

**RESISTANCE TO
ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURAL
CHANGE IN THE MILITARY—
A JFO CASE STUDY**

BY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**RESISTANCE TO ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURAL CHANGE IN THE MILITARY—
A JFO CASE STUDY**

by

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ABSTRACT

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Change is hard but senior leaders must master the task of “change management” in influencing the organization’s culture to keep their organization viable in the future. Leaders must realize that change will often be met with resistance by the organization because the organization strives to maintain consistency and stability. Also, leaders must understand the importance of organizational climate and culture when introducing change to prevent a reduction in morale and organizational effectiveness. Leaders must sell change through a persuasive communications campaign to effectively ensure change takes hold in the organization. Military leaders often have difficulty with change management. While military leaders are well educated about leadership principles, this project recommends that more education be given to all military leaders regarding climate and cultural dynamics to implement effective change management. This project will use the joint Army/Air Force Joint Fires Observer (JFO) initiative to explore the need of mastering “change” leadership in the military.

RESISTANCE TO ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURAL CHANGE IN THE MILITARY— A JFO CASE STUDY

Destiny is not a matter of chance, but of choice. It is not a thing to be waited for, but a thing to be achieved.¹

—William Jennings Bryant

A Myriad of books and articles have been written by scholars, strategic thinkers and senior military leaders on leadership and managing change over the years. These writings recommend different processes or structures to successfully manage change. However, leaders at all levels as well as followers in organizations still do not understand their critical role and responsibility in the complex task of implementing change. This project will provide insightful observations about organizations, leaders, and followers regarding their role in organizational change and how to successfully manage change. Why is this project important? Today's rapidly changing environment dictates that even established organizations must change to remain viable. However, many organizational changes are not managed effectively and create unnecessary turmoil internally and externally to the organization. This project will examine a military case study on the Joint Fires Observer (JFO), showing how the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force implemented organizational change to support a joint initiative. What motivated this case study? Two years after the signing of a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) for the creation of the JFO there are almost none deployed in combat operations in Iraq or Afghanistan performing JFO duties as their primary duty on a daily basis. In this case, a lack of understanding organizational processes could de-rail this change or make it harder to implement. To successfully implement change an organization must know the intricacies of climate and culture and stay actively engaged in facilitating such a change.

Understanding Change

Today, the term change is almost cliché. Change is difficult and requires good leadership and management to successfully implement change. It takes more than just talking about making a change; leaders must have a plan, working diligently in shaping the environment and the organization to affect a change. One would think change would be easy in a military organization as a result of the command discipline. Top military leaders can direct change, but even in a military organization if the change is not implemented effectively, it can be marginalized resulting in poor utilization of resources and reduce the organization's morale. Military leaders sometimes forget it takes both leadership *and* skillful management to effectively implement change within their organizations. Military leaders must realize that while they lead from the authority of their position, they must still provide follow-up assessments and guidance (i.e. management) to ensure change success. An example of improper change management was the uniform change directed by the Air Force Chief of Staff, General McPeak, in the early 1990s. Poor communication and management of this change resulted in numerous modifications over several years before a new uniform was established while creating discontent and lowering of morale of members in the U.S. Air Force.

In mature organizations like the military, change is required to ensure that organizations remain viable over time, adapting to the changes in the environment around them. "Managers and leaders must maintain their perspective as articulated in their vision and mission statements as they move their organization from one state of order to a future state of order."² However, organizations generally prefer stability and consistency; whereas change advocated by a senior leader may not always be well-received and senior leadership must recognize and manage this issue.

Leaders of organizations provide framework by the virtue of their vision and mission statements to foster change. But, “ultimately managers are responsible for implementing leadership’s vision and strategy—making it happen.”³ As a result, one of the essences of managerial practice is change; managers help their people and organization proceed from the present to the future along a path illuminated by the leader’s vision, the organization’s mission, and overall strategy.⁴ Often however, many executives are confused in their role in change management: are they leaders or managers? They are both depending on the function being performed, either making strategic and future decisions for the organization (leading) or implementing change (managing change). Effective managers are not necessarily good leaders and vice versa, the two roles involve totally different skill sets; however both are crucial for a successful organization.⁵ According to Ann Gilley in her book “The Manager as Change Leader,” confusion concerning a manager’s role in organizational change is prevalent, hindering successful change. Among these findings are:⁶

- One-half to two-thirds of major corporate change initiatives fail
- Less than 40 percent of change efforts produced positive change
- One-third of major change efforts make situations worse
- Only 20-50% of reengineering programs succeed
- Many companies find they must undertake moderate organizational change at least once a year, and major change every four to five years

Since change is not always well received, as previously mentioned, senior leaders must understand the challenges involved with implementing change. John Kotter’s book “Leading Change” lists a number of these challenges:⁷

- Preventing complacency
- Failing to create a sufficiently powerful guiding coalition
- Underestimating the power of vision—not understanding that sufficient vision can empower the organization to make necessary changes
- Under communicating the vision by a factor of 10 (or even 100 or even 1,000)
- Permitting obstacles to block the new vision
- Failing to create short-term wins
- Declaring victory too soon
- Neglecting to anchor changes firmly in the corporate (organization's) culture

Leaders often think change is an easy, foregone conclusion; failing to establish a sufficient sense of urgency during change implementation.⁸ Failing to create a sufficiently powerful guiding coalition occurs when senior leadership does not act as a cohesive and engaging group actively advocating, leading and managing change. It is not enough for the senior leader to simply announce change; the senior leader must be actively engaged throughout the entire change process.⁹ The organization must see both the guiding coalition (of supportive leaders) and internalize the vision. “The vision plays a key role in producing useful change by helping to direct, align, and inspire actions on the part of large numbers of people.”¹⁰ Major change is usually impossible unless the majority of people within the organization are willing to help, to the point of making short-term sacrifices. Additionally, people will not make sacrifices even when they are dissatisfied with the status quo unless they believe the benefits of change are attractive and change success is possible. Persuasive communication and message saturation is required to win the hearts and minds of the people of the organization,

because just one influential person in the organization can create obstacles and block change progress.¹¹ Even the organizational structure can be an obstacle for change implementation. These obstacles must be identified and actively defeated through whatever means available within the organization (compensation, motivation, education, etc.).¹² Next, it is imperative that leadership set short and mid-term milestones. Successfully achieving short term milestones creates perceptions of progress that help legitimize and provide momentum for successful change implementation. However many leaders and followers don't realize that major change often takes as many as five to ten years, mistakenly believing that once they observe short term progress, that change has been successful.¹³ Anchoring change requires sufficient time for ensuring future management leadership personifies the original purpose for change.¹⁴ Often, sufficient effort is not apportioned to ensure change is deeply rooted and accepted within both the organization's climate and culture. This difference between organizational climate and culture must be understood for successfully implementing long term organizational cultural change.

Organizational Climate

Lewin, Lippitt, & White first wrote about organizational climate in their 1939 book, *Patterns of Aggressive Behavior in Experimentally Created "Social Climates,"* where they introduced the relationship between leadership style and climate.¹⁵ Their construct of organizational climate spawned the publication of numerous books on this subject. However, the connection between leadership and organizational climate remained unclear until 1968 when Litwin and Stringer published *Motivation and Organizational*

Climate, defining how climate affects human motives for power, achievement, and affiliation.¹⁶

In this project, organizational climate will be defined as short-term in nature, the current pulse of the organization created by the current leadership. In short, climate is the shared perception of “the way things are around here.”¹⁷ The most important determinant of the climate is the behavior of leaders.¹⁸ “Their behavior is shaped by their perception of people, leadership and management style, skills, knowledge, and attitudes and priorities.”¹⁹ When implementing organizational change it must be addressed throughout the entire organization in hope of obtaining buy-in that ensures lasting change. Otherwise, change that does occur may be perceived as a band-aid (or temporary) change. When directing organizational change, the leaders and managers must break through the mindset barrier that may exist throughout the entire organization of “Okay we can follow this change for now, and then revert back to what we used to do when the current leadership changes again.” Lastly, leaders must recognize that different climates may exist simultaneously among various elements of the organization, and their actions at various levels of the core organization can simultaneously affect differing climates.²⁰

Today, military leaders tend to have a keener relationship with members of their organization. The day of the old drill sergeant, the brash leader barking orders and expecting them to be followed immediately, will not likely succeed in today’s military organizations. Current military leaders must create an environment that builds esprit de corps, and nurtures positive morale through which organizational cohesion, performance, dedication, and productivity are directly linked to the leader’s

organizational climate.²¹ Organizational climate must be understood by leaders to effectively navigate the organization through the maze of change that is required to stay viable in the sea of today's ever evolving globalized environments, technologies, and inventions. Often climate change is the predecessor and prerequisite to effective and successful cultural change.

Organizational Culture

Organizational culture is the set of institutional, shared and operating values, beliefs, and assumptions shared within the organization and validated over time.²² It prescribes activities; it defines the “dos and the don'ts” that govern the behavior of its members.²³ Organizational culture has been around for many years, especially in professional organizations. In 1982, Deal and Kennedy, and Peters and Waterman attributed the concept of organizational culture's importance for shaping and affecting positive change to an organization's effectiveness.²⁴ The culture concept focuses on the assumptions and values that underlie organizational policies and procedures.²⁵

According to Roger Harrison in his book entitled *Understanding Your Organization's Character*, an organization's culture:

- Defines what is of primary importance to the organization, the standards against which its successes and failures should be measured.
- Prescribes how the organization's resources are to be used, and to what ends.
- Establishes what the organization and its members can expect from each other.

- Makes some methods of controlling behavior within the organization legitimate and makes others illegitimate; that is, it defines where power lies within the organization and how it is to be used.
- Dictates the behaviors in which members should or should not engage and specifies how these are to be rewarded and punished.
- Sets the tone for how members should treat each other and how they should treat nonmembers: competitively, collaboratively, honestly, distantly, or hostilely.
- Instruct members about how to deal with the external environment: aggressively, exploitatively, responsibly, or proactively.²⁶

The culture is the bedrock of what is important to the organization. Organizational culture is the essence of organizations defining what's important and setting the standards by which to measure success.

Climate or Culture

Climate and cultural are parallel concepts that may or may not be mutually reinforcing.²⁷ Climate is more of a short-term condition directly influenced by the methods and effectiveness of the leaders within an organization. Whereas culture is a long-term, complex phenomenon that generally endures through multiple leaders.²⁸ Since culture is deeply rooted within the value system of the organization, it is very difficult for leaders to change it; they must pursue a methodical and long term engagement policy to successfully change the organization's culture.

Strategic leaders have a difficult task instituting change in an organization because often they are attempting to change the current climate with the overall goal of

creating long term cultural change. When both climate and cultural influences, are synchronized, change will occur more easily. However, adaptation to a new and aggressive change may be an up-hill battle for synchronizing both organizational climate and culture. One must be weary of trying to change the culture without laying a strong foundation fostering effective climate change. In doing so, the role of the strategic leader in both climate and culture change can not be overemphasized.

“The leader contributes to creating a positive climate when his or her behavior reflects the competence and the underlying values, beliefs, and assumptions of the organization.”²⁹ Leaders must always remember that members of their organization who are committed to the organizational culture may not accept change that contradicts the organization’s values, beliefs, and assumptions.³⁰ If you look at a unit with poor performance and/or morale, often it is result of leadership’s imposition of values or processes that are in conflict with the overall culture of the organization.

As discussed above, it is not easy to shift the direction of an organization, especially without sufficient planning. “No single leader, no matter how visionary, driven, or persuasive, can mandate change to occur” without creating negative implications unless the leader skillfully nurtures the change.³¹ One instance where a leader attempted sweeping change without laying the groundwork that negatively affected an entire organization’s culture was General Shinseki’s surprise 2001 mandate directing all U.S. Army soldiers to wear the black beret. One reason this was so divisive was because the black beret had been the head wear proudly worn by the elite U.S. Army Rangers. The Rangers subsequently adopted the tan beret, but to this day, the wear of the black beret still rests uneasy with many soldiers, illuminating the lingering

effects of brute force organizational culture change and manifested adverse effects. If maintaining high morale and a complete organizational focus on the mission is paramount, the brute force method is an example of what not to do regarding organizational culture change. In addition to lowering morale and creating tension in the U.S. Army, this swift action destroyed a long time Ranger organizational cultural artifact.

Cultural Artifacts

Many cultures develop tangible or intangible artifacts that help to symbolize and distinguish their culture. The military has a strong culture and stronger service sub-cultures that use numerous artifacts to distinguish themselves from each other. For example, the United States Army has its black beret that all members wear, different unit shoulder patches on their uniform and the word "HOOAH." People outside the culture can easily identify soldiers of the U.S. Army when mixed in with other military members just by the beret and the lingo. The U.S. Air Force has its own artifacts, especially in the fighter jet community. Many outside the military will recognize a flyer in the U.S. Air Force by the wear of the brown leather jacket, and the use of tactical callsigns like "SLAW", "Q", and "Whiskey" by fighter pilots instead of first names. These artifacts may seem silly to individuals outside the organization who might perceive these artifacts inappropriate in a professional organization, but they are seen as sacred to organization members. Organizational culture artifacts provide the enduring glue that holds an organization together and provides an anchoring point to ground the organization. Changing organizational culture to keep an organization viable for the future can be very difficult unless based on sound logic and sold through a persuasive communication campaign to its members. Any change of cultural artifacts must be well-

thought out ahead of time. Just the simple act of changing or modifying a cultural artifact that may seem benign by a strategic leader may create unintentional obstacles that block proposed change.

Culture Change

A recent technique used by many organizations to facilitate effective climate and culture change is the use of a “coach” to guide the organization through the change process.³² The organization coach is not enamored with providing one on one coaching, but rather focusing on the capabilities and relationships of leaders and management teams to ensure they are on the same sheet of music.³³ “The effective coach is part social psychologist and part organizational development expert with a sound business orientation and acute understanding of what it takes to build alignment, teamwork, and trust.”³⁴ In a military organization this coach should be a subject matter expert who understands the unit’s mission and roles, and is an effective leader capable of simultaneously focusing on mission accomplishment and organizational member welfare.

The organizational change “coach” must possess three key characteristics: credibility, trust and the “click” factor, if there is to be success making the arduous long term culture changes to an organization.³⁵ First, the coach is not part of the leadership strategy development team; but he must be able to converse with the leadership team and show them how they can successfully implement their strategies in the organization, thus the coach must be technically credible.³⁶ Secondly, the coach must be effective and highly skilled in communicating with many different groups no matter their level in the organization. To be a good communicator, the coach must possess the

skill of listening and the ability to asking probing and meaningful questions to uncover new levels of information, that provide mid-course adjustments to organizational glide-path for achieving new strategies.³⁷ A coach who can relate to members at all levels of the organization will inherently garner the trust of the organization. During change, people at all levels who feel they are heard and their input appreciated will be more likely to trust and follow the change process. Lastly, the coach needs to have the “click” factor to transcend all levels in the organization. The “click” factor is best achieved by obtaining the two aforementioned traits—credibility and trust. In short, the “click” factor means the coach is seen by all members as supporting their interests.³⁸

There are many tools to assist in formulating climate or culture change and one such tool that is discussed in this project is the contract.³⁹ Contracts are agreements among groups that provide an understanding of what actions the groups will follow. These contracts are not authoritative but they provide a foundation by which the groups can act and ensure they stay on the same sheet of music. Historically, the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Army have used Memorandum of Agreements (MOAs) to effectively integrate U.S. Air Force Battlefield Airmen into U.S. Army operations.⁴⁰ Since the U.S. Army has no direct command over the Battlefield Airmen, these MOAs have been crucial in establishing roles and responsibilities between the two services. The case study used for this project provides an example of how the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Army use contracts (JFO MOA) to facilitate cultural change.

Game-Plan for Making Culture Change

Change is difficult for the most part because people are reluctant to alter their habits. What worked in the past is good enough; in the absence of a dire threat, people

will keep doing what they've always done.⁴¹ Often change fails because the organization is not prepared for such a move. Leaders who decide to revamp or modify an organization's strategy and then "wait patiently for performance to improve—only to be bitterly disappointed because they've failed to adequately prepare organizational members for the change."⁴² Leaders in the military decide upon a new strategy or course of action, write new contracts and then expect success to be a foregone conclusion. Garvin and Roberto in their article "Change through Persuasion," may offer a solution: "to make change stick, leaders must conduct an effective persuasion campaign—one that begins weeks or months before the turnaround plan is set in concrete."⁴³

Garvin and Roberto argue leaders must embark on a four-part communications strategy. First, prior to announcing a new strategy or plan, leaders must set the stage for member acceptance by formulating a sound communication game plan that will announce and constantly inform about the proposed change.⁴⁴ Second, at the time of initial change, a framework must be present through which members can learn, interpret, and understand the goals and reasons for change.⁴⁵ Third, as time passes, leaders must monitor organizational members' perceptions of change and reinforce or adjust their message if necessary to ensure desired change actually takes hold and becomes permanent.⁴⁶ Members of an organization need to see and believe their leadership is engaged and committed to change throughout the process, while leaders need to understand the importance of achieving buy-in from the bottom-up if the change is going to take hold and endure. Cultural change is a major shift in the way an

organization operates and it takes a long time to fully nurture and achieve lasting change.

Case Study—the Creation of the Joint Fires Observer (JFO)

This case study will examine the process used to establish a new combat position, the Joint Fires Observer (JFO), which was created by an agreement between the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force to enable the use of Close Air Support (CAS) throughout the Army's battlespace. The impetus for creating this case study is to examine the actions taken by the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force to institute a major change amongst the two services that will hopefully result in a cultural change. The creation of the JFO will require both services to change the way they operate, train, and ultimately conduct combat operations. As with any major change, there has been resistance and inaction from both organizations during implementation of this change process. The case study explores the progress of the Army and Air Force implementation by comparing and contrasting Kotter's organizational change challenges, Garvin and Roberto's persuasive communications campaign, the effective use of cultural artifacts, the use of contracts, and the implementation of a cultural coach.

Historical Background

The U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) Nov 14, 2005 establishing a working contract between the two services establishing the JFO. Historically, the U.S. Army has wanted Tactical Air Control (TAC) teams attached to each company.⁴⁷ The U.S. Air Force has never been able to produce, sustain or keep proficient the number of TAC teams to make this U.S. Army desire possible. The TAC team is at the battalion level and may be deployed down to company level to provide

CAS when and where needed. The Air Liaison Officer (ALO) that works at the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) directs the TAC teams and the ALO works directly with the BCT fire support officer, S-3, and BCT commander. The ALO, JTAC, and TACCS make up what is called a Tactical Air Control Party (TACP). Currently, the U.S. Air Force has 594 Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (JTACs).⁴⁸ The U.S. Air Force plans to grow its JTACs to 1,100 by Fiscal Year 2012. The 1,100 JTACs will allow the U.S. Air Force to man the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) and battalion headquarter (HQ) elements with around the clock support as well as provide TAC teams to Companies in the “Ready/Available” status of the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) Model, which equates to about 2/3 of the companies.⁴⁹ Currently, there is a shortage of qualified and current JTACs based on the number required to man tactical units (down to company level) and their respective HQs at an appropriate level to provide 24/7 coverage. This shortage and the desire of the U.S. Army to have Air-to-Ground engagement capability down to the platoon level (i.e. eyes on target for engagement) is what motivated the creation of a 3,000 JFO force.⁵⁰ However, the RAND study “Beyond Close Air Support” views the proposed increase and requirements for maintaining currency and proficiency as an impossible task.⁵¹ They suggest manning TAC teams at battalion tactical operations centers partnered with forward observers at lower echelons, thus advocating the JFO concept.⁵²

The U.S. Army is transforming into a BCT-centric fighting force. As a result of transformation, it is estimated that a heavy brigade unit of action (BUA) today will only have 25 percent of the fire support provided to heavy brigades in 1991 during Operation DESERT STORM.⁵³ This 75 percent reduction in fire support will definitely translate to a

higher demand for fixed-wing (U.S. Air Force) and rotary-wing air-to-ground fire support. Another change since Operation DESERT STORM is the deployment of the joint direct attack munitions (JDAM) allowing virtually all U.S. Air Force fighter or bomber aircraft to perform Close Air Support (CAS) missions, beginning with the initial stages of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. B-52 and B-1 bombers struck al Qaeda and Taliban forces throughout Afghanistan often through CAS missions directed by a controller from the ground.⁵⁴ This capability has since been used frequently during combat operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan. With more U.S. Air Force platforms able to perform CAS missions and engage targets, there is an implied need for more JFO type capability. So, how have the two services performed in their endeavor to increase the number of required JFOs?

Progress in JFO Implementation

The JFO MOA stated that the JFO is a “trained Service member who can request, adjust, and control surface-to-surface fires, provide targeting information in support of Type 2 and 3 CAS terminal attack controls, and perform autonomous terminal guidance operations.”⁵⁵ In the Fall of 2005, the JFO training unit at the Army’s Field Artillery School started training JFOs. Initially, the two services did several things well: they signed the JFO MOA or contract, an important change formulation tool, stood up a training center with excellent support and expert trainers from both services, and set a high standard of training, which has never wavered. In late 2006, the failure or “wash-out” rate hit over 40% and the U.S. Army mandated that FORSCOM take over the manning of the training slots. This mid-course adjustment of making better selection

of candidates to attend the JFO course garnered success, and subsequently reduced the average “wash-out” rate to 13%.⁵⁶

However, two years after implementation of this program, there has been virtually little JFO employment in Operation Iraqi Freedom. In May 2007, there were approximately 400 trained JFOs in the Army.⁵⁷ The Multi-National Corps Iraq Effects Coordinator and his staff were able to formulate a list of about 60 JFOs in theater, of which only 10 had the required paperwork allowing them to conduct JFO duties.⁵⁸ One commander stated that he saw several JFO qualified individuals serving as personal bodyguards to commanders or operating in the TOC as fires coordinators.⁵⁹ Since some U.S. Army commanders have not seen the JFO duty as a priority, this JFO initiative is experiencing blocking obstacles described by Kotter. However, there has been some JFO utilization in Operation Enduring Freedom. One U.S. Air Force ALO stated that 48% of their CAS missions were performed in using JFOs.⁶⁰ Where is the disconnect? Why aren't more JFOs performing JFO duties in combat operations?

Military organizations are orders-directive centric, often resulting with leaders believing once orders given that the subsequent actions will automatically happen and fall into place. In the case of the JFO, the signing of the MOA and the establishment of the JFO training facility led senior leaders to be complacent—another Kotter challenge for achieving change success—failing to monitor progress after change implementation. A Persuasive and persistent communication campaign as described by Garvin and Roberto is critical for change success. Such a communication plan was never executed for the JFO initiative. Without such a campaign, there was never the appearance of a powerful guiding coalition pushing this initiative. Also there were many obstacles

blocking proper JFO utilization. A primary example previously discussed involved deployed BCTs with qualified JFOs performing other duties because of organizational perceptions that the ground threat did not require JFOs to perform their primary duties.⁶¹ As outlined by Kotter, senior leadership emphasis, or a guiding coalition; and removing blocking obstacles such as the perception that JFO duty was not a critical or full time responsibility, prevented proper utilization of the JFO. If the JFO initiative had been fully understood, and sold to military organizations from top to bottom as a combat enabler, then the legitimacy of the JFO would have been greater appreciated. The end result could have meant more qualified JFOs performing their primary duty supporting combat operations in theater.

Up to now, the JFO training facility and the Army and Air Force Observer-controllers (OC) particularly at the National Training Center (NTC), have been the coaches as described by Harkins for making the JFO initiative work. The National Training Center OCs have taken an active role to ensure JFOs are trained and prepared before they go into the engagement zone.⁶² This last minute training should have occurred back at home station between the BCTs and their aligned U.S. Air Force Air Support Operations Squadrons (ASOS). Before U.S. Army's organizational transformation efforts, the Division Fires Support Coordinator was the coach for the JFO initiative, ensuring this change was adopted and executed. However as a result of transformation, the brigade and battalion commanders must now be the coaches if this change is going to be successful.⁶³

The BCT commander must be the lead Army coach building the guiding coalition force described by Harkins. The BCT battalion commanders and the Fire Support

Operations Officers must also help the BCT coach to make the JFO initiative successful. There are many moving parts that must be synchronized to ensure the JFO change occurs, but the BCT commander is the linch-pin in the process, making this position the obvious choice as coach of the change. Some corrective measures are planned to address these issues. Starting Fiscal Year 2010, the JFO will be placed on the BCT's MTOE.⁶⁴ Two other options need consideration to ensure this change occurs. First, create a Military Operating Specialty (MOS) Code—a U.S. Army cultural artifact—that makes JFO a primary duty.⁶⁵ Second, make BCT commanders accountable for JFOs on their Unit Status Reports (USR).⁶⁶ The usage of the Army MOS is a great example of how to use an organizational cultural artifact to assist in changing an organizational culture.

The JFO initiative is a joint endeavor. The U.S. Army has the responsibility of identifying and keeping JFOs current and qualified; however, the U.S. Air Force has a key role in this process too. So far, the U.S. Air Force has provided subject matter experts at both the JFO training facility and NTC, but they must do more. There are U.S. Air Force leaders that feel the JFO is a program that must be run by the U.S. Army and the U.S. Air Force should keep a hands-off approach to their program.⁶⁷ Again, this sentiment is nothing more another example of Kotter's blocking obstacles hindering successful JFO change. ASOS commanders that are aligned with BCT commanders must also be coaches and ensure their U.S. Air Force unit is constantly engaged with the JFOs, ensuring constant training opportunities are fully maximized. One way to force this interaction is to develop a metric that measures the JTAC's training with JFOs by the ASOSs that is included in their global status of resources and training system

(GSORTS) report. This will provide senior U.S. Air Force leaders two indicators: 1) is the ASOS performing the training needed to maintain an effective JTAC/JFO team? and 2) is the U.S. Army providing the appropriate number of JFOs to be trained?

In summary, senior military leaders have directed the JFO initiative (change) by the creation of the JFO MOA. These leaders must engage in the persuasive communications campaign discussed earlier, as well as manage the change process to eliminate the challenges identified by Kotter. The foundation has been laid by senior leaders to create the JFO, but now the coaches, the BCT and ASOS commanders must lead the change by ensuring JFOs are trained and used in this role as their primary duty. Since, it's only been little over two years since the creation of the JFO; the change is still in its infancy stage. Only after the "coaches" actively engage and make the JFOs training a priority will there be enough information concerning how effective the JFO is in their air-to-ground engagement role. Officers and non-commissioned officers receive personal leadership training in their Professional Military Education programs, but little formal training on leading and managing change. Without fully understanding the complexities of leading and managing change in organizational climate and culture, the result will be the inefficient and ineffective use of the JFO as discussed in this case study.

Conclusion

Change is hard, but senior leaders must lead their organizations by always keeping a futuristic vision to determine if organizational change is necessary to remain viable. According to Kotter, there are many mistakes or challenges encountered when leaders attempt to make changes to the organization, and these challenges identified

and described in this project must be expected and prevented. Leaders must plan the change and put together persuasive communications campaign advocated by Garvin and Roberto to retain change movement momentum. Next, leaders must ensure that *all members* of the organization understand what organizational climate and culture are in order to effectively make changes in these two areas.

Changing short term organizational climate is often a prerequisite for enabling organizational culture change. For example, in the JFO case study, there was a period of time where units were not sending the proper individuals to the JFO course, instead they were sending those individuals that they could do without for a few weeks. Sending the wrong individuals resulted in a 40 % “wash-out” rate. Current leadership needed to embrace the JFO initiative and set a positive climate regarding this change and ensure the individuals attending this training were prepared, motivated and set up for success in the course. Organizational culture change will need a coach to oversee the change and ensure a persuasive communications campaign stays on track. The importance of the coach was illustrated in the JFO case study by identifying the need for BCT and ASOS commanders appointed as coaches that support change. These coaches are the driving force to ensure their organizations execute this initiative. Additionally, organization culture possesses cultural artifacts that are derived from the values and beliefs of the organization and can be tangible and intangible objects providing motivation as well as glue holding the organizational cultural together.

When executing cultural change the handling of cultural artifacts must be seriously understood and accounted for in the change process. One of the U.S. Army cultural artifacts is the MOS identifier. Additionally, once the JFO is well established in

the air-to-ground engagement role, the term JFO will become a U.S. Air Force cultural artifact since it will become part of the TACP. One way to provide legitimacy and importance to the JFO position would be to make this duty a stand-alone MOS. The case study showed that military leaders may not be fully in-tune with what is required to effectively change or modify organizational climate or cultural without performing brute force demands which lead to low morale and possibly the inability to successfully implement organizational change. Historically, military organizations often are victim of their command/directive culture because they set an initiative in place as illustrated in this case study without following through ensuring it is widely accepted. The efficiency and effectiveness of the JFO as part of the air-to-ground “kill-chain” is still unknown.⁶⁸ In theory, this concept should work effectively, but in practice it will only be validated when the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force train on a routine basis with a soldier that is performing the JFO duty as a stand-alone duty.

Recommendation

Military Leaders at all levels need better training on leading and managing change in their organizations. Additionally, all members of an organization need to understand the complexities of change management and how it affects organizational climate and cultural change. Education is the first step to help alleviate the pitfalls encountered when changing an organization’s culture. Everyone in the organization must be aware of their role and responsibility for supporting short term climate change and long-term enduring cultural change to prevent negative impact on morale and organizational effectiveness. Lastly, leaders must realize when they need to lead and when they need to manage, as well as provide a coach who ensures organizational

cultural changes is accepted and executed throughout the organization. It must be everyone's goal in the organization to provide a can-do attitude, embrace change, and not allow any blocking obstacles to change accomplishment. By performing as a team that enables change, the morale of the organization will remain high and the organization will prosper.

Endnotes

¹ R. Dale Jeffery, *The Soldier's Quote Book* (Houston, TX: DaVinci Publishing Group, 2000), 119.

² Robert M. Murphy, *Managing Strategic Change: An Executive Overview* (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, June 2003), 39.

³ Ann Gilley, *The Manager As Change Leader* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2005), 4.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 4.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 5.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 4.

⁷ John P. Kotter, *Leading Change* (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1996), 4-15.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 4.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 6.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 7.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 9.

¹² *Ibid.*, 10.

¹³ H. Leach, *The Interagency Process—Analysis and Reform Recommendations*, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 15 March 2006), 12-13.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 14.

¹⁵ Arnon Reichers and Benjamin Schneider, "Climate and Culture: An Evolution of Constructs," in *Organizational Climate and Culture*, ed. Benjamin Schneider (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, Inc, 1990), 10. Arnon Reichers and Benjamin Schneider show the history of management practices and the development of new management strategies in this book.

¹⁶ Ibid., 18.

¹⁷ Ibid., 22.

¹⁸ Stephen A. Shambach, ed., *Strategic Leadership Primer*, 2d ed., (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2004), 33.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Walter M. Craig, Jr., *Organizational Climate, A Concept Worth Consideration*, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1992), 7.

²² Shambach, 30.

²³ Lee Roy Beach, *Leadership and the Art of Change*, A Practical Guide to Organizational Transformation (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2006), 31.

²⁴ Schneider, 28.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Roger Harrison, "Understanding Your Organization's Character," *Harvard Business Review* (May-June 1972): 75-85.

²⁷ Shambach, 33.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Phil Harkins, "Getting the Organization to Click," in *The Art and Practice of Leadership Coaching*, eds., Howard Morgan, Phil Harkins, and Marshall Goldsmith, (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons Inc., 2005), 154.

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid., 156-158.

³⁶ Ibid., 156

³⁷ Ibid., 157.

³⁸ Ibid., 158.

³⁹ James Q. Wilson, *Bureaucracy* (New York, NY: Basic Books, Inc., 1989), 363.

⁴⁰ <http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=187>. "Certain ground combat capabilities are an Airman's responsibility and require unique surface operations that are integral to the application of air and space power. To meet this responsibility, the Air Force recognized the need to organize, train, and equip a force of **Battlefield Airmen** capable of delivering distinctive expertise in a ground combat environment with unequaled firepower, accuracy, responsiveness, flexibility and persistence. These Airmen include Pararescue, Combat Control, Tactical Air Control and Battlefield Weather professionals. They provide a skill set not commonly found across the Air Force and typically operate in combat zones outside the perimeter of Air Force bases."

⁴¹ David A. Garvin and Michael A. Roberto, "Change through Persuasion," in *Harvard Business Review on Managing Health Care* (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Publishing, 2007), 52.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 51.

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 52.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ Tactical Air Control (TAC) team is a two member team that is made up of one Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) and Tactical Air Control and Command Specialist (TACCS). The TACCS is commonly referred to as a ROMAD. The ROMAD, which originates from the days of World War II stands for radio operator, maintainer and driver. The term ROMAD is a cultural artifact to the TACP career field. TACP stands for tactical air control party, which consists of the Air Liaison Officer (ALO), JTAC, and TACCS. The ALO is a rated flying officer that is an expert in U.S. Air Force Airpower employment and is manned down to the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) level. His duties are to provide expert advice on how and when to use Airpower, albeit in the Close Air Support or Interdiction roles, as well as provide advice on what Airpower can do in other roles to help meet the U.S. Army ground objectives. Also, the ALO supervises and directs the JTACs and TACCs under him at the BCT and Battalion levels.

⁴⁸ Mr. Al Watkins, HQ Air Combat Command, TACP/ASOC DMT, telephone interview by author, 31 January 2008.

⁴⁹ CMSgt David Devine, USAF Airstaff, TACP/ASOC FAM, telephone interview by author, 20 March 2008.

⁵⁰ Bruce R. Pirnie, Alan Vick, Adam Grissom, Karl P. Mueller, and David T. Orlestsky *Beyond Close Air Support* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005), 160. The RAND report predicts with transformation that ground forces are likely to increasingly operate fairly autonomous as companies and platoons. Such forces will need routine access to joint fires for support and will often team with Airpower to fight, fix, and defeat enemies that have dispersed. The 3,000 JFO number came from Maj Kyle Lindsay, an instructor at the JFO training facility at

Fort Sill, OK in an email message/survey to author February 2008. Your e-mail citations need specific dates.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Ibid., 160-161.

⁵³ Ibid., 108.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 157.

⁵⁵ LTG James J. Lovelace, USA, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7; Maj Gen Norman R. Seip, USAF, HQ USAF Acting Deputy Chief of Staff, Air and Space Operations, and Rear Admiral Joseph D. Kernan, Director, Operations Support Group, "Joint Fires Observer," Memorandum of Agreement between the U.S. Army, U.S. Air Force, and U.S. Special Operations Command, Washington, D.C., 14 November 2005.

⁵⁶ Lt Col Todd "Joker" Lang, Fort Sill USAF Detachment Commander, email message/survey to author February 2008.

⁵⁷ Lt Col Roderick Dorsey, Former 3 EASOG ASOC Director, email message/survey to author February 2008.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Col Donald Tharp, former 3 EASOG/CC and current 3 ASOG/CC, email message/survey to author February 2008.

⁶⁰ Lang.

⁶¹ Lt Col Jim Sisler, former 9 EASOS/DO, email message/survey to author February 2008.

⁶² Col Rob Risberg, USA former lead U.S. Army OC at National Training Center, interview by author 12 March 2008, Carlisle Barracks, PA.

⁶³ LTC Rafael Torres, J-7 Strategic Planner, former Artillery BN Commander, interviewed by author 19 February 2008, Carlisle Barracks, PA.

⁶⁴ Maj AJ Gaston, 274 ASOS/DO, email message/survey to author February 2008.

⁶⁵ In the U.S. Army, soldiers identify what duty they perform by their MOS, often defining the duty they perform by a three digit MOS instead of stating their duty title in plain English, making the MOS a time honored cultural artifact.

⁶⁶ Col Robert Nye, former Infantry battalion commander and LTC Rafael Torres, former artillery battalion commander interviewed by the author 18 February 2008, Carlisle Barracks, PA. Some may argue that the JFO utilization issue is a training issue that should be addressed in quarterly training briefs. But, without meeting specific and ongoing training qualifications with the U.S. Air Force, the JFO is not qualified to perform their job at all, thus equivalent to a

personnel shortage. While this is a training issue, its implications are equally or more closely aligned with personnel shortages addressed in the unit status report (USR). Also, USRs are monitored by FORSCOM, already intricately involved in monitoring the JFO process. If the USR is used to monitor the JFOs, it becomes a compliance tool that prevents senior leaders from becoming complacent or indifferent to the JFO initiative.

⁶⁷ SMSgt Mark Ericson, Air combat Command A3F and current 11 EASOS superintendent MND-B, email message/survey to author February 2008.

⁶⁸ "Kill-chain" is a common U.S. Air Force term used operationally to describe all the moving parts like command and control requirements and meeting the rules of engagement that are needed for a fighter aircraft to kinetically strike a target.

