PROJECT CHECO
SOUTHEAST ASIA
REPORT
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM
JULY 1972-JANUARY 1973
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM
JULY 1972-JANUARY 1973

24 MAY 74

CHECO/CORONA HARVEST DIVISION
OPERATIONS ANALYSIS OFFICE
HQ PACAF

Prepared by:
CAPTAIN JACK L. TINIUS
Project CHECO 7th AF
Project CHECO was established in 1962 to document and analyze air operations in Southeast Asia. Over the years the meaning of the acronym changed several times to reflect the escalation of operations: Current Historical Evaluation of Counterinsurgency Operations, Contemporary Historical Evaluation of Combat Operations and Contemporary Historical Examination of Current Operations. Project CHECO and other U. S. Air Force Historical study programs provided the Air Force with timely and lasting corporate insights into operational, conceptual and doctrinal lessons from the war in SEA.
The counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare environment of Southeast Asia has resulted in USAF airpower being employed to meet a multitude of requirements. These varied applications have involved the full spectrum of USAF aerospace vehicles, support equipment, and manpower. As a result, operational data and experiences have accumulated which should be collected, documented, and analyzed for current and future impact upon USAF policies, concepts, and doctrine.

Fortunately, the value of collecting and documenting our SEA experiences was recognized at an early date. In 1962, Hq USAF directed CINCPACAF to establish an activity which would provide timely and analytical studies of USAF combat operations in SEA and would be primarily responsive to Air Staff requirements and direction.

Project CHECO, an acronym for Contemporary Historical Examination of Current Operations, was established to meet the Air Staff directive. Based on the policy guidance of the Office of Air Force History and managed by Hq PACAF, with elements in Southeast Asia, Project CHECO provides a scholarly "on-going" historical examination, documentation, and reporting on USAF policies, concepts, and doctrine in PACOM. This CHECO report is part of the overall documentation and examination which is being accomplished. It is an authentic source for an assessment of the effectiveness of USAF airpower in PACOM when used in proper context. The reader must view the study in relation to the events and circumstances at the time of its preparation—recognizing that it was prepared on a contemporary basis which restricted perspective and that the author's research was limited to records available within his local headquarters area.

ROBERT E. HILLER
Chief, Operations Analysis
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FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

V. H. Gallacher

V. H. GALLACHER, Lt Colonel, USAF
Chief, CHECO/CORONA HARVEST Division
Ops Anal, DCS/Plans and Operations

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This report discusses Operation FIELD GOAL, a psychological operation against North Vietnam from July 1972 to the cease-fire in January 1973, with primary focus on the problems encountered in supporting leaflet drops. Some evaluation of the effect on the enemy is also included. Two previous CHECO reports deal with the history of psychological warfare activities in Southeast Asia. The first, *Psychological Operations by USAF/VNAF in SVN*, 16 September 1968, traces the early history, evolution, and expansion of psychological operations in Southeast Asia. The report discusses specific in-country programs such as CHIEU HOI and ELEPHANT WALK and also deals with psychological warfare in support of the interdiction campaign in Laos and missions over North Vietnam. The second report, *Psychological Operations Air Support in SEA*, June 1968-May 1971, updates and expands subjects discussed in the first report and concentrates on the changes that occurred in psychological operations between June 1968 and May 1971. The report also deals with the redeployment of U.S. forces and Vietnamization of the war effort.

(U) Since this report primarily discusses a specific operation (Operation FIELD GOAL), the two previous CHECO reports on psychological operations are recommended reading for background information on (1) the problems of support for these missions in Southeast Asia and (2) the difficulty of evaluating the effectiveness of such operations.
On 1 July 1972, the management and control of psychological operations (PSYOP) in Southeast Asia (SEA) shifted from the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC). This change was a result of the phase-down of direct U.S. ground involvement in Vietnam and the progress of the Vietnamization program; when it became apparent that the government and armed forces of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) could not support aerial PSYOP activities on a large scale, CINCPAC assumed direct management of the program from MACV. The general concept developed for post-Vietnamization PSYOP aerial activity continued to be the high-altitude, wind-drift delivery of leaflets to targeted areas. In the past, especially in SVN, a more varied approach was used involving different types of aircraft with the capability of making low-level broadcasts, and leaflet and material drops to localized areas.

Because it was the U.S. government's objective to achieve a negotiated settlement with the North Vietnamese, the audience for PSYOP were the North Vietnamese soldiers in all of SEA and the populace of North Vietnam (NVN). The PSYOP goal was to persuade a tightly controlled nation of loyal people to stop supporting their government's war policies and objectives. This effort was seen by the U.S. State Department as a crucial prerequisite to achieving a negotiated peace settlement with the
government of North Vietnam. Of the highest concern to CINCPAC and especially Seventh Air Force was the ability to support such an important mission when USAF resources were so thinly stretched during critical phases in the air war over North Vietnam.
CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND

PSYOP Concepts

(S) On 19 October 1971, CINCPAC convened a conference on psychological operations and political warfare in Southeast Asia to determine future PSYOP planning and operational requirements in view of the imminent phase-down of the Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) in Saigon, which had the responsibility for PSYOP in SEA.

(S) Following the CINCPAC conference in October 1971 and prior to the assumption of control and management of PSYOP in SEA by CINCPAC on 1 July 1972, many changes were made in PSYOP goals. These changes resulted principally from the continuing de-escalation of U.S. activities in SEA, especially in RVN. As a consequence, CINCPAC published CINCPAC Operations Order (OPORD) 5102 (12 February 1972) to manage the campaign. A supporting OPORD, Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) OPORD 72-4, PSYOP Leaflet Campaign, 1 July 1972, outlined a high altitude stand-off delivery concept. At that time, CINCPAC assumed responsibility for management and control of a consolidated and greatly reduced PSYOP campaign which included, among other programs, Operation FIELD GOAL.

(S) In addition to a much reduced and consolidated PSYOP mission, the overall organization of forces used in executing the mission was simplified. CINCPAC was responsible for the operational command of the PSYOP
program while PACAF, through 5th, 7th, and 13th Air Forces, provided delivery and logistics support. The Strategic Air Command (SAC) was tasked to provide B-52s or drone aircraft when authorized by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army Pacific (CINCUSARPAC), through the Army's 7th Psychological Operations Group (PSYOPGP) in Okinawa, provided the packaged leaflets, handling and loading, and information on the wind-borne characteristics of the leaflets. The Army also insured that sufficient quantities of leaflets were prepositioned to meet mission requirements, and provided the special training for high altitude leaflet delivery. In addition, the 7th PSYOPGP was responsible for developing appropriate themes for leaflet messages, selecting targets, determining numbers of leaflets to be dropped, imposing mission restrictions, and setting the desired leaflet delivery date. The American Embassies (AMEMBs) in Saigon, Vientiane, and Phnom Penh were responsible for providing mission direction and policy guidance for the countries in which they were located, as well as for approving themes and message content of leaflets, target areas, and the general support of the PSYOP Plan.

Operational Considerations

Of the aircraft available for leaflet delivery in Southeast Asia, the C-130 proved in many respects to be the best platform for high altitude delivery. Yet, because the C-130 was vulnerable to the increasingly effective enemy anti-aircraft defenses, large areas of SEA were denied to C-130s.
To better cope with this threat, B-52s and F-4s were employed in high threat areas while drones were used for selected point targets within NVN. The leaflet delivery systems available in SEA were four C-130 COMBAT SPEAR* aircraft (90th SOS), F-4D/E aircraft (7th AF), C-130 airlift aircraft (374th TAW**), and B-52s and DC-130s with AQM-34 drones from the SAC BUFFALO HUNTER program.***

(S) In addition to the C-130's vulnerability to enemy air defenses, another problem was that leaflet drops could only be made in an unpressurized configuration. That limited the ceiling for leaflet missions to 25,000 feet Mean Sea Level. Because of the nature of the mission, aircrews faced physiological problems experienced by aircrews who fly in unpressurized compartments at altitudes over 10,000 feet for extended periods. Furthermore, the physically demanding task (moving 150-pound boxes at a rapid rate) while on oxygen at altitudes of up to 25,000 feet necessitated implementation of procedures not normally required. Physiological Training Technicians were assigned to each mission to insure that all life support equipment was serviceable and to spot symptoms of high altitude sickness (hypoxia). Any indication of hypoxia required immediate mission abort.

(U) Considering the need for a PSYOP program in SEA in the context of limited available resources and atypical mission requirements, PACAF

*These aircraft possessed an electronic countermeasures (ECM) capability.

**Tactical Airlift Wing.

***See Project CHECO Report, BUFFALO HUNTER, 1970-1972 (U), Hq PACAF, 24 Jul 73 (S) for further information on this program.
OPORD 72-4 set forth a pragmatic, realistic approach. As events developed, however, its execution was hampered because of the very problems it addressed: limited resources and unwieldy mission requirements. In addition, unfamiliar and uncooperative weather in SEA and the changing nature of U.S. involvement in the war reduced the effectiveness of this current concept of PSYOP. However, before exploring its successes and failures, consideration should be given to Operation FIELD GOAL, its development and execution.
Selected Early PSYOP Planning in SEA

(S) A plan for directing PSYOP against NVN existed in 1965 under the code name FACT SHEET. Originally conceived by JUSPAO as a threat campaign, its main message threatened increased bombing if the North Vietnamese continued to support their government's policies. Later, the program was renamed FRANTIC GOAT and was redirected to inform the people of North Vietnam of the actual progress of the war and of the intentions of the government of the Republic of Vietnam and its Allies. The execution of the mission was much the same as the one later outlined in PACAF OPORD 72-4 except that SAC resources were not used.

(S) Successful leaflet delivery in the defensive fortifications of the Red River delta area, where the majority of the NVN population lives, required the use of high performance aircraft. The mission was assigned to the 8th Tactical Fighter Wing, Ubon Royal Thai Air Force Base, Thailand. The Wing's F-4C aircraft used the M-129E leaflet bomb, which was principally used as a chaff dispenser. For leaflet drops in lower threat areas, C-130 aircraft from the 90th SOS were used to perform high altitude drops. While leaflet deliveries were made under FRANTIC GOAT, it was difficult to assess the effectiveness of the campaign. The reaction from NVN in 1967 to the threat of PSYOP was encouraging enough for JUSPAO to set a goal of placing 60 million leaflets per month in NVN. This goal was never achieved.
because of the lack of a PSYOP delivery system that could safely penetrate the NVN defenses and distribute large volumes of leaflets. Moreover, the cessation of bombing in the North in March 1960, and the accompanying restriction on sorties above the 20th parallel, limited the execution of the FRANTIC GOAT campaign. However, the FRANTIC GOAT mission was not entirely suspended; a leaflet campaign, FRANTIC GOAT SOUTH, was developed against the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and the NVN populace below the 20th parallel, as well as against NVN soldiers who had infiltrated the RVN.

**OPORD FIELD GOAL**

After the 1 July 1972 CINCPAC assumption of PSYOP activities in SEA, OPORD FIELD GOAL (developed by the 7th PSYOPGP and dated 22 August 1972) was implemented. The OPORD gave the estimate of the situation as follows:

A requirement exists for the conduct of a continuous United States psychological offensive in Indochina. In view of the rapidly diminishing U.S. forces available in the Republic of Vietnam, those strategic psychological operations campaigns currently being conducted in Southeast Asia by U.S. military commands and governmental agencies will be consolidated into one overall strategic PSYOPS [PSYOP] campaign for SEA under operational command of CINCPAC from 1 July 1972. Incorporated within the overall strategic PSYOPS campaign is Operation FIELD GOAL, a high altitude leaflet dissemination operation (the operation may also be utilized on occasion to disseminate other forms of PSYOPS material such as mini-radios, news sheets, and gift packages as directed), conducted against North Vietnam.

The FIELD GOAL OPORD (a refinement of CINCPAC Operation Order 5102) tasked U.S. forces as follows:
(1) CINCPAC

(a) Retains operational command for the conduct of Operation FIELD GOAL against North Vietnam.

(b) Directs and insures that the conduct of Operation FIELD GOAL is fully coordinated with and has the consent and approval of the American Embassy, Saigon.

(2) CINCUSARPAC

(a) As the coordinating authority for CINCPAC, plans, coordinates, and directs the conduct of Operation FIELD GOAL against target audiences in NVN.

(b) Coordinates the designation of staging areas to support Operation FIELD GOAL with CINCPACAF,* CINCPACFLT,** and CINCSAC*** as appropriate.

(3) CINCPACAF

(a) Provides a support package and aircraft for aerial dissemination of printed media products as required by CINCPAC.

(b) In coordination with CINCUSARPAC, designates staging areas and provides for the handling and storage of propaganda materials.

(c) Provides air transportation support to ship propaganda materials from PACOM**** PSYOP printing plants to designated staging bases in a timely manner.

(d) Insures submission of OPREP [Operations Report] 4 reports by the designated PACAF unit to all parties concerned.

(e) Insures submission of weekly reports concerning quantities of leaflets available for dissemination at the staging area.

*Commander-in-Chief, PACAF.
**Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet.
***Commander-in-Chief, Strategic Air Command.
****Pacific Command.
CINCPACFLT

(a) Provides support packages and aircraft for aerial dissemination of propaganda materials as desired by CINCPAC.

PACAF Operations Order 72-4 continued to task 7th, 13th, and 5th AFs to provide delivery in support of PACAF's responsibilities as outlined above. (Figure 1 depicts the organizational chart for Operation FIELD GOAL.)

Initially, employing standoff wind drift delivery techniques by C-130 aircraft as well as overflight delivery by high performance, B-52, and drone aircraft, 240 million leaflets were to be dropped monthly into NVN. The conduct of Operation FIELD GOAL required the combined efforts of the American Embassy, Saigon; 7th AF; SAC's 8th AF and the 100th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing (SRW); and the U.S. Army's 7th PSYOPGP. Responsibilities were as follows:

American Embassy, Saigon: The Embassy was responsible for providing U.S. mission direction and policy guidance and for approving program requirements, target areas, and leaflet themes and content.

Seventh Air Force: Seventh Air Force was responsible for issuing frag orders for C-130 and high performance aircraft leaflet sorties; storing and handling of leaflets at staging areas; fuzing of M-129E leaflet bombs; providing fighter escort, ECM support, and MIG Combat Air Patrol (MIGCAP) as required; executing C-130 and high performance aircraft leaflet drops; providing meteorological data as required; and submitting required reports.

Eighth Air Force: Eighth Air Force was responsible for storing and handling leaflets at Anderson AFB, Guam; setting the dispenser time;
STATE DEPARTMENT

AMERICAN EMBASSY SAIGON

CINC USARPAC

7th PSYOPGP (USA)

JCS

CINCPAC

OMDR 15 PTF

CINCPACAF

CINCPACFLT

CINCSAC

8thAF

100thSF

7thAF

90thSOS (5thAF)

374thTAW (13thAF)

--- Direct Control

--- Coordination

Figure 1

COMMAND AND CONTROL
OPERATION FIELD GOAL
planning and executing B-52 leaflet dissemination missions; and submitting required reports.

100th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing: The 100th SRW was responsible for mounting chaff cartons in ALE-2 chaff dispensers which were pod-mounted on drones, planning and executing drone leaflet dissemination missions, and submitting required reports.

Seventh PSYOPGP: The 7th PSYOPGP was responsible for developing and testing FIELD GOAL leaflets; coordinating approval of leaflets with the American Embassy, Saigon; printing and packaging leaflets; arranging leaflet bombs and chaff cartons; targeting leaflet drops; requesting leaflet dissemination sorties; and evaluating the effectiveness of Operation FIELD GOAL.

Other items discussed in the OPORD included targeting, operating procedures, and goals for the program. Three target areas—a primary, secondary, and tertiary—were designated and are depicted in Figure 2. The OPORD also provided data for prevailing winds at various times of the year over NVN. For the type of strategic delivery contemplated by the OPORD, wind data was extremely critical, and wind velocities often determined the effectiveness of PSYOP against the North. In addition to detailing administrative and reporting procedures for Operation FIELD GOAL, the FIELD GOAL OPORD listed the objectives of the campaign, which were to:

(1) Degrade enemy combat effectiveness by fostering and encouraging dissension, doubt, defection, desertion, or surrender.

(2) Communicate selected factual information concerning events within the country and the world.
FIELD GOAL TARGET AREAS

Figure 2
(3) Demoralize enemy troops by psychologically isolating them from the local population.

(4) Undermine the political stability of enemy armed forces and civil populations by creating rebellious attitudes and by fostering divisions between the enemy's ethnic, military, religious, and political groups.

(5) Limit the effectiveness of enemy PSYOP and political warfare (POLWAR).

(6) Inform selected target audiences of U.S. policy and statements of high government officials (U.S. and Allied) in order to obtain desired psychological objectives.
CHAPTER IV
DEVELOPING PSYOP LEAFLET AND RADIO DELIVERY SYSTEMS

(U) The organization and coordination needed to deliver a leaflet to a given target was quite complex. When delivering to high threat areas using high value manned weapons system such as the B-52 or F-4, the problem became even more complex. Thus, conduct of psychological operations over NVN was extremely difficult to plan and execute.

(S) In late September 1967, CINCPAC outlined the concepts, missions, and responsibilities for the conducting of leaflet operations against NVN. In October, CINCPAC further outlined the development of an integrated psychological warfare air campaign in response to an increased need for leaflet drops. Also, during this same time period, the suggestion to drop miniaturized radio receivers (mini-radios) was approved as another method of disseminating PSYOP news. MACV felt that a PSYOP campaign against NVN was "worthy of consideration" and merited further review with the intent of developing a delivery technique. Consequently, a MACV message dated 7 December 1967 tasked 7AF to develop a dispensing and delivery system.

(S) General William Momyer, 7AF Commander, recommended a "thorough examination" before accepting such a requirement. A letter outlining the PSYOP requirement prepared by the 7AF Plans staff was coordinated through 7AF Operations, Intelligence, and Material staffs. All 7AF
staff agencies endorsed the concept of the program, and Operations suggested that emphasis be placed on the development of a multi-purpose delivery/dispenser system to be used by low and high performance aircraft for dispensing both leaflets and mini-radios. The Operations staff also suggested that for high-altitude, wind-drift delivery of leaflets, a higher altitude, higher speed aircraft than the C-130 be used, although the C-130 had already supported FRANTIC GOAT. In addition, Operations suggested that if an advanced delivery system was not available, a means of dispensing leaflets from a pressurized aircraft should be developed that would be compatible with all models of the C-130 to provide greater mission flexibility.

In a 7 December 1967 letter, MACV requested that a Southeast Asia Operational Requirement (SEAOR) be developed by Seventh Air Force for an improved delivery system. In a letter of 27 December 1967, MACV suggested that an interim measure be developed to fulfill an "urgent requirement for dispensing systems which would enable low altitude delivery by high performance aircraft to pinpoint geographic areas." The letter also suggested that retainable dispensers such as available flare and munitions dispensers be considered for such a mission. MACV requested that the 7th Air Force Commander consider requesting certification of these types of dispensers to partially meet the overall mission requirement of PSYOP against NVN. Seventh Air Force replied on the 2nd of January that it would take this proposal under consideration.
On 12 January 1967 two pieces of correspondence were prepared by Seventh Air Force (DPLR). The first one dealt with two SEAORs that had been prepared in response to MACV's request. The Command Correspondence Staff Summary Sheet (CCSSS) stated:

Two SEAORs were deemed necessary because of the two distinctly different capabilities required. The first method employs mass drops of PSYOPS material over heavily populated areas of North Vietnam using the wind drift technique. The second method consists of selective high performance delivery of PSYOPS materials over villages or hamlets using direct method of delivery. The SEAORs suggest the use of C-130 or C-141 aircraft for mass delivery and F-4D for high performance delivery. It further suggests the use of existing flare dispenser equipment to dispense the leaflets.

The second piece of correspondence was a reply to a query by PACAF as to what action was being taken to deliver PSYOP material over NVN. The reply reviewed past actions and informed PACAF that two SEAORs were in final draft form. Also, this correspondence suggested that B-52s not be used because of the propaganda value to the enemy if one were lost over NVN. This statement sparked a controversy over the use of B-52s for PSYOP dispensing that significantly slowed the development of a PSYOP mission over NVN.

On 5 March 1968, six officers from Seventh Air Force and MACV met to discuss the two SEAORs developed by Seventh Air Force. The SEAORs were designated 164, High Volume Leaflet and Radio Dispensing System, and 165, High Speed Leaflet and Radio Dispensing System. The conferees determined that the use of flare dispensing systems would not significantly
increase the capacity over the existing method of wind drifting leaflets, which consisted of the release of boxes of leaflets into the airstream through the loading ramp; the aircraft was unpressurized, and the crews had to wear oxygen masks. The conferees also felt that the use of flare dispenser systems in the C-141 would be impractical from the standpoint of cost effectiveness and limitations of aircraft performance. In addition, they determined that the necessity to roll leaflets for use in flare cases would probably produce unknown and varying drift characteristics. Therefore, they concluded that a C-141 aircraft (or an aircraft of equal or better performance) was needed, and a dispenser which allowed pressurization of the cargo compartment should be developed. In regard to SEAOR 165, this group determined that the SUU-13A dispenser was not suitable for the high speed mission because the leaflets would have to be rolled, the dispensers were not economically reusable, and there were problems being encountered with this dispenser on the F-4. There were also weight and balance limitations on aircraft using this dispenser. The panel concluded that a device called a tactical fighter dispenser (TFD) showed promise for this mission because it could accommodate leaflets packed in rectangular boxes, the dispenser was reusable, it could be repacked in-theater, and it showed an increase over present capability. In considering the two methods of delivery, this group recommended further in-theater study on high volume leaflet dispensing before a final position was taken.

The TFD and the M-129E leaflet bomb (similar to the TFD but not reusable) provided a workable solution for the high speed delivery
requirement, but no acceptable high volume delivery system was identified. By October 1968, as indicated in a 7AF CCSSS, 7AF and MACV had not yet come to any conclusion on the best method to deliver leaflets in high volume. Meanwhile, the Tactical Air Command (TAC) had become involved in the discussion because of their expertise in C-130 operations. TAC recommended use of a type of flare launcher, provided it could be modified with an airlock so that the mission could be flown in a pressurized configuration. TAC considered the capability to operate in a pressurized environment "mandatory," stating that "pressurization is essential to aircraft survivability, better aircrew efficiency, and more efficient mission accomplishment." In a separate message to the Air Force Chief of Staff, TAC recommended that the C-141 be used for the high volume mission; but regardless of the type of cargo aircraft used, TAC suggested the following modifications be considered:

a. Pressurized high speed dispensing.

b. Self-sealing fuel tanks with polyurethane.

c. Electronic countermeasures.

d. Ejection seats.

e. Additional protective armor for vital aircraft systems and crew.

These proposals were not acted upon, and, as mentioned above, no decision had been reached by October. A Command Correspondence Staff Summary Sheet dated 4 October 1968 read as follows:

1. SEAORs 164 and 165 have been highly controversial since their initiation in December 1967. The requirement was generated by MAC-PD and forwarded to 7AF by
MACJ-342. An in-house controversy has prevented MACV from coming up with an agreeable position on a preferred method of delivery. The method desired by MAC-PD is the use of B-52s over Laos and the Gulf of Tonkin to drift leaflets into the Hanoi area. From a technical standpoint the use of the B-52 is desirable.

2. MACV has also changed their position on the use of the F-4s for a high speed delivery vehicle; they now prefer the use of ship launched drones. This will tend to complicate the matter since much coordination with the Navy will be required.

Documentation of Seventh Air Force and MACV decisions concerning the further development of delivery systems to support SEAORs 164 and 165 was not available at this writing. However, C-130s and F-4s were used for these leaflet missions both prior and subsequent to the debate that developed concerning their use.

In spite of the controversy concerning the means of dispensing leaflets over NVN, very little change occurred over a period of several years. Undoubtedly, the cost of modifying either a C-141 or C-130 for pressurized high altitude, high volume delivery was prohibitive. OPORD 72-4 and OPORD FIELD GOAL called for delivery of leaflets using techniques much the same as those previously used. The notable exception was the inclusion of B-52 and drone use which was done without comment or restriction. To support Operation FIELD GOAL then, there were four means of getting leaflets and mini-radios over NVN: the C-130 COMBAT SPEAK aircraft, F-4s, B-52s, and drones. (The 374th TAW's C-130 aircraft were committed to airlift missions following the initiation of the 1972 NVA spring offensive, and so were not available for PSYOP.)
CHAPTER V
PSYOP AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM

The Prelude to Operation FIELD GOAL

Historically, psychological warfare operations over North Vietnam were tied closely to the bombing of NVN. For example, in 1965, under Operation FACT SHEET, PSYOP missions against the North coincided with the first orders by President Johnson to bomb the North. PSYOP continued against the North under Operation FRANTIC GOAT, but were limited in March 1968 when the bombing of the North was restricted to the portion of NVN below the 20th parallel. Some PSYOP activities were later conducted against NVN soldiers during the Spring Offensive of 1972 under the FRANTIC GOAT SOUTH campaign.

LINEBACKER I and LINEBACKER II also affected the conduct of Operation FIELD GOAL. The overall goal of these two bombing campaigns was to convince the government of North Vietnam to negotiate a settlement of the war. High-level U.S. planners felt that to achieve that goal, PSYOP against the population of NVN was an absolute necessity.

On 9 May 1972, the President of the United States announced that the bombing of NVN above the 20th parallel would resume and that NVN harbors would be mined. He further announced that these actions would continue until certain conditions were met and a settlement of the war was negotiated. Immediately after the President's speech, CINCPAC ordered Seventh Air Force to execute a leaflet campaign against NVN. Secretary of State (SECSTATE) and Joint Chiefs of Staff messages were the authorities. The execution
message* authorized use of the stand-off, wind-drift technique and overflight by high performance aircraft. The priority targets were NVA forces in the RVN and in SVN. A few days later the populace of SVN was included in the PSYOP targeting. However, it was 10 days after the execution order was issued before Seventh Air Force dropped its first leaflets. By that time, interest had grown to the point that verification of the first leaflet drops was immediately passed by voice communication through channels from Seventh Air Force to MACV and ultimately to the White House.

(S) Yet, communications about PSYOP missions posed problems. In a 6 June 1972 message to General Slay (7AF/DO), General Blesse (PACAF/DD) stated:

Despite almost continuous attention by [my] staff, we have been unable to learn of your intentions concerning this PSYOP mission. Further, 7AF reluctance to advise of mission intentions/problem areas has resulted in a complete lack of appreciation at this and higher headquarters for problems you may be having in complying with execution request.

These leaflet missions were directed by highest authorities to complement military and diplomatic initiatives against the government of SVN. SECSTATE and DOD messages not available to 7AF emphasize the importance of early execution to achieve maximum military, psychological and political impact on the SVN populace.

(S) As briefly mentioned above, weather conditions over SVN and the changing nature of the war in the South had considerable impact on the leaflet delivery concepts and operations outlined in PACAF OPORD 72-4 and

*Significantly, in the execution message, CINCPAC cited an earlier message that directed all concerned to prepare for such an eventuality. See p. 23, below.
OPORD FIELD GOAL. These two factors undoubtedly had a part in limiting the ability of Seventh Air Force to deliver leaflets over the North during May 1972.

May is a transitional month in the regional weather pattern. The winds shift from the northeast monsoon to the southwest monsoon. More significantly, the winds tend to be variable and gusty during the transition. Under these conditions, it is virtually impossible to wind drift leaflets over any appreciable distance. Coincident with these unfavorable winds was the fact that the 90th SOS, which had the only C-130s capable of making leaflet deliveries to NVN, was moving their delivery Forward Operating Location from Tan Son Nhut AB, Vietnam, to Nakhon Phanom RTAFB, Thailand.* The use of F-4s or B-52s, which were critically needed in repelling the invasion of South Vietnam and prosecuting the interdiction effort in North Vietnam, also required favorable wind conditions. The use of drones for pinpoint leaflet drops was untested and, furthermore, was not scheduled until Operation FIELD GOAL began on 1 July 1972.

Apparently, 7AF was not well prepared for the PSYOP mission. Although admittedly low key, a warning message had been sent in early April noting that PSYOP against NVN might be resumed:

Current situation may warrant initiation of limited duration wind drift leaflet campaign against NVN . . . in connection with present North Vietnamese offensive against SVN. FRANTIC GOAT (North) operation is being considered in Washington provided that it can be

*Note: No missions were lost due to this move.
undertaken with minimum risk to delivery aircraft and that resources are available without significantly degrading tactical air effort.

Because of the emphasis being directed toward planning for the possibility of renewed bombing in the North, planning for PSYOP over the North received relatively little attention. In addition, the heavy commitment of USAF resources in support of RVNAF forces and in the interdiction program in North Vietnam delayed the execution of PSYOP mission over the North.

Therefore, a combination of factors beyond U.S. control produced the low point in PSYOP in SEA. Fortunately, once the first leaflet delivery was made over the North, PSYOP missions increased in frequency; by the initiation of Operation FIELD GOAL on 1 July 1972, there was considerable experience in both the planning and execution of PSYOP missions.

Execution of Operation FIELD GOAL

By the time Operation FIELD GOAL began on 1 July 1972, PSYOP against the North in conjunction with LINEBACKER I had been in progress for one and one-half months. During the beginning of Operation FIELD GOAL, there was a shift in control and management from MACV to CINCPAC,* an increase in PACAF's responsibilities, and little change in 7AF's support role. In fact, OPORD FIELD GOAL was still in final approval coordination among the various agencies involved in its execution and was not published until 22 August 1972.

*See p. 1.
FIELD GOAL Aircraft

Four different types of aircraft were used to support Operation FIELD GOAL: C-130, F-4, B-52, and SAC drones. A 1 September 1972 report to CINCPAC outlined the following tasks and assigned support:

1. **C-130 Aircraft**
   - Disseminate 12-18 million leaflets per sortie.
   - Units tasked
     - 90th SOS, TDY [temporary duty] at NKP* (eight sorties/week)
     - 374th TAW,** Det 1 at TSN (one sortie/week)
     - 7AF provide MIGCAP about 18° N

2. **F-4 Aircraft**
   - Configured with nine M129 leaflet bombs, disseminate 1.1 million leaflets per sortie.
   - Employed as directed by CINCPACAF.
   - Targeted in the Hanoi, Haiphong area in conjunction with LINEBACKER missions.

3. **B-52 Aircraft**
   - SAC has one B-52 configured for leaflet drops.
   - 7AF provide EB-66 ECM, F-4 Escort, F-4 MIGCAP, and F-105 IRON HAND as required.
   - Missions are executed as winds permit and have been averaging one sortie per week.
   - Each mission dispenses 8 million leaflets in the Red River Delta area.

*Nakhon Phanom RTAFB.

**These resources used only for targets in SVN, Laos, and Cambodia.
4. **Drone**

   -- Deliver 200,000 leaflets per sortie and targeted at NVN population centers.

   -- Frequency of missions are determined by CINCPAC and CINCSAC and have been averaging two sorties per week.

   -- MIGCAP as required for normal drone missions.

**Aircraft Performance**

(6) **C-130.** Providing weather conditions were favorable, C-130 FIELD GOAL operations were easily carried out. With favorable winds the aircraft could stand off over Laos or the Gulf of Tonkin, and the wind would carry the leaflets to the targets. At an altitude of 25,000 feet, some lightweight leaflets would take from four and one-half to five hours to reach the ground; consequently, the potential standoff range was significant, depending on wind velocity. Depending on leaflet size and mission profile, the C-130 could disperse leaflets in quantities equal to or greater than a B-52 could; even more importantly, as a result of its drop techniques, it did not require the large support package a B-52 did.

However, there were some difficulties with the C-130s. The highly variable and changing winds of the transitional season were a problem in leaflet delivery. For maximum coverage of targets in NVN, the C-130s had to climb to an altitude of 25,000 feet; to reach that altitude, it could carry only 2/3 of a normal load, and the aircraft had to exceed maximum continuous power for a short period of time. Another problem with the C-130 support of FIELD GOAL was the limited number of available aircraft. The 90th SOS had four COMBAT SPEAR aircraft to use.
for leaflet drops against NVN. The PSYOP campaign in RVN, Laos, and Cambodia was supported to some extent by C-130s from the 374th Tactical Airlift Wing. However, when the NVA began their Spring Offensive in 1972, airlift requirements became so great that the 374th TAW had to withdraw their support of PSYOP in SEA. Consequently, the 90th SOS had to assume responsibility for all PSYOP. Although the 90th SOS only possessed three of its four assigned aircraft, C-130 availability was not the major problem. Rather, winds during most of the FIELD GOAL operation did not allow leaflets to be drifted to the primary area using C-130 standoff techniques. Other aircraft (B-52, F-4, and drones) were not available in sufficient numbers since strike and reconnaissance operations took priority.

F-4. The theory of operations of the F-4 in support of FIELD GOAL caused major concern; as perceived by the planners, the problem was having to enter a high threat area to accomplish the leaflet mission. There were two possibilities for using the F-4: (1) leaflet missions could be generated on their own, but would require the same support package as a LINEBACKER mission; (2) more efficiently, the mission could be flown as a part of LINEBACKER missions. If the latter concept were adopted, questions arose concerning the integration of PSYOP into the mission. One possibility was putting the leaflet bombs on chaff aircraft, but the objection was that the chaff aircraft were not always in the right positions to get the leaflets on target. Another possibility was to put up a separate flight of leaflet aircraft with the LINEBACKER missions. The danger here was that in order to get their leaflets on target they had to leave the support package to position themselves over a proper drop point.
The F-4 using the M129E leaflet bomb offered enough versatility to overcome these difficulties. The M129E could be used in two ways: (1) it could be dropped and allowed to fall over a target, dispensing the leaflets at relatively low altitudes and effectively avoiding wind drift; or (2) it could operate much like a C-130, delivering the bomb to a predetermined altitude, say 20,000 feet, dispensing the leaflets, and allowing the wind to carry them to the target.

Yet, there were several problems. The biggest problem with the employment of the F-4 was the shortage of leaflet bombs. At the beginning of LINEBACKER I, the M129Es were the only chaff dispensers available and only a limited number were available for PSYOP use. In the fall, however, a new chaff dispenser was made available which eased the M129E requirement somewhat, and the manufacture of the M129E began again so that a more ample supply became available. The frequency of F-4 leaflet missions was also limited by wind conditions. It was important that a flight of F-4s not get too far from the LINEBACKER support package in making their drops. If the winds were not reasonably favorable, then the leaflet drops could not be made.

B-52. The B-52 proved to be a good platform for standoff leaflet delivery, dropping the leaflets much like the F-4. Using a device called a Hayes dispenser, it could either deliver the leaflets close to a target or use the wind drift technique. The problem in using the B-52 was that it required a sophisticated support package. Because of the limited availability of air resources, Seventh Air Force often
had difficulty providing the support package, and on occasion could not provide it. Once these PSYOP missions were integrated with ARC LIGHT strikes over the North, this problem disappeared.

Drones. SAC drones had been flying reconnaissance missions over the North for some time, with 7AF providing MIGCAP support for them above 10° N. The leaflet drones were usually launched in conjunction with reconnaissance missions; consequently, there was no extra support required by Seventh Air Force for FIELD GOAL drone missions. The drone's best features were that it had the capability of pinpoint delivery and could carry a variety of PSYOP materials.

The total number of leaflets dropped by all aircraft types during FIELD GOAL operations from 1 July 1972 to 28 January 1973 was 660,649,000. This was an average of slightly over 94 million per month compared to the desired 240 million.

Themes, Goals, and Media

The purpose of PSYOP against the North was to attempt to demoralize both the NVA and the population of NVN and to lessen their support for the war against the Republic of Vietnam. This PSYOP campaign developed a number of themes; to get the messages to the NVA and the North Vietnamese people, a number of techniques were used, including leaflets and radio broadcasts. To help get the radio broadcast to the intended audience, mini-radios (the ubiquitous small transistorized radio receiver) were dropped.

Leaflets. The first important leaflet dropped in conjunction with Operation LINEBACKER concerned: the U.S. President's May 9th speech. That
same day, CINCPAC requested a saturation leaflet campaign covering the following items:

1. Information on the presidential decision to mine the waters of North Vietnam and interdict the flow of supplies.

2. The strangling effect this will have on supplies for NVA combat forces.

3. The offer for a cease-fire to stop the killing.

4. The offer to withdraw troops once the cease-fire has begun.

Numerous other leaflet messages were developed. For example, a leaflet mixture called Mix 234 included the following leaflets:

1. Front: The senseless war goes on without end, why?
   Back: A negotiated settlement of the war is the only solution.

2. Front: The war is madness; the Lao Dong [Communist Party of NVN] leaders should have gone into the peaceful political discussion phase.
   Back: The war is a lost cause.

3. Front: The war consumes the product of all work; there is nothing left for building a better life.
   Back: The time has come for an end to the fighting and the beginning of serious political discussion to end the war.

4. Front: When the war ends all prisoners can be returned to their families.
   Back: The time has come for an end to the fighting and the beginning of serious political discussion to end the war.
5. Front: When the war ends, all prisoners can be returned to their families.

Back: All the people can return to their peaceful life when the war ends.

6. Front: The North Vietnamese battle losses in dead and wounded are a monumental tragedy.

Back: The war can end when the Lao Dong negotiates seriously.

7. Front: All must resist a continuation of the war.

Back: Without the cooperation of the people the war would end.

8. Front: How does the Lao Dong Party hope to cope with even greater surprises from the United States?

Back: A military victory is impossible; negotiate an end to the war.

9. Front: The Lao Dong Party greatly miscalculated the determination of the people of the RVN and their allies.

Back: All current military actions against the NVN could have been avoided if the Lao Dong Leaders had not miscalculated and had they negotiated seriously for an end to the war.

These were not soul-stirring messages; they were not intended to be. Rather, they were aimed at a cross-section of the NVN populace and the average NVA soldier.

(3) Other leaflets notified the people to stay away from military targets in order to be safe from the bombing. Some leaflets had pictures of bombed-out bridges in order to illustrate the futility of the rebuilding efforts. One very successful leaflet was called an "inflation leaflet." The leaflet had a written message and a counterfeit of a North Vietnamese
one or two piaster notes that could be cut from the leaflet and used.* The message stated that prices in North Vietnam were too high and that the money on the leaflets was a gift from the government of South Vietnam to be used by the bearer to purchase items he needed but could not afford. (See Figure 3.) The leaflet messages were obviously time sensitive, and the messages and the mixes were frequently changed to meet changing requirements. There was also a so-called tactical leaflet that was dropped just after a bomb strike to gain maximum exploitation of the strike.

Mini-radios. The general concept and rationale behind the use of mini-radios was to apply pressure on the NVN leadership by threatening their monopoly on information for domestic consumption. By dropping mini-radios, it was hoped that the radio audience for U.S. and SVN government broadcasts would be enlarged, and that the party and government would become concerned that an increase in illegal listenership represented a growing divergence from strict loyalty and obedience to government decree. Further, the radios burdened the security apparatus by causing it to search for and retrieve them, and created resentment when an individual either voluntarily or involuntarily gave up the small but valuable item to authorities. Finally, their presence required the government to remind the populace repeatedly that their exposure to information must be restricted.

The delivery of mini-radios offered some unique problems. Saturation delivery was ineffective because the radios could easily be gathered

*(S) Because of the printing technique employed, all notes carried the same serial numbers.
Hãy coi chừng một cuộc cải tiền tệ nữa. Các bạn có thể mất tất cả tài sản, công lao mò hỏi nước mất của bạn.

and confiscated. Consequently, the radios had to be delivered a few at a time. Some new methods of delivery were tried including the flotation of radios to NVN from offshore and balloon delivery. B-52s also successfully delivered mini-radios to NVN, as did C-130s to other parts of SEA.

**Enemy Reactions to FIELD GOAL Leaflets**

(1) There were many channels through which feedback was received from PSYOP campaigns, including Radio Hanoi and the various publications of the Lao Dong Party, the government, and the North Vietnamese Army. Other sources, though less reliable, were captured NVA troops and defectors.

(2) As an example of feedback from NVN governmental sources, the leaflet containing the NVN one piaster note drew a sharp response from the North Vietnamese media. These leaflets were first dropped in late August and reaction from the NVN followed in a radio broadcast on 6 October. Radio Hanoi reported:

> The Nixon Administration recently counterfeited banknotes of the Vietnam State Bank and smuggled them into a number of areas of our country. The Nixon Administration has committed another vile and despicable crime by making and smuggling counterfeit banknotes into the northern part of our country, plotting to upset the DRV's financial and monetary system and economic life, and at the same time intensify psychological warfare against our people. But our people, with intense patriotism, profound hatred for the enemy, and high revolutionary vigilance have collected these banknotes and turned them over to the administration as evidence for denouncing the Nixon administration.

Also on the same day the Vietnam News Agency carried a statement, issued by the Vietnam National Bank, on the subject of counterfeit banknotes.
The statement noted that "to avoid condemnation by progressive governments and people in the world and to conceal its sinister design, the Nixon Administration had defamatory statements printed in the margin of each counterfeit banknote."

It is interesting to note two instances of individual reactions as well. In September 1972 a captured NVA private said he had seen the inflation leaflets, but largely ignored them since he felt that they were useless as money because they had faded. Another source picked up the inflation leaflets near his home in NVN. Although he reported that the one piaster leaflets were pink where they should have been red and all of the serial numbers were the same, he was able to use the notes to make purchases after dark. He was able to use them for approximately two weeks until local NVN officials ordered all of the notes destroyed under penalty of jail. The source stated that he would have liked to have found more of the leaflets because there were many items that his family needed but could not afford. Also, had the notes been of the correct color, he would have been able to make purchases during the day when all of the market stands were open.
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS

In war, the question of allocating resources is often difficult and complex. Psychological operations required the use of strike and support aircraft that could otherwise have been employed in striking enemy field forces and supporting friendly operations in progress. Competing priorities and the complexity of the resource allocation problem, the critical military situation in the Republic of Vietnam, and the unfavorable weather conditions over the North combined to delay implementation of the FIELD GOAL leaflet campaign.

The success of leaflet operations is difficult to assess because results cannot be quantitatively evaluated. Yet, the following quotation from the North Vietnamese news media indicates that PSYOP programs were possibly more successful than the Air Force was able to document.

[The people of NVN must] absolutely refrain from tuning in to radio stations of the American and their henchmen, from reading enemy leaflets, and from storing the enemy's "psychological warfare goods." We must organize ourselves to collect and burn or destroy them immediately. Keep track of, detect and check in time the action of bad elements who surreptitiously tune in on enemy radio stations or hide and use enemy leaflets and "psychological warfare goods" to spread groundless rumors and disrupt order and security.

Thus, there is some evidence to suggest that certain aspects of the PSYOP program, such as the mini-radio and counterfeit leaflet drops, met with some limited success. Nevertheless, there is insufficient evidence to evaluate the effectiveness of the overall program.
FOOTNOTES

1. (S) Project CHECO Report, Psychological Operations by USAF/VNAF in SVN, 16 Sep 68. (Hereafter cited as CHECO, Psychological Operations by USAF/VNAF.)


3. (S) Msg, CINCPAC to 7AF, 122040Z Feb 72, Subj: Ops Order 5102.


5. (S) CHECO, Psychological Operations by USAF/VNAF, Figure 2.

6. (S) Hq PACAF Ops Ord 72-4, 1 Jul 72, p. 2.

7. Ibid., pp. 2-3.

8. (S) Hq PACAF Ops Ord 72-4, p. 2.

9. Ibid., p. 3.

10. (S) Interview, Capt Fred Patterson, Hq PACAF/XOOFS.

11. (S) Annex A to Ops Ord 72-4, para 3a(4).


15. (S) Msg, CINCPAC to 7AF, 092218Z May 72, Subj: Frantic Goat (North); Msg, CINCPAC to 7AF, 172305Z May 72, Subj: Frantic Goat (North); Ltr from Gen Blesse for Gen Slay; ref CINCPAC/DO Msg 060420Z Jun 72; Interview, Major Miller.


17. Ibid., p. 2.

18. Ibid., p. 4.

19. Ibid., p. 6.
20. (S) Msg, COMUSMACV to 7AF, 070035Z Dec 67.

21. Ibid.

22. (S) Staff Summary Sheet, 12 Dec 69, Operational Requirement for PSYOP Leaflet and Radio Dispensing System, Tab A.

23. (S) Ltr, Hq 7AF/DPLR to DOP, Subj: PSYOPS, 12 Dec 67.

24. Ibid., 2nd Ind.

25. (S) Ltr, Hq MACV to Commander 7AF, Operational Requirement for PSYOPS Leaflet and Radio Dispensing System, 27 Dec 67.

26. (S) Ltr, Hq MACV, Operational Requirement for PSYOPS, 27 Dec 67.

27. (S) Command Correspondence Staff Summary Sheet. (Hereafter cited as CCSSS); Ltr (S), 7AF/DPLR to DPO, 2 Jan 68.

28. (S) CCSSS, 7AF/DPLR, 12 Jan 68.

29. (S) CCSSS, 7AF/DPLR, 12 Jan 68.

30. (S) CCSSS, 7AF/DPLR, 4 Oct 68.

31. (S) CHECO, Psychological Operations by USAF/VNAF, pp. 21-22.

32. (S) Memorandum for Record, BREs for SEAOR's 164/165 (PSYOP Dispensing Systems), 7AF/DPLS, 7 Mar 68.

33. (S) CHECO, Psychological Operations by USAF/VNAF, p. 19.

34. (S) CCSSS, 7AF/DPLR, 8 Oct 73.


36. Ibid.

37. (S) Msg, TAC to CSAF, 012306Z Mar 68, Subj: SEAOR 164 (FY-68).

38. (S) CCSSS, SEAOR 164 and 165, Delivery of PSYOPS Materials, 4 Oct 68.

39. (S) PSYOPS in SVII, Sep 68, pp. 19-21.

40. (S) Msg, JCS to PACAF, 090328Z May 72; Msg, SECSTATE to JCS, 122321Z May 72.
41. (S) Msg, CINCPAC to 7AF, 092217Z May 72.
42. Ibid.
43. (S) Msg, SECSTATE to AMEMB Saigon, 122321Z Mar 72.
44. (S) Interview Major Miller.
45. (S) Msg, CINCPACAF to 7AF, Gen Blesse to Gen Slay, 060428Z Jun 72.
46. (S) Appendix B and C, OPORD Field, Goal, 7 Psyop Gp, 1 Jul 72.
47. Ibid.
48. (S) Msg, CINCPAC to 7AF, 200352Z Apr 72.
49. (S) Msg, CINCPAC to 7AF, 130439Z Apr 72.
50. (TS) Project CHECO Report, LINEBACKER: Overview of the First 120 Days, 27 Sep 73, pp. 12-18. Extracted material is SECRET.
51. (S) Msg, 7AF to CINCPAC, 200800Z Jun 72.
52. (S) 7th Psychological Operations Group Opord Field Goal, Hq 7th PSYOP GP, Fort Buckner, Okinawa, 22 Aug 72, p. 1.
53. (S) Ltr, 7AF to CINCPAC, PSYOPS in SEA, 1 Sep 72.
54. (S) Interview, Major Miller.
55. (S) Ltr, 7AF to CSAF, SEA PSYOPS, 8 Apr 72.
56. (S) CCSSS, 7AF, Subj: PSYOP Leaflet Drops, 22 Jun 72.
57. (S) Msg, 7AF to CINCPAC, 100018Z Jul 72.
58. (S) Interview, Major Miller
59. (S) CCSSS, 7AF, Field Goal, 12 Oct 72.
60. (S) Interview, Major Miller.
61. Ibid.
62. (S) Msg, CINCSAC to COMUSMACV, 101430Z Jun 72.
63. (S) Interview, Major Miller.
64. Ibid.
65. (S) CCSSS, 7AF, Strategic PSYOP Leaflet Activity, 8 Aug 72 and 5 Sep 73; Hq PACAF/XOOF files.

66. (S) Msg, CINCPAC, 092215Z May 72, Subj: Leaflet Operations.


68. (S) Msg, 7th PSYOP GP to AMEMB RVN, 200905Z Aug 72, Subj: Additional Proposed Leaflet Texts.

69. (S) Msg, AIRINTELGP to MACV, Da Nang, 140908Z Nov 72.

70. (S) Msg, SECSTATE to AMEMB Saigon, 282043Z Dec 72, Subj: Additional Thematic Guidance to Exploit Air Operations Against NVN.

71. (S) Interview, Major Miller.

72. (S) Msg, SECSTATE to AMEMB Saigon, 022142Z Oct 72, Subj: PSYOP Mini-radios.

73. (S) 7AF Disposition Form, PSYOP Mini-radios, 19 Sep 72; Msg, CINCPAC, 070213Z Oct 72.

74. (S) 7AF Disposition Form, PSYOP Mini-radios, 30 Sep 72.

75. (S) Msg, 7th PSYOP GP to COMUSARPAC, 191605Z Dec 72.

76. (S) Msg, 7th PSYOP GP to COMUSARPAC, 101055Z Oct 72.

77. (S) Msg, 7th PSYOP GP to COMUSARPAC, 251047Z Oct 72.

78. (C) Msg, AIRINTELGP to MACV, Da Nang, 140908Z Nov 72.

79. (S) Interview, Major Miller.

80. (S) Msg, 7th PSYOP GP to CINCUSARPAC, 131039Z Oct 72.
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