


# STUDENT ESSAY

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22 April 1966

## PEACE IN VIETNAM--AN ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION

By



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USAWC RESEARCH ELEMENT  
(Essay)

Peace in Vietnam--An Acceptable Solution

by

Col Joseph F. H. Cutrona  
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US Army War College  
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania  
22 April 1966

## SUMMARY

"Peace in Vietnam--An Acceptable Solution," is a study of the issues in Vietnam today and an analysis of possible solutions to the problem. The issues are defined by using public statements and official documents originating with officials of the United States, North Vietnam, China, and South Vietnam. A report by the Legal Committee of the Internal Control Commission for Vietnam is also used.

The presentation of issues reveals that both sides indicate support of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and would accept a solution which imposed the conditions of the Accords. The real issue becomes the meaning of the words "free elections." The Communist concept is hardly that of the Free World; nor is there any indication that the Communists would accept the type of supervision of elections which would insure "free choice" in its true sense.

A review of the subject of violation of the Accords reveals that the Internal Control Commission for Vietnam reported that the North Vietnamese violated the Accords first. While there is also evidence that the South Vietnamese violated the Accords, the evidence indicates that these violations were a reaction to aggression from the North. The United States did not sign the Accords, but President Eisenhower made a statement upon their promulgation in which he pledged that the United States would react strongly to any violations. That pledge is being upheld today.

The essay considers four possible alternative solutions for Vietnam ranging from capitulation by the United States to continued military pressure until US offers of unconditional negotiations are accepted. An analysis of these alternatives leads to the conclusion that in the present climate of world opinion, the United States must continue to offer unconditional negotiations and accept any opportunity to negotiate. However, the recommendation includes continuing military pressure until negotiations have produced the desired results.

Following recommendation of a solution for Vietnam, the means of implementing that solution are considered. Whether or not the Viet Cong should be included as conferees is discussed as well as means of supervising disarmament and free elections.

The proposed procedure includes accepting the Viet Cong as conferees. However, their position is as protagonists who must agree to stop fighting; not as representatives of a government or a people. Actually, the solution goes further by proposing that the demilitarized and pacified Viet Cong, as a political party, be permitted a role in the future government of South Vietnam. However, their role is not to be in an artificial coalition but only as a political party sponsoring candidates for election--in free elections properly supervised.

Supervision of disarmament, pacification of the Viet Cong, and free elections are to be accomplished by representatives of the 17 nonaligned nations who have already conducted meetings as an informal organization.

## PEACE IN VIETNAM--AN ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION

Once the stage is set, once the issues are defined--if the issues can ever be clearly defined in a situation such as that found in Vietnam, an approach can be made toward resolving the differences which exist. Undoubtedly there is no solution which would be fully acceptable to all protagonists. The possible solutions are myriad. The goal of this analysis is to consider possible solutions in the light of the problem, and to reason to an acceptable solution.

While the real Vietnam problem is deeply-seated in the many years of Chinese, Japanese, and French control of this Southeast Asian country, the crisis which will be considered here dates from the Geneva Accords of 1954. The Accords provided that there would be no establishment of any new military bases, and that there would be no military bases under the control of any foreign state. Further, both parties agreed to insure that the zones assigned to them were not used for the resumption of hostilities or to further an aggressive policy.

The United States was not a signatory to the Geneva Accords but clearly established a national policy with respect to the agreement through a unilateral official comment by President Eisenhower. The President's statement said in part:

. . . but, as loyal members of the United Nations, we also say that, in compliance with the obligations and principles contained in Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, the United States will not use force to disturb

the settlement. We also say that any renewal of Communist aggression would be viewed by us as a matter of grave concern.<sup>1</sup>

The grounds for US involvement were established by North Vietnamese action to incite hostile activities in South Vietnam in violation of the Geneva Accords. This violation was cited in a report of the Legal Committee of the Internal Control Commission for Vietnam issued on 2 June 1962, which said in part:

. . . there is evidence to show that the PAVN (People's Army of Vietnam) has allowed the Zone in the North to be used for inciting, encouraging, and supporting hostile activities in the Zone in the South, aimed at the overthrow of the Administration in the South.<sup>2</sup>

The same report by the Control Commission indicated that the South Vietnamese had also technically violated the Geneva Accords by introducing military personnel and equipment above the prescribed limits. However, the report clearly established that the South Vietnamese actions were a defense against aggression and subversion from the North.

While initial US involvement did not include American fighting units, the United States was committed from the start to any action necessary to prevent aggression. The original intent was merely to advise the South Vietnamese and to assist them with materiel. However, when the situation worsened and some regular forces were

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<sup>1</sup>US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Background Information Relating to Southeast Asia and Vietnam, p. 60 (referred to hereafter as "Congress, Background Information").

<sup>2</sup>Congress, Background Information, pp. 90-91.



introduced by the North, it was necessary to increase aid to comply with the initial pledge.

The North Vietnamese and Viet Cong, on the other hand, consider the United States to be the aggressor and to be acting in violation of the Geneva Accords. They do not admit that they have initiated aggression except in response to United States actions. They purport to be supporting the Geneva Accords and charge that US intervention prevents implementation of the Accords.

This is the situation. The issues are clearly defined by official statements of the adversaries. The Foreign Minister of South Vietnam has set forth the fundamental principles of a "just and enduring" peace:

1. An end to aggression and subversion.
2. Freedom for South Vietnam to choose and shape for itself its own destiny "in conformity with democratic principles and without any foreign interference from whatever sources."
3. As soon as aggression has ceased, the ending of the military measures now necessary by the government of South Vietnam and the nations that have come to its aid; and the removal of foreign military forces from South Vietnam.
4. Effective guarantees for the freedom of the people of South Vietnam.

The above conditions form the basis for the United States' position. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, commenting on these principles, has said:

We indorse those principles. In essence, they would constitute a return to the basic purpose of the Geneva Accords of 1954. . . . Once the basic points set forth by South Vietnam's Foreign Minister were achieved, future relations between North Vietnam and South Vietnam

could be worked out by peaceful means. And this would include the question of a free decision by the people of North and South Vietnam on the matter of reunification.<sup>3</sup>

Ho Chi Minh, in responding to the Christmas-New Year 1965-1966 US peace offensive, reiterated the North Vietnamese conditions for negotiations:

1. The US must completely and unconditionally end its bombings and all acts of war against North Vietnam.
2. The US must stop its aggression in South Vietnam.
3. The US must withdraw its troops and armaments from South Vietnam.
4. The US must let the Vietnamese people settle their internal affairs themselves.

The North Vietnamese also insist that the political arm of the Viet Cong must have a decisive voice in the government of South Vietnam.

While it may appear to be an oversimplification, the alternatives open to the United States can be reduced, in essence, to four:

1. Get out of Vietnam now without any conditions.
2. Meet the North Vietnamese preconditions for negotiations and then negotiate for settlement at the conference table.
3. Continue the fight without agreeing to negotiations until the Viet Cong aggression ceases and all North Vietnamese influence in South Vietnam is withdrawn.
4. Continue to exert military pressure with occasional cessations of bombings during concerted peace drives until the North Vietnamese agree to a "no-conditions" conference.

The first of these alternatives can be rapidly eliminated as being completely incompatible with the United States' position on Vietnam.

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<sup>3</sup>US Government, The White House, Why Vietnam, pp. 13-14.

It would give up South Vietnam, and, eventually, all of Southeast Asia. It would be an admission that there was no validity to the United States' position and would abandon an ally whom three Presidents have pledged to defend.

Actually, the issue transcends the Vietnam situation. The United States pledged to support the Geneva Accords. The Control Commission later verified that North Vietnam had violated the Accords and that there was aggression in South Vietnam. This North Vietnamese violation of the agreement it assertedly supports, plus such demonstrated intent to expand "Wars of Liberation" as the Chinese and North Vietnamese subversion in Thailand, legislate against a policy based on capitulation.

The second alternative, to meet all North Vietnamese conditions, affords little more than the first alternative; except perhaps the formality of a conference. Agreeing to the conditions stipulated by the North Vietnamese would be to abandon South Vietnam to the same extent as in the first alternative. Once the conditions are accepted, little more could be accomplished by a conference than definition of the details of compliance on issues already settled by the US default. The second alternative is not an acceptable solution.

The third alternative, to force the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong to withdraw by applying overwhelming military force, is probably the most acceptable solution in view of the antithetical nature of the North Vietnamese and US positions. The real purpose of the US involvement is to provide an environment in which the South Vietnamese

can establish a viable government which will guarantee the security of the individual citizen and permit him to improve his social and economic position. Once this basic environment is established through removing Viet Cong pressure, the eventual goal of assuring each citizen a voice in the selection of a government for South Vietnam, and in the decision concerning unification with North Vietnam, is a feasible objective. This stability can be achieved, and an orderly environment provided, by driving the aggressors out of South Vietnam. Alternative three, therefore, becomes a feasible objective.

Although the application of overwhelming military force may be the most efficient means of forcing North Vietnamese and Viet Cong withdrawal, it is doubtful that such a solution would be politically acceptable. A solution for Vietnam cannot be divorced from US relationships with other nations. The United States must maintain a position of prestige and retain the respect of other nations to insure favorable relations. Many nations in the world community are urging negotiations and decrying military escalation as lessening the possibility of peaceful solution of the Vietnam problem. Some have even questioned the authenticity of United States offers of negotiations. Any solution which does not include the offer of negotiations would unfavorably affect the position of the United States in the community of nations and lessen support of United States policies. In this light, alternative three becomes at best a fall-back solution in the event some more favorable solution cannot be achieved.

Alternative four recognizes that a negotiated solution would place the United States in a more favorable position in the community of nations. President Johnson recognized this when he conducted an all-out peace effort during the Christmas-New Year period just past. One of his main purposes was to convince the world community of the sincerity of US offers for unconditional negotiations. This goal was accomplished. The apparent failure of this peace offensive to produce unconditional negotiations must not preclude further efforts. However, while continued offers of unconditional negotiations are appropriate, it is essential to continue military pressure to convince the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong that they cannot achieve a military solution and that negotiation offers the only feasible and desirable means of ending the conflict. For these reasons, alternative four is recommended as the most desirable of the alternatives considered here.

Making a choice between the various alternatives open to the United States and assessing the relative merits of those alternatives is by far the easiest of the steps which must be taken by the United States. Determining the bases for negotiation and proposing actions and procedures which will provide Vietnam the opportunity to determine its own destiny without being influenced unduly by external forces, or even by insurgent, dissident or revolutionary internal forces, presents the real challenge which must be met.

When all of the vituperation, charges, and countercharges have been swept aside so that opposing positions become clear, there is, on the surface, full agreement on one basic issue: that the 1954

Geneva Accords should be implemented. All contenders agree that the Accords provide for free choice on the part of the Vietnamese. This is where the basic disagreement arises. The definition of "free choice" is entirely different in the eyes of the Communists than in the eyes of those to whom "free choice" and "self-determination" are meaningful.

The North Vietnamese, the Viet Cong, and their Communist supporters, all insist that the Viet Cong political arm must have a major role in the South Vietnamese government, and that their principles must form the basis of the government and any free elections in Vietnam. That free elections are not compatible with the Communist system is most evident from observation of any Communist state. The fact is made even more emphatic by the very conditions under which the Communists would hold "free elections" in Vietnam--under the conditions prescribed by the Viet Cong.

The United States holds that the elections, and the establishment of the future Vietnamese state, must be based upon "free choice" as it is generally accepted by the free nations of the world. In this case, what is called for is supervision of elections by neutral and impartial observers, and elimination of pressures upon the voters.

It is obvious that this cannot occur under the present conditions of Viet Cong terrorism. Those who live in areas under Viet Cong control are not free to make a choice without the most dire results. Similarly, those in areas not now under Viet Cong control

are susceptible to Viet Cong terrorism prior to the election; or to retaliation after the election.

In North Vietnam, a free election is most unlikely. The North Vietnamese would not agree to supervision. This is certainly not an indication of good faith and resolve to comply fully with the Geneva Accords. Failure to accept impartial supervision is clearly a bar to satisfactory solution of the Vietnam problem.

The United States seeks elections with confidence. There is no record of any state selecting a Communist regime in truly free elections. However, the United States fully realizes that this choice could well be made. The only insistence is that the choice be truly free. Once the conditions of a "free election" have been met, the United States will agree to withdraw its troops. How to establish and maintain these conditions throughout the period of solution, then, is the real problem. It is somewhat doubtful if the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong will ever accept the imposition of conditions which would guarantee free elections. However, if the Viet Cong political arm was given a role in the solution, it is possible that acceptable conditions could be established.

It would be of little value to discuss a basis for negotiations and a recommended US position unless there was some opportunity for the United States to present this position at a peace conference. There will be no conference unless the question of conferees is settled. The North Vietnamese insist that the Viet Cong must be

full-fledged participants in any negotiations. The South Vietnamese say that they will never accept the Viet Cong, whom they refer to as the "National Enslavement Front," as conferees. The United States has indicated that, although they might not accept the Viet Cong as separate negotiators, they would accept them as part of the North Vietnamese representation.

It is certainly impossible to eliminate any consideration of the Viet Cong and to maintain a position that they have no role. The Viet Cong provide a major portion of the force which is opposing the South Vietnamese and the United States on the battlefield in Vietnam. Any solution to the Vietnam conflict must necessarily include specific actions which the Viet Cong will be required to take as steps toward ending the fighting and establishing peace.

To achieve this, the Viet Cong must be accepted as conferees on the basis of their position as active protagonists. They will not be considered as a nation which can agree to the solution of broader political issues, but must be a party to the overall agreement since the full solution must insure compliance by the Viet Cong or be unsuccessful.

The South Vietnamese would possibly agree to participation of the Viet Cong in a conference as protagonists if it was clear that they were not considered as representatives of any government, or territory, but primarily as a revolutionary combatant group. The other protagonists in the Vietnam conflict would also, of necessity, be conferees; but they would have the added status of representing



governments and nations. If the fighting is really to end, and remain halted, all four protagonists must not only pledge an end to combat, but must actively comply with the conditions mutually accepted at a conference in which all participated.

Now it is appropriate to consider the questions which must be satisfactorily answered by the conferees:

1. Withdrawal of forces.
2. The role of the Viet Cong.
3. Means of insuring free elections.
4. Issues to be decided by elections.

Certainly the United States would not agree to withdraw troops from South Vietnam until basic guarantees were provided. These guarantees should insure that South Vietnam will be free to establish viable government down to the hamlet level without any coercion imposed by insurgent or dissident groups. The conditions for troop withdrawal should certainly provide that North Vietnamese elements be withdrawn immediately; and that North Vietnamese serving in Viet Cong units be withdrawn as early as this could be accomplished. Similarly, the Viet Cong, as well as any civilians not members of government forces, must be disarmed to preclude unwanted violence.

The above conditions for withdrawal of US forces from Vietnam would be a bitter pill for the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong to accept. However, violence cannot be precluded unless only those forces which are controlled by duly constituted authority are permitted to bear arms. Recognition of the Viet Cong as an authorized

political party permitted to engage in supervised political activities in competition with other political parties will make the disarming phase of the operation more acceptable to the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong.

It is questionable that the disarming could be fully accomplished. But if a system for disarming unauthorized persons were established, and procedures for detecting and prosecuting those who did not comply with disarmament regulations were effectively implemented, this phase of the operation could be carried out in such a manner that the possibility of the resumption of terrorism would be minimized.

Certainly, such disarmament could not be supervised or enforced by US elements if the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong are to be expected to accept the conditions. However, accomplishment of a large portion of this activity in a manner acceptable to impartial observers would be a prerequisite to withdrawal of US troops from Vietnam. As a first move, or proof of intent, US forces would be withdrawn into the troop bases, and such bases established as enclaves. During the period of disarmament, US troops would be retained in these enclaves and could be employed only upon request of the South Vietnamese government for specific assistance in a specific situation; and then only with the approval of the neutral observers.

Impartial, neutral observers have been mentioned above in connection with observation of disarmament procedures. This group would be a most important and significant element in the overall agreement. It is doubtful that a system of peace enforcement could be set up in

the United Nations unless the basic peace force issue is first resolved--and this does not appear likely at the present time. Such observers, responsive to the conditions of the agreement developed at the aforementioned negotiations, could be provided by the seventeen nonaligned countries who on 15 March 1965, urged unconditional negotiations:

. . . to achieve a political solution to the problem in Vietnam in accordance with the legitimate aspirations of the Vietnamese people and in the spirit of the Geneva Agreement on Vietnam and of the conference of nonaligned countries held in Cairo.<sup>4</sup>

While there is not a formal organization of nonaligned countries with a permanent secretariat, these nations have at times gathered together and have met to at least discuss if not formalize policies. The seventeen countries which have participated include Afghanistan, Algeria, Ceylon, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Iraq, Kenya, Nepal, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Republic, Yugoslavia, and Zambia. These countries are certainly varied enough in background and far enough removed from the actual sources of conflict that they should be acceptable to both sides. It is also significant that these nations made a specific proposal with regard to the situation and that this was a group proposal, formally made pursuant to the direction of the conference of the heads of state or government of these nations held in Cairo in October 1964.

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<sup>4</sup>Great Britain, Foreign Office, Recent Exchanges Concerning Attempts to Promote a Negotiated Settlement of the Conflict in Vietnam, pp. 25-26.

It would be necessary for these nations to meet to accept the responsibility of supervising the enforcement of any agreements made as a result of negotiations between the protagonists and to establish an appropriate "Control Commission" organization similar to that of United Nations peacekeeping forces. In this case, it would be appropriate for the nations involved as primary parties to the conflict to bear the costs of such supervision. Therefore, it is proposed that the United States, South Vietnam and North Vietnam share the expenses of the operations of the "Control Commission" of "Nonaligned Countries." The Viet Cong, as a "nonnation," would not contribute.

While the first task of the "Control Commission" would be to supervise the disarmament of the irregulars in South Vietnam and the withdrawal of North Vietnamese units, the eventual task would be to supervise the establishment of a basis for free elections in both North and South Vietnam. The provisions of the agreement should be that unification of North and South Vietnam will be effected only if independent elections in the North and South each agree to unification. A negative vote in either North or South Vietnam would preclude unification. Further, the "Control Commission" would certify to the treaty signatories that the elections were free and devoid of any pressures.

Following the Geneva Accords, there was no indication at any time that conditions conducive to free and truly representative elections were present. There were no adequate procedures to establish such conditions either in the North or in the South. The

Accords allowed a period of two years for the establishment of such conditions. However, the problem of disarmament of irregulars and disengagement of major forces was not part of the problem at that time. In the present case, a period of three years following the withdrawal of United States forces from Vietnam would be more appropriate. The signal for withdrawal, according to this plan, is the completion of disarmament and disengagement. The three year period following the return to conditions more nearly approaching normalcy would provide time to permit readjustment of economic and political factors which were certainly far from normal during the protracted period of warfare. Particularly important would be time to accomplish correction of those conditions caused by wartime inflation and a disproportionate distribution of assets.

Political parties should not be permitted to commence operations leading toward free elections for the selection of government officials until the disengagement of forces is complete. It is anticipated that this will take nearly a year. Although not all US forces would necessarily be withdrawn from Vietnam by this time, political activity would be appropriate even during such withdrawal once it had been established that the protagonists had in fact been disengaged.

A general election for government officials could be conducted both in the North and in the South within six months after completion of the troop withdrawal. The final phase of the solution would be general elections on unification in both North and South Vietnam. These elections would be conducted two years following completion of troop withdrawal from South Vietnam.

Thus far, the discussion of the conditions of the proposal for agreement has included the withdrawal of forces in some detail as well as means of insuring free elections. Although an allusion was made to consideration of the Viet Cong as an authorized political party, the specific role to be permitted the Viet Cong in the future of Vietnam was not detailed. Such consideration is a critical part of any solution since the views of the protagonists on the role of the Viet Cong are diametrically opposed. The Viet Cong and North Vietnamese hold that the Viet Cong political organization is not only a political party but the only valid government in South Vietnam at this time. The United States and the South Vietnamese do not accept this position in any respect. The next step in the solution, then, is to attempt to reconcile these differences in a manner which could be acceptable to both sides.

While the Viet Cong political element cannot be ignored as a political party nor denied some participation in the future of Vietnam, it cannot be permitted to participate in the future under any conditions which might allow it to operate as a force for "liberation" in the Communist sense of taking over the government. Any terrorist tendencies or revolutionary type activities must be eliminated if the Viet Cong as a political party are to be acceptable to the South Vietnamese and the United States. On the other hand, the solution must permit sufficient valid participation in the future to satisfy both the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese if the proposed solution is to be acceptable to the Communist protagonists.

Disarmament would be a first step in normalizing the Viet Cong political organization, and making it more acceptable as a political party. A second step would be registration. All Viet Cong would be required to register as a basic requirement for political recognition. Those who did not register would be considered as outlaws and handled as such. Registration would be accepted as a formula for amnesty. Only those who register would be permitted to engage in political activity of any type--to include voting.

Many have proposed that a coalition government be established as the vehicle to control South Vietnam during the period immediately following a cease fire. This would be disastrous, and would most likely lead to a Communist takeover as it has in most cases in the past. The cessation of hostilities would not automatically normalize the operations of a guerrilla organization which has exploited terror for many years. Not only have they not acted as citizens; they have acted as a "countergovernment" even to the extent of demanding and collecting taxes in areas they were able to terrorize even for brief periods.

Since one of the marks of citizenship is payment of taxes to a valid government, it is proposed further that another measure of "normalizing" the Viet Cong be the payment of taxes. Payment of legal taxes would be a prerequisite for voting--not only by the Viet Cong but by all citizens. This would be one means of measuring valid citizenship.

After the period of "humanizing" or "normalizing," the Viet Cong, as a political party, would be permitted to participate in political activities and to nominate candidates for election. This proposal, then, does not agree to a mechanical coalition which arbitrarily places representatives of all groups in the government. The present South Vietnamese government, which has been fighting the war to provide stability for its citizens, would continue to govern the nation until replaced by valid elections. As outlined above, these first general elections for public office would occur approximately eighteen months following the signing of an agreement, or some six months following withdrawal of United States forces from Vietnam.

The proposal discussed here accomplishes certain objectives the North Vietnamese demand as a prerequisite for negotiations; but only in a phased program to be accomplished under neutral supervision after an agreement has been signed. The Geneva Accords are placed in effect with appropriate guarantees. The Viet Cong are given a voice in the government, though not to the extent the North Vietnamese indicate they desire at this time. US troops are withdrawn, but withdrawal is delayed until after disarmament has been completed. Finally, all aggression is halted, but as an immediate aftereffect of the agreement, not as a prerequisite to negotiations.

On the other hand, the proposal basically meets US conditions. North Vietnamese units are withdrawn and Viet Cong aggression is halted. A guarantee that aggression will not be renewed is provided



by disarming the Viet Cong. The Geneva Accords are implemented under supervision of neutral observers. While the US has adamantly refused to recognize the Viet Cong political arm in any manner, this refusal cannot logically be extended to supervised activities of registered members of the Viet Cong as a political party in free elections to be conducted with adequate supervision if there is to be any hope of solution. The United States has taken the stand that, in truly free elections, it is confident that the South Vietnamese will not select a Communist form of government. This would put that theory to the test. That test of Vietnamese attitudes is essential if a lasting political solution to the Vietnam problem is to be achieved.

Many would hold that a military peacekeeping force is necessary as a means of enforcing the conditions of a truce. This would not be necessary if both North and South Vietnam were required by the agreement to make military forces available to the Control Commission to assist in enforcing the conditions of the truce in their respective portions of Vietnam. United States forces would be present in enclaves as an available backup to encourage compliance with the disarmament provisions of the agreement. Once disarmament is accomplished, US forces will no longer be necessary, and will be withdrawn from Vietnam.


There is one final question which requires an answer. That is, whether or not the United States should cease military operations when truce negotiations have been accepted and are underway. The

answer to this is an emphatic no. Agreement must precede cessation of hostilities just as is the case in any war--and the situation in Vietnam today is a war in every sense of the word. There must be no slackening of pressures, to include bombing of military targets in North Vietnam. No opportunity for unhampered reinforcement or re-supply can be provided if negotiations are to be meaningful and productive. The United States should go to the conference table with a specific and detailed proposal. The general conditions for agreement could be proposed prior to the conference as an indication of the extent to which the United States is prepared to go to insure political freedom in Vietnam. However, there must be no indication that these are preconditions to a conference and specific details must be reserved for negotiation. The proposal must still be for an unconditional conference.

The basic proposal for an acceptable solution to the Vietnamese problem outlined above, then, is that the United States must continue to exert military influence not only until the North Vietnamese agree to come to the conference table for an unconditional peace conference, but until agreement is reached at that conference. Further, the proposal outlines a series of conditions for agreement that might be acceptable to both sides. In brief, the steps to be taken to establish conditions under which valid free elections to determine whether or not North and South Vietnam are to be united provide for: disarmament and disengagement; withdrawal of US forces upon completion of disarmament; regularization of the Viet Cong political arm as a

political party but with no governmental role until elected to office in supervised general elections; and finally, a general election on unification in both North and South Vietnam, fully supervised by neutral observers.

This is but one solution from among many which might be proposed. However, it is one which offers the possibility of achieving the basic goals of both sides in the conflict. It is definitely a solution which provides a means of implementing the Geneva Accords with proper guarantees. It also provides a role for the political arm of the Viet Cong once that organization is "humanized" and "normalized" as a nonrevolutionary and nonviolent political organization. It is offered as an acceptable solution for peace in Vietnam.

  
JOSEPH F. H. CUTRONA  
Col, Artillery

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3. Beecher, William. "Vietnam Turnabout. With War Going Better, US Isn't as Anxious to Negotiate." Wall Street Journal, 14 Oct. 1965, p. 14.

(The author suggests that since the military tide appears to be changing in favor of the US, some think it is possible North Vietnam may withdraw its support of the guerrillas. The view is expressed that some authorities no longer look to negotiations as the most likely way of ending the war in Vietnam.)

4. Columbia Television Network. A series of analytical programs on Vietnam including interviews with government officials and analysis by veteran reporters.

(CBS presented particularly effective and thorough coverage of all Vietnam developments through a series of special programs. Included among those interviewed were supporters of current US policies, as well as those who do not support the policies. The result was a thorough appraisal of policy and a rather complete expression of divergent views.)

5. Drummond, Roscoe. "Peoples' Right to Choose--The Perils of Coalition: A Warning on Viet Cong." New York Herald Tribune, 25 Feb. 1966, p. 19.

(Roscoe Drummond discusses the dangers of coalition government and discusses a role for the Viet Cong.)

6. Eder, Richard. "Humphrey Scores Viet Cong as Unfit to Share in Rule." New York Times, 28 Feb. 1966, pp. 1, 5.

(Describes the split between the Vice President and Senator Kennedy over the role of the Communists in a Vietnam regime.)

7. "Excerpts from Rusk's Testimony before Senate Foreign Relations Committee." New York Times, 19 Feb. 1966, p. 2.

(Presents critical excerpts from Secretary Rusk's detailed summary of the US position on Vietnam and the basis for US policy.)

8. "Excerpts from the Testimony by General Taylor." New York Times, 18 Feb. 1966, p. 12.

(Significant testimony by General Taylor before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee providing an analysis and appraisal of US policy and efforts in Vietnam.)

9. Fall, Bernard B. The Evolution of Revolutionary Warfare--Indochina. Lecture. Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College, 6 Jan. 1966. (AWC L-65/66)

(Dr. Fall updated his views on Vietnam and a solution for Vietnam.)

10. Fall, Bernard B. Street Without Joy. Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: The Telegraph Press, 1961. (DS550 F3)

(This is the story of what happened to the French in Indochina and is excellent background for a study of the present situation in Vietnam.)

11. Fall, Bernard B. The Two Viet-Nams; A Political and Military Analysis. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963, rev. 1964, second printing 1965. (DS557 V.5 F3 1964)

(Bernard Fall brings to this study more than ten years of research in Southeast Asia. Mr. Fall not only paints the present situation and possible solutions but provides an excellent background study which provides a basis for analysis. This is an invaluable reference for any consideration of possible solutions for Vietnam.)

12. "Four Capitals Focus on Viet Talks." Washington Post, 14 Dec. 1965, pp. A-1, A-11.

(This summary of news dispatches from various capitals provides an indication of the various conditions for peace negotiations which have been proposed.)

13. Frankel, Max. "A Calm Rusk Holds Stage for Seven Hours." New York Times, 19 Feb., pp. 1-2.

(Analysis of Secretary Rusk's Vietnam testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.)

14. Gavin, James M. "A Communication on Vietnam." Harper's Magazine, Feb. 1966, pp. 16-21.

(This is the famous letter by General Gavin outlining his "enclave" theory for Vietnam.)

15. Goldberg, Arthur J. "The Quest for Peace in Vietnam." Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LIV, No. 1389, 7 Feb. 1966, pp. 197-201.

(UN Ambassador Goldberg reports on the US efforts to achieve peace in Vietnam.)

16. Great Britain. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Recent Exchanges Concerning Attempts to Promote a Negotiated Settlement of the Conflict in Vietnam. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1965. (DS557 V5 G72)

(This compilation of the texts of official messages exchanged concerning Vietnam is a most valuable source in tracing peace actions, and the views of the various protagonists. It is arranged chronologically and is easy to use. The authentic development of the situation is difficult to duplicate elsewhere.)

17. Greene, Felix. "President Ho Chi Minh is Interviewed on War." Washington Post, 14 Dec. 1965, pp. A-1, A-10.

18. "Hanoi's Insistence on a US Pullout Dims Parley Hope." New York Times, 24 Nov. 1965, pp. 1, 15.

19. Kenworthy, E. W. "Kennedy Agrees with White House on Vietnam Point." New York Times, 23 Feb. 1966, pp. 1, 12.

(Provides further clarification of Senator Kennedy's proposal with reference to Viet Cong participation in the future government of South Vietnam.)

20. Kenworthy, E. W. "Kennedy Bids US Offer Viet Cong a Role in Saigon." New York Times, 20 Feb. 1966, pp. 1, 2.

(Describes a controversial position by Senator Kennedy that the Viet Cong should have a role in the government of South Vietnam.)

21. Kenworthy, E. W. "Rusk Says Peace of World is Issue in Vietnam War." New York Times, 19 Feb., pp. 1, 3.

(An analysis of testimony by Secretary Rusk before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.)

22. Osanka, Franklin Mark, ed. Modern Guerrilla Warfare. New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962. (U240 08)

(Provides an excellent background on guerrilla warfare, covering the military, economic, sociological, political, psychological, and historical point of view. Has an excellent introduction by Samuel Huntington plus a most comprehensive bibliography on guerrilla warfare for those interested in deeper research.)

23. "Outline of US Position on Vietnam." Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LIV, No. 1387, pp. 115-116.

24. Pike, Douglas. "How Strong is the NLF?" The Reporter, 24 Feb. 1966, pp. 20-24.

(An excellent rundown on the NLF and its relationships with North Vietnam.)

25. "Review and Outlook. Vietnam: A Question of Practicality." Wall Street Journal, 14 Feb. 1966, p. 14.

(An analysis of the military problem in Vietnam as related to the political and humanitarian.)

26. "Secretary Rusk's News Conference of December 9." Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LIII, No. 1383, 27 Dec. 1965, pp. 1006-1013.

(Authentic comment by Secretary of State on progress toward peace in Vietnam.)

27. "Secretary Rusk's News Conference of January 21." Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LIV, No. 1389, 7 Feb. 1966, pp. 189-197.

(An excellent report by the Secretary of State on the US peace offensive.)

28. Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. Communist Plan to Conquer South Vietnam. Bangkok, Thailand: 1963. (DS557 V5S6)

(Though merely a pamphlet, this brief treatise clearly delineates the nature of Communist "Liberation Front" activity in South Vietnam.)

29. "Taylor Asserts A 'Limited War' in Interest of US." New York Times, 18 Feb. 1966, pp. 1, 12.

(An analysis of General Maxwell D. Taylor's testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during hearings on Vietnam.)

30. Taylor, Maxwell D. The US Government and Counterinsurgency. Lecture. Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College, 14 Jan. 1966. (AWC L-65/66)

(General Taylor provided an insight into how US policy in Vietnam was developed and the reasons for this policy.)

31. "The Advancement of Peace." Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LIV, No. 1389, 7 Feb. 1966, pp. 186-189.

32. The White House. Why Vietnam? Washington: US GPO, 1965.

(Exchanges of letters between US Presidents and Vietnamese officials, press conference statements and public speeches are used to develop the nature and reasons for US involvement in Vietnam. The US goals for peace are also definitively presented. There are few other references which so clearly define the nature of the US commitment and the US conditions for peace.)

33. Tregaskis, Richard. Vietnam Diary. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963. (DS557 V5 T73)

(This is an interesting and definitive eyewitness account of combat in Vietnam. It includes discussion of US advisor-Vietnamese relations. While it does not contribute material directly related to a political solution in Vietnam, it gives a feel for the combat situation and some idea of chances for success in combat.)

34. US Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Background Information Relating to Southeast Asia and Vietnam. Washington: US GPO, 1965. (DS557 V5U4 1965c)

(A highly important and useful reference which quotes official agreements and official statements. An opening summary of events provides a rather thorough brief history of significant events from 1948 to January 1965. The reasons for and the nature of US interests are clearly developed through statements of key government officials.)



35. "US Peace Efforts Reported to Members of UN." Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LIV, No. 1387, pp. 117-118.
- (A report by Ambassador Goldberg to the UN concerning the concerted peace drive by the US.)
36. "Vice President Humphrey Returns from Far East Mission." Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LIV, No. 1387, 24 Jan. 1966, pp. 114-115.
- (A personal report by the Vice President on his mission for peace.)
37. Warner, Denis. "Behind the Battlefield: A Search for Stability." The Reporter, 24 Feb. 1966, pp. 25-28.
- (Political aspects of the Vietnam problem are discussed as is the present strength of the government. The need for viability is emphasized.)
38. "What Are We Doing in Vietnam? How Are We Doing It? And Can We Improve Our Efforts?" The Journal of the Armed Forces, 26 Feb. 1966, pp. 2-3, 6, 20, 23.
- (An excellent summary article on General Taylor's testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.)
39. "Why We Are in Vietnam." Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LIII, No. 1383, 27 Dec. 1965, p. 1014.