Strategic Leader Development for a 21st Century Army

A Monograph
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Abstract

STRATEGIC LEADER DEVELOPMENT FOR A 21ST CENTURY ARMY by MAJOR James M. Hardaway, U.S. Army, 43 pages.

As the nature of warfare evolves, the Army must produce leaders who comfortably interact with diverse populations and embrace complexity. This emerging truth dictates a need for change in how Army officers are trained and selected to lead at the highest levels in order to regain the initiative in managing today’s fluid operational environment. The concept of strategic leadership, therefore, must be examined closely in Army doctrine.

Social, cultural, and complex problem-solving skills are becoming a priority and must be developed in young officers to provide enough knowledge for senior leaders to leverage later in their careers. Rarely does the typical Army career prepare someone to succeed in the strategic arena where the non-military elements of national power carry greater effects than large numbers of troops and equipment.

The basic question addressed in this study is “how effective is the U.S. Army at developing strategic thinkers capable of leading decisively in complex and adaptive environments?” To answer this question, three distinct areas are analyzed: (1) the ability of the Officer Education System (OES) to distinguish critical abilities deemed necessary to succeed in the modern security environment, (2) the ability of the Officer Evaluation Reporting System (OERS) to measure an individual’s dedication to self study and lifelong education, and (3) the ability of the same OERS to measure individual skills acquired through operational experience.

The Army’s current OES pushes the most complex topics to the final stages of an officer’s educational career. As a result, few officers get a chance to expand their intellectual boundaries through critical and creative thinking prior to their field grade experience. Doing business this way denies the opportunity for junior level officers to develop the requisite skills needed to excel in the strategic arena. The Army must promote advanced educational opportunities as healthy and necessary to a young officer’s career.

As the key process for reporting a leader’s abilities and potential for advancement, the OERS focuses primarily on current performance and provides little incentive to highlight an officer’s dedication to career-long professional development. The over-valuing of short-term success negates the potential benefits of continuous learning, a long-term endeavor. The result of such short-sightedness stifles innovation while entrenching a “business as usual” approach to leadership development ignoring the changing operational environment. The personnel management system continues to emphasize combat deployments, regardless of skills acquired, over an officer’s need for professional development.

The current version of the OER fails to utilize the leader development aspects it was designed to accomplish. The Army must look into traits and attributes particular to leaders at the senior levels in order to develop context-based evaluation systems. Junior and senior level leaders should not be evaluated on the same scale. A way to accomplish this is to establish qualitative standards for branch qualification based on operational experiences, not just on the number of months assigned.

To force a change in the culture and career progression of leaders prepared for 21st century warfare, the officer education and evaluation methodologies must adapt to reflect the complexities of the contemporary operating environment. To accomplish this, the Army must adjust its leader development systems to recognize and promote strategic thinking much earlier than in past generations.
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Introduction

The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish...the kind of war on which they are embarking.

Carl von Clausewitz

Gone are the massive formations of enemy armor and artillery begging for a war of attrition familiar to veterans of the Cold War era. In their place, networks of ideologically motivated extremists have risen exercising the power of globalization while taking advantage of failed states’ inability to govern effectively. Senior military leaders are discovering the educational leap from tactical assignments to the strategic level to be exponential in scope. In this new paradigm, the cultural complexities of the War on Terror are providing Army senior leaders with challenges that are “intellectually different than previous generations.”

As the nature of warfare evolves, the Army must produce leaders who comfortably interact with diverse populations and “cultures, tolerate ambiguity, take the initiative, and even question authority.” This emerging truth dictates a need for change in how Army officers are trained and selected to lead at the highest levels in order to regain the initiative in managing such a fluid operational environment. The concept of strategic leadership, therefore, must be examined closely in Army doctrine.


Social, cultural, and complex problems-solving skills are becoming a priority and must be developed “during the course of a lifetime of education, service, and experience”\(^5\) to provide enough knowledge for senior leaders to leverage later in their careers. Rarely does the typical Army career prepare someone to succeed in the “strategic arts”\(^6\) where the non-military elements of national power carry greater effects than divisions of tanks and artillery pieces.

Measuring a leader’s dedication to lifelong learning and the skills accumulated through diverse operational experiences, however, is quite a task for the current officer evaluation system.\(^7\) To ensure adaptive skill sets are promulgated to the highest leadership positions, the Army’s evaluation system must include methods for capturing an individual’s ability and potential to think strategically and operate in ambiguous and unpredictable situations throughout a career.

**Research Question and Methodology**

The basic question addressed in this study is “how effective is the U.S. Army at developing strategic thinkers capable of leading decisively in complex and adaptive environments?” To force a change in the culture and career progression of leaders prepared for 21st century warfare, the officer education and evaluation methodologies must adapt to reflect the complexities of the contemporary operating environment. To evaluate the Army’s adaptability in developing strategic thinkers, this monograph analyzes three distinct areas: (1) the ability of the

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\(^{5}\) Maj. Gen. (Ret) Richard A. Chilcoat, “Strategic Art: The New Discipline for 21st Century Leaders,” (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1995), 6. In the same article (p. 1), Maj. Gen. Chilcoat describes strategic art as “guiding the formulation of national security strategy, national military strategy, and theater strategy, thereby linking the use of military forces to the larger political-military context in which wars occur…strategic art must establish the relationships between military power and other instruments of power. It must also guide combatant and theater commanders in fulfilling their strategic responsibilities.”

\(^{6}\) Ibid., iii.

Officer Education System (OES) to distinguish critical abilities deemed necessary to succeed in the modern security environment, (2) the ability of the Officer Evaluation Reporting System (OERS) to measure an individual’s dedication to self study and lifelong education, and (3) the ability of the same OERS to measure individual skills acquired through operational experience.

To determine how well the education system is keeping pace with the changing operational environment, a comparison is made between what skill set is needed in the force and what is actually being taught in the formal educational institutions of today’s Army. Part of this evaluation includes not only what is taught, but who is being taught. To acquire evidence on how well the Army discriminates between who is chosen to receive educational benefits, the leader education process is assessed by analyzing its ability to distinguish skills critical for senior leaders as well as the selection criteria for particular OES opportunities.

Since opportunities for realistic on-the-job education as well as training in war are rare, military education often falls short of the civilian academic model.\(^8\) A well-rounded officer must therefore seek learning opportunities outside the traditional realm of military schooling. The second focus area analyzes how self study and the pursuit of lifelong learning are measured by the Army’s key evaluation mechanism, the OER. This section includes an examination of incentives given for additional degrees or technical training as well as a comparison of the educational background of the Army’s most senior officers.

The final focus area describes how individual operational experience is translated into individual skills on the OER. To effectively predict an officer’s potential for more demanding assignments, officer evaluation instruments must capture the proper mix of both intellectual and

\(^8\) Maj. Gen. (Ret) Richard A. Chilcoat and Lt. Col. Roderick R. Magee II, “Strategic Leadership and the Fourth Army War College,” *Joint Force Quarterly*, (Summer 1996), 77. The civilian academic model refers to the ability of universities to simulate real-world situations for educating students. Universities educate students on theory and foundational knowledge, and then develop realistic scenarios allowing students to apply lessons learned. The difficulty in simulating a realistic, war-like environment presents a serious challenge for military educational institutions.
leadership characteristics as deemed critical by the changing operational environment.\textsuperscript{9} This study concludes with recommendations to bridge the gap between existing competencies and needed capabilities within both the education and evaluation reporting systems.

**Scope and Limitations**

This study focuses on the U.S. Army’s commissioned officer education and evaluation reporting systems. Though critical to successful leadership development and Army mission execution, the warrant officer and non-commissioned officer systems are not analyzed.

This study does not attempt to validate current Army leadership doctrine. As numerous studies were conducted in developing Field Manual (FM) 6-22, the Army’s most recent publication on leadership, this monograph does not attempt to re-examine this data. This study is limited to how well the officer education and evaluation reporting systems reflect accepted Army leadership doctrine.

**Key Definitions and Concepts**

This monograph traces the links between the Officer Education System (OES) and the Officer Evaluation Reporting System (OERS) to validate how well the Army turns strategic thinkers into strategic leaders. As these four terms are used repeatedly throughout the paper, a set of definitions is provided below.

The concept of strategic thinking was taken from Henry Mintzberg’s seminal work on military planning. He defines the term as “a synthesizing process utilizing intuition and creativity whose outcome is an integrated perspective of the enterprise.”\textsuperscript{10} As a key element of Army leadership doctrine, the definition for strategic leadership comes from purely military

publications. The term is used as both a process and a position of authority. General officer training materials define it as a

process used by a leader to affect the achievement of a desirable and clearly understood vision by influencing the organizational culture, allocating resources, directing through policy and directive, and building consensus within a volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous global environment which is marked by opportunities and threats.11

Army doctrinal publications, while alluding to the process, focus more on the positional authority of strategic leaders. Army Regulation 600-100, the Army’s policy guidance on leadership states that “strategic level leadership exists at the highest levels of the Army and includes military and civilian leaders at division and corps level through the national level.”12 This categorizes strategic leaders as those holding the rank of two-star general (O-8) and above.

The Army’s field manual on leadership expands the definition to include “military and Army civilian leaders at the major command through Department of Defense (DOD) levels. The Army has roughly 600 authorized military and civilian positions classified as senior strategic leaders.”13 While this includes civilians and more than doubles the number of strategic leaders as the previous definition, it is still focused on positional authority and rank.

The Officer Education System (OES) is often referred to throughout the paper as institutional training and education and is comprised of:

Branch–immaterial and branch–specific courses that provide progressive and sequential training throughout an officer’s career. Regardless of branch affiliation, functional area, or specialty, the common thread, which ties all OES courses together, is common–core training. Common core training is approved by TRADOC and incorporated into OES courses. The OES includes:

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12 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Regulation 600-100, Army Leadership, (Washington, DC: Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1, 2007), 4.

13 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 6-22, 3-7.
(1) Preappointment/precommissioning training to qualify individuals to serve as officers. This is known as the Basic Officer Leadership Course (BOLC), Phase I for potential 2nd lieutenants.

(2) The officer basic course (BOLC, Phases II and III) to provide officer initial entry and branch qualification training.

(3) The Captain’s Career Course (CCC) to provide advanced branch–specific and branch–immaterial staff process training.

(4) The Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS3) to provide RC Captains with branch–immaterial mid-level staff training.

(5) The Intermediate Level Education (ILE) to provide advanced branch, functional area, and branch–immaterial command and staff training.

(6) The Senior Service College (SSC) or Fellowships to provide senior–level professional education and leader–development training.

(7) Capstone General Officer training.

(8) Advanced civil schooling in appropriate disciplines and areas of concentration.14

The Officer Evaluation Reporting System (OERS) is the system the Army uses to measure an officer’s past performance and future potential. Three distinct forms comprise the OERS: (1) the officer evaluation report (OER), DA Form 67-9, (2) the OER Support Form, DA Form 67-9-1, and (3) the Academic Evaluation Report (AER), DA Form 1059.15

**Background**

Prior to the late 1990s, military leadership categorized most operational problems as fairly linear in nature existing within limited boundaries requiring predominantly authoritative solutions.16 This thought process grew from a host of technically-oriented military victories throughout the 1980s as well as the lingering fear of long wars and unnecessary casualties caused

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by the debacle in Vietnam. As a result, staff planning processes reflected a view of the Army’s operational environment that had changed little since the inception of AirLand Battle doctrine in the 1982 version of FM 100-5, Operations. These staff processes were guided by senior commanders who maintained the critical knowledge and responsibility for directing the proposed technical solutions.

In 1993, Army doctrine changed in response to the conclusion of the Cold War. With the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the concept of full-dimension operations recognized the potential for Army operations that may or may not include full-scale war in the most remote regions of the world. Augmenting these changes were lessons learned from complex operations in such unfamiliar places as Somalia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the Army was obligated to integrate with its sister services, allied militaries, and non-military agencies. These “other” players on the battlefield brought skills and resources not maintained by the technology-focused Army. While recognizing the value of always maintaining an offensive capability, such “small scale” contingencies highlighted the Army’s role in leveraging non-violent power through military assistance and training exercises as well as providing security to allow less-developed governments the time and space for emerging democratic institutions.

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17 Toffler, 56.
18 Heifetz, 76. Heifetz categorizes problem typology on a scale from I – III, with the simpler problems requiring more technical solutions residing on the Type I end of the scale while the complex problems requiring more adaptive solutions residing on the Type III end. “Type I problems are clearly defined and have fairly direct solutions. The leader generally maintains responsibility for implementing a technical solution. Type II problems are also clearly defined, but the solution requires some learning to take place and both the leader and follower share responsibility for implementing a solution which is both technical and adaptive. Type III problems require learning to both define the situation and develop a solution. The follower maintains the primary responsibility for implementing an adaptive solution.”
20 Toffler, 156.
21 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 100-5, 13-0.
While identifying potential problem spots during this era of doctrine reform was fairly straightforward, implementing effective solutions required some institutional learning on the part of both Army leaders and their subordinates. Advances in technology allowed an improved level of situational awareness shared between disparate levels of command. This enabled subordinates to better grasp the overall situation and exercise initiative to achieve the commander’s intent without waiting for higher headquarters to provide direction. Unpredictable battlefield events forced traditionally autocratic commanders to allow their subordinates a fair degree of latitude in executing operational plans.

Lessons learned from these non-traditional operations were captured in the 2001 version of FM 3-0, Operations (formerly FM 100-5). Through the concept of unified action, the Army codified its realization that effective operational planning and execution depended heavily upon joint, multinational, and interagency force integration. While renumbering the operations series of manuals better aligned Army doctrine with manuals produced by Joint Forces Command, analysis of the actual operational environment changed little. The nation-state remained the catalyst behind military conflict and although asymmetric forces were discussed, the majority of doctrine focused on the long-term ability of nations to modernize in order to counter U.S conventional capabilities. The difference between ‘war’ and ‘military operations other than war’ (MOOTW) signified a division between what the Army had been designed to do and what it was forced to do by the realities of the new operational environment. The Army made some questionable assumptions in developing this doctrinal separation: (1) non-combat (MOOTW) operations would be less complex than conventional war, (2) past combat experiences would provide the education for future contingencies, and (3) the operational planning processes

23 Ibid., 2-1.
developed during the Cold War remained sufficient for emerging global security conditions. The implication of FM 3-0 was that well-trained leaders would have the time and ability to properly assess the security environment and prepare their units to operate effectively against any potential threat or contingency.24

Just three months after FM 3-0’s publication, America’s view of the world dramatically changed. The unanticipated attacks of 9/11 led to an overwhelmingly military response in Afghanistan and later Iraq that reflected the key assumptions informing the Army’s full spectrum doctrine. In both cases, military strategic planning documents focused first and foremost on the enemy nation-state because it was the ‘image’ most comfortably recognized.25 Michael Gordon’s critique of the prewar planning for Iraq can just as easily be applied to the War on Terror as a whole. In *Cobra II*, he lists five critical errors made by the administration and military leadership that highlighted their inability to recognize the changing nature of warfare: (1) misreading of the foe, (2) overreliance on technological advancement, (3) failure to adapt to developments on the battlefield, (4) dysfunction of America’s military structures, and (5) disdain for nation-building.26 The accepted paradigm of 20th century warfare assumed that tactical problems were rarely complex in nature and existed within very narrowly guided boundaries. This model became much less useful as brigade and battalion commanders were required more and more to develop operations as part of larger, long-term campaigns with only broad or vague guidance from above.27

24 Ibid., 1-17.
As the latest version of FM 3-0 reaches publication, its authors draw from lessons learned during the first six years of the War on Terror as well as guidance prescribed in both national policy and Department of Defense (DoD) documents, including the *National Military Strategy of the United States of America*\(^\text{28}\) and Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Joint Operations*, both updated within the last two years. From these sources, the Army derives its definition for the operational environment as “a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of military forces and bear on the decisions of the unit commander.”\(^\text{29}\) This description represents the culmination of three eras of military transformation.

Although doctrine is only as good as the people who use it, the Army appears to have made the intellectual transition from primarily focusing on specific threat countries and actors to a broad range of capabilities that can be employed by anyone. The publication of FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, is an attempt to reverse the trend of neglecting doctrine for asymmetric warfare.\(^\text{30}\) While today’s problem sets rarely lend themselves to complete analysis and understanding, the Army is applying intellectual energy to deciphering the adaptive nature of the environment prior to operational execution.

Comprehending the nature of the post-modern security environment constitutes the first step toward adapting to its complexity. With recognition of this complexity comes a need to produce strategic leaders who have the wisdom and vision to create and execute plans and make consequential decisions in a volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous strategic environment.\(^\text{31}\) The key to translating this cognitive learning into substantive change, however, lies in developing


methods to use this new knowledge to inform Army officer education and evaluation mechanisms.

The Army describes the leader development process as the “lifelong synthesis of the knowledge, skills, and experiences gained through institutional training and education, organizational training, operational experience, and self development.” An officer’s education, therefore, stems from three distinct sources: the schoolhouse, the unit, and the individual. The goal of this education is to instill a desire to continuously improve one’s ability to master the challenges presented by the operational environment. While this methodology applies to leaders at all levels, the skills and knowledge associated with strategic leadership are highlighted in key doctrinal publications, acknowledging its significance and need for specificity.

Figure 1. Army Leader Development Model. Source: Headquarters, Department of the Army, Department of the Army Pamphlet 350-58, Leader Development for America's Army, (Washington, DC: Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, 1994), 2.

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32 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 6-22, 8-9.

Additionally, the Army recognizes the need for individual assessment and feedback as well as mentoring, coaching, and counseling, to ensure the right talent is selected for specific job assignments.\textsuperscript{34} There remains only one accepted metric, however, for capturing a leader’s talents and abilities as well as the potential to succeed in more complex and demanding positions, the Officer Evaluation Report (OER). The OER is intended to provide an objective and comprehensive evaluation of the rated officer’s accomplishments and capability by describing both the day-to-day performance and the long-term potential of the officer, all in a single document. Rating officials are obligated by the Army to be discriminating in their evaluations so that Army leaders, selection boards, and career managers can make intelligent decisions about the future of its officers.\textsuperscript{35}

To ensure strategic leaders are selected according to standards reflecting a dynamic operational environment, the assessment methodology must capture an individual’s ability to manage complex and adaptive problems while differentiating between skill sets required by both junior and senior officers. Essentially, the officer evaluation methodology uses a single sheet of paper to discern a leader’s ability to apply lessons learned from institutional training, operational experience, and self study. The majority of this monograph will analyze the Army’s progress in using the OER as a “one size fits all” feedback mechanism.

\textbf{Findings}

The Army has some institutional challenges that hinder the development of a methodology to produce the right mix of self awareness and adaptability in senior leaders. There is a fundamental disconnect between the systems for leader education and leader evaluation. Skill

\textsuperscript{34} Headquarters, Department of the Army, \textit{Department of the Army Pamphlet 350-58, Leader Development for America's Army}, (Washington, DC: Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, 1994), 2.

\textsuperscript{35} Headquarters, Department of the Army, \textit{Army Regulation 623-3, Evaluation Reporting System}, (Washington, DC: Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1, 2007), 21.
sets acquired through institutional education, operational experience, and self development are rarely, if ever, captured on the Army’s main evaluation instrument, the OER.

As the basis for all leadership training, the Leadership Requirements Model (LRM) maintains a single set of leader skills and attributes applicable to all leaders all the time. Without the benefit of situational context, this model does little to inform the institutional training and education system as to what skills are required for proficiency at key gates in an individual’s career.

Operational experience, the second domain of leader development, receives probably the greatest amount of attention regarding an officer’s career progression. Unfortunately, that attention focuses almost exclusively on time spent on combat deployments. Little emphasis is placed on what particular skills or attributes officers develop during the wartime experience. As long as an officer gets a combat patch, what he or she did to get it is not thought to be critical.

As the final pillar in the Army’s Leader Development Model, self development surprisingly receives little emphasis in the evaluation system. Duty postings outside the traditional realm of “time with troops” are perceived as damaging to long-term career aspirations. As a result, advanced degree programs receive little emphasis until late in an officer’s career, when the advantage of additional education may be lost.
Educating Strategic Thinking vs. Leadership

I think there is no activity more important in a man's preparation for war than his periodic return to school duty, not so much because of what he learns in mere facts... For that period he is given an opportunity to think, think in terms of war, without limit on the scope of his ideas.

General Dwight D. Eisenhower

By transforming the way officers think through options about how they will act to decisively defeat adversaries that know no boundaries or rules of warfare, the Army education system plays a significant role in preparing strategic leaders for the intellectual challenges they will face against an equally determined enemy. To determine how well the commissioned officer education system is adapting to the complexities of the international security environment, this portion of the study analyzes the Army’s ability to provide both timely and necessary education to the Army’s most promising leaders.

In his Strategic Research Project (SRP) on the future of Army leader development, Lt. Col. Bob Pricone identifies several “skills” required by officers to succeed in the modern security environment. In addition to the familiar leadership traits of decisiveness, innovation, and initiative, the list details several intellectual attributes including adaptability, self awareness, information synthesis, and the ability to deal with cognitive complexity. The list elevates the ability to “think” strategically to a position of equal or possibly even greater value than the traditionally accepted leadership skills.


In numerous situations in the post-Cold War operational environment, Army leaders at every level have and will continue to make potentially strategic-level decisions as they carry out increasingly complex missions. A key component of leadership at the strategic level is advising civilian authorities on the application of military power in the pursuit of national policy goals. “As a result, lieutenant colonels, colonels, and general officers must operate in a more complex task environment than during the Cold War.”39 This increased task complexity implies much more difficult work and a greater intellectual competence to handle it.40

**The Army Approach to Leadership Education**

The goal for the OES should be to provide the intellectual rigor needed to enable strategic thinking in time for officers to recognize and improve their capability. According to AR 350-1, Army “officer leader development is a continuous process that begins with pre-commissioning training and education and prepares commissioned officers for increased responsibilities and successful performance at the next higher level.”41 Figure 2 depicts the typical educational path taken by Army officers over the span of a 20-year career to prepare for his or her professional tasks.

The current system continues to focus on tactical level skills up through the rank of captain before moving into the operational level at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) for the Army’s majors. CGSC, also known as Intermediate Level Education (ILE), is the first opportunity for officers to receive training in joint operations as well as get their introduction to the strategic level. While exposure to joint operations is limited, all officers leave ILE with a Joint Professional Military Education (JPME)-I qualification. JPME-I education meets the

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mandate of the Goldwater-Nichols Act by providing field grade officers classes that include the following: (1) capabilities and limitations, doctrine, organizational concepts, and command and control of forces of all services; (2) joint planning processes and systems; and (3) the role of service commanders as part of a unified command.\footnote{U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, Panel on Military Education, “Report of the Panel on Military Education of the One Hundredth Congress,” 101st Congress, 1st session, (Washington, DC: U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1989), 4.}

An officer’s primary education in the strategic arts occurs at the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) as a lieutenant colonel or colonel, when an officer has from 17 to 20 years of time in service.\footnote{Headquarters, Department of the Army, \textit{AR 350-1}, 59.} The USAWC fulfills the final requirement for joint service education by providing a JPME-II certification.

![Figure 2. Levels of War and Associated Schooling. Source: Jeffrey D. McCausland and Gregg F. Martin, “Transforming Strategic Leader Education for the 21st-Century Army,” \textit{Parameters}, (Autumn 2001), 21.](image)

The Army’s institutional education model introduces the most complex learning tasks in the last school officers attend in their professional careers. The process assumes officers will only

\footnote{Headquarters, Department of the Army, \textit{AR 350-1}, 52.}
serve at levels they have been trained for and that their training and operational experiences at each level will adequately prepare them for the next stage. This formula, born in the Cold War, fails to take into account the jump in complexity between the levels that has occurred over the last 6-10 years. To successfully grow strategic leaders for the modern era, “the Army cannot wait until the 20-year point in its officers’ careers to educate them in security studies.” An alternative would be to introduce these complex topics as early as possible in the education system.

Adaptability and the Changing Leadership Landscape

FM 6-22, Army Leadership, the Army’s capstone publication on the subject, recognizes that “strategic leaders apply additional knowledge, experience, techniques, and skills beyond those required by direct and organizational leaders.” The implication is that senior leaders ought to think and act differently as warfare at this level is “predominantly intellectual rather than physical.”

While the Army often uses the words “training” and “education” interchangeably, there is a significant qualitative difference between the terms as it applies to leader development. “While training is more concerned with teaching what to think and what the answers ought to be, education is all about teaching how to think and what the questions ought to be.” The term ‘training’, therefore, should be used when the objective is to prepare a leader or a unit to execute a specific task. The term ‘education’, on the other hand, should more often be used when thinking about how to interact with problem sets that may not lend themselves to outright solutions.

44 McCausland and Martin, 21.
45 McCausland and Martin, 26.
46 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 6-22, 12-1.
47 Chilcoat and Magee, “Strategic Leadership,” 75.
48 McCausland and Martin, 23.
Figure 3 describes how the requirements for success are more abstract and less quantifiable as officers progress towards strategic leadership positions. As leaders approach these senior positions, their education should focus less on the specifics for the next potential job and more on adaptive ways of thinking to better manage the unpredictable environment around them.

At the most basic level adaptability can be defined as an effective change in response to an altered situation. Though simple to define, educating the ability to adapt has proven quite challenging in practice. In a study of Special Forces (SF) officers, Susan White and associates identify three overarching types of adaptability: mental, interpersonal, and physical. These types describe individual adaptability in relation to thinking, relationships, and interaction with

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the environment. Figure 4 depicts specific attributes associated with the three types of adaptability and the ease with which they can be trained or educated.

Attributes on the left side of the chart remain fairly stable the older one gets and are difficult to change. These characteristics are more suitable as selection criteria for potential strategic leaders. The attributes on the far right are much more easily altered through training and should reflect the technically oriented exercises and operational experiences of Army leaders. The attributes in the middle two columns form the center of gravity for developing adaptive leaders. Some of these characteristics may be present, but can also be honed through well-crafted educational experiences.51

**Selecting Candidates for Educational Opportunities**

As has been noted earlier, the majority of Army officers receive similar training and educational opportunities up through the rank of major with completion of their ILE requirement.
Prior to attendance at CGSC, there are some opportunities for additional education through either the Advance Civil Schooling (ACS) option or one of several internships. Both the ACS option and the internships are offered as part of specific areas of concentration with additional service obligations in that concentration due upon graduation. These education options allow officers to attend an accredited civilian graduate degree program that incurs a minimum of 12-24 months utilization tour in the area studied.52 While an Army board selects attendees for these programs, the application process is completely voluntary.

Within the Army there are two programs that provide additional opportunities outside the normal scope of OES. The Advanced Military Studies Program (AMSP) provides advanced education in military arts and science for selected ILE graduates. The school emphasizes planning and executing campaigns at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war.53 This program awards the students a Masters of Military Arts and Sciences Degree and is typically followed by duty as a division or corps plans officer for a year or more.

The second program is the Advanced Operational Art Studies Fellowship (AOASF), a 2-year Senior Service College (SSC)-level course that prepares operational planners for assignment to unified commands. The fellowship includes graduate–level college courses, visits to unified command headquarters, and practical exercises in campaign planning.54 This fellowship takes the place of the SSC or USAWC equivalent for Army officers.

In addition to opportunities within the Army itself, officers may attend joint service colleges either before or after they have completed their SSC requirement. These opportunities provide senior leaders additional augmentation to their JPME-II experiences at the SSC. For those

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51 Mueller-Hanson, et al., Training Adaptable Leaders, 8.
53 Headquarters, Department of the Army, AR 350-1, 57-58.
54 Ibid., 60.
officers that progress beyond the rank of Colonel, this experience may be invaluable as some have not attended an educational institution in the preceding ten years. The extremely fast pace of today’s security environment demands that senior leaders be provided with continuous educational opportunities.

**Conclusion**

The Army’s current approach to leader development pushes the most complex topics faced by officers to the final stages of their educational careers. Few officers get a chance to expand their intellectual boundaries through critical and creative thinking prior to their field grade experience. Doing business this way denies the opportunity for junior level officers to develop the requisite skills needed to excel in the strategic arena.

The classroom is a unique opportunity for young officers to reflect and build upon the experiences and training that enable adaptability and self awareness in the post-modern security environment. For many, additional years in school are viewed as a deviation from a soldier’s duty, instead of a central and continuing focus. As a result, officers apply for additional educational opportunities based on their own personal desires for specific jobs, career enhancement, or to get relief from the current pace of operations. Although the educational programs are highly selective, rarely are students specifically recruited for these opportunities based on observed learning potential.

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Measuring a Leader’s Dedication to Lifelong Learning

It's our duty to develop soldiers and leaders who have the skills necessary to succeed today and in the future.

General Eric K. Shinseki

The Army describes lifelong learning as an individual’s choice to “actively and overtly pursue knowledge, the comprehension of ideas, and the expansion of depth in any area in order to progress beyond a known state of development and competency.” This definition of self improvement recognizes that institutional training and education is just one part of Army leader development. While OES opportunities exist to expand or refresh an officer’s knowledge, it is imperative that leaders “do not overlook every option available to continue the learning process on their own.”

Recognizing an individual’s commitment to self study is the first step in developing an Army-wide culture of learning. The following section describes the Army’s attempt at becoming a learning organization by analyzing the importance of continuous learning to senior leaders as well as the ability of the OER to measure the potential value of lifelong learning. If leaders are expected to increasing their level of professional expertise outside of traditional military opportunities, their efforts must be reinforced by their mentors as well as recognized by the Army’s basic individual performance assessment tool, the OER.

58 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 7-0, G-13.
59 Egbert, 13.
The Army’s View of a Learning Organization

Recent updates to Army training and leadership doctrine continue to place a premium on the Army being an organization that “continually expands its capacity to create its future.”62 According to FM 6-22, the purpose of such a learning organization is to harness the experiences of its people to improve the way it operates.63 The end result should be an Army that uses experiential learning (self awareness) to adopt new techniques and procedures to get the job done more effectively (adaptability). While the preceding passages adequately describe learning organizations, the Army’s doctrinal library does little to provide definitive guidance on how leaders should develop these characteristics in their units or their subordinate officers.

The 2001 Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP) Officer Study Report concluded that in order to be a learning organization, the Army must provide more than just doctrine to inculcate the concept and practice of lifelong learning in its culture.64 Organizations learn only through individuals who learn. While individual learning does not guarantee organizational learning, organizational learning cannot occur without it.65 Additional tools and support must be developed that reinforce the philosophy of continuous learning.

To support a culture of lifelong learning, the ATLDP panel made three key recommendations intended to increase an officer’s self awareness and adaptability. These recommendations included: (1) publishing officer performance standards by branch, functional area, and rank to provide the basis for personal assessment, (2) integrating and promoting a distance learning program focused on self development, and (3) supporting officers pursuing self

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62 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 7-0, G-12.
63 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 6-22, 8-2.
64 Headquarters, Department of the Army, ATLDP Officer Study Repor, OS-23.
65 Senge, 131.
development by introducing a 360–degree feedback strategy starting in OES and then expanding
to the field.  

Efforts have begun on two of the three recommendations so far. The Army has recently
been placing more emphasis on masters degree programs using either the ACS option or distance
learning. Additionally, a 360-degree feedback initiative was begun for Army officers through
the Army’s knowledge management system, Army Knowledge Online (AKO). Little if any
progress, however, has been achieved on identifying officer performance standards by rank or
area of expertise.

The emphasis on additional degree programs appears to be more a product of quality of
life issues among officers and less a desire to increase the learning potential of the Army’s
leaders. The program offers educational incentives in exchange for an additional active duty
service obligation. Unfortunately, the program is temporary and “designed to increase retention
among officers with specific skills and experiences” rather than advance the level of
organizational learning.

The 360-degree assessment program, called the Leadership Development Portfolio
(LDP), grew out of a Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) initiative in 2003 resulting from the
ATLDP report cited above. The broad purpose of the initiative is to “develop leader adaptability
and self awareness within the Army.” The website allows an officer to request and receive

66 Headquarters, Department of the Army, ATLDP Officer Study Report, OS-18-19.
67 Headquarters, Department of the Army, “Implementation of the Army Officer Menu of
Incentives Program (Active Army),” MILPER Message 07-237, (Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Human
Resources Command, 2007), 1.
68 Jan T. Swicord, Chief, Evaluation Systems Office, U.S. Army Human Resources Command,
e-mail message to author, January 10, 2008.
69 Headquarters, Department of the Army, “Implementation”, 1.
70 Army Knowledge Online, “Leadership Development Portfolio,”
feedback from subordinates, peers, and superiors throughout his or her career. While the initiative shows promise, it is voluntary and has yet to be integrated into the formal evaluation system.

While the Army is at least recognizing the need to improve leader adaptability through self awareness, the slow pace of change highlights the difficulty of transforming an organization whose culture stems from its own hierarchical design. “Change will not take hold unless senior leaders advocate it and believe in its value for the organization.”

Army Leadership Climate Regarding Continuous Learning

In an article detailing the significance of professional education on military transformation, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Hugh Shelton warned against leaders trained in only the technical side of military science. He charged that military leaders must be “masters of the geopolitical realm.” Echoing the former Chairman’s message, Army generals with experience in complex peace keeping operations have come to value a “broad intellectual background as a key asset” to their success. With these expectations in mind, strategic leaders must seek educational opportunities on a wide range of subjects in order to understand national politics as well as they do military science.

To influence officers to choose the path of lifelong learning, however, obvious benefits should be apparent. Leaders continuously conduct cost-benefit analyses in making their career decisions. In seeking additional education, what will be the payback for sacrificing time in the

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72 Shelton, 4.

operational force? Rather than base their decisions on what will prove most beneficial to the Army, most career-minded officers contemplate the impact that education will have on promotion or command selection potential.

A 2003 study conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School analyzed 20 years of promotion data for potential Army lieutenant colonels. The study compared a variety of demographic as well as educational data and concluded that a “graduate education grants a higher promotion probability for officers who have similar traits.” While the paper helps alleviate the perception that time in school is damaging to a career, the Army is missing an opportunity to highlight additional advantages of continuous learning by focusing its education incentive program on retention instead of professional development.

As the maintainers of organizational culture, the Army’s senior leaders provide a highly visible example for young officers to follow. Company and field grade officers look to that which makes colonels and generals competent and successful. An analysis of the educational background of Army senior leaders yields results that reinforce the findings of the Naval Postgraduate School study cited above. Very few general officers do not have at least one advanced degree, showing their belief in the value of professional development through continuous education.

Many of the advanced degrees, however, were earned during an officer’s attendance at either CGSC or the USAWC. Both schools occur after the midpoint in an officer’s career, leaving little time to utilize the additional learning. The ultimate goal for leader development

75 Kabalar, 44.
76 Carpenter, 7.
should be to push this eagerness for learning down to the lowest levels to increase an officer’s
time to nurture their intellectual potential.

Evaluating Lifelong Learning

The OER provides the basis for most personnel actions including “promotion, career field
designation, elimination, retention in grade, retention on active duty, reduction in force, command
and project manager designation, school selection, assignment and specialty designation.”78 As
the key document impacting an officer’s professional future, a critical objective of the OER
should be to adequately capture one’s ability to continue learning throughout a career.

Analyzing the format of the OER, however, reveals that it yields few opportunities for a
rater to highlight an officer’s dedication to personal professional development. The OER, a two-
page form, is designed to capture critical skills, attributes, and actions on the front page (Part IV)
while allowing the chain of raters to develop a word picture of those qualities as they pertain to
past performance and future potential on the back page (Parts V – VII).79

The first opportunity a rater has to describe an officer’s talents are in Part IV, which
contains a listing of the Army values and the dimensions of the Army’s leadership doctrine that
“define professionalism for the Army officer.”80 These characteristics, according to Army
discipline, should apply across all grades, positions, branches, and specialties and are necessary for
retaining:

the qualities of leadership and management needed to maintain an effective
officer corps. These values and leader attributes/skills/actions are on the DA

78 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3,
Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management, (Washington, DC: Deputy
Chief of Staff, G-1, 2005), 37.

79 See Appendix 2, Figures 7 and 8.

80 Headquarters, Department of the Army, DA PAM 623-3, 18.
Form 67–9 to emphasize and reinforce professionalism. They will be considered in the evaluation of the performance of all officers.81

This short paragraph is all the guidance given to raters to inform their process for selecting the key attributes on an officer’s OER. That these attributes/skills/actions should apply to everyone gives no indication of how to distinguish the qualities better suited for strategic versus organizational or direct types of leadership. The implication of Part IV is that every officer should have these qualities. Unfortunately, this part of the evaluation ignores the possibility that certain qualities may be stronger and more visible than others. By not emphasizing this section, the Army loses a potential capability to highlight specific skills and attributes key to future leader success. The end result is a section that only gains notice when it is seen as inconsistent within a peer group as opposed to distinguishing characteristics of an officer’s leadership ability.

Parts V – VII of the OER allow an officer’s supervisory chain to comment on his or her performance and potential. “Performance is evaluated by considering the results achieved, how they were achieved, and how well the officer complied with professional standards.”82 Performance, therefore, must consider a leader’s experience in evaluating the effort he or she applies, as well as the end results.83 In other words, more should be expected from an officer with more experience. For this to happen, however, there must be some type of baseline standard to measure a leader’s performance, but Army Human Resource Command (HRC) still has a way to go in developing a common set of measurable performance characteristics by rank, branch, or type of duty position.84

Measuring an officer’s potential to succeed in the future is more difficult. This part of the OER is the first place where a leader’s learning over the long term should have an impact.

81 Ibid.
82 Headquarters, Department of the Army, AR 623-3, 25.
83 Ibid., 5.
Unfortunately, the OERS is focused on rewarding short-term success. As OER guidelines direct, “potential evaluations are performance-based assessments of the rated officer’s ability, compared with that of their contemporaries, to perform in positions of greater responsibilities in higher grades.” The potential evaluation depends solely on what an officer accomplished in his current position as compared to his or her peers. There is no requirement or guidance to evaluate a leader’s dedication to professional development, only to doing the current job well. This short-term focus inhibits leaders from branching out from their comfort zone and reinforces a sedentary culture.

**Conclusion**

Army leaders develop and mature through a lifelong synthesis of the knowledge gained through training, education, and experiences. While doctrinal publications have incorporated many changes designed to place a premium on organizational learning, the Army has yet to develop an evaluation system that identifies and rewards leaders who attempt to achieve the same goal. The current OERS places a premium on short-term success while neglecting the values of continuous education.

Strategic leaders obviously recognize the value of intellectual rigor as evidenced by the variety of learning paths taken to achieve their individual success. At the same time, the Army has been slow to institutionalize two fundamental tenets of learning organizations, self awareness and adaptability. The challenges of the emerging operational environment dictate that today’s

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85 Carpenter, 6.
86 Headquarters, Department of the Army, *AR 623-3*, 25.
87 Carpenter, 6.
leaders undergo a broadly based education program. \textsuperscript{90} Current strategic leader development, however, continues to place opportunities for advanced degree programs into the latter stages of one’s career, delaying the application of that additional learning.

As the key process for reporting a leader’s abilities and potential for advancement, the OERS focuses primarily on current performance and provides little incentive to highlight an officer’s dedication to career-long professional development. The over-valuing of short-term success negates the potential benefits of continuous learning, which is a long-term endeavor. The result of such short-sightedness is to stifle a culture of innovation while entrenching a “business as usual” approach to leadership development ignoring the changing operational environment. \textsuperscript{91}

\textsuperscript{90} Shelton, 4.

Measuring Skills Attained through Operational Experience

War makes extremely heavy demands on the soldier’s strength and nerves. For this reason, make heavy demands on your men in peacetime.

Field Marshall Erwin Rommel

Operational experience is derived from taking part in deployments and exercises that “provide rigorous, realistic, and stressful training…under actual or simulated combat and operational conditions.” As a key pillar of the Army’s leader development model, this experience provides a forum for leaders to apply the lessons learned from institutional training as well as lifelong learning programs. The application of this training and education, in turn, should provide an opportunity to further refine those lessons or produce additional learning.

This portion of the monograph analyzes the Army’s ability to determine a specific skill set associated with operational experience while at the same time evaluating those skills with the OER. This section concludes with a critique on how the Army uses operational experience to place senior leaders in positions of greater responsibility.

Skills Associated with Operational Experience

While describing activities that provide operational experience is fairly straightforward, determining the particular skill set associated with this experience is much less clear in Army doctrine. In fact, Army policy regarding operational experience states that the repetition of duty requirements refines and broadens a leader’s knowledge base rather than creates new skills. If


93 Headquarters, Department of the Army, *FM 7-0*, 1-5.

94 Headquarters, Department of the Army, *AR 600-100*, 5.

95 Ibid.
this is the case, then the task of capturing the impacts of operational experience becomes one of identifying the nuanced increase in knowledge previously acquired from either institutional or self development sources. The key then is to determine which senior leader attributes are improved the most through additional operational experiences.

The Army’s Leadership Requirements Model (LRM) provides a common reference for “thinking and learning about leadership and associated doctrine” with all of its components being interrelated. The model contains those competencies and attributes that all officers are charged to maintain. A deficiency in the model is that there is no distinction between leadership requirements for direct, organizational, or strategic leaders. The model implies that as leaders reach increased levels of responsibility, the level of difficulty for the associated competencies and attributes increases linearly.

Numerous studies have been conducted both in developing and then assessing the validity of the LRM. The consensus of these studies is that while the model in its current state is generally adequate, how the leader applies the model and which behaviors are exhibited should differ based upon leader situational context. This streamlines leader education and training among the different levels of leadership, but puts the responsibility for distinguishing effective performance and potential between those levels squarely on institutional leader evaluation mechanisms.

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96 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 6-22, 7-1.
97 Ibid., 2-4
Evaluating Operational Experience

The 2007 Army Campaign Plan directs a shift in Army culture by developing a more strategic, “joint and expeditionary mindset” throughout the force to better meet the needs of today’s regional Combatant Commanders. To codify this goal, however, the Army must analyze joint force competencies in order to capture joint force officer traits and then infuse those traits into the Army’s evaluation system. The end result would be an OER that captures and qualitatively describes experience in joint assignments for senior level leaders.

A strategic leader’s operational experience should have long-lasting impacts as the scope of responsibility is far wider than at the direct or organizational levels. As strategic leaders rarely see their ideas come to fruition during their tenure, evaluation mechanisms must maintain

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the ability to measure the potential impact of a leader’s achievements. This is difficult for a system designed to quantitatively report an officer’s accomplishments every twelve months. As a result, the OER rarely measures results that are qualitative in nature, and thus reinforces the accomplishment of easily measured short-term objectives.”

The current version of the OER was designed with two fundamental purposes in mind: provide for leader development, and support personnel management. The OER has yet to meet officer expectations as a leader development tool. While the evaluation form can quantitatively describe what duty positions a leader has held, it comes up far short in qualitatively measuring the abilities and skills acquired through those positions.

The back side of the OER allows an officer’s supervisory chain to comment on duty accomplishments for a specific rating period. While both the rater and senior rater submit narratives on both performance and potential of the rated officer, it is widely recognized and publicized that senior raters invariably have the most influence on how boards judge an individual officer’s performance. This reality is due in large part to a lack of quantitative metrics for specific leader competencies as well as the limited time promotion board members are allotted to view officer records. Promotion boards must focus their minimal time on the portion of the OER they feel represents the best measure of future performance. The result is that an officer’s accomplishments for an entire year are whittled down to a single paragraph by the senior rater, someone who may not even work that closely with the rated individual.

102 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 6-22, 12-1.
103 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 6-22, 12-2
104 Ecklund, 71.
105 Headquarters, Department of the Army. ATLDP Officer Study Report. OS-9.
Due to the number of rated officers and limited time boards have to complete selections, Army HRC recommends that both raters and senior raters keep their narratives as succinct as possible. To accomplishing this, HRC suggests writing the narratives focused on four key areas: enumeration, promotion, schooling, and command.\textsuperscript{107} Enumeration depicts how the rated officer compares to his or her peers that are also rated by the same supervisory chain. Promotion, schooling, and command present opportunities for the raters to describe an individual’s potential for success at the next rank, selective school, or command level.

The final OER narrative paragraph encompasses the four focus areas that describe a rated officer’s potential based on his or her performance in the last duty position. Other information about specific performance may be added to the narrative, but selection boards have been trained to look for the four focus areas.\textsuperscript{108} As these focus areas are quantitative in nature, there is little qualitative information about the rated officer that relates to a board as to why a particular officer should be selected. Nothing in the OER describes skills or attributes particular to strategic thinking or leadership. The OER format assumes the supervisory chain, and more exclusively, the senior rater, understands and is reinforcing the characteristics needed for today’s operational environment.

**Impact of Operational Experience on Senior Leaders Assignments**

While identifying and measuring the skills associated with operational experience has proven quite challenging to the Army’s evaluation system, the personnel management system places a high premium on current experience. As it applies to senior leader development, HRC

\textsuperscript{107} Headquarters, Department of the Army, “OER Writing Information,” information paper provided as a public information service by the U.S. Army Human Resources Command, https://www.hrc.army.mil/site/protect/Active/openg/oerinfo.htm (accessed 3 Jan 2008).

\textsuperscript{108} Ibid.
narrows the definition of operational experience by focusing almost exclusively on recent combat deployments.\textsuperscript{109}

When it comes to officer placement for Army Colonels, for example, recent deployment experience is the first consideration when anticipating future duty assignments, while any joint experience is secondary.\textsuperscript{110} Instead of emphasizing a leader’s specific skill set, the placement system relies more on where an officer has served recently. HRC seems to have drawn the conclusion that any combat deployment provides a quality learning experience enabling an officer to succeed in more complex assignments. Without a qualititative evaluation of the skills learned and practiced during that tour, this assumption is hopeful at best.


\textsuperscript{110} Senior Leader Development, \textit{Colonels Assignment Framework}. 

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Placement of senior leaders based on timing of jobs instead of specific skills and attributes reinforces the mentality that the “assignments system is driven by requirements to fill spaces rather than quality leader development.”\textsuperscript{111} The ability to develop effective senior leaders hinges on managing the proper learning at the proper time in an officer’s career. This is impossible, however, without an evaluation system that tracks what skill sets are applied and improved upon throughout a career.

**Conclusion**

A critical component in addressing the Army’s senior leader development shortfalls is to first determine the correct skill sets or attributes required in strategic positions. Once the appropriate skill sets are determined, the institutional leader education system can be adjusted to support the new skill sets. From these changes flows the need to review and modify how the best operational experiences are provided to the officers showing the greatest potential to succeed at the upper echelons of military service.\textsuperscript{112}

The Army’s competency-based LRM does not distinguish which leader skills and attributes are critical for strategic leaders. The result is an inability to determine what traits to emphasize during the leader’s career. “Do them all, and do them well” is not a proven method for developing complex and adaptive thinking skills in potential senior leaders. The Army must look into traits and attributes particular to leaders at the senior levels in order to develop context-based education and evaluation systems.

To develop leaders that are self aware and adaptable, the Army must force its officers to seek out novel and unfamiliar situations. “Leaders who remain safely inside their comfort zone will never learn to recognize change or understand the inevitable changes in their

\textsuperscript{111} Headquarters, Department of the Army, *ATLDP Officer Study Report*, OS-9.
\textsuperscript{112} Pricone, 6.
“Environment.” Evaluating adaptability and self awareness, however, is tough for the current OER. With its primary focus on short-term success, the OER neglects the long-term impacts of that officer’s accomplishments. Such a system will not force officers into unfamiliar territory. A possible solution is to expand the evaluation system to include both peer and subordinate ratings. Such a 360-degree assessment may provide selection boards with a much broader picture of an officer’s capability to address a variety of situations and challenges.

Without a method for identifying those skills most enhanced by operational experience, the personnel management system will continue to emphasize combat deployment, regardless of skills acquired, over an officer’s need for professional development. This checklist style of leader placement fails to value duty positions outside the realm of traditional Army leader assignments, many of which may occur in the joint and interagency world.\footnote{114}{Guillot, 75.}

\footnote{113}{Headquarters, Department of the Army, \textit{FM 6-22}, 10-9.}
Results and Recommendations

Research Conclusions

The emerging Joint Operational Environment provides strategic leaders with challenges rarely experienced in previous generations. To date, the Army’s answer to an adversary’s improved capabilities has generally been a technological one. The results of the current War on Terror, however, show that engaging thinking and evolving adversaries takes more than building better machines. Without a new mindset, “both the development and application of technology will be limited by old ideas.”

The Army’s approach to leader development has been as slow to modernize as has the ability to update operational doctrine has been since the end of the Cold War. Joint and strategic topics are addressed too late in an officer’s educational career. These complex areas of study must be introduced prior to their field grade experience. Junior officers with experience in creative and critical thinking have a much higher potential to become senior officers who have mastered these abilities.

Junior officers continue to perceive very limited paths to promotion and career success. Any time away from the “line” is believed to do more damage to a career than good. Advanced educational opportunities are seen as a break from the stresses of the current operational tempo instead of as a path to success. This mindset tends to dissuade the more promising officers who prefer to look for the next key job in the operational force to ensure his or her career goals.

Learning organizations adjust to their surroundings to ensure continued relevance. To become a true learning organization, the Army must codify the traits of self awareness and adaptability into a leader evaluation system that currently emphasizes immediate results over long-term progress. As the span of responsibility widens, senior leader ability to recognize
changes in themselves and their environment must increase exponentially. While dedication to
career-long education is manifested by most of the Army’s strategic leadership, the key
evaluation mechanism, the OER, continues to neglect the values of lifelong learning.

The OERS focuses primarily on current performance and provides little reward for an
officer’s dedication to career-long professional development. Part IV of the OER, specifically,
fails to provide any incentive to solidify communications between junior and senior officers
regarding those traits valued at specific times in a leader’s career. By neglecting the leader
development aspects of the OER, the status quo of achieving and measuring short-term objectives
is maintained.

Army officers become more self aware and adaptable through executing stressful jobs in
a variety of operational experiences. Each different duty position has the potential to provide a
leader with different educational value based on factors intrinsic to the individual as well as the
aspects of the position. The Army has yet to develop a method for determining skill sets required
by rank, branch, or functional area. Without this knowledge, officers are forced to follow along
common paths for selection and promotion as these are the only known ways to acquire the
requisite skills for more advanced positions.

The Army’s competency-based LRM provides a list of skills and attributes easily trained
in the institutional environment. Unfortunately, that same simplicity is transferred to the
evaluation system which maintains the responsibility for distinguishing those leaders best fit for
senior level positions. By not emphasizing the proper mix of complex and adaptive thinking skills
in potential senior leaders, the OER fails to provide a leadership development tool beyond the
company-grade level.

The Army’s personnel management system places a high premium on current combat
experience. While relevant wartime experience should always be sought and valued, blindly

\footnote{Shelton, 14.}
accepting a combat tour as proof of an officer’s ability to think adaptively is a stretch. Little analysis is conducted on the specific skills or attributes enhanced by combat experience. The practice of taking a wartime deployment to “check the block” allows officers to accumulate combat time doing just about anything instead of searching for those tougher, nontraditional positions, many of which may occur in the joint and interagency world.

**Recommended Actions**

“Experiential learning through rotational and developmental assignments, deployments, and crossovers into other functions will enhance an Army leader’s knowledge base.”116 While duties that promote confidence, creativity, and critical thinking complement institutional training and aid in growing all leaders, intellectual rigor must be applied to the selection processes for both educational and operational assignments. Those officers showing the most promise for success at the senior levels should be recruited for these additional learning opportunities, instead of accepting just those that want to apply.

A key enabler in this process would be sending more promising company-grade officers to civilian advanced degree programs allowing them to utilize this additional learning for a much longer portion of their career. To energize the recruiting process, advanced civil schooling needs to be advertised as a career-enhancer.

In addition to more civilian education options, the OES should attempt to introduce the topics concerning joint and interagency operations earlier in an officer’s career. As many officers execute assignments with other services and agencies in the lieutenant and captain years, waiting until CGSC to give them formal education on the subject wastes time in capitalizing on their

earlier experience. An alternative would be to begin JPME-I at the advance course or offer distance learning opportunities to complete the qualification prior to attending ILE.

In line with previous recommendations provided by the ATLDPaneck Report, HRC must change the OER to reinforce its leader development aspects. Part IV of DA Form 67-9 should be adjusted to reflect those skills required by an officer at a particular point in his or her career. Junior and senior level leaders should not be evaluated on the same scale.

The Army must look into traits and attributes particular to leaders at the senior levels in order to develop context-based education and evaluation systems. A way to accomplish this is to establish qualitative standards for branch qualification based on operational experiences, not just on the number of months assigned. Parts V – VII of DA Form 67-9 should not be glossed over by selection boards. These boards should look for qualitative reasons as to why an individual succeeded as opposed to focusing solely on the quantitative rankings within the officer’s relatively small peer group.

Finally, a 360-degree feedback system should be mandated as part of the evaluation system. Too much influence is controlled by the senior rater in the current methodology. If the Army wants to develop leaders comfortable operating in networked, amorphous situations, then the ancient, hierarchical evaluation model needs to adapt. A leader’s success depends not only on how he is perceived by his supervisors, but even more so on how he or she is accepted by subordinates and peers. A 360-degree performance evaluation will largely eliminate officers focused solely on career advancement and insure that our forces are composed of leaders who seek what is best for mission accomplishment.

117 Headquarters, Department of the Army, ATLDPaneck Officer Study Report, OS-11.
118 Ibid.
The recommendations listed above support three specific goals: enhancing the selection process for educational opportunities, providing more time for leaders to utilize their increased education, and reinforcing that education with a qualification-based evaluation system. By synchronizing leader development and evaluation, officers reaching the senior levels will be better versed in the strategic arts and able to recognize and address complex problems as well as provide creative solutions that emphasize the Army’s role in the context of the other elements of national power.
Appendix – Officer Evaluation Reporting System (OERS) Forms

Figure 7. DA Form 67-9, Officer Evaluation Report (front).
### PART V - PERFORMANCE AND POTENTIAL EVALUATION (Rater)

9. Evaluate the rated officer's performance during the rating period and insider potential for promotion.

- [ ] Outstanding performance, must promote
- [ ] Satisfactory performance, promote
- [ ] Unsatisfactory performance, do not promote
- [ ] Other (explain)


### PART VI - INTERMEDIATE RATER

### PART VII - SENIOR RATER

9. Evaluate the rated officer's promotion potential to the next higher grade.

- [ ] Best qualified
- [ ] Fully qualified
- [ ] Do not promote
- [ ] Other (explain)

10. Potential compared with officers in same grade (overprinted on DA):

- [ ] Above center of mass (above 50% in top box, center of mass if 50% or more in top box)
- [ ] Center of mass
- [ ] Below center of mass retain
- [ ] Below center of mass do not retain

11. Comment on performance/potential.

- [ ] Yes
- [ ] No (explain)

12. List three future assignments for which this officer is best suited. For Army competitive category opt, also indicate a potential career field for future service.

---

**Figure 8. DA Form 67-9, Officer Evaluation Report (back).**
### Figure 9. DA Form 67-9-1, Officer Evaluation Report Support Form (front).

**OFFICER EVALUATION REPORT SUPPORT FORM**

For use of this form, see AR 623-3; the proponent agency is DCS, G-1.

#### PART I - RATED OFFICER IDENTIFICATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME OF RATED OFFICER (Last, First, M1)</th>
<th>SSN</th>
<th>RANK</th>
<th>DATE OF RANK (YYYY/MM/DD)</th>
<th>BRANCH</th>
<th>DESIGNATION/MOS (WG/SPECIALTY)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNIT, ORG., STATION, ZIP CODE OR APO, MAJOR COMMAND</td>
<td>STATUS CODE</td>
<td>FROM DATE</td>
<td>LIC</td>
<td>CMD CODE</td>
<td>PSB CODE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### PART II - AUTHENTICATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME OF RATER (Last, First, M1)</th>
<th>SSN</th>
<th>RANK</th>
<th>POSITION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NAME OF INTER. RATER (Last, First, M1)</td>
<td>SSN</td>
<td>RANK</td>
<td>POSITION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAME OF SENIOR RATER (Last, First, M1)</td>
<td>SSN</td>
<td>RANK</td>
<td>POSITION</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### PART III - VERIFICATION OF FACE-TO-FACE DISCUSSION

MANDATORY RATER / RATED OFFICER INITIAL FACE-TO-FACE COUNSELING ON DUTIES, RESPONSIBILITIES AND PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES FOR THE CURRENT RATING PERIOD TOOK PLACE ON (Date) Rated Soldier Initials Rater Initials Senior Rater Initials (Reviewer)

PERIODIC RATER / RATED OFFICER FOLLOW-UP FACE-TO-FACE COUNSELING:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Rated Soldier Initials</th>
<th>Rater Initials</th>
<th>Senior Rater Initials</th>
<th>(Reviewer)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

#### PART IV - RATED OFFICER

(Complete Part IV and Part V below for this rating period)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PRINCIPAL DUTY TITLE</th>
<th>POSITION ACC / BR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

- **STATE YOUR SIGNIFICANT DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES:**

- **INDICATE YOUR MAJOR PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES:**

---

DA FORM 67-9-1, MAR 2006

PREVIOUS EDITIONS ARE OBSOLETE.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>SSN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**PART V - RATED OFFICER CONTRIBUTIONS**

FCMP NOTE: Block IIIId of the OER Support Form, Rated Officer's Accomplishments, has been sized to correspond directly with Block Vb on the OER, where the Rater writes comments on the rated officer's performance. When a user in FCMP creates an OER using a completed OER Support Form, the data entered in Block IIIId of the OER Support Form will automatically transfer to Block Vb on the newly-created OER in their narrative comments on performance. In addition, data entered in Block IIIId of the OER Support Form, Professional Skills/Areas of Expertise, will transfer to Block Vb on the OER, same subject. The rater then may edit the OER until he/she is satisfied with the wording and content of the rater's portion. Rated officers that intend to list additional accomplishments beyond what will fit in the space provided may use the ADD COMMENTS function in the FCMP Wizard to create a continuation page for the form. However, data entered on the continuation pages on the OER Support Form in the FCMP Wizard will not be automatically transferred to an OER created from the completed OER Support Form.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>APFT</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>HEIGHT</th>
<th>WEIGHT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**6. LIST YOUR SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTIONS:**

**7. LIST ANY UNIQUE PROFESSIONAL SKILLS OR AREAS OF EXPERTISE OF VALUE TO THE ARMY:**

**8. IF UNABLE TO SERVE IN THE CURRENT BRANCH/CAREER FIELD, IN WHICH BRANCH/CAREER FIELD WOULD YOU PREFER TO SERVE?**

**9. LIST 3 FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS FOR WHICH YOU FEEL YOU ARE BEST SUITED:**

---

**SIGNATURE AND DATE**

*DA FORM 67-9-1, MAR 2006*  
Page 2 of 2  
APD v1.01

Figure 10. DA Form 67-9-1, Officer Evaluation Report Support Form (back).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. LAST NAME - FIRST NAME - MIDDLE INITIAL</th>
<th>2. SSN</th>
<th>3. GRADE</th>
<th>4. BR</th>
<th>5. SPECIALTY/MOSC</th>
<th>8. COMP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6. COURSE TITLE</td>
<td>7. NAME OF SCHOOL</td>
<td>10. DURATION OF COURSE (YYYYMMDD)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. THIS IS A REFERRED REPORT, DO YOU WISH TO MAKE COMMENTS?</td>
<td></td>
<td>From: Thru:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. PERFORMANCE SUMMARY</td>
<td>12. DEMONSTRATED ABILITIES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*a. [ ] EXCEEDED COURSE STANDARDS</td>
<td>a. WRITTEN COMMUNICATION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Limited to 20% of class enrollment)</td>
<td>[ ] NOT EVALUATED</td>
<td>[ ] UNSAT</td>
<td>[ ] SAT</td>
<td>[ ] SUPERIOR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. [ ] ACHIEVED COURSE STANDARDS</td>
<td>b. ORAL COMMUNICATION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[ ] NOT EVALUATED</td>
<td>[ ] UNSAT</td>
<td>[ ] SAT</td>
<td>[ ] SUPERIOR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*c. [ ] MARGINALLY ACHIEVED COURSE STANDARDS</td>
<td>c. LEADERSHIP SKILLS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[ ] NOT EVALUATED</td>
<td>[ ] UNSAT</td>
<td>[ ] SAT</td>
<td>[ ] SUPERIOR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*d. [ ] FAILED TO ACHIEVE COURSE STANDARDS</td>
<td>d. CONTRIBUTION TO GROUP WORK</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[ ] NOT EVALUATED</td>
<td>[ ] UNSAT</td>
<td>[ ] SAT</td>
<td>[ ] SUPERIOR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>e. EVALUATION OF STUDENT'S RESEARCH ABILITY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[ ] NOT EVALUATED</td>
<td>[ ] UNSAT</td>
<td>[ ] SAT</td>
<td>[ ] SUPERIOR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Rating must be supported by comments in ITEM 14.

13. HAS THE STUDENT DEMONSTRATED THE ACADEMIC POTENTIAL FOR SELECTION TO HIGHER LEVEL SCHOOLING/TRAINING?
   [ ] YES [ ] NO [ ] N/A (A "NO" response must be supported by comments in ITEM 14)

14. COMMENTS (This item is intended to obtain a word picture of each student that will accurately and completely portray academic performance, intellectual qualities, and communication skills and abilities. The narrative should also discuss broader aspects of the student's potential, leadership capabilities, moral and overall professional qualities. In particular, comments should be made if the student failed to respond to recommendations for improving academic or personal affairs.)

15. AUTHENTICATION

| a. TYPED NAME, GRADE, BRANCH, AND TITLE OF RATER | DATE (YYYYMMDD) | SIGNATURE |
| 15. AUTHENTICATION |
| DATE (YYYYMMDD) | SIGNATURE |
| DATE (YYYYMMDD) | SIGNATURE |

DA FORM 1059, MAR 2006

Figure 11. DA Form 1059, Service School Academic Evaluation Report.
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Journal Articles


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—. *Army Campaign Plan: Worth Fighting For.*


—. *Army Knowledge Online. Leadership Development Portfolio.*


—. *Senior Leader Development. Colonels Assignment Framework.*


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Horey, Jeffrey, Jon J. Fallesen, Ray Morath, Brian Cronin, Robert Cassella, Will Franks, Jr., and Jason Smith. Competency Based Future Leadership Requirements. Technical Report


