



PROJECT GUEGO SOUTHEAST ASIA REPORT

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Project CHECO was established in 1962 to document and analyze air operations in Southeast Asia. Over the years the meaning of the acronym changed several times to reflect the escalation of operations: Current Historical Evaluation of Counterinsurgency Operations, Contemporary Historical Evaluation of Combat Operations and Contemporary Historical Examination of Current Operations. Project CHECO and other U. S. Air Force Historical study programs provided the Air Force with timely and lasting corporate insights into operational, conceptual and doctrinal lessons from the war in SEA.									
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HEADQUARTERS PACIFIC AIR FORCES APO SAN FRANCISCO 96553

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FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

EDWARD C. BURTENSHAW, Colonel, USAF

Chief, CHECO Division Directorate, Tactical Evaluation 1 Atch Proj CHECO SEA Report dtd 30 Sep 66 (TS).



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EVOLUTION OF THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR SOUTHEAST ASIA

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This document endeavors to follow the chronological changes in the principal rules of engagement covering U.S. air operations in Southeast Asia from their beginnings through 1965. The introduction carries the situation rather swiftly to 24 November 1962, at which time the MACV Directive No. 62 established definitive operational restrictions on U.S. aircraft to be employed on combat support missions. As the situation grew more complex, additional missions were conceived and initiated to cope with operational requirements. As the reader may or may not be familiar with the nature and scope of these missions, their nicknames, purpose and general area are as follows:

FOREWORD .

ABLE MABLE: A reconnaissance task force which flew the original YANKEE TEAM missions in Laos, commencing May 1964.

BANGO/WHIPLASH: Close air support and rapid response strike aircraft operating in Laos from July 1965. BANGO=F4C aircraft; WHIPLASH= F105's. (See map, page 57.)

BARREL ROLL: Interdiction missions, initially in east Laos, commencing December 1964. Southern Northen Loo, be area later preempted by STEEL TIGER, and BARREL ROLL limited to Laotian panhandle. (See maps, pages 53 and 55.)

FARM GATE: A covert strike operation whose overt mission was the training of VNAF personnel beginning in December 1961. It replaced the shortlived JUNGLE JIM operation.

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FLAMING DART: Retaliatory strikes in NVN following the Gulf of Tonkin incidents of August 1965.

LE ZNAUW

JUNGLE JIM: Original covert training and reconnaissance operations in NVN during November 1961.

NO! SVN



MULE TRAIN: Logistic air support in South Vietnam.

RANCH HAND: Defoliation operations in South Vietnam.

- ROLLING THUNDER: Followed FLAMING DART in strike missions against North Vietnam commencing March 1965. (See map, page 67.)
- STEEL TIGER: Interdiction missions in the Laotian panhandle south of Nape Pass. Initiated April 1965. (See map, page 55.)
- TIGER HOUND: Armed recon and interdiction; a division of the STEEL TIGER area to include southeast Laos south of the 17th Parallel. (See map, page 70.)
- YANKEE TEAM: Reconnaissance, Laos, from May 1964. (See map, page 24.)

evolution of the RULES OF ENGAGEMENT for SOUTHEAST ASIA

In a futile attempt to reverse the course of events engulfing the French in Indochina, the U.S. Air Force contributed 1,800 airlift sorties, comprising 13,000 flying hours, during the first six months of 1954. On 7 May 1954, Dien Bien Phu fell to the Communist Viet Minh, followed on 20 July by the Geneva Convention on the partition of Vietnam. The U.S. decision to pledge increased aid to the government in South Vietnam was made by Presidential announcement of 24 October 1954. Thus began the role which the U.S. Air Force was to play in counter-insurgency within the overall framework of U.S. foreign policy as supplemented by the policies of the Department of Defense.

By spring of 1960, the counter-insurgency situation in RVN had obviously deteriorated. With the arrival of the first of the U.S. Special Forces Teams on 30 May, RVN resistance stiffened. This month also marked the delivery of the first full squadron of 25 A-1H aircraft to the RVN. Later, on 1 October 1961, PACAF deployed a Control and Reporting Post $\frac{1}{}$

> Its purpose was to provide radar coverage for the southern area of SVN and to train the Vietnamese Air Force in controlling air traffic, both civil and military. Within four months, 63 Vietnamese personnel had been trained, the CRP was expanded into a CRC, and it became part of the Tactical Air Control System which was established in mid-January.

> > LELANDTON MINING ST

The JCS, on 14 November 1961, directed JUNGLE JIM forces to be deployed to the RVN. This deployment consisted of the 1st Air Commando Group (formerly the 4400th CCTS), four SC-47's, four RB-26's, and eight T-28's -- all carrying RVN Air Force (VNAF) markings. Within 48 hours, President Kennedy announced the decision to bolster RVN strength but not to commit U.S. combat forces. On 11 December, two U.S. Army helicopter $\frac{2}{}$

The commitment, by the United States, to a policy of unlimited support of the RVN, short of actual combat forces, was subject to many restraining influences. In addition to the provisions of the Geneva Accords of 1954, which the U.S., although not a signatory, had undertaken to support, there were other considerations - the possible alienation of the Vietnamese people; relations with Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand; and vulnerability to charges, by the NVN and Communist China, of aggression in Southeast Asia. Further, and of particular significance to the U.S. Army and Air Force, was the opinion of Mr. McNamara (December 1961) that the war in South Vietnam should be considered a ground war and that although "naval and air support operations are desirable, they won't be too effective..." The U.S. military structure in the RVN and the ensuing intra-command relationships reflected an awareness of McNamara's views.

Two short quotations from the Geneva Accords of 1954 serve to illustrate the nature and scope of the constraints imposed. Chapter III, Article 16 (quoted in part): "With effect from the date of entry into force of the present Agreement, the introduction into Vietnam of any troop reinforcements and additional military personnel is prohibited." Chapter III, Article 17 (a): "With effect from the date of entry into force of the present Agreement, the introduction into Vietnam of any reinforcements in the form of all types of arms, munitions and other war material, such as combat aircraft, naval craft, pieces or ordnance, jet 5/engines and jet weapons and armored vehicles, is prohibited."

Thus, the U.S. decision to increase substantially its aid to the RVN ran head on into the Geneva Accords and the International Control Committee (ICC) established to oversee its provisions.

On 28 October 1961, Secretary of State Rusk sent a message to the American Embassy in Saigon requesting concurrence on ground rules for <u>6</u>/ the introduction of the USAF JUNGLE JIM unit into the RVN. Mr. Rusk proposed that the aircraft have Vietnamese markings painted on them before being flown in or being brought in by surface transportation. Military personnel, other than aircrews, were to arrive in the RVN in civilian clothes but could then wear their uniforms. Such were some of the efforts to circumvent the provisions of the Geneva Accords and the ICC.

This issue was finally settled on 16 November 1961 when President Kennedy formally announced the U.S. decision to aid the Government of Vietnam - short of introducing U.S. combat forces. The position that U.S. combat forces were not involved in the war was to be maintained for the ensuing two years (until 31 December 1963).



By the close of 1961, the Communist insurgency in South Vietnam had grown to proportions where immediate response was required to contain and then defeat the threat. This situation resulted in a modification of our policy position to provide for U.S. armed and manned helicopters to "defend themselves" and to return fire from the ground. (Subsequently, authority was granted to initiate fire on known Viet Cong targets posing a threat.)

The immediate U.S. objective, at this time, was to provide the VNAF with such training as would eventually enable the Vietnamese to perform all required missions. Determined to meet this goal and to realize the "immediate response" requirement, PACAF conceived the covert FARM GATE operation. Following CINCPAC approval, the first of these missions was $\frac{7}{}$ flown in December 1961.

The concept of employment of FARM GATE (previously JUNGLE JIM) was to utilize the function of training the VNAF as a cover. The aircraft and personnel of Detachment 2, 4400th CCTS to actually be used in support of RVNAF actions against the Viet Cong within the borders of the RVN. The concept envisioned, "all feasible operational activity," overt and covert, and would be in addition to the advisory and training functions. $\frac{9}{mm} \mathcal{M} \mathcal{M} \mathcal{M} \mathcal{M}$

In agreeing with the FARM GATE concept, CINCPAC said:

....In addition (to operational tests and combat support flights previously authorized by JCS and CINCPAC to train the VNAF), as decided at the SecDef meeting 16 December, all kinds of conventional combat and combat support flights can be flown in SVN by Detachment 2, 4400th CCTS provided



a Vietnamese is on board for purpose of receiving combat support training.

This was amplified on 26 December when the JCS said that FARM GATE aircraft could be employed on combat missions only when the VNAF did not have the capability. This latest instruction also said that combat training missions with joint crews would be conducted so the Vietnamese crews could take over the missions at the earliest possible time. The rules dictated that the aircraft be based in-country and be of the same type as the host country, if the effort was to be plausibly deniable. These latter dictates had been a continuing limiting factor on FARM GATE 10/operations in the RVN.

The issue of U.S. pilots flying FARM GATE missions in the RVN came to the fore early in 1962. Admiral Felt's opinion of the State Department release of 9 March 1962 was that it evaded the issue. He recommend $\frac{11}{}$ instead, a "factual" statement:

> USAF pilots are flying in two-seator T-28's and RB-26's with VNAF pilots. The purpose of these missions is to train VNAF pilots in tactical air strikes. On some of these training sorties, the aircraft deliver ordnance on actual Viet Cong targets. No USAF pilot has ever flown on a tactical mission except in the role of tactical instructor, and VNAF pilots flying single-seater AD-6's (A-1H's) continue to perform most of the combat air sorties.

In a message to the Embassy in Saigon in February 1963, State expressed the obvious and unequivocal position that the FARM GATE activity in the RVN was a "clear violation of the Geneva Accords."

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The VNAF had no rules of engagement in late 1961 except to avoid overflying the boundaries of neighboring countries. Once an air strike was approved by the AOC or higher authority, the pilot was free to strike the target. Neither were there rules of engagement for air de-13/ fense. Upon being advised of this, CINCPAC suggested to CHMAAG-V that the VNAF be assisted, if they so desired, in developing rules of engagement - initially for air defense. Admiral Felt then proposed guidelines for the interception, identification, and destruction of 14/ NNAF accepted the suggestion and drafted rules of engagement. By late April 1962, the Joint General Staff (JGS) had approved them and was in the 15/ process of coordinating them with other governmental agencies.

MACV Directive Number 62, 24 November 1962, established operational restrictions on U.S. aircraft to be employed on combat support missions $\frac{16}{}$ which read, in extract, as follows:

* * * * * * * * * *

4. GENERAL POLICY:

a. In South Vietnam all operational missions flown by U.S. personnel and/or aircraft are classified as combat support. As a general policy, no missions will be undertaken utilizing U.S. personnel and/or aircraft unless it is beyond the capability of the Vietnamese Air Force (because of lack of training, equipment, etc.) to perform the mission. Efforts will be intensified to provide the necessary training for GVN personnel so that the VNAF can perform all required missions at the earliest possible time.

b. U.S. aircrew personnel operating under the terms of this and other applicable directives are reminded that nothing shall infringe upon the inherent right of the individual to protect himself against hostile attack. In event of such an attack, the individual concerned will take immediate aggressive action against the attacking force with any means available.





5. <u>SPECIFIC RESTRICTIONS</u>: The following specific restrictions are applicable and strict compliance therewith is directed:

a. Farmgate: Utilization of Farmgate aircraft for operational (combat support) missions will be only with a combined U.S. and Vietnamese crew. Farmgate U-10 aircraft will not be employed on armed reconnaissance missions. Farmgate aircraft will carry VNAF markings.

b. Waterglass: 2d Air Division will prepare regulations applicable to U.S. aircraft conducting air defense orientation training under the Waterglass concept. Waterglass restrictions are not included in this directive due to classification.

c. Mule Train/Ranch Hand: C-123's will be U.S. marked. They will be manned with a combined U.S. and Vietnamese crew on applicable combat missions as defined *** above.

d. U.S. Army CH-21C's (Shawnee) and USMC UH-34D's (HUS): Armament may be installed in and utilized from transport helicopters for defensive purposes only. Armament in such aircraft will not be utilized to initiate fires upon any target; however, if the aircraft is fired upon, it may return the fire. Aircraft will be U.S. marked and manned.

e. U.S. Army UH-1's (Iroquois): The U.S. Army armed UH-1 may be used defensively only. It may not be utilized to initiate fires upon any target; however, if the aircraft or any aircraft which it is escorting is fire upon, it may return the fire. Such aircraft, when employed on combat support missions, will be U.S. marked and manned with a combined U.S. and Vietnamese crew.

f. U.S. Army OV-1's (Mohawk): The OV-1's may be utilized in an armed configuration (only as specifically directed by COMUSMACV) for combat support missions; however, such armament will be utilized only defensively. These aircraft will not be utilized as strike aircraft. When utilized in a combat support role, they will be U.S. marked and manned with a combined U.S. and Vietnamese crew.

g. Cambodian/SVN/DMZ Border: MACV Letter, subject: Air Operations, dated 23 October 1962, applies to operations of all U.S. aircraft. However, the general content of this letter is repeated in this directive and is applicable to all U.S. aircraft operating in SVN. Day: Normally no U.S. aircraft will operate closer than three miles to the Cambodian border and then only when the ceiling is at least 1500 feet and visibility is three miles or better. When the border is clearly defined by physical landmarks, operational missions may be conducted to a point no closer than one mile to the border; non-operational flights are restricted to five miles from the border and at least 2000 feet altitude. Night: No U.S. aircraft will operate closer than three miles to the Cambodian border during periods of





reduced visibility and only then when under positive radar control. Unless specifically authorized by this headquarters, no U.S. aircraft will conduct combat missions more than two miles off the coast of Vietnam. Waivers to these border restrictions (paragraph 3c, above cited letter) will be granted with the utmost discretion and then only when the border can be unmistakably defined by visual reference.

Thus, there were aircraft operating within the Republic of Vietnam which had VNAF markings and Vietnamese crews: VNAF markings and U.S.-Vietnamese crews; U.S. markings and U.S.-Vietnamese crews; and U.S. markings with U.S. crews.

Admiral Felt pointed out to General Harkins that JCS message Number 5972 of 6 September 1962 had authorized the initiation of fires by $\frac{17}{}$

> By definition (JCS 5972) suppressive fires resulting from escort missions are considered defensive fire. You should amend paragraphs 5D and E of (MACV Directive 62) in such manner as to indicate armament on UH-1's and CH-21's/UH-34's may be used to initiate fire provided enemy target is clearly identified and is threat to the safety of the helicopter and passengers.

Moreover, JCS message 8678 of 16 February 1963 had authorized an amendment to the rules of engagement, pertaining specifically to U.S. helicopters in the RVN, to allow them to engage clearly identified Viet Cong forces considered a threat to the safety of the aircraft and their passengers. JCS stated that, during a visit of their team to the RVN, it was found that the JCS message of September 1962 concerning rules of engagement for armed Army helicopters had been erroneously interpreted to mean that the helicopter must wait to be fired upon before initiating

return fire. "Such interpretation is more restrictive than was the <u>18/</u> intent..." COMUSMACV amended his rules of engagement accordingly.

The jet question, along with the determination of the purpose and scope of FARM GATE appeared to remain essentially moot. The problem of jet engines and jet aircraft did not seem relevant in regard to the introduction of U.S. Army helicopters. UH-1A's and UH-1B's were both introduced into the RVN. The first five of the turbo-jet UH-1A Iroquois $\frac{20}{}$

Certain violations (of the Geneva Accords) had evidently been deemed acceptable in view of U.S. objectives - others were not. The bases of the value judgments involved were not always deducible.

From the inception of JUNGLE JIM (FARM GATE) activities in the RVN in late 1961, the State Department evidenced growing concern that air operations might become counter-productive by alienating the non-combatant 21/ May, USAF APACAF, 9 HG population. Early in 1962, the Vietnam Task Force had proposed suspending air operations until the subject could be thoroughly discussed at the next SecDef meeting scheduled for 19 February at Headquarters CINCPAC.

Although the DOD had not been in favor of suspending air operations, the issue was placed on the February SecDef conference agenda. Headquarters USAF requested Headquarters PACAF to prepare a thorough briefing on the "concept of employment of air units and methods used for target selection and identification to include measures taken to insure minimum impact on civilian population."



Following a comprehensive briefing by Brigadier General Rollen H. Anthis, SecDef laid down these guidelines: U.S. participation in air missions should balance "risk versus gain"; the Cambodian border was not to be violated; and, operations were to be conducted only when a net "plus" was assured - do not take a chance on killing innocent people $\frac{23}{Record}$, Sec UAF M_{1} , 19 20 62 in order to kill a few Viet Cong.

The State Department remained concerned and continued to have reservations about the net value of air operations in Vietnam. 63 particular concern involved indiscriminate bombing and border violations. Admiral Felt explained that, in both Greece and Indochina, the most positive method of identifying guerillas was by means of ground forces and this by virtue of their being involved in a fire-fight. However, it was also found that use of air power "was considerably curtailed by waiting for footsore troops to run down and fix, in substantial number, a will-othe-wisp guerilla enemy." He pointed out the solution finally settled upon - an attempt to set up an "effective air/ground communication capability for close air support." Recognizing that occasional mistakes might be made, such as were made many times in World War II and Korea, Admiral Felt stated that "they should not become justification for imposing unreasonable restriction on the use of the VNAF." MAAG, 470162

General LeMay, Chief of Staff, USAF, visited the RVN on 16 through 21 April 1962 and made it a point to check into the allegations of indiscriminate bombing. He and his staff found "no substantiation whatsoever for statements which suggested a careless attitude and/or procedures."





During his visit, these procedures and the control structure which had been established were closely examined. The conclusion reached was that, considering the political and operational problems involved, a "solid control structure" existed. Targets were selected by the VN and closely checked by the Joint Operations Center (JOC) and the Air Support Operations Center (ASOC). Targets were marked by the VN forward air controllers (FAC) flying in liaison aircraft. The report illustrated the degree of care exercised by citing a mission in which the VN airborne controller did not arrive to mark the target. The USAF instructor pilots in the aircraft observed that a fire fight was taking place, and saw an officer in a jeep pointing to the location of the enemy; "never- $\frac{27}{}$

On F

It remains that political significance at present of another RKG (Cambodian) border incident certainly outweighs probable military advantages of air operations in border area... Politically, count against us now two and three-quarter strikes. Militarily, there is general agreement that success lies not in drawing tight Cordon Sanitaire in Maginot manner....

The implicit concern reflected in these messages was prompted by many charges of border violations lodged by Cambodia. The Cambodian (and Laotian) border was unmarked, ill-defined, and hotly in dispute. In response to this concern, on 25 January 1963, the commander of the 2nd

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ADVON restricted FARM GATE aircraft from conducting operations within five miles of international borders during daylight and ten miles during darkness. The VNAF did not have this restriction.

On 15 November 1962, the VN JGS published a memorandum entitled "Limitation of Air and Artillery Supports Along Vietnam Republic Border Corridor." Whereas the 2nd ADVON restriction of 25 January provided for a five mile buffer during daylight hours, which was increased to ten miles at night, the JGS memorandum placed a constant 10 KM restriction on air support and 15 KM along the south bank of the Ben-Hai River. Under emergency conditions, according to the JGS, requests for waiver of the restriction would be considered. With regard to the waiver authority which JGS had reserved to itself, CINCPAC advised COMUSMACV, in January 1963, that he also be prepared to waive, with discretion, restrictions on U.S. aircraft. "I expect you to exercise the same (JGS) waiver authority for U.S. operations on case by case basis when deemed necessary and when expected 'take' is worth risk (of border violation) involved."

At this time, and to the normal FARM GATE restrictions imposed by the JCS, another was added by the 2d Air Division. The crews could only conduct strikes under a VNAF forward air controller. An exception was established for night strikes permitting FARM GATE crews to strike under a C-47 flareship which established radio relay between VN personnel under $\frac{30}{30}$





These restrictive measures created many problems, one example of which is illustrated by the Viet Cong attack on the Soc Trang Airfield on 10 September 1963. Within five minutes after the first 81mm mortar hits, four USAF pilots were airborne. In the air, they notified the AOC of the attack and asked for a flareship and additional fighters. They then expended ordnance on what they believed to be the Viet Cong mortar positions identified by what appeared to be muzzle flashes. This was done during ARVN retaliation with mortar and other fire. Immediately $\frac{31}{}$

The commander of the 34th Tactical Group, whose T-28's were involved, commended the aggressive action of the USAF pilots in defending a base under attack. He pointed out, however, that such an action was in violation of the rules of engagement since there were no VNAF crew members on board, no FAC, no flareship, and no way of positively identifying the $\frac{32}{1}$ target which was in an allegedly friendly area. In making this point, the 34th's commander noted that it was difficult to understand why certain rules had to be observed. In a COIN environment, he said, the rules of engagement are necessarily sensitive since there are usually no clearly defined battle lines. He added that the winner of a COIN war would probably be the side which wins over the people and it was possible that victory over a thousand of the enemy could be offset by the unintentional $\frac{33}{2}$

>We must exercise our most mature judgment and restraint at all times and abide by the rules of the game. This is vital, even though in certain situations, such as this case, it might appear that the proper course of action lies elsewhere.... Take pride in accomplishing a difficult job under



adverse conditions in a same and professional manner.

Another case occurred on 5 December 1963, when Army helicopters supporting a II Corps outpost at night were reported to have fired on friendly forces in an attack made without positive identification of the Viet Cong target. The commander, MACV, directed that corrective $\frac{34}{}$

>It is also of concern that a possibility exists in which U.S. pilots conducted indiscreet firing against ground targets without adequate knowledge of the ground force disposition, without communications with ground forces or the air control system, and without prior arrangement or briefing....

These general conditions prevailed to the end of 1963, at which time a test plan involving the arming of OV-1's (Mohawks) was proposed. To permit such testing, General Harkins advised Admiral Felt that the rules of engagement would have to be changed. (MACV directive permitted the Mohawk to be used offensively only after being fired upon.) The OV-1 test (in the role of an armed escort for transport aircraft) was approved $\frac{35}{7}$ and the rules subsequently modified.

Defoliation (RANCH HAND) and crop destruction operations came in for their share of discussion. In mid-1963, control of crop destruction was tightly held at the Washington level. On 19 June, the Embassy Saigon proposed an operation which involved about 3000 acres. "We (General Harkins and Minister Truehart) urgently requesting this discretionary authority in order to minimize delays so that greatest possible crop area





could be hit before conclusion overall military operation toward mid-<u>36</u>/ **July.**" Both Truehart and Harkins were "satisfied that this area is Viet Cong controlled, and that Viet Cong do not repeat do not have nearby alternative sources of food."

The use of napalm was also the center of controversy; however, it was somewhat more loosely controlled than was crop destruction. State felt that "political considerations would suggest limiting use napalm to high priority targets which (are) clearly Viet Cong installations."

In response to a query from the Embassy Saigon, State responded:

Concur discretion in use napalm. To extent control can be exercised, (it) should be left with Task Force Saigon. However, as you are well aware there are special political aspects in its use.

Request State and Defense be advised in time to approve in advance any operations which in your judgment are of size or type likely (to) have significant political repercussions.

The VNAF had observed the results which could be obtained from napalm and had arrived at the conclusion that it was an effective weapon. While some elements in the U.S. remained unconvinced as to the desirability and essentiality of its use vis-a-vis U.S. political interests, the VNAF officially "...,requested that this type of weapon be fully used whenever $\frac{39}{11}$ it seems to be necessary for the purpose of operational missions."

The continuing and ever-changing restraints continued to plague the USAF/VNAF efforts to achieve operational effectiveness. Particularly, the various events within the RVN, and the attitudes of its government



and its people influenced the prosecution of the war against the Communist insurgents. Such incidents as the bombing of the Presidential Palace in February 1962; the maturing of the Buddhist unrest in the late summer of 1963; and the coup of 1 November 1963, which deposed the Diem government, brought the joint air operations to a temporary but disruptive halt.

Immediately following the bombing of the Presidential Palace, (27 February 1962) in what was eventually interpreted as an attempt to assassinate President Diem, the VNAF was grounded. Only FARM GATE aircraft were available to respond to calls for help against Viet Cong attack. Two days later the VNAF A-1H squadrons were released for operations but were allowed to carry ordnance no heavier than 20mm. Subsequently, Colonel Vinh informed General Anthis that all restriction on VNAF strike $\frac{42}{2}$

The alleged repression and persecution of the Buddhists during August of 1963 further confused the issues and detracted the RVN military efforts. The U.S. Embassy reported a conversation which a CAS officer had with General Khiem, Chief of Staff of the General Staff of 21 August. "In answer to a specific question, Khiem said that all general officers, in unison, had lately become convinced that if situation (Buddhist problem) were to continue few weeks longer, morale of Army would seriously deteri- $\frac{43}{}$

Adding religious objectives to the military objective - progress toward which was, at best, not going well - increased the scope and



complexities of the joint RVN/US problem and, in effect, opened a "second front" for the GVN. The GVN was then faced with an internal political conflict as well as an external military conflict.

The coup of 1 November directly resulted from the preceding events. The VNAF, under Colonel Ky who had assumed command, fully supported the coup. The U.S. Air Attache noted, "Most VNAF pilots now bedded down in Alert Room. T-28's at Tan Son Nhut bombed and ready to go. FARM GATE standing by for Viet Cong outpost attacks....."

Plans written in 1962 to saturate the countryside with air-ground actions to seek, destroy and fragment the Viet Cong effort, were approved by the Diem government in February 1963. These plans were initiated 1 July and built up to approximately 15,000 actions during August. With the deterioration of the RVN political situation, emphasis was turned from offensive military action to the maintenance of the government's own existence. The coup wrote "finis" to these plans. This complete and dangerous diversion of VNAF/USAF objectives was accentuated by the potential exploitation of the situation by the DRV.

At the start of the coup, the VNAF had assumed control of all aircraft including USAF aircraft. However, as of 0900L, on 2 November, the Air Attache learned that the VNAF "had relinquished control of all USAF aircraft and had, in fact, asked USAF to maintain and support the battle against the Viet Cong to maximum of their capability as they were all on alert status in support of coup operation." At 1655L, on





1 November, AOC (joint VN/USAF manned) advised the COC, 2d Air Division, of instruction from Colonel Ky that U.S. aircraft would not be permitted to takeoff unless on approved rescue or operational necessity missions. Forty minutes later, at 1735L, grounding of USAF aircraft was lifted.

With the fall of the Diem regime, General Harkins, in a message to $\frac{47}{}$ JCS. stated:

....The big job now, and the entire interest of my people and me, is to get the new team focused on the Viet Cong immediately. We buckle down to this at once.

The crucial question remained unanswered at the end of 1963. Would this radical procedure for effecting governmental change correct the debilitating disease which had afflicted RVN's prosecution of the war or would it merely exchange one syndrome for another, leaving the disease unchecked?

The beginning of 1964 saw the stage set for further restrictions, relaxations, additions, and changes to the rules of engagement in efforts to meet the exigencies of changing political and military policies. Compliance with these policies and rules was not enhanced by activities of the Fourth Estate.

While violation of the Geneva Accords did not become a serious Press issue, the issue of the USAF flying combat missions was raised - many times. The official U.S. position stipulated that a Vietnamese crew member had to be aboard; that all flights were conducted for the purpose



of training the VNAF; and, that comprehensive training sometimes involved combat missions - with the USAF airman in an instructional role.

Certain reporters had received information, allegedly from a U.S. military source (and subsequently confirmed by VN armed forces sources) that FARM GATE aircraft, in many cases, spearheaded ground operations with bombing missions against the Viet Cong. Also, it had been reported to them that there were now two air forces operating in the RVN against the Viet Cong, "the GVN Air Force and, secondly, American units (FARM GATE) controlled and operated by USAF." Ambassador Nolting replied that it was incorrect to say the U.S. was "spearheading" the grand assault. "In training the VN Air Force in operation of T-28's, a new plane to them, we are giving on-the-spot training which often involves training under combat conditions, but that in no case do U.S. pilots operate alone; purpose and objectives being the training of GVN pilots in combat operations." Nolting labeled as "fake" the charge that there were two Air Forces in the RVN. The reporters indicated that they were satisfied with these responses and the discussion made the reports considerably less "sensational."

Countering the Communist insurgency in the RVN had proven to be extremely difficult, complex and vexing. A composite of diverse influences existed - political, psychological, sociological and military. The interaction of these variables had determined the relative effectiveness or ineffectiveness - of joint RVN/U.S. efforts. However, change - an immutable characteristic of progress - continued.



*

On 5 March 1964, the Chief of Staff, USAF, directed TAC to deploy four T-28's and necessary personnel to Udorn for a period of six months, on TDY basis. Prior to their arrival, Ambassador Unger had recommended that the restraints imposed by the U.S. on the use of aircraft and bombs by the RLAF be relaxed and greater discretionary authority given. He proposed their use for reprisal against aggressive actions and for interdiction of build-ups for attack. The JCS supported Ambassador Unger's proposals and recommended even stronger action. They recommended that:

- Missions assigned should be offensive as well as defensive.
- Restrictions on the use of napalm should be removed.
- First priority on interdiction missions should be inbound convoys.
- Considerations should be given to use of U.S. and third country forces to provide air support in Laos.
- U.S. aerial reconnaissance could contribute much in view of the limited capability of the RLAF.
- The SAW detachment being deployed to SEA could provide substantial assistance in training and advice to the RLAF.

These views were forwarded to the State Department. On 20 March, the State Department advised Ambassador Unger that a limited number of bomb fuses could be released to the RLAF, since the proposed use of bombs could be considered in support of "responsive counter-attacks to regain ground lost to the Pathet Lao and as reprisal in response to Pathet Lao attack." This was the first time the RLAF had been permitted to maintain $\frac{50}{}$ custody of any bomb fuses.

In March 1964, several modifications were made to the MACV Directive 62. Vietnamese crews were no longer required on missions flown by U.S. marked, unarmed reconnaissance aircraft, although they could be used on any mission which might be facilitated by the use of VN observers.

With reference to border flights, aircraft were not authorized to cross RVN borders "without diplomatic clearance obtained through the Air Attache, American Embassy, or the Embassy of the country concerned," and even then aircraft were not authorized to fire on or across the borders. Air support activities for border outposts (fire support, reconnaissance, transportation evaluation, supply, etc.) was authorized $\frac{51}{}$

The distances from the borders at which aircraft could normally operate were also changed. Where the border was determined by a river or vehicle route, or if a river or vehicle route was inside and along the border and located within 1000 meters of the border, the maximum operating limit of the aircraft was the river or vehicle route. In other areas, aircraft were limited to 2000 meters from the border when aircraft were directed by a forward air controller (FAC) and 5000 meters when not so directed. All aircraft were required to remain south of an imaginary line parallel with and 5000 meters south of the Ben Hai River separating North and South Vietnam. Restrictions on visual and photographic mission aircraft could be waived under certain MACV provisions. However, the JCS authorized the Air Force to fly armed F-100 missions up to and along the Mekong River where it constituted the Thai-Laotian border. S2/ Authority was not granted to the incursions into Laos.

· 1: ***

F-100 pilots at Takhli, Thailand, were instructed that aircraft would be armed during all operations except air refueling training, but that a safety pin would be retained in the trigger and the trigger safety switch kept off to prevent inadvertent firing. Although specific rules of engagement had not yet been approved for these operations, pilots were instructed that they retained their inherent right of selfdefense and were authorized to take such measures as were necessary to $\frac{54}{}$

ALMAN MARKAN

On 17 May 1964, Communist forces turned against the Neutralists who were co-located on the Plaine des Jarres (PDJ). An overt intervention decision was made by the U.S. to bolster the Neutralist forces and to serve notice to the Communists that the U.S. was determined to back the legal government. It was decided that a reconnaissance effort might provide a means of proving that Viet Minh and Chinese Communists were assisting the indigenous Pathet Lao. Such evidence could be presented $\frac{55}{}$ to the International Control Commission.

The first action in the buildup of this U.S. reconnaissance effort was a CINCPAC alert to Carrier Task Group (CTG) 77.4, on 18 May, to be <u>56</u>/ prepared to conduct a show of force and reconnaissance over Laos. Air Force elements were already present in Southeast Asia. A reconnaissance task force (RTF), nicknamed ABLE MABLE, was in place at Tan Son Nhut AB, Vietnam. F-100 Supersabres were located at Clark AB, Philippines, and Takhli AB, Thailand.



On 18 May, the JCS authorized the first missions, which were flown by USN aircraft. The USAF flew its first mission "during the daylight hours" of the next day. The proposal that low-level reconnaissance flights be initiated with two daylight and one night mission to be flown each week was made by MACV. A further recommendation was that strikes against any targets discovered as a result of these reconnaissance missions would be made by unmarked VNAF or RLAF T-28's. The next option was strikes by marked USAF and FARM GATE aircraft, followed by a final $\frac{57}{}$ option of USAF/USN strikes. The reconnaissance effort was formally christened on 22 May 1964 when JCS assigned the nickname YANKEE TEAM $\frac{58}{}$

to it.

Until the May attack against the Neutralists, the RLAF possessed only four T-28's, plus a few non-tactical aircraft, and its aircraft were restricted to the use of rockets and guns. On 17 May, with the PDJ attack in its second day, American Ambassador Leonard Unger (then Ambassador to Laos) authorized the use of 100 and 500-pound bombs against the attacking forces.

The initial efforts of T-28 or other aircraft operating over Laos were confined to preplanned missions, based on the best intelligence and a system which would allow the Air Force to react to field requests. Rules of engagement and authority to strike had to be resolved at the 59/earliest point if the Air Force effort was to be effective.

A continuous program of reconnaissance in Laos was authorized by the JCS in a message to CINCPAC on 25 May. The Joint Chiefs also made it clear that overflight of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was absolutely not authorized. CINCPAC added that the YANKEE TEAM program had to be responsive to the requirements of the U.S. team in Laos, COMUSMACV, CINCPAC, the JCS and higher authority. Thai bases were not to be used under any circumstances and coordination between the operating forces was to be effected locally. COMUSMACV designated the Commander, 2d Air Division (Major General Joseph Moore), as coordinator between the Air Force and Navy. General Moore was given the authority to suggest but not to compel Navy actions. He assigned the Navy all targets on the MACV target list located north of 18 degrees 30 minutes for planning purposes.

The question of joint US/VN crews on FARM GATE aircraft was raised in May 1964, when 2d Air Division was asked by the Chief of Staff, USAF, to explain its use of VNAF pilots on FARM GATE missions. The 2d Air Division replied that, since November 1962, VNAF pilots had not flown on FARM GATE aircraft but that basic VNAF airmen were used for the task. A VNAF non-commissioned officer had the job of scheduling and controlling basic airmen who stood alert in the ready room adjacent to the 1st Air Commando Squadron operations room. There were "infrequent" occasions when the non-availability of VNAF airmen required the cancellation or delay of a mission. The 2d Air Division pointed out that the presence of the 1st Air Commando Squadron had contributed significantly to VNAF



flown, flying hours, and in the professionalism of the squadron itself.

64/

On 20 May 1964, the JCS, in a message to CINCPAC, reaffirmed that the U.S. policy in Vietnam was that the U.S. military would not take part in combat. An exception was made in the case of FARM GATE aircraft, although these could only be used to fly bonafide operational training missions against hostile targets in order to prepare VNAF personnel for $\frac{65}{4}$ an eventual "take over" from the USAF.

The JCS also stated that helicopters in the theater were for use as transport only and their weapons were for the protection of vehicles or passengers. U.S. Army helicopters would not be used as a substitute for close support air strikes. U.S. military personnel assigned as advisors would be exposed to combat conditions only as required in the execution of their advisory duties. This statement of the JCS on the employment of FARM GATE aircraft and U.S. Army helicopters was one of several actions during 1964 which helped resolve the question of a proper mix of U.S. Army and USAF aircraft in the theater. During 1962-63, the absence of clear-cut directives in this area served as a limitation upon USAF activities in Vietnam.

On the 29th of May, General Moore sent a message to PACAF requesting that he be given authority to employ U.S. aircraft and crews for search and rescue (SAR) as he "deemed necessary in the event U.S. aircraft were downed over Laos (YANKEE TEAM missions)." He did not receive a reply until 6 June when a Navy aircraft was shot down. The pilot ejected



successfully. According to Colonel Robert F. Tyrell, the Air Attache in Vientiane, three requests were forwarded to the Ambassador asking the U.S. pilots be sent in to provide close support for the Air America rescue helicopters. By the time authorization came through for use of Air America T-28 pilots, the rescue helicopters had both been shot up $K \ MON M$ and Navy Lieutenant Charles Klussman was a prisoner of the Pathet Lao.

On 4 June, the Secretary of State requested that the frequency of YANKEE TEAM flights be cut back to one or two days per week, supplemented by demand flights related to specific objectives. CINCPAC agreed with this request but added that, in his estimation, the main purpose of YANKEE TEAM was to provide the intelligence vital to decision making. In the South, reconnaissance flights were needed to keep tabs on Communist $\frac{69}{}$

Scoring higher in the world's attention than this undercurrent of debate was the harsh realty of Lt. Klussman's mishap and, on the following day, the loss of another Navy aircraft. On 6 June, the day before $\frac{70}{70}$ the mishap, the JCS directed CINCPAC to:

>Be prepared to fly two low-level reconnaissance sorties as a single flight over Laos on the Plaine des Jarres area on 7 June. Schedule eight fighter bomber aircraft as escort with optimum mix of weapons for AAA suppression. Escort aircraft are authorized to employ appropriate retaliatory fire against any source of anti-aircraft fire against recce or escort aircraft. Reference AMEMB Vientiane 0611212, coordinate timing of operation and area to be covered by recce operation underway 7 June. Suggest Kitty Hawk resources be employed if operationally feasible. Mission should not overfly Khang Khay or Xieng Khouang.....


TOP SECRET

It was one of these escort aircraft which was shot down. This pilot was recovered.

Later that day, the JCS told CINCPAC that it was necessary that the Communists be taught that the U.S. was going to conduct this reconnaissance program, and use force if necessary. Therefore, a strike force of eight F-100's staging from Tan Son Nhut was to strike the antiaircraft installations at Xieng Khouang on 9 June. After the strike, pilots reported direct hits on the target B_{o}

CINCPACELT reinforced this determination with a message to units under his command directing that there be a minimum of two escorts $\frac{72}{}$ per recce aircraft. CINCPAC was still not able under the prevailing rule to go all the way in deterring the enemy. He directed, on 18 June, $\frac{73}{}$ that there be no use of either napalm or cluster bomb units (CBU).

YANKEE TEAM flights were an "on again, off again" proposition during these early days. On 12 June, Ambassador Unger reported to the State Department that Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma had agreed to the continuation of the flights. Souvanna requested that nothing be said to the press about this or the fact that escorts were being used. Ambassador Unger presented two "compelling" arguments for publicly acknowledging use of escorts: (1) to assure congressional and public opinion that recon planes be adequately protected and (2) by public mention of escorts to forcefully signal Hanoi and Peking which would not be nearly as effective if we appeared to be trying to suppress

TOP SECREP

this information. Souvanna then volunteered that he wanted maximum use made of the RLAF T-28's to interdict supply routes and destroy, on the ground, those supplies already in place. The Ambassador reported, "there is no question in the Prime Minister's mind that violations by Pathet Lao/Viet Minh justify actions already underway and perhaps more, but he insists, for political reasons, that we must avoid going on record acknowledging action and thus giving Communists both propaganda fuel and pretense." He concluded the message by stating: "We have to assume always that RLG forces incapable of standing up to PL/VM if latter really meant to push through, conceivably with air support (there is, of course, always risk that Communists will also introduce aircraft).

Five messages concerning escorts, during this period, were significant. First was a 16 June JCS message which authorized weather reconnaissance flights prior to the actual YANKEE TEAM photo mission. L It RW AVA also authorized flak suppression by the fighters in advance of the recon-Commander of TFG 77.6 asked CINCPAC on 18 June if naissance aircraft. he was right in the assumption that "escort" included any available attack CINCPAC replied that he was correct. or fighter aircraft. General Moore sent a directive to the 33d Tactical Fighter Wing element at Da Nang on 18 June ordering that two F-100's be maintained on alert at all times and to be prepared to put two more on 15 minute and four on one hour alert. The final of the five messages was a CINCPACFLT decision to allow Navy forces to use the "Snake Eye" bomb.





PACAF announced on 20 June that Thailand based USAF assets could $\underline{80}$ / be used for SAR. Two days later the Pacific Air Rescue Center at Tan Son Nhut informed PACAF that the procedures for coordinating rescue between Air America and USAF resources had been established. The H-34's could be scrambled through the Air Attache's office in Vientiane or by the HU-16 aircraft that was always in the area whenever U.S. aircraft $\underline{81}$ / were operating in Laos.

The Navy had EA-3B aircraft available for electronic intelligence gathering (ELINT) missions. CINCPACFLT put a hold on their use on 26 June until intelligence sources could verify whether fire control $\frac{82}{7}$ radar was present in Laos. JCS finally gave the execute order on $\frac{83}{7}$ their use on 30 June.

A few days later, CINCPAC spelled out the JCS policy on rules of $\frac{84}{}$ engagement:

a. When weather permits, reconnaissance aircraft will utilize medium altitude levels above effective hostile ground fire.

b. Route reconnaissance will normally be conducted at medium altitude.

c. Low level reconnaissance will be authorized when medium level reconnaissance will not give satisfactory results. Areas of known strong antiaircraft will be avoided.

d. Low level reconnaissance against areas of strong antiaircraft will be authorized only for specific cogent reasons, on a case by case basis when the requirements are of sufficient priority to warrant the risks involved.





e. In cases of missions flown at medium altitudes, retaliatory fire is authorized if the reconnaissance or escort aircraft are endangered by ground fire.

f. In cases of missions flown at low level and the reconnaissance or escort are fire upon, retaliatory fire is authorized either on the first pass with the reconnaissance aircraft or by circling back and conducting subsequent passes.

g. In cases of missions flown at low level against areas of strong antiaircraft, flights will be escorted and escorts are authorized to employ best operational techniques to minimize risk, which, when authorized by JCS, may include attack of known antiaircraft positions in advance of the reconnaissance aircraft where suppression of ground fire is considered essential for the safety of the reconnaissance aircraft.

Using the policy set forth by JCS, CINCPAC went on to provide $\frac{85}{}$ further guidance:

a. Operational missions should be planned and conducted to emphasize minimum risk to planes and crews consistent with the achievements of desired objectives.

b. As a general rule, reconnaissance missions should be conducted at medium level. Medium level is defined as an altitude above the level of expected hostile ground fire.

c. A differentiation must be made between routine and priority requirements. The determination of priority should be made by Ambassador Vientiane or by COMUSMACV based on intelligence requirements. COMUSMACV must evaluate the urgency of the requirement against the known risks of weather, terrain and hostile fire that must be accepted in accomplishment of the missions. This urgency or lack of urgency should be indicated for each requirement submitted to CINCPAC and will also dictate the operational commanders for the conduct of the mission.



In Laos there are areas that are free d. of hostile ground fire and other areas where hostile ground fire will be expected. Most of these areas are known to you. In scheduling missions over areas where hostile ground fire is not expected, low-level coverage can be conducted if weather precludes coverage at medium levels and if risks involved with the hazards of weather and terrain at low altitude are acceptable. However, when missions are to fly over areas where effective hostile ground fire can be expected, schedule the mission at medium level. In those cases due consideration should be given to requesting use of presuppressive fire if considered essential to the safety of the mission.

The Air Force wanted greater freedom to schedule low-level flights, as required. CINCPACAF recommended the removal of restrictions to permit such flights. Although CINCPAC agreed with CINCPACAF as to the need for low-level missions, he did not feel the time was right to ask for full authority to fly them. He believed overall authority could be won in time, but not until authorities at higher levels were convinced of the advantage of low-level reconnaissance. Until then, permission to fly at low-level would have to be obtained separately for each mission.

General Moore visited with the Ambassador to Thailand, Graham A. Martin, and the Commander of the U.S. Military Assistance Command Thailand, Major General Ernest F. Easterbrook, on 8 July 1964. In a memo for the record, dated 9 July 1964, he reported that Ambassador Martin was worried about the actions that 2d Air Division had taken or was planning which involved Thai bases. The Ambassador suggested that a





close liaison be established with General Easterbrook's office so that $\frac{86}{}$ he could be kept informed and could, in turn, inform the Thais.

The continued success of the Viet Cong in South Vietnam, the successful Pathet Lao/Viet Minh offensive on the Plaine des Jarres, and the critical political conditions which existed in both the RVN and Laos painted a grim picture of the U.S. effort in Southeast Asia in mid-1964. The U.S. COIN effort in South Vietnam was not achieving its objectives. The insurgents increased in numbers and capability and extended their control of the South Vietnam countryside, largely due to successful infiltration from NVN into the RVN. In Laos, the enemy had taken over practically all of the PDJ by the end of May and threatened Muong Soui, where the bulk of the Neutralist forces were located with no avenue for orderly withdrawal. The Royal Laotian Government had little popular support and owed its existence, primarily, to U.S. backing. The government of Vietnam was faced with popular discontent, stemming mainly from Buddhist dissidents and a people tired of years of war.

Despite U.S. military efforts, the continuing influx of Communist personnel and materiel into Laos and South Vietnam brought conditions in these two countries to a dangerous imbalance. Since 1959, an estimated 20,000 officers, men and technicians were known to have infiltrated into South Vietnam and another 17,000 probably came in according to the U.S. State Department.





The Communist forces in Laos were stopped from expanding their area of control beyond what it was in May 1964. YANKEE TEAM reconnaissance flights over Laos and air strikes by RLAF T-28's (and, later, by USAF jet aircraft) were the major contributing factors in curbing enemy activities.

In South Vietnam, the mid-1964 situation was also grim. Fighting under practically the same rules as were in effect when the U.S. stepped up its assistance in 1961, the government was making little progress against the Viet Cong. The Diem coup in November 1963, and the Khanh coup in January 1964, left an aftermath of political instability that practically stopped pursuit of pacification programs elaborately drawn early in the year. The USAF, which, in the spring had grounded its B-26's and T-28's, was in the progress of receiving A-1E aircraft and only a handful were available for combat in June and July. The month of July was the worst and bloodiest of the war for both U.S. and Vietnamese forces - as the Viet Cong pushed their campaign to peak intensity, apparently to coincide with the 10th anniversary of the signing of the Geneva accords.

The Honolulu high level strategy meeting, in early June, to line up a new approach to the war, the change in command of both military and political leadership of the U.S. effort, and tough diplomatic warnings to North Vietnam all signified the opening of a new phase of U.S. participation in the war.





Plans for the stepping up of U.S. efforts dominated MACV activity during July to the point where the MACV staff was significantly detracted from its vital pacification mission in the RVN. General Westmoreland, on 12 July, urgently requested a TDY augmentation which would $\frac{88}{7}$

YANKEE TEAM missions in the Muong Soui and PDJ areas, in support of Operation TRIANGLE were authorized by the JCS on 20 July. The aircraft could fly at medium level, with the exception of one which could go at low altitude if weather permitted. The escort aircraft could retaliate if either the recce or escort aircraft were endangered by hostile fire. On the low-level flight, the aircraft could retaliate on the first pass, if fired upon, and then circle and strike again.

Toward the end of the month, PACAF and CINCPACFLT both expressed concern to CINCPAC about suppressive fire. PACAF considered use of suppressive fire by YANKEE TEAM aircraft most desirable. The message suggested that a combination of counterbattery and preplanned interdiction strikes be used against the "improving" Communist antiaircraft $\frac{90}{}$ fire. CINCPACFLT said that suppressive fire was needed for low altitude missions, and while not 100 percent effective, it would keep gun crews from firing with impunity. It was also felt that the authority to order suppressive fire should be left with the "on-the-scene" $\frac{91}{}$ commander.



Although YANKEE TEAM operations over Laos and USAF support of the RLAF T-28 operations signified an escalation of the conflict in Southeast Asia, the events of early August, in the Gulf of Tonkin, triggered a sudden upsurge in air activity. The attack on the U.S. destroyers Maddux and Turner Joy (2 and 4 August) and the subsequent U.S. Navy strikes on four NVN installations (5 August) helped a lot of pieces fall into place in the complex plans for defending Southeast Asia. First, the movement of USAF jets into the RVN was carried out with justification. The Thai government approved the use of its bases for out-of-country strikes. A system for U.S. control of air defense and the employment of air in out-of-country operations got approval from the RVN government.

For the U.S. Air Force, the Tonkin Gulf incidents were the start of a new emphasis on air power in the counterinsurgency struggle.

More significant, perhaps, than the retaliatory strikes, was the deployment of USAF strength to Southeast Asia following the Tonkin attacks. PACAF was alerted to dispatch two squadrons of B-57's from Clark to Bien Hoa on 5 August. At the same time, it was to alert one F-105 squadron to move from Yokota to Korat, deploy tanker support and four additional F-100's to Takhli. It was also told to alert one RTF of six F-101's to deploy from WestPac to Tan Son Nhut. Deployment alert orders went out also to other CINCPAC units, involving the Marines $\frac{92}{}$





On the morning of the 5th, General Khanh, in a meeting with General Westmoreland, agreed to allow the B-57's and F-102's into the RVN. He also said that the VNAF, along with all Vietnamese armed forces, was on alert status. He said that 25 percent could be off the ground in 30 minutes and the rest in 45 minutes. The RVNAF was ready to attack North Vietnam if they attacked the south, and they would also attack $\frac{93}{}$

Actions were taken in several other areas to prepare for the new situation. With the increased possibility that a retaliatory attack by NVN in South Vietnam might follow, CINCPAC asked its commands to study the air defense needs. It noted that the rules of engagement had two voids: (1) No rules for intercept, pursuit, or destruction of hostile aircraft over Thailand and, (2) no rule for allowing <u>94</u>/ aircraft intercepted over Vietnam to be followed outside the RVN.

To prepare for a possible movement of Communist troops across the 17th Parallel, or into Laos, COMUSMACV recommended, on 6 August, that <u>95</u>/ medium-level and low-level photo recce flights begin over NVN.

In a meeting on the morning of 7 August with the Thai Minister of Defense (Marshal Dawee), the U.S. Ambassador to Thailand (Graham A. Martin) got an agreement for the launch of combat sorties out of Thailand. Martin reported that this approval was granted with reluctance and emphasized the importance of discretion in employing this authority. He also stated that it could have an important impact upon later



proposals for deployment of U.S. ground forces to Thailand. The authority which Dawee granted was unlimited and included strikes against $\frac{96}{}$ North Vietnam.

CINCPAC amplified his rules of engagement in mid-August 1964. He said:

97/

1. In view of fighters in North Vietnam, you are authorized to arm YANKEE TEAM escort aircraft for air-to-air combat, especially in areas where DRV aircraft could be expected to cross the Laotian border.

2. Number, type, ordnance load and tactics of escort aircraft will continue to be determined on individual mission basis. This information will continue to be included in OP-OO reports for long-range plans and OP-1 reports for individual mission approval. The following rules of engagement apply for YANKEE TEAM operations in Laos.

a. If the reconnaissance or escort aircraft are fired upon by ground fire, retaliatory fire is authorized either on the first pass with the reconnaissance aircraft or by circling subsequent passes by escorts.

b. If the reconnaissance or escort aircraft are attacked by hostile aircraft, immediate and aggressive measures are authorized including hot pursuit, but only to the DRV/Laos border.

c. When authorized by JCS on individual mission basis, attacks to known antiaircraft positions in advance of the reconnaissance aircraft is authorized where suppression of ground fire is considered essential for the safety of the reconnaissance aircraft.

CINCPAC went further into rules of engagement on 21 August when he informed tactical commanders that authority to launch YANKEE TEAM weather reconnaissance missions had been delegated and did not require

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approval from higher headquarters. Weather recce missions were authorized as required, provided they were flown at altitudes and in areas where they would not be subject to hostile ground fire. No photography $\frac{98}{}$ was permitted on these flights.

Regarding the OP procedural messages, CINCPAC told his subordinates that, under current ground rules, missions required approval by State, Defense and JCS. Missions had to be flown exactly as listed in the OP-OO and approved by JCS/CINCPAC. If deviations were desired, they had to be submitted as an OP-OO MOD and the mission was not to be flown $\frac{99}{}$ until the request for deviation was acted upon.

Shallow, unescorted photo penetrations into Laotian border areas were approved by the JCS on 25 August. These missions were to be flown at medium altitudes to obtain coverage of specific targets of interest to MACV and were not to exceed one mission every 48 hours. On 15 October, permission was given by the JCS to fly a maximum of two missions per day during the period 15-31 October, in order to complete the terrain study. Missions were flown unescorted and at medium or high-level altitudes, with the 2d Air Division providing SAR support.

Relaxation of the rules of engagement to allow normal FARM GATE operations with either a VNAF student pilot or VNAF observer aboard was agreed to by Sec Def on 25 September. This was in response to a request from the JCS to change several FARM GATE rules. The JCS, in accition to asking for "observers," sought a change of the FARM GATE



mission to include combat support as well as well as training, authorization for scrambling FARM GATE aircraft for immediate requests with only the U.S. crew aboard, and changing the markings on FARM GATE aircraft from VNAF to USAF. The SecDef authorized only the use of "observers," considering the other changes as "not being in the best interest at the 101/ time."

Near the end of Sept 1964, the RLAF gave approval for use of its T-28's in the proposed interdiction strikes along Route 7. These aircraft were authorized for use in high-cover support, flak suppression roles and SAR operations. Armed YANKEE TEAM recon missions were also authorized to strike targets beyond the capabilities of the RLAF T-28's.

In an embassy telecon from the Ambassador in Bangkok to the State Department (October 5th), the Ambassador summarized guide lines for using Thai-based USAF assets. Briefly, they included photo reconnaissance over Laos; armed escort for photo reconnaissance over Laos; SAR operations in Laos; armed escort and suppressive fire for Laotian SAR; air defense of Thai airspace with hot pursuit over neighboring borders authorized; and, in the event of direct Chinese Communist intervention, any use of 102/ Thai-based air power as needed.

A final planning meeting for air strikes against targets in the Panhandle was held at MACV Headquarters on 9 October. Representatives from 2d Air Division, MACV, U.S. Embassy Vientiane, and 7th Fleet At this meeting, the Air Attache, Vientiane, said the attended.





RLAF would go against 13 targets, including Mu Gia Pass, on 14 October 1964 This would be done whether or not the U.S. provided any requested CAP or YANKEE TEAM strikes. (The term YANKEE TEAM in relation to strikes against targets was a CINCPAC/MACV interpretation of the YANKEE TEAM mission which considered the armed escort role in armed recce attacks as part of the overall package.) If authority was not granted for CAP aircraft to fly over Laos, such cover could be provided by aircraft orbiting over the RVN and Thailand. There was no question about the automatic launch of U.S. jets from Thailand or South Vietnam in support of SAR operations or air defense in accordance with the new rules of 104/engagement.

CINCFAC reported that U.S. close air support for RLAF operations in Laos was authorized, using forces based in Vietnam or aboard air-<u>105/</u> craft carriers. The Ambassador to Laos approved YANKEE TEAM operations morth of 20 degrees and east of the Nam Hou and Nam Houp Rivers <u>106/</u> on 28 October.

WARD RANGE.

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In late October, renewed recommendations for approval of YANKEE TEAM strikes against Route 7 were made and the first USAF interdiction mission was finally approved and flown. These interdiction missions, later termed BARREL ROLL, were not authorized alternate targets when flown at night.

Shortly after the Viet Cong mortar attack on Bien Hoa, on 1 November, Ambassador Taylor, concurring with the JCS plans for counteractions, and



Military Pledge

To Back Civilians

Armed Forces Will Not Permit Demonstrations

Vietnamese Air Force commander, Air Vice Marshel Nguyen Cae Ry said yesterday that the Armed Forces have agreed to give full support to the civilian government headed by Chief of State an Khac Suu and that he had personally given assurances to the new Chief of State that the Air Force would state to prevent any military coup attempts against the new government.

The agreement to back the government was reached in a meeting by military femilers at the seaside resort at Cap St. Jacques fast Souther, the Air Force chief said in an exclusive interview with The SAIGON POST.

The support extended to preventing any street demonstrations aimed at topping the fledgling government, he said.

The Air Force chief said he had called on Chief of State Sun last Saturday and gave him his personal assurance that, the Air Force will stop any, military attempt to end the provisional government since he knew the civilians would need to know the position of the military, prior to agreeing to take on their new roles.

During their meeting last weekend at the resort town, Ky suid, the military leaders agrees that they would give the smilitans full support. He said there was no plot among the military leaders to use demonstrations to regain powers. On the trary, he said, the military agreed to prevent civit disturbances. « Dymonstrations are the way of the Communists, » the Air Manshal said adding, « if the people want a change it must be by vote.»

Recent reports have been rife with rumors that disturbances similar to those that less that the toppling down of the Vung Tau charter last August, now aimed at ending the new government led by civilans, were amminent. Rumors also said threats of new coups where in the offing alleged plotted by disgruntled elements among the military.

The weekend meeting of military leaders was also directed at unifying themselves and of making it plain that politics had no place in the Armed Forces.

The morals of the Armed somewhat been somewhat introd by the resent turmoil, in pointed ant. He said the leadership mine be purged of men who sopher to purged of men who sopher to pointee, before the men in the armed Forest rinks will have confidence, two must show them something news he said.

Ky moted that the punishment metad out to the feaders of the September 13 abortive coup had been mild and that now sans man with a benalion or a division can make a coup and then say later that it was just a show of strengthe

The Alt Force chief suited that the automatic west the military have even to at matterranding of operations support and that matthews are write apply pressure to the others.

In answer to compare the first state of the second state of the se

He said plans are some way for interdictions protes against these symmetry man of which run into Tay Minh provides.

Thems roads, Ky added, sra pratected by heavy anti-aircraft guns placed at scatteria. locations along the routed inside South Vietnam,

He massed, however, that the mass cash of all combine has been due to increased operations, and that the damage influence on Victnamese structure to far has come from 50 caliber fire.

(This made is Unclassified)



Norman Call Ky



with an endorsement from COMUSMACV, strongly recommended that retaliatory air strikes be undertaken jointly with the RVN. COMUSMACV wired that he knew of no specific Viet Cong target in the RVN which would constitute an appropriate reprisal. While there was a constant search for such a target, and with some limited success, none were found justifying a mass $\frac{107}{}$ air attack.

While there were enough VNAF/FARM GATE aircraft in the RVN to launch reprisal attacks in the immediate future, COMUSMACV considered it "highly desirable" that he have in-hand authority to use USAF augmentation forces 108/ when and if required. To reduce congestion of bases in the RVN and improve the U.S. posture in Southeast Asia, OSD in early November 1964 was considering an increase in the number of U.S. aircraft based in Thailand. Ambassador Martin, in Bangkok, was asked by OSD on 2 November to get Thai government authority for the movement of aircraft in and out of Thai bases as CINCPAC may desire and for increased use of Thai aircraft on 109/ However, on 7 November, Secretary of State Dean Rusk advised that the Royal Thai Government was not to be approached on the use of Thai-based aircraft until further instructions 110/ were issued.

Following the downing of two USAF aircraft in a three-day period (18-21 November) the rules of YANKEE TEAM operations were changed again. As a result of the crashes, the JCS immediately set 10,000 feet as the new minimum for YANKEE TEAM missions. Authority for low-level missions $\frac{111}{10}$ had to be approved on an individual basis. The U.S. Ambassador in

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Laos was gratified by this decision and recommended that any flight authorized for low-level be individually approved by the Embassy in $\frac{112}{}$ Vientiane.

CINCPACAF considered that JCS restriction of flight to 10,000 feet would only result in significantly less effective reconnaissance operations in Laos and would deny U.S. agencies the intelligence necessary for both military and political planning. Any additional restrictions, if applied to tactical operations, he said, would further decrease the capability for timely response to priority visual and photo reconnaissance <u>113</u>/ requirements.

As the YANKEE TEAM effort cut down enemy daylight activity and increased night movements, there was a need for a night photo-capable aircraft which could keep the enemy off balance and crimp his nocturnal activity. There were two RB-57's in Vietnam and two more enroute in December which were IR configured and capable of night work. The RF-101's had a limited night capability using a pod for carrying flash cartridges,but possessed no self-contained navigation system. All the YANKEE TEAM night photography and the day-and-night ELINT recce operations had employed carrier based RA-3B's, RF-8's, and EA-3B aircraft. These aircraft were restricted to minimum altitudes of 15,000 feet using flash bombs instead of flash cartridges. This restricted the night photo recce to aircraft with bomb bays and eliminated the RF-type aircraft for night operations since flash bombs could not be carried externally due $\frac{114}{}$ In view of these deficiencies in the night



recce capability, CINCPAC asked the JCS for an Air Force strike RTF package of four RB-66B's and two RB-66C's to be deployed to Clark to augment the YANKEE TEAM forces in SEA. These aircraft could operate $\frac{115}{}$ under the rules then in effect.

On 20 November, CINCPACFLT granted authority to COMSEVENTHFLEET to schedule RA-5C aircraft for day as well as night YANKEE TEAM missions. Guidance for employment was a list of specific "do nots". "Do not schedule missions against heavily defended targets unless specifically directed to do so. Do not schedule the RA-5C for weather recce missions. Select altitudes giving a reasonable margin of safety above ground fire $\frac{116}{}$

Ambassador Unger (Vientiane) was obviously unimpressed by the Air Force's arguments concerning altitudes and approval for YANKEE TEAM missions. In a 27 November message he said that various sensor systems allow aircraft to operate just as effectively at medium altitude levels as they operate at low, providing periods of weather promise good ceiling and visibility. The message concluded, "Embassy reserves right to $\frac{117}{}$ comment on all YANKEE TEAM missions."

On 16 Dec 1964, authority was obtained from the Thai Government to use Thai-based USAF aircraft for BDA, CAP, and Nav aid support of RLAF $\frac{118}{}$ T-28 corridor strikes.

On 14 Dec 1964, the first of the BARREL ROLL missions was flown, resulting in strikes against a bridge and a group of buildings on the



east approach. Ambassador Sullivan (Laos) wired the Secretary of State on 18 December that he was disturbed by two aspects of this mission. First, it was his understanding that the bridge was not a target of opportunity unless enemy forces were moving on it. This was a RLAF target and could have been hit by RLAF T-28's that day. The Ambassador felt this pointed up the need for more coordination. Secondly, according to the Ambassador, photos showed houses destroyed on the east approach to the bridge which could well have been civilian dwellings. <u>119</u>/ He added:

>Either I have a serious misunderstanding of rules of the game for these BARREL ROLL missions or else there has been a serious failure in coordination of a type which could cause us some significant headache.....

CINCPAC wired the JCS the next day that he concurred with Ambassador Sullivan's views that the bridge, per se, was not a target of opportunity unless enemy forces were moving on it. The possible civilian houses, he added, appeared to be RLAF Target #25, which was a military installation. However, he did not consider this a target of opportunity in the absence of any observed PL/VM activity. To avoid future misunderstandings, he reported, he was instructing his operational commanders that targets of opportunity were confined to unmistakable military activity of a transient or mobile nature and that fixed installations were to be struck only in connection with attacks on clearly identified military convoys and military personnel or when pre-briefed 121/ YANKEE TEAM procedures were to be used for as a secondary target. all future operations.



Prior to the second series of BARREL ROLL flights, 2d Air Division requested and received approval to fly recce aircraft with the strike group with the recce aircraft authorized to fly below 10,000 feet at optimum altitude to get photos of the type and quality necessary to assess immediate strike results. If the recce aircraft had to descend, $\frac{122}{}$ Like the first mission, napalm was not authorized on these flights, nor were strike aircraft to be launched from Thailand bases.

On 15 December, AC-47 aircraft were introduced to combat, which was to result in additional rules of engagement to provide for their utilization.

Another request by MACV for the use of two Thai-based F-105's to escort strike recce aircraft on the second series of BARREL ROLL missions was disapproved by CINCPAC on 22 December. CINCPAC said that the intent of BARREL ROLL was to limit strike forces to four aircraft from other than Thailand bases. The addition of the two F-105's would raise the number of aircraft to six and would not comply with the ground rules $\frac{124}{}$

At the close of 1964, 2d Air Division published a compilation of the Rules of Engagement summarizing prohibitive and permissive air actions $\frac{125}{}$ in force at that time:





Annex 1 - INTERNATIONAL WATERS AND AIRSPACE OVER INTERNATIONAL WATERS.

1. (TS) U.S. Forces are authorized to attack and destroy any vessel or aircraft which attacks or gives positive indication of intent to attack U.S. Forces.

2. (TS) Hot pursuit into territorial waters and airspace as may be necessary and feasible is authorized.

3. (TS) Hostile forces and installations, other than those actively engaged in accordance with these rules, which are encountered outside the confines of RVN and Thailand will not be attacked except as necessary for self defense and only to that extent.

4. (TS) To pursuit is authorized into CHICOM territorial waters or airspace.

Annex 2 - REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (RVN).

1. (TS) U.S. Forces are authorized to engage and destroy hostile aircraft encountered within the boundaries of RVN.

2. (TS) Hot pursuit may be conducted as necessary and feasible into North Vietnam (DRV), Laos, Cambodia, and over international waters <u>not</u> to include CHICOM territory or territorial waters.

3. (TS) Hostile forces or installations, other than those actively engaged in accordance with these rules, which are encountered outside the confines of RVN, will not be attacked except as necessary for self defense and only to that extent.

Annex 3 - REPUBLIC OF THAILAND.

1. (TS) U.S. Forces are authorized to engage and destroy hostile aircraft encountered within the boundaries of Thailand.





2. (TS) Hot pursuit may be conducted as necessary and feasible into North Vietnam (DRV), Laos, Cambodia, and over international waters not to include CHICOM territory or territorial waters.

3. (TS) Hostile forces or installations, other than those actively engaged in accordance with these rules, which are encountered outside the confines of Thailand, will not be attacked except as necessary for self defense and only to that extent.

Annex 4a- AIR DEFENSE OF LAOS.

1. (TS) U.S. Forces positioned in RVN and Thailand may be used for air defense employment in Laos when authorized by the Commander 2AD or his authorized representative.

a. Information on any action taken under this authority will be provided to JCS by flash precedence message.

2. (TS) U.S. air defense forces are authorized to engage and destroy hostile aircraft in Laos. Hot pursuit may be conducted as necessary and feasible over RVN and Thailand.

a. Hot pursuit into North Vietnam and Cambodia is <u>not</u> authorized <u>ex-</u> <u>cept when actually engaged in combat</u>.

3. (TS) Unless specifically authorized, U.S. air defense forces are not authorized to attack hostile forces or installations, other than those committed against, unless attack first, and then only to the extent necessary for self defense.

4. (TS) Definitions of a hostile aircraft and hostile acts are the same as those defined in paragraph 4 (basic attachment) with the following additions:

a. A hostile aircraft is one which is visually identified, or designated by the U.S. Director of an AOC or his





authorized representative, as a Communist bloc or <u>Cambodian air-</u> <u>craft overflying Laos</u> territory and committing a hostile act.

b. <u>Friendly forces</u> include Air America and Bird & Son aircraft and installations.

Annex 4b- YANKEE TEAM OPERATIONS - LAOS.

1. (TS) <u>Medium level escort</u>: Retaliatory fire is authorized if reconnaissance or escort aircraft are endangered by ground fire.

2. (TS) Low level escort: If reconnaissance or escort aircraft are fired upon, retaliatory fire is authorized either on the first pass with the reconnaissance aircraft, or by circling back and conducting subsequent passes.

3. (TS) Low level escort against areas having strong AAA: Escorts are authorized to employ the best operational technique available to minimize risk which, when authorized by JCS, may include attack on known AAA positions in advance of reconnaissance aircraft where suppression of ground fire is considered essential for safety of the reconnaissance aircraft.

Annex 4c- RESCAP OPERATIONS - LAOS.

1. (TS) RESCAP aircraft will not enter the area of the distressed crew member (s) unless requested by the Rescue "On-Scene-Commander" or Rescue Control.

2. (TS) If rescue helicopters are fired upon, RESCAP aircraft will take action to suppress ground fire after the helicopter (s) departs the area of ground fire.

a. If ground fire is coming from the vicinity of the distressed crew member (s), RESCAP aircraft will

insure that return fire will not endanger friendlies on the ground.

b. If the crew on the ground can be seen and ground fire is preventing helicopters from approaching close enough for pick-up, RESCAP aircraft between the enemy positions and the distressed crew member (s) as a screening action for the helicopters.

Annex 4d- AIR DEFENSE CAP LAOS IN CONJUNCTION WITH RLAF STRIKE/BDA

1. (TS) When requested by the U.S. Ambassador to Laos, CAP is authorized to provide top cover for RLAF T-28 strikes in Laos by CINCPAC TS message 140843Z Oct 64, "Corridor Ops Laos", and IAW JCS 9117, "Definitive Rules of Engagement Applying to Laos." This applies only to authorized pre-briefed targets in Laos and to the provision of navigational assistance to RLAF T-28's and YANKEE TEAM aircraft assigned to obtain BDA of attacked targets. JCS 9117, "Definitive Rules of Engagement Applying to Laos" applies with the following exception: Suppressive or retaliatory fire against AAA is not authorized.

2. (S) Should CAP aircraft be diverted for RESCAP, current SAR rules will apply.

The problem of finding targets visually after dark presented another factor leading to special restrictions and limitations compounded in the rules of engagement. This situation was amply illustrated in the unfortunate bombing of the village of Ban Tang Vai, several miles west of Route 23 and just south of Route 9 in the central panhandle of Laos. (See map, page 53.) Although actual damage to the





village was slight, and there was evidence that high speed aircraft not associated with the BARREL ROLL mission had attacked the village prior to the Navy strike, the incident caused considerable concern in $\frac{126}{}$

Although General Ma, RLAF Commander, representing the Lao Government, accepted apologies from American officials, he was insistent that new limitations be placed on future BARREL ROLL missions, both day and night, and that targets of opportunity be restricted to vehicle and troop movements spotted on or near authorized recon routes. Future BARREL ROLL operations were to be the exclusive preserve of the RLAF.

Under the then-prevailing "rules of engagement" the deputy commander in Thailand was authorized to use available resources to engage and destroy hostile aircraft overflying the country. Hot pursuit of the enemy into North Vietnam (DRV), Laos, Cambodia and over international waters was also authorized. Crossing into Communist Chinese territory, $\frac{128}{}$

Several restrictions were placed on early BARREL ROLL missions, commencing 12 February 1965, which no doubt served to offset the effectiveness of the program somewhat. Early missions were limited to small number of strike aircraft and were sparsely spaced. A period of 72 hours was initially required between armed reconnaissance missions (later reduced to 48 hours), and the use of napalm as a weapon was



prohibited, although there were advocates for its use. Overflight of NVN was not permitted and a two-mile buffer zone was established along the Laos/North Vietnam border. In February, MACV recommended that all such restraints be closely monitored since they created unnecessary restrictions for the tactical commander responsible for $\frac{129}{}$ mission accomplishment.

The sterile interval required between missions in the early months, although reduced from 72 to 48 hours, resulted in mission delays and created scheduling problems. The requirement that the JCS give final approval of all BARREL ROLL missions also limited the scope of the early BARREL ROLL program. Fleeting or mobile targets, pinpointed by such intelligence sources as FAR and Meo forces, road watch teams and Air America pilots, had to be left to the RLAF T-28's until the esta-130/blishment of BANGO/WHIPLASH missions in mid-1965.

A lack of low-level photo reconnaissance photography over Laos was another example of early restrictions affecting air operations. CINCPAC considered low-level oblique and vertical photography essential in locating and confirming dispersed and concealed targets. He recommended low-level reconnaissance, by YANKEE TEAM aircraft, to obtain the required intelligence. Reflights by STEEL TIGER/BARREL ROLL aircraft, merely to obtain BDA, also had to be approved by higher authority. MACV felt that the three-day waiting period for approval of reflights gave the enemy ample time to remove the evidence, especially where mobile targets were concerned. MACV wanted provisions made in

the original operations order to allow reflights to obtain BDA when 131/ necessary, without the necessity for obtaining further approval.

The long-awaited approval for the use of napalm in North Vietnam was finally granted and used in the 15 March strike against the Phu Qui Ammunition Depot. The following day (16 March 1965), to provide operational flexibility on future strikes, the JCS authorized strike missions against the NVN on a weekly basis, with strikes to be executed at any time during a seven-day period. Those targets not struck during the period could be carried over into subsequent weeks.

CINCPAC further relaxed the ground rules for the four-week ROLLING THUNDER program, 17 March - 13 April 1965. Thai-based planes could now be used. U.S. forces could fill out VNAF requirements. Emough stretaft could be used to achieve a high damage level. Random armed with VNAF missions, employing 4-8 aircraft, plus suitable CAP and flak with VNAF missions. Armed recce of highways and railways to strike rolling stock was authorized after strikes. Flak and CAP aircraft medium altitude BDA recce was also authorized.

In late March, according to CINCPAC, the U.S. was transiting between a situation where the U.S. was not involved in a large war with the NVN and/or CHICOMS and a situation where large U.S. forces were actually engaged in combat. In this latter case, U.S. military





actions were circumscribed by political necessity on many occasions. There were certain political restraints which would remain in effect until the U.S. "signals" were properly read in Hanoi, Peking, and Moscow. (CINCPAC) said another review should be made of past restrictions from which there had been some relaxation in recent weeks. In this way it would be possible to move closer toward improved tactical concepts and operational procedures. It was necessary to continue to streamline the decision process at all levels..... Restrictions should be lifted gradually in order to preserve the sensitive agreements which $\frac{133}{}$ had been reached by painstaking political negotiation.

Some of the continuing restrictions were pointed out by CINCPAC. Reconnaissance, both photo and weather, was restricted to medium altitude. Specific requests to high authority were necessary for low-level recce. CINCPAC said that the tactical commander should be given the authority to determine altitudes of recce flights. He also recommended that tactical commanders be given authority to conduct flights on a frequency justified by military needs rather than by an arbitrary timetable.... Advance authority should be granted to strike fleeting and on-call targets. These commanders should also be allowed to determine the number of aircraft and the weaponeering required to complete a task successfully, with the least possible risk. Target selection, including <u>134</u>/ shore bombardment targets, should be authorized at a lower level.

By mid-1965, many of the restraints and restrictions placed on BARREL ROLL had been gradually removed or modified to provide for



daily missions; larger numbers of aircraft were assigned to individual targets; the use of napalm permitted when approved by the American Ambassador to Laos; removal of the two-mile buffer zone; low-level photography and more flexible target assignments were provided for. However, many old limitations were replaced with new ones and political restraints were a never-ending problem in the Laos interdiction 135/ operations.

Aiming at the improvement of USAF's reconnaissance capabilities 2d Air Division (as far back as September 1964) proposed that four to six RF-101's be moved either to Don Muang or Udorn, Thailand, to assist in low-level YANKEE TEAM operations north of 20 degrees in Laos. While the U.S. already had Thai permission to conduct reconnaissance from 1 that country's bases, it would require separate approval to bring a unit into the country. The U.S. Air Attache in Bangkok believed the Thai Government would consider the reconnaissance task force proposed by 2d Air Division as a unit, regardless of the identify given it by the USAF. It would be "a long-term process, if ever," said the AIRA, to negotiate arrangements to position the RTF at Don Muang. He concluded by saying it was possible to arrange for the use of Takhli, Udorn, or Ubon, but even there he would need time to negotiate with $\frac{136}{}$

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Following coordination of the plan with all the various YANKEE TEAM controlling agencies, COMUSMACTHAI and Graham Martin, U.S. Ambassador to Thailand, reviewed the proposed action. Finally, with all agencies



in agreement, the RTF moved into Udorn on 1 April 1965 and, a month later, the Thai Government gave its permission for the U.S. to station $\frac{137}{12}$ RF-101's at Udorn.

Other photo reconnaissance problems were raised by the August 1964 prohibition of accomplishing photographic reconnaissance on weather flights. Second Air Division said that such a restriction did not permit the best use of its aircraft assets. The division added that the JCS were unaware of the restrictions and thought it might not be in line with the latter's thinking. In late January, 2d Air Division informed 13AF of failure in past efforts to obtain approval from MACV and other agencies up the line of authority. The division then asked 13AF to seek permission to photograph targets of opportunity during YANKEE TEAM weather missions. It was not until September that CINCPAC notified COMUSMACV that the rules barring photography had been waived 138/ and photos could be taken.

Following several weeks of command and control discussions among CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT and COMUSMACV, the arguments were closed by CINCPAC when, in a message to COMUSMACV, it was stated that the controlling agency for YANKEE TEAM operations would be CINCPAC. Contained in this decision was CINCPAC's statement of YANKEE TEAM rules of engagement: "Reconnaissance flights may be conducted at medium or low-level..... Retaliatory fire by escorts authorized except against the towns of Sam Neua, Khang Khay or Xieng Khouang. Use of suppressive fire not authorized unless AMEMB Vientiane coordinates and JCS approval is obtained....."

The Air Force continued to press for freedom in applying suppressive <u>139</u>/ fire ahead of reconnaissance flights into heavily defended areas.

- Reality of

By September, the policy had changed only to the extent that <u>140</u>/ approval came from the U.S. Ambassador in Vientiane and CINCPAC.

Another restriction which was detrimental to YANKEE TEAM was the prohibition against use of napalm on escorts. Second Air Division operations personnel considered this to be an outstanding weapon for use against AAA positions, but its use was specifically disapproved. (Use of CBU-2A munitions was authorized by JCS 8899/August 64.)

Rules of engagement appeared to be quixotic - trucks sighted by escorts on YANKEE TEAM missions were immune to attack, while those <u>141</u>/ same trucks, sighted by BARREL ROLL aircraft, could be destroyed.

The majority of the USAF BARREL ROLL and STEEL TIGER missions, during April, originated at bases in Thailand. This marked the first time that combat aircraft stationed on Thai soil had been allowed to fly combat strikes. Approval to use Thai-based aircraft had been sought early in the BARREL ROLL program as being essential to the success of interdiction operations. As of early November 1964, Thailand-based U.S. aircraft could be used over Laos for photo recon, armed escort for recon flights, SAR operations and air defense of Thailand. However, due mainly to the Thai Government's reluctance to risk their status of nonbelligerency by authorizing combat strikes from its bases, this approval was withheld and the first BARREL ROLL



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missions had to be carried out by RVN or U.S. carrier-based aircraft.

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Despite growing interest in the use of Thai-based aircraft, the go-ahead for Thai operations was not given until April. Early that month, the U.S. Ambassador in Bangkok received and passed on to 2d Air Division permission to use Thai-based aircraft for BARREL ROLL Mission 41D, of 7 April 1964.

STEEL TIGER missions, begun 3 April 1965, were to be conducted under the same general ground rules as BARREL ROLL with a notable exception - napalm could now be used when authorized by the Ambassador to Laos.

Approximately two months after the STEEL TIGER operations began, COMUSMACV clarified and consolidated previous message traffic on BARREL ROLL/STEEL TIGER ground rules for operating units. One of the restrictions, the observance of the two-mile buffer zone, was lifted by the Ambassador to Laos a few days later. The message spelled out $\frac{143}{}$

BARREL ROLL:

1. Choke point missions were authorized to conduct armed route reconnaissance and attack targets of opportunity along all approved routes in both BR and SL areas, in addition to their primary missions.

2. Day reconnaissance missions could crater roads along all approved RLAF route segments in both areas - this included all choke points to dispose of ordnance in the event weather or other operational factor prevented strikes against pre-briefed targets.
STEEL TIGER:

1. <u>Not</u> allowed to penetrate BR areas in search of targets of opportunity.

2. Choke point missions could conduct armed reconnaissance or strikes against targets of opportunity along approved routes in the SL area in lieu of primary targets.

3. Could crater approved roads and choke points, within the area, to dispose of ordnance.

BARREL ROLL/STEEL TIGER:

1. When operating in the SL area both were directed to comply with strict radar flight-following and navigational procedures.

2. Thai-based aircraft could be used in strikes against fleeting, transitory targets, when requested through the air support operations center (ASOC) facility at Udorn by any BARREL ROLL/STEEL TIGER flight.

3. All bridges located within route segments authorized for road cratering could be hit, but bridges outside of these segments could not unless they were assigned as primary targets.

4. Secondary targets could be struck before attacking the primary.

5. Approved areas could be used to dump ordnance. (However, there were no authorized jettison areas in Laos except approved target areas such as roads authorized to be cratered and established choke points.) If emergency required jettison in other than a target location, a "safe" site would be selected and the jettison reported as soon as possible.

As the air strikes worked northward in NVN, a request was made for strikes above 20 degrees. This request was approved commencing with $\frac{144}{}$ the 11-17 June 1965 ROLLING THUNDER operations.

On 1 October 1965, all STEEL TIGER missions were ordered to be discontinued until further notice by the Air Attache in Vientiane. The ban on STEEL TIGER missions also applied to ROLLING THUNDER flights with alternate targets in the SL area. BARREL ROLL mission in Northern Laos were not affected. This stringent action followed on the heels of an unintentional strike in an RLG-controlled area. A flight of SL aircraft, due to a navigational error, strafed a fish trap and a bridge, <u>145/</u> damaging both and wounding two civilians and four soldiers.

Interdiction operations were curtailed sharply during October. Second Air Division pointed out that difficulty encountered in positively identifying targets and armed reconnaisance routes, and suggested the possible use of RLAF forward air controllers in future STEEL TIGER operations, similar to procedures established in the successful BANGO/ WHIPLASH close air support program. Early in November, the Air Attache in Vientiane informed CINCPAC that he was making every effort to get General Ma to remove the restrictions placed on STEEL TIGER by convincing him that the weight of effort needed along Route 92, east of Saravane, was beyond RLAF capability. However, he said that he hesitated to $\frac{146}{}$



The restrictions placed on STEEL TIGER operations were lifted later in November. On the 22nd of that month, 2d Air Division, after recounting several minor infractions of the SL ground rules, directed the tactical fighter wings involved to make an immediate review of targeting for the heavy schedule for 22 November. Brigadier General George P. Simler, Director of Operations, 2d Air Division, told responsible commanders, "....Air operations in Laos are extremely sensitive. It is absolutely imperative that your aircrews do not expend munitions outside of approved areas. There have been six instances since 20 November that violated the rules of engagement. Laos is being utilized as a staging base for NVN (North Vietnam) military personnel and supplies inso SVN (South Vietnam). Continued violations will jeopardize U.S. authority to attack enemy forces before they can engage our ground forces. You are responsible for the conduct of your strike crews and their compliance with (the) rules of engagement. There is no excuse that is acceptable for any attack outside an approved area....."

SAR operations, at this time, were also affected by restrictions on suppressive fire. If a pilot of an SAR aircraft flying low cover believed that a downed airman was endangered by ground activity he had authority to attack. He could also attack AAA positions, in a flak suppression role, while helicopters were attempting recover. $\frac{148}{}$ No other authority for suppressive fire was indicated.

At this time, the southern half of the STEEL TIGER area was reconstituted as TIGER HOUND in an effort to speed up the validation of targets sighted in that region.

A special set of rules applying to BARREL ROLL/STEEL TIGER, since the beginning of those operations, were extended to TIGER HOUND. Aircraft employed on these missions were permitted unlimited armed reconnaissance along all motorable roads within a specified area of the Laos panhandle but only targets of opportunity within 200 yards of the road could be struck. Targets beyond this 200 yards limit or anywhere outside the specific geographical area could only be struck if they had previously been approved RLAF targets, or were targets marked by RLAF FAC's. Infiltration trails or waystations could not be attacked and napalm could not be employed.

Ambassador Sullivan (Laos) made it clear that there would be no relaxation of the rules of engagement and proposed to confine efforts to the special zone east of aline from the intersection of Cambodia, $\frac{150}{}$ Laos, and South Vietnam to UTM coordinate XD 8716.

The rules of engagement and the restrictions on targets in the TIGER HOUND, STEEL TIGER, and BARREL ROLL programs were slowly being



moderated, as indicated by a JCS message of 3 December in which the Joint Chiefs stated that Washington's approval was no longer required $\frac{151}{}$ for preplanned missions.

As things stood, however, all planned targets had to be coordinated and validated by AMEMB/USAIRA Vientiane and placed in one of three categories: Priority Alpha - All targets having some residual value that may be attacked without further Vientiane coordination except inclusion in the daily OPREP 1; Priority Bravo - Inactive status, those targets already destroyed, abandoned or having very low residual value; Priority Charlie - Hold status, those targets that may not be struck for political or military reasons.

Although TIGER HOUND aircraft were allowed to perform unlimited armed reconnaissance along the roads and motorable trails within the TAOR, they could not hit villages or built up areas, regardless of military value, without having that target validated by Vientiane or the RLAF. Even with the elaborate communications equipment aboard the ABCCC, including the single side-band radio, target validation took an agonizingly long time. In early December, it was proposed that the system be streamlined. Authority was obtained to have two RLAF officers attached to the TIGER HOUND task force, to ride in the C-130 ABCCC and act as observers, with on-the-spot approval authority $\frac{152}{153}$ for any targets detected. Colonel Groom said:



"....This has worked out very successfully to date - much better than we thought at first. If the Lao observer is in doubt whether to strike the target or not, he has a single side-band radio capability and can call the Laotian Air Force headquarters and have them make the decision. When we first started the program, this happened many times, but since we have been working some months in the area and the people have become more acquainted with the area, we have received approvals almost immediately...."

In the closing months of 1965, the rules of engagement governing strike operations in North Vietnam (ROLLING THUNDER) included the 154/ following:

a. JCS targets previously struck could be re-struck without prior authorization (excluding locks, dams, and that portion of Target 52 which was formerly Target 38).

b. Strike sorties were limited to 1200 for each 14-day cycle, with additional sorties authorized if necessary to destroy SAM installations, trucks, rail stock or NVN naval craft.

c. Military targets of opportunity, in the vicinity of target areas (and crafts or units firing upon aircraft enroute to or from missions) to be destroyed.

d. Targets of opportunity situated outside the armed reconnaissance area were not to be struck if within 25nm of China border, 30nm from the center of Hanoi, or 10nm from the center of Haiphong.

e. Those JCS targets authorized in paragraph "a", above (and with the same exclusions), could be attacked by aircraft returning from missions (including BARREL ROLL and STEEL TIGER aircraft overflying NVNO if those targets lay in the armed reconnaissance area and were suitable as jettison areas.

f. Aircraft overflying Laos were authorized attack on RLAF targeted road segments in Laos.

g. Pre-strike, concurrent and post-strike reconnaissance authorized.

h. MIGCAP, screen aircraft, and other appropriate elements were directed to engage in combat (including SAM suppression) when required to protect strike forces.

i. When engaged in immediate pursuit, U.S. were <u>not</u> authorized to attack NVN air bases from which enemy aircraft were operating.

j. Attacks on populated areas to be avoided during strikes against any target (including those developed by armed route reconnaissance).

k. Flight paths of strike and armed reconnaissance missions to be planned so as to preclude approaching closer than 20nm to the China border.

1. CINCPAC was authorized to assign alternate missions to BARREL ROLL and STEEL TIGER aircraft in the ROLLING THUNDER area.





EPILOGUE

U.S. military operations in Southeast Asia have been marked by a variety of political and operational constraints. Self-imposed restrictions on the application of military power is almost certain to remain an essential feature of our national policy. The nature of the conflict in Southeast Asia and the policy objective of conveying to the enemy the limited nature of our response, even while we conduct air strikes on his territory, require careful consideration of the restrictions to be adopted. A constraints policy must be fashioned which will minimize the risk of major escalation but which also will permit use of enough measured force to assure attainment of our objectives - to check NVN support of insurgency in South Vietnam and Laos.

The rules established for conduct of air operations to date have taken a number of forms. These have included geographic and political restraints; limitations on the size, frequency and altitude of flights; and restrictions on weapon types employed. In combination, they have posed a challenging, sometimes frustrating succession of problems for the commanders and staff officers charged with the planning and conduct of an effective campaign. Gradual modification of the constraints policy has occurred during the reporting period and some of the more restrictive rules which applied to earlier armed recce and strike missions have been relaxed. Several of the constraints that still exist, however, limit the capability of our forces to conduct a campaign that will achieve the desired objective. The repeated discussions and



exchanges which have been generated at all levels by these constraints have centered mainly on the specific proscriptions rather than on the fundamental policy considerations which underlie them.

GLOSSARY

- AAA Antiaircraft artillery
- ABCCC Airborne command and control center
- ACG Air Commando Group
- ACS Air Commando Squadron
- ACW Air Commando Wing
- AD Air Division
- ADVON Advanced Echelon
- AIRA Air Attache
- AMEMB American embassy
- AOC Air Operations Center
- ARVN Army of the Republic of South Vietnam
- ASOC Air Support Operations Center
- BDA Bomb damage assessment
- BR Barrel Roll mission
- CAP Combat air patrol
- CBU Cluster bomb unit
- CHICOM Chinese Communist
- CHMAAG Chief, Military Advisory and Assistance Group
- CINCPAC Commander in Chief, Pacific Area
- CINCPACAF Commander in Chief, Pacific Air Forces
- CINCPACFLT Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet
- COIN Counterinsurgency

COMUSMACTHAI - Military Advisory Chief, Thailand (MACTHAI) COMUSMACV - Military Advisory Chief, South Vietnam (MACV) CRP - Control and reporting post (CRC - Control and Reporting Center)

DOD - Department of Defense

DRV - Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam, NVN)

ELINT - Electronic intelligence

FAC - Forward air controller

FAR - Laotian ground forces

GVN - Government of South Vietnam (SVN)

ICC - International Control Commission

JCS - Joint Chiefs of Staff

JGS - Joint General Staff (South Vietnam)

JOC - Joint Operations Center

MACTHAI - See COMUSMACTHAI

MACV - See COMUSMACV

MIGCAP - MIG defense combat patrol

Navaid - Navigational aid

NVN - North Vietnam

OPREP - Operations report

PACAF - Headquarters, Pacific Air Forces

PDJ - Plaine des Jarres (Plain of Jars, Laos)

PL - Pathet Lao

RA - Reconnaissance/Attack
RB - Reconnaissance/Bomber
RESCAP - Rescue combat patrol
RF - Reconnaissance/Fighter
RKG - Royal Cambodian Government
RLAF - Royal Laotian Air Force
RTF - Reconnaissance task force
RVN - Republic of South Vietnam
SAM - Surface of air missile
SAR - Search and rescue
SEA - Southeast Asia
SL - Steel Tiger mission
TAOR - Tactical area of responsibility

TFG - Task Force Group (Naval Carrier)

TSN - Tan Son Nhut Air Base, South Vietnam

VC - Viet Cong VM - Viet Minh

VNAF - South Vietnamese Air Force

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EVOLUTION OF THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

Footnotes

<u>1</u> /	(S)	Msg, CINCPAC to DIA, dtd 132115Z Mar 63.
2/	(S)	Chronology, "PACAF/USAF Chronology - SEA," undated.
3/	(S)	Memo, Hq PACAF to MajGen Martin, subj: Geneva Accords, 20 Feb 63.
<u>4</u> /	(TS)	CINCPAC Record, SecDef Conf, 16 Dec 61, pp 1-2.
<u>5</u> /	(S)	See Footnote 3 above.
<u>6</u> /	(S)	Msg, SecState to AMEMB Saigon, dtg 282311Z Oct 61.
<u>7</u> /	(TS)	Msg, CINCPAC to PACAF/CHMAAG-V, dtg 202238Z Dec 61.
<u>8</u> /	(TS)	Msg, Hq PACAF to 13AF, dtg 042300Z Dec 61.
<u>9</u> /	(TS)	See Footnote 7, above.
10/	(S)	Msg, CINCPAC to JCS, MACV 280/04, 040510Z Jun 64.
<u>11</u> /	(S)	Msg, CINCPAC to JCS, dtg 110740Z Mar 62.
<u>12</u> /	(S)	Msg, SecState to AMEMB Saigon, dtg 160102Z Feb 63.
<u>13</u> /	(S)	Msg, 2ADVON to Hq PACAF, dtg 130732Z Jan 62.
<u>14</u> /	(S)	Msg, CINCPAC to CHMAAG-V, dtg 230432Z Jan 62.
<u>15</u> /	(C)	Msg, CHMAAG-V to CINCPAC, dtg 240739Z Apr 62.
16/	(S)	Directive No. 62, MAC-V, 24 Nov 62.
<u>17</u> /	(S)	Msg, CINCPAC to COMUSMAC-V, dtg 170613Z Feb 63.
<u>18</u> /	(S)	Msg, JCS to CINCPAC, dtg 161946Z Feb 63.
<u>19</u> /	(S)	Msg, COMUSMAC-V to Sr Adv I-IV Corps, CG USASG-V, dtg 211007Z Feb 63.
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	<u>20</u> /	(S)	Msg, 2ADVON to All Sub Units, dtg 010840Z May 62.
	<u>21</u> /	(TS)	Msg, Hq USAF to PACAF, dtg 092210Z Feb 62.
*	22/		Ibid.
	23/	(TS)	CINCPAC Record, SecDef Conf, 19 Feb 62, pp 4-5.
	24/	(S)	Msg, CSAF to PACAF, dtg 112129Z Feb 63.
	25/	(S)	Msg, CINCPAC to CHMAAG-V, dtg 040531Z Feb 62.
	26/	(S)	Report, Hq USAF, subj: Report of the C/S, USAF, Visit to SVN, 16-21 Apr 62, dtd 24 Apr 62, Item 15, p 11.
	27/		Ibid.
	28/	(S)	Msg, SecState to AMEMB Saigon, dtg 082205Z Dec 62.
	29/	(S)	Msg, CINCPAC to COMUSMAC-V, dtg 250136Z Jan 63.
	<u>30</u> /	(S)	CINCPAC Record, SecDef Conf, 6 May 63.
	<u>31</u> /	(S)	Msg, Hq 34TacGp to Det 1, 34TacGp, 34CCR-63-S, 13 Sep 63.
	<u>32</u> /		Ibid.
	<u>33</u> /		Ibid.
	<u>34</u> /	(C)	Msg, MACV to Sr Adv II Corps, Pleiku, MAC J-311 9391, 7 Dec 63.
	35/	(S)	Ltr (Polemic), Adm Felt to Gen Harkins, dtd 20 May 63. (p 91, CHECO Rept "Command Structure/Relationships," Pt IV.)
	36/	(S)	Msg, AMEMB Saigon to SecState, dtg 190245Z Jun 63.
	37/	(S)	Msg, SecState to AMEMB Saigon, dtg 082156Z Dec 62.
	38/	(S)	Msg, SecState to AMEMB Saigon, dtg 220205Z Dec 62.
	<u>39</u> /		Ibid.
	40/	(S)	Msg, USAIRA Saigon to CSAF, dtg 271445Z Feb 62.
	41/	(S)	Msg, AMEMB Saigon to SecState, dtg 030307Z Mar 62.
	42/	(TS)	CINCPAC Record, SecDef Conf, 21 Mar 62.
	43/	(S)	Msg, AMEMB Saigon to SecState, dtg 211320Z Aug 63.
81			

44/	(U)	Msg, USAIRA Saigon to DIA, dtg 011800Z Nov 63.
45/	(S)	Msg, USAIRA Saigon to DIA, dtg 021430Z Nov 63.
46/	(S)	Log, 2AD Command Center, 1-4 Nov 63.
47/	(U)	Msg, COMUSMACV to Mult Addr, dtd 020631Z Nov 63.
48/	(S)	Msg, AMEMB Saigon to SecState, 62-059C Mar 62.
49/	(S)	Msg, PACAF to 2AD, PAFOP 270153Z Feb 64.
50/		Ibid.
51/	(S)	Msg, COMUSMACV to Cmdr 2AD, MAC J-311, 17 Mar 64.
52/		Ibid.
53/	(S)	Msg, JCS to CINCPAC, JCS 5234, 091324Z Mar 64.
54/	(S)	Msg, 35TacGp to Det 1 27FW, Takhli, DO 356G, 270200Z Mar 64.
55/	(S)	Interview, Col R. L. Tyrell, USAIRA AMEMB Laos, 16 Apr 65.
56/	(TS)	Msg, CINCPAC to TG 77.4, 180057Z May 64.
57/	(TS)	Msg, MACV to CINCPAC, 201147Z May 64.
<u>58</u> /	(TS)	Msg, CINCPAC to MACV, 222305Z May 64.
59/	(S)	Msg, 2AD to PACAF, 2CCR-64, 260716Z May 64.
60/	(TS)	Msg, JCS to CINCPAC, 251740Z May 64.
<u>61</u> /		Ibid.
62/	(TS)	Msg, CINCPAC to MACV, 260836Z May 64.
63/	(TS)	Msg, 2AD to TG 77.4, 281012Z May 64.
64/	(S)	Msg, 2AD to CSAF, 20DC 513-64, MACV files, 15 May 64.
65/	(S)	Msg, UCS to CINCPAC, JCS 6399, MACV files, 20 May 64.
66/		Ibid.
67/		See Footnote 56, above.
68/	(TS)	Msg, SecState to JCS, 041110Z Jun 64.
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71/	(TS)	Msg, JCS to CINCPAC, 072022Z Jun 64.
72/	(TS)	Msg, CINCPACFLT to CTG 77.6, 080048Z Jun 64.
73/	(TS)	Msg, CINCPACFLT to CTG 77.6, 081638Z Jun 64.
74/	(S)	Msg, PACAF to 13AF, PFCVC 444, 120230Z Jun 64.
75/	(TS)	Msg, JCS to CINCPAC, 161904Z Jun 64.
76/	(TS)	Msg, CTG 77.6 to CINCPAC, 181250Z Jun 64.
77/	(TS)	Msg, CINCPAC to CTG 77.6, 182228Z Jun 64.
78/	(S)	Msg, 20DC to 33TFWg, 667-74, 18 Jun 64.
79/	(TS)	Msg, CINCPACFLT to CTG 77.6, 200334Z Jun 64.
80/	(TS)	Msg, PACAF to 2AD, 200334Z Jun 64.
81/	(TS)	Msg, 2AD to PACAF, 20DC-678, 22 Jun 64.
82/	(TS)	Msg, CINCPACFLT to CTG 77.6, 260231Z Jun 64.
83/	(TS)	Msg, JCS to CINCPAC, 301559Z Jun 64.
84/	(TS)	Msg, CINCPAC to MACV, 080009Z Jul 64.
85/		Ibid.
86/	(S)	Memo for Record, MajGen Moore, 9 Jul 64.
<u>87</u> /	(TS)	Op Order, PACAF, 113-64, 24 Jul 64.
88/	(TS)	Msg, MACV to CINCPAC, MAC J31 6004, 120643Z Jul 64.
<u>89</u> /	(TS)	Msg, JCS to CINCPAC, 202147Z Jul 64.
90/	(TS)	Msg, PACAF to CINCPAC, PFODC 64-TS-209, 250520Z Jul 64.
<u>91</u> /	(TS)	Msg, CINCPACFLT to CINCPAC, 290359Z Jul 64.
92/	(TS)	Msg, CINCPAC to PACAF, 050421Z Aug 64.
<u>93</u> /	(TS)	Msg, MCAC/CINCPAC, JOO 7425, 050635Z Aug 64.
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- 94/ (TS) Msg, CINCPAC to PACAF, 061931Z Aug 64.
- 95/ (TS) Msg, MACV to CINCPAC, MAC J31 7451, 060315Z Aug 64.
- 96/ (TS) Msg, COMUSMACTHAI to CINCPAC, 071402Z Aug 64.
- 97/ (TS) Msg, CINCPAC to MACV, 290148Z Dec 64.
- 98/ (TS) Msg, CINCPAC to 2AD, 210101Z Aug 64.
- 99/ (TS) Msg, CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, 210102Z Aug 64.
- 100/(TS) Msg, JCS to CINCPAC, JCS 8074, 252015Z Aug 64.
- 101/(TS) Msg, CINCPAC to MACV, 290148Z Dec 64.
- 102/(TS) Telecon, AMEMB Vientiane to SecState, Embtel 441, 051420Z Oct 64.
- 103/(TS) Msg, MACV to AMEMB Vientiane, MAC J5 10808, 071139Z Oct 64.
- 104/(TS) Msg, MACV to CINCPAC, MAC J3 11197, 121657Z Oct 64.
- 105/(TS) Msg, CINCPAC to PACAF, 140834Z Oct 64.
- 106/(S) Msg, AMEMB Vientiane to MACV, 011128Z Oct 64.
- 107/(TS) Msg, MACV to JCS, MAC J00 12862, 010359Z Nov 64.
- 108/ Ibid.
- 109/(TS) Msg, SecDef to AMEMB Bangkok, DEF 001576, 050042Z Nov 64.
- 110/(TS) Msg, SecState to CINCPAC Vientiane 49, 072232Z Nov 64.
- 111/(TS) Msg, JCS to CINCPAC, JCS 002665, 211924Z Nov 64.
- 112/(TS) AMEMB Vientiane to SecState 791, 220534Z Nov 64.
- 113/(S) Msg, PACAF to 13AF, PFDOP 23149, 242312Z Nov 64.
- 114/(TS) Msg, CINCPAC to JCS, 110327Z Dec 64.
- 115/ Ibid.
- 116/(S) Msg, CINCPACFLT to COMSEVFLT, 200218Z Nov 64.
- 117/(S) Msg, USAIRA Vientiane to 2AD, 270810Z Nov 64.
- 118/(TS) Msg, AMEMB Bangkok to SecState 755, 16 Dec 64.

- 119/(TS) Msg, AMEMB Vientiane to SecState 920, 181140Z Dec 64.
- 120/(TS) Msg, CINCPAC to JCS, 190052Z Dec 64.
- 121/ Ibid.
- 122/(TS) Msg, CINCPAC to MACV, 202243Z Dec 64.
- 123/(TS) Msg, JCS to CINCPAC, JCS 003081, 191725Z Dec 64.
- 124/(TS) Msg, CINCPAC to MACV, 222139Z Dec 64.
- 125/(TS) Ltr, 2AD, subj: Rules of Engagement, w/attach, dtd 12 Jan 65.
- 126/(TS) Msg, CINCPACAF to 13AF/2AD, 65142, Jan 65.
- 127/(TS) Msg, AIRA Vientiane to JCS, AIRA CX 01163, Feb 65.
- 128/ See Footnote 126, above.
- 129/(TS) Pub, "Analysis of SEA Air Opns", Hq USAF, Vol I, 6 Apr 65.
- 130/(TS) Msg, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, limdis MAC J-311, 6262, Jan 65.
- 131/(TS) Msg, CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, 022124, Jan 65.
- 132/(TS) Msg, CINCPAC to JCS, 211040Z Mar 65.
- 133/ Ibid.
- 134/ Ibid.
- 135/ See Footnote 130, above.
- 136/(S) Msg, AIRA Bangkok to 13AF, 2CAS/2307L, 25 Jan 65.
- 137/(TS) Msg, CINCPACAF to CSAF, DPL 65211, 25 Feb 65; and Msg, AMEMB Vientiane to SecState et al, 051129Z Feb 65.
- 138/(TS) Msg, 2AD to 13AF, 20DC 00315, 26 Jan 65.
- 139/ See Footnote 130, above.
- 3 140/(TS) Pub, CHECO SEA YANKEE TEAM Report, May 64-Jun 65.
- 141/(TS) Msg, COMUSMACV to AMEMB Vientiane, MAC J-31, 3083, 062238Z Feb 65.
- 7 142/(TS) Pub, CHECO SEA Report Escalation of the War, Jul-Dec 64.

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- 143/(TS) Msg, COMUSMACV to 2AD, MAC J-312 19910, Jun 65.
- 144/(TS) Msg, JCS to CINCPAC, JCS 003552, 081904Z Jun 65.
- 145/(TS) Msg, USAIRA Vientiane to CSAF et al, AIRA 03404, Oct 65.
- 146/(TS) Msg, 2AD to COMUSMACV, TS 20575, Oct 65.
- 147/(S) Msg, 2AD to 355TFWg et al, S-04960, Nov 65.
- 148/(S) Ltr, SAR Task Force Procedures, undtd, prepared Nov 65.
- 149/(TS) Briefing, SecDef by COMUSMACV, 28 Nov 65.
- 150/(TS) Msg, 2AD TSN to CINCPACAF, 2DO 25687, 021052Z Dec 65.
- 151/(TS) Msg, JCS to COMUSMACV, 7729, 030142Z Dec 65.
- 152/(TS) Msg, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 131735Z Dec 65.
- 153/(S) Interview, Col. J. F. Groom by CHECO, 28 May 66.
- 154/(TS) Msg, JCS to CINCPAC, limdis, subj: RT 42-43, 2227Z 23 Nov 65.