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THE IMPACT OF EMOTION ON NEGOTIATION BEHAVIOUR DURING A REALISTIC TRAINING SCENARIO

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Abstract

This experiment was conducted during a training exercise at a Canadian Forces Base. During this training exercise, military trainee teams confront a simulated human rights violation, in which they must negotiate with the person in charge (an armed police sergeant) in order to protect the lives of the civilians being violently abused and being made to dig what look like their own graves. This experiment explored the impact of emotion on military trainees' negotiation behaviour and perceptions by varying the emotional intensity of the armed sergeant (Sgt) to be very angry and aggressive (experimental condition) or more neutral and yielding (baseline condition).

Two competing theories suggest that an emotion like anger could influence negotiators in different ways. If "social contagion" occurs (van Kleef, De Dreu, and Manstead, 2004a) when facing an aggressive Sgt, his anger may transfer to the trainees, and they may behave more aggressively by making more demands and fewer concessions. In contrast, the 'strategic choice' theory predicts that trainees encountering an aggressive Sgt will be motivated to use his anger as information during the negotiation, thereby countering his demands with fewer demands and more concessions (van Kleef et al, 2004a). Thus, the social contagion hypothesis predicts that the trainees may show more aggressive behaviour toward an aggressive Sgt than toward a neutral Sgt, whereas the strategic choice hypothesis argues that the Sgt's anger will promote a more yielding stance.

The entire scenario was videotaped and later content analyzed, and trainees completed a questionnaire immediately after the scenario conclusion, exploring their perceptions of emotions, role and responsibility, decision strategies, and the outcome of the scenario. The outcome of the scenario was also analyzed in terms of whether the trainees left the civilians in the hands of the police, watched while they were led into a dense forest, or followed them as they were led away.

Results showed that the most common outcome (regardless of whether the Sgt was angry or neutral) was that trainees refused to leave the victims in the hands of the military police and chose to follow the civilians as they were escorted to the police station. The least common response was leaving the civilians in the hands of the abusive police. Subsequent analyses showed that trainees who had made a definitive decision to follow the civilians reported higher levels of satisfaction with the outcome of the scenario than did trainees who either watched or left the civilians. Analyses of the behavioural data showed that when the Sgt was angry, trainees worked harder to diffuse the situation, they were more responsive to the concerns of the Sgt, they showed more empathy, they asked for permission before acting more often, and they complied with the Sgt more than trainees facing a neutral Sgt, providing evidence for the strategic choice hypothesis. Relative to the Sgt, trainees showed a lower proportion of negative behaviours. However, trainees had higher rates of negative behaviours when confronted with an angry Sgt (compared to a neutral Sgt), also providing some evidence for the social contagion hypothesis. On questionnaire measures, the only significant difference noted was that trainees rated the Sgt's anger as significantly higher in the experimental condition. Subsequent analyses showed that team leaders had significantly less desire than team members to change their actions if they had the chance to redo the scenario.

This research also provides some important information relevant to training. As trainees showed some social contagion effects (i.e., a higher rate of negative behaviours when negotiating with an angry than neutral Sgt), more training attention could be given to the subtle impact of a negotiation partner's emotion on one's own response to the situation. Providing strategies to help personnel be even more effective negotiators in angry confrontations, for instance being able to back away from the situation may be useful. This report ends with a discussion of future research ideas.

Résumé

L'expérience qui suit a été effectuée pendant un exercice d'entraînement à une base des Forces canadiennes. Lors de cet exercice, des équipes de militaires stagiaires devaient être confrontées à une violation simulée de droits de la personne, situation dans laquelle elles devaient négocier avec la personne ayant autorité (un sergent de police armé) afin de protéger la vie de civils molestés et obligés de creuser ce qui semble être leur propre tombe. Au cours de l'expérience, on a exploré les répercussions des émotions sur le comportement de négociation et les perceptions des militaires stagiaires en faisant varier l'intensité émotionnelle du sergent armé (sgt) depuis la neutralité et la complaisance (condition de départ) jusqu'à la grande colère et l'agressivité (condition expérimentale).

Deux théories contradictoires donnent à penser qu'une émotion comme la colère peut influencer diversement des négociateurs. Si une « contagion sociale » se produit (van Kleef, De Dreu et Manstead, 2004a) au moment d'affronter un sergent agressif, sa colère peut se transférer aux stagiaires, et ceux-ci peuvent se comporter d'une manière plus agressive en posant plus d'exigences et en faisant moins de concessions qu'autrement. En revanche, la théorie du « choix stratégique » prédit que les stagiaires faisant face à un sergent agressif seront motivés à utiliser sa colère comme un renseignement pendant la négociation, contrant du même coup ses exigences en diminuant le nombre de leurs propres exigences et en augmentant le nombre de concessions (van Kleef et al, 2004a). Par conséquent, l'hypothèse de la contagion sociale prédit que les stagiaires peuvent faire montre d'un comportement plus agressif envers un sergent agressif qu'envers un sergent neutre, alors que l'hypothèse du choix stratégique prétend que la colère du sergent favorisera une attitude plus complaisante qu'il n'en aurait été autrement.

Le scénario entier a été enregistré sur bande vidéo, puis son contenu a été analysé, et les stagiaires ont répondu, immédiatement après la fin du scénario, à un questionnaire explorant leurs perceptions de leurs propres émotions, de leur rôle et de leur responsabilité, les stratégies de décision et le résultat du scénario. Le résultat du scénario a aussi été analysé quant à la question de savoir si les stagiaires avaient laissé les civils aux mains de la police, les avaient surveillés pendant qu'ils étaient conduits dans une forêt dense ou les avaient suivis pendant qu'on les conduisait ailleurs.

Les résultats montrent que l'aboutissement le plus courant du scénario (peu importe si le sergent était en colère ou neutre) est que les stagiaires ont refusé de laisser les victimes aux mains de la police militaire et ont choisi de suivre les civils pendant qu'ils étaient escortés jusqu'au poste de police. La réponse la moins fréquente était de laisser les civils aux mains du policier violent. Des analyses ultérieures ont montré que les stagiaires qui avaient pris la décision définitive de suivre les civils ont signalé des degrés de satisfaction plus élevés par rapport au résultat du scénario que les stagiaires qui soit avaient surveillé les civils, soit les avaient quittés. Les analyses des données comportementales ont montré que lorsque le sergent était en colère, les stagiaires avaient à travailler plus fort qu'il n'en aurait été autrement pour désamorcer la situation; ils étaient plus attentifs aux préoccupations du sergent; ils montraient plus d'empathie; ils demandaient plus souvent la permission avant d'agir et ils étaient plus complaisants avec le sergent que les stagiaires faisant face à un sergent neutre, ce qui confirme l'hypothèse du choix stratégique. Par rapport au sergent, les stagiaires ont présenté une moindre proportion de comportements négatifs. Toutefois, les stagiaires présentaient des taux plus élevés de comportements négatifs lorsqu'ils étaient confrontés à un sergent en colère que lorsqu'ils faisaient face à un sergent neutre, ce qui confirme

aussi dans une certaine mesure l'hypothèse de la contagion sociale. Pour les mesures du questionnaire, la seule différence observée est que les stagiaires ont coté la colère du sergent comme beaucoup plus forte dans la situation expérimentale. Des analyses ultérieures ont montré que les chefs d'équipe étaient beaucoup moins désireux que les membres de leur équipe de modifier leur comportement s'ils avaient la chance de reprendre le scénario.

Cette recherche fournit aussi des renseignements importants quant à l'entraînement. Comme les stagiaires présentaient certains effets de la contagion sociale (c'est-à-dire un taux de comportements négatifs plus élevé en présence d'un sergent en colère qu'en présence d'un sergent neutre), ils pouvaient consacrer plus d'attention aux répercussions subtiles de l'émotion d'un partenaire de la négociation sur leur propre réponse à la situation. Les stratégies pour aider le personnel à négocier plus efficacement au moment de la confrontation avec une personne en colère, par exemple en prenant ses distances par rapport à la situation, peuvent être utiles. Le rapport se termine par une discussion sur des idées de recherche future.

Executive Summary

During the course of military operations, CF personnel are likely to face a range of situations in which they must use their skills to negotiate with diverse parties. These situations are often highly emotionally charged and stressful, and being able to tailor one's responses to the situation is critical. Providing CF personnel with optimal training in order to assist them to be successful negotiators is crucial, and is one element in support of ensuring operational effectiveness, and indeed, in some cases may be even essential to ensuring their safety.

One important factor to consider is the emotional state of one's negotiation partner. This experiment explored the impact of emotion on negotiation behaviour in an operational context. As part of CF pre-deployment training at a Canadian Forces Base, military personnel participate in several realistic training exercises. One such exercise simulates a human rights violation. In this scenario, unarmed trainees encounter armed police (a sergeant and constable) verbally and physically abusing two civilians and forcing them to dig what could be their own graves. The civilians plead for their lives, continuously declaring their innocence and imminent death should the trainees leave. The trainees are kept at a distance (approximately 60 feet) from the two civilians by the lead police officer, the sergeant (Sgt), and they must negotiate with him only. Trainees are challenged to use the negotiation skills they have learned to fulfil their mission mandate and to advocate for the fair treatment of the civilians to promote a successful resolution for all parties.

The literature suggests that negotiating with a very angry and aggressive negotiation partner could have varying effects on one's own behaviour during the negotiation. On the one hand, when negotiating with an angry person, one could "take on" this other's emotions. When "social contagion" occurs, the behaviour of one negotiation partner is unknowingly transferred to the other negotiation partner (van Kleef, De Dreu, and Manstead, 2004a). Anger and demanding behaviour emanating from the Sgt might be mirrored by trainees. On the other hand, working with an angry negotiation partner could also make one more strategic and more likely to work to diffuse the situation, by lessening one's demands and increasing offers and concessions, referred to as the strategic choice hypothesis (van Kleef et al., 2004a).

This experiment explored the impact of emotion on negotiation behaviour by systematically varying the emotional intensity of the armed Sgt to be very angry and aggressive (experimental condition) or more neutral and yielding (baseline condition). The entire scenario was videotaped and later content analyzed, and trainees completed a questionnaire immediately after the scenario conclusion exploring their perceptions of emotions, role and responsibility, decision strategies, and the outcome of the scenario. The outcome of the scenario was also analyzed in terms of whether the trainees left the civilians in the hands of the police, watched while the civilians were led into a dense forest, or followed the victims and police as they were led into a dense forest.

Results showed that the most common outcome (whether the Sgt was angry or neutral) was that trainees refused to leave the victims in the hands of the military police, and chose to follow the civilians as they were escorted to the police station. About 44% of teams in the neutral condition and about 38% of teams in the angry condition chose to accept the risk of following the civilians and police into the forest. The least common response was leaving the civilians in the hands of the abusive police, but this occurred somewhat more frequently when teams faced an angry Sgt (28%) than when teams faced a more neutral Sgt (17%). The other possible response was watching while the civilians were led away, and 28% of teams faced with an angry Sgt watched while the civilians

were led away and 35% of teams faced with a more neutral Sgt did so. Subsequent analyses showed that trainees who had made a definitive decision to follow the civilians reported higher levels of satisfaction with the outcome of the scenario than did trainees who either watched or left the civilians.

Analyses of the behavioural data, and participant reports of the level of anger of the Sgt., showed that the role-playing Sgt was very adept at being angry and abusive toward trainees. The key issue, however, was how trainees would respond to his emotional state. Would they mirror his anger and demanding behaviour or would they strategically use his anger as information and work to diffuse the situation to better protect the civilians? Results showed that when faced with an angry Sgt trainees did work harder to diffuse the situation, they were more responsive to the concerns of the Sgt, they showed more empathy, they asked for permission before acting more often, and they complied more frequently than trainees faced with a neutral Sgt,, providing evidence for the strategic choice hypothesis.

Nonetheless, the Sgt's emotion did seem to have a negative impact on trainee behaviours. Compared to the high frequency of the Sgt's negative behaviours when angry, trainees showed a lower proportion of negative behaviours. However, they showed higher rates of some negative behaviours when confronted with an angry Sgt (compared to a neutral Sgt). Specifically, trainees were more likely to be condescending or insulting to the Sgt, to threaten him, to attempt to circumvent his authority, to oppose his demands, and to express critical opinions of the police activity, behaviours. The increase in negative behaviours suggests that even though the rate of negative trainee behaviour did not match the high levels shown by the angry Sgt, his anger may have influenced the behaviour of trainees who are instructed throughout their training to maintain a primarily neutral and supportive stance during negotiation situations. So though trainees facing an angry Sgt showed evidence of the strategic choice hypothesis, they also showed evidence of taking on his anger, reflecting the social contagion effect.

On questionnaire measures, trainees rated the Sgt's anger as significantly higher in the experimental condition, but there were no other significant differences in terms of other self-reported emotions, perceived role and responsibility or decision-making strategies. Subsequent analyses showed that team leaders had significantly less desire than other members of the team to change their actions if they had the chance to redo the scenario.

This research also provides some important information relevant to training. As trainees showed some social contagion effects (i.e., a high rate of negative behaviours when negotiating with an angry Sgt), more training attention could be given to the subtle impact of a negotiation partner's emotion on one's own response to the situation. Providing strategies to help personnel be able to back away from the situation may be useful. This report ends with a discussion of future research ideas.

Sommaire

Au cours des opérations militaires, le personnel des FC est susceptible d'être confronté à toutes sortes de situations dans lesquelles il doit utiliser ses compétences pour négocier avec diverses parties. Ces situations sont souvent stressantes et fortement chargées sur le plan émotionnel, et la capacité d'adapter ses réponses à la situation est cruciale. Fournir une instruction optimale au personnel des FC afin de les aider à devenir de bons négociateurs est crucial et constitue un élément propre à assurer l'efficacité opérationnelle; dans certains cas, cette instruction peut même être essentielle à la sécurité du personnel.

Un facteur important à considérer est l'état émotionnel du partenaire de négociation. Dans cette expérience, on a exploré les répercussions de l'émotion sur le comportement de négociation dans un contexte opérationnel. Dans le cadre de l'entraînement pré-déploiement à une base des Forces canadiennes, le personnel militaire participe à plusieurs exercices d'entraînement réalistes. L'un deux simule une violation de droits de la personne. Selon le présent scénario, des stagiaires non armés rencontrent un policier armé (un sergent et constable) qui maltraitent verbalement et physiquement deux civils et les force à creuser ce qui pourrait bien être leur propre tombe. Les civils plaident pour leur vie, déclarant continuellement qu'ils sont innocents et qu'ils vont bientôt mourir si les stagiaires partent. Ceux-ci sont tenus à distance (environ 60 pieds) des deux civils par le policier en charge, soit le sergent (sgt), et ils doivent négocier avec lui seul. Les stagiaires doivent mettre à profit les compétences de négociateurs qu'ils ont acquises afin de remplir le mandat de leur mission et ils doivent prôner un traitement équitable des civils afin de parvenir à une solution acceptable par toutes les parties.

D'après la documentation, négocier avec un partenaire agressif et en grande colère peut avoir divers effets sur le comportement de l'autre partenaire pendant la négociation. D'un côté, au moment de négocier avec une personne en colère, l'un des partenaires peut « s'imprégner » des émotions de l'autre. En cas de « contagion sociale », le comportement d'un des partenaires de la négociation est transféré inconsciemment à l'autre partenaire (van Kleef, De Dreu et Manstead, 2004a). La colère et le comportement exigeant émanant du sergent peuvent être reflétés par les stagiaires. D'un autre côté, le fait de travailler avec un partenaire de négociation en colère pourrait rendre l'autre partenaire plus stratégique et plus susceptible qu'il en serait autrement de travailler à désamorcer la situation, en diminuant ses exigences et en augmentant ses offres et ses concessions. C'est ce qu'on appelle l'hypothèse du « choix stratégique » (van Kleef et al., 2004a).

Cette expérience a permis d'explorer les répercussions de l'émotion sur le comportement de négociation en faisant varier systématiquement l'intensité émotionnelle du sergent armé, depuis la neutralité et la complaisance (situation de départ) jusqu'à la grande colère et à l'agressivité (situation expérimentale). Le scénario complet a été enregistré sur bande vidéo, puis son contenu a été analysé, et les stagiaires ont répondu, immédiatement après la fin du scénario, à un questionnaire explorant leurs perceptions de leurs propres émotions, de leur rôle, de leurs responsabilités, de leurs stratégies décisionnelles et du résultat du scénario. Le résultat du scénario a aussi été analysé quant à la question de savoir si les stagiaires avaient laissé les civils aux mains de la police, les avaient surveillés pendant qu'ils étaient conduits dans une forêt dense ou les avaient suivis ainsi que la police pendant qu'ils étaient emmenés dans une forêt dense.

Les résultats montrent que l'aboutissement le plus fréquent du scénario (selon que le sergent était en colère ou neutre) était que les stagiaires refusaient de laisser les victimes aux mains de la police

militaire, et choisissaient de suivre les civils pendant qu'ils étaient escortés au poste de police. Environ 44 % des équipes où la situation de départ était la neutralité et environ 38 % des équipes où la situation expérimentale était la colère ont choisi d'accepter le risque de suivre les civils et la police dans la forêt. La réaction la moins courante au scénario était de laisser les civils aux mains du policier violent, mais cette réaction est survenue plus fréquemment lorsque les équipes étaient confrontées à un sergent en colère (28 %) que lorsqu'elles faisaient face à un sergent neutre (17 %). L'autre réponse possible était de surveiller les civils pendant qu'on les conduisait ailleurs; 28 % des équipes confrontées à un sergent en colère ont en effet surveillé les civils pendant qu'on les conduisait ailleurs, alors que 35 % des équipes confrontées à un sergent neutre ont fait la même chose. Des analyses ultérieures ont montré que les stagiaires qui avaient pris la décision définitive de suivre les civils ont signalé des degrés de satisfaction plus élevés par rapport au résultat du scénario que les stagiaires qui soit avaient surveillé les civils, soit les avaient quittés.

L'analyse des données comportementales et les signalements par les participants du degré de colère du sergent ont montré que le sergent fictif était fort enclin à la colère et à la violence envers les stagiaires. La question clé résidait toutefois dans la manière dont les stagiaires répondraient à l'état émotionnel du sergent. Refléteraient-ils cette colère et ce comportement exigeant ou utiliseraient-ils stratégiquement la colère du sergent comme renseignement pour travailler à désamorcer la situation afin de mieux protéger les civils? Les résultats ont montré que lorsqu'ils étaient confrontés à un sergent en colère, les stagiaires travaillaient plus durement à désamorcer la situation; ils étaient plus attentifs aux préoccupations du sergent; ils faisaient preuve de plus d'empathie; ils demandaient plus souvent la permission avant d'agir; et ils se montraient complaisants plus fréquemment que les stagiaires confrontés à un sergent neutre, ce qui valide l'hypothèse du choix stratégique.

Néanmoins, l'émotion du sergent semblait effectivement avoir une incidence négative sur les comportements des stagiaires. Comparativement à la haute fréquence des comportements négatifs du sergent lorsqu'il était en colère, les stagiaires ont présenté une proportion inférieure de comportements négatifs. Toutefois, ils ont présenté des taux supérieurs pour certains comportements négatifs lorsqu'ils étaient confrontés à un sergent en colère (par rapport à un sergent neutre). En particulier, les stagiaires étaient plus susceptibles d'être condescendants ou insultants à l'égard du sergent, de le menacer, de tenter de circonvenir à son autorité, de s'opposer à ses exigences et de critiquer l'activité et les comportements du policier. L'augmentation des comportements négatifs donne à penser que même si le taux de comportements négatifs des stagiaires ne correspondait pas aux taux élevés que présentait le sergent en colère, sa colère peut avoir influé sur le comportement des stagiaires, à qui on ordonne pendant leur entraînement de privilégier une attitude neutre et coopérative pendant les situations de négociation. Alors, même si les stagiaires faisant face à un sergent en colère ont confirmé la stratégie du choix stratégique, ils ont aussi manifesté une tendance à s'imprégner de la colère du sergent, ce qui confirme l'effet de la contagion sociale.

Pour ce qui est des évaluations exigées dans le questionnaire, les stagiaires ont coté la colère du sergent à un niveau significativement supérieur dans la situation expérimentale, mais il n'y avait pas d'autres différences significatives quant aux émotions déclarées par les stagiaires eux-mêmes, ni quant au rôle perçu ou à la responsabilité perçue ni quant aux stratégies de prise de décision.

Des analyses ultérieures ont montré que les chefs d'équipe étaient beaucoup moins désireux que les autres membres de l'équipe de modifier leur comportement s'ils avaient eu la chance de reprendre le scénario.

Cette recherche fournit aussi d'importants renseignements sur l'entraînement. Comme les stagiaires ont présenté certains effets de contagion sociale (c'est-à-dire un taux élevé de comportements négatifs lorsqu'ils négociaient avec un sergent en colère), ils pourraient porter davantage attention aux répercussions subtiles de l'émotion d'un partenaire de négociation sur leur propre réaction à une situation. Les stratégies visant à aider le personnel à se distancer d'une situation peuvent être utiles. Le rapport s'achève par une discussion sur des idées de recherche future.

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1 Background

1.1 Previous Research and Emerging Themes

Canadian Forces (CF) pre-deployment training recognizes the multiplicity of situations that military personnel will face in operations (e.g. combat, peacekeeping, humanitarian, etc.). Personnel are expected to work in challenging circumstances and to adjust their conduct to reflect particular mission objectives. In peacekeeping, for example, it is likely they will face highly emotionally charged situations in which they have to build positive rapport with a number of actors, including military factions, local police, warlords, and the local population. Strong negotiation skills will be needed in order to promote dialogue that minimizes differences, enhances common understanding of the situation, and produces solutions that help to maintain a secure and stable environment. Even when confronting angry and armed negotiation partners in peace support operations, CF personnel will have to learn how to de-escalate the situation and promote a successful resolution often without the use of lethal force.

This study was conducted at a CF base that provides a pre-deployment training course working to prepare personnel for their upcoming missions. During this course, there are a number of training mechanisms meant to enhance military personnel's negotiation skills. First, military trainees receive a half day lecture that details the most essential aspects of negotiating. These include allowing the negotiation parties to express their positions and opinions; listening and being patient when parties stray from the main issue; bringing the discussion back to the main issue; correcting inaccurate information; summarizing the main issue to avoid focusing on peripheral issues; practicing self-restraint; avoiding lies; and adjourning when there is no foreseeable resolution. As CF personnel with considerable operational experience, instructors bring these aspects of negotiation to life through recounting their own vivid, personal examples of negotiation situations. On their first all day exercise, trainees participate in classroom scenarios that simulate actual negotiation scenarios. Trainees then deploy to a wooded training area to participate in a number of highly realistic training simulations. One in particular, a human rights violation scenario, is designed to test trainees' abilities to negotiate in extreme conditions without the use of lethal force. This training platform provides an ideal opportunity to explore both negotiation behaviour under stress and moral and ethical decision-making as trainees work to resolve an intense moral situation.

In the course of this negotiation scenario, military trainees witness two civilians, a plain clothed man and woman, digging what look to be their own graves under the physical and mental duress of armed police. In this situation, trainees are challenged to use their newly acquired skills to promote a successful resolution by negotiating with the sergeant (Sgt) in charge. However, previous research (Thomson & Adams, 2007) showed that some military teams had trouble maintaining the neutral stance demanded by their training when confronting such a highly emotional situation. Despite the excellent negotiation training provided by CF instructors, trainees in this study showed relatively high rates of negotiation behaviours likely to promote a negative relationship with the police sergeant in charge of the negotiation. More specifically, the previous study varied the physical proximity of the female civilian being beaten, having her approach the trainee teams within arms length or staying more than 50 feet away. Those trainees who experienced a face-to-face encounter with a female victim showed more of these negative relationship building behaviours than trainees who encountered the female victim from a good distance away. Such

behaviours may be the product of experienced military personnel having difficulty assuming a new role. Soldiers are generally accustomed to an agentic warrior role, wherein they are fully armed and trained to engage in combat situations. However, according to CF pre-deployment training documentation, negotiation is a "diplomatic" activity, which requires trainees to adopt an "unaccustomed role" and alter their "character" and "approach". In many cases, this may require that CF personnel defer to the other party in the negotiation. Suppressing the agentic warrior approach is particularly likely to be problematic in highly charged emotional situations in which civilians are being abused (i.e., where there is urgency to resolve a situation).

One problem with the Thomson and Adams (2007) study is that behavioural coding focused solely on trainee behaviour. As such, it could not be conclusively determined whether the trainee teams exhibiting high rates of negative relationship building behaviours did so because they came face-to-face with the female victim or because of the negative interactions initiated by the police Sgt. The current study extended coding to include both trainee and police Sgt behaviour in order to explore the extent to which the high rates of the negative behaviours may have been a product of the dynamic interaction between the Sgt and trainee teams.

It is also unclear if the high rates of negative relationship building behaviours seen in the Thomson and Adams (2007) study would facilitate or hinder efforts to resolve the scenario in a positive way (e.g., ensuring the safety of the civilians). For example, if the negatively coded behaviours merely represented teams justifiably pushing the envelope to save the lives of the civilians, then teams that were more willing to push the Sgt may have produced better outcomes even though the original coding scheme would have labelled these teams as performing sub-optimally. In fact, although trainee teams who experienced a brief face-to-face encounter with the victim showed more negative relationship building behaviours, they also never disengaged from the situation and were more likely to follow the victims as they were escorted through an unknown wooded area by the police than teams who did not experience the face-to-face encounter with the female victim. Perhaps a better indicator of probable success during a negotiation such as the human rights violation scenario is not the *absolute* level of pushing the envelope, but the *relative* level of this in relation to the latitude given by the negotiation partner.

An issue noted during previous research were the high rates of negative behaviour, which could represent the failure of some teams to properly calibrate their approach to the stance of their negotiating partner, the police Sgt (Thomson & Adams, 2007). Negotiation can be understood as two-pronged such that negotiator's push or pull depending on the position of their negotiation partner (van Kleef et al., 2004a). For example, when a negotiating partner seems positively disposed, it may be advantageous to make more requests. On the other hand, when this negotiating partner is less positively disposed, a judicious negotiator may work to re-establish rapport before making further requests. Similarly, when the negotiation partner is being firm or obstinate, offering concessions might help to get the negotiation back on a positive footing.

In the previous study, some teams seemed adept at pulling back when they got a negative message from the Sgt that they were imposing on his territory and/or at pushing forward to achieve gains when the Sgt appeared more friendly and conciliatory. In other cases, however, teams pushed ahead even though the Sgt was getting frustrated and angry with their efforts to influence the situation. Some teams failed to take time to re-establish positive rapport with the Sgt once the negotiation took a turn for the worse. The ability to adjust one's negotiation stance to the fluctuating disposition of one's negotiation partner may ultimately be a better indicator of success than the absolute number of negative or positive behaviours. The current study attempts to

understand the relationship between two negotiating parties by considering both the behaviour of trainees and that of the Sgt. Although this provides a more complex view of the negotiation, however, only a more intricate time-linked analysis possible in future research will help to disentangle the complex push-pull relationship likely to influence negotiating parties.

1.2 Emotion and Negotiations

A potentially critical form of variance during negotiations is the emotional state of the negotiator, and this is particularly relevant for military personnel preparing to deploy to operations where emotionally charged and life threatening situations are inevitable. Surprisingly, despite the fact that emotions are powerful information cues and are central to both negotiations and social conflict, van Kleef, De Dreu, and Manstead (2004a) note that little attention has been given the role of emotions in negotiations. Much of the existing research investigating the effects of emotion in negotiation focuses on the influence of a negotiator's emotion on his or her own behaviour, and does not address the *inter*personal effects of emotions in negotiations. Nonetheless, recent work has shown that emotions have important social functions and consequences. For example emotions can act as communication channels to both oneself (Schwarz & Clore, 1983; cited in van Kleef, et al., 2004a) and others (Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987; cited in van Kleef, et al., 2004a), behave as incentives for or deterrents of behaviour (Klinnert, Campos, Sorce, Emde, & Svejda; cited in van Kleef, et al., 2004a), and induce reciprocal emotions in others (Keltner & Haidt, 1999; cited in van Kleef, et al., 2004a). The implication of this research is that emotions should have an impact not just on individuals but on the emergent interactions between individuals.

Two competing theories have been put forward to explain the role of emotion in negotiation: Social contagion and the strategic choice (also called labelled mismatching). These two theories speak directly to the *inter*personal effect of emotion on people during negotiations. The social contagion theory assumes that individuals participating in negotiation "take on" their partner's emotional states. More formally, the social contagion effect is described as "the spread of affect, attitude, or behaviour from Person A (the initiator) to Person B (the recipient) where the recipient does not perceive an intentional influence attempt on the part of the initiator" (Levy & Nail, 1993, p.266; cited in van Kleef, et al., 2004a). As such, a negotiator facing an angry partner would become angry him/herself and may behave competitively, making higher demands and fewer concessions. Conversely, facing a happy partner, negotiators would become happy and may behave more cooperatively, making fewer demands and larger concessions.

On the other hand, the strategic choice theory assumes that individuals are motivated to both cooperate *and* compete (van Kleef, et al., 2004a). Strategic choice involves paying close attention to a partner's emotion (i.e. "tracking") and then using this information to strategically regulate one's own negotiation behaviour (Pruitt, 1981; cited in van Kleef et al. 2004a). By attending to a partner's emotions as a source of information, a negotiator might assume that an angry partner will not likely make large concessions, whereas a happy partner may be more likely to do so (van Kleef et al., 2004a). Placing low demands on the former and high on the latter, therefore, would be highly strategic. Strategic choice is more likely to occur when individuals do not have information regarding their partner's outcomes or limits, and the observable emotions of the partner are used as a guide. The strategic choice approach may be more desirable for producing positive negotiation outcomes when compared to the social contagion hypothesis, given the former seems to require greater conscious control, whereas the latter seems to imply little or none.

Van Kleef and colleagues (2004a) conducted three studies examining the conditions under which negotiators showed either the social contagion effect or the strategic choice effect when emotions were in play. In one experiment, participants were assigned to negotiate the price, warranty period, and the duration of service contract for a consignment of phones. Negotiations were done by email and participants received regular updates about their partner's intentions and emotional state. These updates were used to manipulate the perceived emotional state of the negotiation partner. For example, participants either received the information, "This offer makes me really angry" or "I am happy with this offer", followed by the partner's intention statement. In support of the strategic choice hypothesis, results showed that participants used their partner's emotional state as a source of information during negotiation, and made significantly fewer demands and larger concessions when facing an angry partner than when facing a happy partner (van Kleef et al., 2004a). At the same time, however, results showed the effects of social contagion, though this was only evidenced in self-reported emotions and not in explicit negotiation behaviour. Participants facing an angry partner rated themselves as more angry on questionnaire measures than those facing a happy partner, but this anger did not carry over to their strategic behaviour, as there were no differences in cooperative behaviour (van Kleef et al., 2004a). Van Kleef and colleagues (2004a) explain this finding by arguing that strategic choice at the behavioural level seemed to have overruled the social contagion at the emotional level.

Van Kleef and colleagues (2004a) conducted a second experiment to extend the results of the first. This experiment explored whether the strategic choices made by participants during negotiations were linked with their partner's emotional state. If so, would the impact of emotion be less if strategic considerations also played a lesser role in the negotiation? This might occur, for example, if participants believed that their partner would be prepared to make large concessions. On the other hand, individuals facing an angry partner who was not prepared to make large concessions would be required to use their partner's emotion as a source of information in order to strategically shape their own negotiation behaviour (i.e., demands and concessions). To test this, van Kleef and colleagues varied the partner's emotion as well as the size of the concession the partner was willing to offer. Finally, this study investigated participants' perceptions about the limits of their partners. Van Kleef and colleagues hypothesized that participants would see the limits as higher in the angry condition, especially when their partner was not prepared to offer large concessions, and this would influence participant's negotiation behaviour in accordance with the strategic choice hypothesis.

Similar to the original study, results from the second experiment by van Kleef et al. (2004a) showed that participants made smaller demands when facing an angry partner compared to those facing a happy one. As well, the social contagion effect was present in participant's self-reported emotion, but was not manifested in their negotiation behaviour. Results also showed that the degree to which participant's considered their partner's emotion was moderated by concession size, demonstrating that another's emotion is only relevant when it is of strategic importance. Finally, participants also showed evidence of tracking. In the small concessions condition, the impact of a partner's emotion was mediated by the participant's estimation of their partner's limits. Van Kleef and colleagues concluded that "it is negotiator's strategic thinking, not their emotional reactions, that is responsible for the effects of the partner's emotions on demands and concession making" (p. 67), supporting the strategic choice hypothesis over the social contagion hypothesis.

Finally, van Kleef and colleagues (2004a) investigated how the partner's experienced emotions (i.e., emotions about the state of affairs) and communicated emotions (i.e., emotions directed at the recipient) influenced a participant's negotiation behaviour. As they explain, communicated emotions are directed to a negotiation partner and as such they will have immediate implications

for the recipient. Indeed, research has shown that demonstrations of anger elicit fear in observers, especially when the anger is directed to the observer (Dimberg & Ohman, 1983, 1996; cited in van Kleef et al., 2004a). Research has also shown that communicated anger is often followed by aggressive behaviour (Averill, 1982; cited in van Kleef et al., 2004a). A partner's negatively communicated emotions (such as anger), therefore, may induce fear in a negotiation partner, and this fear might diminish the cognitive resources available to calibrate one's own behaviour to these emotions as attention shifts away from the negotiation toward issues of safety or danger (Mathews & MacLeod, 1994; cited in van Kleef et al. 2004a) and hinder the ability to produce quick solutions (Giora, 1987; cited in van Kleef et al. 2004a). Van Kleef et al. predicted that a negotiation partner's emotional state would be more influential when this partner was happy than when angry because of a reduction of cognitive load. Mediation analysis showed that when participants received angry messages from their negotiation partners, their attention turned away from their partner's experienced emotions, because participants were attending to their own fear induced emotion. This shift reduced the strategic choice effect, and negotiators showed less tendency to "adjust" to the emotional state of their partners.

Together, these studies have potentially important implications for CF personnel training to go on a variety of operations. In military operations, CF personnel are likely to confront a range of situations in which they must use their skills to negotiate with diverse parties. These situations are often highly emotionally charged and stressful, and being able to tailor one's responses to the situation is critical. Clearly, a crucial factor is the perceived emotional state of one's negotiation partner, and the potential effects of their emotions on the negotiators own emotions and behaviour..

However, as important as previous research is to understanding negotiation behaviour in stressful situations, it is unclear how well it might generalize to the kinds of negotiations faced by CF personnel. In this previous research, the negotiations occurred via emails. The predominance of the strategic choice effect might have been a consequence of the setting itself. The experimental paradigm used by van Kleef and colleagues (2004a) may have provided participants the time to moderate their own emotions and then strategically engage in the task. That kind of strategic approach might be much harder to apply in a field setting when participants are temporally constrained by real-time interactions with an angry negotiation partner. Hence, exploring the role of emotion in a realistic training context could not only produce evidence to generalize previous results, but may also provide a valuable contribution to CF training. Indeed, learning how to track their partner's emotions and to use this information to tailor their own responses to their negotiation partner could be an invaluable negotiation skill for CF personnel.

In order to address these issues the following experiment varied the emotional state of the trainees' negotiation partner, the police Sgt, to determine the *inter*personal effect of emotions on trainees during negotiations. In the experimental condition, trainees were faced with an angry and aggressive Sgt, whereas in the baseline condition, they squared off with a more neutral and yielding Sgt.

Based on previous research, one might argue that some features of the scenario might "pull" more for strategic choice behaviour on the part of trainees. For example, in this human rights scenario the police are armed and the trainee teams are not. This power differential might make the social contagion effect somewhat less likely as trainees can only use their negotiation skills to influence the outcome. As well, the Sgt often makes high demands (e.g., telling the trainees to go away), while extracting consistently small concessions (e.g., refusing trainees' requests) throughout the scenario. These two features suggest that strategic choice would be the most likely negotiation

strategy. For the purposes of this study, if strategic choice emerged in the experimental condition, trainees would likely show fewer demands and requests, larger concessions, and fewer behaviours associated with building a negative relationship and more behaviours associated with building a positive relationship. Trainees may work to de-escalate the Sgt's emotional state, by showing responsiveness to his concerns, minimizing requests and demands, and exhibiting behaviours that build a positive relationship with him. As trainees are encouraged to maintain a positive stance and to be sensitive to the demands of their negotiation partner, failing to show strategic choices during this negotiation scenario may indicate a failure to put training to practice.

On the other hand, if the social contagion effect emerged, trainees would likely show the reverse pattern. When faced with an angry and abusive Sgt, trainees might exhibit similar competitive (i.e., combative or confrontational) behaviour themselves. Facing off with an obstinate Sgt who makes few concessions and large demands, trainees may be unable to buffer their own emotional reactions. They may also exhibit more sub-optimal negotiation behaviours and report higher levels of anger toward the Sgt. Consistent with this effect, previous research showed that some teams responded to an often combative Sgt in kind, showing high frequencies of sub-optimal behaviours, and this behaviour was more prominent when the situation was more emotionally intense (Thomson & Adams, 2007). In the previous study, it was observed that some trainees in emotionally charged situations depended on the warrior role over the diplomatic role, behaving more competitively and less cooperatively (Thomson & Adams, 2007). Though behaving in this manner may be more consistent with their former military training, it runs counter to this particular CF pre-deployment training. Because this is a training exercise and CF personnel are learning new skills, this effect is not wholly unexpected. To follow up on previous findings, this study specifically explores the influence of emotion on trainees' negotiation behaviours, perceptions and the expectations of their team working to resolve the conflict during the human rights violation scenario.

2 Method

2.1 Overview of Training

This experiment was conducted at a Canadian Forces Base (CFB) at which military personnel about to deploy on overseas operations receive a training course to assist them during their deployment. Some of the activities these soldiers will be expected to perform overseas are of a diplomatic nature. To augment this role, this particular training develops a number of skills, such as negotiation and communication. As part of the course, trainees complete several dismounted field exercises where they must apply classroom instruction on negotiation to realistic simulations. These exercises, which are conducted in teams of 3–4 military personnel, provide trainees an opportunity to react to live situations characteristic of their upcoming missions. For example, participants must practice the negotiation and communication skills gained during classroom training, along with other skills such as leadership and navigation. It is critical to note that though students know they will face many different challenges throughout the training course to assess various skills and to prepare them for their missions, they do not know the exact nature of these challenges. As such, the element of surprise is essential. In order to maintain the integrity of this training course (e.g. the element of surprise), the exact details of the pre-deployment training and location can not be disclosed. However, this study was conducted at one specific part of the field exercise, where a human rights violation is occurring. This scenario is described in the next section.

2.2 Human Rights Violation Scenario

In this scenario, trainees encounter two police officers (a sergeant and constable) verbally and physically abusing two civilians and forcing them to dig what could be their own graves. The civilians plead for their lives, continuously declaring their innocence and imminent death should the trainees leave. The trainees receive information that there have been reports of potential human rights violations in the area, including the possible killing and intimidation of non-combatants by the local police. However, the trainees are not aware of the scenario they are about to face. It is set up so that they stumble across it while completing a separate mission. As part of their training, the trainees are obliged to negotiate with the police sergeant (Sgt) and attempt to build a positive relationship with him in order to ensure the safety of the civilians.

The scenario involves four role-players, two civilians (one male and one female) and two police officers (both male). One officer is designated as the Sgt and one as the constable. The scenario begins when a female victim runs out in full view of the trainees screaming and being pursued by an armed police constable. This occurs approximately 100m ahead of trainees as they proceed down a road in the training area. The constable grabs the female victim, drags her back to a clearing where she joins a male civilian. By the time the trainees arrive on the scene, the civilians are being forced to dig what looks like their own graves (demarcated by a couple of headstones) located at the back of the clearing. The negotiation part of the scenario unfolds in a clearing just off the main road. The Sgt is designated as the primary contact with the trainees, and his role is to prevent contact between the trainees and the civilians as well as to frustrate the efforts of the trainees to secure the safe release of the victims. The constable guards the civilians, and threatens and simulates beating them to keep the civilians quiet and compliant. The police officers wear

uniforms and carry light small arms. The civilians wear dirty clothes and show clear signs of physical abuse, (which may or may not be obvious to the trainees).

Throughout the scenario, the armed police constable verbally and physically abuses the two civilians. Figure 1 shows the scenario in action.

Figure 1: Gravesite, civilians, and police constable

Trainees who attempt to get closer to the civilians are stopped at a predetermined point (approximately 60 feet from the civilians and police constable) by the police Sgt who carries a light small arm (see Figure 2).

Figure 2: Police Sgt at the predetermined point

Teams who are hesitant to enter the situation are drawn to the predetermined point by the Sgt. He tells the trainees to approach if they wish to talk and otherwise refuses to cooperate unless the trainees come to him. This sets the stage for the Sgt's initial control of the situation, and makes sure the trainees approach and stand in view of the camera.

Once teams are at arms length of the Sgt, they begin negotiating. The Sgt initially informs the trainees that the situation is police business and that the trainees should go on their way. He explains that the two civilians are "terrorists", and the constable was using intimidation techniques in order to help with the interrogation. When asked, he assures the trainees that he is acting under the orders of his commanding officer, and if they have any questions, they should go to the police station in the village down the road. Meanwhile, the civilians shout pleas to the trainees, insisting that they are innocent and the police were going to kill them. Throughout the negotiation, the constable continuously abuses the civilians and forces them to dig their graves.

2.3 Participants

Participants in this study included 66 military personnel (65 male and 1 female) enrolled in CF pre-deployment training at a Canadian Forces Base (CFB). Fifty-one were Canadians and fifteen were foreign students. Participants ranged in age from 25 to 58 with a mean age of 40 (std. dev. = 7.75). Sixty-four percent had a university or college degree, 67% had served more than 15 years in the military, and 76% were either a Captain or Major. The majority of the participants (83%) spoke either English or French as a first language. All elements of the armed forces were represented, but the majority were from the Army (62%), followed by the Air Force (21%), and then the Navy (12%). The remaining 5% did not provide information concerning their elemental command. Many of the participants were infantry and engineers (e.g., Aerospace Engineer, Communications Electronics Engineer, and Electrical Mechanical Engineer). Other trades represented included Armour, Maritime Surface Officer, Air Navigator, Logistics Officer, Signals Officer, and Artillery.

2.4 Equipment and Set-up

With the same data being captured simultaneously on two different stands, it was critical to match these stands in every possible way. This was done on pre-experimental recces, which worked to match the two different sites as much as possible, by plotting distances and noting potential differences between the two stands. Diagrams of each stand are shown in Figure 3 and 4.



Figure 3: Stand 1 diagram



Figure 4: Stand 2 diagram

Figures 3 and 4 show the location of the possible 'gravesites' as well as the hiding location of the research team and the directing staff (DS). To ensure that the negotiation between participants and the Sgt occurred at the same distance from the gravesite for each session on both stands and to ensure the negotiation occurred in the frame of the hidden cameras, a predetermined point was established by the research team. This point was approximately 60 feet from the gravesite. It was marked by a broken stick, so that it was not detected by trainees. The area where the negotiation occurred on each Stand is identified by a box labelled "predetermined pt. for neg".

In order to have minimal impact on training, it was also critical to capture the performance of teams on the human rights stand while ensuring that the necessary equipment was not detectable. On each stand, Canon XL1 and XL2 cameras were hidden in the bushes for video data collection (see Figure 5).

Figure 5: Canon XL1

Though camera positions varied between each stand, they had similar perspectives and depth of field. One camera was positioned in order to film the trainees and the other was positioned to film the Sgt. These were manned in order to ensure that the trainees and the Sgt stayed in the frame throughout the sessions. A smaller, Sony Digital 8 Handycam was used to film the civilians and the constable. It was unmanned but activated by a member of the research team at the beginning of each session. To pick up the audio, a Wireless LAV Microphone (Sony and Sennheiser) was mounted on the Sgt and was used to capture all conversation between the Sgt. and the trainee teams.

Data collection occurred in May, June and September of 2006. Table 1 shows the number of teams by condition for each data collection period.

Table 1: Date of Data Collection

Date	Baseline Condition	Experimental Condition
May 2006	4	4
June 2006	4	4
September 2006	4	4
Total	12	12

2.5 Experimental Procedures

Pre-experimental activities Prior to experimentation, potential participants were briefed on the study and voluntary consent was elicited (Annex A). Participants were told that this applied field research was designed to learn more about the factors that influence decision-making in an operational context. However, in order to reduce the chance of demand characteristics, social desirability effects, and other potential methodological confounds, participants were not informed of the purpose of the study, i.e., to investigate the influence of emotion on negotiation behaviour. Participants were informed that our research team would be conducting the study during one of the training scenarios. They were not told, however, which stand would be used for the purposes of the study.

It was emphasized to potential participants that the research was designed to impact minimally on their training. They were informed that if they did not choose to participate in the research, this would in no way change the training that they received. Moreover, they were informed that completion of a short post-scenario questionnaire was contingent on time remaining in the rotation to allow time for proper debriefing by the DS. Participants were also informed that, with their consent, their performance on the target stand would be videotaped in order to identify and code specific negotiation behaviours. It was also explained that this videotape and relevant results from it and the questionnaire would be provided to the training system in order to improve their high-quality training. The full consent of every team member was required before videotaping would occur. Participants who chose not to be videotaped could still choose to complete the questionnaires. Once participants had given their consent, we administered the Demographic Questionnaire (Annex B) and gave them an information sheet regarding the study (Annex C).[1] The trainees were also informed that they could end their participation at any time and that they could skip any questionnaire items they preferred not to answer. All experimental procedures and questionnaires were reviewed and approved by the DRDC Humane Research Ethics Committee.

On the morning of the experiment, the role players received a general script and were briefed by DS concerning general scenario requirements. Following this, the research team explained the particular requirements for the study. There were a number of rehearsals at which time the research team made appropriate adjustments in the role players behaviour to ensure the consistency between stands and across sessions.

Experimental manipulation In order to explore the interpersonal effects of emotion on negotiation behaviour (and decision-making strategies), the emotion of the police Sgt was systematically varied. More specifically, in the experimental condition the Sgt exhibited aggressive, uncooperative behaviours typically associated with anger (e.g., shouting, interrupting, frowning, etc.). In the baseline condition, the police Sgt was instructed to say the same things, but exhibited less emotion and more neutral behaviours associated with a more typical negotiation partner (e.g., not shouting, not interrupting, not frowning, etc.). Based on the literature, people who make decisions more systematically will show a greater ability to attend, gather and retain information about the situation. In order to explore the extent to which trainees had been processing systematically, the primary role player (Sgt) had been instructed by the research team to deliver a list of four statements to each of the

[1] Sixty-six trainees agreed to participate in this study by completing the questionnaire. Seven teams chose not to be videotaped, but did complete questionnaires.

trainee teams at some point in the negotiation. These statements were specific reasons that the Sgt was angry which could easily be incorporated into the training scenario without disruption and that could plausibly be delivered in either the experimental/angry sessions or in the baseline/neutral sessions. These statements involved anger at the trainees' organization ("The…TRAINEES' ORGANIZATION…always gives more food to Eastland."), anger at terrorism ("Terrorists killed my brother."), anger at the trainees' interference in the police activity ("Don't interfere with police business."), and anger at team members ("I don't take orders from you."). The key issue was how anger on the part of the police Sgt would influence trainees' negotiation behaviours and their perceptions of the negotiation as they worked through the scenario.

Once a resolution[2] had been reached within the scenario, the DS called "Endex" and videotaping was stopped. Participants immediately completed the questionnaire, which took approximately 5 minutes. After completing the questionnaire, the DS debriefed the trainees and the research team prepared for the next rotation.

At the end of the day, trainees and Directing Staff reconvened for an after action review. At the end of this review, the research team debriefed the participants regarding the full purpose of the study. At this time, participants were given the opportunity to give feedback and to ask questions about the research.

2.6 Measures

Negotiation behaviours The primary objective of the study was to observe the emerging negotiation behaviours of military trainees when confronted with either an angry or neutral negotiation partner. In order to capture the dyadic, interpersonal nature of the negotiation context, the coding scheme used in the first study was expanded to include a refined set of trainee behaviours as well as to introduce a full set of Sgt behaviours. [3]

The coding scheme was divided into 5 stages, including Preliminaries, Assessing the Situation, Relationship Building, Negotiating Skills, and Teamwork. The stages are not strictly hierarchical (i.e., one stage does not need to be completed before another is started), but are fluid and progression through these will naturally vary from team to team. They all have a critical role to play in the negotiation process and behaviours associated with the stages can be optimal or suboptimal. Stages and general activities are shown in Table 2.

[2] See measures section for more information about the scenario's resolution.

[3] A total of 18 new trainee behaviours were added to the original coding scheme. For an account of the development of the trainees' negotiation behaviour coding scheme see *Moral and Ethical Decision-Making in a Realistic Field Training Scenario* (Thomson and Adams, 2007).

Table 2: Negotiation behaviours: stage and general activity

Stage	Trainee General Activity	Sgt General Activity
Preliminaries	Engaging and Establishing a Relationship Having Suitable Body Language in Relation to Sgt	Engaging and Establishing a Relationship Controlling Physical Location of Trainees
Assessing the Situation	Establishing Situational Awareness	Establishing Situational Awareness
Relationship Building	Building a Positive Relationship with Sgt Building a Negative Relationship with Sgt	Building a Positive Relationship with Trainees Building a Negative Relationship with Trainees
Negotiating Skills	Diffusing the Situation Searching for Alternatives Making Contact with the Civilians	Diverting Focus of Discussion Downplaying Seriousness of Situation Retracting Promises
Teamwork	Leadership Communication	

The final coding scheme had 52 behaviours falling under nine general activities for the trainees and 32 behaviours falling under eight activities for the Sgt. Each behaviour was linked with an observable definition as well as further description of features to guide inclusion/exclusion decisions about ambiguous or novel behaviours.

A member of the research team then watched the videotape for each of the 17 sessions and coded the occurrence and duration of the negotiation behaviours for both the trainees and the Sgt on one video stream. Coding was done at the team level. The team leader was fully engaged in the negotiation and thus accounted for the majority of observable behaviours, but team member behaviours were also coded. In rare instances when two team members performed two different behaviours simultaneously (e.g. if a team member took notes while the team leader asked a question), the coding defaulted to the team leader in charge at the time.[4] Researchers were able to identify the team leader from administrative documents supplied by the CF pre-deployment training staff prior to experimentation. Roles were further confirmed by the video data.

Resolving the moral dilemma Military trainees clearly have a difficult moral decision to make as the end of the human rights violation scenario approaches. On one hand, they have been consistently told by the Sgt that their help is neither needed nor wanted, and they are told to return to their own business. The Sgt makes high demands and small concessions. On the other hand, they are witnessing physical and psychological abuse being perpetrated against people claiming to be innocent and pleading for their help. As the Sgt seeks to push for a resolution to the scenario, teams must make a decision about what course of action they will take.

According to the established CF pre-deployment training curriculum, there are 3 possible outcomes to the negotiations on the Human Rights Violation Stand.[5] First, teams are willing to disengage from the situation and leave the civilians with the police. At this point, the trainees prepare to leave

[4] This constraint was imposed in MEFS I, in order to focus on the behaviour of the primary negotiator, as well as to ensure that durations could be meaningfully calculated (as time was more of an issue in this study).

[5] Note that in 3 of the scenarios, DS did not require a clear resolution.

the situation[6], the police take the civilians into the forest and the civilians are shot. In the second outcome, teams stand at the predetermined point and do not attempt to accompany the police and civilians into the forest, but simply watch as the police lead the civilians away. Once out of sight of the trainees, the civilians are shot. The final possible resolution is that the trainees refuse to leave the civilians, and they accompany the police and civilians through the forest to the police station. In this case, the civilians live. At the end of each stand, the resolution of each scenario was recorded by the research team.

Questionnaire Participants completed a 30 item questionnaire (Annex D) designed to tap a number of constructs related to the impact of emotion on decision-making strategies and negotiation behaviour during a human rights violation scenario.

The strategic choice hypothesis suggests that individuals are mindful of the emotional state of the negotiation partner, and that they use this information to guide their negotiation strategies. Teams using the emotional state of the Sgt as information to guide their negotiation behaviour would show a more deliberate, systematic approach to decision-making as opposed to a quick, heuristic approach. With this in mind, the first set of questions was designed to assess participants' overall emotional response to both the human rights violation that they witnessed and to the negotiation with the Sgt. Participants were asked to rate both the Sgt's anger level as well as their own anger toward the Sgt. Participants also rated the level of rapport that they believed they had established with the Sgt. Further questions that explored participants' decision-making strategies. We asked participants four particular questions that were meant to assess either an intuitive or a systematic decision-making strategy. For example, to assess the degree of effortlessness (i.e., use of intuition), participants were asked whether there was a limited amount of time to consider all of the relevant information before they made a decision and if they knew the Sgt was lying from the moment they started negotiating. And to assess the degree of systematic effort, participants were asked if they had considered the pros and cons of all of the options before making a decision and if they thought that there was some evidence that the prisoners could be guilty of terrorist activity.

Other questions exploring trainee reactions to the human rights violation scenario asked participants to rate the level of fear they would have experienced had this mission been real. They were also asked to rate the overall quality of the outcome of the scenario and the overall quality of their response to the scenario. They were further asked to rate their own team's response to the situation in comparison to other teams. Participants were also asked to rate the extent to which their actions would change if they could redo the scenario. As a follow-up question, participants who had indicated they would like to redo the scenario were provided an open-ended section to list what specifically they would have done differently.

An important finding from the previous field study was the observed challenge that some military personnel had assuming a different role (Thomson & Adams, 2007). Behavioural results showed that the transition from soldier warrior to soldier diplomat may not be an easy one, as there was a relatively high incidence of behaviours likely to promote a negative relationship with the Sgt. In response to this, the current study worked to further understand military trainees' perceptions of their role as a soldier diplomat. A number of questions were designed to investigate the degree of role discrepancy in participants involved in a conflictual situation. To explore the internalization of

[6]It should be noted the nature of the exercises prevent trainees from wholly leaving the situation because they know they are being observed by the DS and that they will be briefed at the end of the session. However, when teams motioned back toward the road after the Sgt had said good-bye, this was recorded as the team having left the situation.

behaviours associated with the soldier diplomat, participants rated the extent to which they believed that the only course of action (COA) in this scenario was diplomacy and whether they agreed that the best COA in a situation like the human rights violation was to compromise and make concessions. Questions also tapped the extent to which participants acted on the basis of their own conscience and not the values and practices of the organization they would be representing in operations, the extent to which participants were able to remain impartial, and if they would have liked to be more forceful with the Sgt. Lastly, in order to tap issues of accountability, participants were asked if they felt "personally" responsible for the well-being of the prisoners and whether or not they felt that the outcome of the scenario (either success or failure) had rested on their shoulders.

Finally, participants were required to indicate whether the Sgt had or had not said the series of canned statements during their session. These were presented as true or false questions with 5 false filler statements. Participants also rated their confidence level in each true or false answer they gave.

3 Results

The following section reports analyses of the demographic data, negotiation behaviours, outcome data, and questionnaire data

3.1 Demographic Data

The first analysis compared the demographic characteristics of participants in the experimental and baseline conditions. The only marginal difference between conditions was in rank, with participants in the experimental condition having a marginally lower rank than those in the baseline condition. This pattern was due to 2 high ranking (LCol) participants in the baseline condition.

3.2 Negotiation Behaviours

The next analyses compared the negotiation behaviours of the police Sgt and trainees. In the experimental condition, the Sgt was scripted to be angry and aggressive, and in the baseline condition the Sgt's emotional state was scripted to be more neutral and yielding.

3.2.1 Overview

Tables 3 and 4 show negotiation behaviours categorized by stage and general activity across all scenarios for the Sgt (Table 3) and the trainee teams (Table 4).

Table 3: Sgt negotiation behaviours by stage and general activity

Stage	General Activity	Total Frequency[7]	% of Frequency
Preliminaries	Engaging and Establishing Relationship with Trainees	193	11%
Assessing the Situation	Establishing Situational Awareness	586	34%
Relationship Building	Building a Positive Relationship with Trainees	38	2%
	Building a Negative Relationship with Trainees	457	26%
Negotiation Skills	Diverting Focus of Discussion	211	12%
	Downplaying Seriousness of Situation	259	15%
	Retracting Promises	0	0%
Total		1744	100%

[7] Total frequency refers to the number of times an individual behaviour was observed across all of the scenarios for the Sgt.

Table 4: Trainees negotiation behaviours by stage and general activity

Stage	General Activity	Total Frequency[8]	% of Frequency
Preliminaries	Engaging and Establishing Relationship with Sgt	239	14%
Assessing the Situation	Establishing Situation Awareness	802	46%
Relationship Building	Building a Positive Relationship	162	9%
	Building a Negative Relationship	269	15%
Negotiation Skills	Diffusing Situation	136	8%
	Searching for Alternatives	68	4%
	Initiate Civilian Contact	59	3%
Teamwork	Team Intervention	12	1%
Total		1747	100%

Overall, the specified behaviours were coded 1,744 times for the Sgt and 1,747 times for the trainees. The most common general activity was 'Assessing the Situation', accounting for 34% of the Sgt's behaviour and for 46% of trainees' behaviours. Following this, the next most common activity was 'Building a Negative Relationship', accounting for 26% the Sgt's behaviour and 15% of the trainees' behaviours.

The average duration of sessions in the baseline and experimental conditions was also compared. This analysis showed that both the baseline and experimental sessions lasted an average of 12.9 minutes.

It is also important to note that behaviours were also classified as being either likely to promote a good outcome (optimal) or likely to promote a less positive outcome (suboptimal).[9] In general, one would expect that a greater occurrence of optimal behaviours will foster a more positive negotiation and more suboptimal behaviours will foster a less than positive negotiation.

The following analyses show the frequency of negotiation behaviours exhibited by the Sgt and the trainees, the normalized percentages of those frequencies (i.e. the frequency of each behaviour divided by the total frequency of the general activity), and the percentage of sessions in which the Sgt and the trainees engaged in each behaviour. No inferential statistical analyses were conducted on this behavioural data, as the low N's for some behaviours would have precluded a common approach.

3.2.2 Preliminaries

Two general activities associated with Preliminaries were identified. They included engaging and establishing a relationship and having suitable body language. However, there were too few instances of the activity having suitable body language to warrant reporting, so these were excluded from further analysis.

[8] Total frequency refers to the number of times an individual behaviour was observed across all of the scenarios for the trainees.

[9] Whether behaviours are optimal or suboptimal is subject to military SME validation.

3.2.2.1 Engaging and Establishing Relationship

At the outset of the negotiation, engaging and establishing a relationship can be observed in social behaviours such as shaking hands, smiling, introducing oneself, showing identification cards, and requesting identification from all relevant party members[10]. Tables 5 and 6 show the frequencies as well as the percentage of sessions in which the Sgt engaged in these behaviours.

Table 5: Engaging and establishing relationship with trainees (A)

Behaviour	Type	Frequency			Normalized % of Frequency		
		Baseline	Experimental	Total	Baseline	Experimental	Total
Shake Hands	optimal	15	0	15	32%	0%	28%
Smiling	optimal	3	1	4	6%	17%	8%
Introduce Self	optimal	26	3	29	56%	50%	55%
Show Police ID cards	optimal	3	1	4	6%	17%	8%
Ask for ID	optimal	0	1	1	0%	17%	1%
TOTAL		47	6	53	100%	100%	100%

Table 6: Percent of sessions Sgt was engaging and establishing relationship with trainees (A)

Behaviour	Type	% of Sessions Sgt Exhibited Behaviour[11]		
		Baseline	Experimental	Total
Shake Hands	optimal	63%	0%	31%
Smiling	optimal	25%	11%	18%
Introduce Self	optimal	88%	22%	55%
Show Police ID cards	optimal	25%	11%	18%
Ask for ID	optimal	0%	11%	6%

[10] In the case of the Human Rights Violation Stand, there are essentially three parties - the police, the civilians, and the military trainees.

[11] As a given session could contain multiple occurrences of the same behaviour, this simply shows the proportion of sessions in which the given behaviour was coded at least once.



Figure 6: Engaging and establishing relationship with trainees (A)

As can be seen in Figure 6, all of the Sgt's preliminary behaviours occurred relatively infrequently in the experimental condition. The Sgt shook hands with the trainees in the baseline condition 63% of the time but never in the experimental condition. The Sgt also introduced himself more readily when in a more neutral mood than when angry. As the Sgt was instructed to avoid these preliminary behaviours in the angry condition as an overt expression of his anger and uncooperativeness, these results indicate the effectiveness of the experimental manipulation. Smiling, showing ID cards, and requesting to see the trainees' ID card occurred infrequently across both conditions.

The preliminary behaviours of trainees are shown in Tables 7 and 8 and Figure 7. To their credit, more than half of the trainee teams attempted to uphold customary polite behaviours even when presented with an angry and aggressive police Sgt.

Table 7: Engaging and establishing relationship with Sgt (A)

Behaviour	Type	Frequency			Normalized % of Frequency		
		Baseline	Experimental	Total	Baseline	Experimental	Total
Shaking hands	optimal	11[12]	6	17	18%	11%	15%
Smiling	optimal	4	3	7	7%	6%	6%
Introducing self	optimal	40	35	75	66%	69%	67%
Showing organization ID cards	optimal	5	7	12	8%	14%	11%
Asking Sgt for his ID	optimal	1	0	1	1%	0%	1%
TOTAL		61	51	112	100%	100%	100%

Table 8: Percent of teams engaging and establishing relationship with Sgt (A)

Behaviour	Type	% of Teams Exhibiting Behaviour		
		Baseline	Experimental	Total
Shaking hands	optimal	63%	56%	59%
Smiling	optimal	38%	22%	30%
Introducing self	optimal	88%	100%	94%
Showing organization ID cards	optimal	38%	44%	41%
Asking Sgt for his ID	optimal	13%	0%	6%

[12] The discrepancy between the Sgt's frequency (15) shaking hands and the trainees (11) can be explained by the fact that only one behaviour can be coded at one time. It is likely that other more relevant trainee behaviours occurring simultaneously with hand shaking were coded instead.



Figure 7: Engaging and establishing relationship with Sgt (A)

Fifty-six percent (56%) of teams confronted by an angry Sgt attempted to shake his hand, whereas 63% of teams confronted by a more neutral Sgt did so. All of the teams in the experimental condition introduced themselves, whereas 88% did in the baseline. Like the Sgt, trainees smiled, showed ID cards, and requested to see the Sgt's ID card infrequently across conditions.

Other preliminary behaviours shown by the Sgt included requesting introductions (the Sgt's attempts to meet the other team members), establishing common ground (working to find similarities with the negotiation partner e.g. "I'm a soldier too"), explaining one's purpose (e.g. "We're working to protect people from terrorists."), or creating a social event (e.g. offering a cigarette, requesting water), were not frequently exhibited by the Sgt. These Sgt behaviours are shown in Tables 9 and 10 and Figure 8.

Table 9: Engaging and establishing relationship with trainees (B)

Behaviour	Type	Frequency			Normalized % of Frequency		
		Baseline	Experimental	Total	Baseline	Experimental	Total
Requesting introductions with trainee teams	optimal	0	1	1	0%	10%	3%
Establishing common ground or identity and similarities, sharing point of view	optimal	7	2	9	37%	20%	31%
Explaining general purpose, task, mandate	optimal	4	6	10	21%	60%	35%
Creating a social event	optimal	8	1	9	42%	10%	31%
TOTAL		19	10	29	100%	100%	100%

Table 10: Percent of sessions Sgt engaged and established relationship with trainees (B)

Behaviour	Type	% of Sessions Sgt Exhibited Behaviour		
		Baseline	Experimental	Total
Requesting introductions with trainee teams	optimal	0%	11%	6%
Establishing common ground or identity and similarities, sharing point of view	optimal	38%	11%	24%
Explaining general purpose, task, mandate	optimal	25%	33%	29%
Creating a social event	optimal	25%	11%	18%



Figure 8: Engaging and establishing relationship with trainees (B)

Again, these behaviours on the part of the Sgt were very infrequent. Establishing common ground and creating a social event were more frequent when the Sgt was tasked to be more neutral than when angry.

These preliminary behaviours were observed more frequently by trainee teams, as shown in Tables 11 and 12 and Figure 9.

Table 11: Engaging and establishing relationship with Sgt (B)

Behaviour	Type	Frequency			Normalized % of Frequency		
		Baseline	Experimental	Total	Baseline	Experimental	Total
Requesting introductions with constable	optimal	3	1	4	5%	1%	3%
Establishing common ground or identity and similarities, sharing point of view	optimal	7	9	16	13%	13%	13%
Explaining general purpose, task, mandate	optimal	34	49	83	62%	68%	65%
Creating a social event	optimal	11	13	24	20%	18%	19%
TOTAL		55	72	127	100%	100%	100%

Table 12: Percent of teams engaging and establishing relationship with Sgt (B)

Behaviour	Type	% of Teams Exhibiting Behaviour		
		Baseline	Experimental	Total
Requesting introduction to constable	optimal	13%	11%	12%
Establishing common ground or identity and similarities, sharing point of view	optimal	50%	56%	53%
Explaining general purpose, task, mandate	optimal	88%	89%	88%
Creating a social event	optimal	63%	56%	59%



Figure 9: Engaging and establishing relationship with Sgt (B)

Requesting introductions with the constable was seen very infrequently, occurring only 4 times by 12% of teams. Although requesting introductions was still relatively infrequent, teams made more effort to attempt to establish common ground, regardless of the Sgt's emotional state. In addition, teams showed high instances of explaining their general purpose, current task and mandate, and these behaviours occurred somewhat more often when the Sgt was highly angry. The high frequency of this behaviour may suggest that trainees understood the importance of making their position and mission activities transparent to the Sgt, especially when he was angry. As a negotiation tactic, it may be that trainees disclose this information as leverage to de-escalate the situation.[13] As seen in Figure 9, more than half of teams in both conditions attempted to create a social event. The high frequencies for these behaviours suggest an effort to engage and establish a relationship with the Sgt despite his aggressive emotional state.

Other Sgt behaviours included giving direction to the constable. Often, the Sgt was observed yelling orders to the other police officer. As Tables 13 and 14 and Figure 10 show, this occurred 47 times in the baseline condition and 64 times in the experimental condition, and it was present in every session.

[13] As noted in previous research, this particular behaviour can also come across as a threat, and in some situations, may be a sub-optimal behaviour (Thomson and Adams, 2007).

Table 13: Engaging and establishing relationship with trainees (C)

Behaviour	Type	Frequency			Normalized % of Frequency		
		Baseline	Experimental	Total	Baseline	Experimental	Total
Giving direction/interacting with constable	either	47	64	111	100%	100%	100%
TOTAL		47	64	111	100%	100%	100%

Table 14: Percent of sessions Sgt engaged and established relationship with trainees (C)

Behaviour	Type	% of Sessions in which Sgt Exhibited Behaviour		
		Baseline	Experimental	Total
Giving direction/interacting with constable	either	100%	100%	100%



Figure 10: Engaging and establishing relationship with trainees (C)

3.2.3 Assessing the Situation

Properly assessing the situation is a key goal for all military personnel entering into negotiations. Several behaviours are implicated in establishing situational awareness. Key among these are conducting a general recce of the area, taking notes, and asking for names of the people involved in the situation (i.e. the police and the civilians), using the radio to communicate with mission headquarters, seeking both general and situation-specific information and providing relevant information to one's negotiation partner.

3.2.3.1 Establishing Situational Awareness

Behaviours associated with establishing situation awareness were very common for both the Sgt and the trainees, accounting for the large portion of all observed behaviours. The coding scheme distinguished between information directly relevant to the situation at hand versus information of a more general nature. As Tables 15 and 16 and Figure 11 show, the Sgt sought situation-specific information more frequently than general information, and this occurred more often when the Sgt was angry.

Table 15: Sgt establishing situational awareness

Behaviour	Type	Frequency			Normalized % of Frequency		
		Baseline	Experimental	Total	Baseline	Experimental	Total
Seeking general information not directly relevant to specific situation	optimal	17	18	35	6%	6%	6%
Seeking situation-specific information about what's happening	optimal	33	42	75	11%	14%	13%
Responding to trainees' questions/providing information	optimal	244	231	475	83%	80%	81%
TOTAL		294	291	585	100%	100%	100%

Table 16: Percent of sessions Sgt established situational awareness

Behaviour	Type	% of Sessions Sgt Exhibited Behaviour		
		Baseline	Experimental	Total
Seeking general information not directly relevant to specific situation	optimal	63%	67%	65%
Seeking situation-specific information about what's happening	optimal	100%	100%	100%
Responding to trainees' questions/providing information	optimal	100%	100%	100%



Figure 11: Sgt establishing situational awareness

Another aspect of situational awareness was responding to questions and providing information to trainees. Given the nature of the scenario, the Sgt was required to spend much of his time doing this. As results show, the Sgt responded to the trainees' questions and provided information 244 times in the baseline condition and 231 times in the experimental condition, for a total of 475 times. This behaviour occurred in every session, demonstrating the teams' consistent motivation to probe the Sgt.

Related behaviours for trainees are shown in Tables 17 and 18 and Figure 12.

Table 17: Trainees' establishing situational awareness (A)

Behaviour	Type	Frequency			Normalized % of Frequency		
		Baseline	Experimental	Total	Baseline	Experimental	Total
Indicating intention to Sgt about what they're doing next	optimal	8	9	17	2%	2%	2%
Seeking information not directly relevant to specific situation	optimal	73	55	128	19%	15%	17%
Seeking situation-specific information about what's happening	optimal	114	131	245	30%	35%	33%
Inquiring about nature of infraction	optimal	25	39	64	7%	11%	9%
Determining Sgt's authority structure	optimal	13	14	27	3%	4%	3%
Responding to Sgt's questions/providing information	optimal	69	63	132	18%	17%	18%
Reiterating Sgt's statements	optimal	79	60	139	21%	16%	18%
TOTAL		381	371	752	100%	100%	100%

Table 18: Percent of teams establishing situational awareness (A)

Behaviour	Type	% of Teams Exhibiting Behaviour		
		Baseline	Experimental	Total
Indicating intention to Sgt about what they're doing next	optimal	50%	33%	42%
Seeking information not directly relevant to specific situation	optimal	100%	89%	94%
Seeking situation-specific information about what's happening	optimal	100%	100%	100%
Inquiring about nature of infraction	optimal	75%	100%	88%
Determining Sgt's authority structure	optimal	63%	78%	70%
Responding to Sgt's questions/providing information	optimal	100%	100%	100%
Reiterating Sgt's statements	optimal	100%	100%	100%



Figure 12: Trainees' establishing situational awareness (A)

As part of any negotiation, it is important to elicit information in order to understand the situation. Trainees did a very good job asking both general and specific questions (373 times in total). As shown in Table 18, 94% of teams asked general questions and 100% of teams asked situation-specific questions. Teams asked more situation-specific questions and fewer general questions when confronted with an angry Sgt than when confronted with a more neutral Sgt. Trainees showed some instances of announcing their intentions to the Sgt, though this occurred relatively infrequently in both conditions.

Inquiring about the infraction supposedly committed by the "terrorists" occurred 64 times, and was more frequent when teams were confronted with an angry Sgt than a neutral one. To a lesser extent, trainees asked questions to determine the Sgt's authority structure. In addition, indicating understanding of what is being said during negotiations is of utmost importance. This requires active-listening skills and trainees often reiterated the Sgt's questions and his position, occurring somewhat more frequently when the Sgt was neutral than when he was angry.

Other trainee behaviours aimed at enhancing their situation awareness are shown in Tables 19 and 20 and Figure 13.

Table 19: Trainees' establishing situational awareness (B)

Behaviour	Type	Frequency			Normalized % of Frequency		
		Baseline	Experimental	Total	Baseline	Experimental	Total
General recce of area	optimal	1	0	1	3%	0%	2%
Taking notes	optimal	23	9	32	77%	45%	64%
Asking for names for notes	optimal	4	7	11	13%	35%	22%
Using radio	optimal	2	4	6	7%	20%	12%
TOTAL		30	20	50	100%	100%	100%

Table 20: Percent of teams establishing situational awareness (B)

Behaviour	Type	% of Teams Exhibiting Behaviour		
		Baseline	Experimental	Total
General recce of area	optimal	13%	0%	6%
Taking notes	optimal	75%	33%	54%
Asking for names for notes	optimal	38%	33%	35%
Using radio	optimal	13%	11%	12%



Figure 13: Trainees' establishing situational awareness (B)

Many teams in the baseline condition took notes as the negotiation unfolded, whereas only 33% of teams did in the experimental condition. This is not surprising given the Sgt in the latter condition was less willing to allow team members to take notes. Conducting a general recce and using the

radio[14] occurred very infrequently as did asking for names for notes. In general, then, these behaviours all had low frequencies.

3.2.4 Relationship Building

Relationship Building was coded in terms of fostering either a positive or negative relationship with the other negotiation partner.

3.2.4.1 Building Positive Relationship

In the negotiation context, Sgt behaviours likely to build a positive relationship included showing empathy and responsiveness to the trainees, willingness to let the trainees help, complying with the demands of the trainee, and complimenting them. However, from the Sgt's perspective, it is not critical that he builds a positive relationship with the trainees given that he holds the power and largely dictates how events will unfold over the course of the negotiation. In essence, the negotiation is designed to be extremely challenging for the trainees. As the results show (see overall frequency in Table 3), building a positive relationship only accounted for 2% of the total behaviours coded across all sessions.

As seen in Tables 21 and 22 and Figure 14, positive relationship building was very infrequent and occurred somewhat more often when the Sgt was neutral than when he was angry.

Table 21: Building positive relationship with trainees

Behaviour	Type	Frequency			Normalized % of Frequency		
		Baseline	Experimental	Total	Baseline	Experimental	Total
Empathy and responsiveness to trainee	optimal	4	1	5	16%	8%	13%
Willingness to let trainees' help	optimal	2	0	2	8%	0%	5%
Comply with trainee demands	optimal	19	11	30	76%	84%	79%
Compliment trainee	optimal	0	1	1	0%	8%	3%
TOTAL		25	13	38	100%	100%	100%

[14] These two behaviours may actually be under-represented because of the limited view provided by the camera. That is, team members not in the camera frame may well have conducted general recce activities that went unrecorded as well as used the radio.

Table 22: Percent of sessions the Sgt was building positive relationship with trainees

Behaviour	Type	% of Sessions Sgt Exhibited Behaviour		
		Baseline	Experimental	Total
Empathy and responsiveness to trainee	optimal	25%	11%	18%
Willingness to let trainees help	optimal	13%	0%	6%
Comply with trainee demands	optimal	100%	56%	78%
Compliment trainee	optimal	0%	11%	6%



Figure 14: Building positive relationship with trainees

The Sgt showed very few incidents of empathy toward the trainees, and of willingness to let them help him. He exhibited 30 instances of complying with the trainees' demands, but this was more frequent when in a neutral mood than an angry mood. He complied in only 56% of the sessions in the experimental condition compared to 100% of the sessions in the baseline condition. Complimenting the trainees only occurred once overall. This provides a further benchmark for the success of the experimental manipulation.

On the other hand, we would expect for trainees to be highly motivated to build a positive relationship with the Sgt in order to leverage their negotiation position. Showing empathy, complying with Sgt's demands, and complimenting the Sgt could be means by which to build a positive relationship. As well, teams could also work to build a positive relationship with the Sgt

by asking how they might help resolve the situation, showing respect for the authority of the Sgt by asking permission before acting, and apologizing for any negative behaviour they may have committed. Frequencies for these behaviours are reflected in Tables 23 and 24 and Figure 15.

Table 23: Building positive relationship with Sgt

Behaviour	Type	Frequency			Normalized % of Frequency		
		Baseline	Experimental	Total	Baseline	Experimental	Total
Empathy and responsiveness to Sgt	optimal	16	34	50	27%	33%	31%
Asking how trainees can help resolve situation	optimal	3	7	10	5%	7%	6%
Asking permission to act	optimal	16	27	43	27%	26%	27%
Complying with Sgt's demands	optimal	18	26	44	31%	25%	27%
Complimenting the Sgt	optimal	2	6	8	3%	6%	5%
Apologizing for own negative behaviour	optimal	4	3	7	7%	3%	4%
TOTAL		59	103	162	100%	100%	100%

Table 24: Percent of teams building positive relationship with Sgt

Behaviour	Type	% of Teams Exhibiting Behaviour		
		Baseline	Experimental	Total
Empathy and responsiveness to Sgt	optimal	63%	67%	65%
Asking how trainees can help resolve situation	optimal	25%	44%	35%
Asking permission to act	optimal	88%	89%	88%
Complying with Sgt's demands	optimal	75%	78%	76%
Complimenting the Sgt	optimal	25%	22%	24%
Apologizing for own negative behaviour	optimal	25%	22%	24%



Figure 15: Building positive relationship with Sgt

As the results suggest, positive relationship building was more prevalent when trainees were confronted by an angry Sgt than by a more neutral Sgt (with the exception of apologizing). For example, there appeared to be a greater effort by trainees facing an angry Sgt to show that they were indeed seeing his position. Showing empathy and responsiveness toward the Sgt was observed twice as often when he was angry than when he was neutral (34 times vs. 16 times, respectively), despite the fact that a similar number of teams in both conditions exhibited this. Moreover, asking for permission to act occurred 27 times when teams were confronted with an angry Sgt compared to 16 in the baseline, and complying with the Sgt's demands was seen 26 times in the experimental and 18 times in the baseline condition. Offering to help and complimenting the Sgt were infrequent behaviours. These higher frequencies of positive behaviours when the Sgt was angry suggest that trainees may have been strategically working to lower the emotional intensity of the Sgt in order to promote more effective negotiations.

Comparing the positive behaviours of both the Sgt and trainees, however, showed that trainees exhibited ten times more incidents of empathy toward the Sgt than the Sgt did toward them and asked to help the Sgt much more often than the Sgt actually let them help him. Trainees also complied more frequently with the Sgt and complimented him more frequently.

On the other hand, both the Sgt and trainees showed high frequencies of behaviours likely to promote a negative relationship. These behaviours included being condescending or insulting, expressing opinions critical of the negotiation partner, and physically threatening the negotiation partner. Frequencies for the Sgt's negative behaviours are shown in Tables 25 and 26 and Figure 16.

Table 25: Building negative relationship with trainees (A)

Behaviour	Type	Frequency			Normalized % of Frequency		
		Baseline	Experimental	Total	Baseline	Experimental	Total
Condescending, insulting, sarcastic toward trainees	sub-optimal	21	71	92	64%	69%	68%
Expressing opinion that's critical of trainees' behaviour	sub-optimal	11	25	36	33%	24%	26%
Physically threatening the trainees	sub-optimal	1	7	8	3%	7%	6%
TOTAL		33	103	136	100%	100%	100%

Table 26: Percent of sessions Sgt was building negative relationship with trainees (A)

Behaviour	Type	% of Sessions in which Sgt Exhibited Behaviour		
		Baseline	Experimental	Total
Condescending, insulting, sarcastic toward trainees	sub-optimal	75%	100%	88%
Expressing opinion that's critical of trainees' behaviour	sub-optimal	50%	78%	64%
Physically threatening the trainees	sub-optimal	13%	33%	23%



Figure 16: Building negative relationship with trainees (A)

The Sgt was clearly more condescending when angry, showing 21 occurrences in the baseline condition and 71 in the experimental condition. Although less frequent, he was also more critical in his opinions. The Sgt physically threatened the trainees once in the baseline condition and 7 times in the angry condition.

Other negative Sgt behaviours were less common, including threatening trainees with future consequences and circumventing the authority of the team leader, as shown in Tables 27 and 28 and Figure 17.

Table 27: Building negative relationship with trainees (B)

Behaviour	Type	Frequency			Normalized % of Frequency		
		Baseline	Experimental	Total	Baseline	Experimental	Total
Threatening trainees with future consequences	sub-optimal	2	10	12	3%	5%	5%
Circumventing the authority of the trainee team leader	sub-optimal	0	6	6	0%	3%	2%
Making demands of the trainees	sub-optimal	62	155	217	84%	80%	81%
Boasting about self	sub-optimal	10	23	33	13%	12%	12%
TOTAL		74	194	268	100%	100%	100%

Table 28: Percent of sessions Sgt was building negative relationship with trainees (B)

Behaviour	Type	% of Sessions in which Sgt Exhibited Behaviour		
		Baseline	Experimental	Total
Threatening trainees with future consequences	sub-optimal	25%	44%	35%
Circumventing the authority of the trainee team leader	sub-optimal	0%	33%	17%
Making demands of the trainees	sub-optimal	100%	89%	94%
Boasting about self	sub-optimal	38%	78%	58%



Figure 17: Building negative relationship with trainees (B)

The most frequently observed behaviour was making demands of the trainees. This occurred 217 times within 94% of the teams. This behaviour was also much more prominent when teams were facing an angry Sgt than a more neutral Sgt, occurring 155 times in the experimental condition but only 62 times in the baseline condition. Again, this finding is consistent with what would be expected given the nature of the experimental condition, i.e., an angry Sgt is more likely to make demands. The Sgt also boasted about himself more frequently when angry, occurring in 78% of the sessions. The high frequency of negative Sgt behaviours in the angry condition is further support of the experimental manipulation.

Given these results then a critical question is how trainees might respond to this negativity on the part of the Sgt. Would trainees adjust their behaviours in order to contrast with the Sgt and hopefully diffuse the situation, or would they be "drawn in" and begin to respond negatively to the Sgt as well? Trainees showed several negative behaviours toward the Sgt, and these were typically more frequent when the Sgt was angry, as shown in Tables 29 and 30 and Figure 18.

Table 29: Building negative relationship with Sgt (A)

Behaviour	Type	Frequency			Normalized % of Frequency		
		Baseline	Experimental	Total	Baseline	Experimental	Total
Condescending, insulting, sarcastic toward Sgt	sub-optimal	4	23	27	13%	27%	23%
Expressing opinion that's critical of Sgt's' behaviour	sub-optimal	25	48	73	78%	56%	62%
Threatening Sgt with future consequence	sub-optimal	3	15	18	9%	17%	15%
TOTAL		32	86	118	100%	100%	100%

Table 30: Percent of teams building negative relationship with Sgt (A)

Behaviour	Type	% of Teams Exhibiting Behaviour		
		Baseline	Experimental	Total
Condescending, insulting, sarcastic toward Sgt	sub-optimal	50%	67%	58%
Expressing opinion that's critical of Sgt's' behaviour	sub-optimal	100%	100%	100%
Threatening Sgt with future consequence	sub-optimal	13%	33%	23%



Figure 18: Building negative relationship with Sgt (A)

More than half of the teams were rated as condescending toward the Sgt, with a total of 27 occurrences of this behaviour (23 of them when the Sgt was angry). They also expressed an opinion that was critical of the Sgt's behaviour almost two times more often in the experimental condition, and threatened him with future consequences more often as well.

Other negative trainee behaviours were also more frequent when confronted by an angry Sgt.

Table 31: Building negative relationship with Sgt (B)

Behaviour	Type	Frequency			Normalized % of Frequency		
		Baseline	Experimental	Total	Baseline	Experimental	Total
Circumventing authority of Sgt	sub-optimal	4	31	35	8%	30%	23%
Making demands of Sgt	sub-optimal	19	22	41	38%	22%	27%
Boasting about self	sub-optimal	0	4	4	0%	4%	3%
Actively opposing Sgt's demands	sub-optimal	12	25	37	24%	25%	25%
Acting without asking permission	sub-optimal	1	5	6	2%	5%	4%
Stating relevant regulations	sub-optimal	14	14	28	28%	14%	18%
TOTAL		50	101	151	100%	100%	100%

Table 32: Percent of teams building negative relationship with Sgt (B)

Behaviour	Type	% of Teams Exhibiting Behaviour		
		Baseline	Experimental	Total
Circumventing authority of Sgt	sub-optimal	50%	67%	58%
Making demands of Sgt	sub-optimal	63%	67%	65%
Boasting about self	sub-optimal	0%	33%	17%
Actively opposing Sgt's demands	sub-optimal	50%	78%	64%
Acting without asking permission	sub-optimal	13%	22%	17%
Stating relevant regulations	sub-optimal	38%	56%	47%



Figure 19: Building negative relationship with Sgt (B)

As Tables 31 and 32 and Figure 19 show, trainees attempted to circumvent the authority of the Sgt (e.g. by asking to speak to his superior) considerably more often when he was angry, suggesting an orientation to avoid negotiating with someone who is angry. Interestingly, however, the frequency of making demands of the Sgt was similar in both conditions. As well, teams confronted with an angry Sgt opposed his demands more often than when confronted with a more neutral Sgt (78% vs. 50%, respectively). Although team frequencies were similar, more teams in the experimental condition cited formal regulations.[15] Boasting about the self and acting without permission occurred relatively infrequently. At this point, there is good evidence that trainees were more negatively reactive when confronted with an angry and aggressive Sgt, including the fact that they actively opposed the angry Sgt more often than the neutral Sgt. Indeed, these negative behaviours might have been more common in the experimental condition because the hostile behaviour exhibited by the Sgt provoked the trainees. This trainee behaviour provides some support for the social contagion hypothesis, i.e., the anger of the Sgt was reflected by the trainees.

To understand the full picture, however, it is important to directly compare the frequencies of Sgt and trainee negative behaviours. For some behaviours, trainees clearly behave more negatively toward the Sgt than the Sgt behaved toward them. For example, trainees expressed opinions critical of the Sgt two times more often, warned him of future consequences somewhat more often and were six times more likely to attempt to circumvent his authority. On the other hand, the Sgt showed condescending and insulting behaviours almost four times more frequently than trainees, was five times more likely to make demands of trainees than trainees of him and was more

[15] Although it is clear that stating regulations can be relevant in some situations, invoking reminders of formal regulations may drive a wedge into potential efforts to develop rapport with the police and as such may not be effective.

boastful. Even though the trainees' negative behaviours increased when facing an angry Sgt, the negative behaviours of the trainees should be interpreted in light of the abuse that they took from the Sgt. Even though there was some evidence of social contagion, teams also showed considerable restraint, even when facing an angry Sgt.

3.2.5 3.2.5 Negotiating Skills

Each person engaged in a negotiation must make choices about the strategies she or he believes are most likely to be effective. The role of the Sgt was to distract the teams from their primary purpose and steer the negotiation away from the primary issue (i.e. the physical and psychological abuse of the civilians) as well as to downplay the seriousness of what was occurring.[16] Trainees, on the other hand, worked to diffuse the situation, to search for alternatives, and to make contact with the victims. Frequencies for these strategies are shown in the following section.

3.2.5.1 Diverting Focus of Discussion (Sgt)

As depicted in Tables 33 and 34 and Figure 20, the Sgt's efforts to divert the focus of discussion were observed repeatedly throughout all of the sessions.

Table 33: Diverting focus of discussion

Behaviour	Type	Frequency			Normalized % of Frequency		
		Baseline	Experimental	Total	Baseline	Experimental	Total
Avoiding, shifting to unrelated issues, derailing discussion, terminating discussion	optimal	42	57	99	49%	45%	47%
Denying trainees' requests	optimal	43	70	113	51%	55%	53%
TOTAL		85	127	212	100%	100%	100%

Table 34: Percent of sessions Sgt was diverting focus of discussion

Behaviour	Type	% of Sessions in which Sgt Exhibited Behaviour		
		Baseline	Experimental	Total
Avoiding, shifting to unrelated issues, derailing discussion, terminating discussion	optimal	100%	100%	100%
Denying trainees' requests	optimal	100%	100%	100%

[16] Behaviours associated with retracting earlier promises were not observed in any of the sessions and were excluded from further discussion.



Figure 20: Sgt diverting focus of discussion

Tactics such as avoiding, shifting or derailing the discussion or even denying requests made by the trainees were often used as mechanisms to protect the Sgt's interests and position, and they occurred more often when the Sgt was angry than when more neutral. Given his anger, it is perhaps not surprising that the Sgt would be more likely to deny requests and less willing to discuss issues.

3.2.5.2 Downplaying Seriousness of Situation (Sgt)

Other strategies adopted by the Sgt included making denials/justifications for the police behaviour (i.e., him and his constables) during the scenario and attempting to have trainees see his point of view. According to Tables 35 and 36 and Figure 21, denials and justifications were quite frequent in both conditions, occurring 231 times in 94% of the sessions.

Table 35: Downplaying seriousness of situation

Behaviour	Type	Frequency			Normalized % of Frequency		
		Baseline	Experimental	Total	Baseline	Experimental	Total
Making denials, justifications, shifting responsibility	optimal	106	125	231	90%	89%	89%
Appealing to the trainees to see Sgt's point of view	optimal	12	16	28	10%	11%	11%
TOTAL		118	141	259	100%	100%	100%

Table 36: Percent of sessions Sgt was downplaying seriousness of situation

Behaviour	Type	% of Sessions in which Sgt Exhibited Behaviour		
		Baseline	Experimental	Total
Making denials, justifications, shifting responsibility	optimal	100%	89%	94%
Appealing to the trainees to see Sgt's point of view	optimal	50%	67%	58%



Figure 21: Sgt downplaying seriousness of situation

Attempting to have the trainees see the Sgt's point of view occurred less frequently with only 16 occurrences in the experimental condition and 12 in the baseline condition.

3.2.5.3 Diffusing the Situation (Trainees)

When confronted with the situation they encountered, trainees could use several different strategies to diffuse the situation. For example, the use of humour could lighten the situation, but may not always have been appropriate. Trainees could also attempt to lower the emotional intensity of their negotiation partner. Asking the Sgt to make the constable stop beating the civilians as well as following up on the Sgt's concerns are further strategies that could be used to diffuse the situation. Frequencies for these behaviours are shown in Tables 37 and 38 and Figure 22.

Table 37: Trainees diffusing the situation

Behaviour	Type	Frequency			Normalized % of Frequency		
		Baseline	Experimental	Total	Baseline	Experimental	Total
Using humour	optimal	2	0	2	3%	0%	1%
Attempting to lower emotional intensity of Sgt	optimal	9	24	33	14%	34%	24%
Asking Sgt to get constable to stop beating civilians	optimal	29	7	36	44%	10%	27%
Following up on Sgt's concerns	optimal	26	39	65	39%	56%	48%
TOTAL		66	70	136	100%	100%	100%

Table 38: Percent of teams diffusing the situation

Behaviour	Type	% of Teams Exhibiting Behaviour		
		Baseline	Experimental	Total
Using humour	optimal	13%	0%	6%
Attempting to lower emotional intensity of Sgt	optimal	50%	89%	69%
Asking Sgt to get constable to stop beating civilians	optimal	88%	44%	66%
Following up on Sgt's concerns	optimal	88%	100%	94%



Figure 22: Trainees diffusing the situation

In general, using humour was very infrequent in both the baseline and experimental condition with only 6% of teams engaging in this behaviour. Attempting to lower the emotional intensity of the Sgt occurred more frequently when the Sgt was angry. On the other hand, asking the Sgt to have his constable stop beating the civilians occurred more frequently in the baseline condition when faced with a neutral Sgt. It may be that making requests when faced with an angry negotiation partner may be construed by trainees as exacerbating the situation. As such, trainees might have showed good judgement to keep requests to a minimum in the experimental condition. Similarly, following up on the Sgt's concerns was observed more often when the Sgt was angry than when he was more neutral. This too could help diffuse the situation and ameliorate the emotional intensity during negotiations. Together, these behaviours provide evidence that trainee made strategic choices when negotiating, as it is prudent to make greater requests of a conciliatory negotiation partner and fewer requests of an uncooperative negotiation partner.

3.2.5.4 Searching for Alternatives (Trainees)

Three behaviours that involved searching for alternatives to the situation that teams encountered were also coded. These included prompting or encouraging the Sgt to consider alternatives to his current behaviour, encouraging the Sgt to consider if beating civilians is the best way to realize his own goals and offering solutions to the current situation or problem. Frequencies for these behaviours are shown in Tables 39 and 40 and Figure 23.

Table 39: Trainees searching for alternatives

Behaviour	Type	Frequency			Normalized % of Frequency		
		Baseline	Experimental	Total	Baseline	Experimental	Total
Prompting/encouraging Sgt to consider alternatives	optimal	2	4	6	7%	10%	9%
Encouraging Sgt to consider if beating is best way to reach OWN goals	optimal	3	10	13	10%	26%	19%
Offering solutions to situation	optimal	24	25	49	83%	64%	72%
TOTAL		29	39	68	100%	100%	100%

Table 40: Percent of teams searching for alternatives

Behaviour	Type	% of Teams Exhibiting Behaviour		
		Baseline	Experimental	Total
Prompting/encouraging Sgt to consider alternatives	optimal	13%	22%	17%
Encouraging Sgt to consider if beating is best way to reach OWN goals	optimal	38%	44%	41%
Offering solutions to situation	optimal	100%	89%	94%



Figure 23: Trainees searching for alternatives

Two of the three behaviours occurred relatively infrequently, with only 6 occurrences of attempting to persuade the Sgt to consider other alternatives and only 13 occurrences of prompting the Sgt to consider if beating the civilians would actually further his own goals. However, trainees facing an angry Sgt encouraged the Sgt to consider if beating the civilians was the best way to achieve his own goals more frequently than trainees in the baseline condition. Offering solutions to the situation was observed more frequently with 49 occurrences exhibited by 94 percent of trainees, occurring equally often in the experimental and baseline conditions (25 and 24 times respectively). This provides some evidence that trainees were concerned with generating possible solutions to the problem regardless of the emotional intensity of their negotiation partner. Though difficult to know for certain, there is some evidence suggesting the Sgt was more unwilling to follow through on the trainees' offers to resolve the problem on the human rights violation stand. Sgt responses to offers to resolve the problem would be coded as denying trainee requests. As shown in Section 3.5.2.1, he denied the trainees' requests more often when he was angry than when he was more neutral (43 and 70 respectively). The Sgt is instructed by the DS to follow a limited course of action regarding the scenario outcome, irrespective of baseline or experimental condition. It appears then that these tactics were not very effective in this particular situation, but this might reflect more the current training regimen rather than trainees' competencies.

3.2.5.5 Making Contact with the Civilians

Finally, there were also several different ways in which teams could attempt to make contact with the civilians. For example, they could show empathy and responsiveness to the plight of the civilians or initiate either verbal or physical contact with or without permission. As well, specific offers to remain with the civilians were categorized as another form of making contact with them. As seen in Tables 41 and 42 and Figure 24, teams confronted by an angry Sgt expressed more empathy toward the civilians than those in the baseline condition (78% and 50% respectively). It may be that negotiating with an angry Sgt could increase the salience of the risk faced by the civilians, prompting more outward expressions of empathy.

Table 41: Trainees making contact with civilians

Behaviour	Type	Frequency			Normalized % of Frequency		
		Baseline	Experimental	Total	Baseline	Experimental	Total
Empathy/responsiveness to civilians	optimal	5	15	20	20%	44%	34%
Initiating verbal or physical contact with civilians with permission	optimal	16	12	28	64%	35%	47%
Initiating verbal or physical contact with civilians with permission	optimal	0	1	1	0%	3%	2%
Offering to remain with civilians	optimal	4	6	10	16%	18%	17%
TOTAL		25	34	59	100%	100%	100%

Table 42: Percent of teams making contact with civilians

Behaviour	Type	% of Teams Exhibiting Behaviour		
		Baseline	Experimental	Total
Empathy/responsiveness to civilians	optimal	50%	78%	64%
Initiating verbal or physical contact with civilians with permission	optimal	75%	44%	60%
Initiating verbal or physical contact with civilians with permission	optimal	0%	11%	6%
Offering to remain with civilians	optimal	50%	44%	47%



Figure 24: Trainees making contact with civilians

Teams negotiating with a more neutral Sgt were more likely to initiate either verbal or physical contact with the civilians (75% of teams) than when facing an angry Sgt (44% of teams). Again, these requests may have been kept to a minimum to avoid provoking the Sgt further. To a lesser extent, teams asked to remain with the civilians, and this did not depend on the emotional state of the Sgt. To trainees' credit, there was only one instance of initiating contact with the civilians without permission.

3.2.6 Team Member Intervention

Another behaviour of interest was team member intervention, defined as efforts of team members to "take charge" from the lead negotiator. In some cases, team members recognize that the negotiation is either not proceeding well or is at an impasse. This may be a consequence of the lead negotiator failing to connect with the Sgt, taking an ineffective approach (e.g. being confrontational rather than supportive), or of a team member wanting to share an idea with the team leader. Interventions by another team member (i.e., "piggy-backing"), therefore, typically occur in an effort to refocus the negotiation process. As seen in Tables 43 and 44 and Figure 25, team member intervention was very low, occurring only 12 times throughout all of the sessions, and it was only exhibited by a few teams (17% in total).

Table 43: Trainees team member intervention

Behaviour	Type	Frequency			Normalized % of Frequency		
		Baseline	Experimental	Total	Baseline	Experimental	Total
Intervention of another team member	optimal or suboptimal	4	8	12	100%	100%	100%
TOTAL		4	8	12	100%	100%	100%

Table 44: Percent of teams making a team member intervention

Behaviour	Type	% of Teams Exhibiting Behaviour		
		Baseline	Experimental	Total
Intervention of another team member	optimal or suboptimal	13%	22%	17%



Figure 25: Team member intervention

However, team member intervention occurred slightly more frequently when the Sgt was angry than when neutral (12 times vs. 8 times respectively). Because negotiations with an angry Sgt were likely more difficult, the assistance from other teammates might have been helpful.

3.3 Outcome: Resolving the Moral Dilemma

The third set of analyses explored what happened at the end of each scenario, both in terms of the decisions that teams made (resolution) as well as the actual impact of this decision on civilians (outcome). After an extended negotiation without resolution, the Sgt is signalled by the DS to bring the negotiation to a close by forcing a decision from the trainees. The Sgt informs the trainees that he and the other policeman are taking the civilians into the dense forest, in the general direction of the police station. Whether the police actually intend to lead the civilians to the "protection" of the police station or whether they will simply be killed once out of sight is not made explicit. However, given the violence directed toward the civilians throughout the scenario, there is good reason to believe that the civilians might be killed or at least seriously injured. Teams have a very difficult moral decision to make at this point, and they have limited time to decide how their team will respond to the Sgt's unexpected move to transport the civilians to the police station.

At this point, teams must choose between 3 possible resolutions. First, teams could disengage from the situation[17] and leave the civilians with the police, thereby complying with the Sgt's demands. If

[17]Again, it should be noted the nature of the exercises prevent trainees from wholly leaving the situation because they know they are being observed by the DS and that they will be briefed at the end of the session. However, when teams motioned back toward the road after the Sgt had said good-bye, this was recorded as the team having left the situation.

teams make this choice, the scenario is scripted to have the police take the civilians into the forest, and the civilians are shot once out of sight of trainees. In the second possible resolution, teams do not leave the negotiation area, but watch as the police lead the civilians into the forest. Once out of sight of the trainees, the civilians are shot. The final possible resolution is that the trainees refuse to leave the civilians alone with the police, and they accept the risk of accompanying the police and civilians through the forest to the police station. In this case, the civilians live. At the end of each session, the choices that teams made (and the resulting impact on civilians) were recorded by the research team.

A critical question for this study was whether having faced an angry and uncooperative Sgt would have any impact on the choice that the trainees made at this point in the scenario. Even without the angry Sgt, choosing to accept the personal risk of accompanying armed men into a forest in order to protect the lives of the civilians is a difficult decision. This decision may have been even more difficult for teams faced with an angry Sgt, who wanted only that they agree to leave the situation. Figure 26 shows the choices that teams made at this point in the scenario.[18]



Figure 26: Resolving the moral dilemma

[18] Despite the fact that only 17 sessions were videotaped, the total number of outcomes, 21, equals the total number of sessions that had one of three resolutions. A member of the research team recorded the outcome of each session whether it was filmed or not.

Disengaging from the situation and leaving the civilians (seen in the two bars on the far left) was the least common response of all teams confronted with this human rights violation, whereas accepting the risk and following the police and civilians into the forest was the most common response (seen in the two bars on the far right).To note, within the current training system, there is no one resolution to this particular stand that is considered "correct". Following the completion of the exercise, the DS articulate the merits of each resolution as well as identify optimal and sub-optimal behaviours around the general activities of negotiation.

Results show that 30% of teams confronting an angry Sgt disengaged from the situation and left the civilians in the hands of the police, whereas only 18% of those confronting a more neutral Sgt honoured his wishes and motioned to leave the situation, entrusting the civilians to the sole custody of the police. This can be understood as an indicator of compliance to the Sgt's demands given that he orders trainees to meet him at the police station. Prudently, trainees complied more when they faced an angry Sgt compared with a neutral and yielding Sgt.

After experiencing an angry Sgt, 40% of teams put themselves at risk to accompany the police and the civilians through the forest compared to 45% of teams facing the more neutral Sgt. As well, 30% of teams in the experimental condition remained at the predetermined point and watched as the police escorted the civilians into the forest compared to 36% in the baseline condition.

Given that the scenario outcome was immediately followed by self-report questionnaires, it was important to explore trainees' perceptions about what had happened during the scenario (e.g. civilians were either shot or lived). Results showed several significant differences in the perceptions of teams dependent on the actual scenario outcome.[19]

Across the experimental (angry Sgt) and baseline (neutral Sgt.) conditions, trainees who followed the police and the civilians through the forest were significantly more satisfied with the quality of the outcome than were trainees who disengaged from the situation and left or just watched as the civilians were lead away (Figure 27).

[19] All of the following analyses were done as a 2 (condition: exp/baseline) x 3 (resolution; leave, watch, follow) factorial ANOVA. In all cases, only one main effect was significant and is reported. The other main effect and the interaction were not significant and are not reported.



Figure 27: Quality of outcome

As might be expected, following the civilians into the forest and ensuring that they lived was associated with highest ratings of satisfaction with the outcome of the scenario.

Additional analyses showed that teams who chose to watch the police lead the civilians into the forest rated their anger toward the Sgt marginally higher than those who either left or escorted the police and civilians (Figure 28).



Figure 28: Anger toward the Sgt

The fact that these trainees were somewhat angrier at the Sgt may be associated with their dissatisfaction with the outcome of the scenario. Perhaps the inability to make a decision and simply "watching" leads to a greater need to expel frustration. Transferring anger to another (e.g., blaming another person) away from oneself may be one strategy to cope with such indecisiveness. However, this remains speculative and should be examined further.

An item related to the importance of compromise and making concessions as the best COA in the negotiation also showed a marginal difference as a function of scenario outcomes, as shown in Figure 29.



Figure 29: Compromise and making concessions as the best COA

Team members who watched the civilians being led into the forest were marginally more likely to endorse the view that the best COA was to compromise and to make concessions with the Sgt than were team members who left or followed. There was also some evidence that trainees felt marginally less satisfied with their own personal response to the scenario when confronted with an angry Sgt than with a more neutral Sgt, but this did not depend on the actual outcome of the scenario.



Figure 30: Quality of own personal response

This suggests that trainees confronted with a neutral Sgt were relatively happy with how they handled the situation. Importantly, however, all trainees rated the quality of their personal responses to the scenario above the midpoint of the scale.

3.4 Questionnaire Data

The final set of analyses used self-report questionnaire measures to explore if trainees' experiences during the sessions were different when faced with an angry Sgt or a more neutral Sgt.

Beginning with ratings related to emotion during the scenario, as expected, trainees in the experimental condition rated the Sgt to be significantly more angry during the mission than trainees in the baseline condition with means of 7.13 and 5.24 respectively (Table 45).

Table 45: Emotion

Question	Baseline			Experimental		
	Valid N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Valid N	Mean	Std. Dev.
How angry was the Sgt during the mission? (Not at all=1, moderately=5, extremely=9) (Significant difference at $p < .05$)	33	5.24	1.92	31	7.13	1.67
How angry were you with the Sgt during the mission? (Not at all = 1, moderate =5, extremely =9)	33	5.52	2.25	31	5.52	2.68
What level of rapport did your team develop with the Sgt? (poor = 1, moderate =5, strong =9)	33	4.33	1.99	31	3.45	2.06
If this mission had been real, in your opinion, how likely was it that your team would be harmed? (Extremely unlikely = 1, 50/50 chance =5, extremely likely =9)	32	5.81	1.80	31	5.16	1.71

This finding suggests that the experimental manipulation was successful, and the role-playing Sgt successfully showed more anger toward the trainees in the experimental condition than when in a more neutral emotional state.

Other results related to emotions showed other interesting (but non-significant) patterns. Trainees confronted with an angry Sgt rated themselves as having established somewhat lower rapport with the Sgt than did trainees confronted with a more neutral negotiation partner. The fact that trainees rated their rapport somewhat lower after having faced an angry negotiation partner is consistent with their higher frequency of negative behaviours toward the Sgt, suggesting at least some level of self-calibration. Other results showed that trainees in both conditions thought that there was a "50/50 chance" that they would be harmed if this scenario had been real. Trainees in the baseline condition rated this probability slightly higher than those facing an angry Sgt.

Several questions explored the perceived role of diplomacy during the scenario and the attributions of responsibility trainees made for the situation they encountered. Though there were no significant differences, directional patterns shown in Table 46 are interesting to consider.

Table 46: Role and responsibility

	Baseline			Experimental		
Question	Valid N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Valid N	Mean	Std. Dev.
I thought that the only COA with the Sgt was diplomacy. (Strongly disagree = 1, neutral =5, strongly agree =9)	32	5.91	2.40	31	6.81	2.18
I think in a situation like this, the best COA is to compromise and to make concessions. (Strongly disagree = 1, neutral =5, strongly agree =9)	31	4.97	2.55	31	5.29	2.53
I would have liked to be more forceful with the police. (Strongly disagree = 1, neutral =5, strongly agree =9)	31	6.16	2.02	31	5.32	2.51
I found it difficult to remain impartial to the situation. (Strongly disagree = 1, neutral =5, strongly agree =9)	32	6.13	1.77	31	5.35	2.59
I felt that the success or failure of the mission rested on my shoulders. (Strongly disagree=1, neutral=5, strongly agree=9)	32	5.97	2.18	31	5.03	2.24
I felt personally responsible for the well-being of the prisoners. (Strongly disagree=1, neutral =5, strongly agree =9)	32	5.81	2.05	30	5.57	2.47
During the mission, I was more influenced by my personal conscience rather than the organization's values and practices. (Strongly disagree=1, neutral =5, strongly agree=9)	31	5.45	1.77	31	5.23	2.22

Trainees confronted by the angry Sgt agreed slightly more that the only COA with the Sgt was diplomacy and with the notion that the best COA was to compromise and to make concessions.

Trainees confronted by a neutral Sgt agreed somewhat more that they would have liked to be more forceful with the police and found it more difficult to remain impartial to the situation.

Trainees confronted with a neutral Sgt felt somewhat more personally responsible that the mission depended on them than did those confronted with an angry Sgt. However, levels of perceived responsibility were still relatively high in both conditions. Moreover, trainees in both conditions were also fairly neutral when it came to the influence of the organization's values and practices versus their own personal conscience in resolving the dilemma unfolding on the stand.

Questionnaire items also explored the style in which trainees made decisions during the mission scenario. As shown in Table 47, participants' self-reported styles in making decisions were not different between conditions.

Table 47: Decision-making strategy

	Baseline			Experimental		
Question	Valid N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Valid N	Mean	Std. Dev.
I relied on my instincts to tell me what to do during the mission. (Strongly disagree=1, neutral =5, strongly agree=9)	31	6.10	1.87	29	5.59	2.26
There was very little time in the mission for me to consider all of the relevant information before making a decision. (Strongly disagree=1, neutral =5, strongly agree=9)	33	6.00	1.44	31	5.71	2.64
From the moment we started negotiating with the Sgt, I could tell that he was not telling the truth. . (Strongly disagree=1, neutral =5, strongly agree=9)	33	7.39	1.37	30	7.47	1.17
I considered the pros and cons of all of the options before making my decision (Strongly disagree=1, neutral =5, strongly agree=9)	32	6.00	1.61	30	6.13	1.89
In my view, there is some evidence that the prisoners could be guilty of terrorist activity. . (Strongly disagree=1, neutral =5, strongly agree=9)	31	4.06	2.46	29	3.69	2.14

All trainees suggested they used their instincts to inform them what to do during the mission, but ratings in both conditions were close to the neutral point on the scale. They also did not report that there was little time in the mission to consider the relevant information as means landed close to the neutral point. Questionnaire data also suggests trainees did not necessarily consider the pros and cons of all of the options before making their decisions, with means again close to the neutral point. Trainees agreed that the Sgt was not telling the truth and disagreed that there was evidence that the civilian prisoners could be guilty of terrorist activity.

Trainees were asked a few questions about the scenario outcome. For example, they were asked whether they would change their own actions if they could redo the scenario. As shown in Table 48, all trainees suggested that they would change their actions somewhat.[20]

[20] An open-ended question provided for participants who said they would change their actions asked for specific information about how. This is shown in Annex E at the end of this paper.

Table 48: Ratings of scenario outcome

	Baseline			Experimental		
Question	Valid N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Valid N	Mean	Std. Dev.
If you had the chance to redo this scenario, how much would you change your own actions? (Not at all=1, moderately=5, completely=9)	29	4.90	2.24	31	4.10	2.01
How would you rate the overall quality of the outcome of this situation? (Worst possible=1, neutral=5, best possible=9)	31	3.97	2.47	30	4.17	2.04
How would you rate the overall quality of your response to this scenario? (Worst possible=1, neutral=5, best possible=9)	32	5.47	1.29	31	5.68	1.66
In comparison to other teams in this situation, do you think your team responded better or worse than other teams? (Much worse=1, the same=5, much better=9)	32	5.19	1.51	27	5.37	1.57

In terms of the quality of the scenario outcome as a whole, trainees in both conditions rated the quality of the outcome below the neutral point. However, they rated their own personal response to the scenario as generally more positive. Finally, trainees were asked to compare their own team's response to that of the other teams. Trainees rated their performance as only slightly better than that of other teams.

There is, however, some reason to expect that the leader of the team (or the lead negotiator) could have had a slightly different experience during the scenario than other members of the team by virtue of his position. It was important to explore potential differences between team leaders and team member on the questionnaire measures. These analyses were completed for all questionnaire items, and the only significant difference is shown in Figure 31.



Figure 31: Desire to change actions by role

Members reported being significantly more motivated than leader to change their actions if they had the opportunity to redo the scenario.

Questionnaire items also investigated the potential impact of emotional intensity during the negotiation. Faced with an angry Sgt, for example, would trainees be able to attend to and recall the same level of information? From one perspective, one might argue that the emotional intensity of one's negotiation partner may promote better information processing, if one is even more motivated to be attentive to his issues in order to 'bring him down'. On the other hand, the human rights violation is already an intense situation, and perhaps the high intensity of the angry Sgt would overload people and diminish their ability to focus on his exact message.

Exploring this issue required scripting the police Sgt so that key themes were presented both when he was angry as well as more neutral. This was done using 4 sentences that the Sgt was intended to deliver throughout each scenario. During video coding, researchers also recorded the number of times the Sgt had actually delivered these phrases during each session. The results are shown in Tables 49 and 50.

Table 49: Information Processing – Themes

Theme	Frequency			% Frequency		
	Baseline	Experimental	Total	Baseline	Experimental	Total
Anger at organization	23	59	82	21%	27%	25%
Anger at terrorists	23	43	66	21%	19%	20%
Anger at interference	50	81	131	46%	36%	40%
Anger at trainees giving orders	13	39	52	12%	18%	16%
TOTAL	109	222	331	100%	100%	101%

Table 50: Information Processing – Themes by percent

Theme	% of Sgt Exhibiting Behaviour		
	Baseline	Experimental	Total
Anger at organization	88%	100%	94%
Anger at terrorists	88%	100%	94%
Anger at interference	57%	89%	76%
Anger at trainees giving orders	57%	89%	76%

In order to explore the information-processing capability of trainees, the questionnaire asked trainees to read several sentences, some of which paralleled the 4 key themes and others that participants had not actually heard. They were required to identify which statements they heard during the session and their level of certainty or confidence in their judgements. These recall data were then analyzed in terms of whether trainees were accurate or inaccurate in reporting the sentences that they had actually heard during their team's scenario. Results are shown in Tables 51 and 52.

Table 51: Responses by question type[21]

Question Type	'True' Response	'False' Response	Total
True	148 (mean confidence = 8.0, N = 132)	41 (mean confidence = 5.1, N = 32)	189
False	76 (mean confidence = 6.3, N = 66)	207 (mean confidence = 6.5, N = 178)	283
Total	224	248	472

In Tables 51 and 52, correct responses occur in the 'true' question type and 'true' response cell, as well as the 'false' question type and 'false' response cell (total correct responses: 148 + 207 = 355, 75%). The other two cells represent errors (total errors: 76 + 41 = 117, 25%). The error rate for false items was 17% and the error rate for true items was 34%. Note that some of the questions

[21] Sample sizes for confidence ratings are lower than the event frequency due to missing confidence data.

were false for some respondents and true for others; this has been accounted for in the coding used for both tables.

Table 52: Responses by question type separated by condition[22]

Condition	Question Type	'True' Response	'False' Response	Total
Baseline	True	49 (mean confidence = 8.1, N = 60)	44 (mean confidence = 5.2, N = 21)	93
	False	38 (mean confidence = 6.6, N = 34)	109 (mean confidence = 6.7, N = 93)	147
	Total	87	153	240
Experimental	True	81 (mean confidence = 8.0, N = 72)	15 (mean confidence = 4.9, N = 11)	96
	False	38 (mean confidence = 5.9, N = 32)	98 (mean confidence = 6.3, N = 85)	136
	Total	119	113	232

Preliminary descriptive analyses were conducted on the data in these tables, as shown in Table 52.

As Tables 51 and 52 show, overall trainees were accurate in their recall of relevant themes about 75% of the time. In the baseline condition, they were more accurate at correctly identifying sentences that they had not heard during the scenario (74%) than correctly recognizing sentences that they had actually heard (53%). They were also overly optimistic about their confidence judgements about the latter. Participants in the experimental condition showed the reverse pattern. Participants were less accurate at correctly identifying sentences that they had not heard during the scenario (72%) than correctly recognizing sentences that they had actually heard (84%), although they also showed the highest confidence judgements for correct 'true' responses. Incorrect 'true' judgements were similar in the two conditions, and accounted for about 16% of judgements, whereas incorrect false judgments accounted for about 9% of total judgements, 18% in the baseline condition and 6% in the experimental condition.

The accuracy of participants in the baseline condition was about 66%, and the accuracy in the experimental condition was about 77%. This appears to be evidence supporting the idea that the increased arousal produced by the angry Sgt might have increased the participants' attention and increased their subsequent memories for the encounter. There is also evidence for a different bias in the two groups of participants. The baseline group responded 'true' 36% of the time, while the experimental participants responded 'true' 51% of the time. It can be noted that in such true/false tests the proportion of 'true' and 'false' responses is most often 50%, and so the baseline reflects an unusual proportion of 'true' and 'false' responses.

[22] Sample sizes for confidence ratings are lower than the event frequency due to missing confidence data.

3.5 Summary of Results

First, analysis of the questionnaire data clearly show that the intended experimental manipulation was successful, as trainees in the experimental condition rated the Sgt to be significantly angrier than did trainees in the baseline condition. The Sgt's observed negotiation behaviours as coded from the video also support this assertion. During experimental missions, the Sgt demonstrated fewer customary gestures in the preliminary stages of the negotiation, i.e., he shook hands less with the trainees, introduced himself to trainees less, established common ground less, and created fewer social events. By violating a number of customary behaviours upon introductions, the Sgt may have fostered greater discomfort for trainees caught in the human rights violation scenario. As well, throughout the negotiations, the Sgt in the experimental condition exhibited higher rates of behaviours associated with building a negative relationship. For example, he was much more condescending, insulting, and sarcastic toward the trainees when angry than when neutral, and he expressed critical opinions of the trainees' behaviour more and threatened them with future consequences more. The Sgt also complied with the trainees' demands less and denied their requests more when angry.

For trainee teams, there are a number of patterns in the data worth considering in more detail. The fact that trainees rated their anger as similar in both conditions suggests that trainees did not report themselves as having taken up the anger of the Sgt during the negotiation. However, the high frequency of negative trainee behaviours in the experimental condition suggests that their anger in response to the Sgt may have unwittingly influenced their behaviour. On the other hand, it is possible that the angry Sgt did make the trainees more angry than the neutral Sgt did, but they were reluctant to honestly report their level of anger perhaps because the trainees thought they should have had more control over their emotions. Negotiation behaviours suggest that although trainees showed restraint with some behaviours (e.g. not being condescending in return), they also escalated the situation with negative responses of their own (e.g. circumventing Sgt's authority). These discrepancies between trainees' self-assessments of their emotional state and their actual negotiation behaviours during the mission will be important to explore in more detail.

That the trainees confronted by the angry Sgt agreed slightly more that the only COA with the Sgt was diplomacy, and more strongly endorsed the notion that the best COA was to compromise and to make concessions is also interesting. This pattern suggests that even when faced with an angry adversary, trainees recognized the importance of the diplomatic role in this kind of negotiation, and may have worked to "control" their negative responses to the Sgt by adopting a more diplomatic approach. However, the large relative differences between the frequency of negative responses in the baseline vs. experimental condition suggests that they were perhaps not wholly successful in attempting to control their negative responses (e.g. expressing a critical opinion of the police's behaviour or circumventing his authority). These responses appear to run counter to their diplomatic role. Rather, consistent with the social contagion hypothesis. The Sgt's angry behaviour may have made them more reactive despite their strategic attempts to control their own responses and refrain from responding negatively in return. Future research could further explore this issue more discretely with carefully targeted questions in a more controlled setting, such as trainees' classroom exercises.

It is also noteworthy that teams confronted by a neutral Sgt agreed somewhat more that they would have liked to be more forceful with the police and found it more difficult to remain impartial to the situation. These items may suggest that the trainees confronted by a neutral Sgt may have perceived more latitude in managing the Sgt and may have felt more inclined to "push the

envelope" during negotiations. Negotiation theory suggests that when negotiators perceive such opportunities, they would be prudent to strategically make larger demands and more requests (van Kleef et al., 2004a). Behaviourally, there was some evidence that those facing a more neutral Sgt were taking advantage of the emotional state of the Sgt. For example, teams faced with a neutral Sgt made more requests to get him to stop beating the civilians.

Although most of the results are aggregated at the team level, individual team roles also showed important differences. Team members (i.e. those not acting as team leader) showed significantly higher levels of wishing that they could have redone the scenario. This finding might be explained by the role they play in the scenario. The leader takes on negotiation responsibilities, leaving team members with little opportunity to engage in the scenario and to affect the outcome. In some ways, the team members act as third party observers to the negotiation. Their responses to the situation do not have to be immediate like the team leaders, perhaps providing room to process what is being said by the two negotiators and generate other options. The team members may want to change their actions to the scenario, especially if the negotiation did not go well. The leaders, on the other hand, were in a position of greater control given they were tasked to do the negotiating, and perhaps to feel justified in their negotiation behaviours, they would be less likely to want to change them had they the opportunity. Given that team members seemed to want to change their actions, it is perhaps surprising that there were not more occurrences of team member intervention. This may be a function of the military hierarchy that could be discussed in training. If trainees are expected to work as a non-hierarchical team as opposed to the more traditional hierarchical team, then greater instruction might be warranted around these issues. Research might explore this further given the similar team leader and team member differences emerged in the previous study (Thomson & Adams, 2007).

Thus, as a whole, these results show some compelling differences in behaviour as the result of the emotional state of the team's negotiation partner. Future studies should be conducted with larger sample sizes in each condition (i.e. $n > 99$) in order to allow moderate effect sizes to be detected, assuming power = .80 and alpha = .05, which are in accordance with guidelines provided by Cohen (1988). This experiment has implications for both training and future research, and these are discussed in the next section.

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4 Discussion

This study was initiated in response to the findings of previous research (Thomson and Adams, 2007), in which it was noted that trainees confronted with a high intensity scenario showed a higher than optimal level of negative behaviours directed at their negotiation partner. However, as the previous study had explored only the behaviour of trainees, it was impossible to know the extent to which negative responses were provoked by the behaviour of the Sgt (e.g., the Sgt could simply have been overly negative in some instances giving the trainees more incentive to respond in kind). Moreover, the extent to which these behaviours were a product of wise strategic choices on the part of trainees was not clear. If, for example, trainees recognized the Sgt's behaviour as giving them latitude to take more chances in order to gain concessions, trainees may have perceived the negative behaviours to be necessary. However, the negotiation literature seems to imply that whether negotiation behaviour is optimal or suboptimal depends on the negotiating party's responsiveness to the cues provided by one's negotiating partner (van Kleef et al., 2004a). Being aggressive and "pushing the envelope" is perhaps only prudent when there is clear evidence that the other party is likely to be responsive and to become more yielding. Pushing forward aggressively when the other party is not likely to be amenable to this may escalate the situation and harm the rapport needed to meet one's negotiation goals. Clearly, understanding the reasons for one partner's response requires an understanding of their negotiation partner's responses. This was a confounding factor in the previous Moral and Ethical Field Study which was addressed here.

The key issue we sought to explore was how a negotiation partner is likely to behave in a given situation when provided by observable cues signalling the other's emotional state (van Kleef et al., 2004a). In a very happy emotional state, a negotiating partner would typically be expected to be more conciliatory and amenable to making key concessions. Being angry, on the other hand, may make this person very difficult to negotiate with, and one might be well advised to back off from making aggressive demands until having developed a higher level of rapport. The critical issue explored in the current study was how trainees would respond when confronted with a Sgt who was very angry and aggressive or neutral and yielding. When facing an angry Sgt, would their behaviour escalate as well, providing evidence of 'social contagion' hypothesis, or would they hold it in check in order to diffuse the situation, as predicted by a strategic choice approach to negotiation?

Overall, the behavioural data provide some support for both the social contagion effect (i.e., adopting a similar affective, attitudinal, or behavioural position as the Sgt) as well as evidence of trainees making strategic choices when interacting with the Sgt. Compared to trainees facing a neutral Sgt, trainees confronting an angry negotiation partner showed more behaviours associated with building a negative relationship, such as expressing opinions that were critical of him, acting in a condescending and insulting way, threatening him with future consequences, circumventing his authority, and opposing his demands. As well, trainees facing an angry Sgt made almost the same number of demands as those facing the more neutral Sgt.. This runs counter to the strategic choice model of negotiation which holds negotiators faced with an angry partner should strategically make fewer demands than those faced with a more friendly negotiation partner (van Kleef et al., 2004a). Unless an angry partner seems willing to offer large concessions, it may be imprudent to make high demands. Given the high power inequity in the situation that trainees face (e.g., the Sgt has a gun, and they are unarmed), being demanding when faced with an angry negotiation partner may be especially problematic.

On the other hand, behavioural data also show evidence of strategic efforts to diffuse the situation when faced with an angry Sgt. For example, empathy and responsiveness directed at the Sgt was two times more frequent when he was angry than when neutral. As well, trainees in the experimental condition also showed more instances of following up with the Sgt's concerns and of attempting to lower his emotion. To their credit, trainees confronted by an angry Sgt still made attempts to establish a positive relationship with him. Moreover, for negative relationship behaviours, trainees also seemed to strategically resist responding to the Sgt in kind, even when he was often very condescending and rude. Although they showed higher rates of these behaviours when the Sgt was angry, the frequency of these behaviours overall was still considerably lower than those of the Sgt., showing that they were at least not responding in kind. As such, the behavioural data show evidence of both strategic choice and social contagion effects on the part of trainees when facing an intensely emotional negotiating partner.

For the self-report questionnaire measures, social contagion effects were not so obvious as trainees reported no difference in the personal anger that they felt toward the angry and neutral Sgt during the mission. On average, all trainees rated their feelings of anger as only moderate. Moreover, there was also some evidence that participants faced with an angry Sgt recognized the constraints that the Sgt's anger imposed on them, as those in the experimental condition showed a tendency to agree more strongly[23] that the only COA with the Sgt was diplomacy. Trainees faced with an angry Sgt also reported less desire to be more forceful with the police and reported that they found it less difficult to remain impartial to the angry Sgt. The fact that these ratings were higher for trainees in the baseline condition suggests that trainees faced with a more neutral Sgt may have perceived more latitude in their situation, and consequently they may have felt that more options were available to them other than just diplomacy. As such, these questionnaire patterns seem to support the strategic choice account, that trainees recognized the nature of the situation that they were in, used the Sgt's emotion as information cues, and tailored their actions during the negotiation accordingly.

Nonetheless, this apparent discrepancy between actual behaviours and these self-reports are an important finding of this study, as they suggest a potentially important disconnect between participants' recognition of what they should do (as reported on the questionnaire measures) and what they actually did (as indicated by the behavioural frequencies). Of course, there are many possible explanations for this inconsistency. First, it may be that trainees simply did not report their true emotions during the scenario. If they were actually angry, but knew from their training that a critical part of executing their role was to maintain a positive (or at least neutral) stance toward their negotiation partner, they may have been hesitant to report that they had been angry or that they would have liked to have been more forceful. Trainees might also have inadvertently reported their post-resolution emotions rather than the ones that they actually felt during the scenario. As such, they would have naturally reported having been less bothered than they had actually been, as the intensity of their emotion post-scenario would generally be expected to be lower.[24] Of course, these issues underscore the importance of utilizing multiple measures in order to understand the often complex dynamics of social psychological phenomenon.

Conversely, assuming the questionnaire results reflected the true state of the trainees would imply that they were simply not fully aware that their emotional state influenced their negotiation

[23] Recall that these patterns were not significant.

[24] Of course, this will depend somewhat on the outcome of the scenario.

behaviour. When dealing with a highly angry negotiation partner, trainees may not have been completely aware that some of their behaviours mirrored those of the Sgt, and this could have adversely affected their ability to self-regulate. The emotional intensity and obstinate behaviour of the Sgt could have been subtly transferred to trainees without their conscious awareness. This may have prevented them from using informational cues inferred by his emotional state in order to direct the negotiation, as the strategic choice hypothesis would suggest. This account seems more consistent with the social contagion hypothesis. Of course, it is impossible to know what might account for the inconsistency between trainees' self-reports and their actual behaviour, but future research could investigate this issue further.

A key aspect of this experiment was the choice that teams made when required to quickly decide whether to follow the civilians and police into the forest, to stay in the negotiation area but watch as the civilians were led away, or whether to give in to the persistent urging of the Sgt to leave the situation and to disengage altogether, leaving the civilians in the hands of the abusive police. Any of these decisions is consistent with current training. Nonetheless, it is also clear that this decision is clearly a difficult one to make, as attempting to maintain contact with the civilians means potentially putting oneself in danger as well.

The fact that the most common response was for teams to choose to put themselves in harm's way (even with a most angry Sgt in charge) is heartening in a sense, as it suggests that the teams saw their primary responsibility as being to protect the civilians, perhaps even above their own safety. Teams were slightly less likely to follow and to simply watch civilians be taken away when the Sgt was angry, but leaving the situation occurred more frequently when confronted with an angry Sgt. On the surface anyway, manipulating the anger of the Sgt did not seem to have a strong effect on the choices made as the scenario drew to a close.

Of course, <u>why</u> teams made the choices that they did was not assessed in the current study. Understanding the factors that played into their decision may shed additional light on the impact that the Sgt's emotional state might have had. Of course, as this is a role play scenario, ultimately it is not clear the extent to which these choices would reflect actual behaviours in these situations. As well, the trainees are expected to remain reasonably safe. Sacrificing themselves would prevent them from fulfilling their mission objective, which is ultimately reporting and providing testimony in actual deployments

In a previous study, team members who chose to watch the police lead the civilians into the forest rated the quality of their teams' response and the quality of the outcome significantly less positively than team members who either accepted the risk of following the police and civilians into the forest or team who chose to disengage and leave the civilians in the hands of the abusive police (Thomson & Adams, 2007). This finding was not replicated in the current study. Teams who followed the police and the civilians through the forest were significantly more satisfied with the quality of the outcome than were teams who either stayed or left. Teams that witnessed the death of the civilians at the hands of the police uniformly rated the quality of the outcome to be negative.

And yet, additional analyses showed that teams who chose to watch the police lead the civilians into the forest rated their anger toward the Sgt marginally higher than those who either left or escorted the police and civilians, despite the fact that civilians died when they both watched and left. This finding is consistent with the general pattern of response noted in the previous study (albeit on a different though related dependent variable).The difference, then, does not appear to be a consequence of the death of the civilians. As we speculated in the previous study (Thomson & Adams, 2007), failing to take a definitive stand and simply "watching" as the civilians are lead into

the forest (and are quickly shot) might generate more personal frustration that needs to be vented. Transferring anger to another target and away from oneself post hoc may be a strategy to cope with the indecisiveness and perhaps even to attribute blame to external forces for the negative outcome. It is interesting to note that teams that watched the civilians being led into the forest agreed marginally more that the best COA was to compromise and make concessions with the Sgt compared to teams who left or followed. This positive framing of the resolution that these teams chose may serve as a way to rationalize their relative inaction and indecisiveness. Taking a less aggressive stance and making concessions could also be construed as a more risk aversive approach because trainees act more cooperatively to build a more positive relationship with the Sgt and potentially lower his emotion.

Both this study and the earlier study (Thomson and Adams, 2007) showed that those who chose to watch the civilians be lead away by the police (and shot) have a distinctly different view of the scenario outcome as well as somewhat different emotional responses to it. It is important to understand why these individuals report different levels of satisfaction and emotion, especially when the civilians suffer the same consequence as other teams leave the situation. Does counterfactual thinking emerge more for those who watch than for those who leave? Do those who make a less definitive decision do so because of self-protective reasons or do they genuinely feel that the best solution under the circumstances is to stay as close as feasible to the civilians without putting their ability to be witnesses in jeopardy? To provide an adequate account, these questions will need to be addressed in future research that explores the mechanisms surrounding team decision-making in a moral situation like the human rights violation scenario.

4.1 Training Implications

This research has several possible implications for training.[25] At the most basic level, this study provides some evidence that the positive aspects of relationship building may need more attention during negotiation training. These data show that although teams generally did a good job of working to build a positive relationship, positive relationship behaviours on the part of trainees only accounted for 9% of total behaviours, while negative behaviours accounted for 15%. The behavioural and questionnaire data suggest that though the relative frequency of negative trainee behaviours are lower than those of the Sgt. Thus, trainees did interact negatively with the Sgt, which may not be the best strategy when dealing with an angry police Sgt who has a weapon, especially since trainees are unarmed. Despite the fact that the current study required the Sgt to behave angry and aggressive in half of the sessions, our previous research in which the physical proximity of the female victim, rather than the behavior of the Sgt was manipulated, also reported a high rate of negative relationship building behaviours (Thomson & Adams, 2007).

Given the intense nature of negotiating in a military context, having trainees work harder to introduce positive and responsive behaviours into the negotiation will have value. Moreover, additional training about maintaining neutrality (for example, neutrality in peacekeeping operations is often a requirement) might be helpful, especially in the face of an abusive adversary committing human rights violations. It is important, therefore, to help trainees develop appropriate responses,

[25] As noted in the previous report (Thomson and Adams, 2007), the value of this research for training depends to some extent on the convergence between the coding scheme used for content analysis and the perceptions of actual DS.

not only to aggressive parties in operations, but also to the morally-charged situations that they are likely to face. Moral issues are difficult under normal circumstances. However, with increased operational pressures, these situations are likely to be even more difficult. Unfortunately, in this particular pre-deployment curriculum, there is little (if any) discussion or activity specifically pertaining to managing tough moral situations.

This research also suggests that providing information about potential social contagion effects during negotiations with others might also be helpful to trainees. Moreover, providing specific strategies to deal with social contagion effects may also be beneficial. Although trainees seem to have worked to resist matching the emotional state and conduct of the Sgt, his anger did carry over to their own behaviour to some extent. Looking at the videotapes holistically showed that some trainees simply appeared tired of being responsive and conciliatory, and eventually resorted to more negative behaviours when provoked. Hence, providing trainees with strategies that could assist them in paying close attention to their own reactions and emotions may be useful.

For example, some teams disengaged part way through the negotiation and took time to confer as a team. This strategy appeared to increase team work and provide frustrated lead negotiators with an opportunity to check his or her emotions. This time-out might provide teams with an opportunity to lower feelings of exasperation arising from the Sgt's cantankerous behaviour, regroup as a team, and develop more effective strategies. Given that the total average time of the negotiation was 13 minutes, teaching the value of deliberate breaks in order to reassess both the situation and to get one's own negative emotions in check could be very helpful to trainees. As it stands, the team leader is responsible for the majority of the negotiation, while team members largely observe. Perhaps maximizing team processes during this kind of situation would promote more strategic negotiation, help to keep emotions in check, and guard against the influence of the negotiation partner's emotion, especially when angry.

As well, results suggest a potential disconnect between trainee's self-reported emotions and their actual behaviours that might be worth considering during training. As noted earlier, this discrepancy could have more than one cause. However, if trainees were simply not aware of their own heightened levels of anger (and the potential for these to accelerate their own negative behaviour during the negotiation), this could be very problematic, especially in operations where anger might escalate to the use of force. This suggests that specific training aimed at helping trainees to recognize the subtle impact that another person's emotional state can have on their emotion, attitudes and behaviour may be important. Including this information in the current training curriculum may not be that difficult given that one exercise already encourages trainees to attend to their own physiological indicators (e.g. heart-rate, breathing, etc.). This particular training stand taking shows trainees how their own arousal in highly charged situation can distort their perceptions of time. Broader consideration of the potential for changes in both physiology as well as in one's own attitudes and behaviours in highly intense situations may also be useful for trainees.

This experiment suggests that training could aim to increase the awareness of negotiators to the subtle interpersonal influences of their negotiating partners. Unlike previous laboratory experiments conducted without direct contact between negotiating partners (van Kleef et al., 2004a), the face-to-face negotiations in this study did not grant trainees the luxury of supplanting their own anger for merely strategic considerations. The Sgt's emotions sometimes seemed to have a direct impact on their negotiation behaviours. Trainees, therefore, may benefit from knowing that the emotional state of a negotiation partner can have a subtle influence on their own conduct, so

that they can guard against this and use it to their advantage as the strategic choice hypothesis would emphasize. Using a partner's emotions as information (i.e., tracking) instead of reflecting and escalating those emotions would assist the determination of when it is appropriate to push the envelope and when it is best to make concessions. Reducing contentious tactics is also more in line with the diplomatic role of a soldier, and this may lead to an increase in cooperation and joint gains during negotiations. As such, additional training around this issue may be helpful.

4.2 Future Research

Many different issues could be addressed in future research exploring the decision-making and negotiation behaviour of military personnel under a morally challenging situation. One of the explicit goals of this research is to be able to contribute to the CF training cycle, and to provide feedback about the negotiation behaviours that trainees exhibit and the decisions that they make during this scenario. After having completed two complete research projects, however, it seems important (for both research purposes and training purposes) to work with military SMEs to formally validate the coding scheme. Consistent with previous research (Thomson & Adams, 2007), the results of this study found a high frequency of behaviours associated with building a negative relationship. It is important to ensure that the research team and military SMEs/instructors define behaviours in the same way, and that the behaviours identified in the coding scheme are consistent with the behaviours that are deemed important from the perspective of course instructors.

For example, the coding scheme identifies behaviours that are either optimal or suboptimal, as well as using detailed definitions to distinguish each behaviour. If the information gained from the research is to be of maximal value to the training cycle, the coding scheme should undergo a subject matter expert validation. The validation could involve the research team meeting with CF pre-deployment instructors and providing them with videotaped examples of the relevant behaviours. Discussion could then be focused on the degree to which the behaviours match the current coding scheme, and if they are deemed optimal or suboptimal in the eyes of military personnel. As negotiation research is typically conducted in the laboratory with student populations, it is important to ensure that the presumed meaning of the identified behaviours (e.g. making demands of one's negotiation partner is typically seen as a suboptimal behaviour) is consistent within a military context. SME validation will, therefore, help calibrate research findings with CF pre-deployment training.

Second, it would be ideal to further analyze the data from this study in order to more accurately determine the direction of provocation during this emotional negotiation. Although framed such that the angry person in the negotiation is the one that provokes other negotiation parties, it will be critical to explore the time sequence of behaviours as they evolve in negotiations. This would require a more complex analysis than was possible here. For example, although the pattern emphasized in this report is emotion having "carried over" from the Sgt to the teams, the reverse pattern could also have been true in some cases. [26] It will be important then for future research to consider the direction of provocation and its consequences for negotiation outcomes.

[26] However, video analysis does suggest that the angry Sgt seemed to typically be the prominent instigator of negativity (rather than the recipient of it) during the scenario.

Thirdly, several constructs noted in the wider psychological literature also seem highly relevant to current research. For example, it would be helpful to look further at the potential role of epistemic motivation in highly emotionally charged negotiations like the human rights violation stand. Epistemic motivation can be defined as an individual's "desire to develop and maintain a rich and accurate understanding of the world, including the negotiation task" (DeDreu & Carnevale, 2003; cited in van Kleef et al., 2004b, p.511). The literature suggests that epistemic motivation could influence negotiators' attentiveness to the emotional states of others. For example, a person identified as low in epistemic motivation would be more likely to process information quickly and effortlessly by way of heuristics (van Kleef et al., 2004b). This may mean that such a person may not notice the emotional state of another person, and this lack of awareness may influence their negotiation strategy. On the other hand, another person identified as high in epistemic motivation may process information deliberately and systematically, requiring greater effort (van Kleef et al., 2004b) but also being more in tune with the emotional state of one's negotiation partner. If this is the case, then a negotiator's personal level of epistemic motivation could mitigate the impact of social contagion effects. In short, simply not attending to the cues provided by one's negotiation partner may mean being less influenced by them. [27]

Epistemic motivation has been shown to be related to power and accountability in previous research. First, there is good evidence that compared to low power individuals, high power people often process information more heuristically. Specifically, they pay less attention to information that conflicts with their initial expectations of others (Erber & Fiske, 1984; cited in van Kleef et al., 2004b), make use of stereotypes for formulating impressions of others (Goodwin, Gubin., Fiske, & Yzerbyt, 2000; Neuberg & Fiske, 1987; cited in van Kleef et al., 2004b), and ask fewer questions designed to provide a more accurate account of other people (DeDreu & van Kleef, 2004; cited in van Kleef et al., 2004b). Consistent with this, research by van Kleef and colleagues (2004b) showed that people with high power had less epistemic motivation and were less influenced by their negotiation partner's emotion, whereas, those with low power showed higher epistemic motivation and were more responsive to the emotion of their negotiation partners. Specifically, low power individuals were more likely to take their partners' emotion into account, conceding more when negotiating with an angry partner than with a happy partner. High power individuals, on the other hand, remained unmoved by their partner's emotional state. Epistemic motivation might be an important variable to include in future research as well as include in the current CF pre-deployment training regimen.

Power is a potentially important variable to investigate because power differentials are a large component of the missions of which CF members will be a part. For example, being a representative of the United Nations as a peacekeeper may provide military personnel with a high degree of power through a mandate that includes relatively free movement within a host country, the expectation to document information regarding the host countries' military and paramilitary activities, and the force of the international community. Often, however, this power is illusory as peacekeepers confront individuals who do not recognize the United Nations as a lawful entity and do not care about its protocols. As well, there will be a number of mission actors, such as high ranking military and police officials, local politicians, warlords, etc., who are accustomed to executing power within their own country, sometimes at their own discretion outside any formal process of law. Thus, the potential for confrontation between military observers and mission actors

[27] Of course, having less probability of social contagion does not necessarily mean that the negotiation is optimal, as the costs of decreased responsiveness are likely to be higher than the potential benefits.

seems quite reasonable to assume, and it might benefit trainees if they were to understand this position more comprehensively. Determining the connection between epistemic motivation and power, therefore, might be an important piece of CF pre-deployment training to invoke trainees' apperception and sharpen their decision-making and negotiation capabilities. Training CF personnel to recognize how their own sense of power influences decision-making and negotiations with mission actors would be an important contribution. Because the primary skill development for this particular training is negotiation, which stresses the importance of viewing every party's position in the negotiation as important and relevant, trainees may benefit from understanding how epistemic motivation and power can influence the process both positively and negatively. Identifying high powered individuals in advance of dismounted training exercises may be a way of providing extra coaching to facilitate greater epistemic motivation.

Accountability is another construct to consider as this research program proceeds. This can be understood as the expectation that one will be required to justify their statements or behaviour to another. Military personnel are indeed accountable for their actions, not only to their superiors in the organization but also to their country and in some cases, to the international community. Further research regarding the relationship between epistemic motivation and accountability would be of interest to CF if they were able to use this knowledge to enhance CF pre-deployment training. Would markers such as heightened awareness of accountability positively impact the moral and ethical decision-making strategies trainees adopt during the human rights violation scenario? Would manipulating the degree of accountability lead to increased epistemic motivation and as a consequence different negotiation behaviours? Research has shown that accountability makes people more likely to invoke systematic judgement strategies rather than heuristic strategies. For example, people who feel accountable prefer more complex over simple weighting formulas (McAllister et al., 1979; cited in Lerner & Tetlock, 1999) and show a decrease in hastiness and insufficient processing when they are asked to affirm memory-based interpersonal judgements (Ford & Weldon, 1981; cited in Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). As well, research shows accountability increases consideration of substantive arguments as opposed to irrelevant ones (Chaiken, 1980; cited in Lerner & Tetlock, 1999) and greater attention to situational attributions as opposed to dispositional attributions impacting a target's conduct (Lerner et al., 1998; cited in Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). Accountability, therefore, can lead individuals to process information and make judgements in a more deliberate, effortful and systematic way rather relying simply on heuristics. Not surprisingly, increased sense of accountability has been shown to increase epistemic motivation (van Kleef et al., 2004a). It is possible that accountability will moderate the relationship between epistemic motivation and negotiation behaviours and as such act as an intervention to increase the strategic choice/mismatching effect.

Within the current research platform (i.e. the human rights violation scenario), there are three main parties, the police Sgt (who is in control of the victims), the civilian victims (who are being abused), and the trainee teams (who are working to protect the victims). To this point in the research program, studies have focused on the emotional intensity of the police Sgt and on the physical proximity of a civilian victim. Completing this set of studies would require focusing on some aspect of trainee teams. To do this, of course, it would be necessary to find important research issues that are not likely to impact on training.

Emerging from both observations of mission debriefs by DS as well as from findings of previous research, one possible issue to explore is the impact of promoting a more collaborative team process during the human rights violation scenario. For example, the DS emphasize teamwork in their debriefs and specifically ask trainees how they think they did as a team. However, the

findings documented in this report and those from the previous study (Thomson & Adams, 2007) indicate that those trainees who are team members (and not the team leader) may have a different experience during the human rights violation stand. In particular, results of both studies showed that team members were significantly more motivated than team leaders to change their actions (if provided the opportunity to redo the scenario). One reason for this may be the current structure of the team and the expected behaviours of team members. Exploring different team structures or how team members interact with one another may benefit the pre-deployment training military personnel receive prior to deployment.

In the current human rights violation scenario, teams typically function in a relatively hierarchical way. Though the leadership role switches amongst team members in the course of successive exercises, one person is appointed as leader for each exercise. The team leader is expected to take the primary role facing the Sgt during negotiations on the human rights violation stand, whereas team members (usually 1 or 2 military personnel) typically observe. Moreover, video analyses showed that the team leader seemed to make the team's ultimate decision as the stand moved toward its conclusion (i.e., to leave, watch or follow the civilians) with little consultation with other team members. The impact of this approach is that team members' input might not be fully realized over the course of the human rights violation session because they are for the most part restricted to being observers. This might discourage the presentation of the ideas that individual team members generate as the scenario unfolds. Consider a team member who sees a moral resolution to the situation but does not have an opportunity to introduce this into the negotiation process because of the hierarchical team structure.

An interesting issue to explore here is the impact on team performance during the scenario if all members of the team were able to provide input. Not being fully engaged in the negotiation, the observing members of the team may have the luxury of both attending to more information in the environment and considering other COA. On the other hand, full engagement in the negotiation may, after a time, exhaust the team leader's creative faculties, especially when faced with an angry, unyielding negotiation partner. This might explain why team members were significantly more inclined than team leaders to want to change their actions

Of course, it may not be feasible within this CF training setting to expect that course instructors would be willing to endorse a wholly non-hierarchical team structure. One possible compromise, however, might be to ask whether they would be amenable to altering the scenario slightly to enable more equal input from all team members. Specifically, this could occur by asking teams to take very short breaks from the negotiation to confer as a team, to elicit each team members' ideas about alternative COA, and to attempt to reach consensus in how the teams approach the situation. This manipulation would need to be refined considerably, but the basic purpose is to encourage teams to work more collaboratively. Providing teams with such an opportunity may contribute to the generation of more ideas, positively impacting team decision-making and scenario outcome.

This experimental manipulation (vs. a control condition, if necessary) could be enacted by the DS during a specified point in the scenario (e.g. 5 minute mark) and would parallel previous training scenarios in which DS paused the session to give specific instructions to trainee teams that were having problems (again, observed by the research team). Of course, these ideas would be subject to discussion with potential DS, and the primary consideration in accessing the feasibility of this research would have to be that this manipulation would not impact negatively on training.

Some research suggests that team members who develop ideas independently of their group and then pool them generate more ideas of better quality than team members who brainstorm together

(Nijstad & Stroebe, 2006). Therefore, teams that detach themselves from the situation part way through the scenario in order to re-group and present unique ideas that team members generated while observing the negotiation might be more effective in coming up with unique solutions to the negotiation. Moreover, team members might report less motivation to change their behaviour if they could redo the scenario, if they believe they had an opportunity to present and implement some of their ideas. A greater sense of participation within the team could also foster greater overall satisfaction with the outcome of a team decision (Nijstad, Stroebe, & Lodewijkx, 1999; cited in Nijstad & Stroebe, 2006). To explore these ideas in the context of the proposed study, questionnaires could explore the number of alternative COA identified within the teams, and the quality of these, as well as asking the team about the experience of working collaboratively during the debrief. It is important to note that this is often already done by DS in the course of debriefs.

For the future, there are many different areas of research that could be pursued in this venue. These include calibration of the coding scheme with military SMEs, more complex analysis of the video data to help determine the direction of provocation, exploration of some key constructs (e.g. epistemic motivation, power and accountability), and research that explores the impact of promoting a more collaborative approach to team decision-making on negotiation behaviour and on team decisions.

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Annex A:
Voluntary Consent Form

VOLUNTARY CONSENT FORM

Revised Protocol L-521, Amendment 1

Research Project Title: Decision-making in Operations: A Field Study Part II (Revised Protocol L-521, Amendment 1).

Principal Investigator: Dr. Barbara Adams and Michael Thomson (Humansystems)

DRDC Toronto Principal Investigator: Dr. Matthew Duncan (DRDC)

Co-investigators: Dr. Megan Thompson (DRDC)

I, _____ (name)
_____ (address)
_____
_____ (phone number)

hereby volunteer to participate in the study, "Decision-making in Operations: A Field Study Part II" (Revised Protocol L-521, Amendment 1).

I have been told that an experiment will be conducted at one of the scenarios that I will go through in my regular CF pre-deployment training and preparation.

I understand that:

1. … my participation in this study is completely voluntary, and I understand that I may undertake my training without participating in this study.
2. … I am free to refuse to participate and may withdraw my consent at any time without prejudice or hard feelings at any time.
3. … I may decline any individual items on the questionnaire that I prefer not to answer.
4. … should I withdraw my consent, my involvement as a participant will cease immediately. In this case, I will have the option of requiring that any data that I have provided be destroyed.
5. … the Investigator(s), or their designate, may terminate my participation at any time, regardless of my wishes.
6. … if I agree to participate, I will be video- and audio-taped during the stand and immediately after the stand. These recordings will be used to help identify behaviours and communications that are likely to be associated with successful resolution of the stand.
7. … the video and audio recordings of the sessions are done only at the full consent of the team. Despite my informed consent, therefore, I understand that one or more of my team members may decline. In this case, the session will not be recorded with no penalty to me or my teammates.

8. … I will be asked to fill out two short questionnaires exploring the factors that are associated with decision-making. These questionnaires should take me no more than 5 minutes.
9. … my questionnaire responses will be treated with complete confidentiality, and will not be revealed to anyone other than the DRDC Toronto research team and the Humansystems research team without my consent except as data unidentified as to source.
10. … I will not receive any remuneration for my participation.
11. … all efforts have been made to minimize risks to the disruption to my training by integrating the study into a scheduled scenario, by data collection *only if time permits and at the discretion of the PSTC instructor* and via unobtrusive video and audio recording
12. …that the questionnaire, though remaining completely confidential, asks personally sensitive questions. I understand that some participants might feel discomfort answering these questions, and that the debriefing will provide us with an opportunity to talk about these issues if they arise.
13. … my questionnaire data and videotaped data will be accessed only by members of the research team, and my responses will remain confidential.
14. … the data may be reviewed by an accredited human research ethics audit committee for the purpose of review of research and data storage procedures as they relate to ethical guidelines for research involving human participants. I understand that any summary information resulting from such a review will not identify me personally.
15. … an experimental debriefing will be provided to me by on-site researchers.
16. … I have been informed that the questionnaire, though remaining completely confidential, asks questions that I may find to be sensitive. I understand that I will be debriefed thoroughly about the goals of the study and will have the opportunity to ask questions of the researchers.

I have read the information sheet and have had the opportunity to ask questions of the Investigators. All of my questions concerning this study have been fully answered to my satisfaction. However, I understand that I may obtain additional information about the research project and have any questions about this study answered by contacting Dr. Matthew Duncan (416-635-2000, ext. 3211).

There are no other known or anticipated risks to participants in this study.

For Canadian Forces (CF) members only: I understand that I am considered to be on duty for disciplinary, administrative and Pension Act purposes during my participation in this experiment. This duty status has no effect on my right to withdraw from the experiment at any time I wish and I understand that no action will be taken against me for exercising this right.

I understand that I will receive a copy of the information sheet so that I may contact any of the above-mentioned individuals at some time in the future should that be required. I give my voluntarily consent to participate in the study “Decision-making in Operations: A Field Study” (L521) as explained to me by Humansystems Inc, and therefore agree to fill out the questionnaire.

Volunteer’s Name: _____

Signature: _____

Date: _____

I also grant permission to have my training in one scenario at PSTC videotaped and audio recorded and for my footage to be used for future PSTC training purposes. I grant permission to the principal investigator to quote me directly from the scenario but without attribution or reference to my identity.

Volunteer's Name: _____

Signature: _____

Date: _____

Name of Witness to Signature: _____

Signature: _____

Date: _____

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Annex B: Demographic Questionnaire

DECISION-MAKING: FIELD STUDY

PARTICIPANT NUMBER (e.g. "Echo 1 Bravo" or "E1B"): _____

Please provide your background information in the spaces provided.

What is your current Rank?	**What is your elemental command?**
○ 2Lt ○ LCol ○ Lt ○ Col ○ Capt ○ NCO ○ Maj ○ Other _____	○ Army ○ Navy ○ Air Force ○ Other _____
What is your current trade in the armed forces? (Please indicate the name of your current trade, e.g. engineer, etc.)	**Please indicate how many years you have served in the military in the space below.**
What tours have you completed? For each tour, list location of tour, year, and your job during the tour.	**Please indicate your age below.**
What is your nationality?	**What is your official first language?**
What is your highest level of education?	**Sex**
○ Some high school ○ High school diploma ○ Some university or college ○ University or college degree ○ Graduate degree	○ Male ○ Female

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Annex C: Information Sheet

INFORMATION SHEET

Decision-making in Operations: A Field Study Part II

(Revised Protocol L-521, Amendment 1).

This work is being conducted by a consulting firm named Humansystems in Guelph, Ontario. Humansystems has been contracted by Defence Research and Development Canada Toronto, a human protection and performance laboratory within DND, to conduct this study of decision-making in an operational context. We would like to provide you with more information about this project and what your involvement would entail, should you choose to participate.

The issue of operational decision-making is clearly fundamental to the success of military operations. However, currently, there is only a small amount of research that directly addresses this important issue, especially in the context of a military observer mission. The experiment that will occur during one of the stands during your CF pre-deployment training will explore some of the factors that may influence decision-making in these situations. As part of the experiment, we will also be videotaping and recording all consenting teams at the given stand, in order to identify behaviours and communications likely to influence the successful resolution of the scenario as you negotiate through it. As well, we will be videotaping and recording the debrief provided to you by the directing staff on the stand. At a later date, we intend to provide the CF with the data from these recordings to help them further refine their pre-deployment training. We will also be asking you to complete two short questionnaires regarding your decision-making following one of the scenarios that you will go through in your regular training and preparation. The questionnaires should take no more than 5 minutes.

Your participation in this study is completely voluntary, and you may undertake your pre-deployment training without participating in this study, with no penalty to either yourself or teammates. Recordings of the sessions are done only at the full consent of all members of your trainee team. In cases where one team member chooses not to be videotaped, we will not record the session that includes the non-consenting individual. Whether you have agreed to be videotaped or not, you may choose to participate in the study by filling out the questionnaires. Again, you may choose to undertake your training at the stand without participating in this study in any way and you will be not be videotaped or be asked to complete a questionnaire. You may also end your participation in the study at any time, and may decline to answer any of the items on the questionnaires.

All information you provide on the questionnaire is considered completely confidential. Videotaped information collected during the scenario and debriefing will be coded and categorized. At a later date, we will provide the CF with these recordings so that they can further enhance training and preparation. Results communicated or reported will contain no identifying information. You may withdraw from this study at any time with no penalty to you or your teammates.

We have worked to minimize any risks that are associated with your participation in this study. We have attempted to minimize the potential for disruption of your pre-deployment training by integrating our research into a standard training scenario which all trainees experience. You will still receive your full debriefing of training points from the instructor as well as our short experimental debriefing. This will ensure that you understand what the study hopes to achieve as well as to ensure that the study questionnaire(s) has not caused you any distress. We have also worked to ensure that cameras needed to tape the stand will be as unobtrusive as possible and are not likely to change your training experience. In addition, to minimize potential disruption to training, we will also only collect data if time permits at the discretion of the instructor. Lastly, the questionnaire, though remaining completely confidential, asks personally sensitive questions. Because decision-making is often very difficult in an operational context, some participants might feel discomfort answering some of the questions. The experimental debriefing that we will provide to you will also give us an opportunity to talk about these issues if they arise. We encourage you to provide us feedback about any of the questions, suggestions or concerns about the study.

In addition, all your questionnaire data and videotaped data will be accessed only by members of the research team, and your responses will remain confidential. There are no other known or anticipated risks to you as a participant in this study.

Should you have any questions or concerns regarding this project before, during, or after participation, feel free to contact Defence R&D Canada Toronto (DRDC Toronto), P.O. Box 2000, 1133 Sheppard Avenue West, Toronto, Ontario M3M 3B9. This contact can be made by surface mail at this address or in person, by phone or e-mail, to any of the DRDC Toronto numbers and addresses listed below:

- Principal DRDC Toronto Investigator: Dr. Matthew Duncan, (416-635-2000, ext. 3211), matthew.duncan@ drdc-rddc.gc.ca.

- Chair, DRDC Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC): Dr. Jack Landolt, (416-635-2120), jack.landolt@ drdc-rddc.gc.ca.

This project has been reviewed by, and received ethics approval from the Human Research Ethics Committee at DRDC Toronto (Revised Protocol L-521, Amendment 1).

Annex D: Participant Questionnaire

PARTICIPANT NUMBER (e.g. "Echo 1 Bravo" or "E1B"): _____

STAND NUMBER: _____

SESSION NUMBER: _____

THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS REFER TO YOUR EXPERIENCE IN THIS STAND. PLEASE CHECK THE CIRCLE THAT BEST DESCRIBES YOUR EXPERIENCE. ALL OF YOUR RESPONSES ARE CONFIDENTIAL.	
1. During the mission, I was more influenced by my personal conscience rather than the ORGANIZATION's values and practices.	Strongly disagree Neutral Strongly agree ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
2. How angry were you with the Sgt during the mission?	Not at all Moderately Extremely ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
3. I relied on my instincts to tell me what to do during the mission.	Strongly disagree Neutral Strongly agree ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
4. What level of rapport did your team develop with the Sgt?	Poor rapport Moderate Strong rapport ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
5. There was very little time in the mission for me to consider all of the relevant information before making a decision.	Strongly disagree Neutral Strongly agree ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
6. From the moment we started negotiating with the Sgt, I could tell that he was not telling the truth.	Strongly disagree Neutral Strongly agree ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
7. I thought that the only COA with the Sgt was diplomacy.	Strongly disagree Neutral Strongly agree ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
8. I think in a situation like this, the best COA is to compromise and to make concessions.	Strongly disagree Neutral Strongly agree ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
9. If you had the chance to redo this scenario, how much would you change your own actions?	Not at all Moderately Completely ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
10. If you thought that you would change your own actions, please indicate what you would have done differently in the space provided.	

PARTICIPANT NUMBER (e.g. "Echo 1 Bravo" or "E1B"): _____

STAND NUMBER: _____

SESSION NUMBER: _____

11. I found it difficult to remain impartial to the situation.	Strongly disagree Neutral Strongly agree ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
12. How would you rate the overall quality of the outcome of this situation?	Worst possible Neutral Best possible ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
13. How would you rate the overall quality of your response to this scenario?	Worst possible Neutral Best possible ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
14. In comparison to other trainee teams in this situation, do you think your team responded better or worse than other trainee teams?	Much worse The same Much better ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
15. If this mission had been real, in your opinion, how likely was it that your team would be harmed?	Extremely unlikely 50/50 chance Extremely likely ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
16. I felt that the success or failure of the mission rested on my shoulders.	Strongly disagree Neutral Strongly agree ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
17. I felt personally responsible for the well-being of the prisoners.	Strongly disagree Neutral Strongly agree ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
18. How angry was the Sgt during the mission?	Not at all Moderately Extremely ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
19. I would have liked to be more forceful with the police.	Strongly disagree Neutral Strongly agree ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
20. I considered the pros and cons of all of the options before making my decision	Strongly disagree Neutral Strongly agree ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
21. In my view, there is some evidence that the prisoners could be guilty of terrorist activity.	Strongly disagree Neutral Strongly agree ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

PARTICIPANT NUMBER (e.g. "Echo 1 Bravo" or "E1B"): _____

STAND NUMBER: _____

SESSION NUMBER: _____

The following section contains statements that the Sgt may or may not have said during the mission. Please indicate true if you believe that he did state them or indicate false if you believe that he did not state it. As well, please indicate how confident you are with your response.

22. "Terrorists killed my father."	True	False	Not at all confident			Moderately			Very confident		
	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
23. "The ORGANIZATION is a dysfunctional bureaucracy."	True	False	Not at all confident			Moderately			Very confident		
	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
24. "You're job is to keep the peace nothing more."	True	False	Not at all confident			Moderately			Very confident		
	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
25. "I don't take orders from you people."	True	False	Not at all confident			Moderately			Very confident		
	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
26. "Don't interfere with police business."	True	False	Not at all confident			Moderately			Very confident		
	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
27. "Terrorists killed my brother."	True	False	Not at all confident			Moderately			Very confident		
	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
28. "My family is afraid to go outside because of terrorists."	True	False	Not at all confident			Moderately			Very confident		
	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
29. "The ORGANIZATION arrests more people from Eastland/Westland."	True	False	Not at all confident			Moderately			Very confident		
	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
30. "The ORGANIZATION always gives more food to Eastland/Westland."	True	False	Not at all confident			Moderately			Very confident		
	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

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Annex E : Changing Own Response

Trainee Comment
Been more aggressive
Had I been in lead position, would have been much more forceful with the Sgt
I would arrest the sgt
Tried a more forceful approach
Would have sent one member in search of Capt Smith. I would have been more forceful. I would have jeopardized my own safety.
Taking a somewhat harder stance by indicating that this was against signed agreement
Possible been more aggressive, empathized with Sgt over brother's death; compare that to his father's actions.
Would have tried to get him to stop beating the terrorists. I would have tried to get Cst Jones to join me and not beat the terrorists. I would have tried to understand westlands feelings more - emphasize.
Maintain calm demeanor with Sgt
More preparation; more info on mission and SOP's; More control on emotions; Taken more info
Be more empathetic to the civilians; try to show what they were doing was wrong
Waited to go to police department
Would not have left. Would have stayed until Police arrived.
Lack of info on the scenario; no contact with Ø at all; no training on this particular scenario
Attempted (sic) to establish a personal rapport earlier on
Establish better rapport with the Sgt.
Would have increased the small talk with him. Informed him of the mandate and try to make him realize that what he was doing was atrocity
Draw both soldiers away from victims; call for force protection
I would have come with a video camera to record events from after and to get the chain of command effort [to] effect a stop to the ugly situation ....[illegible]
Not taking notes before getting permission in order to establish trust.
Stayed and send one of the others to radio in
Talk to him out of sight of the workers
Try to explain that we only wanted him to stop what he was doing faster to go to the police station using he route
Would have switched on motorola sooner
I would have asked him How much I could give him to save at least one life even both of them
Je n'aurai pas loisse le Sgy aue les prisonniers

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(U)

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(U) This experiment was conducted during a training exercise at a Canadian Forces Base. During this training exercise, military trainee teams confront a simulated human rights violation, in which they must negotiate with the person in charge (an armed police sergeant) in order to protect the lives of the civilians being violently abused and being made to dig what look like their own
graves. This experiment explored the impact of emotion on military trainees' negotiation behaviour and perceptions by varying the emotional intensity of the armed sergeant (Sgt) to be very angry and aggressive (experimental condition) or more neutral and yielding (baseline condition).
Two competing theories suggest that an emotion like anger could influence negotiators in different ways. If "social contagion" occurs (van Kleef, De Dreu, and Manstead, 2004a) when facing an aggressive Sgt, his anger may transfer to the trainees, and they may behave more aggressively by making more demands and fewer concessions. In contrast, the 'strategic choice'
theory predicts that trainees encountering an aggressive Sgt will be motivated to use his anger as information during the negotiation, thereby countering his demands with fewer demands and more concessions (van Kleef et al, 2004a). Thus, the social contagion hypothesis predicts that the trainees may show more aggressive behaviour toward an aggressive Sgt than toward a neutral
Sgt, whereas the strategic choice hypothesis argues that the Sgt's anger will promote a more yielding stance. The entire scenario was videotaped and later content analyzed, and trainees completed a questionnaire immediately after the scenario conclusion, exploring their perceptions of emotions, role and responsibility, decision strategies, and the outcome of the scenario. The outcome of the scenario was also analyzed in terms of whether the trainees left the civilians in the hands of the police, watched while they were led into a dense forest, or followed them as they were led away. Results showed that the most common outcome (regardless of whether the Sgt was angry or
neutral) was that trainees refused to leave the victims in the hands of the military police and chose to follow the civilians as they were escorted to the police station. The least common response was leaving the civilians in the hands of the abusive police.
Subsequent analyses showed that trainees who had made a definitive decision to follow the civilians reported higher levels of
satisfaction with the outcome of the scenario than did trainees who either watched or left the civilians. Analyses of the behavioural data showed that when the Sgt was angry, trainees worked harder to diffuse the situation, they were more responsive to the concerns of the Sgt, they showed more empathy, they asked for permission before acting more often, and they complied
with the Sgt more than trainees facing a neutral Sgt, providing evidence for the strategic choice hypothesis. Relative to the Sgt, trainees showed a lower proportion of negative behaviours. However, trainees had higher rates of negative behaviours when confronted with an angry Sgt
(compared to a neutral Sgt), also providing some evidence for the social contagion hypothesis. On questionnaire measures, the only significant difference noted was that trainees rated the Sgt's anger as significantly higher in the experimental condition.
Subsequent analyses showed that team
leaders had significantly less desire than team members to change their actions if they had the chance to redo the scenario. This research also provides some important

information relevant to training. As trainees showed
some social contagion effects (i.e., a higher rate of negative behaviours when negotiating with an angry than neutral Sgt), more training attention could be given to the subtle impact of a negotiation partner's emotion on one's own response to the situation. Providing strategies to help personnel be even more effective negotiators in angry confrontations, for instance being able to
back away from the situation may be useful. This report ends with a discussion of future research ideas.

(U) L'expérience qui suit a été effectuée pendant un exercice d'entraînement à une base des Forces canadiennes. Lors de cet exercice, des équipes de militaires stagiaires devaient être confrontées à une violation simulée de droits de la personne, situation dans laquelle elles devaient négocier avec la personne ayant autorité (un sergent de police armé) afin de protéger la vie de civils molestés et obligés de creuser ce qui semble être leur propre tombe. Au cours de l'expérience, on a exploré les répercussions des émotions sur le comportement de négociation et les perceptions des militaires stagiaires en faisant varier l'intensité émotionnelle du sergent armé (sgt) depuis la neutralité et la complaisance (condition de départ) jusqu'à la grande colère et l'agressivité (condition expérimentale). Deux théories contradictoires donnent à penser qu'une émotion comme la colère peut influencer diversement des négociateurs. Si une « contagion sociale » se produit (van Kleef, De Dreu et Manstead, 2004a) au moment d'affronter un sergent agressif, sa colère peut se transférer aux stagiaires, et ceux−ci peuvent se comporter d'une manière plus agressive en posant plus d'exigences et en faisant moins de concessions qu'autrement. En revanche, la théorie du « choix stratégique » prédit que les stagiaires faisant face à un sergent agressif seront motivés à utiliser sa colère comme un renseignement pendant la négociation, contrant du même coup ses exigences en diminuant le nombre de leurs propres exigences et en augmentant le nombre de concessions (van Kleef et al, 2004a). Par conséquent, l'hypothèse de la contagion sociale prédit que les stagiaires peuvent faire montre d'un comportement plus agressif envers un sergent agressif qu'envers un sergent neutre, alors que l'hypothèse du choix stratégique prétend que la colère du sergent favorisera une attitude plus complaisante qu'il n'en aurait été autrement.
Le scénario entier a été enregistré sur bande vidéo, puis son contenu a été analysé, et les stagiaires ont répondu, immédiatement après la fin du scénario, à un questionnaire explorant leurs perceptions de leurs propres émotions, de leur rôle et de leur responsabilité, les stratégies de décision et le résultat du scénario. Le résultat du scénario a aussi été analysé quant à la question de savoir si les stagiaires avaient laissé les civils aux mains de la police, les avaient surveillés pendant qu'ils étaient conduits dans une forêt dense ou les avaient suivis pendant qu'on les conduisait ailleurs.
Les résultats montrent que l'aboutissement le plus courant du scénario (peu importe si le sergent était en colère ou neutre) est que les stagiaires ont refusé de laisser les victimes aux mains de la police militaire et ont choisi de suivre les civils pendant qu'ils étaient escortés jusqu'au poste de police. La réponse la moins fréquente était de laisser les civils aux mains du policier violent. Des analyses ultérieures ont montré que les stagiaires qui avaient pris la décision définitive de suivre les civils ont signalé des degrés de satisfaction plus élevés par rapport au résultat du scénario que les stagiaires qui soit avaient surveillé les civils, soit les avaient quittés. Les analyses des données comportementales ont montré que lorsque le sergent était en colère, les stagiaires avaient à travailler plus fort qu'il n'en aurait été autrement pour désamorcer la situation; ils étaient plus attentifs aux préoccupations du sergent; ils montraient plus d'empathie; ils demandaient plus souvent la permission avant d'agir et ils étaient plus complaisants avec le sergent que les stagiaires faisant face à un sergent neutre, ce qui confirme l'hypothèse du choix stratégique. Par rapport au sergent, les stagiaires ont présenté une moindre proportion de comportements négatifs. Toutefois, les stagiaires présentaient des taux plus élevés de comportements négatifs lorsqu'ils étaient confrontés à un sergent en colère que lorsqu'ils

faisaient face à un sergent neutre, ce qui confirme aussi dans une certaine mesure l'hypothèse de la contagion sociale. Pour les mesures du questionnaire, la seule différence observée est que les stagiaires ont coté la colère du sergent comme beaucoup plus forte dans la situation expérimentale. Des analyses ultérieures ont montré que les chefs d'équipe étaient beaucoup moins désireux que les membres de leur équipe de modifier leur comportement s'ils avaient la chance de reprendre le scénario.
Cette recherche fournit aussi des renseignements importants quant à l'entraînement. Comme les stagiaires présentaient certains effets de la contagion sociale (c'est−à−dire un taux de comportements négatifs plus élevé en présence d'un sergent en colère qu'en présence d'un sergent neutre), ils pouvaient consacrer plus d'attention aux répercussions subtiles de l'émotion d'un partenaire de la négociation sur leur propre réponse à la situation. Les stratégies pour aider le personnel à négocier plus efficacement au moment de la confrontation avec une personne en colère, par exemple en prenant ses distances par rapport à la situation, peuvent être utiles. Le rapport se termine par une discussion sur des idées de recherche future.

14. KEYWORDS, DESCRIPTORS or IDENTIFIERS (Technically meaningful terms or short phrases that characterize a document and could be helpful in cataloguing the document. They should be selected so that no security classification is required. Identifiers, such as equipment model designation, trade name, military project code name, geographic location may also be included. If possible keywords should be selected from a published thesaurus, e.g. Thesaurus of Engineering and Scientific Terms (TEST) and that thesaurus identified. If it is not possible to select indexing terms which are Unclassified, the classification of each should be indicated as with the title.)

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