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TOMORROW THE WORLD

By

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USAWC RESEARCH ELEMENT
(Essay)

Tomorrow The World

by

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Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania
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SUMMARY

Communist expansionism, a major force of the 20th Century, constitutes a continuing challenge to the Free World and particularly the United States. Against this expansion the United States has sought to erect a containment barrier, but world conditions are such that Communist ability simply to generate chaos and possibly breach or leap the barrier must not be discounted. Once in power the Communists have yet to relinquish it, and they use their power to subvert their neighbors. To prevent further Communist expansion the United States must maintain the barrier and tolerate no foci of infection behind it. Specifically the United States must do what is necessary to win in Vietnam and eliminate the threat of Cuba in Latin America. The threat of communism will remain, but it will be contained, and conditions will hopefully have been created for its dissolution and for constructive action to solve the other world problems in the course of time.

TOMORROW THE WORLD

Headlines of the recent past have read, "Revolt In _____." Subcaptions say, "Students Riot. Unemployed Attack Army. Guerilla Bands Active." We in the United States have become inured to such news. When the headlines are repeated in the near future about Country X in South America or Country Y in Africa we will shrug our shoulders and wish they would learn to keep their house in order. Only a few of us will recognize the pattern when subsequent headlines proclaim, "X-ian Liberation Front Formed. Guerilla Chieftain Named Head of Peoples Democratic Army. Terrorism Ravages Country." Fewer still will realize the consequences when the headlines become, "People's Democratic Republic of X Recognized By Communist States. Demand X Be Seated In United Nations." The cycle will be complete when we learn that, "X Denies Aggression Against Neighbor Z. Deplores Z's Oppression Of People," followed by, "X Supports Z Rebels. Promises Support For Peoples War." At this point we will be asking what went wrong? How did it happen? Who is to blame?

This, you say, is unfair. It reduces to absurd simplicity the most complex issues. It ignores fundamental questions of political constraints, national aspirations and frustrations, the forces of modernization, and many other basic issues. I agree, but I hasten to add--nothing succeeds like success. In 1917 the fate of communism was confined to the sealed railroad car in which the Germans transported Lenin to Russia. Not quite fifty

years later Communist leaders control fourteen countries with one-third of the world's population, including the world's largest and most populous states, with some seventy-seven active Communist parties in other countries. This, too, reduces to basic simplicity a number of complex and controversial issues, but the results are historical fact. Moreover Communist expansionism today continues to be as determined as it was during the past fifty years. The theoretical headlines are simply a projection of the past into the future. Substituting Thailand, Dominican Republic, Indonesia, The Congo, or any of a host of other countries for X puts the headlines into perspective. Substituting South Vietnam for X makes the consequences for us all too real.

The expansion of communism ranks as the major political event of the twentieth century to date. Certainly a company listed on the New York Stock Exchange with a comparable rate of growth would command fantastic earning multiples. The dismantling of western colonial empires following World War II pales in comparison with this vast increase in Communist power. It is also of particular significance that, with the exception of one tragic week in Hungary in 1956, no country has emerged from the Communist yoke once it has been imposed. Such a record clearly indicates the magnitude of the Communist challenge.

We are too prone to minimize this challenge. We assert the importance of the fact that the Communists have never come to power by means of free elections, conveniently ignoring the

examples of San Marino and Kerala. When these cases are brought up, we cite their insignificance, again ignoring the very particular circumstances which compelled the Communists to surrender the power they had gained. Only history will tell whether Kerala and San Marino were insignificant or portents. We cite the agricultural failures of communism as evidence of its inapplicability in today's world and inability to meet the needs of the people, ignoring the low place the people's needs occupy in the Communist scale of values. Stalin's Russia and Mao's China by historical example have made very true Lenin's proclamation, "And we declare that the masses will starve until the Red Army triumphs." We take solace from the seeming contradiction between Communist theory and the managerial needs of a modern industrial society, ignoring the Communists ability to work their way out of this dilemma as they have out of others in the past. We also ignore the significance of Communist access to the granaries of the west, as evidenced by Herbert Hoover's humanitarian American Relief Association of the 1920's and the more recent Free World wheat sales to China and Russia, although the humanitarian motivation in the latter case is open to question.

Such sophistries obscure the real facts of Communist expansion. The essence of communism--the exercise of power based upon force unrestricted by law--is so antithetical to our concepts and values that we reject it out of hand. Yet it is the basic tenet of Communist expansion. Lenin seized power from the Kerensky

government in 1917 and exercised it to force communism upon Russia. Stalin's dictatorship was power based upon unrestricted force. The absorption of the Baltic States and establishment of Soviet hegemony over Finland were exercises of force. The creation of the Communist bloc in East Europe had as its base the power of the Red Army of Occupation. The change in power relationships between Mao and Chiang caused the loss of China to communism. This in turn eventually resulted in the continuation of North Korea as a Communist state and the enhanced power potential of North Vietnam. In sum, communism came to power in five countries--Russia, China, Yugoslavia, North Vietnam, Albania--through the use of revolutionary force under Communist Party discipline against governments debilitated or destroyed by world war. In eight other countries--Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Mongolia, North Korea, Poland, Rumania--communism was imposed under the aegis of Soviet occupation forces. Only Cuba breaks the pattern, and here the nature of the Batista dictatorship and Castro's successful hoodwinking of the United States created what may be considered a special case. And although the continuation of these Communist regimes is based upon force, as Hungary made amply clear, no major country as yet has been able to throw off the Communist yoke.

The concept of the Communist states as foci of infection appears to apply to this chronology of Communist expansion. The original infection took hold in Russia and built in strength.

During a period of strain and resulting weakness it moved into surrounding areas, each one of which reinforced the basic illness and threatened neighboring areas. An offshoot took root elsewhere in the body politic, and finally there emerged the full threat of the disease with basic illness centered in Russia and China, surrounded by corrupted governments, and a new infection building in Cuba.

The analogy is not too farfetched. We must realize that the Communists consider themselves continually at war with us and that our destruction is necessary to their survival. As does an infection, so will they move into each area of weakness. They call them revolutionary situations, and the world abounds in them. Where they have established beachheads, as in Cuba or North Vietnam, they will use them to subvert or infect their neighbors. Their objective is the eventual elimination of all but Communist states from the world community. It is the Red version of Hitler's cry: "Today Germany is ours; tomorrow--the world!"

For me there are two statements that encompass this aspect of the Communist threat. They are:

When the Communists took over Marx's immutable science they equipped themselves with the most potent weapon ever devised for building and rationalizing a totalitarian dictatorship, and for fomenting unrest and ill will between man and man everywhere in the world.¹

The Lenins, Stalins, and Khrushchevs come and go; Communism remains. The prospects are for the

¹Harry and Bonaro Overstreet, What We Must Know About Communism, p. 37.

continuation of the indefinite and irreconcilable conflict between democracy and communism.²

Adding to these statements the Communist concept of the inviolability of the socialist states and their concomitant right to infect their neighbors fills out the dimensions of the threat.

We know some of the results of this threat. Under the containment policy we have entered into alliances and positioned U.S. forces around the globe to restrict the physical encroachment of communism into contiguous areas. Since World War II we have been engaged in a continuous series of confrontations with Communist expansive pressures, have fought the Korean War, and are fighting the Vietnamese War. We have spent billions both on our military posture and on the reinforcement of our allies' military capability. Additional billions have gone toward the necessary objectives of economic assistance and development of the Free World. All this to maintain a barrier against further Communist expansion.

But a barrier that cannot be breached can be leapt, and in Cuba the Communists have done just this. They have established a focus of infection on the other side of our geographical barrier, and using the concepts of inviolability and infection of contiguous areas they are exploiting Cuba in every possible way. Further, assisted by the normal and traditional processes for

²Robert Strausz-Hupe, "Back to Sanity," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. LXXXIV, May 1958, p. 31.

conducting international affairs, the active Communist parties in other countries are being readied for the creation of new Cubas--new foci of infection behind the containment barrier. The Dominican Republic is an example, and unless the Communists are similarly frustrated, the United States and the Free World must anticipate that the near future will bring active Communist states in South America, Africa, and Southeast Asia--one or all. That we are not faced with this in Indonesia today is apparently a result of Communist miscalculation, not our opposition.

This is not to say that the containment policy is wrong, or that the Korean War was, and the Vietnam War is, in vain. The geographical barrier, its strength and credibility must be maintained. The dimensions of the threat simply exceed the capabilities of this one response. We must think through again all aspects of the Communist challenge and evolve a means of coping with this challenge in its full dimensions.

It is time for me to say again that I recognize the too simplistic nature of these arguments. The forces of change at work in the world are definitely not all communistic. I recognize that communism is an idea, and ideas or ideologies are not normally defeated by military force. The effects of nationalism, modernization, population growth, feudalistic societies, economic imperialism, and a host of other factors are inextricably involved in this confrontation between communism and freedom. I am not arguing that these factors do not present challenges and problems

which must be solved. I do, however, accept the premise that these factors create tensions, conflicts, and discontents that the Communists can manipulate, organize, and ultimately use as vehicles for achieving power. Then having achieved power, they maintain it by force, have yet to relinquish it, and constitute a more formidable military threat than before.

Military power is thus the sine qua non for Communist maintenance of power and an essential element in their further expansion. In this context I then see United States military power as the sine qua non for preventing Communist expansion and an essential element in countering the threat of communism as an ideology which foments unrest and ill will, as an opponent in an indefinite and irreconcilable conflict, and as an inviolable system of states free to subvert or aggress against their neighbors.

With these concepts in mind, perhaps we should look for a moment at the world through Communist eyes. Undeniably the first thing we would see would be the military might arrayed against us on all our land borders and backed by the massive power of the United States. I doubt if we would believe our own propaganda and see NATO, CENTO, and SEATO as aggressive threats to our security, but rather as constraints upon our aggressive (we would call them liberating) intentions. These treaty organizations would deter us to some extent, but we would recognize that they cannot be equally strong everywhere. Furthermore, United States

unwillingness to even consider the use of nuclear weapons except in retaliation to atomic attack is becoming more and more evident. At very little cost to us we would keep probing, keep the pot boiling here and there. Local Communist parties, dissident groups such as the Kurds, de Gaulle's differences with his allies, Pakistan-India hostilities--all would be useful for distracting the West. The high point, of course, would be Vietnam. Here we would be delighted to see the United States so completely embroiled in a World War II hangover, so obviously fighting Asiatics at great expenditure of manpower and dollars with concomitant increases in Free World tensions. We would conclude that the advantages for us lay in continuing the conflict to the last North Vietnamese.

It would be beyond the barrier of treaty organizations, however, that we would see our greatest opportunity. Everywhere we looked we would see new nonviable nations, old feudalistic states, unstable ex-colonial countries. Endemic to all would be the problems of population growth outstripping economic growth and per capita food production, the desire for modernization conflicting with tribal or ethnic heritages, inadequate governmental apparatuses struggling with insoluble problems. Even though they were not of our making, we would see in the Arab-Israeli feuds, the Latin and South American poor, the Rhodesia-Black Africa crisis, the Cypress problem, grist for our Communist mill. Surely within this hodgepodge of tribes masquerading as nations,

racial conflicts, and poverty, we will be able to achieve another takeover of government by Communists. It happened in Cuba without our really trying. If we work at it long enough, we will succeed. Then we will have another local base of operations to support guerrilla and insurgent movements in contiguous areas to hasten the coming of world communism.

There are other features of the countryside behind the barrier that we find very attractive. One of these is the very low risks we run in seeking our objectives. If we simply avoid posing a direct threat to the United States, as we so unwisely did in our Cuban missile adventure, our risks are limited to the expulsion of our personnel or the loss in popularity of local Communist parties. Such things are very minor compared to the chance to achieve power, particularly when having gotten power we know how to keep it and use it to expand. We also like the low cost of operating in these lands behind the barrier. It is true that promoting insurgency operations requires some funds, some trained manpower, and some diversion of equipment. The funds, however, are generally not large; the manpower is often indigenous; and the equipment is inexpensive, obsolescent, and surplus to our needs. All in all it is a happy combination of limited risks and limited costs toward unlimited objectives.

The most favorable aspect of all is that we do not have to succeed. Recognizing that the United States is our enemy, that the United States is involved in and must react to each crisis,

we know that each insurgency situation we can foment or exacerbate complicates U.S. problems. Each time we can cause the United States to intervene militarily, to spend additional dollars, to take sides in deep-rooted enmities, we further disperse United States power, increase U.S. resource expenditure, diminish Free World international support, and make it more difficult for the United States to meet present commitments and cope with future crises. In sum we have a built-in measure of success even when we fail to meet our objectives. Given the problems that afflict the world, we therefore conclude that simply creating chaos is a legitimate Communist objective. Chaos by itself strikes at our primary enemy while providing a fertile condition for our eventual assumption of power. Yes, the world beyond the containment barrier holds many pleasing aspects for us Communists.

Once again, you say, this is too simple. The Communists do not have this freedom of action. Not only do you ignore the Sino-Soviet split, you do not even differentiate between Russian and Chinese communism. In addition there are serious constraints on both countries--economic strains, agricultural failures, transportation inadequacies, ideological schisms. Again I reply that you are right, but the restraints are restraints on capabilities, not intent, and creating chaos in today's world is well within Communist capability. With regard to the Sino-Soviet split, at least one facet of their argument revolves not around the question of "burying us." Here they agree. Their disagreement centers on

how, when, where, and how deep. To paraphrase Mr. Khrushchev, since shrimp have not yet learned to whistle I am forced to conclude that Communists are still Communists.

Look at the problems facing us again, keeping in mind the Communist objective of obtaining power in a state and using this power to infect or subvert adjoining areas. Do we honestly believe that we can do more than make a start even in the next ten years on such problems as: the world population explosion; land reform in Latin and South America; creating viable political entities in the welter of so-called African states; coping with the problems of racism both in the United States and abroad; the creation and distribution of sufficient food to alleviate famine let alone malnutrition and hunger; and the growing disparity between the have's and have not's which has become known as the revolution of rising frustrations. These and many other similar problems will beset us for many years. Each of them by itself is a fertile seedbed for Communist growth. It does not matter that the Communist appeal is false; it only needs to be plausible. As I write this the results of the Guatemalan elections are not yet available, but an emerging pattern for a Communist beachhead is discernible. To date the history of Columbia under the Alliance for Progress is almost a classic example of Marxist-Leninist doctrine on the failure of the bourgeoisie to care for anything but their own prerogatives. In such a world the refutation of Communist propaganda is more than difficult; denying its appeal is foolishness.

What then is the answer for the United States? If we cannot make more than a start on the problems that generate communism, if the Communists can achieve their objective of chaos if not actually gaining power, if we do not wish or dare to obliterate the Communist states, what can we do? Are we to be faced with an endless series of Koreas and Vietnams, a proliferation of Cubas, and a diminishing world influence?

The answer, I think, is that we have started to do rather well, and if we continue our pressure on the Communists after we win in Vietnam we will do even better. By this I mean that at long last we have begun to undermine militarily the two basic tenets of Communist expansion that I referenced earlier--the inviolability of the Socialist states and the right to infect their neighbors therefrom. Communism of course remains, but the military maintenance of the barrier, which is basically a quarantine, isolates the infection and makes evident the falsity of Communist performances versus its promises. Of at least equal importance, the quarantine helps to constrain within the Communist bloc the disruptive forces--economic, political, psychological, and social--which are the best hope for the fragmentation of Communist power and eventual removal of the Communist yoke.

In the military area the bombs that are falling on North Vietnam have a shock wave that extends throughout the Communist world. In effect the leaders in other countries are saying to Moscow and Peking, "You told us we were safe under your protection,

but look what is happening to our fellow Communists." In Thailand, U.S. military and political action is countering the threat to that country. In the Dominican Republic, Communist expansion was dealt a punishing blow. On our side of the barrier ideas are taking root which eventually can lead to constructive cooperation in attacking the world's problems. Not the least of these ideas is the dawning realization that Communists foment trouble, aggravate existing problems, and seek to frustrate any solutions but their own. It will take many years and many dollars and much patience, but hopefully we will achieve a world truly safe for democracy.

Militarily we will face hard problems and difficult decisions. Our fundamental guideline should be to reduce the military problem to one of containment. We should tolerate no new foci of infection breaking out behind our quarantine, nor sanctuaries when the Communists attempt to breakout by direct or indirect aggression. We must do what is necessary in each situation to enforce these conditions. Eventually this means making it hurt the Communists when they try their adventures. It is not a rollback philosophy, rather it is a quid pro quo of a basic order.

In this regard we must become more tough-minded than we have been in the past. By now we have shed enough blood and spent enough money to be aware that these periodic crises are the warp and woof of Communist expansionism. From the Greek insurgency to Vietnam and all the turmoil in between we must have learned that

we are dealing with a pattern and plan for world domination which has us as the principal enemy. The time has come to halt these aggressions in a manner which makes it too costly for the Communists to continue. I am not advocating that we attack Russia and Red China directly, but I am convinced that we must dare more and risk more in countering their aggressive thrusts. The alternative is that endless series of Koreas and Vietnams by which the Communists plan to destroy us and achieve their objective. We must recognize that the nuclear threat is a deterrent to both sides and that the escalation ladder has many rungs. We stepped up one when we bombed North Vietnam and made their aggression hurt at home. In new situations in the future we shall have to step up again to make aggression unsafe and undesirable to them.

To be specific I believe that this means winning the Vietnam War in a manner not yet contemplated officially. Today we have really a strategic problem of Southeast Asia, not just a tactical Vietnam War. To win we will have to deal strategically with Thailand, Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia. This entails recognizing that of these countries only Thailand is a true state; the others are by-products of French colonialism whose fate it is to be the current friction point in the not so cold war. While we want no North Vietnam territory, we do want peace in the area and a secure South Vietnam. Achieving these objectives requires cutting off outside support to the insurgents and/or breaking the will of North Vietnam to provide this support. In my opinion, given the

nature of the Vietnam War and the advantages to Russia and China of continuing it, we shall have to do both. Doing so will require far more destructive bombing of North Vietnam, a sea blockade of both North Vietnam and Cambodia, and a ground invasion to cut North Vietnamese lines of communication to the south. It is unfortunate that the topography of the region precludes taking this latter action within existing political geography, but the topographical facts are that the region to the south from Laos to the China Sea can only be made secure by a reconstitution of the barrier along roughly the nineteenth parallel. Such escalation is part, and a very hard part, of doing what is necessary to achieve our objectives in Vietnam. By so doing we will create a maintainable military barrier against external support to the insurgents, should eventually realign Cambodia from its status as a Communist sanctuary and supply base, and greatly increase the security of Thailand. The alternative, as I see it, is an indecisive continuation of our present open-ended commitment in Vietnam which the Communists proclaim will be a war to the last North Vietnamese. Such a war, enduring over many years, would be a catastrophe, and would not deter Communist expansion in other than South Vietnam, assuming that the Communist thesis that our political determination will weaken and we will withdraw does not prove to be correct. We must also face the fact that the possibility of a confrontation with China is inherent in both alternatives should they decide to match their irrational words with irrational deeds.

Cuba will also have to be confronted and realigned. Castro's exploitation of Latin American problems will prove intolerable in the long run. Here we are directly attacking the tenet of the inviolability of the Socialist Camp. I am not advocating immediate invasion, but we or the Organization of American States must use our control of the Caribbean Sea and the air over it to combat Castro's attempts at subversion of his neighbors. This must be coupled with an economic war against Cuba which will result in Castro becoming unbearable to the Cubans themselves. Our objective should be to create conditions which will either obviate the need for an outside invasion or will insure the success of any political and/or military action against Castro. These are actions and techniques that we would not choose if we had a choice, but we must act on the principles of reducing our problem to one of containment and the elimination of foci of infection behind the barrier.

There will be other challenges and other risks. Simply maintaining the barrier in view of President de Gaulle's attitude and actions will be a major problem. We must expect recurrences of pressure upon Berlin. The Communist powers cannot be expected to submit tranquilly to erosion of the tenets on which their expansion is based. Nonetheless, though we may not be able to teach shrimp to whistle, we can hope to teach Communists that expansion

does not pay, and in the long run even that communistic
dictatorship under any name can not be forced on mankind.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Anthony R. Parrish".

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