

712CD

75TH MORSS CD Cover Page

you would like your presentation included in the 75th MORSS Final Report CD it must f

- Be unclassified, approved for public release, distribution unlimited, and is exempt from g and other export approvals including the International Traffic in (22CFR120 et seq.); export licensi aulations Arms Re U.S. 1.
 - 12CD as the first page of the presentation; Include MORS Form
 - DEADLINE: 14 June 2007 (Late Be turned into the MORS office no later than: Have an approved MORS form 712 A/B and
 - submissions will not be included.)

<u>Author Request</u> (To be completed by applicant) - The following author(s) request authority to disclose the following presentation in the MORSS Final Report, for inclusion on the MORSS CD and/or posting on the MORS web site.

Name of Principal Author and all other author(s)

Mark A. Rivera

Huntington Beach, CA. 92647-2099 5301 Bolsa Ave MC H017-D420 Boeing Phantom Works, SD&A Principal Author's Organization and address

714-896-1789 714-372-0841 Phone: Fax:

mark.a.rivera@boeing.com

A/B. If the title of the presentation has changed Email: Form 712

Disclosure

Please use the same title listed on the 75^{TH} MORSS please list both.)

Original title on 712 A/B:

Quantifying the Military Effectiveness of Persistent ISR

If the title was revised please list the original title above and the revised title here:

PRESENTED IN:	
WORKING GROUP: 5 and 7	DEMONSTRATION:
COMPOSITE GROUP:	POSTER:
SPECIAL SESSION 1:	TUTORIAL:
SPECIAL SESSION 2:	OTHER:
SPECIAL SESSION 3:	
This presentation is believed to be: Unclassified, approved for U.S. export licensing and other export approvals including	public release, distribution unlimited, and is exempt from the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (22CFR120 et



U.S.

seq.)

Report Documentation Page				I OM	Form Approved IB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.						
1. REPORT DATE 01 JUN 2007		2. REPORT TYPE N/A		3. DATES COVERED		
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Quantifying the Military Effectiveness of Persistent ISR			5a. CONTRACT NUMBER			
			5b. GRANT NUMBER			
				5c. PROGRAM E	LEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S)			5d. PROJECT NUMBER			
				5e. TASK NUMBER		
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER		
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Boeing Phantom Works, SD & A Huntington Beach, CA 92647-2099				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER		
9. SPONSORING/MONITO	RING AGENCY NAME(S) A	ND ADDRESS(ES)		10. SPONSOR/M	ONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
			11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)			
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release, distribution unlimited						
^{13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES} See also ADM202526. Military Operations Research Society Symposium (75th) Held in Annapolis, Maryland on June 12-14, 2007, The original document contains color images.						
14. ABSTRACT						
15. SUBJECT TERMS						
16. SECURITY CLASSIFIC	ATION OF:		17. LIMITATION OF	18. NUMBER	19a. NAME OF	
a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE UU UU				OF PAGES 16	RESPONSIBLE PERSON	

Standard	Form	298	(Rev.	8-98)
Pres	cribed b	y AN	SI Std	Z39-18



Engineering, Operations & Technology Phantom Works

Dhantom

Quantifying the Military Effectiveness of Persistent ISR

Presented at 75th MORSS June 12-14, 2007

Mark A. Rivera Boeing Phantom Works Strategic Development & Analysis









- Persistent ISR Study Objective
- Persistence Defined
- Modeling & Simulation
- Measures of Effectiveness
- Architecture Design Search
- Summary

P-ISR Study Objective



- Develop a process for exploration and design of cost effective Persistent Intelligence, Surveillance, & Reconnaissance (P-ISR) architectures
 - How much persistence is enough to provide critically needed utility?
 - What is the cheapest way to get there?





Engineering, Operations & Technology | Phantom Works

- Means to quickly explore and compare a wide variety of P-ISR architecture designs
 - Included air and space assets
- Means to quantify the military effectiveness of those designs
- Means to quantify the cost of those designs

This briefing will focus on the second bullet and partly on the first

What is meant by "Persistent" ISR?

Engineering, Operations & Technology | Phantom Works

Definition used in analysis:

Persistence matches the frequency of revisit with the "time stability" of the object that you are looking at—the speed with which things change.

John Stenbit, Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration



Revisit rate required for persistence is scenario specific

How much Persistence is enough?



Engineering, Operations & Technology | Phantom Works

Approximate Scenario Time Stabilities				
Target Type	Time Stability			
Construction of Uranium Enrichment Plant	Months			
Massing of Forces	Days			
Movement of Mobile Missile launchers	Minutes/Hours			
Subversive Activity at Infrastructure Sites (Oil pump, Power stations)	Seconds/Minutes			
Human Detection and ID (i.e., Human Bomb)	Seconds			
Border Crossings (Humans and Vehicles)	Seconds			

Effectiveness levels off at the time stability of key dynamic observables in the scenario



You don't want to buy more persistence than you need

M&S Required to Quantify Value of P-ISR

Engineering, Operations & Technology | Phantom Works

- Persistence required is scenario specific so you must: Define a specific scenario and mission goals
- Define quantifiable Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) for achieving those goals
- Define force structures, assets, and capabilities of red and blue forces
 - Blue forces have P-ISR capability
- Model and simulate to determine a force-on-force outcome
 - as a function of P-ISR performance
 - Persistence (Revisit Rate)
 - Data quality (Prob. Of Detection)
 - Data latency (comm/process delays)



You must have good degree of M&S to capture this response

Systems Effectiveness & Analysis Simulation

Engineering, Operations & Technology | Phantom Works

- SEAS is a multi-agent force-on-force reactive simulation
- Blue forces receive P-ISR information in an NCO enabled environment
 - They don't care where or how the information is *originated*, only that they get what they need when they need it
- Blue forces still have some capability even with diminished or absent P-ISR information
 - Indigenous capability determines residual effectiveness
 - Also determines response to decreased/increased ISR
- Red forces have some ability to react and counter
 - Adversary capabilities also determine effectiveness of blue force
 - Both residual and ISR enabled

SEAS simulates blue force's improved ability to respond to a capable adversary as a result of acquiring P-ISR information

Effectiveness and Information

Engineering, Operations & Technology | Phantom Works



Mission effectiveness can be determined by "dialing" architecture performance (information) independently of a specific architecture

Capturing Effectiveness Response



Engineering, Operations & Technology | Phantom Works

- MOE responses are captured in multi-dimensional look-up tables.
 - The result of 1000's of SEAS simulation executions
- Variations on level of persistence and accuracy of data can be quickly determined during architecture design searches



Search & Rescue Scenario

Locate and rescue a handicapped but mobile rescuee in enemy territory

Evade detection by enemy

Avoid combat engagements

MOE response surfaces provide a means for rapidly determining mission effectiveness as a result of any given P-ISR architecture

Measures of Effectiveness Types



Engineering, Operations & Technology | Phantom Works

SEAS / MATLAB Scenarios can Provide These MOEs

- Probability of Mission Success
 - Probability of meeting primary objective(s) i.e. rescue, secure, destroy, etc.
- Mission Duration (Time Improvements)
 - Time to secure an asset or infrastructure under attack
 - Time to neutralize enemy capabilities and assets
- Range of Effectiveness
 - Neutralize enemy from further away (stand-off weapons)
- Cost Effectiveness
 - Required manpower & equipment to achieve a given objective
- Survivability
 - Casualties and Equipment Losses (including those from friendly fire)
 - Duration and probability of survival
- Evasion & Stealth
 - Probability of evading enemy attack assets or danger areas
 - Probability of evading enemy sight
- Lethality
 - Enemy Casualties and Equipment
- Non-combatant Losses
 - Casualties, Assets, Infrastructure, etc.

Architecture Design Search











- Boeing PW has developed a means for quickly exploring cost effective designs of P-ISR architectures
- Revisit rate required for "Persistent" ISR depends highly upon the scenario and mission
 - You don't want more persistence than you need
- Value of P-ISR information depends entirely upon a force's ability to respond to the information
 - The indigenous capabilities of both blue and red forces
- Quantifying increased effectiveness as a result of being provided with P-ISR information requires a high degree of Modeling & Simulation
 - Multi-agent reactive simulation is a must



Engineering, Operations & Technology Phantom Works

2011 Phantom

Backup Charts



BOEING is a trademark of Boeing Management Company. Copyright © 2007 Boeing. All rights reserved.

EOT_PW_icon.ppt | 1/4/2007 | 15

Urban Operations Scenarios & MOEs

Engineering, Operations & Technology | Phantom Works

Embassy Rescue		Search & Rescue		Rescuee Survival		Infrastructure Attack
Probability of Rescue		Probability of Rescue		Probability of Survival		Time to Secure
Mission Durati	on	Mission Durat	tion	Survival Durat	tion	Probability of Securing
Probability of Blue Casua	lty	Probability of Blue Casua	alty	Probability of Red Casua	lty	Probability of Blue Casualty
Probability of Red Casual	ty	Probability of Red Casua	llty			Probability of Red Casualty

MOEs Provided in our study