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**THESIS**

**EFFECTS OF MORAL CONDUCT WAIVERS ON FIRST-  
TERM ATTRITION OF U.S. ARMY SOLDIERS**

by

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March 2008

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**EFFECTS OF MORAL CONDUCT WAIVERS ON U.S. ARMY FIRST-TERM  
ENLISTMENT ATTRITION**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
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## **ABSTRACT**

This study evaluates the U.S. Army's policy on granting moral conduct waivers and the effects of moral conduct waivers on the quality of service. The analysis investigates the wartime levels of recruits who were approved for different categories of conduct waivers. The research methodology includes multivariate analyses in the form of ordinary least squares regression models and probit regression models. This study employs U.S. Army MEPCOM data obtained from the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) for soldiers who enlisted between 2000 and 2006. I analyze first-term attrition as a function of age, sex, race, AFQT, rank, bonus size, education, prior service, youth program participation (such as JROTC), contract length, and all sub-categories of conduct waivers. In addition, I analyze attrition at 180 and 365 days for all cohorts. The study also includes a survival analysis to investigate whether conduct waivers affect the duration of survival during the first enlistment contract.

The analysis reveals that attrition rates differences between soldiers with waivers and those without does not remain constant and depends on when attrition is measured. At the beginning of the first term, conduct waiver soldiers attrite at lower rates than non-waiver soldiers. However, at the end of the first term this pattern is reversed. Model results show that recruits in the Global War on Terror (GWOT) sample did not have a large difference in attrition rates between the waiver and non-waiver groups by the end of the first term of service. By breaking down the conduct waivers into sub-categories of waivers (substance, serious, and traffic), I find that there are significant differences between each groups' attrition rates. These findings raise the question of whether the conduct waiver policy needs to be revised to better suit current wartime needs and demographic changes in the recruit population.

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## **I. INTRODUCTION**

### **A. PROBLEM**

Attrition is costly for the military. When a soldier does not complete his or her initial contract, there are large monetary costs imposed on the Army. These costs stem from recruiting, training, and assigning the soldier to his/her.... Attrition is also one of the few measures of quality in the force. Decreasing attrition is viewed as a cost-saving and quality-increasing trend. Over the last five years, the U.S. Army has been under considerable strain to make yearly targeted recruiting numbers. These elevated recruitment expectations are predicted to continue far into the future. As the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan become increasingly unpopular, the challenges in recruitment are becoming unprecedented in America. This difficulty to recruit has put the All Volunteer Force under strain not seen since the period just following the end of the draft. In fiscal year (FY) 2007 alone, 80,000 new recruits were needed to continue current manning levels and to grow the force to the future goal of 547,000 soldiers.

When considering an applicant for enlistment, recruiters have many indicators with which to calculate the odds of a recruit surviving the initial term of service. Recruiters can examine the applicant's AFQT (Armed Forces Qualification Test) scores, High School performance records, age, marital status and criminal history. When considering criminal history, the recruiter reviews the applicant's prior legal history. The recruit is questioned about any criminal behavior or history of drug/alcohol abuse and asked to describe any encounters with law enforcement personnel. From there, a criminal history background check is conducted at the city, state, and county levels for each area in which that individual has lived. If a moral conduct waiver is deemed necessary for admission, the category of the past offense is determined and a moral conduct waiver packet is submitted to the highest level needed to approve the waiver. The biggest shortcoming of the conduct waiver system is that it depends on recruits to give truthful answers. Recruits have the ability to hide some of their past moral transgressions by either not self reporting criminal history or lying about previous events and habits.

However, they may not have an incentive to do so, since penalties for lying or omitting conduct waiver issues at the time of enlistment can range from punishment under the UCMJ (Unified Code of Military Justice) to a dishonorable discharge under the charge of fraudulent enlistment.

Questions have begun to arise in the public and military sectors as to whether soldiers who require a conduct waiver are diminishing the quality of the force and putting strategic and tactical goals in jeopardy. In *The Army Times*, Michelle Tan (2007, September 3) asserted, “[i]t is sort of like putting bad gas in your gas tank, it is probably cheaper... But after a while you will have to change your engine” (p. 14). Rep. Marty Mehan, D—Mass, said in an online CBS News article, “The data is clear. Our forces are under incredible strain and the only way that they can fill their recruiting quotas is by lowering standards” (CBS, 2007, February 14, p. 1). In civilian and military environments, conduct waivers are currently seen as generally unfavorable exceptions that must be tolerated when the recruiting situation gets difficult. The question that follows, then, is the following: Should the Army continue to make use of conduct waivers? And if so, at what cost?

## **B. BACKGROUND**

Increasing the number of recruits the Army brings in each year has had a natural effect of also increasing the raw number of conduct waiver recruits. However, the increase in conduct waivers is not simply a scale effect. The proportion of recruits that require a conduct waiver has also increased, most likely in order to accomplish the increasingly difficult manpower goals. The Army has had to accept more soldiers than ever who possess a history of criminal activity or morally questionable behavior. When potential recruits have previous legal violations, they are required to disclose their past and have it reviewed by the Army. If the Army deems an individual fit for duty, the recruit is granted a conduct waiver to excuse his or her past improprieties and is allowed entrance into the U.S. Army. It will not be addressed in this paper if this method of identifying questionable behavior is the best means of capturing all those who would possibly need this waiver. It is understood that some recruits “leak” into military service without identifying some behavior, who (if all facts were known) would require a waiver

under current Army policy. But, because the Army's methodology of identifying those in need of waivers has not changed, it is accepted that the percentage of "leakage" is no greater than at other points of the Army's historical recruiting effort. Improvements such as computerized checking of legal backgrounds, has only served to help reduce this leakage and increase the number of reportable moral waiver recruits. As a result, the investigation of differences in attrition rates between recruits requiring a conduct waiver and those who do not, can be made more precise with recent data. All of the U.S. military services assign conduct waivers in a similar manner and are at equal risk of this type of problem.

Recent manpower shortages have required the Army to accept more conduct waivers in order to achieve their yearly recruiting goals. In FY 2003, the U.S. Army brought in 4,918 soldiers who needed a conduct waiver (6.8% of all recruits). That number increased over the next few years to 8,129 in FY 2006 (10.2% of all recruits). Such a large increase of so called "criminal recruits" raised eyebrows and has worried policy makers about the quality of the force. The fact that the Army needed around 10% of its new recruits to come from this morally questionable source highlights the challenges the All Volunteer Force faces with recruiting while fighting a war on terror. This issue has received significant attention from the media and research arenas. Over 23,000 recruits have been brought in under a conduct waiver in the last four years (7.6% of all recruits).

The discussion so far has not distinguished between the various types of conduct waivers. In fact, there are six types of waivers that depend on the type of offense the individual committed before applying to the Army. These include: felonies, serious non-traffic, minor non-traffic, serious traffic, minor traffic, and substance-abuse offenses. These different waiver categories are also given different levels of authorization before being waived. Army Regulation 601-210, the regulation governing recruiting, treats these types of convictions differently and assigns waiver authority according to the category of offense. The approval authority ranges from the local MEPCOM Lieutenant Colonel for minor traffic offenses to a Major General for felony and some serious non-traffic waivers. According to AR 601-210, waiver authorities are directed by regulation

to take into account the nature of the offense and to use the “whole person” approach (Department of the Army, 2005, May 16, p. 30). Specifically, “the burden is on the applicant to prove to waiver authorities that he or she has overcome their disqualifications for enlistment and that their acceptance would be in the best interest of the Army” (p. 30). A waiver can be denied by any of the commanders below the highest approval authority. It is believed that potential recruits who can prove they have put in the hard work to overcome their moral history will actually turn out to be of a higher quality. By erring on the side of caution in this manner, decision-makers attempt to ensure that only applicants who have changed their ways and are truly qualified for service are allowed into the U.S. Army. Risk is, of course, assumed with this type of policy; but the costs of denying entrance to this 10% of recruits and, thus, not making manning goals is understood to be much more costly.

### **C. OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE**

The objective of this thesis is to examine the correlation between a recruit’s conduct waiver status and his or her likelihood of attrition from the U.S. Army. It is hypothesized that effects of needing a conduct waiver for entrance to the U.S. Army on quality of recruits and attrition no longer fit historical trends due to war-time circumstances. It is also hypothesized that recruits with some types of conduct waivers are no more likely to be prematurely discharged than those who did not require a waiver. Currently the U.S. Army is undergoing a change of terminology used in the description of these moral conduct waivers. The older term of “moral waiver” is being replaced with “conduct waiver” (Bland, William S. LTC. Personal Communication, March 18, 2008). This study attempts to adhere to this newer terminology, but it is understood that the two terms can still be used interchangeably and are used to describe the same type of enlistment waiver. Additionally data variables in the results section were supplied with the moral waiver headings, so much of the data analysis will use the older moral waiver term.

This analysis examines all U.S. Army recruits who entered between the years 2000 and 2006. This study will examine the effects and draw conclusions from first-term

attrition, 365-day attrition and 180-day attrition. This thesis also aims to answer the following questions: what other demographic variables contribute to high attrition rates, and are there any factors that mitigate or exacerbate the effect of a conduct waiver? Does entrance with a certain type of conduct waiver carry a higher probability of attrition for the same type of moral infraction? Does a high score on the AFQT mitigate the effects of attrition for conduct waiver recruits?

Through analysis and conclusions from these data sets, I expect to reveal new evidence and insights into the conduct waiver policy.

#### **D. SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS**

This thesis is organized into five chapters. The next chapter gives background information of literature concerning conduct waivers and attrition in the military. Chapter III introduces the data and reveals some information the summary statistics hold. The methodology used in the study will be discussed in this chapter as well. Chapter IV then details the study results. Chapter V provides a summary of the findings, conclusions, and recommendations based on the study.

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## II. LITERATURE REVIEW

The U.S. Army, along with the other U.S. military services, wishes to gain the most highly qualified individuals as recruits. It is believed that recruits of the highest quality will perform better in all performance measurements and, in turn, will come at the most economical cost to the military. This is a difficult task to accomplish because high quality recruits have more outside opportunities. A recruit's potential quality can be a difficult characteristic to measure. Over the history of the All Volunteer Force, researchers and the military have used a recruit's completion of initial obligated term of service as a determining factor for whether that recruit was worth the costs of recruiting and training. Performance in the first term of service is not considered competitive and performance measures are difficult to quantify. The completion of a recruit's first term of obligated service is described and known as attrition. Because attrition is costly, recruit quality has come to represent the likelihood that the recruit will complete the first term of enlistment. Attrition of recruits can be measured, analyzed, and quantified. Work in this area has produced findings that have historically cast a negative light on the practice of conduct waivers. But more recent work indicates that the negative influence of conduct waivers on attrition has been decreasing during war time.

Starting in 1996, Eli Flyer conducted groundbreaking research on the issue of moral conduct waivers using data on male recruits from California enlisting during FY1985 through FY1989. He researched the relationship between pre-service arrests and attrition, using state records for undisclosed information and enlistment files regarding arrests, other quality measures and unsuitability attrition records. His findings cast an early disparity on the use of conduct waivers and questioned the wisdom of recruiting a person with a morally questionable past:

Educational level and AFQT scores have historically been the two most important correlates of separation for unsuitability, and, accordingly, are both prominent factors in recruit selection. They are also considered important in evaluating trends in recruit quality, and minor differences in recruit levels from year to year are considered newsworthy. It is now quite clear that another important factor associated with recruit quality has been identified—arrest history. This factor is highly related to behavior during

military service and sufficiently independent of educational level and AFQT score that it should be taken into account in its own right. (Flyer, 1996, March, p.12)

Flyer's research included historical criminal records that the Army did not have access to. These records were not discovered by the Army due to either the recruits not self reporting their backgrounds or background checks failed to capture all of the recruits past criminal history. At the time, there were large-scale faults in the criminal history checking that resulted in some recruits' criminal records not being disclosed. This increased the effect that a criminal history may have caused on attrition. Flyer felt:

The costs to the Military Services in enlisting recruits with an arrest history are high. The increased turbulence associated with high unsuitability separation rates can only have a marked impact on readiness. Lost training costs and increased disciplinary problems add to the problem. There is little question that the high unsuitability separation rates experienced by the Military Services are driven to a considerable extent by their intake of recruits with an arrest history. (p. 13)

The biggest shortcoming of Flyer's results is that they are based on comparing raw percent distributions between the waiver and non-waiver groups. These descriptive statistics shed some light on the problem but leave many questions unanswered. This type of analysis singles out the number of recruits who did not complete their first obligation out of the population. By comparing the different percentages and then calculating their percent difference, he calculated that a conduct waiver recruit had a 70% higher chance of attrition than a non-waivered recruit. The use of this type of comparative statistics inflated the feel of the effect and ignored the interactions of the other possible variables that may have explained the attrition. To the untrained eye, a 70% increase gives a sense that waivers contribute a stronger effect than they may actually do. Flyer did give credit to the large quantities of recruits who had a conduct waiver and did finish their initial obligation; however, he suggested that a more effective conduct waiver program be established to screen out the high-risk recruits. In addition, he recommended that the Services should specifically focus on improving identification of recruits with an arrest history.



Connor (1997, March) reviewed the use of moral conduct waivers and suggested that “[p]roper screening of recruits to identify individuals most likely to succeed in the military is imperative to maintain a high quality force” (p.1). Connor used a binary logistic model to derive his findings on conduct waiver use. He included variables such as race, age, AFQT, and education to explain the effects on attrition. He only included three types of waiver status as explanatory variables. These included: no prior criminal history, non-felony criminal history, and felony criminal history. This is in contrast to how the military categorizes conduct waivers—by grouping the effects of different types of conduct waivers together. His categorization will give a close estimate of the conduct waiver effects, but the predicted effects will not be as accurate for Army use as if the groups had matched the Army’s system. Connor’s logistic model produced probabilities for attrition of each of his conduct waiver groups for each of the AFQT categories and high school diploma status. The data revealed higher attrition probabilities for conduct waivers across all ranges of diploma status and AFQT scores. Connor finds that the difference in probability of attrition between a recruit with an adult felony conviction compared to a recruit without a history of criminal behavior increases consistently from 12.4 percentage points to 18.4 depending on AFQT category. He also explains that first term unsuitability attrition, may be improved by identifying and decreasing enlistment to individuals based on their criminal background. Connor did not calculate percentage change differences, but rather reported the percentage point difference numbering attrition rates. This technique helped to not inflate the effect and allowed readers to determine the severity of the effect on their own. Connor recommended screening recruits with felony waivers to improve attrition and to save money, but admitted a more in-depth cost-benefit analysis should be conducted.

Many of the studies in this era center on “unsuitability” attrition, which focuses on the conditions of how the soldier was discharged. This type of study gives a much more accurate look at a cause-and-effect-type relationship of needing a conduct waiver for entrance, but tends to lean away from the original argument that conduct waivers cause more attrition overall and reduce the quality of the force. If one is concerned with attrition, one needs to consider the fact the soldier did not make it through the first

enlistment for any reason rather than the cause for discharge. Each discharge costs the same in recruitment and training dollars, regardless of its nature.

Later research provided more in-depth analysis to examine the problematic nature of conduct waiver use. To gain a more accurate understanding of the conduct waiver attrition problem, researchers began to separate the different types of conduct waivers and investigate the effects that different pre-service offences had on attrition. Frabutt (1996, March), for example, separated felony and misdemeanor crimes. His analysis included a logistic regression model that predicted the probability of a recruit with such a waiver not completing an initial term of service. His data came from a sample of California enlistees with known criminal histories. His logit results show that California enlistees with a felony waiver are twenty percentage points more likely to receive an unsuitability discharge than those with no arrest history. Additionally, the study finds that enlistees in the sample with a misdemeanor or lesser charge are 10% more likely to receive an unsuitability discharge than are those with no arrest history (1996). In part due to these findings, other researchers began separating recruits by the severity of the conduct leading to a waiver.

Bohn and Schmitz (1996, June) estimated attrition rates for Navy recruits as a function of demographic variables, such as age, race, sex, education, number of dependants, and the full spectrum of the AFQT categories. They analyzed 20% of the FY1992-93 Navy accessions in their sample. The conduct waiver categories were also expanded to separate crime and drug waivers. These models also included waivers that were granted for criminal and non-criminal pre-service offences. Given the comprehensive set of controls, these models yielded better predictive results for the behavior of recruits who join active duty service with a waiver. Their data suggested that the effect of conduct waivers on first-term attrition may not be as great as predicted in previous research. They found that recruits with waivers for criminal behavior had 5% higher attrition (over two years) than those without. However, the authors also found that the attrition rates of those receiving non-criminal, drug or alcohol abuse conduct waivers were not significantly different than those without waivers. They concluded that the current waiver policies may be adequate for those recruits requiring waivers for minor

infractions. The authors also suggested that the Flyer's estimates of the attrition rates of those with criminal waivers may have been overestimated. Additionally, they concluded that attrition rates may indeed decline if recruits requiring a waiver are not allowed to join. However, in their estimates the savings would far outweigh the costs of recruiting additional qualified applicants. This study began to shift some of the negative views on conduct waivers and opened the door for further research in the area. The issue seemed to be at a standstill—due to low numbers of conduct waivers being issued per year and the services' ability to handle both the costs of recruiting fewer conduct waiver recruits and the cost incurred by the policy decision. This temporary lull in the argument would soon be over as the events of the 9/11/2001 terror attacks placed the military in a situation of increased recruitment demand.

With the onset of Global War on Terror (GWOT), there has been a new emphasis on recruit quality. The increased demand for recruits and the certainty of combat-zone tours have limited the availability of high-quality recruits and have forced the services to reevaluate their minimum entry requirements to maintain manpower levels. The arguments of conduct waivers once again rose up, and research soon followed. Putka, Noble, Becker, and Ramsberger (2004) examined recruit data from 2001. This study surveyed all four military services and included explicit results of 18-month attrition of conduct waiver recruits. The researchers established a model that contained very detailed variables of conduct waivers, gender, race/ethnicity, AFQT category, education amount and quality, marital status, and body mass index. Their logistic models produced the odds of attrition in the first 18 months. This 18-month time period attempted to capture the recruits that caused the greatest expenditure in dollars and produced the least in regards to return on investment. During the first 18 months, the military invests heavily in training and recruitment, but the soldiers are not producing much given that most of their time is spent in training. The study reported separate results for the different services. This study yielded results that have a much more direct relationship to this research on Army personnel than do others in the field. After controlling for all demographic variables, the authors suggested several changes to the way the Army grants conduct waivers. Putka et al. suggested that the Army consider lowering thresholds that trigger waivers for both

minor non-traffic violations and serious non-traffic violations. By contrast, they suggest raising the standards of selection criteria (AFQT and education credential) for two or more minor non-traffic violations, minor non-traffic violations committed before the age of age 14, serious non-traffic violations, felonies, positive pre-entry drug tests, and three or more self-reported marijuana uses. Through these changes, the researchers expected the Army to decrease attrition and reduce costs, although increased recruiting costs were not considered (Putka et al. expanded this research by analyzing repeat behaviors of criminal activity. They found that some types of conduct waivers yielded higher attrition related to moral character. This means that conduct waiver recruits were not completing their first 18 months due to problems that were closely related to those that triggered a waiver. The authors observed that individuals with conduct waivers for non-traffic, adult felonies, marijuana use, positive drug or alcohol tests, or multiple waivers, were significantly more likely to attrite for reasons directly related to such behavioral problems than individuals without waivers(p. 32). The sample used in this study was broad across the services, but it only included a snapshot of one cohort. The data did not capture soldiers who enlisted after the tragic terrorist events of 2001, so their findings do not address the question of long-term trends in the attrition rates of recruits with conduct waivers, or potential changes in these trends during war times.

Putka and Strickland (2005) followed up with another study including data from U.S. Army soldiers who had served during the GWOT and had joined after 9/11/2001. The FY 2003 recruit sample was used and compared to results gained from the pre-GWOT FY 1999 recruit sample. This time, the effects of the GWOT on conduct waiver recruits began to emerge in the data:

With regard to the moral character waivers, Soldiers with such waivers in the FY 03 cohort were 2.25 times less likely to attrite in BCT (Basic Combat Training) than Soldiers with such waivers. Whereas in the FY 99 cohort, Soldiers with moral character waivers were only 1.05 times less likely to attrite in BCT than Soldiers without such waivers. (Putka & Strickland, 2005, September, p. 26)

Putka and Strickland reported odds ratios to quantify differences in attrition rates. They also did not separate conduct waivers into categories based on the severity of the problem. In these samples, soldiers who enlisted with conduct waivers performed slightly

better than their non-waiver counterparts. These findings were directly opposed to their earlier results and all prior studies on this topic. This contrast shows that how conduct waivers are used to fill manning needs may be different during times of war. Given the time of the study, the authors could not observe recruits for a long period of time. Therefore, their attrition results refer to BCT attrition. Putka and Strickland admitted that that these results may only be due to immaturity of the sample, and that over time, different characteristics may affect attrition at different rates.

Studies over the last 20 years have varied in their findings of the effect of conduct waivers on the quality of the force. Earlier findings suggested that such waivers are inadequate manning tools that facilitate meeting recruiting goals in the short run at the cost of higher attrition in the long run. More recent studies indicated that under certain circumstances, conduct waivers may actually bring in the type of soldiers that do well under war-time conditions. In part, the differences in these results are driven from the use of different control and treatment groups, the time at which attrition was measured, cohort years studied, and potentially self selection bias. There does seem to be a trend over time that at least attempts to separate the effect of the different types of waivers and to gain knowledge about specific groups rather than lumping different types of waived individuals together. However, these waivers will continue to be a point of contention as the demand for new recruits continues to intensify during the GWOT.

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### **III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY**

#### **A. DATA DESCRIPTION**

Data for this study were provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC). These data were primarily derived from United States Military Entrance Processing Command (MEPCOM) enlisted personnel data files of new U.S. Army recruits. This data file provides an initial snapshot of each individual collected during initial processing at recruitment centers and military entrance processing centers. For those who separate, the data set includes information concerning the discharge status and discharge date. The data set consists of all enlisted accessions between fiscal year 2000 and fiscal year 2006. The data set contains 520,972 individual records and tracks them through the use of a sequentially assigned individual identification number.

The sample was restricted to soldiers who signed three- or four-year contracts. Limiting the sample this way, allows for both holding constant the length of the initial obligation, and also provides enough time for recruits to mature through time and have an equal opportunity to attrite. Recruits of normal enlistment age (17 to 42) were kept in the sample while individuals outside that range were dropped. It is believed that anyone outside that range had either errors in reporting or enlisted under mitigating circumstances which would bias their attrition measurements. Finally anyone who came in above the rank of E-4 was dropped from the sample. This was done primarily to sharpen the focus of the study and to ensure accurate results, by removing enlistees who are very different from the average recruit. Finally, individuals with missing, or clearly erroneous information were also removed. These restrictions reduced the sample size to 404,646 observations. Table 1 summarizes the sample restrictions and the resulting sample size.

Table 1. Details of Individuals Removed from Sample

Reason for dropping	Number removed	Explanation
Contract Length	102,048	Restricted sample to only 3- and 4-years contracts.
Rank at Time of Entry	7,539	Restricted sample to ranks E-1 to E-4
Age Greater Than 42	6,739	Removed individuals outside the standard enlistment age.
Total Removed From Sample	116,326	

## B. KEY VARIABLES

From the original data set, 14 characteristics were identified as most important, and variables were generated to capture their effects on first-term attrition at various times. The choice of these variables was based on the literature reviewed earlier, indicating that they are contributing factors to attrition; they are also the factors that are considered by commanders when a moral waiver is issued. Table 2 contains a list of all variables used and their description.

Below is a review of the independent variables used in the models and the expected effect of each variable on the dependent (attrition) variables.

**1. Gender.** The **Male** dummy variable takes a value of one for males and zero for females. I expect this variable to capture the gender difference in attrition. Historically, females have shown higher attrition rates than males. A literature review conducted by the U.S. Army center for health promotion and preventative medicine on attrition found that women are more likely to leave the service early than men. Female attrition rates are 1.1 to 1.8 times higher than those of males, depending on the study and service (Knapik, 2004, October, p. 7).

**2. Age.** For this variable, a continuous measurement of age was used. Recruits above the age of 42 or below the age of 17 were dropped from the sample. I hypothesize that recruits' ages will have a significant effect on their attrition rates. Younger recruits may be more physically capable of service, but older recruits are expected to show better decision-making and to have increased chances of completing the



first term of service. Age squared was also included to capture any non-linear effects of age on attrition. I expect this variable to refine the picture of how age affects attrition. The older age groups should have more negative effects on attrition than the younger groups when measuring long term attrition, but may show poorer attrition when analyzing short term attrition.

**3. Race/Ethnicity.** This information was captured by a series of dummy variables (**White, Black, Hispanic, and Other**) indicating the race of the recruit. Prior research in this area has shown varying results for the effect of race on attrition. It is of interest to investigate whether the percentage of moral waivers varies by race and/or over time.

**4. Ability.** The Armed Forces Qualification Test (**AFQT**) score will be used as a proxy for the ability of the recruit. The AFQT variable represents the soldier's raw score from this test. Prior studies have found that this variable is inversely related to attrition. It is unclear, however, how ability interacts with a moral waiver. If soldiers have high ability, they may complete their initial contracts despite having a criminal history.

**5. Education.** The **NHSDG** variable takes a value of one if the soldier dropped out of high school or did not receive a traditional high school diploma (this includes GED-recipients and those who obtained other forms of high school accreditation). Soldiers who received a high school diploma or obtained additional years of education (which range from some college to advanced degrees), receive a value of zero for this variable. Similar to the effect of AFQT, I expect that non-high school graduates will have higher attrition rates; therefore this variable will have a positive effect on the attrition variables.

**6. Youth Programs.** These variables represent participation in various military-related youth or high school programs prior to enlistment. **YP** includes programs such as civil air patrol and sea cadets. **JROTC** defines participation in Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps, a high school program. **ROTC** defines participation in Reserve Officer Training Corps, a program that provides scholarships while providing military officer training in college. I assume these programs will have a small negative

effect on attrition due to the soldiers having some previous experience and having shown previous interest in the military. These variables will be set up in dummy format and will take a value of one for program participation, and zero if the recruits did not report participating in these programs.

**7. Prior Service.** The **PS** dummy variable takes a value of one if the soldier has a history of prior service. These soldiers should know more about the military than a non-prior-service individual, thus making them more likely to complete their contract. They are probably older and will enter with higher rank. On the other hand, I question under what circumstances they were released from military duty previously. This variable was created in order to separate out these individuals, who are believed to be fundamentally different from the rest of the sample.

**8. Marital Status.** The **Married** dummy variable represents the recruit's marital status at time of entry. A 1 will represent married while 0 will represent single, widowed, divorced, and annulled. I expect this variable to have a positive effect on attrition. It has been shown that individuals with families have higher attrition rates than those without during the first term of enlistment. Knapik's literature review on attrition studies finds that service members who are married or have dependents are more likely to exit the service before completion of their enlistment contracts when compared to non-married service members (2004, p. 8).

**9. Rank.** The **RANK** variable represents the soldier's assigned rank at entry. All enlisted grades were assigned a value 1 through 9 but the ranks of E-5 through E-9 were dropped from the sample because it is believed that they do not represent the average recruit and would, therefore, bias the results of the model. This variable should show some negative effect on attrition due to rank being assigned based on a recruit's previous achievements and accomplishments, assistance in recruitment efforts, as well as other quantifiable positive qualities. This variable will be most helpful in removing soldiers who would cloud the moral waiver effects on attrition.

**10. Dependents.** This variable lists the number of dependents a soldier claimed at time of entry. I believe this variable will not have much of an effect on attrition in the short run, but will prove to have a small effect on attrition over the course

of the first term. I hypothesize that the increased pressure of supporting an increasing number of dependents will limit the soldier's choice to attrite.

**11. Contract Length.** Both three- and four-year contracts were set up here into one variable. The length of contract that was signed by the recruit carried a value of either 3 or 4. I hypothesize that two opposing factors affect this variable's effect on attrition. I believe that longer contracts are harder to complete and should show more attrition; however, longer contracts are often assigned to more training-intensive Military Occupation Specialties (MOS), which require higher-quality recruits. This variable was created in order to help restrict the sample, not to measure the effect of these two different contract lengths.

**12. Waivers.**

**MORAL\_WAIVER.** Dummy variables take a value of one for those who need a conduct waiver upon enlistment. Dummy variables were generated based on the waiver codes provided in the data set. The conduct waiver dummy variables generated are as follows: **MORAL\_WAIVER** for all combined waivers that qualified under the conduct aspect, **MT\_WAIVER** for all minor traffic waiver, **ST\_WAIVER** for all serious traffic waivers, **MNT\_WAIVER** for all minor non-traffic waivers, **SNT\_WAIVER** for all serious non-traffic waivers, **FEL\_WAIVER** for all waivers that involved a felony conviction, and **DRUG\_WAIVER** for both self reported and drug screening drug use. For variable creation the original DMDC variable name of **MORAL\_WAIVER** will be used and meant to stand for conduct waivers. Appendix A lists each waiver code included in the sample. Added to that listing is a designation as to which waiver group each code was assigned. I expect that as the severity of the prior offense increases, the effect on attrition will become more positive. This means that the more severe crimes should yield poorer attrition outcomes. However these waiver relationships may be greatly affected by the current war on terror and may have effects on attrition not found in prior literature.

**MED\_WAIVER.** A dummy variable was inserted here to represent recruits who required a medical history waiver to gain enlistment. These waivers are issued for pre-existing medical conditions that would normally block an individual from enlistment.

Additionally medical waivers may be assigned for recruits who do not meet height and weight requirements. The variable takes a value of one if a person needs a medical waiver at enlistment. Historically, soldiers who enlisted with a medical waiver showed lower attrition rates. For this reason, I expect these types of waivers will show higher attrition.

**OTHER\_WAIVER.** In some cases, recruits need waivers that are not medical or conduct in nature. These waivers are issued for such things as too many dependents, having a military spouse, receiving a low AFQT score, or being a conscientious objector.<sup>1</sup> For these types of waivers a dummy variable was created and possessing such a waiver was coded as a 1. I assume these waivers will have a positive effect on attrition due to the fact that they represent something other than a non-waivered recruit.

**NO\_WAIVER.** For soldiers who needed absolutely no waiver to enlist, a dummy variable was created. For these waivers, a dummy variable was set up so that if the soldier did not need a waiver of any kind to enlist a 1 was assigned. I hypothesize that this group will have lower attrition rates. This effect should hold constant across all time measurements of attrition.

**13. Year Cohorts.** The **in\_Year\_200X** is a dummy variable that indicates the year the soldier enlisted. Fiscal years range from 2000 to 2006. This variable is used to capture any significant cohort differences.

The following is a description of the dependent variables used in multivariate regression models as well as in the survival analysis models. These variables use the inter-service separation codes (as well as actual days served) versus contractually obligated days in order to determine attrition and length of time served.

#### **14. Attrition**

For this study, I have chosen to examine attrition at three different points in time: 180-day, 365-day, and first term attrition. First term attrition will be confined to recruits with three- and four-year initial contracts. The data provided contain information on individuals who enlisted for both longer and shorter contracts, but these individuals were eliminated due to their not being allowed enough time to mature through the sample.

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<sup>1</sup> Other waivers include maximum age limit, military spouse, number of dependants, previous military separation, minimum education requirements, sole surviving family member, conscientious objector, and other administrative- type waivers.

These attrition variables will be defined by loss codes used by the U.S. Army and dates of service provided in the data. The goal will be to analyze the effect of having a conduct waiver at recruitment on each attrition variable.

Interservice separation codes were used to determine if a separating soldier was counted as an attrition loss or considered a non-attrition loss. Appendix A includes a complete listing of the separation codes contained in the sample and how they were used to define the attrition variables.

**Attrited under 180.** This is a dummy variable where 1 represents a soldier who did not complete 180 days of active service. This is believed to be the most costly period to the Army due to the high fixed costs for recruitment and training. I expect the first 180 days to be a large portion of the total first-term attrition in both the three- and four-year contract categories.

**Attrited under 365.** This is a dummy variable where 1 represents a soldier who did not complete one year of active service. Soldiers who had an entry date during FY2006 are not included in this sample and are given a missing value because they potentially did not have an opportunity to serve 365 days, since the sample was collected before the end of the 2007 fiscal year. This reduction eliminates 62,147 entries from the sample. The `Attrited_under_365` models contain 342,499 observations. I believe this variable will reflect interesting differences between the types of soldiers who attrite early as compared to those who attrite later on in their contract.

**Attrited before contract complete.** This is a dummy variable where 1 represents a soldier who did not complete the contracted amount of active service of either three or four years. Soldiers who had an entry date during fiscal years 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006 are not included in these models because they did not have an opportunity to complete their entire three- or four-year contract. This reduction eliminates many observations from the model. Models investigating first term attrition contain 170,378 observations.

**Substance Attrition.** This is a dummy variable where 1 represents a soldier attrited for drugs or alcohol reasons. This variable was created to indicate if a soldier had been separated with a discharge coded as Alcoholism or Drugs. This variable will be

used to investigate whether soldiers who enlist with substance waivers are more likely to attrite due to substance abuse. This variable contains 8,567 observations of substance attrition.

Table 2. Variables' Names and Definitions

VARIABLE NAME	VARIABLE DEFINITION
Attrited before contract complete	= 1 if Received an attrition related discharge before contract completed; = 0 if contract completed
Attrited under 365	= 1 if Received an attrition related discharge before 365 days; = 0 if 365 days completed
Attrited under 180	= 1 if Received an attrition related discharge before 180 days; = 0 if 180 days completed
Substance Attrition	= 1 if Received a substance related attrition discharge; = 0 if did not received a substance related attrition discharge.
Male	= 1 if Male; = 0 if Female
Age	Age in years; range = (17 to 42)
Age_sqr	Age squared
White	= 1 if White; = 0 if non-white
Black	= 1 if Black; = 0 if non-black
Hispanic	= 1 if Hispanic; = 0 if non-Hispanic
Other_race	= 1 if Other race; = 0 if white, black or Hispanic
AFQT	Armed Forces Qualification Test score: range = (0 to 99)
NHSDG	= 1 if no high school diploma; = 0 if high school diploma graduate
YP	= 1 if participated in a Youth Program; = 0 if no participation
JROTC	= 1 if participated in JROTC; = 0 if no participation
ROTC	= 1 if participated in ROTC; = 0 if no participation
Married	= 1 if Married; = 0 if not married
RANK	Enlistment Rank; range = (1 to 4)
Dependants	Number of dependants; range = (0 to 9)
FY_year	Fiscal Year of enlistment; range = (2000 to 2006)
Contract_length	Contract Length; range = (3 to 4)
MED_WAIVER	= 1 if received a Medical waiver; = 0 if no medical waiver
MORAL_WAIVER	= 1 if received a Conduct waiver; = 0 if no medical waiver
MT_WAIVER	= 1 if received a Minor Traffic waiver; = 0 if no Minor Traffic waiver
ST_WAIVER	= 1 if received a Serious Traffic waiver; = 0 if no Serious Traffic waiver
MNT_WAIVER	= 1 if received a Serious non-Traffic waiver; = 0 if no Serious non-Traffic waiver
SNT_WAIVER	= 1 if received a Minor non-Traffic waiver; = 0 if no Minor non-Traffic waiver
FEL_WAIVER	= 1 if received a Felony waiver; = 0 if no Felony waiver
DRUG_WAIVER	= 1 if received a Drug waiver; = 0 if no Drug waiver

VARIABLE NAME	VARIABLE DEFINITION
OTHER_WAIVER	= 1 if received a Other type waiver; = 0 if no Other type waiver
NO_WAIVER	= 1 if received No waivers; = 0 if received some type of enlistment waiver
in_FY_y~2000	= 1 if enlisted in fiscal year 2000; = 0 if not in 2000 cohort
in_FY_y~2001	= 1 if enlisted in fiscal year 2001; = 0 if not in 2001 cohort
in_FY_y~2002	= 1 if enlisted in fiscal year 2002; = 0 if not in 2002 cohort
in_FY_y~2003	= 1 if enlisted in fiscal year 2003; = 0 if not in 2003 cohort
in_FY_y~2004	= 1 if enlisted in fiscal year 2004; = 0 if not in 2004 cohort
in_FY_y~2005	= 1 if enlisted in fiscal year 2005; = 0 if not in 2005 cohort
in_FY_y~2006	= 1 if enlisted in fiscal year 2006; = 0 if not in 2006 cohort

### C. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

The descriptive statistics for the model variables are listed in Table 3. This table shows the number of observations, the mean of the variable value across all observations, the value of one standard deviation, as well as the minimum and maximum values.

Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of Model Variables

Variable	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Male	404646	0.8199	0.3842	0	1
White	382422	0.6400	0.4800	0	1
Black	382422	0.1877	0.3905	0	1
Hispanic	382422	0.1299	0.3362	0	1
Other_race	382422	0.0424	0.2016	0	1
Age	404646	21.0611	3.7936	17	42
Age_sqr	404646	457.9599	184.7335	289	1764
White	382422	0.6400	0.4800	0	1
Afqt	404646	56.8569	19.5654	0	99
NHSDG	404646	0.1964	0.3973	0	1
Married	404646	0.1703	0.3759	0	1
Dependants	403162	0.3481	0.8388	0	9
YP	404646	0.0007	0.0261	0	1
J_ROT C	404646	0.0257	0.1583	0	1
PS	404646	0.0957	0.2942	0	1
RANK	395925	1.8757	1.0389	1	4
MORAL_WAIVER	404646	0.0846	0.2782	0	1
MED_WAIVER	404646	0.0569	0.2316	0	1
OTHER_WAIVER	404646	0.0303	0.1715	0	1
Attrited before 180	342499	0.1155	0.3196	0	1

Variable	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Attrited before 365	342499	0.1596	0.3662	0	1
Attrited_before 1 <sup>st</sup> term	170378	0.3348	0.4719	0	1
FY2000	404646	0.1323	0.3388	0	1
FY2001	404646	0.1441	0.3512	0	1
FY2002	404646	0.1447	0.3518	0	1
FY2003	404646	0.1375	0.3443	0	1
FY2004	404646	0.1526	0.3596	0	1
FY2005	404646	0.1352	0.3420	0	1
FY2006	404646	0.1536	0.3605	0	1

Using Table 3, we can see that the dependent variables assume historically known ranges. In some cases the number of observations listed change for a given variable. This is due to missing values for that variable. In addition, the various attrition variables contain different observation numbers. In both the 180- and 365-day attrition, there are 342,499 observations. Yet, in contract-complete attrition, there are only 170,378 observations. This is because many of the individuals did not have an opportunity to mature through the sample timeline to reach their end-of-contract, but they did pass the one-year point.

Values for race/ethnicity show different numbers of observations. This is due to structural errors in the encoding of Hispanic, so this ethnicity code could be generated into a race/ethnicity tracking variable. Some individuals showed either positive or missing values for both categories and could not be determined as to which racial/ethnic group they best fit. In these cases the individuals were given a missing value for race/ethnicity and will be left out of the models using those race codes.

Also listed in Table 3 are the mean values for each variable. About 82% of the sample is male, 64% is white, 19% is African American, and 13% is Hispanic. The average AFQT score of the sample is 64 and 19.6% of the sample does not have a traditional high school diploma.

Next I focus on conduct waivers and the background characteristics of those with such waivers.



## 1. General Observations

After reducing the sample to only include soldiers who were contracted for three- and four-year enlistments, 393,180 individuals remained in the sample. Of those, 32,934 or 8.38% received a conduct waiver prior to enlistment. Table 4 details the number and percentages of each type of conduct waiver issued. In fiscal year 2000 only 5.38% of newly enlisted recruits had a conduct waiver. In 2006 this percentage had grown to 12.36%. (Figure 1). This corresponds to previous studies, which have found that the use of conduct waivers has increased since the onset of the War on Terror.

Table 4. Conduct Waiver Percentages for Fiscal Years 2000 through 2006<sup>2</sup>

	Number	% of sample	% of conduct waivers
Total	404,646	100.00%	N/A
No Conduct Waiver	370,432	91.54%	N/A
Conduct Waiver	34,214	8.46%	100.00%
Minor Traffic (MT)	112	0.03%	0.33%
Serious Traffic (ST)	2,096	0.57%	6.13%
Minor Non-Traffic (MNT)	1,089	0.29%	3.18%
Serious Non-Traffic (SNT)	19,163	5.17%	56.01%
Felony Waiver (FEL)	6,200	1.67%	18.12%
Drug Use Waiver (DRUG)	6,333	1.71%	18.51%

<sup>2</sup> The different types of waivers do not sum to equal the total number of moral waivers because some recruits possess more than one type of moral waiver.




Figure 1. Total and Percentages of Moral Conduct and Medical Waivers Issued during Fiscal Years 2000 through 2006

The level of conduct waivers issued seems high initially but it should be considered in light of the fact that the Army is facing unprecedented recruitment challenges. The U.S. Army Recruiting Command has been tasked with increasing the size of the Army by 8,000 troops a year through FY 2012. This increased quota—along with its already high recruitment demand—means that in fiscal year 2008, 80,000 new soldiers will need to be recruited.

To analyze 180-day and 365-day attrition, I use data from fiscal years 2000 through 2005; for three- and four-year contract-completion attrition, only fiscal years 2000 through 2002 could be used. Table 5 shows the different attrition percentages for the conduct waiver group and no waiver group.<sup>3</sup> In bold are the groups who experienced the lowest attrition rates. Across all years, soldiers who entered with a conduct waiver had consistently lower attrition rates through the initial 180 days and first year of enlistment. This effect could be due to the “whole person” policy, which requires individuals with waivers to have better education, AFQT scores, or other characteristics that would counterbalance the waiver. The early lower attrition rates could also be due to increased monitoring of behavior and restricted privileges in both basic training and

<sup>3</sup> For this comparison, the soldiers with moral waivers who also needed a medical waiver to enlist were removed to ensure interactions between the two variables were not to interfere with the pure attrition rates of moral waiver recruits.

advanced individual training. By the end of the first term, however, soldiers without a conduct waiver have lower attrition rates. Table 5 indicates that those without conduct waivers have achieved a lower attrition percentage than their peers. This reversed effect now puts those without a conduct waiver at roughly a 4 percentage point lower attrition rate by the end of the first term. This equates to a 12.5% difference between the two groups. However, the magnitude of attrition rates between the two groups is now far below the percentage levels found in prior studies by Connor, Flyer, or Frabutt. Furthermore these percentage differences in rates are based on a small, but increasing, number of individuals when taking into account the sample size per year of the conduct waiver group.

Table 5 also indicates that the 6-month and 1-year attrition rates have increased slightly over time since 2000, possibly due to the Global War on Terror. This effect spans across both those with and without a conduct waiver.

Table 5. 180-day, 1-year, and Full-term Attrition Percentages of Soldiers with and without Moral Waivers

Fiscal Year	180-day attrition		365-day attrition		First term attrition	
	Conduct Waiver	No Waiver	Conduct Waiver	No Waiver	Conduct Waiver	No Waiver
2000	<b>8.49</b>	10.73	<b>12.14</b>	14.38	38.41	<b>33.09</b>
2001	<b>9.23</b>	11.66	<b>13.5</b>	15.53	38.18	<b>34.24</b>
2002	<b>9.69</b>	11.12	<b>14.64</b>	15.59	36.49	<b>32.23</b>
2003	<b>10.02</b>	11.27	<b>15.1</b>	16.27		
2004	<b>11.96</b>	14.19	<b>16.97</b>	18.85		
2005	<b>8.71</b>	10.4	<b>14.08</b>	15.28		

Table 6 compares the background characteristics of recruits with conduct or medical waivers to those with no waivers. Since differences in means may appear large for variables with a large variance, I also present standardized differences between both groups. These are calculated as:  $d = (M_1 - M_2) / \sigma$ . These standardized differences illustrate the significance of the differences between the groups. Differences in means that exceed a quarter of a standard deviation will be interpreted as significantly large.

Table 6 shows that 92% of those with conduct waivers were male and 81% of non-waivered soldiers were male. With a standardized difference of more than a quarter of a standard deviation between the two groups, it can be seen that they are significantly different in their gender composition. It is also important to note that those with conduct waivers are also on average 1.4 years older than the no waiver group. The same goes for those with medical waivers. As far as ability, soldiers with both conduct and medical waivers appear to score slightly higher in the AFQT test than those with no waivers. While this indicates in part that the ‘whole person’ policy is being followed, the difference in AFQT scores is insignificant at only 12% of a standard deviation. Interestingly, those with conduct waivers appear to be less likely to have obtained a traditional high school diploma. About 26% of those with conduct waivers do not have a high school diploma, versus 19% of those without waivers and the 17% of those with medical waivers. Some individuals may also possess waivers categorized as other-waivers. The effects of these other waivers are not included in Table 6.

Table 6. Background characteristics of recruits by waiver type

Variables	Moral Waivers	STD DIFF	No Waiver	STD DIFF	Med Waivers	STD DIFF
		Moral vs No		Med vs No		Moral vs Med
Male	0.92	<b>0.29</b>	0.81	0.06	0.83	0.23
White	0.74	0.24	0.63	0.17	0.71	0.07
Black	0.13	0.16	0.19	0.11	0.15	0.05
Hispanic	0.10	0.12	0.14	0.12	0.10	0.00
Other_race	0.03	0.06	0.04	0.01	0.04	0.06
Age	22.14	<b>0.37</b>	20.73	<b>0.30</b>	21.87	0.07
AFQT	58.76	0.12	56.44	0.15	59.35	0.03
NHSDG	0.26	0.18	0.19	0.06	0.17	0.24
Married	0.18	0.05	0.16	0.09	0.19	0.04
Dependents	0.39	0.10	0.30	0.12	0.40	0.01
YP	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.03
J_ROTTC	0.01	0.08	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.05
PS	0.06	0.08	0.08	0.14	0.12	0.22
RANK	1.69	0.16	1.86	0.10	1.96	<b>0.26</b>
Moral Waiver	1.00		0.00		0.07	

Variables	Moral Waivers	STD DIFF	No Waiver	STD DIFF	Med Waivers	STD DIFF
	Moral vs No		Med vs No		Moral vs Med	
Med Waiver	0.05		0.00		1.00	
Other Waiver	0.02		0.00		0.05	
180-day Attrition	0.10	0.06	0.12	0.05	0.13	0.11
365-day Attrition	0.14	0.04	0.16	0.04	0.17	0.08
Full-term Attrition	0.37	0.09	0.33	0.02	0.34	0.07

These findings indicate that there are systematic differences between these groups. Therefore, comparing raw attrition rates may yield misleading results.

## 2. Race/Ethnicity

In this section I investigate further differences in conduct waivers by race category. One caveat is in order: the coding of the race and ethnicity variables changed in 2002 to include previously omitted races and ethnicities. This was a direct attempt to more accurately capture a soldier's true racial and ethnic background. Despite code changes in this sample, all who remained as viable in the sample possessed enough information to be included in one of the four race/ethnicity categories.

Table 7 presents the incidence of waivers by racial category and by fiscal year. It appears that whites possessed on average more waivers than non-whites throughout the years of the sample. Over the 6 years examined, an average of 9.96% of whites needed a conduct waiver to enlist, whereas only 6.26% of non-white recruits required such a waiver. Over the same period of time, there was an increase in the number of white recruits. This amplified the effect, making the numbers of individuals with conduct waivers in that group appear (to a certain extent) larger. As illustrated in Table 7, through all years in the sample, whites carry a higher percentage of conduct waivers than non-whites. Bohn (1996) also noted that the race and ethnicity of Navy enlistees affected waiver probabilities (p. 4-5). Even though his data referred to a 1992-1993 sample. This parallel indicates that the Army may not have increased its waiver percentages much differently from other services in the past. The proportion of the sample with waivers has

increased evenly across all four race/ethnic groups over the years observed. All groups seem to nearly double their number of conduct waivers between 2000 and 2006.

Table 7 includes medical waiver percentages across years as well. All racial groups also see an increase in medical waivers during the same time period, but they do not experience the drastic increase evident in the conduct waiver data. This is expected, since it is far more probable that a recruit could be enlisted with a serious criminal history than for a serious medical condition. Moral problems may be forgiven, but there is obviously a limit to how severe of a medical condition can be accepted.

Table 7. Waiver by Race

Fiscal Year							
White	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
No waiver	85.62%	84.58%	81.15%	83.70%	84.24%	79.60%	75.77%
Conduct waiver	6.41%	7.89%	10.71%	9.29%	7.77%	11.01%	14.33%
Medical waiver	5.37%	5.12%	5.28%	5.63%	6.94%	7.65%	7.38%
Black	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
No waiver	88.91%	86.93%	86.65%	87.66%	88.50%	85.07%	81.53%
Conduct waiver	3.63%	5.50%	6.75%	5.97%	5.25%	6.71%	8.41%
Medical waiver	4.38%	4.12%	3.83%	4.36%	4.66%	5.67%	5.71%
Hispanic	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
No waiver	90.71%	89.14%	88.29%	89.39%	90.27%	85.66%	81.17%
Conduct waiver	3.96%	5.69%	6.35%	5.83%	4.76%	7.14%	9.69%
Medical waiver	3.58%	3.45%	3.50%	3.52%	3.91%	5.65%	6.02%
Other Race	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
No waiver	86.80%	88.64%	85.61%	87.31%	88.78%	83.75%	80.71%
Conduct waiver	5.06%	5.40%	6.93%	6.07%	4.48%	6.70%	9.86%
Medical waiver	6.41%	3.99%	5.27%	5.65%	5.82%	7.78%	6.75%

### 3. Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT)

The AFQT has been used as a “recruit quality indicator” since 1976 (Fitz & McDaniel, 1988, December, p.13). Research has consistently shown that recruits with higher AFQT scores perform better and are less likely to receive early discharges than those with lower scores. Table 8 displays average AFQT scores by waiver status across the years studied. Recruits with both conduct and medical waivers consistently score slightly higher on the AFQT than non-waivered recruits. This should be an indicator that conduct and medical waiver soldiers should perform at par or even better than those with no waivers and be less likely to attrite. This would seem to indicate that the Army is looking for mitigating factors when enlisting soldiers with conduct waiver soldiers; at the very least, the negative criticism conduct waiver recruits receive should be somewhat diminished. Indeed, commanders who authorize waiver approvals are looking for mitigating factors with which to support the award of the waiver; a characteristic such as a high AFQT could definitely be such a factor. This scenario, examined over and over again as each conduct waiver application is scrutinized, would lead to an overall pattern of granting waivers to applicants who are well-suited for success in the Army increasing levels of other quality measurements, such as AFQT. This circumstance would raise the average AFQT score of waived recruits above that of the non-waivered recruits, since applicants are not randomly selected. This actually indicates that the “whole person” policy is being followed and that waivers are not just being used as a loophole to increase recruitment.

Table 8. AFQT Score by Waiver Category and Year

<b>Year</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>Total</b>
Avg. AFQT of non-waivered recruits	55.6	55.6	57.6	55.2	58.3	57.2	55.4	56.4
Avg. AFQT of Conduct waiver recruits	58.2	58.1	59.9	57.0	60.4	60.0	57.9	58.8
Avg. AFQT of Medical waiver recruits	58.5	58.0	59.5	57.3	61.4	60.7	58.9	59.3

#### **4. High School Diploma Status**

Completion of a high school diploma has long been used as a predictor of successful completion of the first-term enlistment. Many studies have often highlighted this factor as a pivotal variable in decreasing attrition. Over the years examined in this study, the annual number of Non-High School Diploma Graduates (NHSDG) increased from 7,462 to 18,626. This increase is more likely a stronger influence on attrition than the increase in conduct waivers alone. Recruits with conduct waivers, however, are less likely to have a traditional high school diploma than recruits without conduct waivers, but this may in part be due to the proliferation of alternative certifications for high school completion. These would include GED, homeschooling, adult education, etc.

#### **D. FOLLOWING INFORMATION**

This overview of descriptive statistics is followed by a more rigorous multivariate analysis and discussion of result. The chapter concludes with findings generated using survival analysis. These are included to help better understand timeline effects of conduct waivers on attrition.



## **IV. RESULTS**

### **A. REGRESSION RESULTS**

To investigate the effect of waivers on attrition, I estimate probit models that control for most observable background characteristics. Probit models are employed because the dependent variables of interest are binary. In all three attrition models the control group is the same and it includes recruits who join the Army without any type of waiver. This no-waiver group requires the individual did not possess a conduct, medical or any other type of enlistment waiver. In addition, the base case in all models is a white male recruit who is a high school graduate, unmarried, with no dependents who did not participate in a youth program or JROTC.

The first two tables (Tables 9 and 10) compare the model coefficients for both a restricted and an unrestricted sample. The restricted sample includes only those cohorts who are observed for the entire length of the first term. The unrestricted sample includes everyone. The results for early attrition were estimated using both the restricted and unrestricted sample to make sure that changes in coefficients' significance and magnitude are actual attrition effects and not merely cohort effects. The 180- and 365- day attrition variable contains 298,444 observations for the unrestricted sample, while the full term attrition variable contains 141,627. This technique controls for individuals who appear in the restricted model to contribute to the regression results. In this method the same cohort of individuals from the 180- and 365-day attrition models can later be compared to the full term attrition measurement. In the first two columns for each sample the models are the same except for the variables that control for ability. These variables are believed to offset the effects of having a moral conduct waiver. By adding these variables in separately it is possible to see the effects that they have on the moral conduct waiver variable coefficients. In the final column the moral waiver variable is replaced by the six separate categories of conduct waivers. The no-waiver group is still the control group. The final model (Table 11) contains the same variables but the model can only be estimated on data for fiscal years 2000-2002.

Table 9 details the probit regression outputs for the unrestricted and restricted sample of 180-day attrition model. This 180-day model also provides marginal probabilities of attrition for each control variable in square brackets. Listed at the bottom of Table 9 is the observed (sample) probability of attrition at 180 days as well as the probability of attriting predicted by the model for an individual with average continuous characteristics and with base case binary characteristics. From this we see that the model is accurately predicting attrition for both the restricted and unrestricted models. Additionally we see that the models are once again very similar, suggesting that cohort effects are not very important. The predicted attrition rate of roughly 12% indicates that the model is performing correctly by accurately reflecting attrition rates for this time period as listed in Table 5. The results in Table 9 indicate that the moral waiver variable carries a significant negative sign, suggesting that those with conduct waivers are less likely to attrite. This predicted marginal effect indicates that having a conduct waiver decreases the attrition probability by 0.02, or 17%.<sup>4</sup> Column 3 and 6 disaggregate the moral waiver category in separate subgroups. The predicted effect of conduct waivers on 180-day attrition again appears to be negative for most subgroups, except minor traffic waivers for which the effect is insignificant. However, the minor traffic waiver category contains only 112 observations, which could be the reason why the predicted effect appears insignificant.

Comparing the effect of conduct waivers with and without the ability proxies indicates that the effect of the waiver increases in magnitude after controlling for ability. This is consistent with the hypothesis that recruits with conduct waivers may be negatively selected. Controlling for ability, reduces even further the attrition rates of recruits with conduct waivers. This suggests that the conduct waiver interacts with ability, which is to be expected given the goals of the ‘whole person’ policy.

The results also suggest that a number of other factors are associated with lower 180-day attrition rates. In particular, it appears that males are 75% (calculate as below in the footnote) less likely to attrite, minorities are less likely to attrite by 35%, 40%, and

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<sup>4</sup> Calculated as the ratio of the marginal effect over the observed probability of attrition  $(0.02/0.12)*100\% = 17\%$ .

35% (for black, Hispanic, and other race, respectively). On the other hand, married individuals are 9.5% more likely to attrite, individuals with dependents are 3.5% more likely to attrite (for each additional dependant), and older individuals are 3.5% more likely to attrite (for each additional year of age). It also appears that recruits with prior military exposure are less likely to attrite. In particular, recruits who participate in youth programs and JROTC are 42% and 14% less likely to attrite, respectively.

Table 9. Probit Models of 180 Day Attrition (Restricted and unrestricted cohort groups).

Variable	Unrestricted Sample Cohort Years 2000 through 2005			Restricted Sample Cohort Years 2000 through 2002		
<b>Demographics</b>						
Male	-0.39268 (0.00745)*** [-0.08659]	-0.39653 (0.00749)*** [-0.08703]	-0.39654 (0.00749)*** [-0.08701]	-0.42286 (0.01028)*** [-0.09854]	-0.42895 (0.01035)*** [-0.0992]	-0.42876 (0.01035)*** [-0.09914]
Black	-0.1938 (0.00838)*** [-0.03438]	-0.23347 (0.00866)*** [-0.0405]	-0.23436 (0.00866)*** [-0.04063]	-0.23487 (0.01116)*** [-0.04388]	-0.2856 (0.01162)*** [-0.05186]	-0.2861 (0.01162)*** [-0.05193]
Hispanic	-0.24203 (0.00982)*** [-0.04142]	-0.27691 (0.01000)*** [-0.0463]	-0.2773 (0.01000)*** [-0.04634]	-0.37498 (0.01448)*** [-0.06413]	-0.42248 (0.01477)*** [-0.06987]	-0.42267 (0.01478)*** [-0.06989]
Other races	-0.23611 (0.01631)*** [-0.0394]	-0.25203 (0.01638)*** [-0.04136]	-0.25235 (0.01639)*** [-0.04139]	-0.23581 (0.02357)*** [-0.04176]	-0.26059 (0.02372)*** [-0.04496]	-0.26078 (0.02372)*** [-0.04498]
Age	0.01477 (0.00924) [0.00282]	0.02043 (0.00926)** [0.00388]	0.02078 (0.00926)** [0.00394]	0.02977 (0.01318)** [0.00601]	0.03625 (0.01322)*** [0.00724]	0.03646 (0.01322)*** [0.00728]
Age_sqr	-0.00024 (0.0002) [-0.00004]	-0.00029 (0.0002) [-0.00006]	-0.00029 (0.0002) [-0.00006]	-0.00051 (0.00028)* [-0.0001]	-0.00056 (0.00028)** [-0.00011]	-0.00057 (0.00028)** [-0.00011]
Married	0.0547 (0.01465)*** [0.0107]	0.05508 (0.01467)*** [0.01071]	0.05487 (0.01467)*** [0.01066]	0.00005 (0.02168) [0.00001]	0.00226 (0.02174) [0.00045]	0.00217 (0.02174) [0.00043]
Dependents	0.0368 (0.00716)*** [0.00703]	0.0229 (0.00719)*** [0.00434]	0.02273 (0.00719)*** [0.00431]	0.06093 (0.01041)*** [0.0123]	0.042 (0.01046)*** [0.00839]	0.04205 (0.01046)*** [0.0084]

	Unrestricted Sample Cohort Years 2000 through 2005			Restricted Sample Cohort Years 2000 through 2002		
<b>Variable</b>						
YP	-0.32529 (0.12643)** [-0.05054]	-0.31473 (0.12632)** [-0.04887]	-0.31521 (0.12631)** [-0.04891]	-0.2718 (0.14038)* [-0.04652]	-0.25817 (0.14032)* [-0.04404]	-0.25855 (0.14032)* [-0.04409]
JROTC	-0.09702 (0.01886)** [-0.01752]	-0.08884 (0.01892)** [-0.01601]	-0.08862 (0.01892)** [-0.01597]	-0.10243 (0.02285)** [-0.01956]	-0.08793 (0.02295)** [-0.01674]	-0.08789 (0.02295)** [-0.01673]
<b>Ability</b>						
AFQT		-0.00404 (0.00017)** [-0.00077]	-0.00404 (0.00017)** [-0.00077]		-0.00543 (0.00025)** [-0.00108]	-0.00543 (0.00025)** [-0.00108]
NHSDG		0.15225 (0.00775)** [0.03061]	0.15168 (0.00775)** [0.03048]		0.21591 (0.01090)** [0.04675]	0.21571 (0.01090)** [0.0467]
<b>Waivers</b>						
Moral Waiver	-0.12448 (0.01217)** [-0.02229]	-0.12926 (0.01221)** [-0.02292]		-0.10917 (0.01734)** [-0.02086]	-0.12114 (0.01744)** [-0.02275]	
Medical Waiver	0.06899 (0.01334)** [0.01367]	0.07899 (0.01338)** [0.01564]	0.0792 (0.01338)** [0.01567]	0.07385 (0.01990)** [0.0155]	0.0855 (0.02001)** [0.01787]	0.0856 (0.02001)** [0.01788]
Other Waiver	0.05788 (0.02844)** [0.01144]	0.07143 (0.02850)** [0.01413]	0.071 (0.02850)** [0.01404]	-0.07232 (0.04263)* [-0.01401]	-0.05242 (-0.04275) [-0.01016]	-0.05234 (-0.04275) [-0.01014]
Drug Waiver			-0.07964 (0.02564)** [-0.0144]			-0.07135 (0.03236)** [-0.01368]
Minor Traffic Waiver			0.20587 (0.15478) [0.04404]			0.17533 (0.16189) [0.03868]

Variable	Unrestricted Sample Cohort Years 2000 through 2005			Restricted Sample Cohort Years 2000 through 2002		
	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Serious Traffic Waiver			-0.32685 (0.04708)*** [-0.05045]			-0.20687 (0.10203)** [-0.03645]
Minor Non-Traffic Waiver			-0.09499 (0.0615) [-0.01699]			-0.19971 (0.08054)** [-0.03536]
Serious Non-Traffic Waiver			-0.11147 (0.01633)*** [-0.01984]			-0.11476 (0.02453)*** [-0.0215]
Felony Waiver			-0.16343 (0.02826)*** [-0.02807]			-0.17513 (0.03859)*** [-0.03156]
Cohort dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observed P(atrrite)	0.1164301	0.1164301	0.1164301	0.1271509	0.1271509	0.1271509
Predicted P(atrrite)	0.1124099	0.1113581	0.1113142	0.1216140	0.1197631	0.1197365
Observations	289444	289444	289444	141627	141627	141627

Notes: The sample includes observations from two different cohort year groups. Standard errors appear in parentheses.

\*\*\*significant at the 1%; \*\* significant at the 5%; \*significant at the 10%. Partial effects appear in square brackets.

Table 10 presents the probit regression results for the restricted and unrestricted models of 365-day attrition model. This model mirrors the 180-day model in the restricted and unrestricted sample sizes. The two samples are defined the same way, the independent variables are the same, and the control group again involves those who enlist without any waivers. Again the regression results appear similar across the two samples, suggesting that using either sample will give us similar results. In this 365-day attrition model. In this 365-day model the observed and predicted probabilities are once again reported at the bottom of the table. Both, the predicted probability and the observed probability of attrition are very similar and correspond well with known historical attrition rates for the first year. Roughly 16% of new recruits are predicted to undergo attrition by the end of the first year. Just as in the 180-day attrition model the 365-day model reports partial effects for all variables in square brackets. The moral waiver variable yields partial effects that are still negative in sign. The moral waiver partial effect is now reduced to -0.018 (or 11%). This would indicate that the effect of having a conduct waiver on attrition is diminishing over time. The conduct waiver subgroups also report similar results, as in the 180-day model, including the minor traffic group. The serious non-traffic, felony and drug conduct waivers make up the majority of conduct waivers and their partial effects are the largest of any of the conduct waivers.

Table 10. Probit Models of 365-day Attrition (Restricted and unrestricted cohort groups).

Variable	Unrestricted Sample Cohort Years 2000 through 2005			Restricted Sample Cohort Years 2000 through 2002		
<b>Demographics</b>						
Male	-0.4466 (0.00692)*** [-0.12092]	-0.45308 (0.00696)*** [-0.12235]	-0.45302 (0.00696)*** [-0.12231]	-0.46745 (0.00969)*** [-0.12883]	-0.47441 (0.00975)*** [-0.13015]	-0.47413 (0.00975)*** [-0.13004]
Black	-0.21292 (0.00774)*** [-0.04716]	-0.24858 (0.00800)*** [-0.05412]	-0.24994 (0.00800)*** [-0.05437]	-0.24129 (0.01044)*** [-0.05444]	-0.28817 (0.01087)*** [-0.06361]	-0.28928 (0.01087)*** [-0.06381]
Hispanic	-0.22094 (0.00889)*** [-0.04816]	-0.25254 (0.00907)*** [-0.05406]	-0.25301 (0.00907)*** [-0.05414]	-0.3352 (0.01316)*** [-0.07123]	-0.37946 (0.01344)*** [-0.07855]	-0.37965 (0.01345)*** [-0.07856]
Other races	-0.21236 (0.01473)*** [-0.04547]	-0.22568 (0.01479)*** [-0.04773]	-0.226 (0.01480)*** [-0.04778]	-0.2022 (0.02163)*** [-0.04438]	-0.22483 (0.02177)*** [-0.04839]	-0.2251 (0.02177)*** [-0.04843]
Age	-0.00222 (0.00853) [-0.00053]	0.00318 (0.00855) [0.00075]	0.00345 (0.00855) [0.00082]	0.00844 (0.01232) [0.00204]	0.01443 (0.01236) [0.00346]	0.01474 (0.01237) [0.00354]
Age_sqr	0.0001 (0.00018) [0.00002]	0.00005 (0.00018) [0.00001]	0.00005 (0.00018) [0.00001]	-0.00007 (0.00026) [-0.00002]	-0.00012 (0.00026) [-0.00003]	-0.00013 (0.00026) [-0.00003]
Married	0.04386 (0.01364)*** [0.01058]	0.04377 (0.01366)*** [0.01051]	0.04369 (0.01366)*** [0.01049]	-0.01275 (-0.02045) [-0.00307]	-0.01075 (-0.02049) [-0.00257]	-0.01105 (-0.0205) [-0.00264]
Dependents	0.03966 (0.00668)*** [0.00941]	0.02494 (0.00671)*** [0.00589]	0.02476 (0.00671)*** [0.00585]	0.06518 (0.00983)*** [0.01577]	0.04658 (0.00987)*** [0.01118]	0.04673 (0.00987)*** [0.01122]
YP	-0.27043	-0.256	-0.2568	-0.26051	-0.24619	-0.24687



Variable	Unrestricted Sample Cohort Years 2000 through 2005			Restricted Sample Cohort Years 2000 through 2002		
	JROTC	(0.10985)** [-0.05549] -0.10811 (0.01729)*** [-0.02434]	(0.10969)** [-0.05266] -0.09673 (0.01734)*** [-0.02179]	(0.10968)** [-0.05278] -0.09646 (0.01735)*** [-0.02172]	(0.12756)** [-0.05491] -0.10456 (0.02119)*** [-0.02408]	(0.12745)* [-0.05187] -0.08962 (0.02128)*** [-0.02063]
<b>Ability</b>						
AFQT		-0.0038 (0.00016)*** [-0.0009]	-0.00379 (0.00016)*** [-0.0009]		-0.00508 (0.00024)*** [-0.00122]	-0.00507 (0.00024)*** [-0.00122]
NHSDG		0.17652 (0.00716)*** [0.04407]	0.17586 (0.00716)*** [0.04389]		0.21755 (0.01029)*** [0.05594]	0.21739 (0.01029)*** [0.05588]
<b>Waivers</b>						
Moral Waiver	-0.07367 (0.01095)*** [-0.01694]	-0.07871 (0.01098)*** [-0.01796]		-0.06936 (0.01592)*** [-0.01628]	-0.08076 (0.01601)*** [-0.01872]	
Medical Waiver	0.03915 (0.01250)*** [0.00946]	0.0498 (0.01253)*** [0.01203]	0.05012 (0.01254)*** [0.0121]	0.04451 (0.01892)** [0.01098]	0.05572 (0.01900)*** [0.01372]	0.0559 (0.01901)*** [0.01376]
Other Waiver	0.03577 (0.0268) [0.00864]	0.04962 (0.02685)* [0.01201]	0.04932 (0.02686)* [0.01193]	-0.08162 (0.04021)** [-0.01895]	-0.0628 (0.04033) [-0.01461]	-0.0629 (0.04033) [-0.01463]
Drug Waiver			0.01056 (0.02267) [0.00251]			0.00197 (0.02933) [0.00047]
Minor Traffic Waiver			0.17491 (0.14618) [0.04498]			0.18605 (0.1526) [0.04882]
Serious Traffic			-0.2969			-0.34609

Variable	Unrestricted Sample Cohort Years 2000 through 2005				Restricted Sample Cohort Years 2000 through 2002			
	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	
Waiver			(0.04181)***				(0.10098)***	
			[-0.05976]				[-0.06893]	
Minor Non-Traffic Waiver			-0.09686				-0.21756	
			(0.05629)*				(0.07492)***	
			[-0.02174]				[-0.04658]	
Serious Non-Traffic Waiver			-0.06591				-0.07777	
			(0.01471)***				(0.02255)***	
			[-0.01508]				[-0.01799]	
Felony Waiver			-0.1348				-0.14744	
			(0.02545)***				(0.03531)***	
			[-0.0297]				[-0.03285]	
Cohort dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observed P(attrite)	0.1586835	0.1586835	0.1586835	0.1586835	0.1643896	0.1643896	0.1643896	0.1643896
Predicted P(attrite)	0.1540814	0.1529086	0.1528467	0.1528467	0.1585642	0.1567825	0.1567216	0.1567216
Observations	289444	289444	289444	289444	141627	141627	141627	141627

Notes: The sample includes observations from two different cohort year groups. Standard errors appear in parentheses.

\*\*\*significant at the 1%; \*\* significant at the 5%; \*significant at the 10%. Partial effects appear in square brackets.

The 365-day attrition model confirms prior findings with respect to the effect of background characteristics on the likelihood of attrition. Again, the results indicate that males, minorities, and higher-ability recruits are less likely to attrite. Older, married, and recruits with dependents are more likely to attrite, all else equal. Both youth programs and JROTC participants continue to display lower attrition rates, indicating that such programs may result in better or more stable job matches.

Table 11 presents the results for first term attrition. This table shows similar probit results as the 180- and 365-day models and presents partial effects for each variable in square brackets. There is only one set of results in Table 11 because first term attrition can only be studied for the cohorts entering during 2000 through 2002. Again this is due to the fact that these are the only cohorts in the sample that are observed for three- or four years. The observed and predicted probabilities of attrition also of around 32% closely match the findings in chapter 3 and historically known attrition rates in the first term. Interestingly, the effect of conduct waivers has turned around at this point and the predicted effect on attrition appears to be positive and significant. The partial effect of the moral waiver is now 0.042. This would indicate that an individual who enters the Army with a conduct waiver stands a 13%% higher probability of attrition by the end of the first enlistment term. Because first term attrition rates are inclusive of earlier attrition rates (180- and 365-day attrition), this effect suggests that the early positive performance of recruits with conduct waivers is wiped out by later higher attrition rates.

Table 11. Probit Models of Full Term Attrition

<b>Variable</b>	Unrestricted Sample Cohort Years 2000 through 2002		
<b>Demographics</b>			
Male	-0.51456 (0.00878)*** [-0.19339]	-0.52364 (0.00883)*** [-0.19671]	-0.52343 (0.00883)*** [-0.19661]
Black	-0.15446 (0.00891)*** [-0.05389]	-0.19193 (0.00929)*** [-0.06646]	-0.19518 (0.00930)*** [-0.06754]
Hispanic	-0.26352 (0.01094)***	-0.29956 (0.01118)***	-0.30057 (0.01119)***

Unrestricted Sample Cohort Years 2000 through 2002			
Variable			
	[-0.08921]	[-0.1004]	[-0.1007]
Other races	-0.22404 (0.01872)***	-0.24163 (0.01882)***	-0.24195 (0.01882)***
Age	[-0.0756] -0.02394 (0.01089)**	[-0.08099] -0.01966 (0.01092)*	[-0.08107] -0.01948 (0.01092)*
Age_sqr	[-0.00854] 0.00041 (0.00023)*	[-0.007] 0.00039 (0.00023)*	[-0.00694] 0.0004 (0.00023)*
Married	[0.00015] 0.00954 (0.01809)	[0.00014] 0.00998 (0.01812)	[0.00014] 0.00955 (0.01813)
Dependants	[0.00341] 0.07432 (0.00876)***	[0.00356] 0.05659 (0.00880)***	[0.00341] 0.057 (0.00880)***
YP	[0.02651] -0.26254 (0.10474)**	[0.02016] -0.24917 (0.10481)**	[0.0203] -0.25014 (0.10485)**
JROTC	[-0.08712] -0.10823 (0.01792)***	[-0.08287] -0.09096 (0.01798)***	[-0.08316] -0.09067 (0.01799)***
	[-0.03765]	[-0.03172]	[-0.03162]
<b>Ability</b>			
AFQT		-0.00431 (0.00020)***	-0.0043 (0.00020)***
NHSDG		[-0.00153] 0.23597 (0.00915)***	[-0.00153] 0.23622 (0.00916)***
		[0.08675]	[0.08684]
<b>Waivers</b>			
Moral Waiver	0.12539 (0.01327)***	0.11514 (0.01331)***	
Medical Waiver	[0.04578] 0.01878 (0.0167)	[0.04191] 0.02996 (0.01675)*	0.03093 (0.01675)*
Other Waiver	[0.00673] -0.11185 (0.03581)***	[0.01074] -0.09353 (0.03587)***	[0.01109] -0.0938 (0.03588)***
Drug Waiver	[-0.03881]	[-0.03255]	0.31889 (0.02432)***
			[0.12029]

Unrestricted Sample Cohort Years 2000 through 2002				
Variable				
Minor Traffic				0.21055
Waiver				(0.13724)
				[0.07828]
Serious Traffic				-0.0733
Waiver				(0.07663)
				[-0.02563]
Minor Non-Traffic				-0.02555
Waiver				(0.05936)
				[-0.00904]
Serious Non-Traffic				0.03352
Waiver				(0.01904)*
				[0.01202]
Felony				0.04006
Waiver				(0.0286)
				[0.0144]
Cohort dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observed P(attrite)		0.3217183	0.3217183	0.3217183
Predicted P(attrite)		0.3181328	0.316976	0.3168949
Observations		141627	141627	141627

Notes: The sample includes observations from two different cohort year groups.  
Standard errors appear in parentheses. \*\*\*significant at the 1%; \*\* significant at the 5%;  
\*significant at the 10%. Partial effects appear in square brackets.

From Tables 9 and 11 there is seen a noticeable change from the 180-day attrition model to the first term attrition model in the sign of the moral waiver coefficient. This reversal of the moral waiver sign indicates that there is a change in the effect that conduct waivers have on attrition over time. Since the sign of the effect was the same in the 180-day and 365-day attrition, regardless of which sample was used (restricted or unrestricted), then the first term effect is most likely the true effect of conduct waivers and not a cohort effect. The negative sign of the moral waiver variable shows that up to the one year point, soldiers with conduct waivers have lower attrition than their counterparts with no waivers. Up to this point conduct waiver actually have an effect of lowering attrition. However, this effect is reversed when looking at

first term attrition, and it appears that soldiers with conduct waivers are more likely to separate before the end of the first term than soldiers with no waivers.

Table 12 summarizes the estimated coefficients of the detailed waiver categories on each of the three attrition variables. From these coefficients it is possible to identify how each type of waiver affects attrition at different points in time. It is also possible to determine in whether particular categories of conduct waivers are driving the sign of the aggregated moral waiver variable. As before, soldiers with conduct waivers are compared to individuals with no waivers.

Table 12. Probit Model of Moral Conduct Waiver Category Attrition

Variable	Attrition Measurement		
	180 day	1 year	Full Term
<b>Waivers</b>			
Drug Waiver	-0.07964 (0.02564)*** [-0.0144]	0.01056 (0.02267) [0.00251]	0.31889 (0.02432)*** [0.12029]
Minor Traffic Waiver	0.20587 (0.15478) [0.04404]	0.17491 (0.14618) [0.04498]	0.21055 (0.13724) [0.07828]
Serious Traffic Waiver	-0.32685 (0.04708)*** [-0.05045]	-0.2969 (0.04181)*** [-0.05976]	-0.0733 (0.07663) [-0.02563]
Minor Non-Traffic Waiver	-0.09499 (0.0615) [-0.01699]	-0.09686 (0.05629)* [-0.02174]	-0.02555 (0.05936) [-0.00904]
Serious Non-Traffic Waiver	-0.11147 (0.01633)*** [-0.01984]	-0.06591 (0.01471)*** [-0.01508]	0.03352 (0.01904)* [0.01202]
Felony Waiver	-0.16343 (0.02826)*** [-0.02807]	-0.1348 (0.02545)*** [-0.0297]	0.04006 (0.0286) [0.0144]
Observed P(attrite)	0.1164301	0.1586835	0.3217183
Predicted P(attrite)	0.1113142	0.1528467	0.3168949
Observations	289444	289444	141627

Notes: The sample contains full numbers of observations possible from each attrition measurement.

Standard errors appear in parentheses. Partial effects appear in square brackets.

\*\*\*significant at the 1%; \*\* significant at the 5%; \*significant at the 10%.

The Serious Traffic and Minor Non-Traffic conduct waivers both have negative signs at each of the attrition points and are significant in the early attrition models. This indicates that these types of waivers are contributing to a predicted lower attrition rate, especially in early attrition. These violations account for 9.3% of all conduct waivers (Table 4). This would indicate that these types of offenses should be considered more forgivable by waiver administrators and continued to be allowed admission to the Army. The evidence in this study indicates that the 'whole person' policy is working for these particular waiver codes.

Serious Non-Traffic and Felony waivers make up 75% of all conduct waivers. According to AR 601-210, these waivers are assigned for, but not limited to, such offenses as aggravated assault, breaking and entering, carjacking and manslaughter (Department of the Army, 2005, May 16, p. 35). These waivers are responsible for the reversal of sign seen in the different attrition variables from Tables 12. They are the largest group and seem to be the driving force behind the general conduct waiver attrition effects. The first year attrition effects are negative in sign and significant. This would indicate that early on soldiers with these waivers are experiencing lower attrition. However, for first-term attrition they reverse sign and lose some significance. This shows that they are experiencing higher attrition at that point.

Out of all categories of waivers, the drug waiver appears to have the strongest (positive) effect on attrition at the end of the first term. Recruits who come in with a drug waiver are 38% more likely to attrite before serving their first term. In the first 180 days they are about 12% less likely to attrite, whereas at 365 days their attrition rates are no different than those of recruits who come in with no waivers. It could be that the higher attrition rates of recruits with drug waivers are driven by the possibility of re-offending while in service. Because the Army has adopted a zero-tolerance policy and conducts random drug tests periodically, re-offending soldiers with drug waivers may be more likely to get caught and separated as a result. It could also be that individuals with drug waivers possess intrinsic behavioral characteristics that make them more likely to use drugs *and* more likely to attrite. These explanations will be considered in more detail in Section C below.

**B. ANALYSIS OF INTERACTIONS BETWEEN MORAL WAIVERS AND MODEL VARIABLES**

“Sometimes, it is natural for the partial effect, elasticity, or semi-elasticity of the dependent variable with respect to an explanatory variable to depend on the magnitude of yet another explanatory variable.” (Wooldridge, 2006, p.204). In this section I investigate whether conduct waivers interact with several background characteristics. Interaction effects between model variables and conduct waivers are estimated using linear probability models with robust standard errors. Of the control variables the following five were found to be significantly interacting with the presence of a moral conduct waiver. The estimates of these regression results are presented in Table 13.

Table 13. Effects of Significant Model Variables Interacted with Moral Conduct Waivers.

<b>Variables Interacted</b>	<b>Attrition Measurement</b>		
	<b>180 day</b>	<b>1 year</b>	<b>Full Term</b>
<b>Black &amp; Moral Waiver</b>			
Black * Moral	0.0239 (.0057)***	0.0332 (.0067)***	0.0983 (.0134)***
Blacks: Moral vs. Non-Moral	-0.0010 (0.0053)	0.0126 (.0062)**	0.1253 (.0124)***
Moral Waivers: Black vs. Non-Black	-0.0255 (.0055)***	-0.0302 (.0065)***	0.0224 (.0130)*
<b>Hispanic &amp; Moral Waiver</b>			
Hispanic * Moral	0.0172 (.0061)***	0.0159 (.0074)**	0.0356 (.0154)***
Hispanics: Moral vs. Non-Moral	-0.0021 (0.0058)	0.0033 (0.0070)	0.0810 (.0146)***
Moral Waivers: Hispanics vs. Non-Hispanics	-0.0311 (.0059)***	-0.0380 (.0071)***	-0.0619 (.0151)***
<b>Medical Waiver &amp; Moral Waiver</b>			
Medical * Moral	-0.0231 (.0092)**	-0.0177 (0.0110)*	-0.0165 (0.0251)
Medical Waivers: Moral vs. Non-Moral	-0.0427 (.0090)***	-0.0318 (.0107)***	0.0297 (0.0247)
Moral Waivers: Medical vs. Non-Medical	-0.0058 (0.0087)	-0.0053 (0.0105)	-0.0027 (0.0244)
<b>NHSDG &amp; Moral Waiver</b>			
	<b>180 day</b>	<b>1 year</b>	<b>Full Term</b>



Variables Interacted	Attrition Measurement		
NHSDG * Moral	-0.0108 (.0051)**	-0.0112 (.0061)*	-0.0494 (.0114)***
NHSDG: Moral vs. Non-Moral	-0.0300 (.0047)***	-0.0248 (.0054)***	0.0051 (0.0101)
Moral Waivers: NHSDG vs. HSDG	0.0212 (.0049)***	0.0335 (.0057)***	0.0057 (.0109)***
AFQT & Moral Waiver	180 day	1 year	Full Term
AFQT * Moral	0.0002 (0.0001)	-0.0002 (.0001)*	-0.0004 0.0003

*Notes:* All interaction effects are estimated via linear probability models with robust standard errors in parentheses (robust to both heteroskedasticity and serial correlation). The differences in outcomes between recruits with moral conduct waivers and those without, and variable participants are obtained by including separate categories for each variable-moral waiver combination in linear probability models, and leaving out the appropriate control group. All models include controls for demographics, ability, cohort year and other types of waivers. Interaction of moral waivers with other race categories and explanatory variables did not yield any significant results.

\*\*\*significant at the 1%; \*\*significant at the 5%; \*significant at the 10%.

### 1. Interaction of Black and Conduct Waivers

The variables indicating Black or Hispanic race revealed a more complex relationship with conduct waivers than the stand alone race dummy variables. Interacting the black dummy variable with the conduct waiver produced a positive coefficient, across all three measures of attrition, thus indicating that being Black with conduct waivers for enlistment increases the probability of attrition. This same regression showed that this interaction was significant. The second regression answers the question of, among Blacks are those with conduct waivers at an increased risk of attrition over those Blacks without conduct waivers? The effect starts out as not significant in affecting attrition, but it worsens 365-day and first-term attrition. This suggests that initially Blacks with conduct waivers should have better attrition in the short run, but see poorer attrition by the end of the first contract. Again all indicators find differences between Blacks and non-Blacks. The next question I pose is: among those with conduct waivers, are blacks at a lower risk of attrition than non-blacks? The regression indicates that this is true (and significantly so) for at least the first year. By the end of the first term this effect changes sign and begins to lose its significance. This reveals that in this sample blacks with conduct waivers succumb to attrition less often, at least in the first year, than non-Blacks with conduct waivers.

## **2. Interaction of Hispanic and Conduct Waivers**

The most interesting regression result for Hispanics revealed that, among those with conduct waivers, Hispanics are at a significantly lower risk of attrition than non-Hispanics. This results holds true across all three indicators of attrition. This is revealing in that in this sample Hispanics with conduct waivers do attrite less than non-Hispanics with conduct waivers. This racial/ethnic group has seen a large increase in recent years, not only in absolute numbers but also as a percentage of the new recruit population.

## **3. Interaction of Medical Waivers and Conduct Waivers**

The next question I pose involves the potential interaction of waivers across different categories. Interactions between conduct and medical waivers proved to only be slightly significant in the 180-, and 365-day attrition measurements. This result sheds light on the question of whether, among those with medical waivers, those who also needed a conduct waiver for enlistment had a higher probability of attrition. For both 180- and 365-day attrition this seems to be true. The negative sign of the coefficients here indicate that individuals with both types of waivers should be expected to have better attrition rates than someone with a medical waiver alone. This may be mostly due to the high amount of dedication it takes to gain entrance under both such conditions. This could also reflect a carry over effect from the conduct waivers themselves and have less to do with the medical waiver status. This effect does lose its significance in the first-term attrition model.

## **4. Interaction of Non-High School Diploma Graduates and Conduct Waivers**

Being a NHSDG, or not having a traditional high school diploma, and entering the Army with a conduct waiver proved to have a negative coefficient for all three attrition measurements. This indicates that being in both groups decreases your chances of attrition. This is contrary to rational thinking, since both categories are considered less than optimal for a new recruit. Looking deeper into the interaction the NHSDG variable was allowed to depend on conduct waiver status. In the early attrition models non-grads with conduct waivers have a significantly lower probability of attrition compared to non-grads with no waivers. But, by the end of the first

term, this difference becomes insignificant. Of those who possessed a conduct waiver, NHSDG's consistently had higher attrition probabilities than traditional high school graduates, and these effects were significant throughout.

## **5. Interaction of AFQT and Conduct Waivers**

The interactions between AFQT and conduct waivers all proved to be insignificant. This was not expected because it was hypothesized that the reason individuals with conduct waivers possessed higher AFQT scores, was because they needed those higher scores to mitigate the fact that they needed a conduct waiver to be granted entrance into the Army. Using the whole person concept was expected to make these two terms much more related.

### **C. CONNECTING CONDUCT WAIVERS WITH ATTRITION REASONS**

Earlier, it was observed that soldiers enlisting with a drug waiver were far more likely to separate before completing their first term, compared to other recruits with different kinds of conduct waivers. Two hypotheses were presented: (1) those with drug-waivers may be more likely to re-offend, and separate due to this, or (2) those with drug waivers may be inherently different in non-observable characteristics, which make them more likely to use drugs and also attrite before the end of the first term. Here I investigate these hypotheses further. Table 14 displays the numbers of soldiers who entered the Army with a conduct waiver for drugs or alcohol. This number is compared with the numbers of soldiers who received a discharge that was issued for a drug- or alcohol-related reason. Out of the entire sample of recruits who were discharged for alcoholism or drugs, 6.84% had enlisted with a drug waiver. This small number suggests that there may be little connection between the type of conduct waiver a soldier receives upon entrance and the reason why he/she attrites. This evidence grants more credibility to the second hypothesis above, namely that other intrinsic characteristics of certain soldiers make them more likely to both abuse drugs and alcohol and also attrite before completing their obligation.

Table 14. Substance Abuse Waivers and Substance Abuse Attrition.

<b>Total Attrition</b>	<b>Substance Attrition</b>	<b>% of total</b>
128315	8567	6.68%
<b>Substance Attrition</b>	<b>Substance waiver and Substance Attrition</b>	<b>% of total</b>
8567	586	6.84%
<b>Total Attrition</b>	<b>Substance waiver and Substance Attrition</b>	<b>% of total</b>
128315	586	0.46%

To further investigate these issues, I estimate multivariate models of substance attrition as a function of all observed control variables and the conduct waiver categories. The new dependent variable - Substance Attrition - takes a value of one if a soldier separates with a discharge coded as Alcoholism or Drugs, and set = 0 otherwise. Table 15 displays the results of the probit regression model along with the partial effects in square brackets. The results suggest that recruits that come in with a drug waiver are twice as likely to attrite for substance use than non-waiver recruits. While the marginal effect is large, the absolute magnitude is relatively small, since only 6.68% of all attrition discharges were for drug/alcohol problems. Of all the conduct waiver subgroups drug/alcohol waivers had the largest effect on predicting a substance type attrition loss. Soldiers with drug waivers had a 200% higher probability of undergoing substance attrition than comparable individuals with no waivers. Interestingly, the significance of the other conduct waiver subgroups may indicate that recruits enlisting with other types of conduct waivers are more likely to offend, and not necessarily for the same reasons that they received their initial conduct waiver. These higher probabilities aid the argument that recruits with waivers may possess prior behavioral problems. These behavior problems result in a conduct waiver for enlistment and those same soldiers engaging in morally questionable behavior later on.

Table 15. Probit Analysis of Abuse Waivers and Substance Abuse Attrition.

Waiver Type	Substance Attrition
Drug	0.69159
Waiver	(0.03076)*** [0.12631]
Minor Traffic	-0.09249
Waiver	(0.33401) [-0.00968]
Serious Traffic	0.40033
Waiver	(0.07171)*** [0.06102]
Minor Non-Traffic	0.10207
Waiver	(0.10274) [0.01246]
Serious Non-Traffic	0.40259
Waiver	(0.02425)*** [0.06008]
Felony	0.40332
	(0.04203)*** [0.06128]
Medical	-0.07928
Waiver	(0.02905)*** [-0.00845]
Other	-0.20311
Waiver	(0.06855)*** [-0.01954]
Observed P(attrite)	0.0672753
Predicted P(attrite)	0.0559317
Observations	105269

Notes: Model includes controls for demographics, ability, and cohort years. Standard errors appear in parentheses. Partial effects appear in square brackets.

\*\*\*significant at the 1%; \*\* significant at the 5%; \*significant at the 10%.

Although these numbers reflect what is known about each individual, there are believed to be problems with our ability to accurately reflect the true relationship between these two variables. These inaccuracies rise from problems of reporting at both recruitment and discharge. First, the severity of the drug or alcohol offenses that generated the conduct waiver is not disclosed. Minor substance offenses are lumped in with true problems with addiction. Also, some offenses like driving under the influence are recorded as traffic waivers and may result in

measurement error. On the tail end is the discharge code. It is possible that some soldiers who commit drug and alcohol offenses and are discharged may not be given an Alcoholism or Drugs separation code. These soldiers can receive misconduct or other types of discharges. The classification of each discharge is determined by the command involved with the soldier and highly subject to the circumstances of the infraction. These problems obscure the relationships between conduct waivers and types of discharges. The magnitude of both the waiver classification, and more critically, the nature of discharge problems are not known. So at this time, with the data available, there can not be a true causal relationship determined between the type of conduct waiver and the type of attrition discharge.

#### **D. SURVIVAL ANALYSIS RESULTS**

The regression results discussed earlier indicate that attrition rates of recruits with moral conduct waivers depend crucially on the time at which attrition is measured. To provide a more complete picture of attrition rates over time, I conduct a survival analysis of attrition. Survival analysis models the time to event data; in this context, attrition is considered to be the event of interest. The survival analysis model also assumes that attrition occurs just once for each subject in the sample. This event modeling could be considered as the rate or time to which new enlisted soldiers progress or attrite in their first contract. In this case, the 'event' of interest would be the soldier not completing the first under circumstances considered as attrition.

Survival analysis in this study will answer questions such as: what is the percentage of the population that will survive past entry to the Army? Of those that survive, at what rate will they attrite? Do soldiers who enlist with a conduct waiver have higher or lower odds of survival, and how do these odds vary over the life of the first contract? Does the failure or attrition rate remain constant and how do those rates compare with soldiers who have no waivers?

Figure 2 is the graphical depiction of the survival analysis for the lifespan of the soldiers in the sample population. This table shows the percentage of soldiers remaining as time progresses through the first contract. This percentage is calculated by the number of soldiers lost to attrition over the total number of soldiers in the sample. Both conduct waived and non-waivered groups are displayed by separate trace lines on the graph. Conduct waiver recruits are

represented in red and non-waivered recruits are shown in blue. Both lines show soldiers dropping out of the sample, due to attrition, over time. These lines represent the attrition percentage at that particular day for the two groups.




Figure 2. Survival Analysis of Moral Conduct Waiver and Non-Moral Conduct Waivered Recruits.

Looking at the two lines two major trends can be identified. First there is a distinct difference in the attrition percentages up to and at the one year point. At the one year point slightly less conduct waiver recruits had undergone attrition compared to non-conduct waived recruits. This difference shows that at the one year point soldiers with conduct waivers have been actually performing better during the years studied than their non-waivered counterparts. This would indicate that conduct waivers actually predict better odds of completing the first year of enlistment. This effect may be from conduct waiver recruits possessing characteristics that help them endure the rigors of initial training and change in lifestyle. Under the close

supervision of the first year of military service, conduct waived soldiers tend to be well suited for military life. Understanding this phenomenon and capitalizing on the reasons of success could lead to large scale savings that replacing those soldiers would normally cost.

The second trend noticed in the Figure 2 is that over the lifespan, or full term of contract, soldiers without conduct waivers reverse the early attrition behavior and begin to attrite at a rate that soon out paces the conduct waived soldiers. This reversal is also seen as a change in sign of the conduct waiver variable in the coefficient in the different regression analysis of this study. At the end of the 3 and 4 year marks conduct waiver attrition has risen to pass non-conduct waiver attrition by roughly 4 percentage points. Table 5 gives specific information for each year groups individual differences in attrition percentages for the 180 day, 365 day, and contract complete measurements, that Figure 2 attractively displays.



## **V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **A. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS**

It was hypothesized in this study that historical attrition rates and models for individuals with conduct waivers no longer fit what is happening with soldiers who entered the Army with a conduct waiver in the GWOT era. It was found that the difference in attrition rates between those with conduct waivers and those without currently stands at around 4 percentage points (or 12.5%) for soldiers in their first term of enlistment. This difference is dwarfed by previous studies that stated much larger percentage differences (Flyer 1996, Frabutt 1996, and Connor 1997). This much lower figure is in contrast to recent public opinion that objects to the increased use of conduct waivers. The analysis showed that soldiers with conduct waivers actually have lower early attrition; for example, 180-day attrition was 2 percentage points lower (a 20% difference) and 365-day attrition was 2 percentage points lower (a 11% difference) for those with a conduct waiver.

Probit model analysis was used to determine the predicted probability of attrition at the 180-day, 365-day and at the end of the first term. This model included variables that have in the past been proven to be predictors of attrition and that make sense in the current climate. These models allowed for the determination of predicted probabilities of attrition. These probabilities reinforced the the same trend of conduct waiver soldiers having lower attrition up through the 365-day point and then experiencing slightly worse attrition rates through the end of the first term of enlistment.

Conduct waivers were next broken down into six sub-categories and the same probit regression models were run using these variables in place of the more general conduct waiver variable. The Serious Traffic and Minor Non-Traffic conduct waivers both showed consistent results of improving attrition for early and late attrition. Serious Non-Traffic and Felony waivers make up the largest conduct waiver sub-group and are the driving force behind the overall conduct waiver attrition effects. These two sub groups both experience lower attrition than the

non-conduct waiver group in the short run and then their attrition rates fall below the non-waivered group sometime after the one- year point.

There is little correlation between conduct waivers and the reasons for attrition. The probit analysis indicated a 12.6% higher probability of substance attrition for those who came in under a substance type conduct waiver, than those with no waivers. With the available data it is not possible to understand the true relationship between the types of conduct waivers issued and the nature of the attrition discharge a soldier receives. Problems with both conduct waiver coding and categorization of discharges are believed to exist and make determinations of the correlation between waivers and reasons for attrition difficult to accurately measure.

Survival analysis results mirror those found in the probit multivariate models. The attrition rates of conduct-waivered soldiers are slightly better than those without conduct waivers through the first year of service. Soon after the first year these rates fall off and are soon below that of non-waivered soldiers. By the end of the first contract the same 4 percentage point difference in attrition rates is noticed. The survival analysis gives a graphical view of what is happening in terms of attrition over the lifespan of the initial contract.

## **B. RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **1. General**

The increase in the number of conduct waivers noticed over the years studied in this thesis should not be as troubling as indicated by the media and some policy makers. This increase in the raw number of conduct waivers has been shown in this study to be at least partly due to an increase in overall recruitment numbers. The use of conduct waivers was shown to be mitigated by such factors as higher AFQT scores as well as the whole person approach to assigning conduct waivers.

Finding out why soldiers short of their first year of service have better attrition rates could be key to aiding in the retention of these type soldiers and to reducing the costs of attrition. There seems to be some time effect that these first term soldiers are experiencing in their lives that changes their chances of attrition. It is recommended that future studies focus on identifying

reasons why these soldiers attrite and if measures can be instituted to mitigate early losses. Improvements in matching types of conduct waivers to true reasons for attrition discharges would help provide these answers.

## **2. Moral Conduct Waiver Visibility**

As seen in Chapter IV with both the regression results, as well as with the survival analysis, once conduct-waivered soldiers pass the one year point their attrition rates begin to worsen and quickly surpass those of their non-waivered counterparts. I believe this is happening because the soldiers are slowly being released from the controlled environment of basic training and specialty training. As soldiers are granted more responsibility for their own actions, and no longer are under the watchful eye of the drill instructors, they seem to have the maneuverability to allow their past morally questionable lifestyles to once again affect their decision making. This in turn allows them to make errors of judgment that causes their attrition. I suggest assigning these soldiers some sort of first term marker. This indicator would give leaders better visibility and garner an extra amount of attention and supervision to help insure conduct waiver soldiers complete their first term. This conduct tag would allow leaders to have a better understanding of which soldiers need to be monitored somewhat more closely. This tag could be used in creating barracks room assignments and assignment of battle buddies. This may also carry an added benefit of decreasing overall attrition rates by aiding to keep any conduct waiver soldiers from including additional soldiers' in future morally questionable activities that might cause their attrition. This tag or marker would have to be designed in such a way as to ensure it did not draw a negative connotation to the soldier but rather alert leaders that additional supervision may be needed.

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**APPENDIX A. INTERSERVICE SEPARATION CODES AND  
ATTRITION DETERMINATION**

<b>Sep Code</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Determined to be attrition</b>
1000	Unknown or not applicable	Yes
1001	Expiration of term of service	No
1002	Early release, insufficient retainability	Yes
1003	Early release, to attend school	No
1005	Early release, in the national interest	No
1008	Early release, other, including RIF, VSI, and SSB	No
1010	Condition existing prior to service	Yes
1011	Disability, severance pay	Yes
1012	Permanent disability retirement	Yes
1013	Temporary disability retirement	Yes
1014	Disability, no condtn existng prior to srvc, no sev pay	Yes
1016	Unqualified for active duty, other	Yes
1017	Failure to meet weight or body fat standards	Yes
1022	Dependency or hardship	Yes
1030	Death, battle casualty	No
1031	Death, non-battle, disease	No
1032	Death, non-battle, other	No
1050	Retirement, 20 to 30 years of service	No
1052	Retirement, other	No
1060	Character or behavior disorder	Yes
1064	Alcoholism	Yes
1065	Discreditable incidents, civilian or military	Yes
1067	Drugs	Yes
1071	Civil court conviction	Yes
1072	Security	Yes
1073	Court-martial	Yes
1074	Fraudulent entry	Yes
1075	AWOL or desertion	Yes
1076	Homosexuality	Yes
1077	Sexual perversion	Yes
1078	Good of the service (discharge in lieu of court-martial)	Yes
1080	Misconduct, reason unknown	Yes
1082	Unsuitability, reason unknown	Yes
1083	Pattern of minor disciplinary infractions	Yes
1084	Commission of a serious offense	Yes
1085	Failure to meet minimum qualifications for retention	Yes
1086	Unsatisfactory performance	Yes
1087	Entry level performance and conduct	Yes
1090	Secretarial authority	Yes

<b>Sep Code</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Determined to be attrition</b>
<b>1091</b>	Erroneous enlistment or induction	<b>Yes</b>
<b>1092</b>	Sole surviving family member	<b>Yes</b>
<b>1094</b>	Pregnancy	<b>Yes</b>
<b>1095</b>	Minority (underage)	<b>Yes</b>
<b>1096</b>	Conscientious objector	<b>Yes</b>
<b>1097</b>	Parenthood	<b>Yes</b>
<b>1098</b>	Breach of contract	<b>Yes</b>
<b>1099</b>	Other	<b>Yes</b>
<b>1100</b>	Immediate reenlistment	<b>No</b>
<b>1101</b>	Dropped from strength, desertion	<b>Yes</b>
<b>1102</b>	Dropped from strength, imprisonment	<b>Yes</b>
<b>1105</b>	Dropped from strength, other	<b>Yes</b>

## APPENDIX B. ENLISTMENT WAIVER CODES

CODE	DESCRIPTION	WAIVER TYPE
AYA	AGE MAXIMUM EXCEEDED FOR ENLISTMENT PURPOSES WAIVER GRANTED BY THE HIGHEST AUTHORITY LEVEL.	Other Waiver
AYB	AGE MAXIMUM EXCEEDED FOR ENLISTMENT PURPOSES WAIVER GRANTED BY THE RECRUITING COMMAND HEADQUARTERS LEVEL.	Other Waiver
AYC	AGE MAXIMUM EXCEEDED FOR ENLISTMENT PURPOSES WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. MARINE CORPS COMMAND LEVEL.	Other Waiver
AYD	AGE MAXIMUM EXCEEDED FOR ENLISTMENT PURPOSES WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. ARMY BRIGADE, U.S. MARINE CORPS DISTRICT, U.S. NAVY AREA, OR U.S. AIR FORCE GROUP LEVEL.	Other Waiver
AYE	AGE MAXIMUM EXCEEDED FOR ENLISTMENT PURPOSES WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. ARMY BATTALION, U.S. NAVY DISTRICT, U.S. AIR FORCE SQUADRON LEVEL, OR U.S. MARINE CORPS RECRUITING STATION.	Other Waiver
AYF	AGE MAXIMUM EXCEEDED FOR ENLISTMENT PURPOSES WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. COAST GUARD RECRUITING CENTER.	Other Waiver
BAA	DEPENDENCY OF A MILITARY SPOUSE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE HIGHEST AUTHORITY LEVEL.	Other Waiver
BAB	DEPENDENCY OF A MILITARY SPOUSE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE RECRUITING COMMAND HEADQUARTERS LEVEL.	Other Waiver
BAC	DEPENDENCY OF A MILITARY SPOUSE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. MARINE CORPS REGIONAL COMMAND LEVEL.	Other Waiver
BAD	DEPENDENCY OF A MILITARY SPOUSE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. ARMY BRIGADE, U.S. MARINE CORPS DISTRICT, U.S. NAVY AREA, OR U.S. AIR FORCE GROUP LEVEL.	Other Waiver
BAE	DEPENDENCY OF A MILITARY SPOUSE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. ARMY BATTALION, U.S. NAVY DISTRICT, U.S. AIR FORCE SQUADRON LEVEL, OR U.S. MARINE CORPS RECRUITING STATION.	Other Waiver
BAF	DEPENDENCY OF A MILITARY SPOUSE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. COAST GUARD RECRUITING CENTER.	Other Waiver
BBA	DEPENDENCY DUE TO NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS WAIVER GRANTED BY THE HIGHEST AUTHORITY LEVEL.	Other Waiver
BBB	DEPENDENCY DUE TO NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS WAIVER GRANTED BY THE RECRUITING COMMAND HEADQUARTERS LEVEL.	Other Waiver
BBC	DEPENDENCY DUE TO NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. MARINE CORPS REGIONAL COMMAND LEVEL.	Other Waiver
BBD	DEPENDENCY DUE TO NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. ARMY BRIGADE, U.S. MARINE CORPS DISTRICT, U.S. NAVY AREA, OR U.S. AIR FORCE GROUP LEVEL.	Other Waiver

<b>CODE</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>	<b>WAIVER TYPE</b>
BBE	DEPENDENCY DUE TO NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. ARMY BATTALION, U.S. NAVY DISTRICT, U.S. AIR FORCE SQUADRON LEVEL, OR U.S. MARINE CORPS RECRUITING STATION.	Other Waiver
BBF	DEPENDENCY DUE TO NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. COAST GUARD RECRUITING CENTER.	Other Waiver
CYA	MENTAL QUALIFICATION—MEETS ASVAB TESTING REQUIREMENTS (AFQT & SUB TEST) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE HIGHEST AUTHORITY LEVEL.	Medical Waiver
CYB	MENTAL QUALIFICATION—MEETS ASVAB TESTING REQUIREMENTS (AFQT & SUB TEST) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE RECRUITING COMMAND HEADQUARTERS LEVEL.	Medical Waiver
CYC	MENTAL QUALIFICATION—MEETS ASVAB TESTING REQUIREMENTS (AFQT & SUB TEST) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. MARINE CORPS REGIONAL COMMAND LEVEL.	Medical Waiver
CYD	MENTAL QUALIFICATION—MEETS ASVAB TESTING REQUIREMENTS (AFQT & SUB TEST) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. ARMY BRIGADE, U.S. MARINE CORPS DISTRICT, U.S. NAVY AREA, OR U.S. AIR FORCE GROUP LEVEL.	Medical Waiver
CYE	MENTAL QUALIFICATION—MEETS ASVAB TESTING REQUIREMENTS (AFQT & SUB TEST) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. ARMY BATTALION, U.S. NAVY DISTRICT, U.S. MARINE CORPS RECRUITING STATION, OR U.S. AIR FORCE SQUADRON LEVEL.	Medical Waiver
CYF	MENTAL QUALIFICATION—MEETS ASVAB TESTING REQUIREMENTS (AFQT & SUB TEST) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. COAST GUARD RECRUITING CENTER.	Medical Waiver
DAA	LAW VIOLATIONS OF ADJUDICATED MINOR TRAFFIC OFFENSE(S) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE HIGHEST AUTHORITY LEVEL.	MT Moral Waiver
DAB	LAW VIOLATIONS OF ADJUDICATED MINOR TRAFFIC OFFENSE(S) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE RECRUITING COMMAND HEADQUARTERS LEVEL.	MT Moral Waiver
DAC	LAW VIOLATIONS OF ADJUDICATED MINOR TRAFFIC OFFENSE(S) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. MARINE CORPS REGIONAL COMMAND LEVEL.	MT Moral Waiver
DAD	LAW VIOLATIONS OF ADJUDICATED MINOR TRAFFIC OFFENSE(S) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. ARMY BRIGADE, U.S. MARINE CORPS DISTRICT, U.S. NAVY AREA OR U.S. AIR FORCE GROUP LEVEL.	MT Moral Waiver
DAE	LAW VIOLATIONS OF ADJUDICATED MINOR TRAFFIC OFFENSE(S) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. ARMY BATTALION, U.S. NAVY DISTRICT, U.S. MARINE CORPS RECRUITING STATION, OR U.S. AIR FORCE SQUADRON LEVEL.	MT Moral Waiver
DAF	LAW VIOLATIONS OF ADJUDICATED MINOR TRAFFIC OFFENSE(S) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. COAST GUARD RECRUITING CENTER.	MT Moral Waiver
DBA	LAW VIOLATIONS OF ADJUDICATED SERIOUS TRAFFIC OFFENSE(S) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE HIGHEST AUTHORITY LEVEL.	ST Moral Waiver
DBB	LAW VIOLATIONS OF ADJUDICATED SERIOUS TRAFFIC OFFENSE(S) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE RECRUITING COMMAND HEADQUARTERS LEVEL.	ST Moral Waiver



<b>CODE</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>	<b>WAIVER TYPE</b>
DBC	LAW VIOLATIONS OF ADJUDICATED SERIOUS TRAFFIC OFFENSE(S) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. MARINE CORPS REGIONAL COMMAND LEVEL.	ST Moral Waiver
DBD	LAW VIOLATIONS OF ADJUDICATED SERIOUS TRAFFIC OFFENSE(S) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. ARMY BRIGADE, U.S. MARINE CORPS DISTRICT, U.S. NAVY AREA, OR U.S. AIR FORCE GROUP LEVEL.	ST Moral Waiver
DBE	LAW VIOLATIONS OF ADJUDICATED SERIOUS TRAFFIC OFFENSE(S) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. ARMY BATTALION, U.S. NAVY DISTRICT, U.S. MARINE CORPS RECRUITING STATION, OR U.S. AIR FORCE SQUADRON LEVEL.	ST Moral Waiver
DBF	LAW VIOLATIONS OF ADJUDICATED SERIOUS TRAFFIC OFFENSE(S) WAIVER GRANTED BY U.S. COAST GUARD RECRUITING CENTER.	ST Moral Waiver
DCA	LAW VIOLATIONS OF ADJUDICATED MINOR NON-TRAFFIC OFFENSE(S) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE HIGHEST AUTHORITY LEVEL.	MNT Moral Waiver
DCB	LAW VIOLATIONS OF ADJUDICATED MINOR NON-TRAFFIC OFFENSE(S) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE RECRUITING COMMAND HEADQUARTERS LEVEL.	MNT Moral Waiver
DCC	LAW VIOLATIONS OF ADJUDICATED MINOR NON-TRAFFIC OFFENSE(S) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. MARINE CORPS REGIONAL COMMAND LEVEL.	MNT Moral Waiver
DCD	LAW VIOLATIONS OF ADJUDICATED MINOR NON-TRAFFIC OFFENSE(S) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. ARMY BRIGADE, U.S. MARINE CORPS DISTRICT, U.S. NAVY AREA, OR U.S. AIR FORCE GROUP LEVEL.	MNT Moral Waiver
DCE	LAW VIOLATIONS OF ADJUDICATED MINOR NON-TRAFFIC OFFENSE(S) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. ARMY BATTALION, U.S. NAVY DISTRICT, U.S. MARINE CORPS RECRUITING STATION, OR U.S. AIR FORCE SQUADRON LEVEL.	MNT Moral Waiver
DCF	LAW VIOLATIONS OF ADJUDICATED MINOR NON-TRAFFIC OFFENSE(S) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. COAST GUARD RECRUITING CENTER.	MNT Moral Waiver
DDA	LAW VIOLATIONS OF ADJUDICATED SERIOUS NON-TRAFFIC OFFENSE(S) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE HIGHEST AUTHORITY LEVEL.	SNT Moral Waiver
ddb	LAW VIOLATIONS OF ADJUDICATED SERIOUS NON-TRAFFIC OFFENSE(S) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE RECRUITING COMMAND HEADQUARTERS LEVEL.	SNT Moral Waiver
DDC	LAW VIOLATIONS OF ADJUDICATED SERIOUS NON-TRAFFIC OFFENSE(S) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. MARINE CORPS REGIONAL COMMAND LEVEL.	SNT Moral Waiver
DDD	LAW VIOLATIONS OF ADJUDICATED SERIOUS NON-TRAFFIC OFFENSE(S) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. ARMY BRIGADE, U.S. MARINE CORPS DISTRICT, U.S. NAVY AREA, OR U.S. AIR FORCE GROUP LEVEL.	SNT Moral Waiver
DDE	LAW VIOLATIONS OF ADJUDICATED SERIOUS NON-TRAFFIC OFFENSE(S) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. ARMY BATTALION, U.S. NAVY DISTRICT, U.S. MARINE CORPS RECRUITING STATION, OR U.S. AIR FORCE SQUADRON LEVEL.	SNT Moral Waiver

<b>CODE</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>	<b>WAIVER TYPE</b>
DDF	LAW VIOLATIONS OF ADJUDICATED SERIOUS NON-TRAFFIC OFFENSE(S) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. COAST GUARD RECRUITING CENTER.	SNT Moral Waiver
DEA	LAW VIOLATIONS OF ADJUDICATED FELONY OFFENSE(S) AS AN ADULT WAIVER GRANTED BY THE HIGHEST AUTHORITY LEVEL.	FEL Moral Waiver
DEB	LAW VIOLATIONS OF ADJUDICATED FELONY OFFENSE(S) AS AN ADULT WAIVER GRANTED BY THE RECRUITING COMMAND HEADQUARTERS LEVEL.	FEL Moral Waiver
DEC	LAW VIOLATIONS OF ADJUDICATED FELONY OFFENSE(S) AS AN ADULT WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. MARINE CORPS REGIONAL COMMAND LEVEL.	FEL Moral Waiver
DED	LAW VIOLATIONS OF ADJUDICATED FELONY OFFENSE(S) AS AN ADULT WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. ARMY BRIGADE, U.S. MARINE CORPS DISTRICT, U.S. NAVY AREA, OR U.S. AIR FORCE GROUP LEVEL.	FEL Moral Waiver
DEE	LAW VIOLATIONS OF ADJUDICATED FELONY OFFENSE(S) AS AN ADULT WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. ARMY BATTALION, U.S. NAVY DISTRICT, U.S. MARINE CORPS RECRUITING STATION, OR U.S. AIR FORCE SQUADRON LEVEL.	FEL Moral Waiver
DEF	LAW VIOLATIONS OF ADJUDICATED FELONY OFFENSE(S) AS AN ADULT WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. COAST GUARD RECRUITING CENTER.	FEL Moral Waiver
DFA	LAW VIOLATIONS OF ADJUDICATED FELONY OFFENSE(S) AS A JUVENILE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE HIGHEST AUTHORITY LEVEL.	FEL Moral Waiver
DFB	LAW VIOLATIONS OF ADJUDICATED FELONY OFFENSE(S) AS A JUVENILE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE RECRUITING COMMAND HEADQUARTERS LEVEL.	FEL Moral Waiver
DFC	LAW VIOLATIONS OF ADJUDICATED FELONY OFFENSE(S) AS A JUVENILE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. MARINE CORPS REGIONAL COMMAND LEVEL.	FEL Moral Waiver
DFD	LAW VIOLATIONS OF ADJUDICATED FELONY OFFENSE(S) AS A JUVENILE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. ARMY BRIGADE, U.S. MARINE CORPS DISTRICT, U.S. NAVY AREA, OR U.S. AIR FORCE GROUP LEVEL.	FEL Moral Waiver
DFE	LAW VIOLATIONS OF ADJUDICATED FELONY OFFENSE(S) AS A JUVENILE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. ARMY BATTALION, U.S. NAVY DISTRICT, U.S. MARINE CORPS RECRUITING STATION, OR U.S. AIR FORCE SQUADRON LEVEL.	FEL Moral Waiver
DFE	LAW VIOLATIONS OF ADJUDICATED FELONY OFFENSE(S) AS A JUVENILE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. COAST GUARD RECRUITING CENTER.	FEL Moral Waiver
EAA	PREVIOUS MILITARY SEPARATION, DOES NOT APPLY TO DELAYED ENTRY PROGRAM SEPARATION, RE-ENLISTMENT ELIGIBILITY REASON WAIVER GRANTED BY THE HIGHEST AUTHORITY LEVEL.	Other Waiver
EAB	PREVIOUS MILITARY SEPARATION, DOES NOT APPLY TO DELAYED ENTRY PROGRAM SEPARATION, RE-ENLISTMENT ELIGIBILITY REASON WAIVER GRANTED BY THE RECRUITING COMMAND HEADQUARTERS LEVEL	Other Waiver

<b>CODE</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>	<b>WAIVER TYPE</b>
EAC	PREVIOUS MILITARY SEPARATION, DOES NOT APPLY TO DELAYED ENTRY PROGRAM SEPARATION, RE-ENLISTMENT ELIGIBILITY REASON WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. MARINE CORPS REGIONAL COMMAND LEVEL.	Other Waiver
EAD	PREVIOUS MILITARY SEPARATION, DOES NOT APPLY TO DELAYED ENTRY PROGRAM SEPARATION, RE-ENLISTMENT ELIGIBILITY REASON WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. ARMY BRIGADE, U.S. MARINE CORPS DISTRICT, U.S. NAVY AREA, OR U.S. AIR FORCE GROUP LEVEL.	Other Waiver
EAE	PREVIOUS MILITARY SEPARATION, DOES NOT APPLY TO DELAYED ENTRY PROGRAM SEPARATION, RE-ENLISTMENT ELIGIBILITY REASON WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. ARMY BATTALION, U.S. NAVY DISTRICT, U.S. MARINE CORPS RECRUITING STATION, OR U.S. AIR FORCE SQUADRON LEVEL.	Other Waiver
EAF	PREVIOUS MILITARY SEPARATION, DOES NOT APPLY TO DELAYED ENTRY PROGRAM SEPARATION, RE-ENLISTMENT ELIGIBILITY REASON WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. SEPARATION, RE-ENLISTMENT ELIGIBILITY REASON WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. COAST GUARD RECRUITING CENTER.	Other Waiver
EBA	PREVIOUS MILITARY SEPARATION, DOES NOT APPLY TO DELAYED ENTRY PROGRAM SEPARATION, PAY GRADE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE HIGHEST AUTHORITY LEVEL.	Other Waiver
EBB	PREVIOUS MILITARY SEPARATION, DOES NOT APPLY TO DELAYED ENTRY PROGRAM SEPARATION, PAY GRADE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE RECRUITING COMMAND HEADQUARTERS LEVEL.	Other Waiver
EBC	PREVIOUS MILITARY SEPARATION, DOES NOT APPLY TO DELAYED ENTRY PROGRAM SEPARATION, PAY GRADE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. MARINE CORPS REGIONAL COMMAND LEVEL.	Other Waiver
EBD	PREVIOUS MILITARY SEPARATION, DOES NOT APPLY TO DELAYED ENTRY PROGRAM SEPARATION, PAY GRADE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. ARMY BRIGADE, U.S. MARINE CORPS DISTRICT, U.S. NAVY AREA, OR U.S. AIR FORCE GROUP LEVEL.	Other Waiver
EBE	PREVIOUS MILITARY SEPARATION, DOES NOT APPLY TO DELAYED ENTRY PROGRAM SEPARATION, PAY GRADE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. ARMY BATTALION, U.S. NAVY DISTRICT, U.S. MARINE CORPS RECRUITING STATION, OR U.S. AIR FORCE SQUADRON LEVEL.	Other Waiver
EBF	PREVIOUS MILITARY SEPARATION, DOES NOT APPLY TO DELAYED ENTRY PROGRAM SEPARATION, PAY GRADE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. COAST GUARD RECRUITING CENTER.	Other Waiver
ECA	PREVIOUS MILITARY SEPARATION, DOES NOT APPLY TO DELAYED ENTRY PROGRAM SEPARATION, LOST TIME WAIVER GRANTED BY THE HIGHEST AUTHORITY LEVEL.	Other Waiver
ECB	PREVIOUS MILITARY SEPARATION, DOES NOT APPLY TO DELAYED ENTRY PROGRAM SEPARATION, LOST TIME WAIVER GRANTED BY THE RECRUITING COMMAND HEADQUARTERS LEVEL.	Other Waiver
ECC	PREVIOUS MILITARY SEPARATION, DOES NOT APPLY TO DELAYED ENTRY PROGRAM SEPARATION, LOST TIME WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. MARINE CORPS REGIONAL COMMAND LEVEL.	Other Waiver

<b>CODE</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>	<b>WAIVER TYPE</b>
ECD	PREVIOUS MILITARY SEPARATION, DOES NOT APPLY TO DELAYED ENTRY PROGRAM SEPARATION, LOST TIME WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. ARMY BRIGADE, U.S. MARINE CORPS DISTRICT, U.S. NAVY AREA, OR U.S. AIR FORCE GROUP LEVEL.	Other Waiver
ECE	PREVIOUS MILITARY SEPARATION, DOES NOT APPLY TO DELAYED ENTRY PROGRAM SEPARATION, LOST TIME WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. ARMY BATTALION, U.S. NAVY DISTRICT, U.S. MARINE CORPS RECRUITING STATION, OR U.S. AIR FORCE SQUADRON LEVEL.	Other Waiver
ECF	PREVIOUS MILITARY SEPARATION, DOES NOT APPLY TO DELAYED ENTRY PROGRAM SEPARATION, LOST TIME WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. COAST GUARD RECRUITING CENTER.	Other Waiver
EDA	PREVIOUS MILITARY SEPARATION, DOES NOT APPLY TO DELAYED ENTRY PROGRAM SEPARATION, CONDITION THAT EXISTED PRIOR TO SERVICE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE HIGHEST AUTHORITY LEVEL.	Other Waiver
EDB	PREVIOUS MILITARY SEPARATION, DOES NOT APPLY TO DELAYED ENTRY PROGRAM SEPARATION, CONDITION THAT EXISTED PRIOR TO SERVICE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE RECRUITING COMMAND HEADQUARTERS LEVEL.	Other Waiver
EDC	PREVIOUS MILITARY SEPARATION, DOES NOT APPLY TO DELAYED ENTRY PROGRAM SEPARATION, CONDITION THAT EXISTED PRIOR TO SERVICE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. MARINE CORPS REGIONAL COMMAND LEVEL.	Other Waiver
EDD	PREVIOUS MILITARY SEPARATION, DOES NOT APPLY TO DELAYED ENTRY PROGRAM SEPARATION, CONDITION THAT EXISTED PRIOR TO SERVICE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. ARMY BRIGADE, U.S. MARINE CORPS DISTRICT, U.S. NAVY AREA, OR U.S. AIR FORCE GROUP LEVEL.	Other Waiver
EDE	PREVIOUS MILITARY SEPARATION, DOES NOT APPLY TO DELAYED ENTRY PROGRAM SEPARATION, CONDITION THAT EXISTED PRIOR TO SERVICE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. ARMY BATTALION, U.S. NAVY DISTRICT, U.S. MARINE CORPS RECRUITING STATION, OR U.S. AIR FORCE SQUADRON LEVEL.	Other Waiver
EDF	PREVIOUS MILITARY SEPARATION, DOES NOT APPLY TO DELAYED ENTRY PROGRAM SEPARATION, CONDITION THAT EXISTED PRIOR TO SERVICE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. COAST GUARD RECRUITING CENTER.	Other Waiver
EEA	PREVIOUS MILITARY SEPARATION, DOES NOT APPLY TO DELAYED ENTRY PROGRAM SEPARATION, SKILL REQUIREMENT WAIVER GRANTED BY THE HIGHEST AUTHORITY LEVEL.	Other Waiver
EEB	PREVIOUS MILITARY SEPARATION, DOES NOT APPLY TO DELAYED ENTRY PROGRAM SEPARATION, SKILL REQUIREMENT WAIVER GRANTED BY THE RECRUITING COMMAND HEADQUARTERS LEVEL.	Other Waiver
EEC	PREVIOUS MILITARY SEPARATION, DOES NOT APPLY TO DELAYED ENTRY PROGRAM SEPARATION, SKILL REQUIREMENT WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. MARINE CORPS REGIONAL COMMAND LEVEL.	Other Waiver
EED	PREVIOUS MILITARY SEPARATION, DOES NOT APPLY TO DELAYED ENTRY PROGRAM SEPARATION, SKILL REQUIREMENT WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. ARMY BRIGADE, U.S. MARINE CORPS DISTRICT, U.S. NAVY AREA, OR U.S. AIR FORCE GROUP LEVEL.	Other Waiver

<b>CODE</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>	<b>WAIVER TYPE</b>
EEE	PREVIOUS MILITARY SEPARATION, DOES NOT APPLY TO DELAYED ENTRY PROGRAM SEPARATION, SKILL REQUIREMENT WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. ARMY BATTALION, U.S. NAVY DISTRICT, U.S. MARINE CORPS RECRUITING STATION, OR U.S. AIR FORCE SQUADRON LEVEL.	Other Waiver
EEF	PREVIOUS MILITARY SEPARATION, DOES NOT APPLY TO DELAYED ENTRY PROGRAM SEPARATION, SKILL REQUIREMENT WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. COAST GUARD RECRUITING CENTER.	Other Waiver
FAA	DRUG INVOLVEMENT NOT CONSIDERED A LAW VIOLATION WITH ALCOHOL ABUSE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE HIGHEST AUTHORITY LEVEL.	DRUG Moral Waiver
FAB	DRUG INVOLVEMENT NOT CONSIDERED A LAW VIOLATION WITH ALCOHOL ABUSE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE RECRUITING COMMAND HEADQUARTERS LEVEL.	DRUG Moral Waiver
FAC	DRUG INVOLVEMENT NOT CONSIDERED A LAW VIOLATION WITH ALCOHOL ABUSE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. MARINE CORPS REGIONAL COMMAND LEVEL.	DRUG Moral Waiver
FAD	DRUG INVOLVEMENT NOT CONSIDERED A LAW VIOLATION WITH ALCOHOL ABUSE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. ARMY BRIGADE, U.S. MARINE CORPS DISTRICT, U.S. NAVY AREA, OR U.S. AIR FORCE GROUP LEVEL.	DRUG Moral Waiver
FAE	DRUG INVOLVEMENT NOT CONSIDERED A LAW VIOLATION WITH ALCOHOL ABUSE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. ARMY BATTALION, U.S. NAVY DISTRICT, U.S. MARINE CORPS RECRUITING STATION, OR U.S. AIR FORCE SQUADRON LEVEL.	DRUG Moral Waiver
FAF	DRUG INVOLVEMENT NOT CONSIDERED A LAW VIOLATION WITH ALCOHOL ABUSE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. COAST GUARD RECRUITING CENTER.	DRUG Moral Waiver
FBA	DRUG INVOLVEMENT NOT CONSIDERED A LAW VIOLATION WITH MARIJUANA USAGE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE HIGHEST AUTHORITY LEVEL.	DRUG Moral Waiver
FBB	DRUG INVOLVEMENT NOT CONSIDERED A LAW VIOLATION WITH MARIJUANA USAGE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE RECRUITING COMMAND HEADQUARTERS LEVEL.	DRUG Moral Waiver
FBC	DRUG INVOLVEMENT NOT CONSIDERED A LAW VIOLATION WITH MARIJUANA USAGE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. MARINE CORPS REGIONAL COMMAND LEVEL.	DRUG Moral Waiver
FBD	DRUG INVOLVEMENT NOT CONSIDERED A LAW VIOLATION WITH MARIJUANA USAGE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. ARMY BRIGADE, U.S. MARINE CORPS DISTRICT, U.S. NAVY AREA, OR U.S. AIR FORCE GROUP LEVEL.	DRUG Moral Waiver
FBE	DRUG INVOLVEMENT NOT CONSIDERED A LAW VIOLATION WITH MARIJUANA USAGE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. ARMY BATTALION, U.S. NAVY DISTRICT, U.S. MARINE CORPS RECRUITING STATION, OR U.S. AIR FORCE SQUADRON LEVEL.	DRUG Moral Waiver
FBF	DRUG INVOLVEMENT NOT CONSIDERED A LAW VIOLATION WITH MARIJUANA USAGE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. COAST GUARD RECRUITING CENTER.	DRUG Moral Waiver

<b>CODE</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>	<b>WAIVER TYPE</b>
FCA	DRUG INVOLVEMENT NOT CONSIDERED A LAW VIOLATION WITH OTHER DRUG USAGE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE HIGHEST AUTHORITY LEVEL.	DRUG Moral Waiver
FCB	DRUG INVOLVEMENT NOT CONSIDERED A LAW VIOLATION WITH OTHER DRUG USAGE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE RECRUITING COMMAND HEADQUARTERS LEVEL.	DRUG Moral Waiver
FCC	DRUG INVOLVEMENT NOT CONSIDERED A LAW VIOLATION WITH OTHER DRUG USAGE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. MARINE CORPS REGIONAL COMMAND LEVEL.	DRUG Moral Waiver
FCD	DRUG INVOLVEMENT NOT CONSIDERED A LAW VIOLATION WITH OTHER DRUG USAGE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. ARMY BRIGADE, U.S. MARINE CORPS DISTRICT, U.S. NAVY AREA, OR U.S. AIR FORCE GROUP LEVEL.	DRUG Moral Waiver
FCE	DRUG INVOLVEMENT NOT CONSIDERED A LAW VIOLATION WITH OTHER DRUG USAGE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. ARMY BATTALION, U.S. NAVY DISTRICT, U.S. MARINE CORPS RECRUITING STATION, OR U.S. AIR FORCE SQUADRON LEVEL.	DRUG Moral Waiver
FCF	DRUG INVOLVEMENT NOT CONSIDERED A LAW VIOLATION WITH OTHER DRUG USAGE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. COAST GUARD RECRUITING CENTER.	DRUG Moral Waiver
FDA	DRUG INVOLVEMENT NOT CONSIDERED A LAW VIOLATION WITH DRUG AND ALCOHOL TEST POSITIVE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE HIGHEST AUTHORITY LEVEL.	DRUG Moral Waiver
FDB	DRUG INVOLVEMENT NOT CONSIDERED A LAW VIOLATION WITH DRUG AND ALCOHOL TEST POSITIVE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE RECRUITING COMMAND HEADQUARTERS LEVEL.	DRUG Moral Waiver
FDC	DRUG INVOLVEMENT NOT CONSIDERED A LAW VIOLATION WITH DRUG AND ALCOHOL TEST POSITIVE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. MARINE CORPS REGIONAL COMMAND LEVEL.	DRUG Moral Waiver
FDD	DRUG INVOLVEMENT NOT CONSIDERED A LAW VIOLATION WITH DRUG AND ALCOHOL TEST POSITIVE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. ARMY BRIGADE, U.S. MARINE CORPS DISTRICT, U.S. NAVY AREA, OR U.S. AIR FORCE GROUP LEVEL.	DRUG Moral Waiver
FDE	DRUG INVOLVEMENT NOT CONSIDERED A LAW VIOLATION WITH DRUG AND ALCOHOL TEST POSITIVE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. ARMY BATTALION, U.S. NAVY DISTRICT, U.S. MARINE CORPS RECRUITING STATION, OR U.S. AIR FORCE SQUADRON LEVEL.	DRUG Moral Waiver
FDF	DRUG INVOLVEMENT NOT CONSIDERED A LAW VIOLATION WITH DRUG AND ALCOHOL TEST POSITIVE WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. COAST GUARD RECRUITING CENTER.	DRUG Moral Waiver
HAA	MEDICAL DISQUALIFICATION HEIGHT WAIVER BY THE HIGHEST AUTHORITY LEVEL.	MED Waiver
HAB	MEDICAL DISQUALIFICATION HEIGHT WAIVER GRANTED BY THE RECRUITING COMMAND HEADQUARTERS LEVEL.	MED Waiver
HAC	MEDICAL DISQUALIFICATION HEIGHT WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. MARINE CORPS REGIONAL COMMAND LEVEL.	MED Waiver

<b>CODE</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>	<b>WAIVER TYPE</b>
HAD	MEDICAL DISQUALIFICATION HEIGHT WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. ARMY BRIGADE, U.S. MARINE CORPS DISTRICT, U.S. NAVY AREA, OR U.S. AIR FORCE GROUP LEVEL.	MED Waiver
HAE	MEDICAL DISQUALIFICATION HEIGHT WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. ARMY BATTALION, U.S. NAVY DISTRICT, U.S. MARINE CORPS RECRUITING STATION, OR U.S. AIR FORCE SQUADRON LEVEL.	MED Waiver
HAF	MEDICAL DISQUALIFICATION HEIGHT WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. COAST GUARD RECRUITING CENTER.	MED Waiver
HBA	MEDICAL DISQUALIFICATION WEIGHT WAIVER GRANTED BY THE HIGHEST AUTHORITY LEVEL.	MED Waiver
HBB	MEDICAL DISQUALIFICATION WEIGHT WAIVER GRANTED BY THE RECRUITING COMMAND HEADQUARTERS LEVEL.	MED Waiver
HBC	MEDICAL DISQUALIFICATION WEIGHT WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. MARINE CORPS REGIONAL COMMAND LEVEL.	MED Waiver
HBD	MEDICAL DISQUALIFICATION WEIGHT WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. ARMY BRIGADE, U.S. MARINE CORPS DISTRICT, U.S. NAVY AREA, OR U.S. AIR FORCE GROUP LEVEL.	MED Waiver
HBE	MEDICAL DISQUALIFICATION WEIGHT WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. ARMY BATTALION, U.S. NAVY DISTRICT, U.S. MARINE CORPS RECRUITING STATION, OR U.S. AIR FORCE SQUADRON LEVEL.	MED Waiver
HBF	MEDICAL DISQUALIFICATION WEIGHT WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. COAST GUARD RECRUITING CENTER.	MED Waiver
HCA	MEDICAL DISQUALIFICATION DISEASE CLASSIFICATION (ICD-9) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE HIGHEST AUTHORITY LEVEL.	MED Waiver
HCB	MEDICAL DISQUALIFICATION DISEASE CLASSIFICATION (ICD-9) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE RECRUITING COMMAND HEADQUARTERS LEVEL.	MED Waiver
HCC	MEDICAL DISQUALIFICATION DISEASE CLASSIFICATION (ICD-9) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. MARINE CORPS REGIONAL COMMAND LEVEL.	MED Waiver
HCD	MEDICAL DISQUALIFICATION DISEASE CLASSIFICATION (ICD-9) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. ARMY BRIGADE, U.S. MARINE CORPS DISTRICT, U.S. NAVY AREA, OR U.S. AIR FORCE GROUP LEVEL.	MED Waiver
HCE	MEDICAL DISQUALIFICATION DISEASE CLASSIFICATION (ICD-9) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. ARMY BATTALION, U.S. NAVY DISTRICT, U.S. MARINE CORPS RECRUITING STATION, OR U.S. AIR FORCE SQUADRON LEVEL.	MED Waiver
HCF	MEDICAL DISQUALIFICATION DISEASE CLASSIFICATION (ICD-9) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. COAST GUARD RECRUITING CENTER.	MED Waiver
JYA	SOLE SURVIVING FAMILY MEMBER WAIVER GRANTED BY THE HIGHEST AUTHORITY LEVEL.	Other Waiver
JYB	SOLE SURVIVING FAMILY MEMBER WAIVER GRANTED BY THE RECRUITING COMMAND HEADQUARTERS LEVEL.	Other Waiver

<b>CODE</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>	<b>WAIVER TYPE</b>
JYC	SOLE SURVIVING FAMILY MEMBER WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. MARINE CORPS REGIONAL COMMAND LEVEL.	Other Waiver
JYD	SOLE SURVIVING FAMILY MEMBER WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. ARMY BRIGADE, U.S. MARINE CORPS DISTRICT, U.S. NAVY AREA, OR U.S. AIR FORCE GROUP LEVEL.	Other Waiver
JYE	SOLE SURVIVING FAMILY MEMBER WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. ARMY BATTALION, U.S. NAVY DISTRICT, U.S. MARINE CORPS RECRUITING STATION, OR U.S. AIR FORCE SQUADRON LEVEL.	Other Waiver
JYF	SOLE SURVIVING FAMILY MEMBER WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. COAST GUARD RECRUITING CENTER.	Other Waiver
KYA	MINIMUM EDUCATION REQUIREMENT WAIVER GRANTED BY THE HIGHEST AUTHORITY LEVEL.	Other Waiver
KYB	MINIMUM EDUCATION REQUIREMENT WAIVER GRANTED BY THE RECRUITING COMMAND HEADQUARTERS LEVEL.	Other Waiver
KYC	MINIMUM EDUCATION REQUIREMENT WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. MARINE CORPS REGIONAL COMMAND LEVEL.	Other Waiver
KYD	MINIMUM EDUCATION REQUIREMENT WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. ARMY BRIGADE, U.S. MARINE CORPS DISTRICT, U.S. NAVY AREA, OR U.S. AIR FORCE GROUP LEVEL.	Other Waiver
KYE	MINIMUM EDUCATION REQUIREMENT WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. ARMY BATTALION, U.S. NAVY DISTRICT, U.S. MARINE CORPS RECRUITING STATION, OR U.S. AIR FORCE SQUADRON LEVEL.	Other Waiver
KYF	MINIMUM EDUCATION REQUIREMENT WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. COAST GUARD RECRUITING CENTER.	Other Waiver
LYA	ALIENS WHO HAVE TRAVELED OR RESIDED IN A NATION WHOSE INTERESTS ARE INIMICAL TO THOSE OF THE UNITED STATES (ALSO APPLIES TO ALIENS WHOSE SPOUSE, PARENT, BROTHER, SISTER, OR CHILDREN CURRENTLY RESIDE IN SUCH A NATION) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE HIGHEST AUTHORITY LEVEL.	Other Waiver
LYB	ALIENS WHO HAVE TRAVELED OR RESIDED IN A NATION WHOSE INTERESTS ARE INIMICAL TO THOSE OF THE UNITED STATES (ALSO APPLIES TO ALIENS WHOSE SPOUSE, PARENT, BROTHER, SISTER, OR CHILDREN CURRENTLY RESIDE IN SUCH A NATION) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE RECRUITING COMMAND HEADQUARTERS LEVEL.	Other Waiver
LYC	ALIENS WHO HAVE TRAVELED OR RESIDED IN A NATION WHOSE INTERESTS ARE INIMICAL TO THOSE OF THE UNITED STATES (ALSO APPLIES TO ALIENS WHOSE SPOUSE, PARENT, BROTHER, SISTER, OR CHILDREN CURRENTLY RESIDE IN SUCH A NATION) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. MARINE CORPS REGIONAL COMMAND LEVEL.	Other Waiver
LYD	ALIENS WHO HAVE TRAVELED OR RESIDED IN A NATION WHOSE INTERESTS ARE INIMICAL TO THOSE OF THE UNITED STATES (ALSO APPLIES TO ALIENS WHOSE SPOUSE, PARENT, BROTHER, SISTER, OR CHILDREN CURRENTLY RESIDE IN SUCH A NATION) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. ARMY BRIGADE, U.S. MARINE CORPS DISTRICT, U.S. NAVY AREA, OR U.S. AIR FORCE GROUP LEVEL.	Other Waiver



<b>CODE</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>	<b>WAIVER TYPE</b>
LYE	ALIENS WHO HAVE TRAVELED OR RESIDED IN A NATION WHOSE INTERESTS ARE INIMICAL TO THOSE OF THE UNITED STATES (ALSO APPLIES TO ALIENS WHOSE SPOUSE, PARENT, BROTHER, SISTER, OR CHILDREN CURRENTLY RESIDE IN SUCH A NATION) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. ARMY BATTALION, U.S. NAVY DISTRICT, U.S. MARINE CORPS RECRUITING STATION, OR U.S. AIR FORCE SQUADRON LEVEL.	Other Waiver
LYF	ALIENS WHO HAVE TRAVELED OR RESIDED IN A NATION WHOSE INTERESTS ARE INIMICAL TO THOSE OF THE UNITED STATES (ALSO APPLIES TO ALIENS WHOSE SPOUSE, PARENT, BROTHER, SISTER, OR CHILDREN CURRENTLY RESIDE IN SUCH A NATION) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. COAST GUARD RECRUITING CENTER.	Other Waiver
MYA	REFUSAL OR FAILURE TO COMPLETE A LOYALTY CERTIFICATE (INCLUDES DEROGATORY INFORMATION ENTERED ON A LOYALTY CERTIFICATE) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE HIGHEST AUTHORITY LEVEL.	Other Waiver
MYB	REFUSAL OR FAILURE TO COMPLETE A LOYALTY CERTIFICATE (INCLUDES DEROGATORY INFORMATION ENTERED ON A LOYALTY CERTIFICATE) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE RECRUITING COMMAND HEADQUARTERS LEVEL.	Other Waiver
MYC	REFUSAL OR FAILURE TO COMPLETE A LOYALTY CERTIFICATE (INCLUDES DEROGATORY INFORMATION ENTERED ON A LOYALTY CERTIFICATE) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. MARINE CORPS REGIONAL COMMAND LEVEL.	Other Waiver
MYD	REFUSAL OR FAILURE TO COMPLETE A LOYALTY CERTIFICATE (INCLUDES DEROGATORY INFORMATION ENTERED ON A LOYALTY CERTIFICATE) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. ARMY BRIGADE, U.S. MARINE CORPS DISTRICT, U.S. NAVY AREA, OR U.S. AIR FORCE GROUP LEVEL.	Other Waiver
MYE	REFUSAL OR FAILURE TO COMPLETE A LOYALTY CERTIFICATE (INCLUDES DEROGATORY INFORMATION ENTERED ON A LOYALTY CERTIFICATE) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. ARMY BATTALION, U.S. NAVY DISTRICT, U.S. MARINE CORPS RECRUITING STATION, OR U.S. AIR FORCE SQUADRON LEVEL.	Other Waiver
MYF	REFUSAL OR FAILURE TO COMPLETE A LOYALTY CERTIFICATE (INCLUDES DEROGATORY INFORMATION ENTERED ON A LOYALTY CERTIFICATE) WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. COAST GUARD RECRUITING CENTER.	Other Waiver
NYA	CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR WAIVER GRANTED BY THE HIGHEST AUTHORITY LEVEL.	Other Waiver
NYB	CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR WAIVER GRANTED BY THE RECRUITING COMMAND HEADQUARTERS LEVEL.	Other Waiver
NYC	CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. MARINE CORPS REGIONAL COMMAND LEVEL.	Other Waiver
NYD	CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. ARMY BRIGADE, U.S. MARINE CORPS DISTRICT, U.S. NAVY AREA, OR U.S. AIR FORCE GROUP LEVEL.	Other Waiver

<b>CODE</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>	<b>WAIVER TYPE</b>
NYE	CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. ARMY BATTALION, U.S. NAVY DISTRICT, U.S. MARINE CORPS RECRUITING STATION, OR U.S. AIR FORCE SQUADRON LEVEL.	Other Waiver
NYF	CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR WAIVER GRANTED BY THE U.S. COAST GUARD RECRUITING CENTER.	Other Waiver
PYA	ARMY SERVICE ADMINISTRATIVE WAIVER—SERVICE UNIQUE WAIVER POLICY GRANTED AT THE HIGHEST AUTHORITY LEVEL.	Other Waiver
PYB	ARMY SERVICE ADMINISTRATIVE WAIVER—SERVICE UNIQUE WAIVER POLICY GRANTED AT THE RECRUITING HEADQUARTERS LEVEL.	Other Waiver
PYD	ARMY SERVICE ADMINISTRATIVE WAIVER—SERVICE UNIQUE WAIVER POLICY GRANTED AT THE ARMY BRIGADE LEVEL.	Other Waiver
PYE	ARMY SERVICE ADMINISTRATIVE WAIVER—SERVICE UNIQUE WAIVER POLICY GRANTED AT THE ARMY BATTALION LEVEL.	Other Waiver
QYA	AIR FORCE SERVICE ADMINISTRATIVE WAIVER—SERVICE UNIQUE WAIVER POLICY GRANTED BY THE HIGHEST AUTHORITY LEVEL.	Other Waiver
QYB	AIR FORCE SERVICE ADMINISTRATIVE WAIVER—SERVICE UNIQUE WAIVER POLICY GRANTED BY THE RECRUITING HEADQUARTERS LEVEL.	Other Waiver
QYD	AIR FORCE SERVICE ADMINISTRATIVE WAIVER—SERVICE UNIQUE WAIVER POLICY GRANTED BY THE U.S. AIR FORCE GROUP LEVEL.	Other Waiver
QYE	AIR FORCE SERVICE ADMINISTRATIVE WAIVER—SERVICE UNIQUE WAIVER POLICY GRANTED BY THE USAF SQUADRON LEVEL.	Other Waiver
RYA	NAVY SERVICE ADMINISTRATIVE WAIVER—SERVICE UNIQUE WAIVER POLICY GRANTED AT THE HIGHEST AUTHORITY LEVEL.	Other Waiver
RYB	NAVY SERVICE ADMINISTRATIVE WAIVER—SERVICE UNIQUE WAIVER POLICY GRANTED AT THE RECRUITING HEADQUARTERS LEVEL.	Other Waiver
RYD	NAVY SERVICE ADMINISTRATIVE WAIVER—SERVICE UNIQUE WAIVER POLICY GRANTED AT THE NAVY AREA LEVEL.	Other Waiver
RYE	NAVY SERVICE ADMINISTRATIVE WAIVER—SERVICE UNIQUE WAIVER POLICY GRANTED AT THE NAVY DISTRICT LEVEL.	Other Waiver
SYA	U.S. COAST GUARD SERVICE ADMINISTRATIVE WAIVER—SERVICE UNIQUE WAIVER POLICY GRANTED AT THE RECRUITING CENTER LEVEL.	Other Waiver
XYA	MARINE CORPS SERVICE ADMINISTRATIVE WAIVER—SERVICE UNIQUE WAIVER POLICY GRANTED AT THE HIGHEST AUTHORITY LEVEL.	Other Waiver
XYB	MARINE CORPS SERVICE ADMINISTRATIVE WAIVER—SERVICE UNIQUE WAIVER POLICY GRANTED AT THE RECRUITING HEADQUARTERS LEVEL.	Other Waiver
XYC	MARINE CORPS SERVICE ADMINISTRATIVE WAIVER—SERVICE UNIQUE WAIVER POLICY GRANTED AT THE REGIONAL COMMAND (USMC ONLY) LEVEL.	Other Waiver

<b>CODE</b>	<b>DESCRIPTION</b>	<b>WAIVER TYPE</b>
XYD	MARINE CORPS SERVICE ADMINISTRATIVE WAIVER—SERVICE UNIQUE WAIVER POLICY GRANTED AT THE USMC DISTRICT LEVEL.	Other Waiver
XYE	MARINE CORPS SERVICE ADMINISTRATIVE WAIVER—SERVICE UNIQUE WAIVER POLICY GRANTED AT THE USMC RECRUITING STATION LEVEL.	Other Waiver
XXB	MARINE CORPS SERVICE ADMINISTRATIVE WAIVER—USMC MEDICAL REHABILITATION PROGRAM (MREP) GRANTED AT THE RECRUITING HEADQUARTERS LEVEL.	Other Waiver
XXE	MARINE CORPS SERVICE ADMINISTRATIVE WAIVER—USMC MEDICAL REHABILITATION PROGRAM (MREP) GRANTED AT THE USMC RECRUITING STATION LEVEL.	Other Waiver
YYY	NO CONDITION CURRENTLY EXISTS REQUIRING A WAIVER; HOWEVER, THERE MAY BE ADMINISTRATIVE CONDITIONS THAT EXIST.	NO Waiver

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