgenthau of the University of Chicago is also quoted.)

14. The New York Times, 24 Mar. 1966, p. 14C.

(This is a translation of excerpts from the Soviet letter to communist parties concerning the Sino-Soviet dispute and is an account of Soviet views of Chinese objectives.)

15. The Washington Post, 25 Mar. 1966, p. A-20.

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(This is an account of a visit to Peking by an organization seeking to overthrow the government of Malaysia and the statement of the Chinese that assistance would be given to the organization.)

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