

JOINT FORCES STAFF COLLEGE
JOINT ADVANCED WARFIGHTING SCHOOL

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS:
THE APPLICATION OF JOINT DOCTRINE

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

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Conclusions drawn from the analysis demonstrate that many of the failures could have been anticipated, if not avoided, by creatively applying the guidance in doctrinal publications for intelligence and civil-military or related operations. Doctrine will not meet all challenges presented in complex operations; problems stemming from technology or intelligence classification and releasability will continue to present challenges regardless of doctrinal guidance. The study concludes with a look at specific findings and potential solutions to overcoming them in future operations.

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ABSTRACT

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS: THE APPLICATION OF JOINT DOCTRINE by Larry A. McInnis, 85 pages.

This research examines select intelligence failures during complex contingency operations between 1990 to the present and considers whether adherence to joint doctrine might have alleviated these shortcomings. Four specific principles of joint intelligence are applied as a metric in this examination: Perception; Synchronization; Unity of Effort, and Collaboration. Analyzing the application of these principles across numerous small scale operations gave insight as to whether joint doctrine can be used as an anecdote for future complex operations.

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Introduction

The US military's role in national security expanded during the 1990s, taking on new missions that fell short of traditional warfare. General Anthony Zinni, Commander, US Central Command, implemented a program of Regionalization in an effort to expand military cooperation in the region. President Clinton backed General Zinni's efforts as part of his larger engagement approach to achieving global order – a multilateral and multinational interaction to implement US foreign policy.¹ These actions steered the military down a road of untraditional operations that continues today. The US Military lacks a military peer competitor; there are new and growing regions of instability (partly a result of globalization) that threaten our or our allies' national interests. Added to that, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review elevated Stability Operations to a level of importance on par with Combat Operations. The combination of these phenomena indicate that Civil-Military Operations (CMO) will persist for the foreseeable future.²

This research is focused on intelligence support to CMO during operations in the 1990's, lessons derived from those operations and, along with more recent intelligence dilemmas in the middle east and north Africa, whether those lessons have been captured in current joint doctrine to the extent necessary to improve operations in the 21st century.

The changing nature of military operations over the last 25 years coincided with two phenomena: The end of the Cold War and the Information Revolution. These are

¹ Anthony Zinni and Tony Koltz, *The Battle for Peace* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 194-195.

² Thomas P. M. Barnett, *The Pentagon's New Map* (New York: Berkley Publishing Group, 2004), 168.

both significant because they opened a wide range of sources and methods to provide information to military forces engaged in combat or other, less traditional operations.³

The hypothesis that guided this research was that if the Joint Force Commander's (JFC) intelligence staff applies current joint doctrine in planning and executing Civil-Military Operations (CMO), they will recognize the unique intelligence requirements of the 21st century warfighter and will produce relevant products that satisfy the Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIR) across the range of military operations.

Restated, the JFC's intelligence staff must evolve their approach to intelligence collection, analysis, production and dissemination to account for the unique information demands of unconventional military operations. Today's joint doctrine for intelligence captures the lessons learned and gaps identified during low-intensity or non-combat operations during the 1990's. Many of the improvements witnessed during operations in the following decade (e.g., Operations ENDURING FREEDOM, IRAQI FREEDOM and UNIFIED ASSISTANCE) support this hypothesis. Consistent application of joint doctrine will ensure that intelligence preparation of the operational environment produces data necessary to answer the CCIR's – including the nontraditional. Finally, Civil-Military Operations introduce cultural considerations that increase the complexity of intelligence analysis, synthesis and application. The new cultural paradigm through which intelligence must be considered is also captured, to a degree, in Joint Pub 2-0: Joint Intelligence.

³ Dorn, A. Walter. *The Cloak and the Blue Beret: The Limits of Intelligence-gathering in UN Peacekeeping* -- Charters, David A. *Out of the Closet: Intelligence Support for Post-modernist Peacekeeping* (Toronto, ON: Brown Book Company, Ltd, 1999), 45.

For the purposes of this work, CMO refers broadly to: Peacekeeping; peace enforcement; humanitarian assistance and disaster relief; Security, Stability, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) operations, and Civil Affairs activities. Additionally, the use of “traditional” in conjunction with “operations,” “combat” or “warfare” refers to large, organized force-on-force combat operations.

Civil-Military Operations present intelligence analysts with three specific challenges not faced in conventional warfare: Civil-sector issues and developments; new partners and sources from which the intelligence community cannot be isolated; numerous partners not previously encountered; and organizations heretofore foreign to the intelligence process.⁴ It can be argued, and often is, that intelligence support is germane across the range of military operations. Certain circumstances, however, make unique demands on intelligence staffs; CMO present such demands. CMO information requirements are atypical, however they do not replace, but are in addition to those necessary for traditional warfare.⁵

This research examines repeated intelligence shortfalls in light of recently published joint doctrine publications. Specifically, could the failures have been prevented by following these new doctrinal precepts or, conversely, were the failures the result of unrelated causes (e.g., nascent implementation of technological advances). The impact of the findings, if accurate, will be borne out in future operations as the US responds to growing global issues (health, wealth, economic growth and decline), complicated by problems such as world population growth, demographic shifts and increased urbanization. Such problems have the potential to draw US military forces into

⁴ Adam B. Siegel, “Intelligence Challenges of Civil-Military Operations,” *Military Review* (September-October 2001): 45.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 46.

stability operations across South America, Africa, and Southwest and east Asia as nations in these regions compete for strategic resources and attempt to resolve growing problems. Understanding the cause and effect relationships between intelligence mishaps and a lack of suitable doctrine will pay valuable dividends in directing the application of our intelligence resources, both fiscal and manpower, against future problem sets.

The Weinberger and Powell doctrines of the mid 1980s were derived from lessons learned in Vietnam and posed a rationale for committing US forces in conflict. However, rules like the application of overwhelming force did not account for challenges handed to the military during the 1990's.⁶ Today's doctrinal approach must include clear national objectives and sound exit strategies, to be sure, but must also accommodate operations that are global in scope, conducted against state and non-state actors and often times against undetectable adversaries. This requires a paradigm shift in military thinking and potentially the need for a new, much broader doctrine of war than those put forth by Secretary Casper Weinberger and General Colin Powell.

In approaching the research, it was deemed necessary to formulate a framework from current joint doctrine to evaluate lessons learned and related findings, and to be able to draw conclusions with regards the aforementioned claims – specifically that joint doctrine can successfully guide intelligence analysts in their responses to operational information requirements. The precepts for joint intelligence in Joint Pub 2-0, Joint Intelligence, form the basis of the framework used in this inquiry and are explained in detail in Chapter I.

Certain limitations guided the research to maintain the scope of the end product. The period considered was 1991 through 2007; however, the concentration of operations

⁶ Zinni, 86.

occurred during the last decade of the 20th century. Operations conducted after 2000 were reviewed to illustrate examples where past lessons could have or did influence recent operations. The number of operations selected and reviewed was limited due to time and constraints of the research project; the intelligence principles selected from Joint Pub 2-0 were also limited for the same reason. How cited examples were categorized across the framework of joint intelligence principles was largely subjective and many of the shortfalls discussed fit within two or three of the four joint principles examined. Finally, the research only dealt with unclassified sources of information. A review of classified holdings concluded that the subject could be reasonably discussed at the unclassified level.

Chapter I A Framework for Intelligence Support

The following paragraphs discuss four principles for the conduct of joint intelligence; they are introduced in Joint Pub 2-0, Joint Intelligence, and reiterated throughout the remainder of the document. These principles are appropriate at all levels of war and across the entire range of military operations. As such, they suggest a framework against which specific case-studies or examples of intelligence successes and failures can be measured.

Perception: Assess all proposed actions from the following perspective: How will the adversary likely perceive this action and what are their probable responses? Perception requires an understanding of culture, religion, social norms, customs and traditions, languages, and history of the adversary, the neutrals and noncombatants in the operational environment. (Note that in civil-military operations the neutrals and non-combatants, vice the adversary, may be the actors of focus.)

Synchronization: All intelligence sources and methods must be applied in concert with the Operation Plan and Order. The Plan dictates timing and sequencing of intelligence operations. Of note, the Commander drives Intelligence Synchronization (Joint Pub 2-0).

Unity of Effort: Facilitated by centralized planning and decentralized execution, unity of effort enables commanders to apply available intelligence assets effectively. To work, organizations (i.e., military, national or multinational) must understand and accept the commander's desired end state and related objectives. Unity of effort should facilitate information sharing among all commands, staffs and government agencies.

Collaboration: Invaluable expertise on a diverse range of topics resides in government and non-government centers. Equally, multinational members possess valuable perspectives on regionally diverse problems. Without collaboration, intelligence products are typically one dimensional.

These principles of perspective, synchronization of intelligence and operations, unity of effort and broad collaboration can be applied to collection, analysis, production and dissemination (the Intelligence Process) to successfully answer the Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIR). Using these principles will enable the intelligence analyst to formulate accurate priority intelligence requirements that drive operations toward the commander's ultimate end state. This concept should hold true for traditional force-on-force war and less traditional military operations.

Examples of shortfalls of these principles are found throughout US military operations conducted during the 1990s. Each principle is considered in turn as a metric against which intelligence gaps or failures from various operations are measured.

Chapter II Perception

The principle of perception states that analysts must assess actions in light of the following: How will the adversary likely perceive this action and what are their probable responses? Of significant importance here is understanding regional social geography, which is to say the culture, religion, social norms, etc. This cultural perspective was often absent in the examples considered below; however, they provided important initial milestones in the development of intelligence support to civil-military operations.¹ Ethnocentrism, mirror imaging between two nationalities (particularly between first world powers (US) and third-world nations) has and will continue to generate problems for intelligence analysts. Accurately predicting hostile intent while mirror-imaging is unlikely, and the likelihood of miscalculations (e.g., Iraq's invasion of Kuwait) becomes exaggerated as nations or adversaries make calculations based on inaccurate perceptions of the US government or vice-versa.²

Failures in perception affected every operation reviewed from 1990 to the present. This issue impeded efforts for Operation PROVIDE COMFORT; during Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti, it led to gaps in intelligence databases (i.e., local leaders, crime figures, etc.); in Operation RESTORE HOPE, Somalia, it led to the miscalculation of public reaction to a US presence; in Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, Bosnia, it precluded Human and Open Source Intelligence (HUMINT/OSINT) exploitation, at least initially, because of a prior lack of interest or intelligence priority in that region of the world. These and other perception shortfalls are covered in greater

¹ Michael W. Schellhammer, "Lessons from Operation Restore Democracy," *Military Intelligence* (January – March 1996): 18.

² Roger Z. George and Robert D. Kline, eds, *Intelligence and the National Security Strategist: Enduring Issues and Challenges* (Washington, D.C.: National University Press, 2004), 394-395.

detail later. Cultural challenges will continue to be one of the most significant, if not the leading cause of friction in civil military operations for the next decade while the Department of Defense (DOD) attempts to bridge this corporate knowledge gap to the rest of the world.

Because of the volatility of civil-military operations, intelligence must also be structured to transition rapidly if humanitarian aid or peacekeeping operations escalate. While it is true that Operation PROVIDE COMFORT in northern Iraq began as a humanitarian mission, the mission quickly changed complexion. "Confronted with a stubborn, uncooperative former enemy, coalition forces conducted combat, peacemaking and peacekeeping operations simultaneously to ensure the success of their primary humanitarian mission."³

The aforementioned shortfalls have been addressed to a degree. DOD Directive 3000.05 directs the geographic combatant commanders to develop intelligence campaign plans for stability operations which must include, as a minimum: "Information on key ethnic, cultural, religious, tribal, economic and political relationships...." Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England, in the same directive, tasks Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to "Develop opportunities for DOD personnel to contribute or develop stability operations skills by learning languages and studying foreign cultures, including long-term immersion in foreign societies."⁴ This directive and modifications to joint doctrine for intelligence will impact the issue but it will likely not correct the problem quickly.

³ MAJ John M. Kelly, USA, "Tactical Implications for Peacemaking in Ethnic Conflict." (Monograph, Army Command and General Staff College, Ft Leavenworth, KS, 1993), 13.

⁴ Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations. (Washington D.C. DoD Directive 3000.05, 18 NOV 2005): 6.

Perception is reality. This is unfortunate but often true and it colors our interpretation of information, our approach to problem solving, and what we deem appropriate actions in light of our situational awareness. During the 1990s US intelligence perception was largely a product of a cold-war paradigm that lacked the influence of multinational operations and the experience to solve very complex, non-combat related problems.

Perception also colors assumptions that drive planning. Ignorance about regional culture results in gaps or errors and ultimately impacts or hinders the achievement of military objectives. These assumptions exist in the Intelligence Estimate of the commander's plan and must address not only operational military factors, but strategic political realities and tactically relevant characteristics of the landscape, such as cultural, tribal or economic features. As discovered after conflict in Bosnia, nations also must understand that while intelligence estimates are strategic, the nature of crisis and conflict today is fundamentally different from that of the Cold War period and events and factors driving strategic estimates have a major political component. Estimates are, therefore, volatile. During crisis management operations encountered in Civil-Military Operations (CMO), estimating will have to be a rolling process with frequent reassessment required.⁵

Perceptual shortfalls continued to impact military operations, specifically assumptions, in the next decade. During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) a lack of analysis on culture led to inaccurate assumptions in the operations plan.⁶ This argument was also made by a senior US Central Command (USCENTCOM) intelligence planner,

⁵ Larry K. Wentz, ed, *Lessons From Kosovo: The KFOR Experience* (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Command & Control Research Program, Washington, D.C., 2002), 148.

⁶ George W. Smith Jr., "Genesis of an Ulcer: Have we Focused on the Wrong Transformation?" *Marine Corps Gazette* 89, no. 4 (April 2005): 30.

Gregory Hooker, in a book that examines the assumptions used to guide the OIF plan development.⁷

Regarding military planning and doctrinal guidance, cultural understanding is an essential ingredient for developing the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (JIPB). Note: The current term for this process is Joint Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE) and is used exclusively to describe the process heretofore. During the traditional JIPOE process, planners employed enemy doctrine to predict probable enemy courses of action. Phase II of the process considered that doctrine in a situational environment. CMO does not present such clean lines or approaches to planning. In Operation RESTORE HOPE, Somalia, the Joint Task Force Intelligence Director had to revert to political questions in lieu of traditional force-on-force or Order-of-Battle data to predict potential enemy courses of action.⁸ In Kosovo, intelligence planners fell short in their characterizations of the nonmilitary aspects of the environment, such as the ethnic situation of cultural hatred, the socioeconomic situation of clans and organized crime, and attitudes among local leaders and civilians towards a foreign military presence.⁹ JIPOE techniques work and although they were historically rigidly applied for combat operations, they are equally suited for CMO. Choosing the correct questions based on perceptual awareness will drive appropriate intelligence priorities and requirements.

These lessons began to be applied after 2000 during operations in Afghanistan. While significant, success in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM may have as much to do with the size and nature of the force as to actually applying lessons from operations

⁷ Gregory Hooker, *Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom: The Intelligence Estimate*. (Washington, DC.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2005), 26.

⁸ MAJ James M. Stuteville, USA, "Tactical Intelligence Support in Somalia: Lessons Learned," (MS Thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1996), 42.

⁹ Wentz, 449.

conducted in the '90s. The force was small and consisted largely of special operations personnel who were more familiar with working in close proximity to an indigenous populous. For example, the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), upon notification of pending deployment, took proactive planning steps that included cultural awareness.

The first things we created were country studies for all the countries in Southwest Asia and the Middle East. These country studies would form the basis of any [JIPOE] products we would need to assemble during a deployment sequence and covered geography, weather, culture, military, and any significant issues such as revolution or other internal affairs.¹⁰

Evidence to the former claim, that military forces are lacking in this regard, is pointed out by Alfred Renzi as late as 2006. He claimed that the most glaring gap regarding operational preparation of the operational environment or “shaping the battlefield” is the lack of cultural knowledge. Regrettably, in many current plans such detailed ethnographic information is not included in Annex Bravo, the Intelligence Annex of any Operations Plan.¹¹

Lack of cultural awareness affected more than the intelligence annex of plans, it distorted the formulation of all information requirements in the planning process. During Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, the cold war perception paradigm drove the definition of intelligence as target-specific data rather than political, cultural and regional information. General Zinni noted that the most immediate and pressing need of Kurdish refugees holed up in the mountains of northern Iraq was fresh water.¹² Traditional definitions of intelligence were still a problem in 1999 during operations in Kosovo.

¹⁰ Gregory J. Ford, “Lessons Learned from Afghanistan: A Battalion S2’s Perspective.” *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* Vol. 30 Issue 1 (Jan-Mar 2004): 19. <http://ezproxy6.ndu.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=mth&AN=12846416&site=ehost-live> (accessed 10 January 2008).

¹¹ LTC Alfred E. Renzi, USA. “The Military Coordination Group,” (MS thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2006), 43.

¹² Zinni, 78.

Leonard Hawley writes in *The Quest for a Viable Peace* that a non-traditional intelligence collection effort is essential. Working to transform the power structure in Kosovo required an expanded assessment of obscure issues which fell outside the typical political and military considerations.¹³ Information needs such as these must be translated into intelligence requirements and products. A cultural approach to intelligence should synchronize with the Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIR) and drive accurate Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR) and, consequently, support operational objectives, exactly as described in today's joint doctrine. Again in General Zinni's case, Essential Elements of Information (EEI) became leaders and military organizations, the northern Iraqi army, the history of the Kurdish-Iraqi conflict, and Kurdish political and tribal structures and lifestyle habits. In CMO, these untraditional EEI are critical to the theater combatant and combined task force commanders' decision-making.¹⁴

The concept of a comprehensive intelligence estimate, or lack thereof, is reiterated by Cees Weibs in his review of intelligence operations during the war in Bosnia. Analysts must combine military intelligence with other information, the social, political, economic, etc., information that presents a truly integrated intelligence picture which, in Bosnia, was routinely missing.¹⁵ In 2003 after the invasion that toppled Saddam Hussein's government, Sheik Mohammed Khamis Saadi said the Americans made a fundamental mistake by interpreting Iraq's societal dynamics along purely religious and ethnic lines. "They came and saw the society as Kurds, Sunnis, Turks,

¹³ Jock Covey and others, eds., *The Quest for a Viable Peace: International Intervention and Strategies for Conflict Transformation* (Washington, D.C.: US Institute for Peace, 2005), 247.

¹⁴ Kelly, 36.

¹⁵ Cees Wiebes and others, eds., *Intelligence and the war in Bosnia: 1992 – 1995* (Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2006), 56.

Shiites and Christians," he said. "They didn't understand the tribal culture."¹⁶ That the US gave consideration to religious and ethnic lines in OIF is a step in the right direction; however, the notion of tribal cultures illustrates the vast breadth of the problem. Iraq is one of many regions globally that is informally governed by centuries old tribal relationships.

Civil-Military Operations brought several new challenges to the task of intelligence support, one of which was new sources of information. An excellent example during Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti was the use of Civil Affairs (CA) teams to collect regional information like population demographics, food sources, or the structure of local government. These CA teams evolved into information multipliers.¹⁷ This concept was better implemented in operations conducted after the turn of the century and is discussed several times throughout this paper.

Language barriers were an issue that impacted operations in Somalia; as cited, there were few Somali linguists available in the Army and, consequently, Counter Intelligence (CI) teams were initially hindered in their collection efforts.¹⁸ Oversights such as these were understandable, indeed, perhaps unpreventable given the US military's unexpected involvement in civil-military operations during the 1990s. The availability of the kinds of intelligence necessary to support strategic and operational planning in these low-threat regions was often hampered by low collection priority and in some cases, a lack of existing embassy or Defense Attaché personnel to develop long-term, intimate knowledge of the areas. Regional US military and political priorities

¹⁶ Renzi, 45.

¹⁷ Cpt Linda Snyder, USA and Cpt David P. Warshaw, USA, "Force Protection: Integrating Civil Affairs and Intelligence." *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* 21, no. 4 (Oct-Dec 1995), 27.

¹⁸ Stuteville, 55.

resulted in an inaccurate picture of the Somali theater and impacted operations accordingly.¹⁹ The US has routinely been unprepared for operations in obscure corners of the world due to low intelligence collection priorities, insufficient resources, competing regional crises or some combination of these or similar issues.

Referring again to *The Quest for a Viable Peace*, Ken Hawley speaks of the necessity for the intelligence community to focus on unstable or collapsing countries well before their situation becomes urgent. This is a challenge to the Regional Combatant Commander because intelligence assets are limited and generally focused on the problem of the day; still, failure to collect baseline information from available sources prior to internal conflict may prove more problematic after the situation deteriorates, causing some critical sources of information to “disappear or to ‘be disappeared.’ ”²⁰

Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) provides another example where the general US military is making progress comparable to Special Operations forces, but on a small scale. As defined in current joint doctrine, the important aspects of PSYOPS include: Talk the language; know the local culture; speak the truth. PSYOPS worked remarkably well in Afghanistan. U.S. forces were predominantly Special Operations teams and could speak local languages to leverage the local people. The result was that Afghans saw themselves liberated by fellow Muslims. Conversely, with the much larger regular force in Iraq, PSYOPS failed. The average soldier had virtually no knowledge of Arabic and

¹⁹ Stuteville, 53.

²⁰ Covey, 246.

only a superficial understanding of local culture.²¹ This characteristic of the military, generally speaking, is likely applicable to most regions of the world.

An example that demonstrates political and military priorities impacting force readiness to conduct CMO is the availability of basic regional information. During Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, Bosnia, there were large gaps in regional knowledge of the former Yugoslavia, (e.g., a lack of good (not to mention military) maps).²² This shortfall in regional baseline knowledge was a negative factor again while planning for Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan. Maps were in high demand and not readily available at the tactical level. They were in short supply at the operational level as well (e.g., for the Director of Intelligence on the Joint Task Force Commander's staff) and their accuracy was in doubt because they were not up to present day US military standards. At the operational level, specific tactics, techniques, and procedures had to be devised to overcome this obstacle, creating 1:50,000-scale maps developed using National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) data and a special software program (FalconView).²³

The level of impact of perceptual failures increases from the tactical to the strategic level. While a tactical failure of perception may create a disproportional strategic effect, such as internet publication of abusive photos at Abu Ghraib, perceptions skewed at the national level may negatively shape the conduct of entire operations. In the political realm, i.e., in Washington D.C., perception may impact the vision for a national security strategy, guidance provided for theater-level conceptual planning and security

²¹ Richard A. Muller, "Military Lessons from Gulf War II: Successes as well as Failures." *Technology Review Online* (12 March 2004), 2. http://muller.lbl.gov/TResays/30-Lessons_of_Iraq.htm (accessed 12 January 2008).

²² Wiebes, 56.

²³ Ford, 22.

cooperation programs, or guidance to a combatant commander for operational planning.

During military operations, Washington's perception of the operational environment, the various actors within a conflict, etc., are all shaped by political perception.

A case in point: During Bosnian operations in 1995-1996, the Clinton Administration's political agenda played a significant role in deciding which intelligence assessments were adhered to and which were cast aside. For example both Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and DOD intelligence assets formed the opinion that there were no "good guys" or "bad guys" in the conflict; there were both Serbian and Muslim atrocities and neither ethnic group was particularly good. These reports were aligned with coalition intelligence findings, particularly those of the British; however, this view conflicted with President Clinton's political approach to resolving the conflict, supporting the Muslims, and so the administration's acceptance and application of "ground-truth" intelligence reporting was largely null. Subsequent strategic decisions and guidance were reflective of US national political perceptions. Similar political forces impeded relations between the US and other NATO and European Union countries participating in the operation and this impasse ultimately curtailed US sharing of intelligence with key allies in the region.²⁴

Despite past problems, a positive example of CMO is the Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (JTF HOA), whose primary objective is denying safe haven to terrorist organizations. This Joint Task Force manages rotational units as they conduct civil-military activities in the region. The primary purpose of such activities is to maintain an American presence in the area for some deterrent effect, gain some goodwill among the local population, conduct subtle yet overt reconnaissance, and assist indigenous people to

²⁴ Wiebes, 65.

develop the economic means to resist monetary temptations from terrorists seeking shelter. In the words of one JTF HOA commander, a simple veterinary tour of the region to inoculate cattle is like putting money into the owner's bank account, because that is what the livestock represents. By extension, the improved economic stability of the farmer gives some physical basis for the campaign of persuasion to resist terrorist financial incentives. In short, civil-military operations like these provide the tools to ameliorate the conditions that can contribute to terrorism or insurgency. It is through activities like these that the distinction between civil-military operations and security cooperation is blurred, given that the local farmer with healthy cattle can then afford to refuse terrorist payoffs. Later, further assistance could enable local populations to resist terrorist coercion. Such operations are very much complementary to counterterrorism or counterinsurgency, not necessarily for the somewhat wishful thinking of 'winning hearts and minds,' but for the population's physical ability to resist the coercion of America's adversaries.²⁵ Success in formulating relations with the local populace, as described, can also vastly increase access to ground-truth intelligence and benefit follow-on CMO and/or unconventional military operations.

In the case of the global war on terrorism, there are intertwined questions of how to fight a network and how to gather cultural intelligence. These questions present the United States with a strategic challenge and require an examination of the type of information DOD captures and what is to be done with that information. According to Renzi we've met half the requirement, in so much as Foreign Area Officers, primarily assigned to either Defense Attaché Offices or Security Assistance Offices, already do good ethnographic reconnaissance as it relates to the host country military, but the

²⁵ Renzi, 32.

information is not prioritized, stored, shared or used well.²⁶ This shortcoming was also emphasized in Dave Sloggett's research of untraditional warfare, exposing what he called a huge cultural awareness gap from the national through tactical levels of war, highlighting the need for political or military leaders to understand values and ideology.²⁷

Joint intelligence doctrine in 2000 focused somewhat on the "people" but the anemic level of detail dedicated to intelligence requirements – those of a people's history and culture – was a direct reflection of an imbalance in the JIPOE process. The figure illustrated below from Joint Pub 2-0, 2000, summed up the mindset of the joint community regarding where the people fit within the intelligence requirements for the development of a coherent campaign design. If properly balanced, a corresponding red arrow entitled "People" would be in the center of this diagram opposite the existing arrow entitled "Forces," drawing attention to the reality that civilian populations are the centerpiece of the post hostilities environment where CMO are predominant. As depicted in the diagram, this view of the battlespace did little to reinforce the requirements then defined in Joint Pub 5-00.1, Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning, which stated that "campaign planners must plan for conflict termination from the outset of the planning process and update those plans as the campaign evolves."²⁸ The diagram was not carried over into JP 2-0, 2007 and more focus was added regarding cultural impacts on intelligence planning and support to operations.

²⁶ Renzi, 15.

²⁷ Dave Sloggett, "OPINION – Decision Superiority in Operations Other Than War" *Janes Defence Weekly* (November 28, 2005): 2.
http://www8.janes.com.ezproxy6.ndu.edu/Search/documentView.do?docId=/content1/janesdata/mags/jdw/history/jdw2005/jdw12790.htm@current&pageSelected=allJanes&keyword=decision%20superiority&backPath=http://search.janes.com.ezproxy6.ndu.edu/Search&Prod_Name=JDW& (accessed 30 Dec 2007).

²⁸ Smith Jr., 30.




Figure 1. Dimensions of the battlespace.⁹

Major General Barbara Fast postulates that the lessons learned in the current environment (OIF) have dramatically shaped how we think about the conduct of intelligence operations and have shaped our development and implementation of doctrine. In this way, we are able to better “know ourselves” while conducting operations to more effectively “know the enemy.”²⁹ Today’s operating environment emphasizes the individual soldier’s role in the intelligence process. It is a cultural mindset change so that today’s soldier sees everyone they come in contact with as having

²⁹ MG Barbara G. Fast, USA, “Intelligence Lessons Learned: Leveraging the Practical Experience of Operation Iraqi Freedom/Operation Enduring Freedom” *Foreign Studies DOCTRINE* # 09 (June 2006): 52.

intelligence value – every soldier is a sensor. Soldiers talk to the local population and observe more relevant information than many of the technical intelligence sensors can collect and process.³⁰

Implementing joint intelligence doctrine, twice revised since 1990, will serve combatant commanders and their intelligence staffs well. However, sound joint doctrine will not compensate for shortcomings of personnel educated to understand cultural influences and trained to apply that knowledge to planning and conducting Civil-Military Operations. That said, knowing what we don't know is the first step toward compensating for intelligence gaps. A next step, doctrinally speaking, would be to explore alternate sources in business or academic communities where others have found and applied answers to some of these complex questions.

³⁰

MG Fast, 56.

Chapter III Synchronization

Synchronization states that all sources and methods must be applied in concert with the Operation Plan; the Plan dictates timing and sequencing of intelligence operations. Of note, Joint Pub 2-0, Joint Intelligence, emphasizes that the Commander drives intelligence synchronization, not the Director of Intelligence.

The following examples highlight how intelligence and operations disconnects impeded military operations during the 1990s. Amidst the discussion of gaps and failures, it is noted here that Synchronization has improved greatly 2000, incorporating lessons of the '90s and the creative application of those lessons during operations beyond that timeframe. In addition to evidence of successes in synchronization, this quote taken from Joint Pub 2-0, Intelligence Support to Joint Operations, 1990, illustrates that the military understood the concept of synchronization, even if it wasn't called so specifically.

“When time-sensitive intelligence cannot be relayed quickly and reliably to those who need it most, it is of negligible value in the fast-paced environment of the modern battlefield. Success in solving this problem, which is as technical as it is organizational, requires meticulous planning and thorough testing.” Michael I. Handel, Professor of National Security and Strategy, Army War College Intelligence and Military Operations, 1990 (Joint Pub 2-0).

Major James Stuteville points to a disconnect between Intelligence and Operational planners at the US Central Command (USCENTCOM) that ultimately resulted in intelligence shortfalls at the tactical level. The USCENTCOM staff required one level of intelligence to conduct strategic and operational planning; his logistics staff needed information on infrastructure; the Intelligence Director had requirements for information on clans, population, attitudes, etc. All of this intelligence was required to

tailor the force structure (including intelligence collection assets) to support follow-on collection at the tactical level once deployed. Stutteville describes the intelligence preparation of the operational environment as flawed in that it did not provide a view of the situation/environment adequate to plan for the appropriate intelligence collection assets. This argument was captured in the following statement from the RESTORE HOPE after-action review:

The Strategic and Operational Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) process failed to provide CENTCOM/JTF and ARCENT commanders the lens through which the factors of mission, enemy, terrain, troops and time-available (METT-T) could be focused during the early stages of deployment planning.¹

Operation RESTORE HOPE presented numerous other instances of poor coordination between intelligence and operations planners which resulted in an improper force structuring vis-à-vis intelligence assets.² This was evidenced by a lack of Signals and Imagery intelligence (SIGINT and IMINT) collection capabilities and a flawed communications plan.

Poor initial intelligence on Somalia gave the commander of Operation RESTORE HOPE a flawed understanding of the environment; knowing Somalia was a country with limited or no communications capability, he decided to forgo the use of SIGINT collection. His decision was based on a valid assumption, poor indigenous communications systems; however, this indigenous shortfall drove Somali clans to communicate almost exclusively via two-way radio, a huge SIGINT collection

¹ Stuteville, 52-53.

² Ibid., 54.

opportunity that was missed due to poor collaboration (i.e., synchronization) between the intelligence and planning staffs.³

Another example was the lack of any organic, or tactical-level imagery collection capability. This gap eventually impaired force protection measures because the necessary work-around ultimately gave adversaries insight into US intentions. Both the Army and Marines had Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) for imagery intelligence, but these weren't deployed because of limited initial airlift to the region and also due to airspace de-confliction issues with Army helicopters. Lack of UAV imagery forced the use of helicopters to conduct aerial reconnaissance of potential supply routes, providing Somali clans advanced notification of Army convoy routes.⁴ Initial low force levels and lift capability, combined with poor coordination on the planning staff, resulted in a decision to not deploy IMINT and SIGINT assets early in the operation.

A communications synchronization problem revolved around the use of "split-based operations." The key to split-based operations is that the tactical commander can receive intelligence from other (upper echelon) sources to fulfill his requirements when it is not available from local assets. In Somalia, the commander used a classified AN/TSQ-190(V) Trojan Special Purpose Intelligence Remote Integrated Terminal (Trojan SPIRIT) mobile communications system to receive national- and operational-level intelligence, thus enhancing his tactical picture. (Note: Trojan SPIRIT is an intelligence dissemination satellite terminal that provides access for intelligence processing and dissemination systems; the Trojan SPIRIT combines the Trojan Data Network with mobile switch extensions to offer a worldwide, forward-deployed, quick-reaction

³ Stuteville, 54.

⁴ Ibid., 55.

reporting and analysis link.)⁵ While the principle was sound there were mistakes made during operational-level planning. Trojan SPIRIT requires leased satellite communications coverage which was inadequate in the Somalia region. The lack of prior coordination with satellite providers for coverage in an underdeveloped part of the world degraded initial operations. The Army force commander had to rely on national-level intelligence to develop initial estimates until the operational and tactical pictures were better oriented and evolved to a useful state.⁶

Matthew Aid attests that integration of intelligence with operational plans and execution of peacekeeping operations was finally achieved in 1995 the during Bosnian conflict, a success based largely on previous lessons learned in Haiti and Somalia. Aid points to successes of the International Force in Bosnia following the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords in 1995, successes which highlighted the relative importance of intelligence required to conduct peacekeeping operations.⁷ Success may have been achieved vis-à-vis the integration of intelligence with operations (i.e., synchronization) however other intelligence issues of perception, collaboration and unity of effort suggest that the overall application of intelligence for CMO was still beyond reach.

A case of synchronizing intelligence operations can be seen in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. The establishment of the CJ2X, the commander's staff lead for Counter Intelligence and Human Intelligence (CI/HUMINT) collection operations paved the way for close coordination of these two assets. In Afghanistan, immediate CI

⁵ Federation of American Scientists, Intelligence Resource Program. *AN/TSQ-190 TROJAN / TROJAN SPIRIT II Communications Central*, <http://www.fas.org/irp/program/disseminate/trojan.htm> (accessed 25 February 2008).

⁶ Stuteville, 49-50.

⁷ Ben De Jong and others, eds., *Peacekeeping Intelligence: Emerging Concepts for the Future* (Oakton, VA: OSS International Press, 2003), 142.

and HUMINT challenges included improving reporting timeliness and procedures, developing and managing source administration and records, redesigning the CI and HUMINT force structure, and focusing and synchronizing all related operations throughout the theater. Once the CJ2X became the intelligence release authority for the theater's tactical CI and HUMINT reporting, collected information no longer had to leave the area of operations and return prior to being released to units and intelligence analysts throughout the intelligence community. This initiative made CI and HUMINT reporting a critical player in the targeting process and helped to synchronize this activity with other intelligence efforts in theater.⁸

Ron Stallings' comment on this point is that the most apparent change and most significant contribution of the CJ2X concept arriving with CJTF-180, then the forward Headquarters in Afghanistan, was local command, control and synchronization of all CI and HUMINT operations. By design, the CJ2X coordinated and ensured CI and HUMINT supported both local commanders and national requirements. Collection efforts were aligned with the intelligence requirements of commanders (at all levels) on the ground in Afghanistan. Source operations became synchronized with interrogation operations, and tactical and strategic CI and HUMINT merged in both locations (source operations outside the wire and interrogations inside the wire).⁹

While synchronization was being worked out in Afghanistan in 2002, ongoing planning for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) at US Central Command (USCENTCOM), Tampa Florida, and in Washington D.C. was being plagued by major disconnects. These failures during planning for the forth phase of OIF (Phase IV –

⁸ Ron Stallings and Michael Foley, "CI and HUMINT Operations in support of Operation Enduring Freedom." *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* (Oct-Dec, 2003), 2.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 3.

stability operations in preparation for transition to an indigenous government) have been tied to disagreements between policy makers in Washington and intelligence analysts at USCENTCOM. As previously discussed in Chapter II, Perception, Hooker claimed that USCENTCOM's assumptions of the situation in Iraq were based on differing viewpoints than those held in Washington D.C. and that these competing views negatively influenced the final plan.¹⁰ There were also control measures in place at USCENTCOM to ensure operational security which limited intelligence planners from gaining broad, community-wide inputs during the plan development process, particularly inputs from national intelligence agencies. The plan eventually executed by General Tommy Franks had already been completed by the time the National Intelligence Estimate for Iraq was published. This illustrates a lack of synchronization between the national and operational level leadership. Within USCENTCOM, on the other hand, the Intelligence, Operations and Plans staffs were "teamed" and physically co-located to facilitate OIF planning, which demonstrated a good effort to synchronize internally, even if the concept was lost on those beyond the boundaries of USCENTCOM proper. Finally, because the OIF planning focus was largely on Phases I – III (deter aggressors, seize the initiative and dominate the enemy/environment), intelligence resources were largely considered and sourced only for these phases of the plan. Little forethought was given to supporting security, transition or reconstruction operations likely to be needed in Phase IV.¹¹

Hooker also contends that the lack of interagency coordination during the planning process also contributed to the flawed execution of Phase IV operations. As alluded to in the preceding paragraph, this was a result of the tight security surrounding

¹⁰ Hooker, xi.

¹¹ Ibid., 92.

the overall plan development process and was deemed necessary to keep operation details out of the media and, subsequently, maintain the US element of surprise.¹² Tom Donnelly also highlights this planning/security confliction and points to two competing imperatives in the planning process: Rapid deployment without compromising US intentions vs. a large enough force structure to achieve the mission.¹³ A possible solution to this particular problem (i.e., engaging the Interagency, and national non-Defense intelligence agencies in particular) may be the Joint Intelligence/Operations Center (JIOC), a concept initiated in 2006 by former Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, Dr. Stephan Cambone. The JIOC construct was designed to address the shortcoming of national intelligence agency participation in military planning by allowing the Combatant Commander to assign various agencies specific intelligence support tasks – either within a National Intelligence Support Plan or addressed separately. The JIOC concept could still fail because the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, who leads the national-level JIOC effort, has no authority over non-defense intelligence agencies. Hence the success of the JIOC concept in supporting any phase of the military planning process has yet to be determined. The JIOC concept and its origins are discussed in greater detail later in this chapter.

Despite problems that arose in OIF, some argue that there were successes which in hindsight may outweigh the shortfalls. At the least, observations such as the following allude to an overall improvement in the conduct of operations. As stated by Michael Decker before the Senate Armed Services Committee, the situational awareness of commanders at every level during OIF exceeded that of any modern war. Satellite-based

¹² Hooker, 35.

¹³ Thomas Donnelly, *Operation Iraqi Freedom: A Strategic Assessment* (Washington D.C.: AEI Press, 2004), 36.

friendly force and logistics force tracking abilities, combined with e-mail exchanges enabled synchronization of command and staff tasks at theater, operational, and tactical levels.¹⁴ Speaking for the US Marine Corps, Decker gives the example that Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets are embedded in both command elements and maneuver units:

USMC has technical specialists in all-source fusion, SIGINT, CI/HUMINT, reconnaissance and UAV operations that can be task organized to support any given commander's situation based upon his specific requirements. Enhanced intelligence support to the Marine maneuver unit in combat enables more efficient utilization of theater, service and national collection assets while simultaneously enabling commanders to focus their organic collection assets on their immediate areas of responsibility.¹⁵

General Zinni's proposed solution to synchronization does more than integrate military intelligence and operations, it includes all elements of government influence. In his book *The Battle for Peace*, the General refers to a National Monitoring and Planning Center (NMPC) to monitor world events for the beginnings of instability, conflict or other problems where US interests might be impacted. The Center is composed of intelligence, operational monitoring and planning capabilities, all three combined for the purpose of integrating US government power.¹⁶ A lower level Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) is then responsible for executing plans and programs set forth by the NMPC.¹⁷ General Zinni's approach goes beyond the breadth and depth of the JIOC

¹⁴ COL David Eshel, "Operation Iraqi Freedom: C4ISR Lessons Learned." *Defense Update: International Online Defense Magazine*, Issue 1 (2005): 4. <http://www.defense-update.com/features/du-1-05/feature-oif-c4-1.htm> (accessed 11 January 2008).

¹⁵ Decker, Michael H. "Statement for the record from Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps before the Strategic Forces subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee concerning Marine Corps Intelligence Programs and Lessons Learned in recent military operations." (7 April 2004): 4.

¹⁶ Zinni, 162.

¹⁷ Ibid., 170.

concept. Although similar to the NMPC/JIATF initiative, the JIOC falls short of being a truly whole-of-government solution to fighting war and winning peace.

General Zinni also points to other examples of organizational restructuring that merely grow bureaucracies instead of solving real and/or perceived problems. One US government response to the September 11 terrorist attacks was to consolidate numerous agencies for better cross-coordination. Another was to create a new senior cabinet position, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), to manage and integrate all national intelligence community efforts. According to General Zinni, creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the DNI position aren't likely to succeed in integrating the intelligence of the nation. DHS lacks authorities to compel outside agency participation and the DNI is simply another layer of bureaucracy on an already overburdened intelligence community.¹⁸

Here is a final point regarding synchronization of intelligence with plans and operations at the national and international level. Conducting operations in any context with the United Nations (UN) leads to synchronization problems because of the US's difficulty, and at times their refusal, to share intelligence with UN coalition members. The rationale behind this US reluctance is discussed in chapters IV and V. However, despite a reluctance to share intelligence with the UN, most information used in UN or UN and NATO combined operations originates from the United States (according to the Aspin-Brown Commission report of 1996). The war in Bosnia offers a good example, but information shared with the UN is generally more filtered than that provided to NATO partners (for reasons stated above and delineated below).¹⁹ Until the US is able to

¹⁸ Zinni, 133.

¹⁹ De Jong, 364.

share intelligence assessments or indications and warnings freely across coalition organizations, synchronizing the functions of intelligence, plans and operations will remain cumbersome at best.

Earlier the topic of JIOC was proposed as a potential solution to synchronization. Prior to the year 2000, ill use of synchronization hampered intelligence support to operations; after 2000 it became a major theme across the national and defense intelligence community, driven largely by then Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, Dr. Stephen Cambone. Intelligence failures highlighted after Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM were the catalyst for his “Reinventing Defense Intelligence” (RDI) initiative. RDI stimulated two intelligence reform initiatives: The JIOC concept and the Intelligence Campaign Plan (although no longer called an Intelligence Campaign Plan but is doctrinally referred to as intelligence support to campaign planning).

JIOC’s were implemented at all Combatant Commands. Its implementation differs among those commands depending on the commander’s desires and requirements. Implementation nuances aside, the JIOC objective was to improve coordination between intelligence, plans and operations. JIOC organizations generally include personnel from the command’s J2 – Intelligence, J3 – Operations, and J5 – Plans directorates. Co-location of intelligence personnel with the key planners and the executors they support is intended specifically to address the principle of synchronization. Like JIOC, intelligence support to campaign planning expands on prior approaches to supporting campaign plan design with an “Annex B – Intelligence,” adding national intelligence products and improving overall coordination of national assets that support the commander’s priority

intelligence requirements. The Intelligence Task List (ITL) is a component of intelligence support to planning and specifically directs intelligence Combat Support Agencies (CSA) to provide specific products at specified intervals, all in concert with the plan. In addition to the ITL these CSAs (e.g., Central Intelligence, National Security, and Defense Intelligence Agencies, and the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency) now also create National Intelligence Support Plans (NISP) per guidance from the director, Defense Joint Intelligence/Operations Center (D-JIOC) coordinated with requirements specified in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). Of note, the D-JIOC was recently reorganized and renamed to the Defense Intelligence/Operations Coordination Center; however, the objectives are the same. While there are still issues of authority and coordination between the CSAs, the overall concept was a sound step toward synchronization.

Chapter IV Unity of Effort

Unity of Effort: Facilitated by centralized planning and decentralized execution, it enables commanders to apply available ISR assets effectively. To work, all organizations must understand and accept the commander's desired end state and related objectives. Unity of effort should facilitate information sharing among all commands, staffs and government agencies.

Of note, MAJ John Kelly distinguishes between unity of effort and unity of command and states that according to Army doctrine, unity of effort represents a significant departure from command.¹ Lack of command results in inadequate authorities and results in friction when attempting unity of effort.

According to joint doctrine, the President retains command authority over US forces but may place appropriate forces under the operational control of a foreign commander to achieve specific military objectives. However, any large-scale participation of US forces in a major operation will likely be conducted under US command and operational control or through competent accepted and stable regional security organizations such as NATO. Therefore in most multinational operations, the Joint Force Commander must share intelligence with foreign military forces and coordinate receiving intelligence from those forces.² This dictum implies that the US can operate seamlessly with NATO or other coalition forces, especially if operating under specific arrangements for tasks such as sharing intelligence. As stated before, sharing intelligence should be simple and seamless; the examples cited in this chapter reveal that

¹ Kelly, 6.

² Joint Publication 2-0: "Joint Intelligence." Joint Staff, Washington DC//J2P/J7-JDD. 22 June 2007, V-2.

the application of intelligence in support of coalition operations display neither of those characteristics.

This principle speaks to two discreet problem areas of intelligence in Civil-Military Operations: Unified application of ISR assets toward meeting the commander's objectives, and information sharing. They are interrelated and each raises unique challenges to the US combatant commander engaged in multinational operations.

Before discussing these challenges it is important to clarify certain nuances about both NATO and the United Nations (UN) vis-à-vis intelligence as a discipline and the sharing of intelligence products. Both topics present a dilemma, particularly for the UN. Unless information handling reforms come about, unity of effort and intelligence sharing will be difficult at best and will continue to hinder the US military's interaction with foreign partners.

The UN has been called a sieve for information, however this is not a flaw but a deliberate, structured organizational approach that allows numerous countries, even those whom may be in conflict with each other, to participate in international missions. The UN is a highly transparent organization by design and, because of political sensitivities, conducting intelligence activities has long been considered unacceptable. This view has changed to some degree in recent years because of force protection challenges. Commanders must have situational awareness of belligerents and their sympathizers in order to successfully conduct assigned missions.³ However the highly political nature of the UN and its sieve character make it difficult, if not impossible, for participating member nations to share national intelligence. Instead of intelligence, the UN employs military information and it remains unclassified and available across the entire

³ De Jong, 15.

organization. This poses obvious security problems for participants like the US and its allies. The probability of highly or even moderately classified information being distributed across the UN membership makes sharing impossible. This absence of intelligence ultimately endangers UN forces because at a minimum it hinders force protection efforts.

NATO has no independent intelligence capacity. The organization does not engage in tasking or collection but instead relies completely on member states for intelligence products. The term “NATO intelligence” refers to intelligence sharing rather than production.⁴ NATO intelligence authorities can request intelligence from the nations but the nations are not obligated to provide it. Recently some nations have transferred operational and tactical authority for the direction of some intelligence collection resources to NATO field commanders, but this is not doctrine and member nations aren’t obligated to declare intelligence collection resources to the Alliance. One legacy of NATO’s reliance on its individual nations for these products is a lack of staffs trained and equipped to manage complex, multidisciplinary intelligence collection operations. Hence NATO staffs are end users of finished intelligence provided by their respective nations and their operationally deployed commands.⁵ The unintended consequences of this organizational characteristic are further explored in this chapter.

This design flaw of both the UN and NATO puts all parties involved in military operations in a sometimes precarious position, relying heavily on the cooperation of other participants to accomplish the mission. Another issue is the structure of command relationships between member nations. There are also legal restraints on US forces that

⁴ Wiebes, 45.

⁵ Wentz, 130.

complicate unity of effort by limiting or at times prohibiting the collective use of critical intelligence products. These restrictions transform the concept of “command” to that of “cooperation.” Cooperation was the key to success, or lack thereof, during operations in Bosnia, Somalia, Kosovo, that is to say everywhere NATO or the UN played a role during the 1990s. These problems continued during military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq at the turn of the century.

One consequence of limited intelligence reciprocity was the establishment of National Intelligence Centers (NIC) by states providing troops to UN operations; the fear of missing critical intelligence because of poor information dissemination forced the NIC arrangement. The logic is sound because commanders must ensure force protection and may need to transition from peace-related operations to traditional conflict with little notice.

In the war in Bosnia, 1992-1995, troop contributing nations realized they couldn't rely on intelligence support from the UN (for all the aforementioned reasons) and NICs were established as a work-around. One of the resulting dangers was that NICs, although attached to the UN, were under the control of their respective national governments. This meant that the intelligence operations were driven by potentially conflicting national priorities instead of the standing UN policy.⁶ The NIC concept was logical and it was necessary to meet national intelligence requirements in the absence of a workable UN process. However caution must be exercised when employing such interim solutions. In the case of NICs, the total number of intelligence centers can become unwieldy. There were at least ten such centers operating in the Bosnian theater of operations.⁷

⁶ Wiebes, 71.

⁷ Siegel, 50.

Another cause of failure between NATO, UN member states, the US military and national intelligence organizations was a lack of trust. One example clearly illustrated the problem during operations in Kosovo. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) established and deployed a Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM); however, OSCE's fully transparent information doctrine, like that of the United Nations,' meant there were no provisions for OSCE to protect any classified information NATO might be willing to release. In the absence of such a security agreement sharing classified information between NATO and the OSCE's Vienna staff, the KVM staff in Pristina and with KVM field observers was impossible.⁸

Another example where mistrust comes into play is when two or more member nations participating in a coalition operation are simultaneously involved in a conflict between themselves. This was the case with Turkey and Greece during the Bosnian crisis; the result was that other coalition nations were reluctant to share intelligence with either country for fear it would be used to the other's disadvantage.⁹ At the same timeframe intelligence transferred between American, German and NATO forces routinely wound up in Belgrade, Yugoslavia because Croats operating with coalition forces had been infiltrated by Serbians.¹⁰ In organizations as large and diverse as NATO, issues regarding loyalties, treaties or political differences can impede unity of effort.

NATO's organizational structure is based on a political treaty between 26 nations. Decisions among the member nations are reached by consensus, all members agree or the decision is not taken. The treaty may improve the extent to which NATO nations cooperate but their all-or-none process for decision-making impedes a unified approach

⁸ Wentz, 138.

⁹ Wiebes, 62.

¹⁰ Ibid., 70.

to operations. This was demonstrated during Operation JOINT GURADIAN, Kosovo. The NATO intelligence director requested an intelligence estimate to serve as a policy and strategic decision baseline for senior political and military authorities. Because of NATO's consensus business practice such products must be unilaterally agreed to if they are to be authoritative (i.e., one that has the full concurrence of all nations and the approval of the NATO Military Committee). In this instance a draft was quickly produced and substantively agreed to by all national Balkans experts. However, national senior approval authorities in their respective capitals could not reach consensus on the estimate and it was never published.¹¹

A continuing challenge in achieving unity of effort is the disparity in technological capabilities across NATO, the UN and the US. The technology gap is more of an issue between the US and UN countries, be it weapons or communications systems, but the level of technology is also lacking in NATO. The problem is not equally representative across all nations but it presents problems when building global coalitions. The lowest-common-denominator factor can quickly degrade unified effort.

During the first Gulf War in 1991, the strategic, operational, and tactical military capabilities and technological art demonstrated by the US forces was a shock to the NATO community. The demonstration was repeated when the US participated in Kosovo operations in 1999 and the US advantage remained unchanged at the turn of the century. NATO command and staff intelligence has not kept pace with advances in communications, computing technology, information management or strategic and operational intelligence art.¹² Failure to keep pace technologically with the US was the

¹¹ Wentz, 134.

¹² Wentz, 132.

cause of historic unity-related problems for both UN and NATO; their lack of progress on this front foretells of continuing struggles in future combined operations.

Poor planning resulted in inaccurate identification of the Commander's Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR) during Operation PROVIDE COMFORT in northern Iraq, 1991. As discussed in Chapter II, Perception, essential elements of information (EEI) differ for Civil-Military Operations; environmental and regional data become key to meeting the commander's objectives – in this case providing humanitarian assistance. Earlier, more accurate intelligence assessments on weather, regional and local security, medical facilities and logistics would have aided Lieutenant General John Shalikashvili in the accomplishment of his mission.¹³

As mentioned at the outset of this chapter, exchanging unity of command for unity of effort leads to diminished or nonexistent command authority. This was evident in Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti. The US Support Group command construct was such that the commander had an intelligence staff under his command but did not control the US Defense Attaché or various Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) personnel operating in his Area of Responsibility (AOR). This organizational structure left cooperation as the driving force for intelligence support.¹⁴ A particular example of lack of authority arose when a special forces group was brought in to conduct an area assessment; the assessment was conducted but there was no effort to share resulting ethnographic information with the US Support Group and the commander lacked the

¹³ Kelly, 36.

¹⁴ Renzi, 68.

authority to compel any such cooperation.¹⁵ Cultural intelligence of this nature proved to be critical and lacking during Haitian operations.

Although organizational hegemony wasn't achieved in Haiti there were incidents of success. Thoughtful planning for command and control of US forces was evident in that the US Atlantic Command implemented a concept called Joint Force Packaging; the result was that all operational headquarters in the AOR had identical information architectures, were seeing the same common operational picture and were using standardized intelligence and communications tactics, techniques and procedures.¹⁶

There were circumstances in Operations RESTORE HOPE and CONTINUE HOPE, Somalia, where a combination of convoluted command relationships and US legal restraints resulted in a degradation of intelligence operations and support. In the first example, Lieutenant General Cevik Bir was the UN Operations Somalia (UNOSOM) commander. Because he was a Turkish national there were restrictions on the level of direction he could impose on US assets. Lieutenant General Bir could not focus the intelligence effort, he could only request information be collected and passed to the UNOSOM staff.¹⁷ The entire intelligence structure was therefore based on cooperation and the lack of command had a limiting effect on the overall approach to operations.

The second failure due to command relationships spilled over from Operation RESTORE HOPE to CONTINUE HOPE. The US Central Command (USCENTCOM) had deployed a Combined Intelligence Support Element (CISE) to provide analysis and fusion but because of US laws restricting the command and control of intelligence assets,

¹⁵ Renzi, 54.

¹⁶ Thomas R. Wilson, "Joint Intelligence and Uphold Democracy," *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Spring 95), 55.

¹⁷ Stuteville, 41.

the CISE could only support US forces; that is to say the unit could not be aligned under a foreign UNOSOM commander. The CISE supported the US Joint Task Force (JTF) in Somalia but wasn't under command of the JTF Commander, Major General Thomas Montgomery, because under the UN organizational construct he was subordinate to LTG Bir as his Deputy Commander. Consequently the CISE remained under the control of USCENTCOM in Florida and they set analysis and production priorities. When these priorities shifted away from Somali operations the US JTF (and by association UNOSOM) lost intelligence support. This US/Coalition organizational structure resulted in a violation of the principle of Unity of Effort.¹⁸

Toward the end of the 1990s, solutions or work-arounds were being implemented to compensate for the problems of moving intelligence across coalition organizations. One solution to the sensitivities over security and releasability was the reliance on unclassified, open-source information in lieu of traditional intelligence products. The most impressive contributor of open source data to the alliance in Kosovo was the Multinational Intelligence Coordination Cell (MNICC), manned by a select number of NATO nations on a bilateral basis at the US European Command's Joint Analysis Center in Molesworth, U.K.¹⁹ As discussed in the introduction, the internet provides easy access to vast amounts of information; in the absence of bona fide intelligence products commanders will continue exploiting this resource.

One of the problems with sharing intelligence is the nature of the intelligence itself. This is probably best represented in the discipline of Signals Intelligence (SIGINT). Sharing SIGINT is done largely according to bi-lateral agreements, even

¹⁸ Stuteville, 42.

¹⁹ Wentz, 146.

among NATO nations. Agreements that support intelligence exchanges between two parties become complicated in a multi-national intelligence center. The result is often a back-door approach to sharing information; not everyone sees everything and that degrades the staff's overall situational awareness.²⁰ The complexities of sharing SIGINT with allies is described by a former Deputy Director of the National Security Agency, Bill Black:

“Black stated that in the past the NSA had only exchanged information on a bilateral basis, and that the American legislation regarding compartmentalization made it difficult to do the same in a coalition of allies.”²¹

As pointed out by Adam Siegel in chapter II, Perception, civil-military operations introduce new types of clients. Intelligence releasability may become a major problem depending on the nature of these clients.²² Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, Bosnia, represented a SIGINT-rich environment with multiple collection assets and operations by most participating countries. However, the difficulties of bilateral agreement and compartmentalization described by Black precluded sharing most SIGINT across the coalition. The lack of information security arrangements between NATO and non-NATO organizations also presented recurring problems during the Kosovo crisis in 1999.²³ The fact that US and UN forces in Kosovo encountered information sharing difficulties identical to those experienced only four years earlier in Bosnia highlights how poorly the military learns and applies its lessons. This is even more perplexing when US joint doctrine had already begun to capture those lessons and expose their potential pitfalls.

²⁰ Wiebes, 246.

²¹ Ibid., 276.

²² Siegel, 45.

²³ Wentz, 138.

The following are three examples from more recent operations where prior lessons have inspired new approaches to intelligence support in order to avoid repeating recent mistakes. All three speak to collaboration as a key element in achieving unity of effort in the absence of command.

Major General James Marks set out several recommendations for the Joint Task Force Intelligence director to consider for success: Set the vision, build the intelligence architecture; build the intelligence team; build analytic collaboration; fight Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), and influence decision making. Major General Marks also speaks to the Intelligence Battlefield Operating System as an adaptive network of properly trained, equipped and deployed intelligence organizations, a complex system from mud-to-space in real time that includes theater and national capabilities. The general stresses cooperation and division of labor “internally, higher, lower, adjacent, and across components and coalition.”²⁴ Both of his recommendations emphasize collaboration as a necessary ingredient for intelligence operations.

The US Marine Corps devised a unique organizational solution to collaboration. The Marine Core Intelligence Agency (MCIA) serves as the parent command for intelligence personnel on joint duty and in Combat Support Agencies (CSA). Consequently, MCIA connects marines assigned to defense agencies, regional security operations centers, joint intelligence centers and joint reserve intelligence centers, enabling them to work as a virtual team in support of warfighting and combat

²⁴ MG James A. Marks, USA, “Lessons Learned: Six Things Every “2” Must Do – Fundamental Lessons from OIF – Military Intelligence During War With Iraq,” *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* (Oct-Dec, 2003): 1. http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IBS/is_4_29/ai_112129332 (accessed 5 January 2008).

development of associated intelligence requirements.²⁵ This not only ensures joint war fighters are supported but also ensures that Marine intelligence requirements are not lost in the process.

The synchronization problem discussed in Chapter III, synchronizing Counter Intelligence and Human Intelligence (CI and HUMINT) operations and products, also impacts unity of effort. Some intelligence professionals proclaimed that CI and HUMINT accounted for more than 80 percent of the intelligence collection in places such as Bosnia, Kosovo and more recently, Afghanistan. According to Stallings, the introduction of the integrated Combined Joint Intelligence Integration (CJ2X) concept has proven to be a major step in the right direction. This concept incorporates management, control, and coordination measures that synchronize and de-conflict CI and HUMINT in all directions throughout the theater of operations.²⁶

From a present-day perspective, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has probably the most immediate challenges regarding unity of effort. The department must leverage state and local government resources as well as numerous federal agencies, and be able to respond to a broad spectrum of crises or disasters within the United States. Shear numbers make Unity of Command impossible; however, Unity of Effort is taking seed.

The need to share information with state and local civil authorities quickly identified the need to support crisis operations at the unclassified level. If government or military intelligence assets are necessary to support crises, the resulting products pertain

²⁵ Decker, 4.

²⁶ Stallings, 1.

to US soil, infrastructure or personnel, raising legal issues that must be resolved.²⁷ In a proactive effort the Air Force Air Combat Command (ACC) sponsored a multi-agency workshop in April 2006 to discuss defense support to civil authorities. The workshop included representatives from 27 federal and defense department agencies and included the Department of Homeland Defense, National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, the Joint Staff, the National Guard Bureau, U.S Northern Command, US Joint Forces Command and various Air Force agencies. Workshop topics focused on developing an imagery collection, production and dissemination strategy to support contingencies on US soil. At the heart of the discussions was the question of command relationships: Who takes the lead in a crisis; who works for whom?²⁸ Workable command relationships are one key to unified effort.

Following the US government debacle after Hurricane KATRINA (at federal, state and local levels), President George Bush signed into law the Post-Katrina Emergency Reform Act of 2006. The Act establishes new leadership positions within DHS, brings additional functions into the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), creates and reallocates functions to other components within DHS and amends the Homeland Security Act in ways that directly and indirectly affect the organization and functions of various entities within the department. In addition, DHS has made other organizational changes outside of FEMA which complement the changes mandated by

²⁷ MSgt Mark Haviland, USAF, "After Katrina: ACC's Intel Team Applies Lessons Learned." *Air Force Print News* (31 August 2006), 1. http://www.acc.af.mil/news/story_print.asp?id=123026271 (accessed 22 September 2007).

²⁸ Ibid.

Congress. Together these changes will strengthen the Department's ability to prevent, prepare for, protect against, respond to and recover from domestic hazards or threats.²⁹

The US global war on terrorism is another arena in which the military must rely on US diplomatic efforts and support from other nations' military and police forces. One senior official at USCENTCOM sees over-classification of intelligence as a primary inhibitor of unity of effort in the Global War on Terrorism:

The fight to defeat worldwide networked terrorist cells will only be successful if information can be shared across agencies and coalition partners. Doing that means operators must resist the urge to put the highest classification on intelligence and other documents – classifications that make it that much harder to share, said Col. Richard A. Davis, chief of US Central Command's Strategic Command, Control, Computers and Communications (C4) Architecture, Programs and Policy division.³⁰

Future US military operations will continue to be either civil-military or unconventional in nature. Standing up the hybrid US Military/State Department Combatant Command to manage diplomatic, military and humanitarian efforts in Africa (USAFRICOM) and the reorganization of US Southern Command along similar military and diplomatic functional lines supports this assumption and the nature of these commands will require unity of effort across their staffs. All the aforementioned examples in this chapter illustrate a final but continuous theme in Civil-Military Operations: Much success is the result of interpersonal relationships. Personalities matter.

²⁹ Department of Homeland Security website, "About the Department," http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/gc_1169243598416.shtm (accessed 3 February 2008).

³⁰ Gordon Lubold, "Sharing Intel with Coalition Partners Critical to Terrorist Fight." *C4ISR Journal*, Vol. 6 Issue 1 (Jan/Feb2007): 11. <http://ezproxy6.ndu.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=mth&AN=23944681&site=ehost-live> (accessed 10 January 2008).

Chapter V Collaboration

Invaluable expertise on a diverse range of topics resides in US government and non-government centers. Coalition members possess equally valuable perspectives on regionally diverse problems. Without collaboration between all these parties, intelligence products are typically one dimensional.¹

The intelligence discipline is inherently collaborative. Data that makes up intelligence is gathered from numerous sources or disciplines (e.g., Humans, Signals, Imagery) and fused into reference or actionable products. Intelligence is also produced at every level of war (i.e., the strategic, operational and tactical) and combined into a common operational picture to give the combatant commander relevant battlespace awareness. A good example of early intelligence collaboration was the concept of Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities (TENCAP). This allowed national-level products to benefit “boots-on-the-ground” commanders and began a long, sometimes arduous road of integrating national-to-tactical level intelligence in direct support of the war fighter. At the Combatant Command and Joint Task Force level intelligence architectures include collaborative tools such as chat, e-mail and conferencing that improve support to operational tasks like targeting. Hence, collaboration is required throughout the intelligence process. The next examples illustrate that this is sometimes achieved, but not always.

As with Unity of Effort, collaboration among the US, UN and NATO is complicated by many issues. The makeup of these organizations implies collaboration among the various member states. Although their design seems structured to facilitate

¹ Joint Pub 2-0, II-11.

cooperation it is hampered by variables like intelligence classification and releasability problems, issues of trust between members and technological inequities among nations, the latter two were discussed earlier.

As we approach the new challenges of the 21st century collaboration becomes a key to success. Using the Global War on Terrorism as an example, terrorist cell networks exist across numerous middle east countries. USCENTCOM is responsible for many of these but it is often difficult to share applicable intelligence, even among US agencies. Highly sensitive programs and classifications used to protect sources and the parochial, stove-piped design of the networks on which intelligence is stored makes sharing it clunky and time consuming.² Applying the joint principle of intelligence collaboration can resolve some of these issues.

There are multiple opportunities for collaboration within DOD. As the combatant or joint task force commander begins planning for a specific operation, the intelligence staff is building intelligence databases and estimates to support both planning and execution. As mentioned in Chapter II, Perception, Civil-Military Operations bring unique intelligence requirements such as regional demographics, food sources, the structure of local governments.³ These were the essential elements of information necessary for non-combat operations like Operation PROVIDE COMFORT in northern Iraq. Within the commander's planning and execution staff, Civil Affairs (CA) personnel are an excellent source for this unique information. CA teams have intimate access to local populations and the respective knowledge and insights that can be used to enhance the intelligence effort and ensure primary intelligence requirements are satisfied.

² Lubold, 11.

³ Snyder, 27.

While CA teams can provide an early perspective on regional social geography, the relationship between CA and intelligence staffs is a highly sensitive one. Civil Affairs personnel must build relationships of trust with local populations and their leadership. Any perception of their exploitation of local populations for intelligence purposes may damage this relationship and potentially endanger US personnel. This safety issue was recognized in Operation JOINT GUARDIAN; the relationship between CA teams, the Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) center and intelligence staffs was a delicate one but considered necessary for peace support operations. While there were US and NATO discussions about the role of CA/CIMIC supporting intelligence operations, there was no doctrine on how they could or should support them. Still, CA/CIMIC had invaluable insights about the political-military situation, persons of interest, ethnic minority abuses, and rule of law and anticrime operations.⁴ While not covered in doctrine during the 1990s, today's Joint Pub 3-57: Joint Doctrine for CMO does speak to the interrelation of CA and intelligence staffs:

Traditionally, in a hostile or uncertain environment, administration, logistics, and CMO (typically CA) staff elements collocate in the rear area where the majority of their activities take place, while the operations and intelligence staff elements are positioned forward where the focus of their interests lie. In an uncertain to permissive environment, the logistic and CMO focus is operational area-wide and looks forward and to the rear. The activities of these staff sections are the heart of the operation, and therefore the focus of the operations staff's activities and the intelligence staff's collection efforts.

The CMO officer (typically a CA officer) and staff may be collocated with the operations and intelligence staff elements and the information operations (IO) cell to more efficiently exchange information and requirements. Additional C2 structures (including a civil-military operations center [CMOC]) and communications may be required to facilitate interagency coordination.⁵

⁴ Wentz, 461.

⁵ Joint Publication 3-57: *Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations*, Joint Staff, Washington D.C. 21 June 1995, II-1.

The latest version of Joint Pub 3-57 broadens the focus from purely joint CA to a more encompassing doctrine linking military power with other government instruments, a shift from earlier treatments where CMO were considered a subset of CA.

Although Joint Pub 3-57 clarifies joint terms there is more to be done in multinational civil-military interoperability. Many NATO members such as Canada and the United Kingdom currently use the concept of civil-military cooperation. Joint Pub 3-57 allots several pages to current NATO doctrine in this area; however, the Alliance is rewriting its civil-military cooperation manual and it appears that the United Nations will then adopt the package largely intact. Thus a priority for the next version of Joint Pub 3-57 must be an update on NATO/UN CIMIC doctrinal changes.⁶

The HUMINT Analysis and Requirements Cell (HARC) used in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM is additionally charged with ensuring that Counter-Intelligence (CI) and HUMINT collectors are focusing on the HUMINT collection priorities of the commander and are integrated into the overall unit collection plan. These requirements must be shared and tasked down to even passive HUMINT collectors within CA, the military police and Criminal Investigation Division, presence patrols, Psychological Operations (PSYOP) teams, medical units and Information Operations. This initiative was underway in Afghanistan by late October 2002.⁷

The CA/Intelligence connection was recognized in Kosovo, even if poorly implemented, but the same was not true for operations during Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia. At least initially intelligence personnel missed collection

⁶ Joint Force Quarterly, Autumn-Winter 2001, 1.
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0KNN/is_2001_Autumn-Winter/ai_87779067/pg_1
(accessed 9 February 2008).

⁷ Stallings, 4.

opportunities and failed to recognize possible information assets due to their ignorance of the situation. Many potential sources did not fit the conventional definition of intelligence sources, including non-governmental organizations (NGO) providing humanitarian relief in the region.⁸

Major General Marks was deployed as the Combined Director of Intelligence (C2) to the Combined Force Land Component Commander (CFLCC) during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. The general notes the following regarding intelligence support and collaborating to achieve mission success:

As a "2" you will not work in a vacuum; you must leverage every possible resource. There is more to this task than you might think. Today, intelligence in support of tactical commanders depends on worldwide operations in real time (across services, joint, coalition--tactical to strategic). During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, small unit actions drew directly upon national level intelligence delivered to commanders on the ground in real time. SIGINT operations involving national assets and entities on three continents were used to provide real time force protection and targeting data directly to tactical commanders.⁹

Major General Mark's advise illustrates that present day commanders are doing a much better job at integrating intelligence sources locally, regionally and globally.

As early as Operation RESTORE HOPE, Somalia, intelligence analysts were waking up to the idea of collaboration, albeit not specifically described as such. Stuteville described the combining of CI and CA teams to improve collection potential as "intelligence synchronization."¹⁰ While it may be synchronization it also speaks to the critical need for collaboration, or the intelligence director reaching beyond the green door, so to speak, to use all available resources in support of the commander's information requirements.

⁸ Stuteville, 45.

⁹ MG Marks, 2.

¹⁰ Stuteville, 46.

Michael Smith and Melinda Hofstetter warned that the integration of intelligence and non-governmental organizations was an unholy alliance; there are benefits but also pitfalls. Military objectives are typically short term and focused on security, stability, and possibly the administration of food or services. NGOs, on the other hand, spend decades in an environment providing humanitarian assistance to decrease poverty, disease or starvation. Their goals are long-term. NGOs also see security not in an East-meets-West perspective but as a multi-faceted “North-South” scenario. When a sound human intelligence base cannot be laid due to a lack of military assets, open sources of information, to include NGO personnel, may prove useful. Not all will share information equally and some regard cooperation with the military negatively. That said, open and aggressive sharing of information can increase the chance of overall mission success.¹¹

In addition to previous warnings regarding the use of NGO, CA or other civilian representatives as potential information sources, it must be noted that if pressed or placed in a precarious situation their loyalty will likely revert to parent organizations and their associated mission objectives or constituents, not to DOD.

To maximize the use of CA, CI and other potential information sources, initial planning must anticipate the close collaboration for intelligence both within and outside of DOD. Regarding CA activities in the 1990s, there was a missing piece to how such operations were conducted. They tended not to be closely coordinated, often lacked focus in the original conception of the mission and exhibited too little continuity in execution, resulting in disparate activities over space and time. Without focus and

¹¹ Michael M. Smith and Melinda Hofstetter, “Conduit or Cul-de-Sac? Information Flow in Civil-Military Operations,” *Joint Force Quarterly* Spring 99, no. 21 (April 1999): 103-104.

continuity these civil-military efforts, even if well executed, can become isolated feel-good projects or photo opportunities without lasting impact.¹²

Just as with CA teams, similar problems have been encountered with HUMINT during civil-military operations. While CA, CI and NGO representatives are not targeted specifically as HUMINT sources they fall into the same disciplinary genre and may fulfill intelligence requirements in a similar fashion. Civil-military or non-combat operations and their unique intelligence requirements are well suited to the field of HUMINT. There are, however, pitfalls to be avoided in both the sources and the management of HUMINT operations. As a subjective art, HUMINT operations and their resulting products can leave room for confusion or misinterpretation of information.

Dave Sloggett discusses standardization as a possible solution to collaboration. One difficulty with HUMINT is that it is often collected through clandestine meetings and the process can be highly subjective and liable to error. Results of these clandestine discussions are then documented as reports. Free text is used to describe quite complex relationships between core elements of people, places, property and events, the fundamental building blocks of intelligence analysis in CMO. The challenge is how to create the circumstances where the information collected from such sources can be exploited as actionable intelligence. One element of a possible solution is to build common definitions of terms (lexicons) to enable a level of discipline to be brought to the underlying freedom of authors compiling contact reports. This would provide a common frame of reference from a terminology viewpoint, limiting mistakes where different

¹² Renzi, 31.

people use terms in separate ways.¹³ Standardization is a recurring theme and is further discussed regarding information sharing and associated technologies that enable it.

Standardization was applied as a means of improving HUMINT in Operation RESTORE HOPE, Somalia. The unique threat environment of diverse elements fighting each other with a variety of weaponry made the traditional application of Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE) ineffective. JIPOE was originally designed to identify conventional enemies and their potential courses of action; it was a tool for prediction. In response to this intelligence breakdown in Somalia, analysts adopted HUMINT and CI techniques and developed association matrices and time-event charts (both CI tools) as predictive products.¹⁴

A prime example of mismanaging HUMINT operations was seen in Operation JOINT GUARDIAN. Kosovo was a HUMINT-intense environment in which everyone became a collector. This placed a significant challenge on the ground component commander's HUMINT director who coordinated the Joint Task Force HUMINT activities, and also on the HUMINT Operations Cell, which integrated national and tactical level HUMINT reporting. They were both required to de-conflict collection activities, integrate disparate inputs from traditional and non-traditional HUMINT collectors, and then analyze, archive and disseminate findings. There were situations in Kosovo where HUMINT, CA, PSYOP teams and a Multinational Specialized Unit were unknowingly talking to the same person or persons, threatening their confidentiality and viability as a source. Death threats were also made to people who were seen willingly

¹³ Sloggett, 1.

¹⁴ Stuteville, 44.

working with Kosovo Force (KFOR) soldiers and in many cases these sources refused to deal with either KFOR or the US.¹⁵

During Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, Afghanistan, collaboration across the JTF commander's staff became vital to the success of conducting and coordinating HUMINT and CI operations. Staff elements involved in the process were the director of CI and HUMINT activities (the C2X), the CI Coordinating Authority (CICA) and the HUMINT Operations Cell (HOC) chief. Led ultimately by the C2X, these three individuals were charged with coordinating, managing, de-conflicting and properly reporting CI investigations, CI force protection and HUMINT source operations, mobile and sporadic team-level operations, interrogations and debriefing results, certain overt HUMINT operations and all covert and/or special compartmented HUMINT operations. This harmonious relationship fully incorporated primary HUMINT analysis and requirements management and totally complemented the intelligence centers, especially the Coalition Joint Intelligence Support Element (C-JISE) in Afghanistan.¹⁶

Command support for this concept is a must in order for the collaboration to work. The de-confliction of CI and HUMINT operations and sources is extremely difficult and frustrating to execute, and therefore one of the biggest challenges for the C2X and the Task Force Counter-Intelligence Coordination Activity (TFCICA) to orchestrate. In Afghanistan a tiered approach to de-confliction of sources was used. Source registers were obtained from tactical organizations (Army, Air Force, Marines and the Special Operations community), de-conflicted and used to create a theater source registry for tactical collectors. De-confliction was continued across and between national

¹⁵ Wentz, 459.

¹⁶ Stallings, 1.

agencies until there was a totally coordinated US theater source registry. Special emphasis was placed on the selection of sources based on placement, access and level of information; that is, tactical versus strategic information. By early October 2002 the staff began to de-conflict coalition CI and HUMINT collectors. Once completed, no CI or HUMINT source was being seen, paid, or supported by multiple organizations. At the functional component level this process was strictly managed by the Ground Force Commander's CI and HUMINT director (G2X) and the TFCICA.¹⁷

The process of de-conflicting these intelligence operations must consider both active and passive CI and HUMINT collectors and is probably the most difficult task assigned to the TFCICA and the C2X team. The standard approach is to focus from the lowest and most internal elements outward to ultimately national and coalition collectors. De-confliction begins with proper source administration and ends with extensive coordination and good work relationships. Once de-confliction extends beyond the borders of the standard chain of command (i.e., national collectors, special operations forces, sister services and coalition forces) working relationships and mutual objectives become critical.¹⁸

De-confliction or coordination applied to intelligence operations in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM demonstrate that collaboration within the intelligence discipline is critical and it is a general principle for conducting joint operations. Coordination will resolve many conflicts across US intelligence staffs, US and NATO or coalition forces but there are other variables that impede faithful application of this principle. The

¹⁷ Stallings, 4.

¹⁸ Ibid.

following paragraphs examine how technology can help or hinder the ability to collaborate in Civil-Military Operations.

As was recognized in the Unity of Effort and Synchronization failures discussed previously, technological disparities across the US, UN and NATO forces led to many problems in collaboration that might otherwise have enhanced meeting operational objectives. As discussed in Chapter IV, Unity of Effort, the technological lag in some UN and NATO nations will continue to be a source of friction to executing coalition operations. The technology gap is decreasing over time but when combined with ongoing classification and releasability factors, it will continue to plague multilateral cooperation in the future. Larry Wentz chronicled good examples of this failure during operations in Kosovo.

Wentz nailed the information-age issue in his book “*Lessons From Kosovo: The KFOR Experience*” when he said “NATO needs information tools; Kosovo was a Microsoft war.”¹⁹ The most sophisticated information management tools available across most of the alliance information structure were those found in the Microsoft Office application. Clearly NATO needs more capable information management applications such as these. NATO Headquarters intelligence requirements in this sector have been documented but by no means satisfied nor even necessarily agreed upon across the alliance regarding a way forward.²⁰ It is fair to say that most conflicts in the future will be Microsoft wars because the US, the world leader in information management and superiority, relies so heavily on this suite of tools. It is perhaps more accurate to call future wars “information wars” as the US increases access to information resources,

¹⁹ Wentz, 150.

²⁰ Ibid.

rapidly moves larger volumes of data and shapes that data with exceedingly advanced visualization tools.

Wentz describes a paradox of information management within NATO during Operation JOINT GUARDIAN:

“Although seemingly contradictory, NATO Headquarters intelligence was concurrently starved for intelligence and plagued by a glut of intelligence. From this contradiction arises the central issue of how to structure and manage high volumes of intelligence information, reporting, and dissemination using digital information systems and networks. Despite the challenges posed by digital system information management, the use of such systems was absolutely central to NATO’s success in maintaining high tempos in operations, coordination, crisis management, and politico-military consultation at all echelons. Unlike NATO’s analog and newer digital record communications systems, the digital wide area networks in use during Kosovo were not governed by any hierarchical reporting responsibilities or dissemination management scheme. Consequently, dissemination of intelligence reporting was too often on the basis of who one knows, not who needs to know.”²¹

This concept of “who one knows” vice “who needs to know” emphasizes, albeit implicitly, the need for collaborative relationships on and between coalition intelligence staffs. Forming personal and professional networks across international boundaries can help mitigate the lack of standards or information management schemes described above. During Kosovo operations there were no standard templates for structuring intelligence support for peace operations and the military had to adapt those used in wartime. The intelligence needs of the KFOR and the related coalition reporting procedures, information sharing criteria and methods, and national responsibilities were only broadly addressed.²² Standardization across NATO won’t resolve all issues associated with information sharing problems but such discipline can facilitate cooperation in the absence of a more formal process.

²¹ Wentz, 149.

²² Wentz, 448.

The need for a common communications architecture was clear in the planning for Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. The ability to work across a true coalition staff necessitated a combined system that facilitated immediate information sharing and dissemination. The following describes how the Director of Intelligence at USCENTCOM met the requirement:

CENTCOM established a Coalition Intelligence Center (CIC)... to leverage the access, intelligence expertise and perspectives of ... 68 OEF Coalition partners. Intelligence representatives ... were integrated into daily JICCEN operations on a more comprehensive basis.... The Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System (CENTRIXS) ... links into Global Command & Control System (GCCS) Common Operation Picture (COP) servers and facilitates operations/intelligence sharing at releasable levels.... This is a 'big deal' in terms of information superiority – we simply cannot move very far ahead without enforced standards, discipline and sustained funding emphasis in this regard.

Brigadier General John F. Kimmons, USA, Director of Intelligence, USCENTCOM, 23 May 2002.²³

The CENTRIXS solution was no doubt a response to US only, closed architectures used in operations during the 1990s, where “network information dissemination” was solved by soft and hard-copy data transfers across a disconnected coalition intelligence environment.

Lack of interoperability was responsible for the information sharing dilemma during Operation JOINT GUARDIAN. The US was still wrestling with this issue in 2003 so it is no surprise that NATO and the UN were years behind in the same effort. The KFOR’s dissemination capability supporting intelligence sharing consisted mainly of three independent secure information networks. At best, the de facto KFOR intelligence system architecture was a federated network of stove piped NATO and national systems that, for both NATO and national security policy reasons, were not interconnected.

²³ Joint Pub 2-0, V-13.

Exchange of information was essentially done via hard copy and sneaker net soft copy.²⁴

Hence even where there's a desire to share intelligence, unimpeded by security classification, the collective coalition members often do not have the tools to do so.

Lessons learned during the 1990s and applied in OEF led to insightful enhancements for the follow-on Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF). Colonel David Eshel describes OIF as the first major military operation conducted under the newly introduced Army Net-Centric Warfare (NCW) doctrine. It was also the first in which the US Army, Marines and coalition forces shared, to a large extent, a common computer-automated operations suite.²⁵ CENTRIXS evolved from a US Army program called Project Morning Calm (PMC). It was developed at the US Army's Intelligence and Security Command and initially tested in the US Pacific Command. Architectural connections and processes, data screening tools and security firewalls were compiled to create a seamless, virtual information. The resulting architecture from PMC continues to support operations in USCENTCOM's military operations today.

The examples thus far have been focused on Combatant, Joint Task Force or Component commanders, either struggling with the inability to collaborate or creating solutions to achieve collaboration in spite of many obstacles which precluded it. From the national perspective collaboration describes what today is called the "Whole of Government Approach" to achieving US national security interests. National collaboration integrates the Inter-Agency (IA) members of the National Security Council (NSC) to bring all elements of power to bare on a problem. The IA is comprised of the cabinet level Secretaries of the NSC. The concept is sound and the practice must be

²⁴ Wentz, 467.

²⁵ Eshel, 1.

adopted if the US is to avoid making mistakes such as those in OIF and OEF. The DOD is well suited to deterring aggression and defeating enemies (winning the war) but it is ill equipped to win the peace. Tasks such as nation-building, implementation of civil governance, building infrastructure and creating economic institutions are foreign to DOD. Achieving these last milestones of a US operation requires input from the entire talent pool of the US government. Access to information from across the NSC helps intelligence analysts flesh out the key requirements necessary to succeed in Civil-Military Operations.

The true solution requires analysts to reach beyond government sources alone. Because the US will conduct operations exclusively within the construct of international coalitions, the “Whole of Government Approach” must be expanded to include governments, agencies and organizations of partner nations as well. Operations in Kosovo early on demonstrated the need for this global approach:”

There was a shortfall in political assessment that was further compounded by lack of insight into the complex economic factors impacting the allied force and NATO’s strategy. Again, the lack of nations’ reporting to NATO and an initial lack of appreciation of economic factors, in general, was a challenge for the Headquarters’ intelligence staff.²⁶

Wentz goes on to describe the importance of a basic understanding of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia’s electrical power capacities, petroleum supplies and sources, military petroleum storage (strategic and tactical), the politico-economic vulnerabilities of the Milosevic regime and the impacts of the conflict on regional markets and economies.²⁷ These essential elements of information fall outside the traditional scope of

²⁶ Wentz, 142.

²⁷ Wentz, 143.

intelligence questions and the analysts' ability to answer them requires cooperation between US *and* coalition nations' government agencies.

The broad spectrum of information requirements needed in Kosovo is further discussed by Wentz:

US intelligence contributions did not include integrated military, political, and economic assessments and forecasts. Aside from the obvious need for military intelligence reporting, which was largely met by the US defense intelligence establishment, strategic assessment and forecasting was not a strong suit of any contributing nation.²⁸

This paragraph reiterates the necessity of the whole of government approach in finding CMO solutions, using both US and international organizations for information on infrastructure and societal institutions to establish a situational awareness beyond the military aspects of conflict.

One of the better examples of recent collaboration across the US government was seen during relief operations following the massive Tsunami that impacted Indonesia. As part of the crisis planning process the intelligence staff established relations with various IA components involved in the mission. This collaboration improved operations and streamlined the overall transition from crisis operations (humanitarian relief) to redeployment of the US forces involved. The US Agency for International Development (USAID) was lead organization conducting the operation; the UN played a supporting role.²⁹ The US military is very good at massive logistics and quick response in times, as demonstrated during disasters like the Indonesian Tsunami in 2004 or the Pakistan earthquake in 2005. However, other government agencies are better suited for tasks such

²⁸ Wentz, 145.

²⁹ Dewey G. Jordan, "Unorthodox Approaches to Intelligence in Operations Other Than War," *Marine Corps Gazette* 90, no. 5 (May 2006): 57.

as disaster relief and humanitarian assistance.³⁰ Establishing logical, workable command relationships will go a long way toward facilitating collaboration during planning and execution of future Civil-Military Operations.

³⁰ Renzi, 33.

Chapter VI Findings and Recommendations

This chapter considers broad findings from the examples above and proposes solutions to intelligence shortfalls where practicable. The span of time over which these gaps were witnessed illustrates a trend of resurgent problems when conducting intelligence operations in support of Civil-Military Operations. That many of the analysts or operators involved found temporary solutions is laudable; however, time spent resolving shortfalls on-the-fly is time probably better spent on answering the critical intelligence needs of the commander.

The most significant lesson and one that supports the original thesis is that the application of Joint Doctrine for Intelligence can alleviate some of these recurring problems. Joint Pub 2-0, Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations, dated 9 March 2000, captures three of these four principles as responsibilities of the Joint Task Force J2 (staff intelligence director). Though these areas were not singled out as specific principles until 2006, they were clearly seen as keys to providing successful intelligence support. In fact, doctrine began to capture some of these concepts as early as 1990, as revealed in the quote in Chapter III by Michael Handel (cited on page 22).

The latest Joint Pub 2-0, Joint Intelligence, is only one publication that discusses the conditions examined throughout this paper. There are eight additional doctrinal publications that speak directly to aspects of the lessons identified herein. These publications cover Joint Planning, Joint Intelligence, Non-governmental operations, Civil Affairs, Interagency Coordination and Peace Operations. Much of this guidance was unavailable to the actors addressed in this research; however, future intelligence analysts,

operators and planners can apply these new resources in an effort to alleviate future intelligence shortfalls.

In addition to changes in recent Joint Doctrine, the US government has examined civil-military-type operations for over a decade. As early as May of 1994 the government was evaluating the national approach to peacekeeping policies and programs. One result was President Clinton's Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25, issued to develop a comprehensive policy and framework for peace-related operations arising since the end of the cold war. In May of 1997 the president signed PDD 56, which outlined the management of Complex Contingency Operations. PDD 56 introduced the Inter-Agency approach to contingency solutions and identified a need for personnel with a broad base of skills to plan and manage operations in this new environment. Finally in November of 2008, President George Bush signed National Security Presidential Directive 44, issuing guidance for Inter-Agency efforts on reconstruction and stabilization. Hence there are numerous publications, documents and directives to help future planners and intelligence analysts shape their approach to unconventional operations.

Intelligence support is sometimes called generic across the entire range of military operations. Just as the intelligence process supports multiple aspects of targeting (e.g., both kinetic and non-lethal), it can be used equally to support traditional warfare and CMO. The intelligence process is not function-specific; however, the analyst must understand the unique information requirements of the commander charged with executing the mission.

Many of the lessons gleaned from operations conducted during the 1990's were successfully applied to operations in Afghanistan in 2002, such as the integration of CI

and HUMINT to support the roles of targeting and force protection. What is not clear is whether these were consciously applied lessons or whether intelligent operators and analysts adapted to an uncooperative environment. In either case these incidents demonstrate the need for broad coordination and collaboration across the commander's staff. Whereas the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) concept attempts to integrate a whole-of-government approach to solutions, a "whole of information" approach (including CI, HUMINT (TFCICA), CA and PA) is required in the planning process for CMO. A possible solution to this organizational shortfall is the Joint Intelligence/Operations Center (JIOC), a construct that facilitates the integration of representatives from all of these disciplines.

Applying the various doctrinal publications mentioned and presidential guidance formulated over the past 15 years to the JIPOE process is critical. While the guidance doesn't offer concrete solutions for implementing joint intelligence principles, it will inform planners at the planning level and key them to possible problems during the execution phase of operations.

Chapter II, Perception, examined the lack of intelligence resources to collect on all problem sets within a commander's region of responsibility. Fiscal realities at the combatant commands and national intelligence agencies makes intelligence prioritization a continual challenge. One solution is to glean intelligence collection requirements from insights gained through the commander's Theater Security Cooperation Program (TSCP). TSCP is the ongoing "phase zero" for all the commander's theater contingency plans and must be used as a barometer for future problems. Feedback from TSCP activity can drive

intelligence collection efforts or priorities, resulting in necessary information to establish an accurate baseline of regional information.

Standardization was highlighted as a need during the 1990s and became the solution to several problems after 2000. Standardized operating procedures for the conduct of HUMINT operations across units and commands improved the quality and timeliness of subsequent intelligence products. Application of standardization across all intelligence-related functions on the staff (e.g., intelligence, public affairs, PSYOP, Information Operations and Strategic Communications) will alleviate some of the problems cited in the research. Another area where standards were employed successfully is in the technology domain. Information architectures used as early as operations in Haiti, 1994, were harmonized across both the commander's staff and throughout his component organizations.

Some issues will not be resolved by joint doctrine alone. Technological inequities between the US and its partners were among the most significant problems faced in the conduct of complex, multinational operations. Given that the US acts multilaterally in most cases, technological problems and security classification issues will continue to impede our ability as a global force for stability. Because of the impact technology has on the principles of synchronization, unity of effort and collaboration, both the UN and NATO must balance future military investments between the information domain and weapons acquisition. The US brings ample kinetic capability to the table; however, the inability to communicate sensitive or critical information across the coalition dilutes their ultimate utility.

Many cases were made for using international, US non-governmental organizations' personnel or other non-traditional sources for intelligence purposes. While they are useful, the intelligence professional must be cognizant of these sources' primary objectives and their need to maintain credibility among the local populace. Any perception of ties with US or coalition intelligence efforts can jeopardize civilian efforts and will likely diminish their cooperation. Intelligence staffs must balance the importance of these contributions to situational awareness and the sensitivity of providing their piece of that puzzle, and find creative ways of interfacing that protects the interests of both parties. The example cited in the research is working the sources through an intermediary such as Civil Affairs teams or the Public Affairs office.

The US intelligence community has undergone enormous change in the last eight years. Findings over the past two decades, beyond those referenced in this research, have caused a re-evaluation of how the US prepares, shares and applies intelligence resources. The introduction of new intelligence concepts (e.g., JIOC, Intelligence Support to Campaign Planning and National Intelligence Support Plans) were designed to bolster combatant commander's contingency and operations plans. These ideas evolved from a 1980s intelligence paradigm that was cold-war centric and ill-suited to today's complex military applications. Technological advances such as the Distributed Common Ground System are being adopted across the military services in an effort to initiate network-centric operations and maximize the global information grid (i.e., the Internet). Finally, the defense department responded to the Global War on Terror by standing up several Counter Terrorism agencies, centers or task forces to integrate all national intelligence

resources, the Federal Bureau of Investigations, the Customs Department and other key federal agencies.

The foregoing steps will make a positive impact vis-à-vis the principles of joint intelligence. But intelligence must be ensconced in the doctrinally approved but as-yet-to-be completely implemented concept of DIME. DIME is the Diplomatic, Informational, Military and Economic combined approach to securing US national interests. Applied as defined in doctrine can alleviate problems such as those in the middle east, will aid in the Global War on Terrorism and will end the historical US approach to solving national security problems with a military-only response.

Chapter VII Conclusion

The thesis set forth at the outset of this research was that joint doctrine can provide the solution to many problems encountered in recent Civil-Military Operations (CMO). Four doctrinal principles of joint intelligence were applied as a metric to address the hypothesis. Aptly applied, these principles are sound and will inform the intelligence analyst or planner of potential methods for meeting the new and unique information requirements of CMO.

The four principles, Perception, Synchronization, Unity of Effort and Collaboration, are closely related and often times overlapped as a cause of the shortfalls cited. The disadvantage of this similarity is that problems implementing one principle often translate into problems with others. Conversely, a solution to one principle will solve several; better Synchronization leads to improved Collaboration and Unity of Effort. The ability of the intelligence planner to not only apply these principles but to synthesize their application across the plan will lead to better intelligence support overall.

The findings and recommendations discussed in Chapter VI must be considered in light of current global conditions. Today's intelligence challenges demand a robust, integrated and creative approach to supporting operations. Whether working at the Combatant Commander's level or within the National Security Council, practitioners of intelligence must recognize the lessons of recent US government interventions and develop agile solutions. Principles of joint doctrine, both for intelligence and other disciplines, provide a good point of departure for this evolution.

Global problems the US faces include growing and competing economies, inequitable distribution of wealth, expanding access to information and knowledge

(which in some countries simply highlights the inequity of wealth), limitations to highly demanded resources such as oil, water and electricity, an increase in failing and failed states, and a continuance of global non-state actors or obstructionists attempting to influence the US or our allies' interests. More than ever before, regional challenges have the potential to become global in scope and the world response will not be military specific but a combined approach of security, economic, humanitarian and institutional assistance.

The defense department is broadening its traditional military approach to theater solutions. The recent re-organization of US Southern Command and the stand up of US Africa Command are a testament that the military no longer sees itself as the sole US solution to the problem of global stability. The string of US interventions during the last two decades shows that cooperation across both the US and international governments is required for successful, enduring results.

As the defense department evolves, the intelligence community must embrace the changes necessary for complex global responses. The intelligence community's interaction with US government agencies, non-governmental entities, close allies and distant relations such as the UN are addressed in current joint doctrine. The failures of the 1990s and the successes of the following decade formed the foundation for that guidance; if applied in the spirit intended, collective joint doctrine will bolster intelligence support to military operations, traditional and otherwise.

Appendix 1 List of Operations

1. Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, Northern Iraq, 5 April 1991 – 31 December 1996.

Following Operation DESERT STORM, the United Nations passed resolution 688 condemning Iraqi repression of Iraq's northern Kurdish population and asked UN member states to assist the Kurds and other refugees in the region. The conditions of some 500,000 refugees in the freezing remote mountains in southeastern Turkey prompted President Bush to order the United States' European forces to direct immediate relief assistance. The operation sought two goals: To provide relief to the refugees and to enforce the security of refugees and the humanitarian effort.¹

2. Operation RESTORE HOPE, Somalia, 3 December 1992 – 4 May 1993.

Expanded peacekeeping in Somalia began after the failure of UN Operation Somalia I (UNOSOM I). Five hundred thousand Somalis were dead from famine by the fall of 1992 and hundreds of thousands more in danger of dying. Clan violence in Somalia interfered with international famine relief efforts and President Bush sent American troops to protect relief workers in a new operation called Restore Hope. The US-led coalition had a mandate of protecting humanitarian operations and creating a secure environment for eventual political reconciliation. A joint and multinational operation, RESTORE HOPE – called UNITAF (unified task force) – was a US-led, UN-sanctioned operation that included protection of humanitarian assistance and other peace-enforcement operations.²

3. Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, 19 September 1994 – 31 March 1996.

In May 1994, the Haitian military selected Supreme Court Justice Emile Jonassaint to be provisional president. The UN and the US reacted to this extra-constitutional move by tightening economic sanctions. On July 31, 1994, the UN adopted Resolution 940 authorizing member states to use all necessary means to facilitate the departure of Haiti's military leadership and restore constitutional rule and Jean-Bertrand Aristide's presidency. In the weeks that followed, the United States took the lead in forming a multinational force to carry out the UN's mandate by means of a military intervention. Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY objectives were fostering democratic institutions and reducing the flow of illegal immigrants into the United States. The United States movement of forces to Haiti began in September 1994 with the approval of the Security Council. The operation succeeded both in restoring the democratically elected government of Haiti and in stemming emigration. In March 1995, the US transferred the peacekeeping responsibilities to UN functions.³

4. Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, Bosnia, 14 December 1995 – November 1996.

¹ GlobalSecurity.Org. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/provide_comfort.htm (accessed 13 Feb 2008).

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

Beginning in December 1995, US and allied nations deployed peacekeeping forces to Bosnia in support of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR. This operation marked the first commitment of forces in NATO's history as well as the first time since World War II that American and Russian soldiers have shared a common mission. Multinational Division (North) and the US Task Force Eagle's history began in 1995 following the NATO-imposed cease-fire, halting the destructive four-year Balkan conflict. After the General Framework Agreement for Peace was signed on 14 December 1995, the United States 1st Armored Division, as part of NATO's Rapid Reaction Corps, was ordered to Bosnia-Herzegovina as part of the operation.⁴

5. Operation JOINT GUARDIAN, Kosovo, 10 June 1999 – 26 February 2004.

On 10 June the UN Security Council adopted a detailed resolution outlining civil administration and peacekeeping responsibilities in Kosovo and paving the way for a peaceful settlement of the conflict and the safe return home of hundreds of thousands of Kosovo Albanian refugees and internal displaced persons. The resolution was passed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which allows security forces to carry weapons for force protection and to use force in carrying out the UN resolution's directives.⁵

6. Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, Afghanistan, 7 October 2001 – Present.

The operation was in response to al Qaeda attacks against the United States on 11 September, 1991. The short term goals of the military action included the capture of Osama bin Laden and other al Qaeda leaders, the prevention of further attacks by al Qaeda, the end of Afghanistan's harboring of terrorists, their training camps and infrastructure, and the removal of Mullah Omar and the Taliban Regime. Long term goals include the end of terrorism, the deterrence of state sponsorship of terrorism and the return of Afghanistan into the international community.⁶

7. Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, Iraq, 19 March 2003 – Present.

Initial objectives of the operation were to overthrow the government of Saddam Husain and to prevent future Iraqi use or distribution of weapons of mass destruction. US government and limited allied partners succeeded in quickly overthrowing the Husain regime; however, securing a peaceful environment in Post-Saddam Iraq has proved more complicated. Operations currently focus on quelling inter-factional conflict and attempts to shore up a national government and the requisite institutions for a sustainable peace.

8. Operation UNIFIED ASSISTANCE, Indonesia, 5 January – 14 February 2005.

The international humanitarian operation effort in the wake of the tsunami that struck South East Asia on 26 December 2004. Some 20 US naval vessels and 85 US military aircraft participated to deliver food and supplies to the flood survivors.⁷

⁴ GlobalSecurity.Org. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/joint_endeavor.htm (accessed 13 Feb 2008).

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

Appendix 2

Glossary

AOR	Area of Responsibility
CA	Civil Affairs
CCIR	Commander's Critical Information Requirements
CENTRIXS	Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System
CFACC	Combined Force Air Component Commander
CFLCC	Combined Force Land Component Commander
CFMCC	Combined Force Maritime Component Commander
CI	Counter-Intelligence
CICA	CI Coordinating Authority
CISE	Combined Intelligence Support Element
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Force
CMC	Civil-Military Cooperation
CMO	Civil-Military Operations
CMOC	Civil-Military Operations Center
DCGS-A	Distributed Common Ground Station – Army
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DIOCC	Defense Intelligence/Operations Coordination Center
DOD	Department of Defense
EEI	Essential Elements of Information
FRY	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
HARC	HUMINT Analysis Requirements Center
HOA	Horn of Africa
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
IA	Inter-Agency
IGO	International Government Organization
IMINT	Imagery Intelligence
INSCOM	Intelligence and Security Command (US Army)
ISR	Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance
ITL	Intelligence Task List
JIACG	Joint Inter-Agency Coordination Group
JIC	Joint Intelligence Center
JICCEN	Joint Intelligence Center USCENTCOM
JIOC	Joint Intelligence Operations Center
JIPB	Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace
JIPOE	Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment
JISE	Joint Intelligence Support Element
KFOR	Kosovo Force
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army

KVM	Kosovo Verification Mission
MATGF	Marine Air-Ground Task Force
MCIA	Marine Corps Intelligence Agency
NATO	North American Treaty Organization
NCW	Net-Centric Warfare
NGA	National Geospatial Intelligence Agency
NGO	Non-Government Organization
NSA	National Security Agency
NSC	National Security Council
NICC	National Intelligence Coordination Center
NISP	National Intelligence Support Plan
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
OSINT	Open Source Intelligence
PA	Public Affairs
PIR	Priority Intelligence Requirements
PSYOP	Psychological Operations
SIGINT	Signals Intelligence
SSTR	Security, Stability, Transition and Reconstruction
TENCAP	Technical Exploitation of National Capabilities
TFCICA	Task Force Counter Intelligence Coordination Activity
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UN	United Nations
UNITAF	Unified Task Force
UNOSOM	United Nations Operations Somalia
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
USAFRICOM	US Africa Command
USAID	US Agency for International Development
USCENTCOM	US Central Command
USEUCOM	US European Command
USJFCOM	US Joint Forces Command
USPACOM	US Pacific Command

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