

# **Life After the George W. Bush Administration: A New US Strategy Towards China for Future Administrations**

**A Monograph  
by  
Lieutenant Commander Ronald B. Ross  
U.S. Navy**



**School of Advanced Military Studies  
United States Army Command and General Staff College  
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

**AY 2008**

**APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED**

<b>REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE</b>			<i>Form Approved</i> <i>OMB No. 0704-0188</i>		
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. <b>PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.</b>					
<b>1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)</b> 15-05-2008		<b>2. REPORT TYPE</b> AMSP Monograph		<b>3. DATES COVERED (From - To)</b> July 2007-May 2008	
<b>4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE</b> Life After The George W. Bush Administration: A New US Strategy Towards China For Future Administrations			<b>5a. CONTRACT NUMBER</b>		
			<b>5b. GRANT NUMBER</b>		
			<b>5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER</b>		
<b>6. AUTHOR(S)</b> LCDR Ronald B. Ross (US Navy)			<b>5d. PROJECT NUMBER</b>		
			<b>5e. TASK NUMBER</b>		
			<b>5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER</b>		
<b>7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</b> Advanced Military Studies Program 523 Spencer Place Leavenworth, KS 66048			<b>8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER</b>		
<b>9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</b> Command and General Staff College 1 Reynolds Avenue Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027			<b>10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)</b> CGSC		
			<b>11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)</b>		
<b>12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT</b> Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited					
<b>13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES</b>					
<b>14. ABSTRACT</b> In November 2008, U.S. citizens will go to the polls to choose a new President and a new administration. The Bush administration's strategy of engagement with China is designed to build a peaceful relationship through diplomatic, informational, military and economic (DIME) dialogue. Whether US policy makers follow the status quo or choose another strategy will be of great importance in America's effort to retain its status as the sole superpower.  This monograph is about strategy—and the use of strategy in guiding actions towards a peer competitor. The author has sought to examine and analyze this strategy in various contexts. This monograph offers the next administration a recommended strategy towards China. To provide a recommended strategy, a comprehensive look at current international relations theories and how these theories help provide a framework for grand strategy is required.  History has shown that strategy involves more than applying military might to solve problems between warring countries or parties. A good strategy involves more than just the military, but includes diplomatic actions, information strategies and economic measures all designed to cause another nation's actions to conform to regional, national and/or multinational objectives.					
<b>15. SUBJECT TERMS</b> STRATEGY, CHINA, DIPLOMACY, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS					
<b>16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:</b>			<b>17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT</b>	<b>18. NUMBER OF PAGES</b>  65	<b>19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON</b> Stefan J. Banach, COL, US ARMY
<b>a. REPORT</b> UNCLASS	<b>b. ABSTRACT</b> UNCLASS	<b>c. THIS PAGE</b> UNCLASS			<b>19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code)</b> 913-758-3302

# SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

## MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

LCDR Ronald B. Ross

Title of Monograph: Life After the George W. Bush Administration: A New US Strategy Towards China for Future Administrations

This monograph was defended by the degree candidate on 15 April 2008 and approved by the monograph director and reader named below.

Approved by:

\_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Joseph Babb

Monograph Director

\_\_\_\_\_  
Jacob W. Kipp, Ph.D.

Monograph Reader

\_\_\_\_\_  
Stefan J. Banach, COL, IN

Director,  
School of Advanced  
Military Studies

\_\_\_\_\_  
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

Director,  
Graduate Degree  
Programs

## **Abstract**

LIFE AFTER THE GEORGE W. BUSH ADMINISTRATION: A NEW US STRATEGY TOWARDS CHINA FOR FUTURE ADMINISTRATIONS by LCDR Ronald B. Ross, US Navy, 65 pages.

In November 2008, U.S. citizens will go to the polls to choose a new President and a new administration. The Bush administration's strategy of engagement with China is designed to build a peaceful relationship through diplomatic, informational, military and economic (DIME) dialogue. Whether US policy makers follow the status quo or choose another strategy will be of great importance in America's effort to retain its status as the sole superpower.

This monograph is about strategy—and the use of strategy in guiding actions towards a peer competitor. The author has sought to examine and analyze this strategy in various contexts. This monograph offers the next administration a recommended strategy towards China. To provide a recommended strategy, a comprehensive look at current international relations theories and how these theories help provide a framework for grand strategy is required.

History has shown that strategy involves more than applying military might to solve problems between warring countries or parties. A good strategy involves more than just the military, but includes diplomatic actions, information strategies and economic measures all designed to cause another nation's actions to conform to regional, national and/or multinational objectives.

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction .....	1
Contemporary International Relations Theories.....	4
Realism.....	7
Liberalism.....	9
Neo-Conservatism .....	11
History of Chinese Politics.....	14
Chinese Foreign Policy System.....	15
Historical Chinese Political Strategy Towards the US .....	21
Internal/External Problems Facing China .....	29
Internal Problems.....	30
Oil and Energy Requirements .....	30
Chinese Pollution Problems .....	32
Human Rights Issues .....	34
Economic Inequality.....	38
External Problems .....	40
Taiwan Issue.....	40
China and Myanmar/Burma Relationship.....	42
Chinese Involvement In Darfur.....	44
The Nuclear Weapon Neighbor.....	45
Current US Strategy Towards China.....	47
Relevance Of Power Transition Theory Towards A New Peer Competitor .....	50
Summary .....	56
A Recommended China Strategy .....	59
Diplomatic Courting.....	60
Information Superiority .....	62
Military Dominance Through Concealment.....	63
Economic Integration .....	64
Bibliography .....	I

## TABLE OF FIGURES

Figure 1: The Formal Organization of Political Power in China.....	16
Figure 2: Chinese Foreign Policymaking Process.....	17

## Introduction

The world was on its edge. News reports streamed from every media outlet that saw the coming events as the most horrific in decades. At home in the United States, congressional leaders met to debate the necessity of mobilizing the entire country for what was an inevitable war with China. It had been referred to as “World War III”; “The Greatest of All Wars”; “The Pacific Superpower Showdown”. Because of China’s large military force, many congressional leaders believed that bringing back the draft was the only reasonable choice to counter this huge threat. Military leaders testified before congress of the need for more troops stating that every able bodied person between the ages of 18 and 50 would be needed if there was any chance of defeating this Goliath.

Meanwhile, in China, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was ramping up its military might, mobilizing its industrial capability, and enlisting all of its able bodied citizens to demonstrate to the world that it was worthy to wear the title as the “World’s New Superpower”. All U.S. corporations were exiled from China and Chinese citizens were forbidden from conducting any foreign trade with the U.S. Likewise was the same in the United States. Economic leaders of both countries scrambled to find alternative resources from other countries to satisfy their current standard of living. Similarly, diplomatic meetings and alliances were being formed by both sides and each solicited as many nation states on its side as possible, knowing that a key to success in this war would rest upon the help they received from their allies.

The United Nations held round-the-clock talks with representatives from not only the two superpowers, but other major nations to halt the movement of war. The Secretary-General continuously called for diplomatic solutions to the ongoing problems between the two nations. As the world tuned in to television, internet and radio, all wondered how two powerful nations who were once thriving economic partners found themselves on the brink of war.

The above situation is a fictitious story that takes place some thirty to forty years into the future. China has risen to the status of superpower and the United States, once the world's only superpower, is now faced with a formidable challenge to its status, its influence, and its national security. The question now is whether this scenario truly is as fictitious as it sounds? Could the United States find itself in a war with China in the distant future? The simple answer to both of the questions is: it depends.

In November 2008, U.S. citizens will go to the polls to choose not only a new President but also a new administration. The Bush administration's strategy of engagement in the Pacific is designed to build a peaceful relationship through diplomatic, informational, military and economic (DIME)<sup>1</sup> dialogue. As stated in the 2006 National Security Strategy, "The United States is a Pacific nation, with extensive interests throughout East and Southeast Asia. The region's stability and prosperity depend on our sustained engagement: maintaining robust partnerships supported by a forward defense posture sustaining economic integration through expanded trade and investment and promoting democracy and human rights".<sup>2</sup> As stated above, war with China depends on the strategy that the next administration takes. Dr. Robert Ross,

---

<sup>1</sup> A detailed explanation of instruments of national power can be found in *Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, 14 May 2007 [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new\\_pubs/jp1.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1.pdf) (accessed September 19, 2007).

<sup>2</sup> National Security Council, *The National Security Strategy of the United States*, (Washington, DC: The White House, March 2006) <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006> (accessed September 20, 2007) 40.



political science professor at Boston University, states it well when he says, “The United States alone cannot determine the course of US-China relations...But US strategy will play an important role in the future development of Asian security”.<sup>3</sup> Whether US policy makers follow the status quo or if they choose another strategy will be of great importance in America’s effort to remain as the sole superpower.

Military theorist, Carl Von Clausewitz, defines strategy as “the use of an engagement for the purposes of the war”.<sup>4</sup> Unfortunately, Clausewitz’s definition is one sided and does not take into account a strategy that avoids war all together. Like Clausewitz, prominent British military historian and strategist, Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart defines strategy from a military context when he describes strategy as “the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy”.<sup>5</sup> Clearly history has shown that strategy involves more than applying military might to solve problems between warring countries or parties. A good strategy involves more than just the military, but includes diplomatic actions, information strategies and economic

---

<sup>3</sup> Robert S. Ross, “A Realist Policy for Managing US-China Competition”, *The Stanley Foundation Policy Analysis Brief*, November 2005, 3.

<sup>4</sup> Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*. ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 177.

<sup>5</sup> B.H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy* (New York: New American Library, 1974), 335.

measures all designed to cause another nation's actions to conform to regional, national and/or multinational objectives.<sup>6</sup>

This monograph is about strategy—and the use of strategy in guiding actions towards a peer competitor. Strategy is researched, examined, and analyzed in various contexts. The purpose of this monograph is to provide the next administration with a recommended strategy towards China. However, before being able to provide a recommended strategy, a comprehensive look at current international relations theories and how these theories help provide a framework for grand strategy is required.

## **Contemporary International Relations Theories**

Literary Nobel Prize winner Bertrand Russell wrote, “Love of power, like vanity, is a strong element in normal human nature, and as such is to be accepted; it becomes deplorable only when it is excessive or associated with an insufficient sense of reality. When this occurs, it makes a man unhappy or foolish, if not both.”<sup>7</sup> Russell has assessed that man's nature is to seek after power. Whether it is the power within a family as seen between a husband and wife or whether it is the power sought after by many within business, social realms or the power of

---

<sup>6</sup> Department of Defense, Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2007), 518.

<sup>7</sup> Bertrand Russell, *The Conquest of Happiness* (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1996), 21.

politics, humans have an intrinsic need for power. Take this a step further, and one can see that same need extending outwards towards a nation state and its need for power within the international system. Hans Morgenthau wrote, “International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power”.<sup>8</sup> Here lies one of the fundamental reasons for the study of international relations. John Mersheimer has written, “Calculations about power lie at the heart of how states think about the world around them”.<sup>9</sup> International Relations experts seek to ascertain, explain and even formulate theories that forecast the relational struggles between nation states and more recently, between non-state actors. This is a difficult task at best. One must assume that the behavior of a national leader is to act in a rational manner seeking to maximize power in terms of himself and his nation. Only through history can we look back and make attempts to understand what the national leadership viewed as its strategy for achieving that secure level of power.

Power is a very elusive term often hard for one to put his finger on in international relations. Many definitions have been proposed, but the power that this monograph speaks of is the power national leadership has to influence the mind and thus the behavior of another national leadership. When placing this definition in terms of a nation state, we are describing a nation

---

<sup>8</sup> Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967) 25.

<sup>9</sup> John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001), 12.

which has the power to influence the actions of another nation in favor of its strategic goals.<sup>10</sup> Power is not the only thing national leadership seeks after though. For many, they understand that security is a major concern, both internally and externally. This is why often times, power is seen as a nation's ability to defend itself against an invading enemy. Nations that have either defended their territories or through whose geography have been able to warn off an attack are seen as powerful nations. Whereas, nation states with dismal military capabilities are often seen as weak; pawns to be used on the chessboard of the international system. Noted author, John Lewis Gaddis writes, "Most nations seek safety in the way most animals do: by withdrawing behind defense, or making themselves inconspicuous or otherwise avoiding whatever dangers there may be".<sup>11</sup>

A question that often comes to mind is whether there is a way to foresee what national leadership would do in a given situation? Having the ability to understand what they considers to be their means of power and what they view as contrary to their security, one would surmise that it would be a fairly easy task to guess what moves they would make in the international world. But to do so, would certainly be "watering down" all the complexity that goes into decisions statesmen make for their countries. There are many different schools of thought that abound in

---

<sup>10</sup> Mearsheimer, 26.

<sup>11</sup> John L. Gaddis, *Surprise, Security, and the American Experience*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004) 13.

International Relations. This monograph covers three schools: Realism, Liberalism, and Neo-Conservatism.

## Realism

The most dominant and prevalent theory in US politics is realism or *real politik* as it is commonly referred in many academic circles. Even though realism's dominance has occurred primarily since the end of World War II, during the Cold War period between the United States and the Soviet Union, its origins can be traced as far back as the days of Thucydides. Thucydides wrote about the struggle of power between the Athenians and the Spartans during the Peloponnesian Wars.<sup>12</sup> Here lies the most basic tenet of political realism. The Realists outlook in the international community is based upon the role power plays within that system. As stated earlier in this monograph, power can be an elusive term. Among the most noted realists, power has taken on different and in many cases, competing definitions. This has become a source of criticism among non-realist theorists. For this monograph, it is the struggle for power among competing nations that lie at the backbone of political realism. Author, Barry Buzan argues, the "focus on power politics provides the apparent continuity of the realist tradition".<sup>13</sup>

---

<sup>12</sup> Morgenthau, 8. Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 7) also writes about Thucydides' influence on political realism's birth.

<sup>13</sup> Barry Buzan, "The Timeless Wisdom of Realism?", in *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*, eds. Steve Smith, Ken Booth, and Marysia Zalewski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, 51.

Realists also believe that human nature, more specifically, the evil tendencies of humans, is a driving force behind the strong desire for power among nations. Because human beings are imperfect creatures, the desire for power will never go away and thus continues to be the strength or driving force behind international relations.<sup>14</sup> Also key to the human aspect of realism is the premise that the international system is anarchic because there is no overarching authoritative body that supersedes the nation state, the system in itself allows for states to take matters into its own hands to solve its security related problems.<sup>15</sup>

In a nutshell, political realists believe that the international system in which they exist in is anarchic and that there is no authority above the state's authority. Because of this, states must settle disputes among themselves. They also believe that the principal players within the

---

<sup>14</sup> Morgenthau, 3. Morgenthau attempts to lay out six principles of political realism that he believes best defines his school. A summation of each principle is given below. (1) Politics is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature. (2) Interest is defined in terms of power. In other words, a national leader thinks and acts in terms of interest as defined as power. (3) Power, that is interest determined power, changes over time and is based upon the political and cultural context of the time. (4) Political realism is aware of the moral significance of political action. Realists believe that universal moral principles, those that apply at all times, is non-applicable due to the changing nature and context of politics and thus must be judged within its own context and time. (5) In light of number four above, states should and do recognize the rights of other states to pursue their interests and thus believe in the moral principle of respect towards one another. (6) Political realist is not unaware of the existence and relevance of standards of thought other than political one, but must subordinate these other standards to those of politics.

<sup>15</sup> Michael Sheehan, *The Balance of Power: History and Theory*, (New York: Routledge, 1996) 5.

international system are the sovereign nation state. Non-state actors have no real power in this system. Because sovereign states are the players in the system, they behave in a rational manner seeking after its own interests in terms of national security and overall survival. In an effort to pursue these two interests, states amass power in the form of military and economic capability.

## **Liberalism**

Rival to the realist perspective is liberalism. Some of the most prominent founders of liberalism are German philosopher Immanuel Kant, British economist Adam Smith, and a key proponent was former US President, Woodrow Wilson.<sup>16</sup> Unlike realism, which sets out to explain how states *should* behave, liberalism attempts to describe how states *do* behave. Liberals focus on how states and society relate to one another.<sup>17</sup>

There are some key assumptions that are made by liberal thinkers. The first is that individuals or specialized groups are the primary actors in the international system and that they make both rational and risk adverse decisions on behalf of the State among a mixture of

---

<sup>16</sup> Jack Snyder, "One World, Rival Theories", in *Foreign Policy* (November/December 2004), 56.

<sup>17</sup> Anne-Marie Slaughter, "International Law in a World of Liberal States", in *European Journal of International Law* (1995), 6.

interests.<sup>18</sup> “...Liberals focus on the ways in which interdependence encourages and allows individuals and groups to exert different pressures on national governments”<sup>19</sup>

A second assumption is that States represent a specific group of society and it is the interests of that group that are pursued on an international basis. The very fact that there are representatives of the group inherently says that some who are within the group will not have their interests represented internationally, but that the good of the group is represented over any particular individual. Therefore, the decisive link between societal demands and state policy, [is the] nature of domestic representation.<sup>20</sup>

A final assumption is that State actions on the international scene are determined by an aggregate of the many factors it has determined to be the interests of its represented group or society. In other words, States behavior is only determined by understanding what factors its society determines to be of most importance. Thus, over a period of time, State behavior in the international system changes as its interests as determined by its citizens changes. Liberals also believe that it is not just the job of the national leadership to interact with other States, but that

---

<sup>18</sup> Andrew Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics”, in *International Organization* 51, No. 4, (Autumn 1997): 516.

<sup>19</sup> Slaughter, 6.

<sup>20</sup> Andrew Moravcsik, *Liberalism and International Relations Theory* (Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, Working Paper No. 92-6, 1992).



economic, monetary, and social institutions also play key parts in not only establishing peace between nation states, but also that of maintaining peace.<sup>21</sup>

## Neo-Conservatism

Neo-conservatism took root in America in the early 1970's. In the Fall of 1973, Michael Harrington, a social writer, and some colleagues at *Dissent* magazine were the first to coin the label on those of whom they viewed as former allies. The majority of persons receiving this label were men who were strong supporters of America's involvement in the Vietnam War. Some of today's most prominent supporters of neo-conservatism are George W. Bush, Richard Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz. Many neocons, as they have become nicknamed, believe America's role in the international community is as "militant interventionist".<sup>22</sup> Mearsheimer describes neo-conservatism as "Wilsonianism with teeth". In other words, neocons bring together President Woodrow Wilson's liberalist policies and places emphasis on military might to provide the "bite" behind the policy to persuade adversaries to comply with your desires. Neocons see

---

<sup>21</sup> Snyder, 56-59.

<sup>22</sup> Gary Dorrien, *Imperial Designs: Neoconservatism and the New Pax Americana*, (New York: Routledge, 2004) 7.

America's military as the world's premier military force and use its power to advance its political desires and interests internationally.<sup>23</sup>

Another key feature of neocons is their belief in "bandwagoning". Bandwagoning is a term used to describe the behavior of nation states to "join in" on the side of world leadership as a means of assuring self preservation. Rather than being an enemy to the one nation that could easily destroy it, a nation state (usually one that is no match whatsoever for the superpower) becomes an ally as a form of securing future peace for itself. Because of the neocons belief in bandwagoning, the use of military power is a primary choice over diplomacy due to the belief that nation states would rather bandwagon with them than to take the chance and develop policies and actions that are contrary to the interests of the United States in this case.<sup>24</sup>

Key also to the neo-conservatism view is the idealist thoughts and actions in the push for democratic states throughout the international system. Behind their push for democracy is the belief that democratic states are by their nature averse to warring with other democratic states and thus peace is more able to be achieved worldwide as more nation states become democratic. The

---

<sup>23</sup> John J. Mearsheimer, "Hans Morgenthau and the Iraq War: Realism versus Neo-Conservatism" in *Open Democracy*, (2005) 1.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid*, 2.

Bush administration's desire to spread democracy throughout the Middle East is a prime example of neo-conservatism at work.<sup>25</sup>

The purpose of this chapter is to introduce readers to the three mainstream schools of international relations theory of Realism, Liberalism, and Neo-conservatism. Realists believe that the international system is anarchic and that states, as the main actors, possess military capabilities that can be dangerous to other states. Because states seek power as a means of assuring national security and they cannot be sure of their neighbors' intentions, they take actions that are designed to maximize their interests. On the other hand, Liberals hold that it is the states desires that determine their behavior in the international system and thus it becomes difficult to ascertain their actions because their desires change over time. Liberals also believe that state interaction goes beyond the national leadership and can occur in institutions other than government. Liberals seek to maximize state participation in international organizations as a means of influencing other states. Finally, Neo-conservatives combine the military power behind Realism with the ideals found in Idealism, namely the building of democratic states throughout the world.

Now that a foundation in international relations theory has been laid, the question is whether Chinese foreign policy has subscribed to any of the traditional western international

---

<sup>25</sup> Dorrien, 181-189. See also John Muravchik "The Past, Present and Future of Neoconservatism" in *Commentary* (October 2007).

relations theory. The next chapter will look at the history of Chinese politics. Specifically, this monograph will focus on the political system in China and historical perspective on foreign policy towards the United States.

## History of Chinese Politics

From the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century and into the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, westerners and in particular, Americans have realized how complex governmental political systems are in many non-western countries. Steven Levine says, “Chinese leaders, like policy-makers everywhere, bring to their encounters with the complexities of foreign affairs sets of presuppositions, values, expectations, preferences, and operating assumptions....”<sup>26</sup> The fundamental lack of understanding of the intricacies of these complex systems all too often causes confusion and false assumptions on the part of the western governments.<sup>27</sup>

---

<sup>26</sup> Steven I. Levine, “Perception and Ideology in Chinese Foreign Policy,” in *Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice*, ed. Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 33.

<sup>27</sup> Taeho Kim, “Leading Small Groups: Managing All Under Heaven,” in *China’s Leadership in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: The Rise of the Fourth Generation*, ed. David M. Finkelstein and Maryanne Kivlehan (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2003), 121-122. The purpose of this section is to bridge the learning gap and bring some understanding of the complexities of the Chinese political system. The three most crucial variables of Chinese politics are ideology, power, and policy. This monograph will lay out what appears to be the political system of China and how it operates and functions to not only develop its foreign policies, but also execute them on a day to day basis. An attempt will also be made to provide an historical perspective on the Chinese political strategy towards the United States. See Byung-joon Ahn, *Chinese Politics and the Cultural Revolution: Dynamics of Policy Processes* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1976) 3.

## Chinese Foreign Policy System


Ideas play important roles in the development and execution of foreign policy. For Chinese leaders, their ideological roots have been dictated by Marxist-Leninist teachings. For most Chinese citizens, Marxism-Leninism was the lens through which the outside world were seen.<sup>28</sup> Along with Marx and Lenin, Chinese political leadership's foreign policy views were also shaped by the teachings of Mao Tse-tung.<sup>29</sup>

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rules the People's Republic of China (PRC) through the monopolization of various power relations throughout the country. As Figure 1 illustrates, political power in China is shared by the Party, the military and government.

---

<sup>28</sup> Levine, 30-32.

<sup>29</sup> Ahn, *Chinese Politics and the Cultural Revolution*, 3.




**Figure 1: The Formal Organization of Political Power in China<sup>30</sup>**

As seen above, China's bureaucratic structure is organized along a vertical command system where very little horizontal coordination occurs. Information is spread only to those who are directly involved in a particular situation; we refer to this in the military as "the need to

---

<sup>30</sup> Kim, 123.

know.” An important group in Chinese politics is the *xitong*<sup>31</sup> that is defined by the specific policy tasks that it oversees.



**Figure 2: Chinese Foreign Policymaking Process<sup>32</sup>**

<sup>31</sup> According to Flemming Christiansen, the literal meaning of *xitongs* is systems. Flemming Christiansen, “Democratization in China: structural constraints” in *Democracy and Democratization*, ed. Geraint Parry and Michael Moran (New York: Routledge, 1994) 154.

There are six xitongs: military affairs; legal affairs; administrative affairs; propaganda; united front affairs; and mass organization affairs. Leading Small Groups (LSG) head the xitongs and provide an avenue between the heads of the CPC and the xitongs. The LSGs bring bureaucrats across China together to formulate and deliberate over political issues before they are brought before the Politburo. During policy formulation, key organizational representatives provide input to foster and ensure cooperation across all groups. To ensure control over the process, top Politburo leaders head the LSG processes.<sup>33</sup>

Most recent count has over twelve LSGs with one of the most important being the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group (FALSG). Figure 2 shows the importance of the FALSG in foreign relations policymaking. When a foreign policy issue comes forth, the International Liaison Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the General Staff Department all come together to provide intelligence and analysis to the Central Committee (CC) General Office. The job of the CC General Office is to coordinate the actions of various departments, receive and process various reports and transmit them to the General Office of the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group and the Foreign Affairs Research Team of CC Policy. The Foreign Affairs Research Team is not part of the actual channels for decision making but serves to assist the General Office FALSG in making recommendations to the FALSG. Once the FALSG receives

---

<sup>32</sup> Kim, 127.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid, 123.



the recommended issue and makes a consensus decision, it approves the recommendation in perfunctory style as the head of the FALSG is the Chinese President.<sup>34</sup>

Figure 2 above demonstrated the bureaucratic flow that takes place in Chinese foreign policymaking. Within that process, key leaders play a significant role in influencing the recommendations and eventually the decisions that transpire out of the Politburo. However, I do not want anyone to believe that there are not any other individuals that help influence the process. Inside of all organizations, there are certain influential individuals who truly run the organization but are sometimes labeled as “the assistant.” In Chinese society, specifically in Chinese politics, that individual is known as a *mishu*. The term literally means “secret book”, but is often translated as “secretary.” The Mishu, unlike aides in most countries, wields great power and influence within Chinese politics.<sup>35</sup> Kim states, “within the bureaucracy, *mishus* therefore continue to act as ‘intellectual entrepreneurs,’ marketing ideas to other *mishus*, often in the form of consensus building documents, which are critically important vehicles for building consensus within the complex structure of China’s ‘fragmented authoritarianism’.”<sup>36</sup> *Mishus* conduct day to

---

<sup>34</sup> It must be noted that the entire approval process is simply that; a bureaucratic process in which the leading members of the Politburo who have foreign-policy responsibilities are the members of the FALSG. For further reading, see Michael D. Swaine, “Chinese Military Role in National Security Policymaking”, *National Defense Research Institute* (1998): 22.

<sup>35</sup> Wei Li and Lucian Pye, “The Ubiquitous Role of the Mishu in Chinese Politics”, in *The China Quarterly*, No. 132 (December 1992) 913.

<sup>36</sup> Kim, 141.

day business on behalf of their political leader bosses handling communication and coordination between leaders; some have even gone as far as fostering personal disputes or policy rifts.<sup>37</sup>

According to Wei Li and Lucian Pye, “a *mishu* is generally accepted as the *alter* ego of his leader, even to the extent of carrying out quite personal courtesies, and other parties usually treat him as though he were the leader.”<sup>38</sup> Insight into the past qualifications of a *mishu* as stated by Li and Pye is “political reliability, good general education, good writing skills, obedience, and competence to wage class struggle.”<sup>39</sup> But, because of the age of computers, *mishus* are now required to be technically savvy, able to communicate with others both inside China and in the international realm, through various media means.<sup>40</sup>

So why is an “aide” or “secretary” so important in China? History has proved that being a *mishu* pays great dividends for those aspiring to the top leadership in China. Many *mishus* have ascended to positions formerly held by their bosses maintaining the position of *mishu* as being one of great importance to many aspiring political Chinese leaders.<sup>41</sup>

---

<sup>37</sup> Ibid, 141.

<sup>38</sup> Li and Pye, 921.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid, 935.

<sup>40</sup> Kim, 145.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid, 148-149.

## Historical Chinese Political Strategy Towards the US

Since 1949, it is of no surprise that relations between the US and China has been barely cordial at best. At some points in time, there were no formal relations at all between the two countries.<sup>42</sup> Because of their different political perspectives they have been unable to establish common ground to truly open relations. However, since the 1980s, they have enjoyed shared economic successes and that has kept them from becoming warring enemies.<sup>43</sup>

The question that comes to mind is whether there has been a time in the last fifty years where China and the US have enjoyed good relations between themselves? The answer is, yes. In 1972, US President Richard Nixon and Chinese Premier Mao Zedong or Tse tung opened relations between China and the United States.<sup>44</sup> This was a major turning point in Chinese foreign policy as Communist rule had isolated them from the rest of the western world. To enhance its position among Pacific nations and to strengthen its national security, Mao felt it necessary to normalize relations with the US. What caused the Chinese to change its position

---

<sup>42</sup> Harold C. Hinton, "Peking-Washington: Chinese Foreign Policy and the United States," in *The Center for Strategic and International Studies* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1976) 81.

<sup>43</sup> Jia Qingguo, "Chinese Relations with the United States," in *The Golden Age of the U.S.-China-Japan Triangle, 1972-1989*, ed. Ezra F. Vogel, Yuan Ming, and Tanaka Akihiko (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2002) 109.

<sup>44</sup> Matthew Veal, "Analyzing Sino-American Relations of 1972," *OmniNerd.com*, 12 December 2006, accessed on 16 December 2007 from [http://www.omninerd.com/articles/Analysing\\_Sino\\_American\\_Relations\\_of\\_1972](http://www.omninerd.com/articles/Analysing_Sino_American_Relations_of_1972).

towards the United States were the Soviet Union as a common enemy in 1969 and the Vietnam War.

College professor and author, Chun-tu Hsueh states, “since the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, one of China’s consistent objectives in its foreign policy has been security....”<sup>45</sup> In 1969, it became very clear to Chinese leaders that a real threat was looming at their doorstep or more precisely, their border. Russian troops were massing along the border with China after having invaded Czechoslovakia a year earlier.<sup>46</sup> Fearing the same fate as the Czechoslovakians, Chinese leaders understood that a balancing of power was needed to provide for its national security.<sup>47</sup> According to Harold Hinton, “... [it was] the threatening Soviet presence to the North [that] remained the dominant factor in Peking’s foreign policy calculations.”<sup>48</sup> It was at this time that the door to China was once again opened to US leaders.<sup>49</sup>

---

<sup>45</sup> Chun-tu Hsueh, *China’s Foreign Relations: New Perspectives*, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982) 1.

<sup>46</sup> Robert L Worden, *China: A Country Study*, Federal Research Division: US Government, 1988, 490.

<sup>47</sup> Harold C. Hinton, “Peking-Washington: Chinese Foreign Policy and the United States,” in *The Center for Strategic and International Studies* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1976) 31.

<sup>48</sup> Harold C. Hinton, *The Bear at the Gate: Chinese Policymaking under Soviet Pressure*. (Washington: American Enterprise Institute and Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1971).

<sup>49</sup> Matthew Veal, *Analyzing Sino-American Relations of 1972*, OmniNerd.com, 12 December 2006, accessed on 16 December 2007 from [http://www.omninerd.com/articles/Analysing\\_Sino\\_American\\_Relations\\_of\\_1972](http://www.omninerd.com/articles/Analysing_Sino_American_Relations_of_1972).

By February 1972, Chinese-US relationship grew to the point of President Nixon and Premier Chou En-lai signing the *Joint Communique of the United States of America and the People's Republic of China* that fostered political, cultural, and economic relations between the two countries.<sup>50</sup> The dramatic turn that led to the signing of the *Joint Communique* was termed “ping pong diplomacy” due to the back and forth exchange visits by the highest ranking officials of both countries.<sup>51</sup> Richard Nixon stated:

“Any American policy toward Asia must come urgently to grips with the reality of China.... It does mean recognizing the present and potential danger from Communist China and taking measures designed to meet that danger.... We simply cannot afford to leave China forever outside the family of nations, there to nurture its fantasies, cherish its hate and threaten its neighbors.... For the short run, then, this means a policy of firm restraint, of no reward, of a creative counter pressure designed to persuade Peking that its interests can be served only by accepting the basic rules of international civility. For the long run, it means pulling China back into the world community-but as a great and progressive nation, not as the epicenter of world revolution.”<sup>52</sup>

What Nixon was saying was that the US needed a policy of “pressure and persuasion” along with the current policy of “containment without isolation.”<sup>53</sup>

---

<sup>50</sup> U.S. Department of State, “Joint Communique of the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China,” [usinfo.state.gov](http://usinfo.state.gov), February 28, 1972, accessed on 17 December 2007 from [http://usinfo.state.gov/eap/Archive\\_Index/joint\\_communique\\_1972.html](http://usinfo.state.gov/eap/Archive_Index/joint_communique_1972.html).

<sup>51</sup> Hsueh, 3.

<sup>52</sup> Richard Nixon, “Asia after Viet Nam” in *Foreign Affairs* 46, no. 1, (October 1967) 121, 123.

<sup>53</sup> Jaw-ling Joanne Chang, “United States-China Normalization: An Evaluation of Foreign Policy Decision Making” in *Monograph Series in World Affairs* vol. 22, book 4 (Denver: University of Denver, 1986) 29.

The road towards normalization was paved by improved relations from 1972-1973.<sup>54</sup> Ambassadors Huang Chen of China and Arthur Watson of the US to France were the links that fused the normalization process between the two countries. However, when extremely sensitive information had to be discussed, the “backchannel”, in which Nixon and Chou directly negotiated, became the preferred method cutting out the two middle men.<sup>55</sup>

From 1974-1977, the normalization process came to a “snail’s crawl” as both sides found themselves deeply engrossed in domestic problems. For the United States, it was *Watergate* and a sudden absence in Presidential leadership. In China, the PRC found itself occupied with an anti-Confucius ideological campaign designed to attack Premier Chou En-lai.<sup>56</sup> In January 1977, President Carter took office but he too found himself entangled with Panama Canal Treaties, Middle East peace talks, and Strategic Arms Limitations Talks II (SALT II). Normalization with the PRC was important to US foreign policy but not as high on the priority list at that time.<sup>57</sup> It was not until December 1978 that both sides were able to come to a normalization agreement that paved the way for future working relations between the US and China.<sup>58</sup>

---

<sup>54</sup> Chang, 36.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid, 104.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid, 108.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid, 109.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid, 114-115.

In 1978, the PRC found itself in a predicament it did not want. A series of border provocations took place between China and Vietnam. Various attempts to settle the disputes were to no avail. In December 1978, Vietnamese troops invaded Cambodia to overthrow the Chinese backed Pol Pot regime. On February 17, 1979 China began a two week long attack against Vietnam. Having driven the Vietnamese forces back, PRC leadership made the decision on March 5, 1979 to withdraw its troops thus ending the conflict.<sup>59</sup>

In 1979, following its conflict with a Soviet backed Vietnam, the PRC found itself involved in another international issue along its northwestern border. As Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan, Chinese leadership found itself forming alliances with the US and Pakistan to counter the perceived threat of an expanding Soviet Union. However, during the early 1980s, relations with USSR slowly improved, though formal normalization of relations never occurred until the end of the decade.<sup>60</sup>

In 1985, Sino-Soviet relations took positive steps when Mikhail Gorbachev took office. Recognizing that the Soviets could not contend with a US-China-Japan front and that the Soviet economy was heading towards ruin, he began to repair relations with his border neighbor.

---

<sup>59</sup> Daniel Tretiak, "China's Vietnam War and Its Consequences," in *The China Quarterly* No. 80 (December 1979) 740-751.

<sup>60</sup> Shaheen F. Dil, "The Cabal in Kabul: Great-Power Interaction in Afghanistan," in *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 71, No. 2 (June 1977) 468-476. See also Gerald Segal, "China and Afghanistan," in *Asian Survey*, Vol. 21, No. 11 (November 1981) 1158-1174.

Analysts believe that China played a very important role in the collapse of the USSR. By involving itself in the Soviet-Afghan war and taking positive steps towards normalizing relations with the US, China was able to put significant pressure on the Soviet leadership that help Gorbachev come to the decision to open up relations with all nations involved and subsequently ending the Cold War. According to Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, “Gorbachev chose, instead, to acknowledge socialist pluralism, renounce the Brezhnev Doctrine, promote glasnost and perestroika, and finally acquiesce in destruction of the Berlin Wall and the Warsaw Pact.”<sup>61</sup>

1989 was a year of great change in the world. The Cold War confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States ceased to exist. East and West Germany reunified into one nation.<sup>62</sup> According to Jianwei Wang and Zhimin Lin, “The overwhelming US-Soviet rivalry gave China a strategic edge in the US-Soviet-China triangle, and helped to water down or simply gloss over potential problems between Beijing and Washington.”<sup>63</sup> With all the changes occurring in the world and positions shifting within the international community, nations vied to

---

<sup>61</sup> Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, “China as a Factor in the Collapse of the Soviet Empire,” in *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 110, No. 4 (Winter 1995-1996) 501-518.

<sup>62</sup> Qimao Chen, “New Approaches in China’s Foreign Policy: The Post Cold War Era,” in *Asian Survey* Vol. 33, No. 3 (March 1993) 237.

<sup>63</sup> Jianwei Wang and Zhimin Lin, “Chinese Perceptions in the Post-Cold War Era,” in *Asian Survey* Vol. 32, No. 10 (October 1992) 903.



reestablish themselves in this new system. China is no different than any other nation as demonstrated in their foreign policy change.<sup>64</sup>

Having viewed that the world has changed and there no longer is the competition between bi-polar superpowers, China has assessed that their nearest threat is from hegemony-not just a perceived American hegemony, but also regional hegemony.<sup>65</sup> To counter this perceived threat in the post-Cold War world, China immediately adopted a new foreign policy of circumference diplomacy and defense modernization.<sup>66</sup>

The policy of circumference diplomacy is essentially a “good neighbor” policy. The overall goal is to make as many friends with regional neighboring countries within Asia Pacific to the west Asian rim as possible.<sup>67</sup> James Hsiung believes, “[China’s] ultimate globalization ... was an attempt to operationalize the idea of a ‘collegial sharing of power among nations’ to counter the threat of a unipolar world.”<sup>68</sup> The positive response from the international world, especially the non-western world, is testament to the effectiveness of the new Chinese foreign policy.<sup>69</sup>

---

<sup>64</sup> Chen, 237.

<sup>65</sup> Yong Deng, “Hegemon on the Offensive: Chinese Perspectives on U.S. Global Strategy,” in *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 116, No. 3 (Autumn, 2001) 343-344.

<sup>66</sup> James C. Hsiung, “China’s Omni-Directional Diplomacy: Realignment to Cope with Monopolar U.S. Power,” in *Asian Survey*, Vol. 35, No. 6 (June 1995) 573.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid*, 574.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid*, 575.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid*.

Starting in the summer of 1989, relations with the US declined. Various incidents brought a rift in relations between the two countries. To counter the negative pressure from the US, the PRC stepped up its friendship efforts through a globalized good-neighbor policy.<sup>70</sup> The premise of this new policy was as follows: (1) strengthen Asia Pacific relations; (2) repair any broken bridges in south and west Asia; (3) seek out new relations in Central Asia; (4) strengthen ties with European nations; (5) expand influence in Latin America to build up established relations and create new relations; and (6) entice US businesses to invest in China.<sup>71</sup>

The second prong of the Chinese strategy is defense modernization. A 1995 GAO study stated, “China has begun to modernize its military by acquiring some new weapon systems, restructuring its forces, and improving its training.”<sup>72</sup> According to the 1998 Chinese Defense White Paper, the PRC pursues a policy that is defensive in nature; places defense construction subordinate to public construction; is designed to strengthen international and regional security cooperation; and is an active proponent of international arms control and disarmament.<sup>73</sup> The key to China’s defense modernization program is to ensure the world understands that it is about

---

<sup>70</sup> Hsiung, 576.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid, 576-577.

<sup>72</sup> U.S. Government Accounting Office Report to Congressional Committee, *National Security: Impact of China’s Military Modernization in the Pacific Region*, GAO/NSIAD-95-84, Chapter 0:3.

<sup>73</sup> Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, “White Paper on China’s National Defense, 27 July 1998,” The Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), <http://www.nti.org/db/china/engdocs/wpnatdef.htm> (accessed December 19, 2007).

remaining defensive and not offensive. The PRC's goal is to be perceived as a "peaceful" nation to both regional and global nations.<sup>74</sup>

## Internal/External Problems Facing China

With the rise of economic stardom, power, and prestige comes the rise of additional problems for an aspiring superpower. As China rises in power, there are many problems, both internal and external, that it faces that impact its ability to exercise a new foreign policy of "peaceful development."<sup>75</sup> According to a Chinese minister, "China [is] clear that there are still many difficulties and problems in China's economic and social development that we cannot afford to ignore."<sup>76</sup>

This chapter is designed to highlight some of the most important problems facing Chinese leadership as they attempt to execute foreign policy in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The coverage of these problems, internal and external, will be limited in nature due to the constraints of the papers length. However, the salient issues will be covered.

---

<sup>74</sup> Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Ireland, "China's Independent Foreign Policy of Peace," <http://ie.china-embassy.org/eng/SinoIrishRelations/t112826.htm> (accessed December 19, 2007).

<sup>75</sup> Sujian Guo, "Challenges and Opportunities for China's "Peaceful Rise," <http://bss.sfsu.edu/sguo/My%20articles/006%20Introduction.pdf> (accessed December 19, 2007).

<sup>76</sup> Xinhua, "Chinese minister on difficulties, problems facing China," in *CHINAdaily*, [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-03/06/content\\_312341.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-03/06/content_312341.htm) (accessed December 19, 2007).

## Internal Problems

### Oil and Energy Requirements

China has the largest population in the world totaling over 1.4 billion people. A journey for economic development by various free market mechanisms has produced a need for oil.<sup>77</sup>

China's growing emergence in the energy market is causing nations such as the United States to take notice. With the US being the world's largest energy consumer and China running second, this could prove to be a contentious issue in coming years.<sup>78</sup>

As the 21<sup>st</sup> Century began, Chinese leaders and economic analysts worldwide, specifically the International Energy Agency (IEA), predicted that China's demand for energy resources would only rise about 3 to 4 percent through the year 2010.<sup>79</sup> Their prediction proved incorrect. By 2006, China's GDP continued at a steady rate of growth of 7 to 8 percent, but energy consumption grew over 15 percent.<sup>80</sup>

---

<sup>77</sup> Henry Lee and Dan A. Shalmon, "Searching for Oil: China's Oil Initiatives in the Middle East," in *BCSIA Discussion Paper*, (Cambridge: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, January 2007).2.

<sup>78</sup> Kenneth Lieberthal and Mikkal Herberg, "China's Search for Energy Security: Implications for U.S. Policy" in *NBR Analysis*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (April 2006) 6-7.

<sup>79</sup> Daniel H. Rosen and Trevor House, "China Energy: A Guide for the Perplexed" in *China Balance Sheet*, (A Joint Project by the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Peterson Institute for International Economics, May 2007) 7.

<sup>80</sup> Rosen and House, 7.

So what does this mean for Chinese security and more precisely, Chinese foreign policy? Matthew Forney writes, "...with oil in short supply currently, producers are just pumping one million barrels more than the 81 million barrels being consumed worldwide. Every day growing demand from China is clearly having an unwelcome impact."<sup>81</sup> U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick stated it differently when he said, "[The question at hand is] can China become a "stakeholder" in the global energy system's norms and rules?"<sup>82</sup> What Zoellick appears to be saying is whether China will play according to the current rules and norms prevalent within the global energy system or whether it will, through fear and overwhelming demand, attempt to change the rules to suit them better? This could have a major affect upon not only their foreign policy but that also of the US and other countries. According to Lieberthal and Herberg, "If Beijing believes that the United States is attempting to use energy politics as an instrument to weaken and contain China, then Beijing will be more likely to use its growing energy influence to frustrate US foreign and security policies."<sup>83</sup> Thus, according to these same authors, China has sought out an energy policy in which they will buy oil from any country that will sell to them. The basics of this policy are an active, energy focused, commercially centered strategy on those

---

<sup>81</sup> Matthew Forney, "China's Quest for Oil" in *Time Magazine*, <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,725174,00.html> (accessed December 20, 2007).

<sup>82</sup> Robert B. Zoellick, "Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?" (speech presented to the National Committee on US-China Relations, New York City, September 21, 2005).

<sup>83</sup> Lieberthal and Herberg, 10.

nations with energy export capabilities to meet their growing demands. This could pose a problem for Washington since those targeted nations include Iran, Russia and Sudan;<sup>84</sup> each of whom could provide significant security related problems for the US and the world.

## Chinese Pollution Problems

As alluded to in the above section, Chinese desire for greater energy resources is double the increase in Chinese GDP. Due to an increase in energy consumption, coal consumption has increased 75 percent from 2000-2005.<sup>85</sup> This increase in production though comes at a huge price. According to Kazuhiro Ueta of Kyoto University, “One of the most serious pollution problems in China is health and environmental damage generated by sulfur dioxide related air pollution.”<sup>86</sup> Judith Banister writes, “The burning of coal – widespread in China – releases a different mix of pollutants depending upon the type of coal and whether the coal is raw or washed, high-sulfur or low-sulfur, smoky or less smoky.”<sup>87</sup> Ueta attributes this problem to two main reasons: (1) lack of environmental policy priority versus economic policy; and (2)

---

<sup>84</sup> Lieberthal and Herberg, 12-23.

<sup>85</sup> The World Bank, “Cost of Pollution in China: Economic Estimates of Physical Damages,” (report presented at the International Conference on Sustainable Development in Beijing, China, March 2, 2007) 7.

<sup>86</sup> Kazuhiro Ueta, “Comment on ‘Environmental Consequences of Rising Energy Use in China’,” in *Asian Economic Policy Review* Vol. 1 (2006) 176.

<sup>87</sup> Judith Banister, “Population, Public Health and the Environment in China,” in *The China Quarterly* No. 156, Special Issue: China’s Environment (December 1998) 989.

inadequate implementation and enforcement mechanisms within the environmental policy. In line with the above reasons, he questions whether Chinese leadership will have the will to enact such a policy.<sup>88</sup> Another problem is that Chinese factory owners are unwilling to comply with high cost pollution control methods and the current preference of paying lesser cost fines for noncompliance.<sup>89</sup>

So what consequences will China's pollution problems have globally? There are three major consequences to the regional environment that can be attributed to China's economic growth and its pollution problems.

First, because China is recognized as the regional leader much of what they do is followed by small regional states. Accordingly, as stated earlier, China's record for pollution control is dismal. Even though they have some pollution control laws, they are not strictly enforced. It is thought, therefore, that if China's enforcement of pollution controls are lacking, so will other developing Asian nations in the surrounding region.<sup>90</sup>

---

<sup>88</sup> Ueta, 176.

<sup>89</sup> Jan Mazurek, "Ill Wind From China: Rapid Growth Brings Pollution, Higher Gas Prices," in *Progressive Policy Institute Policy Report* (April 2005) 4.

<sup>90</sup> Ming Wan, "China's Economic Growth and the Environment in the Asia-Pacific Region," in *Asian Survey*, Vol. 38, No. 4 (April 1998) 372.

Secondly, because China's natural resources are diminishing they will continuously look to the international community for imports. This will alter the available supply worldwide which could lead to resource competition among nation states.<sup>91</sup>

Finally, China's pollution problems could potentially cause domestic problems that could slow down economic growth. Although some analysts do not believe that this would occur, it is still a possibility that must be taken into account.<sup>92</sup>

Overall, China has significant pollution problems that are due to booming economic development and weak government action. Unfortunately, unless the PRC leadership takes drastic measurements to curtail their pollution problem, it could potentially become a regional and global problem that could alter their foreign policy and overall strategy outlook. There is hope. In December 2006, China became the third country to join the US in the FutureGen International Partnership to reduce carbon emissions.<sup>93</sup>

## Human Rights Issues

One of the greatest problems affecting citizens throughout the world is violations against the basic rights of human beings. All too often though, this is seen as a problem in non-western

---

<sup>91</sup> Wan, 372.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid.

<sup>93</sup> Congressional Research Service, "China-US Relations: Current Issues and Implications for US Policy," Order Code RL33877, October 1, 2007, 25.



countries with pressure being placed upon them by western nations.<sup>94</sup> Foreign governments have many times used soft power politics as a tactic of foreign policy.<sup>95</sup> China is no exception. For example, as part of the Communist diatribe against imperialism, the subject of human rights in China in its earliest days emphasized the National sovereignty and self-determination from colonial rule.<sup>96</sup> In *International Strategic Studies*, Gu Yan, states, “The development of international law of human rights helps the Third World countries make use of the issue of human rights to oppose hegemonism and colonialism, to preserve sovereignty and independence and to promote the development and prosperity of [the] national economy.”<sup>97</sup> The issues that are raised within the international community concerning China are as follows: (1) political imprisonment; (2) religious repression; (3) problems with criminal procedures; (4) capital punishment; (5) political and religious repression in Tibet; (6) coercive population planning; and (7) prison maltreatment and labor camp exports.<sup>98</sup>

---

<sup>94</sup> Benita Ferrero-Waldner, “The EU-China Human Rights Dialogue,” (speech presented to the European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighborhood Policy, Strasbourg, December 12, 2007).

<sup>95</sup> Joseph S. Nye, “Soft Power,” in *Foreign Policy* No. 80 (Fall 1990), 153-171.

<sup>96</sup> Andrew J. Nathan, “Human Rights in Chinese Foreign Policy” in *The China Quarterly*, No. 139 (September 1994) 624-628.

<sup>97</sup> Gu Yan, “On Human Rights in International Relationships,” in *International Strategic Studies* (China Institute for International Strategic Studies, No. 3, September 1991) 10.

<sup>98</sup> Nathan, 633-634.

In 1989 international attention on its human rights problems focused on China with the Tiananmen Square Massacre. This incident brought criticism and condemnation from the international community with many imposing sanctions, cutting off aid, canceling cultural exchanges, suspending military sales, and even voting for suspension of international loans to China.<sup>99</sup>

Will China's human rights problems cause further assaults upon its strategic foreign policy? According to Qimao Chen, "The Beijing leadership has expressed many times its willingness to discuss and cooperate with all countries in an effort to establish a new international order that is stable, rational, just and conducive to world peace."<sup>100</sup> Beijing believes that nation states should not interfere with the internal affairs of other nation states, but does believe that open discussion and dialogue concerning human rights should be part of normal international talks especially with western countries.<sup>101</sup>

Unfortunately, China has not made much progress towards curbing its human rights problems. In fact, in January 2007, China vetoed a US led United Nations Security Resolution (UNSCR) criticizing Burma's human rights record; the fifth time it has vetoed any UNSCR.<sup>102</sup>

---

<sup>99</sup> Nathan, 635-636.

<sup>100</sup> Qimao Chen, "New Approaches in China's Foreign Policy: The Post-Cold War Era," in *Asian Survey*, Vol. 33, No. 3 (March 1993) 244.

<sup>101</sup> Chen, 244.

<sup>102</sup> Congressional Research Service, 19.

According to a 2007 Annual Report to the US Congressional-Executive Commission on China, “China’s human rights practices in the last year reflected Chinese leaders’ intolerance of citizen activism; suppression of information on urgent matters of public concern; the instrumental use of law for political purposes; and the localization of dispute resolution as a method of insulating the central government and Party from the backlash of national policy failures.”<sup>103</sup>

China’s lackluster human rights performance could pose problems for their economic prosperity in the years to come from both internal and external sources. As host to the 2008 Olympics, the world will be looking to see what type of changes have been made in China since 1989 that have warranted the International Olympic Committee (IOC) to award China the rights to be host.<sup>104</sup> Externally, pressure put on China to intervene into the atrocities in Darfur appears to be working. A senior Chinese official, Zhai Jun, made an official visit to Sudan to push the Sudanese government into allowing a UN peace keeping force into Sudan.<sup>105</sup> China has also deployed an PLA engineer unit to the Sudan peacekeeping mission. As China integrates more

---

<sup>103</sup> Congressional-Executive Commission on China, *2007 Annual Report*, October 10, 2007, 1.

<sup>104</sup> Erin Randolph, “Despite Human Rights Violations, China to Host 2008 Olympics,” *Iowa State Daily*, July 17, 2001, under “News,” <http://media.www.iowastatedaily.com/media/storage/paper818/new/2001/07/17/New/Despite.Human.Right.s.Violations.China.To.Host.2008.Olympics-1054332.shtml> (accessed December 26, 2007).

<sup>105</sup> Helene Cooper, “Darfur Collides with Olympics, and China Yields,” *The New York Times*, April 13, 2007, under “Diplomatic Memo,” <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/13/washington/13diplo.html> (accessed December 26, 2007).

into the international community, we could very well see a changing perspective from the Chinese leadership towards human rights in China.

## Economic Inequality

China has one of the most productive and rising economies of today.<sup>106</sup> Much of this success can be attributed to China's switch from a socialist based command economy to a market based, capitalist style economy.<sup>107</sup> Writer Michael Spence says, "In China, the bottom 10 percent of the income distribution has seen its income rise by 42 percent in the past 10 years. The middle has grown by 115 percent and the top 10 percent by 168 percent. Everyone has benefited but not equally."<sup>108</sup> Based upon the above numbers, everyone is doing better, but not equally sharing in the prosperity of the times.

Economic inequality in China, according to Dennis Tao Yang, is a product of China's system that favored heavy industry over agriculture. Yang says, "The main enforcement

---

<sup>106</sup> James Burkhardt, Harry Harding, Angang Hu, and Ashley Tellis Carnegie, "China's Peaceful Rise," speeches in *Endowment for International Peace*, (September 20, 2004) 1-2, 7.

<sup>107</sup> Dwayne Benjamin, Loren Brandt, John Giles, and Sangui Wang, "Income Inequality During China's Economic Transition," in *China's Economic Transition: Origins, Mechanisms, and Consequences* (July 2005) 5. See also Janet L. Yellen, "Reflections on China's Economy," in *FRBSF Economic Letter*, No. 2004-31 (Center for Pacific Basin Studies within the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Research Department, November 5, 2004).

<sup>108</sup> Michael Spence, "Globalization's Losers Need Support," *Nigerian Tribune*, December 21, 2007, under "Business and Economy," <http://www.tribune.com.ng/21122007/biznes.html> (accessed December 26, 2007).

mechanisms included the state control of agricultural production and procurement, the suppression of food-staple prices, and restrictions on rural-to-urban migration via a household registration system.<sup>109</sup> Another problem that is arising due to income inequality is the escalating food costs due to loss of farm lands. Because of urbanization, farm land is being lost to industrial development due to the rising cost of land prices.<sup>110</sup>

According to the Conference Board, income inequality would probably be worst had not the PRC taken strong steps to promote national investment within the interior of the nation, taken positive steps towards an anti-poverty campaign, and pumped additional resources towards rural education and healthcare.<sup>111</sup> Overall, the PRC are attempting to close the income gap between the tri-class structures that has emerged from their economic successes.

---

<sup>109</sup> Dennis Tao Yang, "Urban-Biased Policies and Rising Income Inequality in China" in *The American Economic Review*, Vol. 89, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the One Hundred Eleventh Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association (May 1999) 306-310.

<sup>110</sup> CSC Staff, "Perennial Problems Burgeoning in New Ways," *ChinaStakes.com*, December 24, 2007, under "Economy," <http://chinastakes.com/story.aspx?id=112> (accessed December 26, 2007).

<sup>111</sup> The Conference Board, "China's Turbo Growth Not Sustainable Because of Growing Economic Imbalances," *Earthtimes.org*, December 3, 2007, under "Can China's Growth Trajectory be Sustained?" Report No. 1410, [http://www.earthtimes.org/articles/show/news\\_press\\_release,234381.shtml](http://www.earthtimes.org/articles/show/news_press_release,234381.shtml) (accessed December 27, 2007).

## External Problems

### Taiwan Issue

Like a dripping faucet in the middle of the night or a nagging headache that will not go away, so it is for Chinese leadership when speaking of the Republic of China (ROC) or Taiwan. Without a doubt, the greatest problem in terms of relations with the United States that face Chinese leadership is the Taiwan issue.

In 1921, two parties emerged vying for power in China. On the Communist side was the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and on the Nationalist side, the Kuomintang (KMT). The KMT at the time controlled the majority of cities in China and was led by Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek).<sup>112</sup> In the 1930s, this warring between parties was temporarily muted when Japanese forces attacked China.

On the Communist side, the CCP was led by Mao Zedong. For him, the Japanese invasion provided an opportunity for a communist advance against the KMT. Mao, coming from

---

<sup>112</sup> Odd Arne Westad, *Decisive Encounters: the Chinese Civil War, 1946-1950*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003, 23.

a more agricultural background, used the situation to increase his party's influence in the northern rural regions of China.<sup>113</sup>

In 1943 in Cairo, Egypt, Chiang Kai-shek, US president, Franklin Roosevelt and British prime minister, Winston Churchill all endorsed the Cairo Declaration which stated that all territories taken by the Japanese to include Formosa or Taiwan would be reinstated back to the Republic of China (ROC).<sup>114</sup> In 1947, civil war ensued once again and continued between the two parties until 1949 when Jiang and the KMT were forced to retreat to Taiwan.

With the mainland secured by the CCP and Taiwan in the hands of the KMT, the issue that has arisen out of the civil war is whether Taiwan is part of China or not? Known as the "One China" principle, the crux of the argument is that the Cairo Declaration declared that Taiwan belonged to the ruling government of the Republic of China but since the ROC leadership was driven off the mainland by the CCP, then the ROC ceased to exist as of 1949 and Taiwan belonged to the new ruling government, the CCP.<sup>115</sup> Today, the issue stems around the government of Taiwan asserting its right to independence. The PRC refuses to deny the use of

---

<sup>113</sup> Denny Roy, *Taiwan: a political history*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003) 73. Another good source concerning the history of Taiwan is Hungdah Chiu, ed., *China and the Taiwan Issue*, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1979).

<sup>114</sup> *Ibid*, 55-67.

<sup>115</sup> Stanton Jue, "The 'One China Policy': Terms of Art", in *Foreign Service Journal*, (May 2005), 59.

force if Taiwan declares independence. The ROC refuses to renounce their right to independence. For now, there is only one China; Taiwan is not independent.<sup>116</sup>

## China and Myanmar/Burma Relationship

Myanmar/Burma is a country that has been crippled by decades of authoritarian rule. In 1948, Burma achieved independence from British rule and renamed itself the “Union of Burma.” In 1974, it became the “Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma.” In 1988, it changed its name back to the “Union of Burma,” and in 1989, its ruling military junta declared it the “Union of Myanmar.” It must be noted that the United States does not recognize the name Myanmar since it was changed by the current military junta which the US believes is illegitimate.<sup>117</sup>

Burma poses a problem because it shares its north-eastern border with China. Since illegitimately taking control, the ruling military junta has been very oppressive to the people of Burma.<sup>118</sup> Burma is important to the Chinese because of its access to the Indian Ocean for the

---

<sup>116</sup> Jue, 59-61.

<sup>117</sup> BBC News, “Should it be Burma or Myanmar?” *BBC News Magazine*, September 26, 2007, under “Who, What, Why?”, [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk\\_news/magazine/7013943.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/magazine/7013943.stm) (accessed January 1, 2008).

<sup>118</sup> Yuza Maw Htoon and Khin Zaw Win, “Expediency and Interests in Contemporary China-Myanmar Relations,” A roundtable discussion for *China’s New Role in African and the South: A Search for a New Perspective*, under “Focus on the Global South,” <http://focusweb.org/china-s-new-role-in-africa-and-the-south-a-search-for-a-new-perspective.html?Itemid=144> (accessed January 1, 2008).



cities of Yunnan and Sichuan.<sup>119</sup> According to Shee, Myanmar is important to the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to be able to achieve two-ocean dominance in both the Pacific and Indian Oceans. China has also brokered arms deals with the Myanmar government not to mention the enormous economic ties the two countries have together.<sup>120</sup>

Because of the atrocities committed against the Burmese people, the international community has tried to coerce the military leadership into loosening up its brutal hold on the people through economic sanctions with little effect.<sup>121</sup> Now they are looking to China, as a rising world power, to use its influence upon the dictatorship regime. According to a government transcript, US Secretary of State, Condoleeza Rice stated, "We will return again and again to those states that have influence, like China, to move this forward, because there needs to be a process of political reconciliation."<sup>122</sup> A European Union (EU) envoy recently stated, "China's

---

<sup>119</sup> Poon Kim Shee, "The Political Economy of China-Myanmar Relations: Strategic and Economic Dimensions," in *Ritsumeikan Annual Review of International Studies*, (The International Studies Association of Ritsumeikan University, Vol. 1, 2002) 33.

<sup>120</sup> Ibid, 36-37. See also United Press International, "China-Myanmar Trade Increased in 2007," *United Press International Journal*, December 9, 2007, under "Business," [http://www.upi.com/NewsTrack/Business/2007/12/09/china-myanmar\\_trade\\_increased\\_in\\_20076547](http://www.upi.com/NewsTrack/Business/2007/12/09/china-myanmar_trade_increased_in_20076547) (accessed January 1, 2008).

<sup>121</sup> Burma Project, "China in Burma: The Increasing Investment of Chinese Multinational Corporations in Burma's Hydropower, Oil & Gas, and Mining Sectors," in *EarthRights International* (September 2007) 1.

<sup>122</sup> Michael Heath, "Rice Urges 'More Vigor' on Myanmar from International Community," *Bloomberg.com*, December 22, 2007, <http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601080&sid=adPZgNaD47yI&refer=asia> (accessed January 1, 2008).

support has been vital to achieving initial steps toward national reconciliation in military-ruled Myanmar.”<sup>123</sup> As the world has recognized, China has the greatest potential to make a difference for democratic hopefuls in Myanmar/Burma. This is an opportunity to flex its might in the eyes of the international community.

## Chinese Involvement In Darfur

One of the most tragic situations occurring in the world today are the atrocities in Darfur, Sudan. According to one source, it all started with a drought. Prior to the drought, nomads and farmers got along and shared the natural resources, grazing land and water. Once the drought began, farmers, out of fear, began to fence off their lands to keep the nomads from using up the land and water to care for their camels and families. Eventually, this led to sporadic fighting between the two groups with the Sudanese government said to be supporting the Arab nomads.<sup>124</sup>

With deaths ranging in the tens of thousands, the international community has called upon China, as one of the leading nations invested in the region, to intervene in the situation and influence the Sudanese government to stop the fighting. As of May 2007, China has provided

---

<sup>123</sup> Lindsay Beck, “EU says China pressure on Myanmar key but limited,” *International Herald Tribune*, December 20, 2007, under “News and Features,” <http://www.iht.com/articles/reuters/2007/12/20/news/OUKWD-UK-MYANMAR-EU-CHINA.php> (accessed January 1, 2008).

<sup>124</sup> Stephan Faris, “The Real Roots of Darfur,” *The Atlantic Monthly*, April 2007, <http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200704/darfur-climate> (accessed January 1, 2008).

over 1,800 military troops, observers, and civilian police in support of United Nations global peacekeeping operations and is showing the world that it is ready to take on responsibilities of a leading nation.<sup>125</sup> It has recently begun the deployment of 140 troops into Sudan for Peacekeeping Operations.<sup>126</sup>

## The Nuclear Weapon Neighbor

Another opportunistic issue that the PRC leadership faces is North Korea's continued pursuit of nuclear weapons. It is opportunistic because China is the only remaining ally of North Korea. Opportunistic because they can either do nothing and hope that the status quo will be sufficient to maintain stability or they can intervene and promote themselves as a world leader in the eyes of the international community.<sup>127</sup>

For several decades, China has had on/off relations with North Korea. Recently, with both Hu Jintao and Kim Jong Il taking over as leaders of respective countries, relations have been stable but not very close.<sup>128</sup> Stable in the sense that North Korea relies very heavily on China's

---

<sup>125</sup> Bates Gill, Chin-hao Huang, and J. Stephen Morrison, "Assessing China's Growing Influence in Africa," in *China Security*, Vol. 3, No. 3, (Summer 2007). 3-5.

<sup>126</sup> Alfred de Montesquiou, "Sudan Welcomes Chinese Peacekeepers," in *The Associated Press*, February 1, 2008, <http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5g0iY9m1J-zXaGftKPTmzRxaTwwD8UHNm800> (accessed February 12, 2008).

<sup>127</sup> Timothy Hildebrandt, "Uneasy Allies: Fifty Years of China-North Korea Relations," in *The Woodrow Wilson Center Asia Program Special Report*, No. 115, (September 2003) 1-3.

<sup>128</sup> Hildebrandt, 1-3.

economic aid packages, trade relations, and energy supplies that PRC leaders know provide them with an upper hand in negotiating with North Korea that other nations do not have.<sup>129</sup>

In September 2005, China took a giant step towards being a world leader when it hosted the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks concerning North Korea's nuclear program. Not only were the United States, Japan, Russia and South Korea in attendance, but North Korea showed up willing to negotiate.<sup>130</sup> As of the writing of this monograph, North Korea has allowed US and international nuclear inspectors to oversee the dismantling of its plutonium-producing nuclear facilities. On the downside, it did not meet 2007 end of the year declaration of its atomic programs and facilities.<sup>131</sup> Time will only tell whether nuclear weapons will be a thing of the past on the Korean Peninsula. The fate of Korea and China's positional role is perhaps the most important of all the external relations for long term stability.

---

<sup>129</sup> Anne Applebaum, "It's China's Problem," in *Washington Post*, under "News," October 17, 2006, [http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/16/AR2006101601018\\_pf.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/16/AR2006101601018_pf.html) (accessed December 28, 2007).

<sup>130</sup> U.S. Department of State, *Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks Beijing*, (September 19, 2005, 2005/T13-28).

<sup>131</sup> Paul Eckert and ed. Chris Wilson, "U.S. Will Hold North Korea to Nuclear Commitments," *Reuters*, under "News," January 2, 2008, <http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSN024270462008102?sp=true> (accessed January 2, 2008).

## Current US Strategy Towards China

One of the key purposes for writing this monograph is to propose a new US strategy towards China. But before a new strategy can be proposed, the current strategy must be examined.

The current US strategy towards China is *engagement*. As stated in the 2002 National Security Strategy, “We [the US] welcome the emergence of a strong, peaceful, and prosperous China.” It also states that the US “seeks a constructive relationship with a changing China.”<sup>132</sup> The 2006 National Security Strategy says, “As China becomes a global player, it must act as a responsible stakeholder that fulfills its obligations and works with the United States and others to advance the international system...”<sup>133</sup> The engagement policy first came into play as a strategy towards China in 1972 when President Nixon signed the Shanghai Communiqué.<sup>134</sup> The document stated that both sides would seek normalization in relations, that neither would seek

---

<sup>132</sup> National Security Council, *The National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington, DC: The White House, 2002) <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2002> (accessed January 2, 2008) 27.

<sup>133</sup> National Security Council, *The National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington, DC: The White House, 2006) <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2006.pdf>, (accessed February 12, 2008).

<sup>134</sup> William J. Perry and Ashton B. Carter, “The Content of U.S. Engagement with China,” *Preventive Defense Project* Vol. 1, No. 2 (July 1998): 2. Another name often used is *constructive engagement*.

hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region nor would any side advocate any other nation attempting to do so, and that neither side would enter into third party agreements against one another.<sup>135</sup>

According to Perry and Carter, US engagement policy comprises four strands: (1) [to] deepen and broaden the defense-to-defense relationship; (2) stabilize the Taiwan question; (3) engage China's neighbors; and (4) encourage greater participation by China in counter-proliferation and other international security efforts.<sup>136</sup> Peter Feaver of Duke University says, "Constructive engagement overstates the ability of the United States to shape Chinese behavior promising, in effect that we can shape their conduct by shaping their perceptions, their interests, and ultimately their domestic political order."<sup>137</sup> Michael Mastanduno writes about a study conducted in 1945 by Albert Hirschman titled *National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade*. Mastanduno states, "Hirschman argued that the conscious cultivation of asymmetrical interdependence, if conducted strategically by the government of a powerful state, would lead weaker states to reorient not only their economies but also their foreign policies to the preferences

---

<sup>135</sup> U.S. Department of State, *Joint Communique of the United States of America and the People's Republic of China* (February 28, 1972).

<sup>136</sup> Perry and Carter, 3.

<sup>137</sup> Peter D. Feaver, "The Clinton's Administration's China Engagement Policy in Perspective," (essay Duke University) <http://www.duke.edu/web/cis/pass/pdf/warpeaceconf/p-feaver.pdf> (accessed January 2, 2008).

of the stronger state.”<sup>138</sup> Hirschman’s statement lends credibility to Feaver’s statement that a policy of engagement can, in fact, cause a weaker state to change its conduct to be more in line with the dominant state. Mastunduno goes on to say, “Threats and coercion usually inspire resentment and resistance in a target state; rewards and inducements are more likely to prompt a willingness to bargain.”<sup>139</sup> One writer believes that the current Bush strategy is designed to reach out to surrounding nations, especially democratic nations, in the Asia-Pacific region and allowing the region to shape China vice the United States trying to shape China.<sup>140</sup> According to former deputy secretary of state Robert Zoellick, “China has a responsibility to strengthen the international system that has enabled its success.”<sup>141</sup> The premise of Zoellick’s statement is that it is in China’s best interest to participate in the international system if it wants to continue its economic successes.

So the question is whether the US strategy is working to shape the behavior of China in favor of US policy? One may say “no”. In October 2006, a Chinese submarine surfaced in the

---

<sup>138</sup> Michael Mastanduno, “Economic Engagement Strategies: Theory and Practice,” (paper prepared for *Interdependence and Conflict*, edited by Edward Mansfield and Brian Pollins, for submission to University of Michigan Press, Dartmouth College, June 2001) <http://psweb.sbs.ohio-state.edu/faculty/bpollins/book/Mastanduno.pdf> (accessed January 2, 2008) 2-3.

<sup>139</sup> *Ibid*, 5.

<sup>140</sup> Thomas Donnelly and Colin Monaghan, “Legacy Agenda, Part III: The Bush Doctrine and the Rise of China,” in *American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research*, April 2007, under “National Security Outlook,” [http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.26066/pub\\_detail.asp](http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.26066/pub_detail.asp) (accessed January 2, 2008) 1.

middle of a US carrier strike group signifying that the People's Liberation Army (Navy) (PLAN) can maneuver whenever and wherever it desires without US approval within regional waters. In April 2007, China declared that the US discriminated against a Chinese paper company by applying tariffs to its exports.<sup>142</sup> In November 2007, Chinese officials denied access to US military ships and aircraft into Chinese territory following prior approval due to the US arms sales to Taiwan and the US inviting the Dalai Lama to the White House.<sup>143</sup> Though there is no indication that war is on the horizon, relations between both countries have become rather contentious recently showing China's determination to determine its own destiny—rather than the US making that determination.

## **Relevance Of Power Transition Theory Towards A New Peer Competitor**

In early 1990s a popular song launched throughout the United States called, "I've got the power!" In political science, the concept of power is one that many attempt to describe. According to political scientist and author, Joseph Nye, "Just as farmers and meteorologists try to

---

<sup>141</sup> Donnelly and Monaghan, 3.

<sup>142</sup> Shu-Ching Jean Chen, "Chinese Target of U.S. Tariffs Alleges Discrimination," in *Forbes.com*, April 9, 2007, under "Market Scan," [http://www.forbes.com/2007/04/09/us-china-paper-markets-equity-cx\\_jc\\_0410markets1\\_print.html](http://www.forbes.com/2007/04/09/us-china-paper-markets-equity-cx_jc_0410markets1_print.html) (accessed January 3, 2008).

<sup>143</sup> Gordon G. Chang, "China Flexes Its Muscles," in *Wall Street Journal*, January 2, 2008 under "Commentary," [http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119923886057561427.html?mod=googlenews\\_wsj](http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119923886057561427.html?mod=googlenews_wsj) (accessed January 3, 2008).



forecast storms, so do leaders and analysts try to understand the dynamics of major changes in the distribution of power among nations.”<sup>144</sup> John Vasquez says, “In International politics, only nations have power, and their power can only be limited by the power of other nations.”<sup>145</sup> The transition of power from one nation to another is what this chapter is about.

The power transition model first originated as a theory in 1958 by A.F.K. Organski. Power transition theory differs from other theories of power politics in how it describes interactions within the international world. Power transition refuted three assumptions prevalent in realism: (1) realist believes the international system is anarchic. On the contrary, power transition theorists view the world as hierarchical in which there is usually one nation heading the international community. Ronald L. Tammen and Jacek Kugler wrote in *Power Transition and China-US Conflicts*, “In the past, hierarchies were constructed around nation states, but in this global environment they also include powerful soft power non-national actors such as corporations, interest groups and non-governmental organizations (NGOs);”<sup>146</sup> (2) power transition sees both the international political system and the domestic political system as functioning similarly with regards to resources. The competitive process for resources

---

<sup>144</sup> Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “The Changing Nature of World Power,” in *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 105, No. 2 (Summer 1990), 177.

<sup>145</sup> John A. Vasquez, *The Power of Power Politics: From Classical Realism to Neotraditionalism*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) 49.

<sup>146</sup> Ronald L. Tammen and Jacek Kugler, “Power Transition and China-US Conflicts,” in *Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 1, (2006) 36.

domestically functions the same when it comes to competition for resources in the international community; (3) nations decide whether to war against another nation based upon the perceived net gain that can be obtained.<sup>147</sup>

Power transition theory has three overarching categories that lend itself towards comparative analysis among competitors: hierarchy, power and status quo. The international system is comprised of the dominant nation which is typically the most powerful nation. The nations below the most powerful are referred to as great power nations. Though they are considered great powers, they are not as powerful as the dominant nation and do not have the capability to overtake the dominant nation.<sup>148</sup> One of the key features of the dominant nation is that it establishes the status quo within the international system. In other words, the rules of the road that all nations must follow include rules specific to economics, politics and military interactions.<sup>149</sup> According to Tammen and Kugler, “Nations satisfied with the *status quo* accept

---

<sup>147</sup> Jacek Kugler and A.F.K. Organski, “The Power Transition: A Retrospective and Prospective Evaluation,” in Manus I. Midlarsky, ed., *Handbook of War Studies*, (Boston: Unwin Hyman) 172-173. See also Jonathan M. DiCicco and Jack S. Levy, “The Power Transition Research Program: A Lakatosian Analysis,” in Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, eds., *Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press) 115-116.

<sup>148</sup> Kugler and Organski, 173.

<sup>149</sup> Douglas Lemke, “Great Powers in the Post-Cold War World: A Power Transition Perspective,” in T.V. Paul, James J. Wirtz, and Michel Fortmann, eds., *Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, (Stanford, CA.: Stanford University Press, 2004) 56.

the rules the pre-eminent nation creates, manages and defends, because they share the resulting stability, prosperity and peace.”<sup>150</sup>

This brings us to the premise of the theory. If any of the great power challengers become dissatisfied with the status quo and the challenger is able to achieve parity or equality with the dominant nation, then the chance of war between the two nations rises significantly. Now some nations may not be satisfied with the status quo if they believe their nation is not receiving full benefit from the international system. However, if the dominant nation can remain stronger than the challenger, then war between the two are unlikely. If however, there is a challenger who has achieved parity but is satisfied with the status quo, then once again, war is unlikely. Though the challenger may eventually take over as the dominant nation, because they are satisfied with the status quo, they will more than likely continue to maintain the status quo of their predecessor. In other words, satisfied nations tend to get along and security fears diminish because of their satisfaction.<sup>151</sup> According to Indra De Soysa, John Oneal, and Yong-Hee Park, “When there is a stable equality of power between two rivals, war should be more likely than when one state is clearly dominant, but less dangerous than when a power transition occurs.”<sup>152</sup>

---

<sup>150</sup> Tammen and Kugler, 36.

<sup>151</sup>Tammen and Kugler, 57-58.

<sup>152</sup> Indra De Soysa, John R. Oneal, and Yong-Hee Park, “Testing Power-Transition Theory Using Alternative Measures of National Capabilities,” in *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 41, No. 4, (August 1997) 511.

The relevant question then, is whether power transition theory applies to a situation between China and the US? Research concluded by Organski and Kugler shows that the most dangerous parity period is when the challenger approaches 100% of the Gross National Product (GNP) capacity of the dominant nation and continues to a point of 120%. At 80% capacity, they believe parity is met and continues to 20% beyond the dominant nation's complete capacity—the challenger then becomes the new dominant nation.<sup>153</sup>

So where does China currently fall in comparison to the US? According to Tammen and Kugler's research, they anticipate China reaching parity with the United States somewhere between 2025 and 2035 and becoming the new dominant nation by 2075 if current conditions continue at par.<sup>154</sup> So now that there is the possibility that China will one day ascend from its challenger position and become the new dominant nation, does that mean that war is inevitable? Not necessarily. Remember earlier in this chapter we said that another condition must exist for the prospects of war to be more certain. Will China be satisfied with the status quo at the point of parity? Political scientists, John Vasquez and Marie Henehan demonstrate through historical data that nations go to war more over territorial disputes than any other type of dispute.<sup>155</sup> Currently,

---

<sup>153</sup> A.F.K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, *The War Ledger*, (Chicago, IL.: University of Chicago Press, 1980) 11-63.

<sup>154</sup> Tammen and Kugler, 45.

<sup>155</sup> John Vasquez and Marie T. Henehan, "Territorial Disputes and the Probability of War, 1816-1992," in *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 38, No. 2 (2001) 123-138.

there is no known territorial dispute between China and the US, but we must not forget about the Taiwan Issue discussed earlier in this monograph that could provide the potential for confrontation between China and the US. India, Japan, Korea, Russia, and the Spratly Islands are all potential territorial issues that could pose problems for China in the future.

What other indications are there that a contender may not be satisfied with the status quo? Earlier in this chapter I mentioned that satisfied nations have no need to fear their security with the dominant nation. But a clear indication that a nation fears for its security is the amount of national money that is spent purchasing and building up its military capacity. According to the *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute*, China's military expenditures continued to rise to a point of surpassing Japan as the largest military spender in Asia and becoming the fourth largest military spender in the world as of 2006.<sup>156</sup> As stated earlier in this monograph, China has one of the most productive and rising economies of today.<sup>157</sup> So would China be unhappy with the current status quo even though they are prospering at a rapid pace? Will China's economy be as hot in 2025 as it is today? Do the Chinese believe that they can produce an economic system that can outpace the current international capitalistic system?

---

<sup>156</sup> Petter Stalenheim, Catalina Perdomo, and Elisabeth Skons, "SIPRI Yearbook 2007: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security," in *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute*, (2007), <http://yearbook2007.sipri.org> (accessed January 6, 2008).

<sup>157</sup> Burkhardt, Harding, Hu, and Carnegie, 1-2, 7.

Based upon the parameters of my research, I am unable to find any literature that would lead me to believe that the Chinese are unsatisfied with the current global economic system that they are flourishing under. Based upon this, at the writing of this monograph, I do not believe the Chinese leadership is dissatisfied with the status quo. But what I do believe is that as long as the Chinese economy continues to grow, dissatisfaction will not take root. However, the extent of increases in military spending remains problematic.

## **Summary**

The purpose of this monograph was to propose an alternative strategy to be used towards a rising peer competitor in China. China currently has one of the most prolific economies in the world and is proving to be a strong economic competitor of the United States. But China's role as a peer competitor does not stop with economics. They are also a future military peer competitor that strikes at the heart of America's national security.

China's booming economy has allowed it to increase spending towards building up its military arsenal. Because of China's lack of transparency concerning its defense spending, it is difficult for defense analysts to provide an accurate assessment of China's true military power. This poses a problem for the sole superpower. Not being able to accurately assess a potential competitor's power base makes not only the US nervous but also its regional neighbors.

In chapter one of this monograph, I describe three of the leading theories of international relations.<sup>158</sup> In chapter two, I discussed the Chinese political system having its roots taken from Marxist-Leninist-Maoist teachings and how ideology influences their political decision making.<sup>159</sup> In chapter three, I point out the problems that China faces as it rises in the

---

<sup>158</sup> Early in the chapter I focus on the concept of power. Power is by far a major driving factor for nations to want to change the status quo in international relations. Because international politics is a struggle for power, China's rise in the international community poses a series of problems for the US. International relations theorists seek to explain the dynamics between the struggles of nations and also provide a means of predicting future behavior of national leaders and their countries. The most prevalent international relations theory, realism, is concerned about the struggle for power among nations. Realists believe that the international community is anarchic, with no international body being able to provide authoritative leadership over the community. Because a most basic instinct of humans is to obtain power, realists are concerned with the desire within national leaders to obtain power, at all costs, within this anarchic system. I also laid out what well renowned international relations theorist Hans Morgenthau refers to as the six principles that best defines the school of realism. The foremost rival theory to realism is liberalism. Liberal theorists believe that international relations is governed by individuals or groups of individuals. They believe that decisions for nations are made based upon the desires of the dominant groups of people. They also believe that the decisions that are made are based upon what those dominant people believe to be in their best interest, not necessarily what is truly in the best interest of the nation. Because of this, liberalism subscribes to allowing international institutions to shape the world of the community; its rules, behaviors and norms. A final school of IR theory discussed which has been prevalent during the Bush administration is neo-conservatism. Neo-conservatism ascribes towards much of the school of thought of idealism but add to it the dimension to take matters into their own hands using their military might. Neo-conservatism are huge proponents of freedom and democracy. As such, they believe in the power of less powerful countries bandwagoning with the more powerful nation state.

<sup>159</sup> An in-depth discussion of the workings of the Chinese political system was had demonstrating the internal structure that also influences Chinese decision making. Also key in this discussion was the role that mishu play in China's political system. Many of China's top leaders were themselves former mishu which shows the importance that is placed upon this role within their society. I continued in this chapter to discuss the Chinese historical strategy towards the United States. Ascribing to a form of bandwagoning with the US during the Cold War to counter the immediate Soviet threat, relations between the two countries were once again open. But this did not last as the Soviet empire collapsed signaling the end of the Cold War between the two superpowers. No longer having an immediate threat at its doorstep, Chinese foreign policy soon changed to what was known as

international community.<sup>160</sup> Chapter four describes the current US strategy towards China of engagement. The premise behind the strategy is for the US to reach out to China and encourage her participation in international institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).<sup>161</sup> In Chapter five, I introduced a balance of power theory known as power transition theory. In the most simplistic way, power transition is about how power transitions from one nation to another nation.<sup>162</sup>The final and most important chapter

---

*circumference diplomacy* and *defense modernization*. Their strategy was clear cut; diplomatically improve relations among their neighbors while simultaneously build up its defense forces. This brings us to their current strategy known as “peaceful rise.” Essentially, the Chinese publicly state that they seek economic prosperity at the harm of no other nation, yet they continue to pour large sums of money into defense modernization.

<sup>160</sup> Due to its booming industrial economy, China’s oil and energy needs present it with a significant resource problem. To keep its economy rising, Chinese leaders have realized their need to reach out to other nations for their energy needs. This has caused them to negotiate with precarious regimes in areas such as Sudan, Venezuela and Iran. Other problems plaguing China due to its flourishing economy is pollution, specifically air pollution. Because of the lack of regulations upon industry that is common in the US, the Chinese people are finding an increasing amount of health related problems that stem back to the poor air quality in China. Another problem that the US finds intolerable is the human rights violations that China’s leadership has failed to adequately address. Finally, Chinese prosperity is not falling upon every citizen. Those involved in the manufacturing industries within China’s major cities are prospering but those involved in agricultural development are still finding themselves living in poverty. Also threatening to China’s prosperous uprising are external problems such as the Taiwan issue, its relationship with Myanmar, intervention in Darfur, and the nuclear weapons threat from the Korean peninsula.

<sup>161</sup> The idea is that a rising China that are deeply embedded in international institutions that are mostly established by the US, will be more apt to continue in the institutions that have created their fortunes. The problem with this strategy is that it is passive and hinges upon the Chinese compliance with this hopeful strategic outcome.

<sup>162</sup> Power transition theorists believe that the international community is composed of a hierarchal leader known as the dominant nation. Underneath the dominant nation are aspiring great power nations. According to this theory, rising great power nations will attempt to become the dominant nation by waging war when power parity is achieved and when they are not satisfied with the current status quo. If they



will encompass a new strategy towards China that consists of the US engaging regionally within the whole of Asia as a counterbalance to any hegemony actions of China while restraining China's economic rise. The US must use a strategy that incorporates all elements of national power to include *diplomatic courting, information superiority, military dominance through concealment, and economic integration with surrounding nations.*

## **A Recommended China Strategy**

My analysis of China using Power Transition Theory suggests that today the United States has no reason to fear a rising China. However, what the theory cannot do is predict what China's economy will be like in 30-40 years nor can it predict who will be in power and whether they will continue to subscribe to a truly "peaceful rise." Thus it is prudent that future US political leaders take a more active role in shaping the type of China they want to see in the future.

In an earlier chapter the author stated that the current administration's strategy toward China is *engagement*. Though this strategy has allowed for relations between the US and China to be cordial, it is not active enough to ensure China rises to be a "responsible stakeholder" in the international community.

---

reach power parity but are satisfied with the status quo, then the probability of war is greatly diminished. The point of introducing this theory is that I believe it will have profound relevance in 30-40 years based upon China's rising economy and defense buildup.

This paper proposes a new strategy for not only the upcoming administration, but for the long term—a more aggressive strategy that shapes the behavior of China regionally and internationally while allowing for the US to remain the sole superpower. This strategy will be based upon a mixture of both engagement and containment. The root of this strategy is that the US engages regionally within Asia as a counterbalance to any hegemonic actions of China while restraining or maintaining China’s economic rise.

### **Diplomatic Courting**

In order for this new strategy to take root, a solid diplomatic base must be laid with those countries surrounding China in Asia. The US State Department will play a key role reaching out to nations such as India, Australia, Japan, Taiwan, Singapore, Indonesia, Russia and Vietnam. Key to this strategy is the forming of collective security agreements with India and Russia to constrain any aggressive military behavior by China while also maintaining a balance of power within Asia.

Two politically and militarily powerful nations surrounding China are India and Russia. The US enjoys very positive relations with India politically, economically, and militarily. They are one of the most important democratic friends the US has that can help to maintain a balance of power within Asia. Maintaining and strengthening relations with India should be one of the

---

top priorities for Asian state department leaders. Another key nation surrounding China that has the potential politically and militarily to balance against China is Russia. Unfortunately, the relations between the US and Russia are most often strained though political talks continue between the nations. US political leaders must push for unobstructed dialogue with Russian leaders, creating diplomatic agreements that foster peaceful relations and stability in the region.

The US must also take away any potential allies China may seek to join forces with like North Korea. This is a very sticky situation. There are opposing views on whether North and South Korea will one day merge as one Korea. To shape this outcome, the process must begin with the US opening dialogue with North Korea. US political leaders must put aside past discrepancies and diplomatically set itself up as a support of Korean re-unification. The goal is for the US, not China, is to be in position to help broker re-unification, if and when the time arises. If this occurs, the question of concern would be whether the US would have similar relations with a single Korea as it had with South Korea. Nonetheless, the US must make diplomatic efforts to maintain relations with South Korea and improve relations with the North Korean leadership.

The US must continue to ensure that relations between China and Taiwan remain status quo. Economic ties between the two nations have been the glue that has solidified their peaceful relationship to date. With that said, the US must continue to maintain its stand on the *One China Policy* along with ensuring Taiwan military assistance against an aggressive China as long as Taiwan does not provoke the aggression by declaring de facto independence. Diplomatic leaders must show Taiwan that her continued economic prosperity is in direct proportion to her maintenance of the *status quo*.

One of the most important international organizations from which the US can make significant shaping actions upon China is through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). ASEAN have made important strides towards building a peaceful and cooperative relationship with China and its member nations. The US must provide ASEAN nations with

incentives such as regional security and economic trade that will encourage democratic processes within these countries along with their agreement to encourage democratic processes in China. US diplomats must take all possible actions to show the ASEAN nations the benefits that democracy has had upon the welfare of its people and its nations.

Just as a man courts a woman to marriage, so must the US court the nations that surround China from Japan down to Australia and back up to India in the Indian Ocean region. This will take a concerted effort by all departments of the federal government. The US must call on its foremost regional allies, Japan and Australia, to push for strong democratic relations among all nations that surround China. They must persuade Chinese leaders that democracy is the best form of government for the continued success of China. Overall, the US diplomatic strategy within Asia should be to engage those nations surrounding China to ward off any hegemonic temptations by China. Winning and maintaining the hearts of China's neighbors will provide a counterbalancing force that promotes democratic processes throughout all of its institutional agreements.

## **Information Superiority**

This is probably the area of much needed improvement for the United States. In order for the US to achieve information superiority it will have to expend large sums of money promoting the importance of institutional alliances and democratic processes. The US must take back the airwaves by flooding them with the message that the US wants to see all of the countries of Asia prospering as much as the US has prospered and that no one nation should do so at the disadvantage of others. This sounds hypocritical, but it is the message that must radiate from the halls of the White House. Future presidents must ensure that Asia prosperity is a key theme that all governmental spokespersons articulate to the international community. Talk is cheap unless the US can produce institutions that foster prosperity not only for the US but also for Asian nations.

## **Military Dominance Through Concealment**

In 2003, President George W. Bush made a strategic decision to send US troops in Iraq to topple the regime of Saddam Hussein. Five years later the United States is fighting a counterinsurgency against some of the most determined groups on earth? What he also did not foresee is that he has tied up his fighting ground forces for years to come and has put the US in a vulnerable position of possibly not being able to stop a rising nation such as China from attacking any of its regional neighbors. If the US is going to remain a deterrent force against a large conventional military force as the People's Liberation Army (PLA), future administrations will need a new defense strategy that stresses military strength through a large, technologically dominant force.

While not advocating an arms race, but the US military must not only rebuild its ground forces upon completion of its war efforts in both Afghanistan and Iraq, but they must also substantially increase the size of its sea forces to counter the aggressive shipbuilding of the PLAN.

But here is the twist to all of this. The US must not be so transparent with its military buildup. It must not appear to China and the international community that it is in an arms race with China. This could be seen as threatening Chinese growth, but it is a requirement if the US wants to ensure it is in position to counter any actions that are contrary to a "peaceful rise."

Also important is the continuous reminder to China's neighbors that building up their defensive capabilities can only increase their ability to fend off any attack by an aggressive China. The US must increase its defensive arms sales as a supporting effort.

Finally, budget constraints and high operational tempo (OPTEMPO) in the Persian Gulf has resulted in a decrease in Pacific naval presence. This trend must be reversed. US Seventh Fleet assets must not only increase in overall size but also in OPTEMPO conducting more Naval fleet deployments into the region as a show of presence and force; presence to nations

surrounding China and force directed towards China. The US military must also assert itself in the Asian region by increasing the number of multilateral exercises with neighboring nations, encouraging Asian nations to build up its defensive forces while conducting bilateral/multilateral exercises among themselves.

## **Economic Integration**

It has been said that America's foreign policy centers around economic prosperity and all decisions that are made are based upon perceived threats to that prosperity. It is not uncommon that the most talked about issue in American domestic politics is the economy. For centuries the American dream that most immigrants to America seek after is economic prosperity. Since the founding of the United States, its leaders have sought a foreign policy that seeks to maximize its economic wealth. With that said, future US strategies towards China must have as an underlying basis, maximizing economic prosperity.

In order to maximize prosperity in Asia, the US must ensure it establishes institutions that integrate within the current ASEAN structure. By engaging ASEAN countries, the US can establish an element of trust among these countries that binds them towards support of US foreign policies. It must also encourage the establishment of other economic institutions that will allow all Asian countries to participate and trade with one another more freely.

The US must also ensure Free Trade Agreements remain an integral part of relations with Southeast Asia countries. Fair and open trade promotes stable economies and stable economies promote national security. An integral part of creating Free Trade Agreements is to be able to tie them together. Being able to tie the South Asia Free Trade Area (SAFTA) countries to ASEAN countries could bring significant economic growth to all Asian countries. The US must ensure its presence is felt throughout Asia in a positive way that entices these nations to provide favorable trade with the US over China.

US economic leaders must figure out a way of strengthening the purchasing power of the US dollar. They must also encourage the establishment of large Asian companies within the US to help bolster the US job market. Foreign automakers have laid the foundation, but diversification from other industries must occur.

Finally, one key way the US can assure its friends in Asia that it is working to provide for a better way of life for them is by sending economic aid packages to those nations to help alleviate suffering during tough times. When disasters strike, which are a common occurrence throughout that region, the US must ensure that it is the first nation to pony up not only monetary aid, but personnel on the ground where necessary to assist. This is not limited to military personnel, but also state, treasury and agricultural employees lending their expert help.

## Bibliography

- Ahn, Byung-joon. *Chinese Politics and the Cultural Revolution: dynamics of Policy Processes*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1976.
- Applebaum, Anne. "It's China's Problem." *Washington Post* October 17, 2006.  
[http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/16/AR2006101601018\\_pf.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/16/AR2006101601018_pf.html) (accessed December 28, 2007).
- Banister, Judith. "Population, Public Health and the Environment in China." *The China Quarterly* No. 156 (December 1998): 989.
- BBC News. "Should it be Burma or Myanmar?" *BBC News Magazine* September 26, 2007.  
[http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk\\_news/magazine/7013943.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/magazine/7013943.stm) (accessed January 1, 2008).
- Beck, Lindsay. "EU says China pressure on Myanmar key but limited." *International Herald Tribune* December 20, 2007.  
<http://www.iht.com/articles/reuters/2007/12/20/news/OUKWD-UK-MYANMAR-EU-CHINA.php> (accessed January 1, 2008).
- Benjamin, Dwayne, Loren Brandt, John Giles, and Sangui Wang. "Income Inequality During China's Economic Transition." *China's Economic Transition: Origins, Mechanisms, and Consequences* (July 2005): 5.
- Burkhardt, James, Harry Harding, Angang Hu, and Ashley Tellis Carnegie. "China's Peaceful Rise." *Endowment for International Peace* (September 20, 2004): 1-2, 7.
- Burma Project. "China in Burma: The Increasing Investment of Chinese Multinational Corporations in Burma's Hydropower, Oil & Gas, and Mining Sectors." *EarthRights International* (September 2007): 1.
- Buzan, Barry. "The Timeless Wisdom of Realism?." Edited by Steve Smith, Ken Booth, and Marysia Zalewski. *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*: 1996.
- Chang, Gordon G. "China Flexes Its Muscles." *Wall Street Journal* January 2, 2008.  
[http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119923886057561427.html?mod=googlenews\\_wsj](http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119923886057561427.html?mod=googlenews_wsj) (accessed January 3, 2008).
- Chang, Jaw-ling Joanne. "United States-China Normalization: An Evaluation of Foreign Policy Decision Making." *Monograph Series in World Affairs* vol. 22, book 4. Denver: University of Denver, 1986.
- Chen, Qimao. "New Approaches in China's Foreign Policy: The Post Cold War Era." *Asian Survey* Vol. 33, No. 3 (March 1993): 237.
- Chen, Qimao. "New Approaches in China's Foreign Policy: The Post-Cold War Era." *Asian Survey* Vol. 33, No. 3 (March 1993): 244.
- Chen, Shu-Ching Jean. "Chinese Target of U.S. Tariffs Alleges Discrimination." *Forbes.com* April 9, 2007. [http://www.forbes.com/2007/04/09/us-china-paper-markets-equity-cx\\_jc\\_0410markets1\\_print.html](http://www.forbes.com/2007/04/09/us-china-paper-markets-equity-cx_jc_0410markets1_print.html) (accessed January 3, 2008).
- Christiansen, Flemming. "Democratization in China: Structural Constraints." *Democracy and Democratization*. Edited by Geraint Parry and Michael Moran. New York: Routledge, 1994.



- Clausewitz, Carl von. *On War*. Edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976.
- Congressional Research Service. "China-US Relations: Current Issues and Implications for US Policy." Order Code RL33877 (October 1, 2007): 25.
- Congressional-Executive Commission on China. *2007 Annual Report* (October 10, 2007): 1.
- Cooper, Helene. "Darfur Collides with Olympics, and China Yields." *The New York Times*, April 13, 2007. <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/13/washington/13diplo.html> (accessed December 26, 2007)
- CSC Staff. "Perennial Problems Burgeoning in New Ways." *ChinaStates.com* December 24, 2007. <http://chinastakes.com/story.aspx?id=112> (accessed December 26, 2007).
- De Soysa, Indra, John R. Oneal, and Yong-Hee Park. "Testing Power-Transition Theory Using Alternative Measures of National Capabilities." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* Vol. 41, No. 4 (August 1997): 511.
- Deng, Yong. "Hegemon on the Offensive: Chinese Perspectives on U.S. Global Strategy." *Political Science Quarterly* Vol. 116, No. 3 (Autumn 2001): 343-344.
- Department of Defense, Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2007.
- DiCicco, Jonathan M. and Jack S. Levy. "The Power Transition Research Program: a Lakatosian Analysis." *Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Dil, Shaheen F. "The Cabal in Kabul: Great-Power Interaction in Afghanistan," *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 71, No. 2 (June 1977) 468-476.
- Donnelly, Thomas and Colin Monaghan. "Legacy Agenda, Part III: The Bush Doctrine and the Rise of China." *American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research* April 2007. [http://www.aei.org/publication/pubID.26066/pub\\_detail.asp](http://www.aei.org/publication/pubID.26066/pub_detail.asp) (accessed January 2, 2008).
- Dorrien, Gary. *Imperial Designs: Neoconservatism and the New Pax Americana*. New York: Routledge, 2004.
- Eckert, Paul and Chris Wilson. "U.S. Will Hold North Korea to Nuclear Commitments." *Reuters* January 2, 2008. <http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSN024270462008102?sp=true> (accessed January 2, 2008).
- Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Ireland. "China's Independent Foreign Policy of Peace." <http://ie.china-embassy.org/eng/SinoIrishRelations/t112826.htm> (accessed December 19, 2007).
- Faris, Stephan. "The Real Roots of Darfur." *The Atlantic Monthly* April 2007. <http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200704/darfur-climate> (accessed January 1, 2008).
- Feaver, Peter D. "The Clinton's Administration's China Engagement Policy in Perspective." <http://www.duke.edu/web/cis/pass/pdf/warpeacefonf/p-feaver.pdf> (accessed January 2, 2008).
- Ferrero-Waldner, Benita. "The EU-China Human Rights Dialogue." *Speech presented to the European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighborhood Policy, Strasbourg* (December 12, 2007).

- Forney, Matthew. "China's Quest for Oil." *Time Magazine*.  
<http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,725174,00.html> (accessed December 20, 2007).
- Gaddis, John L. *Surprise, Security, and the American Experience*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004.
- Gill, Bates, Chin-hao Huang, and J. Stephen Morrison. "Assessing China's Growing Influence in Africa." *China Security* Vol. 3, No. 3 (Summer 2007): 3-5.
- Gilpin, Robert. *War and Change in World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.
- Guo, Sujian. "Challenges and Opportunities of China's 'Peaceful Rise'." <http://bss.sfsu.edu/sguo/My%20articles/006%20Introduction.pdf> (accessed December 19, 2007).
- Hart, B.H. Liddell. *Strategy*. New York: New American Library, 1974.
- Heath, Michael. "Rice Urges 'More Vigor' on Myanmar from International Community." *Bloomberg.com* December 22, 2007.  
<http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601080&sid=adPZgNaD47yI&refer=asia> (accessed January 1, 2008).
- Hildebrandt, Timothy. "Uneasy Allies: Fifty Years of China-North Korea Relations." *The Woodrow Wilson Center Asia Program Special Report* No. 115 (September 2003): 1-3.
- Hinton, Harold C. "Peking-Washington: Chinese Foreign Policy and the United States." *The Center for Strategic and International Studies*. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1976.
- Hinton, Harold C. *The Bear at the Gate: Chinese Policymaking under Soviet Pressure*. Washington: American Enterprise Institute and Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1971.
- Hsiung, James C. "China's Omni-Directional Diplomacy: Realignment to Cope with Monopolar U.S. Power." *Asian Survey* Vol. 35, No. 6 (June 1995): 573.
- Hsueh, Chun-tu. *China's Foreign Relations: New Perspectives*. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982.
- Htoon, Yuza Maw and Khin Zaw Win. "Expediency and Interests in Contemporary China-Myanmar Relations." *China's New Role in Africa and the South: A Search for a New Perspective*. <http://focusweb.org/china-s-new-role-in-africa-and-the-south-a-search-for-a-new-perspective.html?Itemid=144> (accessed January 1, 2008).
- Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China. "White Paper on China's National Defense." *The Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI)*, July 27, 1998.  
<http://www.nti.org/db/china/engdocs/wpnatdef.htm> (accessed December 19, 2007).
- Jue, Stanton. "The 'One China Policy': Terms of Art." *Foreign Service Journal* (May 2005): 59.
- Kim, Taeho. "Leading Small Groups: Managing All Under Heaven." *China's Leadership in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: The Rise of the Fourth Generation*. Edited by David M. Finkelstein and Maryanne Kivlehan. New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc, 2003.
- Kugler, Jacek and A.F.K. Organski. "The Power Transition: A Retrospective and Prospective Evaluation." *Handbook of War Studies*. Boston: Unwin Hyman.
- Lee, Henry and Dan A. Shalmon. "Searching for Oil: China's Oil Initiatives in the Middle East." *BCSIA Discussion Paper*. Cambridge: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, January 2007.

- Lemke, Douglas. "Great Powers in the Post-Cold War World: A Power Transition Perspective." *Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004.
- Levine, Steven I. "Perception and Ideology in Chinese Foreign Policy." *Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice*. Edited by Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994.
- Li, Wei and Lucian Pye, "The Ubiquitous Role of the Mishu in Chinese Politics." *The China Quarterly*, No. 132 (December 1992): 913.
- Lieberthal, Kenneth and Mikka Herberg. "China's Search for Energy Security: Implications for U.S. Policy." *NBR Analysis* Vol. 17, No. 1 (April 2006): 6-7.
- Mastanduno, Michael. "Economic Engagement Strategies: Theory and Practice." *Interdependence and Conflict* June 2001. <http://psweb.sbs.ohio-state.edu/faculty/bpollins/book/Mastanduno.pdf> (accessed January 2, 2008).
- Mazurek, Jan. "Ill Wind From China: Rapid Growth Brings Pollution, Higher Gas Prices." *Progressive Policy Institute Policy Report* (April 2005): 4.
- Mearsheimer, John J. "Hans Morgenthau and the Iraq War: Realism versus Neo-Conservatism." *Open Democracy* (2005): 1.
- Mearsheimer, John J. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. New York: W.W. Norton, 2001.
- Moravcsik, Andrew. "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics." *International Organization* 51, No. 4 (Autumn 1997): 516.
- Moravcsik, Andrew. "Liberalism and International Relations Theory." *Center for International Affairs Working Paper* No. 92-6 (1992).
- Morgenthau, Hans J. *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967.
- Muravchik, John. "The past, Present and Future of Neoconservatism." *Commentary* (October 2007).
- Nathan, Andrew J. "Human Rights in Chinese Foreign Policy." *The China Quarterly* No. 139 (September 1994): 624-628.
- National Security Council. *The National Security Strategy of the United States*, Washington, DC: The White House, 2006.
- National Security Council. *The National Security Strategy of the United States* 2002. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2002> (accessed January 2, 2008).
- National Security Council. *The National Security Strategy of the United States* 2006. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2002/nss2006.pdf> (accessed February 12, 2008).
- Nixon, Richard. "Asia after Viet Nam." *Foreign Affairs* 46, no. 1 (October 1967): 121, 123.
- Nye, Joseph S. Jr. "Soft Power." *Foreign Policy* No. 80 (Fall 1990): 153-171.
- Nye, Joseph S. Jr. "The Changing Nature of World Power." *Political Science Quarterly* Vol. 105, No. 2 (Summer 1990): 177.
- Organski, A.F.K. and Jacek Kugler. *The War Ledger*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1980.

- Perry, William J. and Ashton B. Carter. "The Content of U.S. Engagement with China." *Preventive Defense Project* Vol. 1, No. 2 (July 1998): 2.
- Qingguo, Jia. "Chinese Relations with the United States." *The Golden Age of the US-China-Japan Triangle, 1972-1989*. Edited by Ezra F. Vogel, Yuan Ming, and Tanaka Akihiko. Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2002.
- Randolph, Erin. "Despite Human Rights Violations, China to Host 2008 Olympics." *Iowa State Daily*, July 17, 2001.  
<http://media.www.iowastatedaily.com/media/storage/paper818/new/2001/07/17/New/Despite.Human.Rights.Violations.China.To.Host.2008.Olympics-1054332.shtml> (accessed December 26, 2007).
- Rosen, Daniel H. and Trevor House. "China Energy: A Guide for the Perplexed." *China Balance Sheet* (May 2007): 7.
- Ross, Robert S. "A Realist Policy for Managing US-China Competition." *The Stanley Foundation*, November 2005.
- Roy, Denny. *Taiwan: A Political History*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003.
- Russell, Bertrand. *The Conquest of Happiness*. New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1996.
- Segal, Gerald. "China and Afghanistan," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 21, No. 11 (November 1981) 1158-1174.
- Shee, Poon Kim. "The Political Economy of China-Myanmar Relations: Strategic and Economic Dimensions." *Ritsumeikan annual Review of International Studies* Vol. 1 (2002): 33.
- Sheehan, Michael. *The Balance of Power: History and Theory*. New York: Routledge, 1996.
- Slaughter, Anne-Marie. "International Law in World of Liberal States." *European Journal of International Law* (1995) 6.
- Snyder, Jack. "One World, Rival Theories." *Foreign Policy* (November/December 2004): 56.
- Spence, Michael. "Globalization's Losers Need Support." *Nigerian Tribune* December 21, 2007.  
<http://www.tribune.com.ng/21122007/biznes.html> (accessed December 26, 2007).
- Stalenheim, Petter, Catalina Perdomo, and Elisabeth Skons. "SIPRI Yearbook 2007: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security." *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute* 2007. <http://yearbook2007.sipri.org> (accessed January 6, 2008).
- Swaine, Michael D. "Chinese Military Role in National Security Policymaking." *National Defense Research Institute* (1998): 22.
- Tammen, Ronald L. and Jacek Kugler. "Power Transition and China-US Conflicts." *Chinese Journal of International Politics* Vol. 1 (2006): 36.
- The Conference Board. "China's Turbo Growth Not Sustainable Because of Growing Economic Imbalances." *Earthtimes.org* December 3, 2007.  
[http://www.earthtimes.org/articles/show/news\\_press\\_release,234381.shtml](http://www.earthtimes.org/articles/show/news_press_release,234381.shtml) (accessed December 27, 2007).
- The World Bank. "Cost of Pollution in China: Economic Estimates of Physical Damages." *Report presented at the International Conference on Sustainable Development in Beijing, China* (March 2, 2007).
- Tretiak, Daniel. "China's Vietnam War and Its Consequences," *The China Quarterly* No. 80 (December 1979) 740-751.

- Tucker, Nancy Bernkopf. "China as a Factor in the Collapse of the Soviet Empire," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 110, No. 4 (Winter 1995-1996) 501-518.
- U.S. Department of State. "Joint Communiqué of the United States of America and the People's Republic of China." *Usinfo.state.gov*, February 28, 1972.  
[http://usinfo.state.gov/eap/Archive\\_Index/joint\\_communique\\_1972.html](http://usinfo.state.gov/eap/Archive_Index/joint_communique_1972.html) (accessed December 17, 2007).
- U.S. Government Accounting Office. *National Security: Impact of China's Military Modernization in the Pacific Region*. Report to Congressional Committee, GAO/NSIAD-95-84, Chapter 0:3.
- Ueta, Kazuhiro. "Comment on 'Environmental Consequences of Rising Energy Use in China'." *Asian Economic Policy Review* Vol. 1 (2006): 176.
- United Press International. "China-Myanmar Trade Increased in 2007." *United Press International Journal* December 9, 2007.  
[http://www.upi.com/NewsTrack/Business/2007/12/09/china-myanmar\\_trade\\_increased\\_in\\_20076547](http://www.upi.com/NewsTrack/Business/2007/12/09/china-myanmar_trade_increased_in_20076547) (accessed January 1, 2008).
- US Department of State. *Joint Communiqué of the United States of America and the People's Republic of China* (February 28, 1972).
- US Department of State. *Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks Beijing* (September 19, 2005, 2005/T13-28).
- Vasquez, John A. *The Power of Power Politics: From Classical Realism to Neotraditionalism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
- Vasquez, John and Marie T. Henehan. "Territorial Disputes and the Probability of War, 1816-1992." *Journal of Peace Research* Vol. 38, No. 2 (2001).
- Vea, Matthew. "Analyzing Sino-American Relations of 1972." *OmniNerd.com*, December 12, 2006. [http://www.omninerd.com/articles/Analysing\\_Sino\\_American\\_Relations\\_of\\_1972](http://www.omninerd.com/articles/Analysing_Sino_American_Relations_of_1972) (accessed December 16, 2007).
- Wan, Ming. "China's Economic Growth and the environment in the Asia-Pacific Region." *Asian Survey* Vol. 38, No. 4 (April 1998): 372.
- Wang, Jianwei and Zhimin Lin. "Chinese Perceptions in the Post-Cold War Era." *Asian Survey* Vol. 32, No. 10 (October 1992): 903.
- Westad, Odd Arne. *Decisive Encounters: the Chinese Civil War, 1946-1950*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003.
- Worden, Robert L. *China: A Country Study*. Federal Research Division: US Government, 1988.
- Xinhua. "Chinses minister on difficulties, problems facing China." *CHINAdaily*.  
[http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-03/06/content\\_312341.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-03/06/content_312341.htm) (accessed December 19, 2007).
- Yan, Gu. "On Human Rights in International Relationships." *International Strategic Studies, China Institute for International Studies* No. 3 (September 1991): 10.
- Yang, Dennis Tao. "Urban-Biased Policies and Rising Income Inequality in China." *The American Economic Review* Vol. 89, No. 2 (May 1999): 306-310.
- Yellen, Janet L. "Reflections on China's Economy." *FRBSF Economic Letter* No 2004-31 (November 5, 2004).

Zoellick, Robert B. "Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?" *Speech to the National Committee on US-China Relations* (September 21, 2005).